


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

*Air University
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538.

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VERSAR Announces \$2.5 Million Award for Chemical Warfare/Counterterrorism Protective Suits

SPRINGFIELD, Va., Oct. 17 /PRNewswire/ -- VERSAR INC. (Amex: [VSR](#) - [news](#)) today announced that its wholly owned subsidiary, GEOMET Technologies, Inc., has been awarded a \$2.5 million Delivery Order by the U.S. Army Materiel Command for continued production and fielding of the Self-contained Toxic Environment Protective Outfit (STEPO) System. The total contract funding is now at \$34 million.

The system will be used by the Department of Defense during response to potential incidents involving chemical or biological agents.

http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/001017/va_versar_.html

SIGA Technologies to Participate in Biological Defense Research Effort

NEW YORK, Oct. 17 /PRNewswire/ -- SIGA Technologies, Inc. (Nasdaq: [SIGA - news](#)) announced today the receipt of a \$600,000 research grant from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), to be shared with Oregon State University, to develop a drug for treating or preventing human disease caused by poxviruses due to deliberate release (i.e. biological warfare) or emergence of new pathogens from nature.

The three-year project will be carried out through a partnership between Oregon State University, which has a long history of poxvirus proteolysis research, and SIGA, which will be applying its expertise in developing proteinase inhibitors as anti-infectives.

http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/001017/ny_siga_te.html

NUCLEAR WEAPONS 'SAFE FROM RADICALS'

Pakistan says its nuclear arsenal is safe, despite claims by American officials that it could fall into the hands of Islamic radicals. Analysts yesterday joined military leader General Pervez Musharraf in rejecting the suggestions made on the US television show 60 Minutes. The show broadcast a story that said US officials believed many military officers in General Musharraf's army were sympathetic to Islamic militants and if the General tried to crack down against Islamic leaders he might be overthrown, thereby putting the country's nuclear arsenal in their hands. Analysts say the General, whose popularity is suffering because people say he has failed to improve the country since he took power a year ago, is in no position to crack down on Islamic groups. Ijaz Hussain, chairman of the International Relations Department at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, said the General needed their support. "He doesn't have a constituency so he'd like to take the soft line. He's certainly not going to provoke them," he said. On Sunday, General Musharraf appeared on 60 Minutes, one of the most widely watched programmes in America, and insisted that the weapons were "extremely secure. This is my guarantee," he said. "Never has a religious party won seats in our assemblies. Never. Pakistan is a very moderate Islamic country," he insisted. But US officials are increasingly concerned that the generals are beholden to Islamic radicals, and militant fundamentalists could end up controlling nuclear weapons, the programme said. "This is the same old stereotype," said Mansoor Jaffer, deputy secretary of information for Jamaat-i-Islami, one of Pakistan's largest religious parties. "Nuclear weapons have been used by so-called developed countries, in particular the United States. We believe they should be used for deterrence and not against humanity. We believe religious people are more responsible than so-called progressive people. Islam is a religion of peace." However, US officials don't seem convinced. Former US Central Command chief General Anthony Zinni told the programme that a scenario under which Pakistan's nuclear weapons could wind up in the hands of Islamic militants was "very possible". "My worry is that Musharraf may be the last hope. We could have fundamentalists and another fundamentalist state that looks like Iran. That could be dangerous for obvious reasons. Or, we could have complete chaos and something that looks like Afghanistan." But while US officials may think General Musharraf could be a threat to the Islamic groups, many in Pakistan feel he is simply caving in to their demands. One example often used to illustrate this point is the military regime's retreat on its proposal to make it more difficult to accuse someone of blasphemy.

Nuclear attack against India an option: Musharraf

WASHINGTON: Pakistan could use its nuclear bomb against India if its security is jeopardised, military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf told CBS. "I would never like to use it first of all. But if you ask me a direct question when would I use them ... if Pakistan's security gets jeopardised, then only one would like to think of it," Musharraf told the TV programme on Sunday.

The military ruler said he was proud of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.

Asked how secure were Pakistan's nuclear weapons, Gen. Musharraf said, "Very secure. That is my guarantee. The national command authority is in place."

According to the Federation of American Scientists, Pakistan has 25 to 35 nuclear bombs, which have the capability to target any city in India.

Gen. Anthony Zinni, retired chief of central command, told CBS that Musharraf may be America's last hope in Pakistan, and if he fails, the fundamentalists would get hold of the "Islamic bomb".

Justifying the coup, Musharraf said that "the people of Pakistan were fed up with what was going on" in the country and that he "restored confidence".

Gen. Musharraf said, "Pakistan is not a Banana republic or a failed state in the region with nuclear weapons, but a state that could end up in a nuclear war with India." (PTI)

Israelis queue for gas masks as they prepare for a violent future

By Alan Philips in Jerusalem

QUEUES formed at gas mask distribution centres in Jerusalem yesterday as wary Israelis prepared for what many fear could be a violent future.

