


#59

10 Apr 2001

*USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER*

# *CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL*

*Air University  
Air War College  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

*Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538.*

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Sunday, March 4, 2001

## **LANL Squad Tracks Anthrax**

**By Jennifer McKee**

*Journal Staff Writer*

It goes like this: You're the leader of a rogue nation. You've got charismatic power in spades, but are tight on cash and badly in need of an arsenal. Nukes? Don't even try, said Paul Jackson, a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory overseeing the lab's bioweapons project. Nuclear weapons are too expensive.

But that's no problem. Mother Nature has already perfected dozens of ways to wipe out human beings.

Voila: biological warfare, the cheap, effective alternative to nuclear weapons....

<http://www.abqjournal.com/scitech/266820news03-04-01.htm>

**Tuesday April 3 8:33 AM ET**

## **Russia Urges Time Limit on U.N. Arms Inspections**

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia said on Tuesday the United Nations (news - web sites) should promise to lift economic sanctions against Iraq if weapons monitoring proved negative over an agreed time period, in an effort to persuade Baghdad to readmit inspectors.

Arms monitors left Iraq on the eve of four days of U.S-British bombing raids in 1998, prompted by Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s refusal to allow them full access to suspected arms facilities. Baghdad has not allowed them back, saying it has complied with U.N. demands and wants a crippling embargo lifted....

[http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010403/ts/russia\\_iraq\\_dc\\_2.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010403/ts/russia_iraq_dc_2.html)

## **Experts: Plague could be bio-terror attack**

**Wednesday, 4 April 2001 19:16 (ET)**

Experts: Plague could be bio-terror attack

By CLAUDE SALHANI

As the number of animals in Britain facing slaughter passes the one million mark, United Press International presents an in-depth, multipart survey on the causes and likely implications of the epidemic, the worst disaster to hit British agriculture in modern times. Here, analyst Claude Salhani, an experienced expert on international terrorism, finds that respected authorities take very seriously the possibility that the epidemic could be the deliberate result of a bio-terrorist attack on Britain and that such an attack could be a "dry run" for an even more devastating future bio-terror assault on the \$1 trillion U.S. agricultural industry....

<http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=174320>

Jane's Defence Weekly

April 4, 2001

## **Australia Supports US NMD Programme**

By Ian Bostock, JDW Correspondent, Sydney

Australia has enunciated its support for the National Missile Defense (NMD) programme being developed by the USA, much to the chagrin of other Asia-Pacific nations such as China and India.

In a recent meeting with US Vice President Dick Cheney and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that the Bush administration has Australia's support for the NMD programme.

"A missile defence system is not going to kill anyone," said Downer, "but missiles will. That's why we're very understanding of their position". The Australian government currently has no plans to acquire an NMD-type capability or to become a full member of the US NMD programme.

Downer expressed concern at the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. He said that the joint Australian/US Pine Gap monitoring facility in central Australia would be made available in order to "telegraph clearly" the launching of hostile ballistic missiles against the USA or its allies.

Responding to criticism that the NMD programme would propagate a regional arms race and result in a backlash from countries that possess offensive ballistic missile capabilities, such as China and India, Downer cited the recent change in attitude toward NMD among some European countries, such as Germany, Italy and the UK. He said that these countries were warming to the idea of the necessity for a programme that provides the type of capabilities envisaged under the NMD initiative.

## **CRACKING OF HUMAN GENETIC CODE BRINGS NEW PROBLEMS**

### **UA professors assess bioterrorism threat**

**Governments in U.S. are unprepared, but few groups can mount threat**

**BY [TRACY WHEELER](#)**

*Beacon Journal medical writer*

In Russia, stockpiles of smallpox virus -- a disease thought to have been eradicated long ago -- have disappeared without explanation. In Africa, the Ebola virus is on a rampage. In Britain, mad-cow disease is suspected of killing at least 80 people.

It's possible -- likely, even -- that such events are isolated incidents, beyond anyone's control.

But a presentation at yesterday's "2001: The Human Genome Odyssey Conference" offered another possible explanation -- bioterrorism, the use of biological agents to cause chaos for a terrorist cause....

<http://www.ohio.com/bj/news/docs/032810.htm>

## **EDITORIAL**

### **Chemical Arms Crossroads**

Four years ago the world took a needed step toward greater peace and sanity. Eighty-eight nations signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which called for the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Since then, the countries joining the pact have swelled to 174.

The agency formed to monitor compliance with the agreement, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has conducted more than 850 inspections at 408 production and storage sites. Thousands of tons of the weapons have been destroyed, including 7,000 tons of American chemical ordnance. But that's only a quarter of the US total. It's a big and expensive job.

And the biggest part of it resides in a country where bureaucratic sludge is still plentiful but government money is in short supply - Russia....

<http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/04/06/fp10s2-csm.shtml>

Inside The Pentagon

April 5, 2001

Pg. 3

## **Biden Says American Public Is 'Totally Uninformed' About NMD Issues**

"The public, through our negligence, is totally uninformed" on the issue of National Missile Defense, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) said at a press briefing today. "We're just beginning to discuss this here in Washington [DC], and the way we discuss it in Washington, we act as if the American public has any idea . . . of what we're talking about." Biden spoke at a briefing on the political and technical challenges facing National Missile Defense called by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC.

Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says he is concerned about the level of debate on NMD, and adds that public polls showing support for NMD can easily be taken out of context. Nobody, argues Biden, would be opposed to a functioning ideal missile defense, but most people lack the significant knowledge of the issues to make informed decisions on the matter.

"We cite polls as if the American public has any notion of the cost, notion of the difficulty, anything surrounding the strategic doctrine that would flow from . . . any National Missile Defense strategy," he said. "There is no inevitability to a National Missile Defense, on the grounds that the American people have already accepted the notion."

Biden views NMD as "the central national security issue of our day," and now, he says, "is the time for us to begin discussing it . . . so the public understands what's at stake."

"It's not just a matter for the high priests of nuclear strategy," he said. "National Missile Defense is not just a weapons system. Some would use it as a substitute for arms control, and if people aren't careful, National Missile Defense could come at the expense of both nuclear nonproliferation and alliance cohesion, depending on how we do this. All this for a system, that at this point we cannot yet build, at a cost we have no idea of."

Biden is also concerned about the Bush administration's policy on NMD, and says the administration's stance on such a critical issue affects all areas of U.S. foreign policy.

"I have no notion of what kind of National Missile Defense [President Bush is] talking about, because he describes four separate systems that would require significantly different capabilities. But he says them all in one breath and then sums them up as if he's talking about a limited . . . national defense system," Biden said. "If you listen to the debate and the assertions that are being made, it's as if one system fits all, and that's simply not the case."

