


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

*Air University
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538.

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August 28, 2001

Report criticizes 'hazmat' training

By John Drake
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department is "woefully" unprepared for a major hazardous-materials incident or an attack with chemical or biological weapons, according to an internal risk-assessment report obtained by The Washington Times.

Many firefighters and medical personnel who are the first to respond to such incidents do not have adequate training to recognize a specific hazard or weapon, let alone contain it, the untitled report says. It refers specifically to their weaknesses in the second and third categories of the five-level training set by federal law and the National Fire Protection Association.

"There is a failure to meet minimum performance requirements" in those two levels of hazardous-materials training,

the reports states. "The current level of training is woefully inadequate with regard to the severity of risk posed to this jurisdiction."

The department has not conducted "technician" hazardous-materials training, the third level, in more than two years, a fire department source said. That training covers railroad freight disaster, such as the derailment of a CSX Corp. train in a Baltimore tunnel last month.

The report outlines how the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department could not handle a chemical- or biological-weapons attack that authorities prepare for during events such as presidential inaugurations or the upcoming protests against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which are meeting in Washington at the end of next month.

"The operational effectiveness and safety of the department with regard to these incidents has been greatly diminished," the report states.

The problem is exacerbated because the department's only "hazmat unit" operates part time, according to the fire department source. If Engine 12 is out on a call, no one is available to respond to an incident with the hazardous-materials unit.

Chief Ronnie Few and other top officials were out of town yesterday, but the director of the D.C. Emergency Management Agency said the fire department and the city government are working with other agencies to identify and solve disaster-preparedness issues, and they've already made some headway.

The District can now work directly with Federal Emergency Management Agency headquarters in the event of a weapons-of-mass-destruction attack, rather than going through the agency's regional office in Philadelphia, he said. And after a disaster drill last month, groups of local and federal officials now meet regularly to plan for disaster issues, such as decontamination, command structure, radio compatibility and hospital capacity, he said.

But the report also found that the D.C. fire department's equipment is deficient.

For its entire fleet, the department has fewer than four military-style kits of antidotes for common biological and chemical weapons, such as sarin, the nerve gas used in the Tokyo subway attack in 1995 that killed seven and injured about 200.

Comparatively, every medic unit in Fairfax County carries the kits, as do the hazardous-materials trucks and medical supervisors.

The report says the department does not outfit all its vehicles with gas detectors or binoculars, which would enable rescue workers to identify a hazardous material by a placard from a safe distance. Instead, some rescue workers say they would use the "blue canary" system, relying on the reactions of other personnel.

"It's a terrible thing, but if the police officers are falling over next to the scene, then you know not to go near it," one medic said.

Unlike the Metropolitan Police Department, firefighters and medics have not held drills for working in large crowds, and they have received little equipment or preparation for the two-day World Bank-IMF demonstrations that authorities anticipate will be violent, according to medics.

"The only thing we did receive is some gas masks, and some training for how to don it," said Kenneth Lyons, a paramedic and chairman of the department's medical union, AFGE Local 3721.

"We hoped there would be some additional practical, hands-on training," he said. "We haven't had any of that." The report blames officials' lack of foresight and a budget crunch for the department's unpreparedness.

"Unfortunately, with the fiscal crisis and the misperceived risk ... special operations has been reduced to a 'bare-bones' function and increased risk" for the city and the department, the report states.

Published Thursday, August 30, 2001

Japanese sect was close to bioterrorism, journal says

Live anthrax found at office

PARIS -- (AFP) -- Aum Supreme Truth, the Japanese doomsday sect that carried out a nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, made a trial run of an anthrax weapon, using harmless vaccine bacteria as a test, New Scientist says.

What has been dismissed as a botched attempt to carry out an anthrax attack may have been a dress rehearsal for the real thing, it says in a report due to be published on Saturday.

Hiroshi Takahashi, a scientist at Japan's National Institute of Infectious Diseases, told an anthrax conference in Maryland in June that the sect cultured the bacteria in large drums of liquid in the basement of its headquarters outside Tokyo, the report says.

Then, in July 1993, sect members pumped the liquid to the roof and sprayed it in the air for 24 hours.

Takahashi said police investigated when neighbors complained about the smell, but they were unable under Japan's religious protection laws to enter and search the building.

However, they did manage to take samples of a fluid leaking from a pipe on the outside of the building.

No one in the neighborhood fell sick. Because of this, when light was eventually shed on Aum's experiments with biological weapons, the operation was seen as a failed attempt to create anthrax.

But, New Scientist says, new evidence suggests Aum was farther down the road to anthrax terrorism than previously thought.

A laboratory at Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff has now analyzed the fluid sample taken by the police, and found it to be full of live, healthy anthrax bacteria.

DNA analysis shows that the bacteria belong to the Sterne strain, which is used in live vaccine for animals, the report says.

Sterne anthrax is designed to lack a fragment of DNA that enables the bacteria to become toxic, and is thus harmless.

Aum carried out the spraying in a practice run but may have been discouraged from carrying out a real attack because of police attention, an Arizona researcher suggested.

The results of the tests show the sect had already overcome the biggest hurdles with bioweapons -- keeping cultures alive, manufacturing enough of the bacteria and spraying in sufficient volumes to cause mass death.

Aum released the nerve gas sarin in the central Japanese city of Matsumoto, killing four people, in June 1994.

It carried out a sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995, killing 12 and injuring about 5,000 others.

<http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/world/digdocs/077554.htm>

(Editor's Note: Below, excerpt from media roundtable discussion with Mr. Duehring. Entire discussion available at hyperlink listed after article.)

Presenter: Mr. Craig W. Duehring, PDASD (Reserve Affairs)

Thursday, August 30, 2001 - 2:30 p.m. EDT

Media Roundtable with PDASD RA Duehring

Q: John Liang with InsideDefense.com. You've pretty much stood up all of your weapons of mass destruction civil support teams. How are you planning to maintain and keep them -- maintain their readiness?