"We have to be ready for anything that might happen," said Rafi Lieber, 41, a father of four. "Of course the Palestinians do not have gas weapons, but you never know what to expect. We are not panicking, but maybe we will see a repeat of 1991, when Saddam Hussein sent his Scuds against us."

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/?ac=003654058356588&rtmo=lnHkvPHt&atmo=rrrrrvs&pg=/et/00/10/18/wmid418.html>

Washington Times

Washington Times

October 18, 2000

Pg. 1

Hill Eyes Probe Of Gore's Deal With Russia

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

Senior congressional leaders yesterday called for hearings to investigate secret deals between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that included keeping Congress in the dark on Moscow's nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott expressed "deep concern" about a report in yesterday's editions of The Washington Times that revealed a secret 1995 deal between the vice president and the Russian leader not to reveal to Congress the details of a plan by Russia to build a reactor for Iran.

Notification was required under U.S. weapons proliferation law.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms also has begun an investigation into back-channel arrangements between Mr. Chernomyrdin and Mr. Gore, which appeared directed at avoiding sanctions for nuclear-related transfers and conventional arms sales, a senior aide said.

House leaders also are considering an investigation of Mr. Gore's behind-the-scenes diplomacy on Russia, staff aides said.

Texas Gov. George W. Bush also questioned Mr. Gore's judgment in the arrangement with Mr. Chernomyrdin, who was Russia's No. 2 leader in the early 1990s.

Bush spokeswoman Karen Hughes said yesterday that the Republican presidential nominee believes that Mr. Gore showed "incredibly bad judgment" in striking a deal in 1995 with the Russian prime minister not to tell Congress the details of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran.

"The vice president owes the American people and the Congress an explanation," she said. "It's always a concern to learn that the vice president of the United States was involved in secret agreements with a foreign country — secret

agreements that apparently allowed Russia to send weapons to Iran for almost five years with no sanctions and were designed to keep Congress in the dark."

Gore spokesman Jim Kennedy said yesterday that the vice president's discussions with Mr. Chernomyrdin "were not a secret" because Mr. Gore mentioned he was holding "private discussions" during a news conference in 1996.

As for notifying Congress, Mr. Kennedy said: "The administration has kept Congress fully informed on Iranian nuclear cooperation with Russia and any reported advice from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had no effect on our determination to keep the Congress fully informed."

Senior aides from both the House and Senate disputed the assertion and said there was no notification of the 1995 nuclear deal to build the reactor.

Classified documents obtained by The Times show that Mr. Chernomyrdin provided Mr. Gore in a Dec. 9, 1995, letter with details on Russia's deal with Iran to build a nuclear reactor. The Russian leader stated in the letter that the information could not be disclosed to "third parties, including the U.S. Congress," adding that "I am counting on your understanding."

A separate 1995 agreement, called an aide memoire and signed by Mr. Gore and Mr. Chernomyrdin, states that the United States would "take appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia" under "domestic law" for conventional arms transfers to Iran.

Rep. Christopher Cox, California Republican and chairman of a critical assessment of the Clinton administration Russia policy, said six House committees looked into the matter during their investigation but were never informed of the Russian nuclear deal.

Mr. Cox said the story in The Times reveals "a second secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement allowing not only conventional weapons but nuclear technology to go to Iran."

"There was no evidence of these recently revealed Gore-Chernomyrdin exchanges" in the investigation by the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, he added.

A third document disclosed by The Times yesterday was a letter labeled "secret" that was sent in January by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

It states that the United States used the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement to avoid applying U.S. weapons proliferation laws.

"Without the aide memoire, Russia's conventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various provisions of our laws," Mrs. Albright stated in the Jan. 13 letter.

"This is very disturbing," said Lott spokesman John Czwartacki. "It appears that this administration by the admission in Madeleine Albright's letter, allowed the Russians to evade U.S. sanctions." Senate hearings on the issue are "under active consideration," he said.

The Albright letter also drew sharp criticism from Mr. Helms, North Carolina Republican, who said it showed Mr. Gore agreed to help Russia evade U.S. law.

"The letter is a clear admission by Albright that Gore promised not to implement sanctions required by U.S. law — a charge that has been vigorously denied by the vice president's office," Helms spokesman Marc Thiessen said.

National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger stated in a television interview Sunday that one U.S. sanctions law, the 1992 Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act, did not apply to Russian weapons sales.

"Albright's letter to Ivanov shows that to be a lie," Mr. Thiessen said.

Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush's foreign policy adviser and a national security official under President Bush, backed a congressional investigation.

"I think the question really is about this series of deals and whether congressional oversight was followed," said Miss Rice, an authority on Russia. "It's troubling when you see something this secret. It's an odd way of dealing."

A senior staff member of the House International Relations Committee also stated that the Clinton administration failed to provide information contained in the Chernomyrdin letter to Mr. Gore to that committee, as required by a provision of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.

