


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19 Mar 2001

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

*Air University  
Air War College  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

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## **Biological weapons pose threat to Canada, U.S., scientist says**

Ed Struzik, Journal Staff Writer  
The Edmonton Journal

The day is coming when the weapon of choice for criminals, terrorists and cult groups is more apt to be a micro-organism or toxin than a gun or bomb.

That's the view of U.S. scientist Dr. Ronald Atlas who has been advising the U.S. government on the growing concern that criminals will target food, water, air and individuals with viruses, bacteria, fungi and toxins to further their cause.

Speaking at the University of Alberta on Saturday, Atlas suggested police, physicians and the public-health system in both Canada and the United States are ill-prepared to deal with the threats....

<http://www.edmontonjournal.com/city/stories/010311/5079889.html>

MONDAY MARCH 12 2001

Foot-and-mouth

## Nazis planned to use virus against Britain

FROM ROGER BOYES IN BERLIN

NAZI Germany was ready to deploy the foot-and-mouth virus as a biological weapon against Britain in the final months of the war, according to German historians.

The effect of the virus was understood by the German military which was convinced that, if efficiently delivered, foot-and-mouth could paralyse Britain. Research into the disease was part of a broad bacteriological warfare programme put together under the umbrella of Himmler's SS....

<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,2-97518,00.html>

Space News  
March 12, 2001  
Pg. 3

## Air Force Official Slams GAO Report About SBIRS Low

By Jeremy Singer, Space News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force officer running a missile tracking satellite program blasted a U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report that criticized the effort as risky.

"This report is inaccurate, and its conclusions, recommendations and basic premise are largely overcome by events," Air Force Col. Michael Booen, program director for the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low, said in a letter to his superiors.

The GAO report, released Feb. 28, described SBIRS Low as at risk of not meeting schedule, cost and capability goals. That drew a public response from U.S. Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.), the House Appropriations defense subcommittee chairman, who requested the audit. In a prepared statement released March 2, Lewis called the GAO's conclusions "very troubling."

But Booen shot back at the GAO in a strongly worded letter to his superiors at the Pentagon, using terms like false and misleading to characterize many of the report's key findings. A copy of the March 1 letter was obtained by Space News. Jim Specht, a spokesman for Lewis, did not return numerous phone calls seeking comment for this story.

SBIRS Low is a planned constellation of some 24 satellites in low Earth orbit that would track missiles in the middle portion of flight. It is a critical element of all but the most elemental versions of the planned U.S. National Missile Defense system.

In an interview with Space News, Booen said GAO's conclusions were based largely on an earlier development and deployment strategy for SBIRS Low that has since been abandoned. For example, the report did not take into account Air Force plans to stretch-out the launch schedule for the SBIRS Low satellites so that they can be tested more thoroughly in orbit, Booen noted.

Although the Air Force briefed the GAO on the new strategy prior to the completion of the final version of the report, the GAO auditors did not evaluate the new plan, Booen said in the interview.

"Contrary to the GAO report conclusions, the [Air Force] has significantly reduced the risks for SBIRS Low, has aligned the program to support missile defense, and is committed to launching the first satellites by 2006," Booen wrote in the letter.

"The GAO recommendation to restructure the program to reduce these risks would no doubt create a self-fulfilling prophesy of not meeting the congressionally mandated 2006 first launch date, and undermine early operational support to [National Missile Defense]," Booen wrote.

James Solomon, assistant director of space systems at the GAO, said SBIRS Low program officials informed him of the new plan in December. According to Solomon, however, the Pentagon's acquisition chief had not yet approved the plan and directed the Air Force to refine it and resubmit it by May. Booen disputed Solomon's account of events. In an interview, Solomon said the draft version of the Air Force's new SBIRS Low strategy appears to address some but not all of the GAO's concerns. "If they tell me the plans are finalized today, we'll take another look at it and see what they've got," Solomon added.

Much of the criticism in the GAO report was directed toward the Air Force's SBIRS Low software development strategy. The GAO said plans to complete the software more than three years after the launch of the first SBIRS Low satellite carried the risk that the software "may not be available when needed or perform as required."

Booen hotly disputed that contention.

"They are measuring us against the standard of having [the software] ready for the first launch, but that's not the standard that we're following now," Booen said.

But the GAO's auditors are not the only ones who believe the Air Force's SBIRS Low strategy is risky. Philip Coyle, recently retired as the Pentagon's director of testing and evaluation, said he is concerned that the Air Force strategy could lead to integration problems with the SBIRS Low constellation. The Air Force should perform more testing on the ground to ensure that the software allows the satellites to communicate with each other before launching them, Coyle told Space News.

GAO also found that key technology for the SBIRS Low constellation is not far enough along in development. Booen's letter called this conclusion misleading, and said the technology would be ready when needed. The Air Force is spending more than \$200 million in 2001 on SBIRS Low technology development, which "speeds up technology development like you wouldn't believe," he said during his interview.

The Air Force could launch the SBIRS Low satellites today using existing technology, but is focused on reducing the weight and increasing the lifetime of the spacecraft, Booen said.

*Special correspondent Frank Tiboni contributed to this article.*

## **CIA Is Stepping Up Attempts To Monitor Spread of Weapons**

*By Vernon Loeb*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Monday, March 12, 2001; Page A15

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet last week created a unit with 500 analysts, scientists and support personnel to focus on nonproliferation and arms control issues, calling the spread of missile technology and "weapons of mass destruction" a growing global threat.

The Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center will bring three existing CIA analytic staffs together under Alan Foley, a veteran Soviet military analyst. As head of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, he has spent the last three years supporting arms control treaty negotiators....

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55503-2001Mar11.html>

Washington Times

March 14, 2001

Pg. 1

# Hyde Hits North Korea Over Deal On Nukes

By Ben Barber, The Washington Times

Rep. Henry J. Hyde of Illinois, the Republican chairman of the House International Relations Committee, yesterday backed President Bush's hard-line stance toward North Korea, threatening to block completion of a 1994 nuclear deal unless the North clearly reveals its nuclear past.

Mr. Hyde said the nuclear deal, in which the United States, South Korea and Japan promised the North two modern atomic power plants, depends on the North explaining its earlier manufacture of plutonium "in quantities sufficient to build nuclear weapons."

The "Agreed Framework," as the deal is known, "got us past the 1994 nuclear crisis," Mr. Hyde said.

"It did so not by resolving the dispute between North Korea and the [International Atomic Energy Agency], but rather by postponing resolution of the dispute to a point well into the future."

If the dispute is not resolved, Mr. Hyde told the American Enterprise Institute, "and we continue to insist on verification, then under the terms of the Agreed Framework the reactors should not be completed."

Mr. Hyde offered the warning as North Korea abruptly canceled Cabinet-level talks with South Korea. Mr. Hyde and other knowledgeable officials in Washington say Mr. Bush's harsh warning last week that the United States would insist on "verification" of all deals with the North prompted the last-minute cancellation by the Pyongyang government.

The Bush administration's chill toward North Korea followed a year of North Korean overtures toward both the United States and South Korea, including visits to Pyongyang by Madeleine K. Albright, the secretary of state in the Clinton administration, and by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung.

"If there has been no break with the past, President Bush's insistence on verification will make it very unlikely that the nuclear reactors will ever be completed in North Korea," Mr. Hyde said.

Mr. Hyde proposed that Congress and the Bush administration form a "Bipartisan Accord on North Korea" to cement in place verification demands made by the United States.

"If the North Korean government is genuinely interested in improving relations with the United States, it too must accept that it needs to give us signs of reassurance and understanding.

"What we need is a signal of a genuine break with the past and a commitment to cooperation in the future.

"The best way for the North Korean government to send such a signal, perhaps the only way for it to do so, is to acknowledge the need for verification, to cease resisting its existing verification obligations, and to positively embrace the concept as a way of demonstrating to the world that it no longer has anything to hide."

Mr. Hyde also said any North Korean willingness to conclude a future agreement to stop missile production or proliferation must be verified.

In addition, he said that any U.S. launch of North Korean satellites —part of a missile deal now being offered by Pyongyang — must not allow the transfer of sensitive technology.

The United States negotiated the Agreed Framework in 1994 for North Korea to freeze its nuclear weapons programs in return for the provision to build twin light-water nuclear power plants and supply fuel oil until the plants were completed.

But Republicans opposed the deal because it did not allow full verification of how much plutonium the North already had produced as potential bomb fuel.

Yesterday, Mr. Hyde said Republicans had in the past slowed the framework process by delaying shipments of fuel oil.

"There is probably no more contentious foreign policy issue than this over the past decade," said Mr. Hyde, who projects considerable influence in the House. He called for a bipartisan agreement on future policy toward the North.

The Clinton administration signed the nuclear deal when worries about the North's nuclear program "gave rise to a crisis that some say almost led to war in the spring of 1994," Mr. Hyde said.

"Skeptics in Congress had few means to slow down the nuclear project, because [the reactors were] not funded by the United States [but by South Korea and Japan]. So . . . we restricted U.S. funding for the purchase of heavy fuel oil under the Agreed Framework."

It was not clear how North Korea would react to any attempt to block construction of the nuclear power plants, which were said earlier to be of a design that makes it difficult to extract nuclear weapons fuel.

Some officials have suggested offering conventional coal or oil-fired power plants instead. Others suggested simply selling or giving them electricity generated in South Korea.

The unraveling of the Agreed Framework comes as the Bush administration tacked sharply away from the previous administration's accommodating stance in recent days, with one official calling North Korean leader Kim Jong-il a "despot."

Mr. Bush's shift came as South Korean President Kim visited Washington last week seeking support for his own dovish "sunshine policy" toward the North.

Yesterday's brief announcement by North Korea that it would not attend scheduled ministerial talks — the latest in a series of high-level meetings since the leaders of North and South met in Pyongyang in June — was seen by some as a reaction to Mr. Bush's strong condemnation of North Korea last week.

Kim Sung-han, a North Korea expert at South Korea's state-funded Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, speculated in Seoul that the cancellation was "an indirect protest of the results" of the Bush-Kim summit, the Associated Press reported.

However, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher dismissed any link between a tougher U.S. policy toward the North and the cancellation as "pure speculation."

"They didn't specify any reasons for postponing the South-North ministerial," Mr. Boucher told reporters at the State Department.

"There's no reason to believe that — as has happened in the past when these things have been postponed — that this ministerial will not be rescheduled."