Duehring: Well, we just had a discussion about that with the deputy secretary a little bit earlier today, and we were reviewing the costs associated with it. You know that we have stood up nine teams, and I was told today I think that the 10th team, Georgia, will probably be certified in about two weeks.

And that's just a guess on our part right now. Then we'll be looking at the next set after that, until we get to the grand total of 32 teams.

There are costs associated with it, the initial start-up cost running about \$5 million per team. The continuing cost year after year is about half that, about 2.6 million per year. We will -- it is a significant cost, but when you think about the payback, especially from the threat of terrorist attack, we have to do something.

And as the logic dictates, a lot of the resources that we in America have to combat this type of terrorism or to even detect it and figure out very quickly what the problem is, because -- oh, if you have a lot of people getting sick in one area, you don't know where it's coming from. Is it coming from the water? Is it coming from the air? Is it coming from something they touch? This is what we have to do determine.

The assets are most likely available in the armed forces. We've been working on these programs or parallel programs to this for years, especially in NATO, because I was -- you know, I was over there for so many, many years, and we wore the protective gear, and we learned how to put the armbands on. Of course, technology has caught on and advanced past that now. And I think that the idea of this team, this civil support team for weapons of mass destruction, is a pretty good fix.

Is this going to be the -- how it's going to look eventually? Are we going to always end up with a 22-man team in exactly 32 locations? I don't know. It's certainly under discussion. I expect that there will be modifications as time goes on. And perhaps there's cheaper ways to do it. We're certainly looking into that.

Q: What parts of the cost are you reviewing?

Duehring: I'm sorry?

Q: What portions of the costs to keep -- you say you're reviewing the costs --

Duehring: Yeah. Actually, what I'd like to do is maybe get you a little more information on that, because the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for civil support is -- has that information, and I'm afraid if I try to get it off the top of my head, I might give you something that's inaccurate. And so -- [We are reviewing the entire out year cost projections for the teams, in every budget category.]

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001/t08312001_t830dueh.html

The World Today

By Globe Staff and Wires, 8/31/2001

CHINA

Chemical bomb blast kills one, injures three

BEIJING - A chemical bomb thought to have been left by the Japanese during fighting in World War II exploded in northeast China, killing one person and injuring three others, state media said yesterday. Construction workers uncovered the bomb, which exploded Tuesday, and another that specialists defused in Harbin, capital of Heilongjiang province, the Xinhua News Agency said. It did not say whether the workers were among the victims. The bombs were thought to be chemical weapons abandoned following Japan's invasion of much of China in the 1930s and 1940s, Xinhua said. An estimated 700,000 Japanese chemical bombs were left in China and more than 10,000 have been found in the northeast in the past 20 years, it said. (AP)

http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/243/nation/The_World_Today+.shtml

Friday, August 31, 2001, updated at 07:56(GMT+8) World

Chinese Representative Urges to Preserve Global Strategy Stability

Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, urged Thursday in Geneva the preservation of global strategic stability and the upholding of the treaty regimes which have already come into force in the areas of arms control and disarmament.

The Chinese Ambassador said at the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament that the priority is to take resolute measures to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.

To this end, an international legal instrument should be concluded as soon as possible, Hu urged.

The Chinese delegate said that the Conference on Disarmament should commence multilateral negotiations on this issue and establish an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate.

Hu said China supports the [Russian](#) proposal, which calls for re-starting the substantive work of Conference on Disarmament, including dealing with the issue of nuclear disarmament.

He said the global arms control and disarmament efforts have come to a critical cross-road and that "where to go" has become a major concern for the international community.

A series of major issues of the international community, including the nuclear weapon reduction process, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the negotiation of a protocol of Convention on Biological Weapons, have met with undeserved challenges, said Hu.

The Chinese Ambassador pointed out that last year, the whole international community, including the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, recognized the treaty on anti-ballistic missile (ABM Treaty) as a corner stone of global strategic stability.

However, "we hear the advocacy for the total abrogation of this Treaty this year. All these cannot but generate profound negative impact on the international security of the 21st century and jeopardize the interest of all states in the world," Hu added.

He said that the international community should urge the parties concerned to honor the integrity and effectiveness of ABM Treaty and advocate under the premise of upholding and abiding by the ABM Treaty to further reduce offensive strategic weapons.

On the issue of missile non-proliferation, he said that the international community should further explore the possibility of establishing a global regime for the prevention of missile proliferation on the basis of equality and non-discrimination and with the participation of all states.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200108/31/eng20010831_78932.html

New York Times
September 2, 2001
Pg. 1

U.S. To Tell China It Will Not Object To Missile Buildup

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 — The Bush administration, seeking to overcome Chinese opposition to its missile defense program, intends to tell leaders in Beijing that it has no objections to the country's plans to build up its small fleet of nuclear missiles, according to senior administration officials.

One senior official said that in the future, the United States and China might also discuss resuming underground nuclear tests if they are needed to assure the safety and reliability of their arsenals. Such a move, however, might allow China to improve its nuclear warheads and lead to the end of a worldwide moratorium on nuclear testing. Both messages appear to mark a significant change in American policy. For years the United States has discouraged China and all other nations from increasing the size or quality of their nuclear arsenals, and from nuclear tests of any kind.

The purpose of the new approach, some administration officials say, is to convince China that the administration's plans for a missile shield are not aimed at undercutting China's arsenal, but rather at countering threats from so-called rogue states.

Today Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser, offering a more nuanced explanation of the administration's strategy, emphasized that the United States was not seeking a deal with China.

"The United States is not about to propose to the Chinese that in exchange for Chinese acceptance of missile defense, we will accept a nuclear buildup," she said. But she stopped well short of saying the administration would oppose the buildup.