The aide said the secret deals help explain why the Clinton administration has failed to provide two reports to Congress on Russian arms sales to Iran under a proliferation law passed last year.

"The reports would have shown the Russians were violating the 1995 aide memoire," he said.

Aerospace Daily
October 18, 2000

NASA Seen Funding Russian Germ-Warfare Labs Through Lax Oversight

NASA didn't follow U.S. State Dept. guidelines for overseeing biotechnology grants to Russia and so may have inadvertently wound up funding germ warfare laboratories for purposes that to this day remain unknown to the agency, the NASA Inspector General's office reported yesterday.

The report drew a quick response from a key Republican committee chairman, who charged "NASA's lack of vigilance is unforgivable."

Reporting on a review launched after a January report in The New York Times, the NASA IG found that almost three-fourths of \$1.68 million in NASA grants intended for space biotechnology work found its way to "institutions that had been affiliated with Russia's biological warfare program." The head of the Russian Space Agency (RSA) panel named to oversee space biotechnology grants from NASA, Yuri T. Kalinin, was the director of Biopreparat, a civilian agency that conducted most of the Soviet Union's biological warfare research beginning in the 1970s and remains largely under wraps today, according to the IG report.

"Biopreparat officials deny that they are still involved with biological warfare and describe the organization as a joint-stock drug company, 51% owned by the Russian Government," the IG report stated. "However, Biopreparat is still led by its Cold War-era management and institutes affiliated with Biopreparat continue to conduct research on pathogens that were part of the Soviet biological warfare program."

Those pathogens include tularemia, encephalitis, plague, smallpox and anthrax, according to an open source survey of scientific papers published by the Biopreparat institutes conducted by the NASA IG. Five of the Biopreparat institutes - the State Research Institute for Highly Pure Biopreparations; the Institute for Immunological Engineering; the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology "Vector"; Joint Stock Company Biochimash, and the State Research Institute of Applied Microbiology - shared about \$1.08 million in NASA grants passed through Biopreparat.

That money was part of the \$400 million NASA agreed in June 1994 to spend on goods and services for the Shuttle/Mir phase of the International Space Station project, which included \$20 million for space-related research on the ground. Although the \$1.08 million was directed to individual researchers who had submitted winning proposals, "anecdotal evidence from several sources indicates that some institutes transferred little of the funds to the researchers with winning proposals.

"The veracity of this evidence is difficult to determine because the contract with the RSA did not give NASA the right to examine how the Russian institutes distributed the funds that they received," the IG report continued.

Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.), who as chair of the House Science Committee oversees NASA authorization bills, issued a statement yesterday after the IG Office posted its Oct. 13 report on its Website, noting that in August the CIA reported "Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for Iran."

"The Administration continues to look the other way when it comes to Russia's violation of nonproliferation norms," Sensenbrenner stated, citing testimony last week on the space agency's interpretation of legislation linking expenditures for Russian space hardware to its weapons exports to Iran (DAILY, Oct. 13). "This report by the NASA Inspector General confirms that taxpayer funds entrusted to NASA ended up in the hands of Russian scientists engaged in researching the development of biological weapons. NASA's lack of vigilance is unforgivable." The RSA contract was not drafted in a vacuum, the IG found, even though when the grant program was initiated most information about the Russian biological warfare program was classified. NASA sought help from the U.S. Intelligence Community, according to the IG report, and was told some of the institutes it was funding had been involved in germ warfare research. The State Dept. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs also warned NASA of the institutes' bio-war background, but neither the State Dept. nor the intelligence agencies discouraged the space agencies from continuing the contact.

Instead, the State Dept. set guidelines for working with the suspect agencies, including insisting that all NASA-funded projects at germ warfare labs include "an active Western partner" involved in decisions and "physically present for key experiment." Yet the IG found NASA continued to exercise "very little influence over which research projects in the space biotechnology discipline were selected," and funded three proposals at suspect germ warfare institutes even after receiving the State Dept. guidelines.

"Despite guidance to the contrary from the State Dept., NASA did not regularly visit and participate in research it was funding at Russian institutes that had been part of the Soviet biological warfare program," the IG report stated.

"U.S. scientists were not physically present for any key experiments or milestones in any of the Russian biotechnology research. NASA only briefly visited two institutes and no site visits were scheduled following the receipt of guidance from the State Dept."

In its report, which confirmed the broad outlines of the New York Times report on Jan. 25 and fleshed out some details, the NASA IG's office recommended that NASA "carefully" coordinate future funding of foreign researchers with the State Dept. Bureau of Nonproliferation.

"If the program funds biotechnology research in countries with known or suspected biological weapons programs, NASA should practice 'invasive collaboration,'" the IG concluded in its sole recommendation, with which NASA concurred.