Jane's Defence Weekly  
March 14, 2001

## **US Army, Navy In THAAD-CEC Test Exercise**

By Michael Sirak, JDW Staff Reporter, Washington DC

The US Army and Navy last month conducted an exercise in the central Pacific as part of a continuing drive to assess the ability of the navy's Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC) to pass real-time missile tracking data to land-based army missile defence systems.

Establishing a link between navy sensors and army theatre missile defences like the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) and Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems will allow the army systems to engage targets beyond the line of sight of their radars, thereby utilising more fully the potential ranges of their interceptors, US defence officials say.

The CEC network, which Raytheon is developing, allows navy ships and aircraft to share real-time radar data and targeting information.

The 21 February exercise addressed interoperability issues related to linking the CEC with the THAAD system. It built on previous THAAD-CEC-related activities.

Participating in the exercise were a prototype THAAD radar located at the army's Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR) and two navy Aegis-class vessels, the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG70) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Russell (DDG 59).

Senior Raytheon programme official Ron Fowler said the exercise focused on one of the more challenging aspects of the THAAD-CEC integration: identifying accurately the location and orientation of the land- and sea-based sensors to establish an accurate fix on a target.

"In order to effectively network sensors, it is very important to know not only the exact location of each sensor, but also exactly where each sensor is pointed," Fowler told Jane's Defence Weekly.

To do this, he said, officials employed a new procedure under which the THAAD radar and navy sensors tracked common 'ephemeris' satellites - spacecraft with known exact trajectories - as a means of determining their relative positions.

The exercise provided "useful data", the analysis of which will help determine the plausibility of the satellite tracking method, Fowler said.

Army and navy officials planned the THAAD-CEC exercise on a more extensive DoD data-collection experiment that involved launching a sounding rocket from Wake Island into the KMR. The experiment collected "extensive optical and radar data" from numerous surface and airborne sensors that will be applied to improving the design of missile defence interceptors and sensors, the army said in a statement.

The THAAD radar and navy sensors tracked the sounding rocket and also tracked common ephemeris satellites before and after launch, Fowler said.

International Herald Tribune

March 14, 2001

## **Low Uranium Risk In Kosovo, UN Says**

By Associated Press

GENEVA -- Contamination caused by depleted uranium ammunition used in Kosovo is low, but there are still possible dangers from radiation in the water supply, the United Nations Environment Program said Tuesday.

The United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces used munitions containing depleted uranium, a slightly radioactive heavy metal, during the 78-day air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, as well as in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995.

In its final report on samples taken from 11 sites across Kosovo in November, the agency said it found low levels of radiation and mild contamination from depleted uranium dust.

Aerospace Daily

March 14, 2001

## Senators Plan Hearings On Russia Arms Sales To Iran

Two Senate Republicans said yesterday they plan to schedule hearings in response to Russia's announcement Monday that it plans to sell conventional weapons to Iran and help Tehran finish a nuclear power plant.

Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee, told The DAILY that he is "deeply concerned" about Russia's plans and intends to take a "very aggressive look" at the matter. Brownback said he wants to impress upon the Russians that the announcement is "not good" for U.S.-Russian relations, Russia or stability in the Middle East.

Sen. Gordon Smith (R-Ore.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations European Affairs Subcommittee, said that Russia's announcement is of "great concern" and "genuine alarm."

Critics of Russia's plans are concerned that Iran could use the weapons to threaten U.S. and allied forces in the region, and that the nuclear power plant technology could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Russia insisted that the conventional weapons will be for defensive purposes and that the nuclear power plant work won't help Iran's weapons programs.

Brownback and Smith held a hearing last year on allegations that the Clinton Administration reached a secret 1995 pact in which Russia avoided legally required U.S. sanctions for arms sales to Iran by agreeing to curb such exports (DAILY, Oct. 23, 26).

The Russia-Iran announcement shows the 1995 agreement "wasn't worth what paper it was written on," Smith said. State Dept. spokesman Richard Boucher said Monday the Bush Administration is awaiting details on what Russia plans to sell Iran and will be looking "particularly closely" at the sale of any advanced conventional weapons or "sensitive" technology, such as nuclear missile technology.

A 1992 U.S. law calls for the imposition of sanctions against countries that sell "destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons" to Iran. Among the law's mandatory sanctions is a one-year ban on the export of items on the U.S. munitions list, which includes satellites, although the president can waive the mandatory sanctions for "national interest" reasons.

-- *Marc Selinger*

Washington Post

March 14, 2001

Pg. 26

## \$5 Billion To Repair Nuclear Plants Sought

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Weeds are growing through one building and concrete is falling from the roof of another at the nuclear weapons plant at Oak Ridge, Tenn., which enriched the uranium used in the 1945 Hiroshima bomb and still handles every nuclear weapon going into and out of the U.S. stockpile, a top Energy Department official told Congress yesterday. Gen. John A. Gordon, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, painted a dire portrait of Oak Ridge's Y-12 Plant as he asked a Senate Appropriations subcommittee for an additional \$300 million next year for repairs to nuclear weapons production facilities.

"We need to spend an additional \$300 million to \$500 million a year over currently planned levels for the next 17 years . . . to refurbish the weapons complex to perform just its basic mission," Gordon said.

Gordon got a sympathetic reception from Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.), chairman of the subcommittee on energy and water development.