"We have told the Chinese that the missile defense system is not aimed at them, and we intend to make that point more forcefully," she said. "We do not believe that there is any reason for the Chinese to build up their nuclear forces, but their modernization has been under way for some time."

Other officials say that while there may not be an explicit agreement, both American and Chinese strategists know that China needs more weapons to ensure that it could overwhelm a missile defense system.

But word of the new approach drew scathing criticism from Joseph R. Biden Jr., the Democrat of Delaware who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "This is absolutely absurd," he said today. "It shows that these guys will go to any length to build a national missile defense, even one they can't define. Their headlong,

headstrong, irrational and theological desire to build a missile defense sends the wrong message to the Chinese and to the whole world." This is especially true, he said, regarding India, which would try to balance against any Chinese buildup.

"This is taking 50 years of trying to control nuclear weapons and standing it on its head," he added.

The administration decided on the strategy during a review by officials preparing for Mr. Bush's trip to China next month. The president's top advisers concluded that China's nuclear modernization is inevitable and that they might as well gain advantage by acquiescing in it.

"We know the Chinese will enhance their nuclear capability anyway, and we are going to say to them, 'We're not going to tell you not to do it,' " a senior administration official deeply involved in formulating the strategy said in an interview this week. "Why panic? They are modernizing anyway."

Though Beijing has long planned to build up its arsenal, outside experts and a review last year by the Central Intelligence Agency have warned that an American missile shield could prompt China to expand its deterrent even further, possibly setting off an arms race across Asia.

Beijing now has fewer than two dozen nuclear missiles able to reach the United States, as part of a minimal deterrent created by Mao in the 1950's and 1960's. To replace those aging missiles, China is now developing mobile, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles that would be far more likely to withstand a first nuclear strike.

A report to Congress last year noted that intelligence officials predicted in 1999 that by 2015 China was likely to have "a few tens" of missiles with smaller nuclear warheads that could hit the United States.

One of those new missiles, the DF-31, may be able to reach northwestern edges of the United States, though it is designed primarily to hit Russia and Asia; the longer-range DF-41, still under development, could reach much of the continental United States.

Some in the Bush administration now believe that the Chinese buildup may be larger — and that by acquiescing in it, Washington may defuse objections to its missile defense plans. If those plans are causing any change in Chinese nuclear strategy, administration officials insisted in interviews, it is only at the margins.

"At most, missile defense might speed up their program slightly, or prompt them to build a few more missiles," one official insisted. "But they are on that path anyway, and may add only modestly to it."

A number of China experts disagree. Robert A. Manning of the Council on Foreign Relations, who published a long study last year of China's nuclear ability, said on Friday: "It's hard for me to accept the idea that what we do is totally irrelevant. If you are a Chinese military planner, your architecture and force structure depend on what the United States is doing, first and foremost."

In an interview last month with the publisher, editors and reporters of The New York Times, China's president, Jiang Zemin, deflected a question about China's response to the missile defense plan and suggested that his visitors knew more about the size and quality of China's fleet than he did. "I hope he was joking," one of Mr. Bush's top aides said. As for the ban on nuclear testing, both the United States and China have signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Bush administration has made clear that it wants that accord to remain in indefinite limbo in the Senate, which rejected it two years ago.

A senior official said this week that in future years a resumption by China of underground tests of its nuclear weapons might be accepted by the United States, which might also someday want to resume testing.

"We don't see the need for any tests, by anyone, in the near future," the official said. "But there may, at some point, be a need by both countries to make sure that their warheads are safe and reliable."

Whether the administration's new approach to China is considered a change in American policy or simply, as the administration insists, a recognition of nuclear reality, the implications could be enormous.

At home, Mr. Bush risks angering the right wing of his own party, which has long protested any buildup in Chinese arms.

And Democratic critics of the missile defense plan, like Mr. Biden, have also argued that even before the technology for a missile shield is proven, Mr. Bush may set off an arms race that could include China as well as the world's newest nuclear nations, India and Pakistan.

"The question is, can you accept another 50 or 60 nuclear-tipped missiles aimed at the United States at a time that Americans believe that they are no longer being targeted?" asked Bates Gill, an expert in Chinese nuclear strategy at the Brookings Institution.

Mr. Gill, who says he believes that the administration is "right to acknowledge the practical inevitability" of the modernization of Chinese nuclear forces, also warns of a possible side effect should China incorporate new technologies to defeat the missile shield.

"We shouldn't be sanguine about the possibility of China proliferating antimissile defense technology in the future, if the U.S.-China relationship goes badly," he said. "That could include basic decoy and shrouding technology for Pakistan, and potentially Iran and North Korea."

The new American stance could also have a major impact on the nuclear politics of Taiwan and Japan. Every major nuclear advance on the mainland leads to renewed calls in Taiwan for an independent nuclear force — a movement that the United States quashed during the cold war. American intelligence agencies keep a close eye on Taiwan to make sure that its program is not resuscitated.

As the only country ever to have suffered the devastation of nuclear attacks, Japan has long renounced nuclear weapons, and it is almost inconceivable that it would reverse that policy as long as it can depend on American nuclear protection.

But Japanese officials have said privately that while they endorse missile shield research, they worry that it would only encourage China to speed its positioning of both medium- and long-range nuclear missiles. They fear that any placement of theater missile defenses in Japan — where 60,000 American forces are based — could provoke China to increase the number of weapons targeted there.

In interviews, administration officials dismiss the argument that the missile defense would set off any kind of arms race in Asia.

"The Indians know what the Chinese are doing, and so does everyone else," a senior official said. "If we canceled the whole missile defense program tomorrow morning, China would still build more and better missiles, and other countries would figure out their response."

Ms. Rice said today, "We are hoping to have with the Chinese a relationship in which we can discuss missile defense issues openly."