-- *Frank Moring Jr.*

Nuclear waste processing plant opens in Severodvinsk

Story Filed: Wednesday, October 18, 2000 4:34 AM EST

ARKHANGELSK, October 18 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian state-owned enterprise "Zvezdochka" and the U.S. Lockheed Martin Energy Technologies company have commissioned a nuclear waste processing plant in the city of Severodvinsk, in the north of Russia.

The new facility was brought on-stream in line with an agreement "on reduction of mutual threat" signed between the governments of Russia and the United States.

It is designed to process solid and liquid nuclear waste which will be sorted, neutralized and cleared of radioactive components.

Facilities for temporary storage have already been built there, and a coastal terminal for unloading used fuel to be processed is under construction now.

The new complex is expected to reduce risks when handling nuclear waste removed from decommissioned submarines.

Korean Herald

Updated: 10/18/2000

by Shin Yong-bae Staff reporter

S. Korea, U.S. agree on extending missile range

Wrapping up five years of drawn-out negotiations, South Korea and the United States have virtually struck a deal on Seoul's bid to upgrade its missile capabilities, officials here said yesterday.

The two sides agreed to permit South Korea to develop missiles "to the extent to meet its security needs" during a new round of missile talks in Washington Monday, they said.

The accord enables South Korea not only to produce and deploy missiles with a 300 km range and 500 kg warhead, but also to develop missiles with a range of up to 500 km for research purposes.

However, Seoul and Washington stopped short of announcing a final agreement on missile development because of a difference over points on the form of the accord.

"Both sides have almost agreed on the content of our missile guidelines. But additional consultations are needed to settle the form of the agreement," said a brief statement released by the South Korean Embassy in Washington.

Government sources here said South Korea insists that the missile accord should be in the form of Seoul's "policy declaration," while the United States wants it to be a kind of "memorandum" to make the agreement more binding.

But the sources said the two sides would not hold more missile talks because they believe that the issue can be adjusted through bilateral diplomatic channels.

With both sides agreeing on the missile range, the United States is expected to support South Korea's move to join the global Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at stopping missile proliferation.

Under the MTCR, 32 member states are banned from trading in missiles with a range of over 300 km and with warheads of more than 500 kg.

South Korea had been banned from developing missiles that could travel longer than 180 km in accordance with an agreement made between Seoul and Washington in 1979.

But Seoul had hoped to build missiles at least capable of reaching any target in North Korea to counter the Communist regime's escalating missile threats. The two Koreas have been divided for half a century, with more than 2 million troops stationed along their border.

North Korea shocked the world in August 1998 by test-firing a long-range ballistic missile that flew over Japan's territory and landed into the Pacific Ocean.

The missile agreement between South Korea and the United States comes at a time of rapid thaw in inter-Korean relations, following the historic June inter-Korean summit.

But Foreign Ministry officials said it is expected that the accord will not affect the ongoing rapprochement in inter-Korean relations because the matter had been under discussion for a long time.

South Korea and the United States had been negotiating Seoul's bid to extend its missile range since 1995.

DefenseNews.com

October 19, 2000

New Center Part Of U.S. Preparations For Possible Chem/Bio Attack

By Tom Canahuate, DefenseNews.com Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — It is not a question of if, but when a chemical or biological attack occurs in the United States, said Maj. Gen. John Doesburg, commander of the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen, Md.

The American public needs to understand the threat from chemical and biological weapons, and the U.S. military must prepare for that eventuality, Doesburg told DefenseNews.com Oct. 18. Doesburg was attending the Association of the United States Army's annual convention .

Doesburg said the U.S. military has an important role in homeland defense, and "we need to have in place before an attack the right training and equipment."

When a chemical or biological attack does occur, "we need to be able to bring the resources to bear when asked by the civilian authorities."

In an effort to help better prepare local law enforcement, emergency medical crews and fire departments for such an attack, Doesburg's command has established the National Protection Center (NPC), which will take military products and transfer the technology in those products to the commercial sector, making them available for civil authorities at an affordable cost.

The NPC has signed agreements with all campuses of the University of Massachusetts, and with Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, to help in this technology transfer process. The NPC has a similar agreement with New York-based IBM to support the technology transfer at the industry level. Doesburg said the NPC is seeking to build a network of universities and companies to make specialized chemical and biological products available to local civilian agencies.

He said one example of this effort revolves around the Army's Chemical Agent Monitor system, which can detect and determine what chemical agent was used in an attack. The system costs approximately \$5,000 a unit and requires intensive maintenance and training to operate.

Doesburg said most local police agencies and fire departments cannot afford to purchase or maintain this system. The goal of the NPC, in cooperation with academia and industry, will be to develop a more cost-effective and less labor-intensive monitor system for civilian use based on military technology.