"Taking the wrong path on missile defense can make us much less secure," warned Biden. The ultimate test of any NMD system is asking whether the United States is more secure than before the system was built, he said.

Biden expressed doubts about the soundness of sinking billions of dollars into NMD when there are other pressing national security programs that could use funding. Chief among his concerns is the problem of vast amounts of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. "Worst of all in my book," he said, "are loose nuke programs in the former Soviet Union [that] are threatened with major cutbacks in this year's budget."

"Loose nuke programs guard against the full range of nuclear delivery systems by keeping those weapons out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists groups," said Biden. "By contrast, even the best National Missile Defense will protect us only from one source of nuclear attack, if that . . . [and] something less than the best National Missile Defense remains a daunting and expensive challenge."

"There's hundreds of billions of dollars that we may spend, that we could otherwise spend more effectively on other national security issues," Biden said. But spending massive amounts of money on NMD could also lead Russia to rely more heavily on its nuclear arsenal, he warns. Biden also says fielding an NMD system increases the risk of accidental nuclear war or ballistic missile launches. "I think we pay much too little attention to that prospect in light of the state of the defensive capabilities and warning systems within the former Soviet Union," he said.

Deploying NMD "could lead China to build more strategic missile than it would otherwise field." Such an increase in the Chinese arsenal would fuel an arms race in India and Pakistan, says Biden, and if one of those nations builds up an arsenal, "how long can we expect Taiwan, the two Koreas and Japan from taking that road?" he asked. "The single greatest fear I have of a new arms race in Asia is Japan going nuclear."

"In short, National Missile Defense could lead to a world with more nuclear weapons, more nuclear powers, more weapons on the hair trigger . . . is that a world in which we're more secure than we are today? I don't think so."

There are other things the United States can and must focus on, he said. "The cost is great, the time is short, and the political environment, at this point, where I work, is supercharged, without very much informed debate."

-- Jeff Bennett

London Daily Telegraph

April 5, 2001

## **Bush Risks New Row By Quitting ABM Pact**

By Toby Harnden in Washington

PRESIDENT BUSH is planning to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty despite the insistence of China, Russia and Europe that it remains a crucial pillar of global security.

The final decision, likely to spark controversy in Moscow, Beijing and among America's allies, is due to be taken within weeks. A source close to the Pentagon, said: "I have no doubt we will do it." Senator Jon Kyl, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the Bush administration was "poised" to withdraw.

"The treaty is an anachronism of the Cold War that prevents us dealing effectively with the threats of the 21st century." Mr Bush wants to proceed with a missile defence programme to counter the potential nuclear threat from countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya, but the ABM treaty would prevent this.

Among senior figures thought to have backed pulling out of the treaty are Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser, and Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary. Withdrawal from the ABM treaty would be the latest example of Mr Bush's desire to follow what aides say is a foreign policy of "new realism" that refuses to be "romantic" about Russia or to accept conventional wisdom about international agreements.

He has defined Russia as a "strategic competitor", rather than a "strategic partner" as Bill Clinton had described it, and vowed to treat countries such as China and North Korea on the basis of their actions. Mr Rumsfeld has said that the ABM treaty, signed by the then superpowers, was "ancient history" and described support for it as "Cold War thinking".

Henry Kissinger, who as Richard Nixon's Secretary of State negotiated the treaty, has said it should be set aside. Mr Clinton decided to develop a missile defence system within the terms of the ABM treaty, which allowed America and the Soviet Union to each site one land-based missile system on its territory.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia announced that it had taken over all its treaty commitments. The treaty provides for one side to withdraw from it after giving six months' notice. A senior Bush administration source said the ABM treaty was so restrictive that "almost thinking about anything puts you outside it" and space or sea-based systems were prohibited.

The treaty had "served its purpose" and he believed America's allies would accept that. He said: "Reasonable people will find a way to reach reasonable conclusions." Another Republican source said: "The ABM treaty will be treated as the dead letter it is, after appropriate consultation with our allies."

Last year, President Jiang Zemin of China and President Putin said in a joint statement that it was "of vital importance to maintain and strictly observe ABM". Col General Leonid Ivashov, a senior Russian official, said last month that American withdrawal from the treaty would "cause competition between the creators of strategic defensive and offensive systems".

He said: "If the US leaves the treaty, Russia will certainly take measures to protect its security."

International Herald Tribune

April 5, 2001

## **Reports Say Kursk Carried A-Arms**

By Associated Press

OSLO -- The Russian nuclear submarine Kursk had atomic weapons on board when it sank in the Arctic in August, despite Moscow's insistence that it did not, experts said Wednesday.

The Kursk sank off northwestern Russia during training exercises on Aug. 12, killing all 118 aboard. Russian officials repeatedly told Norway's military that the submarine, one of Russia's most modern, was carrying on non-nuclear practice weapons.

But a member of the Russian government investigating commission, Grigori Tomchin, said in an interview that the submarine was carrying atomic weapons. "Yes. That has been known for a long time," he told Norway's TV-2.

Mr. Tomchin, a Russian lawmaker, said he was tired of all the secrecy about the wreck and encouraged the military to be more open.

Harald Ramfjord, a Norwegian engineer who has been central in planning the proposed salvage of the Kursk, said he had also seen secret Russian documents confirming the presence of atomic weapons.

New York Times

April 5, 2001

## **Russia: Germ-Warfare Expert Replaced**

In the latest shuffle in Russia's national security establishment, the general director of the organization that oversaw the Soviet Union's vast germ warfare program has been replaced by a civilian public health expert and a former official of Tatarstan, Dr. Ramil U. Khabryev. Gen. Yuri T. Kalinin's continued tenure had fueled Western suspicions that Russia may be violating the treaty banning biological weapons.

--Judith Miller (NYT)

Defense Daily

April 5, 2001

Pg. 4

## **Space And Missile Defense Top Priorities For SASC Panel, Allard Says**

By Kerry Gildea

While lawmakers are awaiting the results of the Pentagon's ongoing defense modernization and requirements review, space control and ballistic missile defense will be top priorities this year for the Senate Armed Services Committee's (SASC) Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, according to chair of the subcommittee.

The United States must push forward with land-based ballistic missile defense now and not lose another year to begin constructing an early warning radar site on Shemya Island in Alaska, Sen. Wayne Allard (R-Colo.), chair of the SASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, told Defense Daily in an interview on Monday. Allard became chair of the subcommittee in the second session of the 106th Congress.