But until now, there have been few discussions between China and the Bush administration about missile defenses. In the late spring, James A. Kelly, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, was sent to Beijing to give a rough outline of the administration's plans to his Chinese counterparts.

Instead, the administration's focus has been on talking to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, and winning his agreement to abandon the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which bars most of the tests for a missile shield that Mr. Bush hopes to begin in Alaska next year.

American officials have raised with Mr. Putin and his aides the possibility that Russia could contribute to the missile shield project and that some of its technology might be incorporated in it. No similar offer is contemplated with the Chinese now.

Washington Post
September 2, 2001
Pg. 1

U.S. To Give Details Of Shield Tests To China

Aim Is to Assuage Fears On Missile Defense Plan

By Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States plans to offer China an advance look at plans for testing President Bush's proposed missile defense shield, part of an emerging effort to soften Beijing's opposition to the plan, Bush administration officials said yesterday.

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said the United States will begin intensive talks over the next several weeks to try to convince China it would not be threatened by the shield and should not accelerate a buildup of nuclear missiles pointed at the United States.

"We want to engage China on issues regarding missile defense, and we really haven't," Rice said in an interview.

"We want to have serious talks with them about why this is not a threat to them. We want to have serious talks with them about why we think stability in the Asia-Pacific region would be well served by this capability."

Another administration official said that as a sweetener for China, the United States will signal that it recognizes both sides might want to resume nuclear weapons testing in the future. Such tests, now precluded by a voluntary worldwide moratorium, could allow China to field a new generation of mobile, multiple-warhead missiles.

The official said the United States has no plans for nuclear tests but reserves the right to conduct them because of concerns about the safety of nuclear weapons. "We have to maintain the reliability of our stockpile," the official said. "That's not something we can deny to others."

A missile defense shield, a system that would allow the United States to intercept enemy missiles, is one of Bush's most earnestly sought goals. The administration has not settled on the system's architecture, but it is likely to include

land- and sea-based components, with the possibility of space-based elements. The administration maintains that the shield is designed not to defend against world powers such as China, but to offer protection against terrorists and rogue states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

The proposals described yesterday are part of an emerging policy toward China that is taking shape as Bush prepares for a state visit with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Beijing next month.

The relationship got off to a sour start when China held 24 crew members of a Navy surveillance plane for 11 days during Bush's third month in office. Now the administration is engaged in intense debate over the proper carrots and sticks to offer the Chinese: At the same time it is offering Beijing inducements to cooperate with missile defense, it is taking a tougher line on nuclear non-proliferation.

In response to concern over missile transfers to Pakistan, the United States imposed sanctions yesterday on a major Chinese arms manufacturer and banned U.S. companies from launching their satellites on Chinese rockets.

A senior U.S. official said yesterday that this American effort to stem missile proliferation showed that the Bush administration is not relying exclusively on the development of a missile shield to confront the dangers posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

"We're being realistic," another administration official said. "We imposed these sanctions because the law required us to and because it was right to do. Overall, it's still about reducing the world's reliance on nuclear weapons."

Morton H. Halperin, a former official of the State and Defense departments who is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the talks Rice described are based on the administration's understanding that an effective missile defense shield would be very difficult to deploy without the cooperation of European allies. "It will be very hard to get that support if the deployment is over the objection of Russia and China," Halperin said.

China has about two dozen missiles pointed at the United States, and scholars expect that number to increase tenfold over the next decade. Rice said that because of the ongoing buildup, opponents of a missile defense shield should not argue that it "is somehow going to drive an arms race."

"No one likes the fact that there is a modernization going on. We don't think it's good for the world," Rice said. "But if we stopped all of our missile defense plans tomorrow, you would not see the Chinese cease their military modernization. This is a modernization that predates serious missile defense negotiations."

Rice said the briefing on missile defense technology and testing plans will be similar to ones that have been provided to Russia and U.S. allies in Europe.

Rice was interviewed after the New York Times posted an article on its Web site saying that the United States planned to abandon its objections to the Chinese buildup in an effort to overcome that country's opposition to Bush's missile defense program.

"The implication here that the U.S. is acquiescing in the Chinese nuclear modernization in order to buy China's acceptance of missile defense is just not right," Rice said. "The United States will continue to say that further nuclear buildup is not necessary and is not good for peace and stability. There's no conscious policy to try to take advantage of this recognition of the Chinese military modernization for something else."

The possibility of accepting nuclear tests by China would constitute a major change in U.S. policy. Bush opposes ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which bans testing of nuclear weapons, on the grounds that it is not verifiable or enforceable. It was rejected by the Senate in 1999. But the president supports an informal moratorium on testing that was initiated by his father in 1992.

"Testing is not a near-term issue for anyone," Rice said. "We believe that the moratorium should stay in place. We don't believe that anyone has any reason to test."

Conservatives warned the administration against giving too much ground for the sake of the missile shield. Kenneth Adelman, who was President Ronald Reagan's arms control director, said he disagreed with the notion that "if you act very sweetly toward the Chinese, the Chinese will reciprocate."

"My experience over many years of negotiating with the Chinese is that they take what you give and give almost nothing in return," Adelman said.

Staff writer Alan Sipress contributed to this report.

Efforts to Convince Beijing That Missile Shield Is Not a Threat Draw Criticism

By Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration added a note of restraint to its overtures to China yesterday after critics from across the spectrum said the White House appeared to be going too far in trying to build support for a missile defense shield. Administration officials said Saturday that the United States has no way of stopping a nuclear buildup in China -- underway since at least the mid-1990s -- although it does not condone it. Several China scholars and lawmakers attacked that posture yesterday as overly generous. By the time the Sunday talk shows went off the air, the administration had an important sentence to add.

"Certainly, if the Chinese continue with their plans for a modernization and buildup of their forces, it's something we would have to take into account in our own military planning," an administration official said.