Los Angeles Times

October 19, 2000

Pg. 15

Ridding Russia Of Its Chemical Weaponry Requires U.S. Help

By Mikhail S. Gorbachev

Half a century of East-West animosity has left us with many daunting challenges: downsizing standing armies, closing military bases, cleaning up toxic and radioactive waste sites and rebuilding international bridges of trust between the United States, Russia and other nations long divided by the Cold War. Most daunting of all these Cold War legacies, however, is ridding the world of the enormous, dangerous and costly stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Just three years ago, both the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma ratified the international Chemical Weapons Convention. Today, 173 countries have signed this historic agreement, banning its signatories from researching, developing, producing, stockpiling or using these horrific weapons. It also obliges all nations, including the two major chemical weapons possessors, Russia and the U.S., to abolish their arsenals over the next decade.

Chemical weapons were last widely used in World War I, yet Russia and the U.S. continue to have large stockpiles. Most recently, chemical weapons were used in the Iran-Iraq border wars and by Japanese terrorists in the Tokyo subway. With the exception of much smaller arsenals on the Korean peninsula and in India, both of which are being destroyed, Russia and the U.S. are the only major chemical weapons superpowers remaining. The United States, to its credit, has made considerable progress toward destroying its 31,000-ton arsenal at nine major stockpile sites (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, Utah and the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific). One of the major challenges for both countries is the cost of destruction. The total U.S. cost will approach \$20 billion, far surpassing the initial cost of developing chemical weapons arsenals. Russia estimates about half that cost, \$10 billion; although Russia's arsenal is one-third larger than the American cache, its weapons are less complicated and less loaded with explosives and propellants, making disassembly and destruction a more straightforward process.

Nevertheless, Russia's economic situation today cannot bear such a large burden. Russia therefore very much needs Western support. Fortunately, the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, initiated eight years ago by Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), has committed about \$150 million to date to support construction of a facility in the steppes of Siberia to destroy 5,400 tons of Russian VX and other nerve agents.

But some members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the past two years have sought to close this program down, arguing that it would achieve less national security benefit for the United States than originally anticipated. While a compromise was reached that uses limited leftover money for the coming fiscal year, future U.S. funding is in jeopardy.

The Russian Duma also has been reluctant to fully fund this program. I have written to President Vladimir V. Putin as well as to several dozen other world leaders about this, resulting in many responses of support, including from British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Putin has assured me that Russia will increase its budgetary allocations to chemical weapons destruction this year.

I applaud Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Henry H. Shelton, who criticized the shortsightedness of the U.S. Congress and warned that these are highly desirable weapons for terrorists and rogue states and represent a serious proliferation threat. While I am sympathetic to congressional calls for increased "burdensharing" in helping Russia fulfill its obligations to abolish chemical weapons, I believe that the recent House actions are potentially harmful to U.S. national security interests. Russian chemical weapons, many small enough to fit into a backpack yet powerful enough to kill thousands, are very susceptible to theft and diversion.

It is essential that Russian chemical weapons destruction should remain a vital part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. At least a dozen other countries and the European Union have committed about \$100 million to date to the Russian program. These commitments would be threatened if the U.S., the mainstay of the international effort, withdrew its support. And the Chemical Weapons Convention itself would be threatened should Russia withdraw, possibly leading to other key arms control agreements being jeopardized.

Both Russians and Americans committed trillions of dollars to wage a decades-long Cold War. It's now time that we commit a small percentage of those sums to rid ourselves of these dangerous wartime legacies that threaten our security, public health and the environment.

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the former Soviet leader, is president of Green Cross International, an environmental organization in 26 countries whose work includes advancing the safe destruction of Cold War arsenals. The U.S. affiliate of Green Cross is Global Green USA. Web site: <http://www.globalgreen.org>.

Washington Times

October 19, 2000

Pg. 4

Senators Fear Aiding Chinese Military

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The Senate has identified 50 Chinese weapons firms that are eligible to buy advanced U.S. computers under new Clinton administration rules easing controls on overseas high-technology sales.

All the Chinese companies are involved in developing advanced conventional weapons or nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, according to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican.

Mr. Helms and Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin Democrat, listed the companies in an Oct. 6 letter to President Clinton asking that they be included on a government list of high-risk buyers. The letter also is intended as a warning to U.S. manufacturers that sales of advanced computers to these firms and institutes should require export licenses.

"The new rules will allow computers performing up to 28,000 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second) to be sold without government review to military organizations in . . . China, India, Pakistan and Russia," the senators wrote.

"The new controls drop any distinction between military and civilian customers, thereby allowing powerful American computers to be purchased directly by foreign entities building weapons of mass destruction," they said. The White House announced in August that it was loosening controls on overseas sales of U.S. supercomputers, systems that have numerous military applications ranging from designing long-range missiles to testing nuclear warheads.

The administration announced then that it would help U.S. manufacturers identify weapons makers but failed to produce a comprehensive list.

For example, the current warning list on Chinese companies contains only six entities, Mr. Helms and Mr. Feingold noted.

"To reduce the potential that computers manufactured in the United States may help fuel nuclear and missile proliferation, Mr. President, we respectfully urge that your administration publish a comprehensive list as soon as possible," the senators said.