"We need to make sure that more resources are put in" to the nuclear complex, said Domenici, whose state contains two major nuclear facilities, the Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories. "This is not a place to save money over the next four years of this president -- and actually, if he tries, it will be harmful in the end."

During last year's campaign, President Bush called for dramatic cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and the administration's initial budget proposal last month contained a \$180 million reduction in the \$4.5 billion annual allotment for maintaining nuclear weapons, known as the "stockpile stewardship" program.

Gordon contended that increased funding is needed "even if the nuclear stockpile is over time made smaller." He said a tentative agreement between the Pentagon and his agency calls for refurbishing the B-61 nuclear bomb,

carried by U.S. warplanes, and the W-76 warhead, mounted on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Noting that those two weapons make up "60 percent" of the U.S. stockpile, Gordon said the existing weapons complex "cannot fully support that schedule and that plan."

Gordon also said funding is needed to consolidate nuclear weapons facilities that are "spread throughout the landscape" of the sprawling Los Alamos National Laboratory. "I need to pull together in one location at Los Alamos the nuclear operation so that we can do the safety and the protection of those facilities in one place, instead of having guards and guns at five or six or seven different locations," he said. He did not estimate the cost of such a project.

Washington Times

March 15, 2001

Pg. 1

## **U.S. Warns Russia On Dealings With Iran**

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday warned Russia that its planned arms and nuclear power deals with Iran could jeopardize its support in the West.

Saying the Bush administration intends a "realistic approach" to Moscow, Mr. Powell said at a Senate hearing that he will raise U.S. complaints forcefully with Russian officials over the Iran deals.

"If Russia wants a better relationship with the United States and the West . . . we have to be concerned when we see suggestions that they may be investing in weapons sales with regimes such as Iran," Mr. Powell told the Senate Budget Committee.

Mr. Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice met separately yesterday with Sergei Ivanov, top security adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mr. Ivanov is the highest-ranking Russian official to visit Washington since President Bush took office Jan. 20.

Mr. Ivanov talked with Miss Rice for more than two hours at the White House, then met with Mr. Powell. An administration official, speaking on background, called the discussions "very constructive and businesslike." Emerging from his meeting with the secretary of state, Mr. Ivanov said U.S. fears that Russia is selling Iran nuclear weapon technology or weapons of mass destruction are misplaced.

"In fact, there are no arms deals with Iran so far, but we discussed the possible future contracts of conventional weapons being sold by Russia to Iran and they are all legitimate," Mr. Ivanov told reporters outside the State Department.

The Bush administration repeatedly has expressed unhappiness with Russia's expanding military ties with Tehran, underscored by this week's warm summit in Moscow between Mr. Putin and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami. The sales of advanced conventional weapons and sensitive technology to Iran could have "serious ramifications," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Tuesday.

Russia has brushed aside U.S. criticisms. Mehdi Safari, Iran's ambassador to Moscow, said last month that Iran plans to purchase approximately \$7 billion in arms from Russia over the next several years.

The administration official, speaking on background, said he knew of no overall review of U.S. aid programs to Russia, but Mr. Powell said yesterday the lavish bilateral and multilateral support Russia received in the early days of the Clinton administration are over.

"Our goal should not be to make Russia our best friend, or to make it our enemy again," Mr. Powell told the Budget Committee. "We should help it through our example, through support where support is merited, but not by throwing money down on programs that don't make sense."

Mr. Powell said Russia's diplomatic and financial investment in Iran, which the United States considers a "rogue state" and a sponsor of terrorists, resembled the failed support the old Soviet Union gave to undemocratic regimes during the Cold War.

"The old Soviet Union wasted decades of treasure investing in regimes that had no future," Mr. Powell said. "It's a lesson they should have learned — that it would not be wise to invest in regimes that are not following accepted standards of international behavior."



But Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico Republican, said Russia's domestic economic woes would make it hard for the United States to constrain Moscow's foreign arms sales.

"I don't know whether you can say to a country that is having an awful time meeting its obligations that we, America, want you to behave a certain way even if it means you get no resources for your regime," Mr. Domenici said.

One proposed budget cut outlined by Mr. Powell could have a direct impact on a key Russian sector, a leading Russian oil executive said this week.

Mr. Bush's budget calls for a 21 percent cut in the Export-Import Bank, which provides loan guarantees for U.S. businesses investing in risky overseas markets.

Simon Kukes, president of Tyumen Oil Co., Russia's fourth-largest oil company and a recipient of Ex-Im guarantees in the past, said the cuts would cripple U.S. oil companies seeking Russian partners and clear the way for European and Chinese rivals.

"This is not charity money," Mr. Kukes said during a Washington visit. "It's a signal of stability. Reversing these cuts is the best thing the Bush administration could do."

Thursday, 15 March 2001

## Lab-created killer virus sparks biotech fears

By MARTIN KHOR  
Third World Network Features

*(Recent news that a new deadly virus was created during a genetic engineering experiment has set off warning bells that the use of the technology should be very carefully monitored and regulated. In the experiment that went wrong, an engineered mousepox virus acquired the capacity to damage the immune system and killed all the mice involved. The scientists warned that it is "not too difficult" to create similar viruses that are deadly to human beings. Are we in danger of new diseases created in poorly-regulated labs?)*

**THE potential hazard of applying genetic engineering for medical purposes was dramatically publicized recently when Australian scientists revealed they had accidentally created a killer version of the mousepox virus that killed all the mice in their experiment....**

<http://www.mb.com.ph/OPED/2001-03/OE031508.asp>

New York Times  
March 15, 2001

## China Willing To Talk About Missile Defenses

By Craig S. Smith

BEIJING, March 14 — China's top arms-control negotiator, reiterating the country's opposition to American development of a national missile-defense system or a smaller "theater" system in Asia, said today that China was willing to discuss the proposed antimissile shields with the United States in order to "narrow our differences."