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said in an interview Saturday that the United States will hold intense talks with China over the next few weeks in an effort to persuade Beijing that China would not be threatened by a missile shield and that world stability would be enhanced. Bush is to make a state visit to Beijing next month.

Rice said the United States plans to provide China with information about planned missile shield tests, as it has Russia and European allies.

An article in yesterday's New York Times quoted senior administration officials as saying that in an effort to overcome Chinese opposition to the missile defense program, the Bush administration plans to tell leaders in Beijing that it has no objections to their military buildup.

Rice told The Washington Post, "We assume the modernization is underway. We're not going to acquiesce in it."

Another administration official said, "There is no explicit or implicit quid pro quo. There is no wink and a nod."

Nevertheless, Robert Kagan, an authority on China who is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the news accounts "make even strong missile defense advocates like myself wonder if the price is getting to be too high."

"I don't think there's any question that where there's smoke, there's some fire," Kagan said. "There's a game being played here, where we're trying to calm Chinese sensitivities by indicating a certain acquiescence in their modernization program. We're sending little subtle signals that the reason they don't have to fear a missile defense is our acceptance of their effort to overwhelm it, which strikes me as a form of strategic insanity on our part."

When asked on CBS's "Face the Nation" about the idea of the United States withdrawing opposition to a Chinese build-up, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) said, "I intend to talk to White House officials about that when I get back after Labor Day, but I am very skeptical. . . . I would not like to see them become any more powerful in the nuclear line. I think we ought to formulate our policy in many different ways to try to avoid just that."

On CNN's "Late Edition," Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.) said he considers the possibility of resumed nuclear testing to be "absurd" and "a huge step back."

"We ought to try to continue to put pressure on the Chinese and others not to have offensive weapons buildups," Dorgan said. "Our entire approach ought to be to reduce the nuclear threat, not increase it."

Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), who has just returned from Taiwan, said that the overtures to China were unexpected but that he has faith in Rice. "She has the toughness and the diplomatic knowledge to make this work," King said.

(Editor's Note: Referenced article in the CPC Outreach Journal #96, 31 Aug 2001)

New York Times

September 3, 2001

Pakistan's Restraint

To the Editor: Re "India and the Bomb" (editorial, Aug. 28):

You stress nuclear restraint in South Asia, but end up advocating the same double standard that is mainly responsible for the failure of all nonproliferation efforts in the region. While you urge American "appeals" to India to restrain its nuclear weapons program, you advise Congress to continue nuclear sanctions on Pakistan, even though you acknowledge that it was India's nuclear tests in 1998 that forced Pakistan to respond. Selective policing of the nonproliferation regime is the problem, not the solution.

The question of nuclear sanctions on Pakistan should not be confused with other issues. President Pervez Musharraf has announced a detailed road map for the restoration of democracy by October 2002. Pakistan's cooperation with international counterterrorism efforts is well known.

Pakistan continues forcefully to advocate nuclear restraint so that South Asia can avoid a destructive arms race and our resources can be spent on urgent economic and social objectives.

Maleeha Lodhi, Ambassador of Pakistan, Washington, Aug. 28, 2001

New York Times
September 3, 2001

Putin, Sizing Up Bush, Says The Retinue 'Makes The King'

By Patrick E. Tyler

MOSCOW, Sept. 2 — President Vladimir V. Putin said this weekend that he believes that George W. Bush has a strong reliance on a powerful circle of aides, but that this circle is still struggling over its priorities, especially in regard to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

In an interview with a Finnish newspaper held Saturday before Mr. Putin's departure for Finland today, the Russian leader was asked to evaluate the first seven months of the Bush administration. He said he found his American counterpart "a comfortable and substantive partner," but at the same time added that he had come to believe in the "correctness of the expression that it is the retinue" of aides "that makes the king."

"Of course, it is he who makes the final decision," Mr. Putin added, according to a transcript of the interview issued by his press service, "but we have a feeling that his team has not determined some priorities yet."

Only when they do, he added, "will our dialogue take on a substantive character."

The Russian leader seemed to confer a negative judgment on the quality of consultations that have been under way since the two leaders met in Slovenia and Genoa this summer. Moreover, his remarks indicated that Russian officials sense that the debate in Washington over how to proceed with missile defense is still under way and may undergo further change as the White House contemplates a battle in Congress over funding for a \$60 billion project whose effectiveness has been intensely debated.

An influential Russian legislator said here tonight that Russian officials have been urging Mr. Putin to take a "more measured tone" in speaking publicly about Mr. Bush's plans on missile defense.

"Frankly, I do not think it is in our interest to stir up an excessive dust storm on this subject," said Vladimir P. Lukin, a deputy speaker of the Russian Parliament and former ambassador to Washington. Whatever Washington does, Russia's nuclear deterrent will remain unaffected by American missile defenses for at least 10 to 15 years, he said, "so we have no need to be hysterical."

"It is the American authorities who are interested in destroying this treaty," Mr. Lukin continued, "They must deal with the problems this creates with their opposition in Congress, with their allies, with China as it increases its nuclear buildup; it is your problem how to avoid stimulating an arms race with India and Pakistan."

And, he added, "if they have the money to build the most excessive response to the least probable threat situation, that's O.K."

Since his first meeting with Mr. Bush, Mr. Putin has met with each of Mr. Bush's principal advisers: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who accompanied Mr. Bush to Slovenia in June; Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush's national security aide who traveled to Moscow in July; and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who visited here in August.

Russian officials complained during the summer that they were confused by the variety of statements from Washington on whether the Bush administration plans to negotiate a new strategic accord to replace the ABM treaty and to cut nuclear stockpiles further, or whether it is preparing to act alone.