"We are confident that American companies do not want their reputations damaged by inadvertent sales of computers to China's weapons manufacturers, and further that they would prefer to spend their marketing dollars on buyers presenting no proliferation problem."

The 50 companies identified in the letter "are well-known parts of China's nuclear, missile and military complex," they said. The companies fit the description of firms that pose a risk of weapons proliferation or diversion of civilian high-technology products to weapons programs.

Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which tracks foreign weapons programs, said the export decontrol will benefit China's strategic nuclear warhead modernization and missile program.

"The boost to China's military will be dramatic," Mr. Milhollin said.

The firms identified by the Senate are the "strategic backbone" of China's advanced military weapons complex, he said in an interview.

"I think it's too dangerous to let powerful technology to flow to the Chinese military without a review," Mr. Milhollin said. "These are the most dangerous entities."

The relaxation of the controls followed an intense lobbying effort by the U.S. computer industry, which was eager to do business abroad.

A White House spokesman could not be reached for comment.

U.S. intelligence officials told The Washington Times in June that China's main nuclear weapons center was using U.S. supercomputers illegally to simulate warhead detonations.

A special House committee that investigated Chinese spying and technology acquisition in 1998 said that supercomputer sales increased sharply during the Clinton administration. Between 1996 and 1998, China purchased 603 high-speed computers.

Washington Post

October 19, 2000

Pg. 1

China Spy Probe Shifts To Missiles

By Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writers

A new review of Chinese military documents provided by a defector in 1995 has led U.S. intelligence agencies to conclude that Chinese espionage has gathered more American missile technology than nuclear weapons secrets, senior U.S. officials said.

The conclusion was reached only this year because the CIA and other intelligence agency linguists did not fully translate the huge pile of secret Chinese documents, totaling 13,000 pages, until four years after the agency obtained them, according to a senior law enforcement official, who described the delay as a major blunder.

The belated translation and analysis has prompted a major reorientation of the FBI's investigation into Chinese espionage. From 1996 until late last year, the FBI probe centered on the suspected loss of U.S. nuclear warhead data, and quickly narrowed into an investigation of Wen Ho Lee, a researcher at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Now, however, the FBI--which never found evidence that Lee spied for China--has shifted its focus to the Defense Department and its private contractors.

That is because the documents provided by the defector show that during the 1980s, Beijing had gathered a large amount of classified information about U.S. ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles. The missile secrets are far more likely to have come from defense officials or missile builders than from Los Alamos or other U.S. nuclear weapons labs, officials said.

The shift in the investigation's focus follows several years of highly public and controversial efforts by the FBI, CIA and Energy Department to determine whether China stole the designs of advanced nuclear warheads from the United States, and if so, whether Beijing was aided by U.S. spies.

Plagued by internal disputes between agencies, partisan pressures from Congress, and an apparently mistaken decision to focus on Lee, counterintelligence investigators were slow to review the full 13,000 pages that originally sparked the inquiry.

The CIA concluded several years ago that the defector who supplied the documents was a Chinese double agent, casting doubt on the information he delivered and delaying its translation from Mandarin to English. But the FBI, which has interviewed the defector in the United States, believes that he is legitimate. The CIA now says the evidence about the defector is "inconclusive," but agrees that the information he handed over has proven accurate, a senior government official said this week.

The FBI, officials said, pressed for translating more of the document and, to support its case, began to question directly the Chinese informant, a former Chinese missile specialist whom the bureau brought to the United States. Although the FBI refused to say where he is now living, a senior intelligence official said earlier this week, "We know his whereabouts."

Because the informant was a volunteer who approached the United States with an unsolicited offer to provide Chinese secrets, he is known in intelligence jargon as a "walk-in." He smuggled the documents out of China through DHL, the private delivery company, according to a former intelligence official who has reviewed much of the

translated material. The documents appear to be a five-year "strategic plan" for development of China's new generation of missiles, the former official said.

Another intelligence expert familiar with the material described it as "an embarrassment of riches."

When the walk-in first delivered the documents, a senior U.S. official said, the CIA read and translated the titles of each major portion, then ordered a full translation of a 76-page section dealing with "nuclear" information--data on U.S. warheads, including the most advanced weapon in the U.S. arsenal, the W-88.

One nuclear weapons official familiar with the process said the CIA had Chinese linguists read the documents for "intelligence purposes," to see whether they contained valuable information about Chinese missiles and warheads, and decided they did not. The agency did not perform a "counterintelligence review" to determine whether they contained classified information about U.S. missiles and warheads, the official said.

Because of the CIA's belief that the walk-in was a double agent, a full translation of the documents seemed less pressing. "He failed an agency polygraph," one intelligence official explained. The CIA's suspicions about the informant also slowed the FBI's already limited investigation at Los Alamos of Wen Ho Lee.