"We need to move forward on missile defense and stay focused on that," he said.

Allard does not think it makes sense to wait another year to start construction on an early warning site for missile defense on Shemya.

"We need to start with the land-based system," Allard said. "And, on Shemya I think there is some infrastructure there that we need to begin. If we don't let these contracts shortly, we get delayed another year. Then, as we move forward there may be a role for the Navy and maybe a role for space-based. But, we need to start with the most simple and applicable. Land-based is probably the most practical."

Another area Allard intends to pay close attention to this year is space control. Allard's state is home to U.S. Space Command and NORAD and a host of aerospace contractors, including the Lockheed Martin [LMT] unit that builds Titan launch vehicles.

Pleased with the recent Rumsfeld Space Commission assessment of space control and management, Allard said the next step will be implementing all that has been recommended. While most of the recommendations can be made administratively, some may require congressional action, he noted.

"We need an evaluation of our space assets--how we are going to use our space assets and how we will defend our space assets," he said.

Allard also hopes to get the private sector more involved in military space. More private sector partnerships are necessary to get the space assets the nation needs, he noted.

"We need to set up more contracts that are competitive," Allard said.

He also thinks the use of commercial imagery "needs to be considerably expanded." Reliance on commercial imagery for the more mundane types of data will free up the military assets for the more urgent battlefield requirements, Allard noted.

Allard's panel also will weigh in on any recommendations the administration puts forward regarding nuclear weapons cuts. President Bush has hinted that making some strategic cuts may be a means for winning more global acceptance for missile defense.

Allard said he is awaiting recommendations on such proposed cuts as well as any additional forces, including more B-2 bombers or a follow-on to the B-2. Northrop Grumman [NOC] has been marketing a follow-on B-2, known as the "B-2C," that could come with a lower price tag.

Allard, who succeeds Sen. Bob Smith (R-N.H.) as chairman of the subcommittee, signaled a willingness to review recommendations for more of the bombers.

"There could be some validity to it because we're talking about long-range capability--having the capability to reach out and not have so many bases overseas," he said.

Allard served in the U.S. House from Colorado's 4th Congressional District from 1991 to 1996 before being elected to the Senate in 1996. He also chairs the Senate Banking Committee's Housing and Transportation Subcommittee, and sits on the Senate Budget Committee and Agriculture Committee. Allard was also appointed by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) to serve on the Senate's High Tech Task Force and the National Security Working Group.

Washington Times

April 6, 2001

## Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

### Chinese missile moves

U.S. spy satellites are continuing to detect movements of Chinese ballistic missiles from a factory in central China. According to intelligence officials, the latest trainload was spotted outside a factory during one satellite pass.

Subsequent photographs revealed they had departed.

"They disappeared," said one official.

Three earlier shipments of short-range missiles, believed to be new CSS-7s, were traced from the factory in Yuanan, in western Hubei province, to bases at Yongan and Xianyou — two bases within firing range of Taiwan. The missiles are part of a force of 300 short-range missiles opposite Taiwan that U.S. military and intelligence officials say is being built up at a rate of 50 missiles a year.

The missile buildup is a key target of frequent U.S. aerial surveillance flights — like the EP-3E aircraft and its 24 crew members now being held captive by the Chinese military in Hainan Island.

### Iraq moves missiles

Iraq is moving some of its surface-to-air missiles. Intelligence officials said several of Iraq's Russian SA-6 missile systems were moved from areas in northeastern Iraq.

The SA-6 batteries are high-priority intelligence targets and knowing their location is a life-and-death matter for the U.S. pilots enforcing air exclusion zones over Iraq.

The SA-6 is considered a very effective anti-aircraft missile and is believed to have been the weapon that shot down a U.S. F-117 stealth fighter over Yugoslavia.

Washington Post

April 8, 2001

Pg. B7

## Missile Defense: A Global Approach

By Max M. Kampelman and Frederick Seitz

In response to President Bush's commitment to national missile defense, Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for a limited, Europe-wide missile defense program. We ought to welcome this Russian proposal and link it to U.S. objectives.

The established "wisdom" is that acting on missile defense would require withdrawal from the ABM Treaty -- a very controversial idea in this country. Our allies and friends, observing this domestic debate, contribute their concerns that national missile defense is threatening to Russia and China.

We believe it would be irresponsible for the U.S. government to leave its people defenseless in the face of clear signs that a growing number of countries are developing ballistic missiles capable of reaching this country with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Our government needs to lead us into a creative international approach to missile defense designed to resolve the domestic and international controversy.

One promising approach would be to revisit earlier proposals that have not been pursued -- proposals reflecting President Ronald Reagan's early pledge to share the fruits of U.S. strategic defense research with other countries. Nearly 10 years ago, in October 1991, Vladimir Lukin, vice speaker of the Russian Duma, stated that "we could be talking about a strategic defense system for all mankind." Russian President Boris Yeltsin embraced a global protection system in a United Nations speech the following year. From June through October 1992, the United States and Russia pursued high-level -- and promising, although unpublicized -- talks regarding a cooperative approach to missile defense, one that transcended the ABM Treaty.

President Putin also has called for "new mechanisms" to protect against certain Third World countries, and he has advocated "umbrellas" so that "we could jointly protect all of Europe." It is time to welcome, however belatedly, the initiatives presented by Yeltsin, Putin and others.

The ABM Treaty provides for negotiations between the parties regarding new futuristic missile defense technologies, defined as those based on "other physical principles." In informing the Russians that the United States wishes to discuss their proposals, along with other ideas, we should make it clear that we wish those talks to be expanded at the appropriate time to include NATO, China, Japan, Israel and others.

The U.S. objective should be to create an international consortium dedicated to a missile defense designed to protect everyone. It should also be understood that our efforts to defend ourselves will continue, whether or not the talks proceed constructively.

Should Russia prove not to be serious about its proposals, the United States and its NATO allies should nevertheless form an international missile consortium. Its goal, using both cutting-edge scientific research and farsighted diplomacy, would be to create a global missile defense system within the decade, the fruits of which could be shared by all nations.

This proposal dovetails with the new administration's desire to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear-based deterrence, since an effective global defense would lessen the value of long-range nuclear missiles.

It is now almost universally acknowledged that missile defense technology is maturing, but more work is needed to achieve highly reliable, deployable systems. Substantial effort at the conceptual level has gone into space-deployed global defensive systems that would detect and destroy missiles in their highly vulnerable and slow initial boost phase, well before warheads are deployed. Space-based systems could destroy attacking missiles during boost phase using conventional, not nuclear, explosives.