Last month, a senior State Department official, John R. Bolton, traveled to Moscow and said in a radio interview that Washington wanted Russian agreement to amend the ABM treaty by the time Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin meet in November in Crawford, Tex. Without such an agreement, Mr. Bolton said, the United States reserved the right to withdraw under terms of the treaty.

But Mr. Bolton asserted the next day that Washington was not laying down any deadlines. Two days later, Mr. Bush stepped in and said the United States "will withdraw from the ABM treaty on our own timetable at a time convenient to America," but he added that he had no "specific timetable in mind."

Speaking to the Finnish interviewer, Mr. Putin expressed concern that the United States under Mr. Bush might be taking the position that "America is so strong that it does not need any negotiations and any agreements." He said this represents the "most extreme" and "toughest" approach to international relations.

Despite those concerns, Mr. Putin said Russia would not overreact if the United States did decide to withdraw from the ABM treaty. Moscow would continue to work in its foreign policy to rebuild its economy while maintaining "good-natured" relations with its neighbors and main partners. He added that "we, for sure, consider the United States one of them."

If the United States decides to abandon the treaty approach, Mr. Putin said, "Well, what is to be done? If this is the way, we can only throw up our hands. But even in this event, we will not whip up any hysteria."

In the case of NATO's planned expansion, to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Russians did lobby vigorously against the increase, only to look powerless when they lost the argument. In the interview on Saturday, Mr. Putin coined the new watchword of the Russian leadership — "calm."

Over the last several days, both Mr. Putin and his minister of defense, Sergei B. Ivanov, have repeated this mantra in public statements, refraining from warning that Russia could react to a missile shield by putting multiple warheads on a new generation of its missiles.

With the new tone, Mr. Putin appeared to be speaking to a European audience, framing Russia's position as reasonable, consistent and stable, while suggesting that the Bush administration was teetering on recklessness.

"You said that Europe is somewhat concerned about the relations between Russia and the United States," Mr. Putin told the Finnish journalist Saturday. "I would like to calm you down. Russia, at least, is not doing anything that would complicate the international situation."

"We don't violate any of the obligations that we undertook," Mr. Putin said. "We are told that something got obsolete like 1972 ABM treaty. It's not what we say, it's what we are told. We disagree that this treaty is obsolete; nevertheless, expressing good will, we are ready for negotiations."

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September 4, 2001
Pg. 1

U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits

By The New York Times

This article was reported and written by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William J. Broad.

Over the past several years, the United States has embarked on a program of secret research on biological weapons that, some officials say, tests the limits of the global treaty banning such weapons.

The 1972 treaty forbids nations from developing or acquiring weapons that spread disease, but it allows work on vaccines and other protective measures. Government officials said the secret research, which mimicked the major steps a state or terrorist would take to create a biological arsenal, was aimed at better understanding the threat.

The projects, which have not been previously disclosed, were begun under President Clinton and have been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to expand them.

Earlier this year, administration officials said, the Pentagon drew up plans to engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax, a deadly disease ideal for germ warfare.

The experiment has been devised to assess whether the vaccine now being given to millions of American soldiers is effective against such a superbug, which was first created by Russian scientists. A Bush administration official said the National Security Council is expected to give the final go-ahead later this month.

Two other projects completed during the Clinton administration focused on the mechanics of making germ weapons.

In a program code-named Clear Vision, the Central Intelligence Agency built and tested a model of a Soviet-designed germ bomb that agency officials feared was being sold on the international market. The C.I.A. device lacked a fuse and other parts that would make it a working bomb, intelligence officials said.

At about the same time, Pentagon experts assembled a germ factory in the Nevada desert from commercially available materials. Pentagon officials said the project demonstrated the ease with which a terrorist or rogue nation could build a plant that could produce pounds of the deadly germs.

Both the mock bomb and the factory were tested with simulants — benign substances with characteristics similar to the germs used in weapons, officials said.

A senior Bush administration official said all the projects were "fully consistent" with the treaty banning biological weapons and were needed to protect Americans against a growing danger. "This administration will pursue defenses against the full spectrum of biological threats," the official said.

The treaty, another administration official said, allows the United States to conduct research on both microbes and germ munitions for "protective or defensive purposes."

Some Clinton administration officials worried, however, that the project violated the pact. And others expressed concern that the experiments, if disclosed, might be misunderstood as a clandestine effort to resume work on a class of weapons that President Nixon had relinquished in 1969.

Simultaneous experiments involving a model of a germ bomb, a factory to make biological agents and the development of more potent anthrax, these officials said, would draw vociferous protests from Washington if conducted by a country the United States viewed as suspect.

Administration officials said the need to keep such projects secret was a significant reason behind President Bush's recent rejection of a draft agreement to strengthen the germ-weapons treaty, which has been signed by 143 nations. The draft would require those countries to disclose where they are conducting defensive research involving gene-splicing or germs likely to be used in weapons. The sites would then be subject to international inspections.

Many national security officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations opposed the draft, arguing that it would give potential adversaries a road map to what the United States considers its most serious vulnerabilities. Among the facilities likely to be open to inspection under the draft agreement would be the West Jefferson, Ohio, laboratory of the Battelle Memorial Institute, a military contractor that has been selected to create the genetically altered anthrax.

Several officials who served in senior posts in the Clinton administration acknowledged that the secretive efforts were so poorly coordinated that even the White House was unaware of their full scope.

The Pentagon's project to build a germ factory was not reported to the White House, they said. President Clinton, who developed an intense interest in germ weapons, was never briefed on the programs under way or contemplated, the officials said.

A former senior official in the Clinton White House conceded that in retrospect, someone should have been responsible for reviewing the projects to ensure that they were not only effective in defending the United States, but consistent with the nation's arms-control pledges.

The C.I.A.'s tests on the bomb model touched off a dispute among government experts after the tests were concluded in 2000, with some officials arguing that they violated the germ treaty's prohibition against developing weapons.