Another reason for the FBI's limited inquiry at Los Alamos in 1996 and 1997, a former FBI agent said, was that the bureau's Chinese counterintelligence agents were "already swamped" by highly publicized allegations of Chinese campaign contributions to the 1996 Democratic presidential campaign.

One official who did pay attention to the CIA's 76-page translation on nuclear warheads in 1995-96 was Notra Trulock III, then the Energy Department's intelligence chief. Trulock was given a copy of the material about the W-88 before it was officially circulated within the intelligence community, triggering a complaint by then-CIA Director John M. Deutch, who had concerns about the document being properly secured, a CIA official confirmed.

Trulock used the translation to draft an "administrative inquiry" calling for an investigation of Chinese espionage, which in turn led the FBI to open a formal investigation that focused on Lee in 1996.

In 1997, a team led by former CIA deputy director Richard Kerr reviewed the small portion of translated material. Kerr felt that it showed "how very aggressively the Chinese were pursuing [U.S.] secrets," according to a participant in the study, who added that the team decided that if the walk-in was a bona fide double agent, it was "baffling that such valuable information was planted with him."

In late 1998, after a House select committee chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) received testimony about alleged Chinese espionage at the weapons lab, the FBI "pushed hard to get the entire document translated," said one government official.

A CIA damage assessment in early 1999 by Robert Walpole, a senior intelligence officer, was based on further, partial translations of the documents. But the CIA did not order a full translation until after Walpole's assessment was made public in March 1999.

"They brought Chinese linguists from all over the government to take part," said one former senior intelligence official.

As the full translation began to unfold, the Department of Defense was called in to help determine the sensitivity of information pertaining to missiles and reentry vehicles. The Pentagon concluded the information was highly classified and had been stolen by Beijing, a former senior official said.

In September 1999, Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told congressional committees they were widening the investigation of nuclear espionage beyond Lee to include other potential suspects at numerous defense facilities.

The announced reason for the expansion was the government's realization that the information about the W-88 warhead contained in the walk-in documents could have come not just from Los Alamos, but also from hundreds of other facilities within the nation's nuclear weapons complex.

But as authorities expanded the investigation into alleged nuclear espionage, they started looking for possible sources of compromised missile data as well.

The Defense Monitor

A New U.S. Nuclear Weapon?

Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, Jr. USN (Ret.)

A number of sources are now generating arguments in favor of the United States developing a new low-yield nuclear weapon with earth penetrating capability. As always in nuclear matters, there is more going on in the

Pentagon, Congress, White House, and U.S. nuclear laboratories than is revealed in this rather bland proposal for one new nuclear weapon design. An extract from a commentary which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on July 14 provides some context.

"The U.S. Senate is preparing to take a major step to abandon all pretense that U.S. nuclear forces exist only to deter war. An amendment to the pending Defense Authorization Act for 2001 would lead to the development of a new nuclear weapon designed expressly for fighting.

The new weapon is to be a low-yield device with earth penetration capability, intended to destroy deeply buried bunkers. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, N.M., which would build the device, is a strong advocate of it. Robinson apparently favors a new, low-yield device because U.S. leaders presumably would be more ready to employ smaller weapons than to use the larger city- and silo-busting high-yield weapons in our current arsenal. He considers large weapons "self-detering."

Not only is the Senate's action a throw-back to those unlamented days of preparing to prevail in nuclear war, but it also is a flagrant repudiation of a solemn pledge the United States made in May at the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York. We joined with Britain, France, China and Russia in a commitment to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

Regrettably, this action is merely one more blatant signal that the United States is determined to pursue nuclear dominance indefinitely through enhanced readiness to fight a nuclear war. Additional preparations include the decision to resume production of tritium and plutonium pits for thermonuclear weapons, continued subcritical explosive testing in Nevada, and rejection of Russian proposals to reduce nuclear numbers 75% below START II levels. The thinking behind all of this was revealed by then Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre when he said in March: "Nuclear weapons are still the foundation of a superpower...and that will never change."

It is the conflict between the true believers in U.S. nuclear supremacy and America's obligation to work for nuclear disarmament that should stimulate resistance to producing a new, "more usable" nuclear weapon. The low yield strategy must be blocked or our nation will affirm its adherence to a nuclear warfighting doctrine and thereby weaken the entire global non-proliferation regime. A new weapon design would also strengthen the voices of those in our nuclear laboratories who continue to agitate for resumption of explosive nuclear testing.

In short, design and production of a new warfighting weapon would weaken every element of restraint embodied in current restrictions on U.S. nuclear programs. At the same time, coupled with U.S. failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and plans to deploy a National Missile Defense system, it would send a clear signal to the world that America is actively preparing for nuclear war. This signal might well ignite a new nuclear arms race and end non-proliferation efforts globally. Far from increasing national security, a new weapon would imperil the safety of all Americans.