Although the engineering challenges of developing such systems are complex, the underlying principles involved are scientifically valid. If and when an effective missile defense system is developed, protocols should be established concerning all rocket launches worldwide, whether or not the launching nation is a consortium member. It would be in the best interests of responsible nations to join such a cooperative program, assuming they share the goal of achieving peace and stability while avoiding the threat of nuclear blackmail or attack.

Some say the concept of strategic defense is misguided because individual nuclear bombs could still be used against us by clandestine means. But while such an event would be devastating, the destruction would not be comparable to



the paralyzing damage that could be wrought by a half-dozen missiles, each containing multiple nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.

The diplomatic effort to create an international consortium for global missile defense should be a vital national initiative. It would provide us with an opportunity to serve the national interest as well as the objectives of peace and stability.

Protection of our nation is not a principle open to compromise. The time has come to put partisanship aside and, under the leadership of the president, work toward a domestic and international consensus on global missile defense.

*Max M. Kampelman was State Department counselor and, from 1985 to 1989, head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. He is chairman of the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Frederick Seitz, president emeritus of Rockefeller University, is past chairman of the Defense Science Board and past president of the National Academy of Sciences.*

Washington Times

April 9, 2001

Pg. 1

## **Spy Photos Show Beijing Set For Underground Test**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

China is preparing to conduct a small, underground nuclear test in the midst of a standoff with the United States over the detention of 24 American military personnel, The Washington Times has learned.

U.S. intelligence officials said the EP-3E surveillance aircraft that collided with a Chinese interceptor jet April 1 was gathering electronic intelligence related to the impending test, along with other intelligence targets.

The test preparations were detected two weeks ago at China's Lop Nur testing facility in western Xinjiang province. They were based on U.S. spy satellite photographs that showed activity related to nuclear testing at one location of the testing site.

One official said the underground blast could be another in a series of "subcritical" nuclear tests — small explosions that do not produce an actual nuclear yield but are useful in weapons development and maintenance.

However, other officials familiar with intelligence reports said the Chinese are known to have a covert testing program that relies on small, or low-yield, nuclear explosions.

In 1996, China became a signatory to an international treaty banning all underground nuclear blasts.

U.S. intelligence officials said suspicions about the secret Chinese nuclear testing program were confirmed after agents from Beijing purchased special nuclear containment equipment from Russia several years ago.

The special equipment is known to be used in masking the seismic signatures of nuclear explosions — like the small blast China set off June 1999, days before a senior U.S. diplomat delivered an apology to Beijing for the mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, during the air war there.

The timing of that test, which took place at Lop Nur, was viewed as an intentional signal from Beijing, which had cut off all military contacts with the United States and had begun vitriolic attacks on the United States in the government-controlled media.

Although the test preparations were spotted before the showdown between China and the United States began, officials did not rule out a connection to China's stepped-up aggressive harassment of U.S. intelligence and plans for the test.

China is opposing Bush administration plans for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and plans for deployment of a national missile defense, and it has been engaged in a concerted effort to influence U.S. policies, said defense and intelligence officials.

A test during the current standoff would signal China's growing nuclear power, said the officials.

A U.S. defense official said the testing activity at the current time is a sign that China's leader, President Jiang Zemin, may not be fully in control.

"Some say Jiang is a moderate who wants good relations with the United States," the official said. "If that's the case, this test during a difficult period with the United States indicates he is not in control of China."

The EP-3E conducts signals intelligence operations that are aimed at collecting large amounts of communications and other electric signals. The aircraft left from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, Japan, and flew south along the Chinese coast until its encounter with two Chinese interceptor jets near Hainan Island.

The aircraft's sensitive listening equipment is capable of picking up communications thousands of miles inland, including any signals from Lop Nur, the main Chinese nuclear testing facility, intelligence officials said.

The U.S. intelligence community also uses RC-135 reconnaissance flights and spy satellites to collect intelligence from Lop Nur. It also has "sniffer" aircraft that can detect any nuclear particles produced from nuclear tests after they take place.

China in the past has used tests of its missiles and nuclear weapons as political signals to the United States.

China is currently engaged in a major strategic weapons buildup. Last year, it conducted two flight tests of a new road-mobile long-range missile known as the DF-31.

China also is building a longer-range missile known as the DF-41 and a new class of ballistic missile submarine that will be equipped with a naval version of the DF-31.

China last conducted large-scale nuclear tests in 1996. It announced later that year it was agreeing to the international nuclear test ban known as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the 1996 tests to be the first blasts of a new small warhead — believed based on the design of the W-88, the United States' most advanced small nuclear warhead, obtained through espionage.

Although China signed the test ban treaty, it has not ratified it.

The U.S. Senate rejected the pact in 1999. The State Department said at the time of the Senate debate that U.S. ratification of the treaty would "constrain" China's nuclear weapons modernization because any information on U.S. nuclear testing obtained by Chinese spies could not be used without first conducting nuclear tests.

"China is not likely to rely on weapons incorporating information obtained through espionage without first conducting nuclear explosive tests," the department said in a 1999 fact sheet.

The fact sheet also stated that China said when it signed the test ban treaty in 1996 that "it would continue to evaluate the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. . . . We believe that China has initiated such a program at its Lop Nur test site."

China has refused to permit international monitoring at its nuclear weapons test facilities — a key reason Senate Republicans rejected the test ban treaty as unverifiable.

Negotiators failed to include provisions in the treaty that would allow precise monitoring near Lop Nur.

Despite the Senate's rejection of the treaty, the Bush administration is seeking \$21 million for international monitoring of the defunct treaty, a sign treaty proponents are operating outside the control of administration political appointees.

"It's the Clinton bureaucracy doing this, and it shows the Bush administration hasn't reined them in," said one U.S. official.

The continued nuclear test efforts by China show "China could never be a reliable treaty partner" since it announced in 1996 that it would no longer test, this official said.

Aviation Week & Space Technology

April 9, 2001

## **Washington Outlook**

Edited by Paul Mann

### **Doubling Up**

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld may restructure the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, to boost its clout. The agency might report directly to the secretary, rather than the Pentagon acquisition chief. Or BMDO's boss, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, might get a fourth star, with the post retaining senior rank. Real clout is money and one official says BMDO's budget will be doubled.

## Defense News

April 9, 2001

Pg. 1

U.S. Navy Seeks Larger Share Of Antimissile Funds

By Robert Holzer, Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — In a bid to grab a larger share of Pentagon missile defense spending, U.S. Navy officials are proposing to boost the nation's nascent global missile defense network, service and Defense Department sources said.