Sha Zukang, director of China's Arms Control and Disarmament Department, called the national missile-defense plan an American attempt "to seek its own absolute security" at the expense of other countries. He also said the presence in Asia of a smaller shield would hurt stability in the region.

But he said China was heartened by the Bush administration's recent assurances that a national missile shield is not meant to neutralize China's ability to defend itself against attack. "China welcomes the statement," he said, "and we are ready to have dialogue and discussions with the Americans."

Mr. Sha's remarks come just days before China's deputy prime minister, Qian Qichen, goes to the United States to meet President Bush, where he is expected to deliver a similar message. China experts said the softer tone may be an attempt to lay the groundwork for that meeting and appears to be part of a broader effort to build trust with the new administration.

"This statement appears to mark a shift from full-on opposition to a willingness to engage in a more open dialogue about the U.S.-China strategic nuclear relationship," said Bates Gill, a Chinese military specialist at the Brookings Institution, a research group in Washington. Mr. Gill was part of a nonofficial delegation that recently met with Mr. Sha and heard similar conciliatory remarks.

James Lilley, formerly an ambassador to China who is now with the American Enterprise Institute, said Mr. Sha's remark "is consistent with other feelers we've seen coming out and we should examine them very carefully."

The United States and Japan have already agreed to joint research of a theater missile defense, which would be used to intercept missiles over a more limited area. Such a system, China fears, could be used to shield Taiwan, over which Beijing wishes to regain sovereignty.

China has urged the United States to stop selling arms to Taiwan and it is particularly distressed by the island's request for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with Aegis radar systems, which Beijing regards as potentially a piece of a theater missile-defense system.

Mr. Sha repeated the country's warnings against the Aegis sale and those warnings were also delivered today to Adm. Dennis Blair, the commander of United States forces in the Pacific, who is visiting Beijing. Mr. Qian is expected to repeat those warnings to Mr. Bush when he visits Washington next week.

"Among the arms they have sold or proposed to sell to Taiwan, Aegis is the worst," said Mr. Sha.

Mr. Sha also said that if Japan put in place a theater system, China would consider it the forward deployment of a potentially larger missile defense for the United States. But China would not object to a theater system that is limited to protecting American troops or ships, he said.

American proposals for a system that would protect all the United States have drawn strong opposition from many countries, most notably Russia and China. The Russians, though, have softened their opposition and last month proposed an alternative missile-defense system to Washington. Now China may be following Russia's lead.

Mr. Sha said China feels particularly disadvantaged because of its limited nuclear arsenal and inability to develop more advanced nuclear warheads because of its adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits countries from testing nuclear bombs.

He said a national missile defense, if pursued, would be tantamount to a unilateral expansion of the United States' nuclear weapons capability because it would neutralize other countries' ability to make defensive strikes in response to an American attack. He also warned that it could trigger a new global arms race.

Washington Post

March 15, 2001

Pg. 20

## **WHO To Test Health Effects Of Depleted Uranium In Iraq**

By Howard Schneider, Washington Post Foreign Service

BASRA, Iraq -- The Iraqi government has for years insisted that the use of depleted uranium shells by U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War inflicted serious environmental damage here in the southern part of the country. Parts of the desert around Basra remain littered with spent ammunition and the hulls of tanks and other vehicles destroyed by the ultra-hard rounds. Iraqi doctors say the health effects have become increasingly obvious, including abnormal incidence of genetic problems and cancer among children.

In a climate of hostility toward the Iraqi government and in particular President Saddam Hussein, these reports have largely been disregarded in the West. But now, with concern rising in Europe about exposure to depleted uranium munitions used in the bombing of Yugoslav targets during the Kosovo war, the Iraqi claims will get a new review.

A team of World Health Organization officials will arrive here this month to analyze whether there is a link between the use of depleted uranium shells in the Gulf War and cancer or birth defect rates in this part of Iraq. The WHO study fits with other efforts to see whether the ammunition has damaged the health of those who used it or those against whom it was directed -- in the 1991 Gulf War as well as the Balkans conflict eight years later.

Initial WHO analyses in Kosovo, as well as Defense Department and other military studies, have concluded there is no connection between the ammunition and cancer or other health effects, including "Gulf War Syndrome". A U.N. Environmental Program study released Tuesday showed "no cause for alarm" over radiation from the controversial munitions, but urged monitoring for unknown long-term effects.

But mounting concern, particularly among NATO countries whose troops were deployed in Yugoslavia, has intensified the demand for further testing. This has made Iraqis feel the issue is finally getting the attention it deserves. But they are also angry that the United Nations and others did not seem to care when they were the only ones concerned about it.

"We have been talking about this a lot, and nobody really listened," said Abdel Karim Hassan Sabr, deputy director of the Hospital for Maternity and Children in Basra.