Intelligence officials said lawyers at the agency and the White House concluded that the work was defensive, and therefore allowed. But even officials who supported the effort acknowledged that it brought the United States closer to what was forbidden.

"It was pressing how far you go before you do something illegal or immoral," recalled one senior official who was briefed on the program.

Public disclosure of the research is likely to complicate the position of the United States, which has long been in the forefront of efforts to enforce the ban on germ weapons.

The Bush administration's willingness to abandon the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty has already drawn criticism around the world. And the administration's stance on the draft agreement for the germ treaty has put Washington at odds with many of its allies, including Japan and Britain.

The Original Treaty

During the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union produced vast quantities of germ weapons, enough to kill everyone on earth.

Eager to halt the spread of what many called the poor man's atom bomb, the United States unilaterally gave up germ arms and helped lead the global campaign to abolish them. By 1975, most of the world's nations had signed the convention.

In doing so, they agreed not to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile quantities or types of germs that had no "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." They also pledged not to develop or obtain weapons or other equipment "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."

There were at least two significant loopholes: The pact did not define "defensive" research or say what studies might be prohibited, if any. And it provided no means of catching cheaters.

In the following decades, several countries did cheat, some on a huge scale. The Soviet Union built entire cities devoted to developing germ weapons, employing tens of thousands of people and turning anthrax, smallpox and bubonic plague into weapons of war. In the late 1980's, Iraq began a crash program to produce its own germ arsenal. Both countries insisted that their programs were for defensive purposes.

American intelligence officials had suspected that Baghdad and Moscow were clandestinely producing germ weapons. But the full picture of their efforts did not become clear until the 1990's, after several Iraqi and Soviet officials defected.

Fears about the spread of biological weapons were deepened by the rise of terrorism against Americans, the great strides in genetic engineering and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left thousands of scientists skilled in biological warfare unemployed, penniless and vulnerable to recruitment.

The threat disclosed a quandary: While the United States spent billions of dollars a year to assess enemy military forces and to defend against bullets, tanks, bombs and jet fighters, it knew relatively little about the working of exotic arms it had relinquished long ago.

Designing a Delivery System

In the mid-1990's, the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies stepped up their search for information about other nations' biological research programs, focusing on the former Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Libya, among others. Much of the initial emphasis was on the germs that enemies might use in an attack, officials said.

But in 1997, the agency embarked on Clear Vision, which focused on weapons systems that would deliver the germs.

Intelligence officials said the project was led by Gene Johnson, a senior C.I.A. scientist who had long worked with some of the world's deadliest viruses. Dr. Johnson was eager to understand the damage that Soviet miniature bombs — bomblets, in military parlance — might inflict.

The agency asked its spies to find or buy a Soviet bomblet, which releases germs in a fine mist. That search proved unsuccessful, and the agency approved a proposal to build a replica and study how well it could disperse its lethal cargo.

The agency's lawyers concluded that such a project was permitted by the treaty because the intent was defensive. Intelligence officials said the C.I.A. had reports that at least one nation was trying to buy the Soviet-made bomblets. A model was constructed and the agency conducted two sets of tests at Battelle, the military contractor. The experiments measured dissemination characteristics and how the model performed under different atmospheric conditions, intelligence officials said. They emphasized that the device was a "portion" of a bomb that could not have been used as a weapon.

The experiments caused concern at the White House, which learned about the project after it was under way. Some aides to President Clinton worried that the benefits did not justify the risks. But a White House lawyer led a joint assessment by several departments that concluded that the program did not violate the treaty, and it went ahead.

The questions were debated anew after the project was completed, this time without consensus. A State Department official argued for a strict reading of the treaty: the ban on acquiring or developing "weapons" barred states from building even a partial model of a germ bomb, no matter what the rationale.

"A bomb is a bomb is a bomb," another official said at the time.

The C.I.A. continued to insist that it had the legal authority to conduct such tests and, intelligence officials said, the agency was prepared to reopen the fight over how to interpret the treaty. But even so, the agency ended the Clear Vision project in the last year of the Clinton administration, intelligence officials said.

Bill Harlow, the C.I.A. spokesman, acknowledged that the agency had conducted "laboratory or experimental" work to assess the intelligence it had gathered about biological warfare.

"Everything we have done in this respect was entirely appropriate, necessary, consistent with U.S. treaty obligations and was briefed to the National Security Council staff and appropriate Congressional oversight committees," Mr. Harlow said.

Breeding More Potent Anthrax

In the 1990's, government officials also grew increasingly worried about the possibility that scientists could use the widely available techniques of gene-splicing to create even more deadly weapons.

Those concerns deepened in 1995, when Russian scientists disclosed at a scientific conference in Britain that they had implanted genes from *Bacillus cereus*, an organism that causes food poisoning, into the anthrax microbe.

The scientists said later that the experiments were peaceful; the two microbes can be found side-by-side in nature and, the Russians said, they wanted to see what happened if they cross-bred.

A published account of the experiment, which appeared in a scientific journal in late 1997, alarmed the Pentagon, which had just decided to require that American soldiers be vaccinated against anthrax. According to the article, the new strain was resistant to Russia's anthrax vaccine, at least in hamsters.

American officials tried to obtain a sample from Russia through a scientific exchange program to see whether the Russians had really created such a hybrid. The Americans also wanted to test whether the microbe could defeat the American vaccine, which is different from that used by Russia.

Despite repeated promises, the bacteria were never provided.

Eventually the C.I.A. drew up plans to replicate the strain, but intelligence officials said the agency hesitated because there was no specific report that an adversary was attempting to turn the superbug into a weapon.