At stake could be billions of dollars in additional funding for the Navy's missile defense efforts in coming years — if Pentagon officials embrace the schemes.

The options range from an emergency capability to thwart North Korean ballistic missiles to more far-reaching efforts to counter the future missile arsenals of Iran, Libya and other nations, according to Navy documents. Defense News obtained copies of the documents.

"We have something now that can deal with the wolf at the door," a Pentagon source said, referring to the U.S. military's dearth of capabilities for addressing near-term missile threats emerging around the globe.

These options were presented in recent weeks to senior Pentagon officials, including Stephen Cambone, an advisor to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, defense sources said.

Rumsfeld is reassessing the Pentagon's entire missile defense architecture, and significant changes to existing programs soon could be proposed. These reviews should be finished in a few weeks and presented to Congress by May 15.

Pamela Bain, spokeswoman for the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said April 6 that the reviews are still ongoing and there is no firm date yet for their completion.

What makes the Navy options so attractive, service and defense sources said, is that they can all be spun off the service's existing Area and Navy Theater Wide efforts for only a small increase in cost.

Navy Area is a more limited-range system, which uses the Block IVA version of the service's Standard missile along with upgrades to the Aegis radar. Navy Theater Wide is a more advanced missile, the SM-3 version of Standard, equipped with the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile, that destroys an enemy missile by ramming it at high speed.

For example, the Navy could base two DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in Japan, equipped with 30 SM-2 Block IV air defense missiles, to counter the North Korean Taepo Dong missile threat within 12 to 18 months, according to Navy documents. These missiles are already in the fleet today, service officials said.

The extra cost of fielding this deterrent, which would enable the warships to target North Korea's missile inventory during its vulnerable ascent phase, is \$150 million to \$200 million, according to Navy data.

"If the problem is North Korea then we ought to be able to put a couple of ships into position to get a boost phase or an ascent phase engagement," a Navy source said. "We are really close to the coast and we would see this thing take off."

However, none of these options outlined by the Navy are compatible with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, service sources said. That treaty prohibits the deployment of missile defense systems at sea.

Limiting U.S. missile options simply because they don't comply with the ABM treaty, would be a serious mistake, Baker Spring, senior fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation here, said April 6.

"If deployment is home plate, no program gets you to home that is treaty compliant," Spring said.

Navy officials maintain that if any of the service's proposed global missile defense options are embraced by Pentagon officials it will cause little if any impact on the existing Area and Navy Theater Wide efforts.

"We are taking a step-by-step approach here that gives us reasonable capability over a reasonable time," the Navy source said, "without bankrupting the national treasury."

Specific near-term global defense options being proposed by the Navy, in addition to the emergency deployment scheme, include:

\*Enhanced Theater Wide Contingency. Builds off the existing Navy Theater Wide program and would be rapidly deployed. Envisions two Aegis-equipped cruisers with 50 or more SM-3 missiles available by 2005 for an additional cost of \$1.4 billion to \$1.8 billion.

\*Enhanced Theater Wide Tactical. Capable of targeting more advanced missiles expected from North Korea and Iran in the boost or ascent phase. Entails equipping two or more Aegis cruisers with 60 SM-3 missiles outfitted with a larger 21-inch second stage rocket motor compared to the 13.5 inch motor used today. Available by 2008, this capability could cost \$3.5 billion to \$4.5 billion.

\*Navy Regional Defense. Would counter all known future missile threats, but involves the construction of new ships specifically configured for missile defense missions as well as a bigger missile. Would take up to nine years to develop at a cost of \$8 billion to \$10 billion.

"To some extent the Navy can do this mission more cheaply because they don't have to build a new infrastructure," retired Vice Adm. J.D. Williams, former deputy chief of naval operations for naval warfare, said April 6. "We are going to maintain those ships whether we put ballistic missile interceptors on them or not."

Williams' comments echo those of a recently released Pentagon report that assessed the Navy's contribution to a national missile defense system. The report, "Naval National Missile Defense: A Potential Expansion of the Land-Based National Missile Defense Architecture to Extend Protection," was completed last year, but only signed out by Rumsfeld on March 2. The report was jointly produced by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Navy. According to the report, "ship-based alternatives provide greater flexibility to position radar assets or interceptor missiles in response to emerging conflicts."

A future naval missile defense squadron of six specially configured missile cruisers could be a complement to land-based systems for a cost of \$4 billion to \$7 billion, according to the Pentagon report.

All of these options hinge on the Navy successfully completing flight testing and the intercept of a ballistic missile in flight, service sources said. The service had a successful flight test in January and the first intercept test is now scheduled to take place later this year.

"If we haven't hit anything by the end of 2002, then we are not going to be doing any of this," the Navy source said.

Korea Times

April 9, 2001

## **57 Percent Of Koreans Oppose NMD**

Fifty-seven percent of the Korean public are opposed to the U.S. plan to deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, according to a survey released by Rep. Kim Hee-sun of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party. The poll, conducted by Media Research, showed that only 32 percent of the respondents gave favorable responses to the NMD that new U.S. President George W. Bush has strongly advocated since his Feb. inauguration.

As for the U.S. hard-line policy toward North Korea, 55.6 percent said it would have an adverse effect on the Korean peninsula. In contrast, only 17.5 percent of respondents answered that the hard-line policy will bring about positive results.

According to the survey, only 3.5 percent of those polled regarded the U.S. as a "blood-tied ally", while 56.2 percent thought that the U.S. is a "close friend" and 36.2 percent referred to it as just "one of many countries."

President Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy toward Pyongyang received support from 53.1 percent, while the solution to the North Korean issue put forward by opposition Grand National Party president Lee Hoi-chang received the approval of 39.6 percent.

Asked about why Washington is pushing ahead with the NMD, 41 percent cited "enlargement of U.S. influence on the global scale," followed by 20.0 percent who mentioned U.S. military buildup.

An overwhelming 79 percent of respondents held the view that there is no equal footing in Seoul-Washington diplomacy, compared with 19.3 percent who believed South Korea is conducting diplomatic activities with the U.S. on equal terms.

Meanwhile, 59.3 percent urged the Seoul government to send a special envoy to Tokyo to deliver its position on Japan's approval of history textbooks that justify the island country's wartime atrocities.

As a solution to the textbook dispute, 28.3 percent answered that South Korea should consider its options, including the severance of diplomatic ties with Japan.

The survey covered 1,004 male and female respondents across the nation from March 30-31. "The government should reflect this public opinion carefully in implementing policies, given that the environment for diplomacy and security surrounding the Korean peninsula is changing," Rep. Kim stressed.