Depleted uranium shells were developed for use against tanks and other vehicles, effective because of their armor-piercing strength. The shells are coated in the metal left over after uranium ore is processed for use in nuclear reactors or weapons. It is less radioactive than naturally occurring uranium, but in some instances may also contain traces of plutonium or other highly radioactive substances.

Independent of its radioactive properties, depleted uranium also has the potentially toxic properties of other heavy metals.

Top Iraqi officials have tried, as did their counterparts in Yugoslavia, to maximize the potential propaganda value of the issue. But Sabr and other doctors say that the evidence they see requires further analysis -- a thorough epidemiological treatment, rather than the back-of-the-envelope calculations done to date in southern Iraq.

Sabr said, for example, that between 1993 and last year, the rate of congenital defects among live births at the Basra hospital rose from 1.8 percent to more than 4 percent. "Couples here are afraid of getting pregnant," he said. "They are afraid of the birth defects."

So far, however, he said the hospital has not studied the intervening years or prior years, to establish a more detailed record. Nor has it had the time or money to try to determine whether postwar population shifts, intermarriage patterns or other environmental factors might have contributed to the increase.

The area around Basra is heavily industrialized, the flat desert horizon frequently broken with the smokestacks of oil refineries and chemical plants, more often than not emitting a thick black or gray plume of pollution. Near the Shatt al-Arab waterway, in low-lying, marshy areas, oily slicks of water are visible from the roadway.

For 20 years the region has been a focal point of conflict, beginning with the war against Iran during the 1980s and continuing through the Gulf War and a decade of sanctions.

The remnants of those battles are prominent, both in the form of plentiful war memorials -- statues pointing toward the Iranian enemy; an Iraqi soldier slaying a sea serpent -- as well as destroyed vehicles, bridges and buildings.

The region remains heavily militarized, with machine guns propped atop Toyota pickups and frequent roadside sentries deployed throughout an area whose Shiite Muslim population broke into open revolt against the largely Sunni Muslim government in Baghdad after the Gulf War ended.

The uprising was suppressed with force, a fact that contributed to the U.S. and British decision to impose a "no-fly" zone over this part of the country, as well as over the northern provinces that are home to Iraq's rebellious Kurdish minority.

The southern region is also poor, a fact Iraqis blame on international sanctions and the U.S. and British air patrols that nix any hope of private investment. Western officials consider its economic conditions a sign of Baghdad's neglect.

But Iraqi health and political officials insist the depleted uranium shells lie somewhere at the root of what they contend is an epidemic.

"We have found the relationship between these things and cancer, and we have announced it," said Gen. Abdel Wahab Jabouri, who serves on an Iraqi committee on depleted uranium that has tried to trace health problems among Iraqi troops to service in areas where the ammunition was most intensively used.

"The uranium causes these diseases," he said. "The subject doesn't need further evidence. Even Americans are complaining."

## Russia Will Build Reactor For Iran

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

Russian nuclear power officials said yesterday they will build a second nuclear reactor for Iran amid mounting concerns on Capitol Hill over Moscow's growing military and technology sales to Tehran.

A bipartisan group of lawmakers, meanwhile, will ask President Bush in a letter today to slash aid to Russia if arms deals — announced this week during a Moscow summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami — proceed.

The Bush administration, which considers Iran a rogue state and a sponsor of terrorism, warned Mr. Putin this week that sales of arms and nuclear technology to Iran would have "serious ramifications" for U.S.-Russian ties.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher declined to comment on the latest reactor deal, but added: "Our overall policy in this area is quite well known."

Russia in November abrogated a secret understanding with the Clinton administration that it would refrain from new arms deals with Iran. The Putin-Khatami meeting provided the first official fruits of the warming military relationship between the two countries.

Operators of a St. Petersburg nuclear plant are already at work on one nuclear reactor contract, worth about \$800 million, that Tehran says will supply power from the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr.

The U.S. government has protested that Russian technology could be used to develop nuclear weapons.

Mr. Khatami toured the site of the St. Petersburg plant yesterday as part of the first visit by an Iranian leader to Russia in four decades.

Afterward, factory General-Director Yevgeny Sergeev told reporters that Mr. Khatami confirmed plans to order a second reactor after the first is delivered, possibly by late next year.

Delays in delivering the first plant — first ordered in the mid-1990s — have been a source of friction between Iran and Russia.

But Mr. Sergeev said yesterday the Iranian leader signaled his clear intention to proceed with a second contract that could be worth up to \$1 billion for Russia's cash-strapped export sector.

Rep. Joseph M. Hoeffel, Pennsylvania Democrat and the principal author of the letter to be sent to Mr. Bush today, noted that a 1996 anti-terrorism law prohibits U.S. aid to countries that "provide lethal military equipment to terrorist states."

"We want a good relationship with the Russians," Mr. Hoeffel said in a telephone interview yesterday.

"But they can't expect a good relationship with us if they don't see the necessity of not selling arms to a rogue nation that sponsors terrorists," he added.

Iran has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1984.

The United States provided more than \$1 billion in assistance to Russia in fiscal year 2000, including \$196 million under the Freedom Support Act; \$222 million through Department of Energy programs; and \$240 million in food assistance through the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Another \$360 million in funds under a program to reduce and control the old Soviet Union's nuclear-missile storage sites would not be affected any aid cutoff, said Mr. Hoeffel.