Defense News
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Pg. 4

Congress Orders BMDO To Bridge Emerging Gaps

Emerging Capabilities Threaten American Theater Missile Defense Systems

By Gopal Ratnam, Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON - At the insistence of Congress, the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) must come up with a plan to fix possible gaps between the coverage of U.S. theater missile defense systems and emerging missile capabilities.

The 2001 Defense Authorization Act directs the BMDO to "adapt ballistic missile defense systems and architectures to counter potential threats" posed by certain medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Defense Secretary William Cohen's office is required to submit a report to the Congress by Feb. 15, 2001, on how BMDO proposes to address this gap.

The directive to BMDO follows concerns expressed by several Republican members of Congress that existing U.S. theater missile defense systems may be inadequate to defeat certain intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, according to several congressional sources and missile defense analysts.

The current systems lack capability against ballistic missiles in the 2,500-4,000 kilometer range, said one House Armed Services Committee staff member

"We are asking for a plan [from BMDO] to adapt ... to start looking at covering this gap," the staff member said.

Another congressional staff member said, "We realized that we have a hole in our defenses."

The different U.S. missile defense programs are designed to combat several types of ballistic missiles.

The National Missile Defense system, for instance, is designed to counter intercontinental-range ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500 kilometers and beyond.

All the theater missile defense systems, including the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system, and Navy programs like Navy Theater Wide and Navy Area Defense, are designed to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles up to 2,500 kilometers.

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as North Korea's two-stage Taepo-Dong-2, or medium-range missiles like Iran's Shahab-4 and China's CSS-5 missiles, may reach beyond the ability of the current U.S. array of theater missile defense systems, said one analyst at the Congressional Research Service, the research arm of the U.S. Congress here.

BMDO spokeswoman Air Force Lt. Col. Coennie Woods said the congressional directive is aimed at addressing this gap.

"Existing systems, architectures, and plans postulate ballistic missile threats that are essentially either short-range or long-range," she said, adding that the congressional directive seeks to address the threat from missiles that fall between these two kinds.

However, this does not require new systems to be developed, but a "plan to adapt existing systems," Woods said. Current systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense and Navy Theater Wide could address this gap but they are not being tested against such targets, said Baker Spring, missile defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a think tank here.

Tests of these theater missile defense systems are governed by a September 1997 agreement between the United States and Russia. It imposes restrictions on the speed and range of both the target missile and the interceptor used in these tests.

According to the agreement, the speed of an interceptor or kill-vehicle used in a test cannot exceed 3 kilometers a second, while the speed and range of the target missile used in tests cannot exceed 5 kilometers a second and 3,500 kilometers, respectively.

The United States and Russia also are partners in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, which prohibits development and deployment of a missile defense system for homeland defense. The September 1997 agreement, however, allows development of some theater missile defense systems.

These test limits impose artificial restrictions on U.S. ability to judge the performance of theater missile defense systems, said Rep. David Vitter, R-La., who has campaigned for removing these restrictions.

The "existing systems can be adapted, [but] we need to come up with an expansion of the development and testing plan," he said. "I don't know how you can have confidence [in the missile defense systems] unless you test against these targets."

The congressional directive also asks BMDO to examine the use of Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-low and -high satellites in theater missile defense system.

SBIRS-Low is a constellation of 24 low-Earth orbit satellites that will track missiles during their entire flight. The first of the SBIRS-Low satellites is expected to be launched in 2006. SBIRS-high is a constellation of five satellites that is expected to become operational in 2006.

Pentagon officials have said SBIRS-low is critical to the advanced versions of the National Missile Defense system, which would include several hundred ground-based interceptors.

However, the congressional directive is the first time BMDO is being asked to consider the satellites' use for theater missile defense purpose, Vitter and other analysts said.

"SBIRS-low has several obvious uses ... this was an obvious use of the system," Vitter said. "This is a significant step by Congress to ask BMDO to examine use in theater missile defenses."

Using SBIRS-low for theater missile defense systems would improve their response time, said the Congressional Research Service analyst.

The satellites would be able to spot an enemy missile earlier in its trajectory and cue missile defense interceptors to the target and "provide an ability to shoot earlier," he said.

To allow BMDO more control over funding and management of the SBIRS-low program, Congress has mandated that the program be moved from the U.S. Air Force to BMDO by October 2001.

ANTI-MISSILE ROCKETS GET ARMY'S OK

Washington Times

Reuters

October 23, 2000. Israel's army, in a statement apparently aimed at Iraq, announced yesterday that its missile-killing U.S. backed Arrow-2 rockets were ready for action. "They have been declared operational to intercept surface-to-surface missiles," an Army communiqué said. Defense establishment sources said the timing of the announcement was important psychologically in the face of unspecified Iraqi actions. Israel's Defense Ministry said last month the Arrow missile has passed a key test by hitting a simulated ballistic target launched toward Israel similar to the Scud missiles that Iraq fired during the Gulf War in 1991.