Army Times  
April 9, 2001  
Pg. 14

## **Shots In The Dark**

What the Pentagon doesn't want you to know about the anthrax vaccine By Kent Miller, Times Staff Writer

The Defense Department is on the verge of having to further curtail or altogether suspend its anthrax vaccination program because of dwindling supply.

With only about 32,000 doses now in stock, defense officials say, and shots continuing at a rate of about 5,000 doses a month, the supply will run out by the end of September.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has asked for a review of the vaccination policy, but will "make no snap decisions," according to his spokesman, Rear Adm. Craig Quigley. He "wants to understand the facts behind the vaccine" before taking any action.

But while supplies run down and Rumsfeld studies the issue, prosecutions of service members who refuse the shots continue. Perhaps the most celebrated of these is the case of Air Force Capt. John Buck, the first military doctor to refuse the shots. He is to be court-martialed May 15 at Keesler Air Force Base, Miss. Other cases continue to wind their way through the courts.

While the Pentagon's foes on the anthrax issue have primarily been service members, others are beginning to join the fray.

Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal wrote to Rumsfeld and Dr. Bernard Schwetz, acting deputy commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, March 21, urging them to abandon the anthrax vaccination program or make it voluntary.

Blumenthal has standing in the debate, he said, because his state could bear responsibility if its guardsmen get sick as a result of the vaccinations.

"Unfortunately, and directly contrary to law, the [vaccine] is being administered to military personnel under threat of imprisonment, loss of pay and discharge," Blumenthal wrote. "In effect, the military is forcing its personnel to serve as human guinea pigs for an unlicensed drug that has not been proven to be safe or effective."

Blumenthal and other critics of the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, known as AVIP, say the Pentagon and the Food and Drug Administration are hiding information about the safety and efficacy of the vaccine and violating the individual rights of service members by continuing the program.

Here's what they say the Pentagon doesn't want you to know:

DoD officials have themselves called the vaccine inadequate

The Pentagon was concerned about the vaccine's inadequacies long before the immunization program began.

The first anthrax vaccine was developed in the 1950s to protect sheep handlers from contracting cutaneous anthrax, which enters the body through the skin. But no vaccine has ever been tested against aerosolized or "inhalational" anthrax - the form used in biological weapons - in humans.

Indeed, as early as 1985, military officials were seeking a different vaccine to protect troops against exposure to airborne anthrax. The Army solicited bids that year to develop a new anthrax vaccine from the biologics industry.

"There is an operational requirement to develop a safe and effective product which will protect U.S. troops against exposure [to] virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis," it said in an official request for proposals.

"There is no vaccine in current use which will safely and effectively protect military personnel against exposure to this hazardous bacterial agent."

The FDA concluded independently in 1985 that the anthrax vaccine's "efficacy against inhalation anthrax is not well documented."

And in 1989, Assistant Defense Secretary Robert W. Barker wrote to Sen. John Glenn, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, saying "current vaccines, particularly the anthrax vaccine, do not readily lend themselves to use in mass troop immunization." Barker cited problems including a higher-than-desirable rate of adverse reactions to the shots and the "lack of strong enough efficacy against infection by the aerosol route of exposure."

The vaccine's effectiveness against inhaled anthrax is unknown

A 1994 report by the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee concluded that the vaccine could not be expected to protect troops against airborne anthrax.

"Unfortunately, when anthrax is used as a biological weapon, it is likely to be aerosolized and thus inhaled," the report said. "Therefore, the efficacy of the vaccine against biological warfare is unknown. . The vaccine should be considered investigational when used as a protection against biological warfare."

As an investigational drug, the vaccine would require informed consent each time a shot is administered. Military officials fear the extra work involved, however, and worry that too many troops might choose not to accept the shots.

Another Senate report, "Unproven Force Protection," released in February 2000 by the Senate Committee on Governmental Reform, also criticized the inoculation program. Mandatory vaccination "expands and distorts the use of invasive, dated medical technology to address perceived weaknesses in detection technology and external physical protection against biological attack," the report said. "Born of a post-Gulf War panic over apparent weaknesses in chemical and biological warfare defenses, the AVIP is an unmanageably broad military undertaking built on a dangerously narrow scientific and medical foundation."

The report criticized Pentagon medical leaders for responding to questions "with an excess of faith but a paucity of science."

The anthrax threat is real, but overstated

Anthrax worries reached their height in 1990 during Operation Desert Shield. Defense intelligence experts knew Iraq had been trying to develop germ warfare agents, and Saddam Hussein was believed to have anthrax in his stockpile of unconventional weapons. Most British troops and about 150,000 U.S. troops were given anthrax vaccines.

When the U.S.-led coalition ground offensive began in early 1991, however, strong winds blowing toward the Iraqi lines all but eliminated any incentive Iraqi commanders might have had to use bio-weapons against allied forces.

Today, the defense intelligence community reports U.S. forces face an increasing risk of exposure to the hostile use of biological weapons. But the exact nature of that threat is not clear. In a July 1999 opinion piece in the Washington Post on domestic defenses against biological and chemical warfare, then-Defense Secretary William Cohen asserted that "at least 25 countries, including Iraq and North Korea, now have - or are in the process of acquiring and developing - weapons of mass destruction." A year later, in an opinion article in this newspaper, Cohen downgraded that estimate, saying "at least 10 countries are developing anthrax as a weapon."

Then, in December 2000, the Pentagon decided to suspend shots for service members going to Korea. Officials said then that North Korea was not an imminent threat for anthrax attack.

In a 1997 television appearance, Cohen held up a 5-pound bag of sugar and said the bag, if filled with anthrax spores, was enough to wipe out half the population of Washington, D.C. But government experts later wrote in Archives of Internal Medicine, a medical journal, that Cohen had overstated the effect by 100 times.

The vaccine has never been clinically tested on humans

Air Force Reserve Maj. Thomas Rempfer was in the Air National Guard in 1998 when he and fellow pilot Maj. Russell Dingle were tasked by their commander to research the vaccine and develop questions and answers for Air Guard leaders. Their research led them to conclude the vaccine wasn't safe, and not long after, both resigned their Guard commissions. (Ironically, they were later able to join the Air Force Reserve.)

In a December meeting with Army Times reporters and editors, Rempfer pointed out that the only controlled clinical tests of the vaccine on humans actually involved a different vaccine.

His documentation shows that Dr. Philip Brachman, who was then chief of the Investigations Center at the Public Health Service's Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, conducted the first human field trials of anthrax vaccine at four goat-hair processing mills from 1955 to 1959. His findings were published in 1962. But the vaccine he used was developed by Merck Sharpe and Dohme, the giant pharmaceutical company.