"The strategic implications of Russia's arms transfers to Iran cannot be underestimated," the congressional letter warned.

"Russia's recent actions should stimulate intense scrutiny by the United States, and while we recognize the waiver authority granted in this law, we urge you to act swiftly and appropriately," the lawmakers wrote to Mr. Bush.

Signers included former House International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman, New York Republican; Rep. Gary L. Ackerman, New York Democrat and ranking minority member of the International Relations subcommittee on the Middle East; Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, Maryland Democrat; and Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican and a leading voice among congressional Republicans on Russian issues.

Mr. Boucher said the administration had not yet received the letter and declined to comment on its contents.

Russian officials have rejected U.S. complaints about the Iranian deals, saying they were a bilateral matter between two sovereign states.

Sergei Ivanov, Mr. Putin's top security adviser, told senior Bush administration officials during a visit to Washington this week that Russia planned to sell only defensive arms and the sales would not destabilize the region.

Returning to Moscow yesterday, Mr. Ivanov told reporters he had had productive meetings with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

"We had a good understanding on maintaining everything we achieved which was good under the previous administration and on creating new mechanisms," said Mr. Ivanov. He said Moscow and Washington are still discussing new institutions for handling the bilateral relationship, to replace the joint commissions of the Clinton years chaired by Vice President Al Gore and a succession of Russian prime ministers.

*This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

Wall Street Journal

March 16, 2001

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Washington Wire

## **Rumsfeld's Rule: Don't Move Too Fast On Building A Missile-Defense Shield**

The defense secretary appears likely to say no to a Pentagon plan to start construction in July on a ground-based shield similar to one Clinton proposed. The Pentagon would award a contract April 16 for site preparation in Alaska for the shield's radar. Missile-defense fans in Congress have hoped Bush would start work this year to show support for the system, but the move would create diplomatic tensions.

Pentagon officials say it doesn't matter whether work in Alaska begins this year or in 2002. The earliest a shield could be completed is 2006. Rumsfeld, meantime, continues to review several ground, sea and space-based options to ultimately develop a national missile-defense system.

*-- Ronald G. Shafer*

Wall Street Journal (WSJ.com)

March 16, 2001

## **White House Plans Deep Reductions In Russia Nuclear-Safeguard Fund**

By Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration plans deep cuts in programs aimed at helping Russia safeguard its nuclear materials even though a recent high-level commission called the program essential to national security. A proposed budget for fiscal 2002, now being put together by the administration, would cut spending for Russian nuclear nonproliferation activities to \$800 million from \$872 million, government and private sources said Thursday.

The cuts were ordered by the White House despite several attempts by Energy Secretary Spence Abraham to obtain more money for a program widely supported by nonproliferation advocates, said these sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Energy Department originally had hoped for a substantial increase in financial support for the program. A Clinton administration draft proposed more than \$1.2 billion for the fiscal year starting Oct. 1, the sources said. In January, a bipartisan, private commission called the risk of theft of Russian nuclear materials "the most urgent unmet national security threat" facing the United States and urged sharp increases in spending.

The Energy Department initiatives targeted by budget cutters include programs aimed at reinforcing security at Russian nuclear weapons facilities, providing help to economically strapped Russian nuclear scientists and helping Russia convert weapons-grade plutonium to less-threatening materials.

While changes may still be made in the funding levels before President Bush sends Congress his detailed budget proposals for fiscal year 2002, several attempts by the department to get additional money already have been rebuffed by the Office of Management and Budget, the sources said.

"This budget signals a retreat from a decade's worth of work with Russia to secure nuclear weapons expertise and materials," said William Hoehn of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a nonproliferation advocacy group.

According to the latest Energy Department budget document, programs to increase security at Russian nuclear facilities would be cut by \$31 million to about \$170 million. The Energy Department sought an increase to \$225 million.

The government's Russia "nuclear cities" program, aimed at finding jobs and getting economic aid to Russian nuclear scientists, would be cut by \$20 million to about \$7 million, the sources said.

Mr. Bush will ask for more money to dispose of Russia's excess plutonium stocks, but the amount falls far short of the proposed doubling of the \$226 million program that the Clinton administration proposed, the sources said.

Reports of the budget cuts brought a sharp response Thursday from Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

"Dramatic cuts to these programs ... may cripple our efforts to secure nuclear material in Russia and ensure that Russia's nuclear physicists are gainfully employed in nondefense-related industries," Ms. Tauscher wrote Mitchell Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget.

In January, a top-level, bipartisan commission issued a report recommending top priority and sharply increased on the Russian nonproliferation assistance programs. The panel said the risks of Russian nuclear materials being obtained by terrorists or unfriendly smaller states is significant and real.

The report urged spending of \$30 billion over 10 years to help Russia keep its nuclear materials and atomic scientists out of the hands of rogue states or terrorists. Such spending would be a prudent investment in world security, the commission concluded in a report sent to the Energy Department and White House.

The panel was co-chaired by former GOP Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee and Lloyd Cutler, a White House counsel for former President Clinton. The commission also included former Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia and former Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., both widely respected experts on nonproliferation and national security.