This year, officials said, the project was taken over by the Pentagon's intelligence arm, the Defense Intelligence Agency. Pentagon lawyers reviewed the proposal and said it complied with the treaty. Officials said the research would be part of Project Jefferson, yet another government effort to track the dangers posed by germ weapons. A spokesman for Defense Intelligence, Lt. Cmdr. James Brooks, declined comment. Asked about the precautions at Battelle, which is to create the enhanced anthrax, Commander Brooks said security was "entirely suitable for all work already conducted and planned for Project Jefferson."

The Question of Secrecy

While several officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations called this and other research long overdue, they expressed concern about the lack of a central system for vetting such proposals.

And a former American diplomat questioned the wisdom of keeping them secret.

James F. Leonard, head of the delegation that negotiated the germ treaty, said research on microbes or munitions could be justified, depending on the specifics.

But he said such experiments should be done openly, exposed to the scrutiny of scientists and the public. Public disclosure, he said, is important evidence that the United States is proceeding with a "clean heart."

"It's very important to be open," he said. "If we're not open, who's going to be open?"

Mr. Leonard said the fine distinctions drawn by government lawyers were frequently ignored when a secret program was exposed. Then, he said, others offer the harshest possible interpretations — a "vulgarization of what has been done."

But he concluded that the secret germ research, as described to him, was "foolish, but not illegal."

New York Times
September 4, 2001

Next To Old Rec Hall, A 'Germ-Making Plant'

By Judith Miller

CAMP 12, NEVADA TEST SITE, Nevada — In a nondescript mustard-colored building that was once a military recreation hall and barbershop, the Pentagon has built a germ factory that could make enough lethal microbes to wipe out entire cities.

Adjacent to the pool tables, the shuffleboard and the bar stands a gleaming stainless steel cylinder, the 50-liter (53-quart) fermenter in which germs can be cultivated.

The apparatus, which includes a latticework of pipes and other equipment, was made entirely with commercially available components bought from hardware stores and other suppliers for about \$1 million — a pittance for a weapon that could deliver death on such a large scale.

The factory was built by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that works to contain the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Officials said the project was intended to assess how hard it would be for a terrorist or rogue nation to assemble a germ factory.

The agency also wanted to see if a small operation produced any telltale "signatures" — sounds, chemical emissions or patterns of operation that could help intelligence agencies find such plants.

"The project also showed us how relatively simple it would be for a terrorist to assemble such a facility without being detected," said Jay C. Davis, the former director of the agency who, with the Pentagon's permission, showed the secret plant to a Times reporter and a team from ABC News.

Officials stressed that the plant never made anthrax or any other lethal pathogen. Rather, it produced only harmless biopesticides during two production test runs in 1999 and 2000. Dr. Davis declined to say how much was made. But if it had been anthrax germs, he said, it would have made enough to kill at least 10,000 people.

Officials said the Pentagon built the plant in this largely deserted camp because it was well guarded. Building 12-7, the former recreation hall and about four dozen other buildings here were abruptly closed in January 1993 after the global moratorium on underground nuclear testing took effect.

Between 1951 and 1963, more than 800 nuclear tests were conducted here at the vast Nevada Test Site, whose parched sands and eerily quiet, sagebrush-covered mesas and mountains are scarred by giant atomic craters.

The interior of Building 12-7 — 120 feet long and 40 feet wide — seems frozen in time. Dusty signs warn visitors not to sit on the pool tables or to talk about secret projects with anyone who has no "need to know."

Dr. Davis and other officials said the Defense Department's lawyers had carefully reviewed the project to ensure that it did not violate the biological weapons treaty or American law. Because it was purely defensive and never made deadly germs, it was both legal and appropriate, he and others said.

But apparently few outside of the agency or even in the Pentagon's upper echelons knew much about the secret project. Dr. Davis said the White House was never briefed about it, given its small scale and low cost.

When subsequently told about the germ factory, several former White House officials said they were stunned that the agency's lawyers had approved it without having referred it to the White House or Congressional oversight committees for legal review.

The Pentagon's decision to permit a visit to the site came after The Times requested information about the program, called Bachus.

Some officials said the project, with its fermentation aspect, was named for Bacchus, the Greek god of wine. But an agency spokesman said the name was an acronym for Biotechnology Activity Characterization by Unconventional Signatures.

Tuesday September 4 12:19 PM ET

U.S. Says Germ Warfare Research 'Purely Defensive'

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. research on protecting the military from chemical and biological weapons has been "purely defensive," the White House said Tuesday, responding to a report that the work was testing the limits of a treaty banning such weapons.

"The United States has operated, for a period of time, a program that was designed to protect our service men and women particularly from the hazards of chemical and biological warfare," White House spokesman Ari Fleischer ([news - web sites](#)) said.

The New York Times reported Tuesday that the government had embarked on a program of secret research on biological weapons that, some officials say, tests the limits of the 1972 global treaty banning such arms.

Fleischer said the U.S. research falls within the limits of the treaty.

"It's purely defensive," he added when asked if the United States was trying to develop a bomb with the research. "We are honoring the treaty."

The treaty forbids nations from developing or acquiring weapons that spread disease, but it allows work on vaccines and other protective measures.

Government officials cited by the newspaper said the secret research, which mimicked the major steps a state or terrorist would take to create a biological arsenal, was aimed at better understanding the threat.

The projects, which have not been previously disclosed, were begun under President Bill Clinton and have been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to expand them, the article said.

Earlier this year, administration officials said, the Pentagon ([news - web sites](#)) drew up plans to engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax, a deadly disease ideal for germ warfare, according to the Times.

The experiment has been devised to assess whether the vaccine now being given to millions of American soldiers is effective against such a "superbug," which was first created by Russian scientists, the article said.

A Bush administration official told the Times the National Security Council is expected to give the final go-ahead later this month.

Two other projects completed during the Clinton administration focused on the mechanics of making germ weapons, according to the report.

http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010904/pl/arms_germwarfare_report_dc_1.html