The vaccine now used by the military was granted to the U.S. Army in 1965.

And according to an April 1999 report by the General Accounting Office, the current vaccine differs from the vaccine used in the Brachman study in three ways:

\*\* The manufacturing process changed when the Michigan Department of Public Health was granted a license and began producing vaccine for the military.

\*\* The strain of anthrax that Merck used to grow the original vaccine was not the same strain used to grow the military's vaccine.

\*\* The ingredients in the vaccine were changed to increase the yield of the protective component of the vaccine.

The military's vaccine was used in a 1960s study conducted at a mill in Talladega, Ala., but the results were not published. A 1969 memorandum from the licensing oversight board stated: "The lack of cases of anthrax in an uncontrolled population of approximately 600 persons in the Talladega mill can hardly be accepted as scientific evidence for efficacy of the vaccine."

Still, a license was granted for the military's vaccine in 1970 without data on its effectiveness. The approved package insert refers to the Brachman study, which predated the military's vaccine.

The manufacturer did not notify the FDA of key changes

The manufacturing of a drug is controlled by both a product license, which establishes the chemical composition of the drug, and a site license, which controls the procedures used to operate the product line.

BioPort Corp. and its predecessor, Michigan Biologic Products Institute (which received the license originally held by the Michigan Department of Public Health) have failed to keep the FDA informed of key changes they were making, changes that could have affected their licenses.

The Food and Drug Administration has documented numerous violations in the manufacturing of the vaccine. Blumenthal's letter to Rumsfeld characterizes these as relating to "organization and personnel, buildings, facilities, equipment controls, laboratory controls and records and reports."

Reports in 1996 and the three following years all found problems.

For example, Blumenthal noted, four major pieces of equipment used to formulate the vaccine were used without prior FDA approval, as required by law. "The new equipment was made of stainless steel and was not glass-lined, as the originals were."

Blumenthal noted other errors: "Some lots of the vaccine were not properly labeled, a potential violation of federal law, and one lot's shelf life was extended after it had expired."

In 1998, three former employees of the Michigan Biologic Products Institute filed a grievance with the state's Civil Service Hearings Division seeking a portion of the profits from the sale of the vaccine. During a hearing in March 2000, Dr. George Burgoyne, one of the three, testified that after the Defense Department showed increased interest in the vaccine in the late 1980s, changes had to be made so larger quantities of the vaccine could be produced. The production changes included additional filters and a new container in which to grow the bacteria.

Dingle, the Air Force reservist, explained the issue. "Before the Gulf War, 7,500 doses was the largest batch they had made," he said. But as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein became more menacing in the Gulf, the Pentagon "saw the need for more vaccine because the United States had sold [anthrax] spores, equipment and technology to the Iraqis."

Defense officials needed 300,000 doses immediately, but up to that time, the lab had only made 70,000 doses total.

But while the changes increased production capacity, the FDA was never notified, as required by law.

And in February 1998, just one month before the first troops began receiving shots under the mandatory vaccination program, the FDA found that "the manufacturing process for anthrax vaccine is not validated."

Military officials knew they needed to amend the license

In October 1995, a group of military medical experts gathered in Falls Church, Va., to discuss modifying the FDA license so the anthrax vaccine could be administered in fewer doses and so it could be approved for inhalational anthrax.

According to official minutes from the meeting, Brig. Gen. Walter Busbee, joint program manager for biological defense, said the six-dose schedule was a key issue for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then-Secretary of Defense William Perry.

He noted that a tour of duty in areas like Korea was 13 months, and the six-shot regimen needed to produce full immunity took 18 months.

Col. Arthur Friedlander, chief of the Bacteriology Division of the Army's Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, offered a possible solution. He said the original series of six doses was established in the 1950s, but later studies of rhesus monkeys showed the military's vaccine was effective in much smaller doses than required by the label, according to notes from the meeting.

When the monkeys received just two shots, 100 percent of them survived exposure to airborne anthrax four to nine months later and 88 percent survived when exposed two years after the shots, he said. When the monkeys received just one dose, 100 percent survived exposure to airborne anthrax administered six weeks later.

Lt. Col. Phillip Pittman, chief of special immunizations at the Army medical institute, said Gulf War research suggested that two doses followed by annual boosters appeared to provide sufficient protection.

The group then discussed the need to get the manufacturer to apply to the FDA for a change in the license, so they could change the required regimen.



But when they realized that such a change would automatically put the vaccine in the experimental category - an "investigational new drug," in the parlance of the FDA - they took pause.

"Several participants expressed concern over putting the vaccine back into IND status," according to meeting minutes.

In 1996, after the license was transferred to Michigan Biological Products Institute, the institute filed the application with the Food and Drug Administration.

That request is still pending.

The mandatory vaccination program may be illegal

Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal says there are four reasons why the anthrax immunization program is illegal:

\*\* "The anthrax vaccine has not been proved safe or effective for its intended use in that [it] has never been licensed for protection against inhalational anthrax.

\*\* "The vaccine is not being manufactured in accordance with either its site license or product license.

\*\* "The vaccine is not being administered according to the license.

\*\* "Since the vaccine has not been tested on humans, there is no basis for concluding that it is safe and effective."

Because of these deviations, the military's use of the vaccine must be considered experimental, Blumenthal said. Under federal law, citizens of the United States, including service members, can only be given an experimental drug when they are fully informed of the risks and benefits and provide their informed consent.

Rempfer, Dingle and others argue that defense officials' decision to file the IND application is proof they recognized that they wanted to use the vaccine for a purpose and at a dosage that fell outside of the scope of the license.

Pentagon officials deny that.

Such changes normally would trigger classification of the vaccine as an investigational new drug. Any service member asked to take it would first have to be told of the advantages and risks, then given the choice whether or not to take it. In theory, that was how the vaccine was supposed to have been administered during the Gulf War. In practice, many commanders just told their subordinates to line up and take their shots.

Executive Order 13139, signed by then-President Clinton in September 1999, says the Defense Department cannot give investigational new drugs to service members without their informed consent, except in times of national emergency.

"Waivers of informed consent will be granted only when absolutely necessary," the executive order says.

According to the relevant portion of U.S. law - Title 10, Section 1107 of the U.S. Code - only the president may grant waivers for investigational new drugs.

Further, the law says, a waiver may be granted "only if the president determines, in writing, that obtaining consent is not feasible, is contrary to the best interests of the member or is not in the interests of national security."

"The current IND process requires the submission of controlled studies proving that the drug is safe and effective for the proposed new use," Blumenthal wrote in his recent letter to Rumsfeld. No such studies have been conducted on the AVA (anthrax vaccine adsorbed, the official name of the drug). Furthermore, such controlled studies of a new drug pursuant to an IND application cannot be conducted on human subjects without their informed consent."

The Pentagon chose, however, to use a different approach to the matter. In a March 4, 1997, letter, Dr. Stephen C. Joseph, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, sought FDA permission to use the vaccine to protect U.S. troops "against the threat of an Iraqi biological warfare attack with anthrax."

"While the package insert for this vaccine is nonspecific as to the route of exposure, DoD has long interpreted the scope of the license to include inhalation anthrax," he wrote to the FDA's lead deputy commissioner of food and drugs, Dr. Michael Friedman. ". Please advise whether the FDA has any objection."

In a carefully worded response, Friedman noted the "paucity of data regarding the effectiveness of anthrax vaccine for prevention of inhalation anthrax." But despite the lack of proof of effectiveness, the use of the vaccine for that purpose "is not inconsistent with the current label," he wrote.

Blumenthal's letter addresses this point: "In his very short letter, with the stroke of the pen, Dr. Friedman wiped out 10 years of DoD analysis and 25 years of FDA law designed to protect the safety and well-being of the citizens of the United States."

The Defense Department insists that today's vaccine meets FDA approval, and FDA officials have testified to that effect before Congress. Still, lawyers who argue against the anthrax vaccine say these statements are "informal opinions," not the official position of the FDA.

"What we need is a waiver of informed consent" from the president, said Air Force Reserve Lt. Col. John J. Michels Jr., a judge advocate general who defended Maj. Sonny Bates, the highest ranking officer to refuse the anthrax shots.

President Bush did that during the Gulf War, he added.

Defense officials "have gone through a great deal of effort to preclude the commander in chief from assuming his legal responsibilities under federal law for waiving service members' [rights to] informed consent," Michels said. "We just don't know why."

Staff writers Vince Crawley and Deborah Funk contributed to this report.

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## **Manufacturer Gears Up For New Batch**

By Deborah Funk, Times staff writer

Officials of BioPort Corp., the sole manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine, say they may have finally cleared a major stumbling block that has kept them from producing vaccine for the Defense Department.

Company officials believe they now can show that each batch of vaccine made at the Lansing, Mich., plant is identical, which is critical to winning Food and Drug Administration approval of its manufacturing process. The company also has resumed production to demonstrate that the vial-filling process meets FDA standards.

BioPort is preparing for a pre-approval inspection at the end of summer, said Kim Brennen Root, company spokeswoman. If the company meets FDA approval, it could begin supplying the vaccine in early 2002.

The Defense Department now has only about 32,000 doses of vaccine left, with additional vaccine set aside for special forces units and research. Unless defense officials make some adjustments to the program, they could run out of the vaccine in early fall.

Army Col. Randy Randolph, Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program Agency director, said defense officials are reviewing contingency plans. They could again limit who receives the shots - for the fourth time since the program began in March 1998 - or change the program in some other way, Randolph said. It's "premature" to discuss what those plans might be, he said.

*Arms Control Today* [April 2001](#)

## **The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has It Enhanced U.S. Security?**

**Jonathan B. Tucker**

Long before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) became international law, the United States decided that the possession and use of chemical arms was not in its national interest. In November 1985, Congress mandated that the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons be unilaterally destroyed. Then, in May 1991, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, President George Bush went one step further by declaring that the United States would formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, once the CWC entered into force.

By signing the convention in January 1993 and ratifying it in April 1997, the United States sought to ensure that other nations would also renounce the possession and use of chemical weapons, reducing the risk that U.S. civilians or soldiers would face poison gas at home or on the battlefield. The CWC requires member states to destroy all chemical weapons stockpiles and dedicated production facilities within a decade of entry into force and to renounce their reacquisition in the future. Functioning both as a disarmament and a non-proliferation measure, it is the first multilateral treaty to require the elimination of an entire category of weapons under strict international monitoring....

<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/april01/tucker.html>

Korea Times

April 10, 2001

## **Civic Groups United To Block US Missile Defense Program**

By Soh Ji-young, Staff Reporter

More than 40 civic groups yesterday formed an alliance to oppose U.S. missile defense programs, claiming such moves will prevent peace from prevailing on the Korean peninsula.

“The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) projects being pushed by the United States will only spark an international arms race, with the Korean peninsula as the main victim,” said the Korean Committee Against NMD-TMD and for Peace at a press conference held yesterday morning at the Seoul Press Center in central Seoul.

Major nongovernmental organizations, such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and the People's Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA are taking part in the coalition. “The initiative of the U.S. government to deploy the NMD-TMD system is nothing more than a design to secure its hegemony,” the Korean Committee said.

“As the Bush government is intent on fabricating North Korea's military threat to justify its program, it will ultimately damage the prospect of peace and unification between the two Koreas, which is starting to take root,” the group said.

“We will undertake all necessary efforts to stop the NMD-TMD plan,” the coalition vowed.

The Korean Committee also wrote a letter to U.S. President George W. Bush and urged him to give up the missile plan.

Saying they are ``quite satisfied with one episode of `Star Wars,'" the activists demanded that President Bush abandon the ballistic missile defense system and stated that they will link arms with all the peace-loving people across the world to lay the mindless NMD-TMD plan to rest.

The coalition also called on President Kim Dae-jung to ``take a clear stand on the NMD-TMD issue," and give up all efforts to participate in the controversial missile defense programs.

After the press conference, they visited the U.S. Embassy to deliver the protest letter addressed to President Bush. The coalition will conduct various workshops, seminars and publicity campaigns on the NMD and TMD projects to enhance public awareness of the issue.

Signature drives, street campaigns and protest rallies will also be staged against the U.S. Embassy and the Defense Ministry to voice opposition to the missile plan.

Joining international campaigns, a group of civic activists will be dispatched to Washington in June to make protest visits to the White House and other defense-related agencies. ``We are currently organizing the matter with U.S. peace organizations," said a civil activist.

Meanwhile, a civic rally will be held today in front of the U.S. Embassy at 2 p.m. to oppose the U.S. missile defense program.

USA Today

April 10, 2001

Pg. 5

## **EU: Depleted Uranium Weapons Posed No Risk**

The use of depleted uranium ammunition in the Bosnia and Kosovo wars in the 1990s posed no health risks for either NATO soldiers handling them or the general population, the European Union said. But EU foreign ministers said that because of "apparent health and environmental problems in the region," they would remain alert to any new evidence.