Defense Daily  
March 16, 2001  
Pg. 3

## **Missile Defense, TacAir Two Top Priorities For HASC R&D Panel**

By Frank Wolfe

Ensuring theater defense against faster missiles and continuing the debate over tactical aviation are two top priorities for Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's (HASC) research and development (R&D) panel.

"I think missile defense is going to be a key area," Hunter told Defense Daily in an interview yesterday. "I think we've entered the age of missiles in the same way [Army Gen.] Billy Mitchell warned us in the 1920s we'd enter the age of airpower. If we don't acquire the ability to shoot down not only the slower, Scud-type missiles, but the new, hotter missiles, like the [Iranian] Shahab and the [North Korean] Taepo Dong II, we're going to be facing a situation in which potential adversaries have the ability to overwhelm systems like the PAC-3, purely as a function of speed." Lockheed Martin [LMT] is the prime contractor for the Army's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile system. The Bush administration has spoken of its commitment to fielding missile defense systems and has chosen not to delineate theater systems, like PAC-3, from national missile defense.

"Instead of defining this geographically in terms of theater defense versus national missile defense, what American military leaders are going to have to accept is the fact that the missile threat is manifested in missiles that are much faster than we anticipated a few years ago," Hunter said. "If we're going to protect our troops in theater, we have to have the ability to shoot down fast missiles... We're going to have to be able to take down missiles that go faster than three kilometers per second."

Such capability, however, may violate agreements on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that the Clinton administration negotiated with Russia and that demarcated theater missile defense systems from national missile defense systems.

HASC R&D panel members have recently received briefings from Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, on missile defense.

HASC will also be interested in continuing the debate over the military tactical aviation programs--the Lockheed Martin F-22, Boeing [BA] F/A-18E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter. But assuring the viability of tactical aviation will depend largely on the defense topline, Hunter said. "Let's see what the administration comes up with. The topline is very important. I think you've got to have long-range bomber capability. I think one of the lessons of Kosovo is that stealth coupled with precision munitions is a very effective way of projecting power," Hunter said. "[And] you've got to have TacAir in sufficient capability to do what we have to do."

Hunter said that DoD and Department of Energy spending should amount to at least \$360 billion to execute current programs. "I don't think you can get there from here without \$360 billion. That's the cold, clinical analysis without any new systems. That's with a fairly spartan agenda just to replace old platforms," Hunter said.

Other needs that Congress may address in the FY '02 defense bills or in an FY '01 supplemental include a \$3.5 billion Army ammunition shortfall and \$6.9 billion to close a pay gap between the military and civilians.

For the HASC R&D panel, "continued infusion of technology into the New Attack Submarine is important," Hunter said. Such technology insertion will allow the Virginia-class submarines (SSN-774) to stay ahead of the diesel submarine threat and more sophisticated threats, he said.

General Dynamics [GD] and Newport News Shipbuilding [NNS] are teamed on the Virginia-class program.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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## **Mission Impossible**

By Henry D. Sokolski

*Described as "preventive defense" or "extended deterrence" by its supporters--but decried as "a new form of gunboat diplomacy" by its detractors--a new program called the "Counterproliferation Initiative" was unveiled in December 1993 by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin.*

*There was considerable controversy over what "counterproliferation" meant. But it was widely interpreted as indicating that the United States--having recently demonstrated overwhelming military superiority in the Gulf War--would now flex its muscles even further, looking into the ways and means of preemptively striking regional troublemakers or would-be attackers.*

*Although there was talk of building conventional weapons capable of destroying deeply buried targets like command centers (Aspin said both new strategies and new military capabilities were needed), the initiative envisioned the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defeat chemical or biological weapons. The idea, simply, was to "locate, neutralize, or destroy" others' weapons of mass destruction before they could be used. For the first time, the United States openly added targets in the Third World to its nuclear-weapons targeting plan.*

*Now, after eight years of reality, the initiative has morphed into something much less than promised. Author Henry Sokolski describes the process.*

The fate of President Bill Clinton's "Counterproliferation Initiative" was tethered to its strategic assumptions. An initial interest in devising plans for preemptive strikes against foreign proliferation activities simply ignored the American culture's bias against launching Pearl Harbor-like attacks. More important, the initiative at first presumed that some military-technical means could neutralize proliferation problems. And that, in fact, turned out to be inherently difficult, if not impossible.

Strategic weapons (long-range missiles and nuclear weapons) are of proliferation concern, after all, precisely because no effective military countermeasures against them are yet available, and because only a few strategic weapons can produce war-winning or victory-denying results. To presume that there could be some finite military solution to proliferation is to seriously underestimate what the threat is about.

The sources of these initial misunderstandings can best be understood by tracking the origins of the initiative, which were rooted in the fallout from the war against Iraq.

First, despite clear U.S. military superiority over Baghdad, Iraq's missiles and chemical and biological weapons stockpiles--and its fledgling nuclear program--heightened concern that the United States would eventually face enemies armed with strategic weapons.

Second, critics of the first Bush administration complained that U.S. export controls had failed to prevent Iraq from acquiring the advanced technologies needed to develop these capabilities. Together, these two events (and the presidential election in 1992), put tremendous pressure on the Bush administration to come up with some sort of response.

Late in the summer of 1992, the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources suggested a reorganization aimed at strengthening Defense Department efforts against strategic weapons proliferation. The proposal called for a new deputy under secretary of defense to be created to oversee the activities of the Defense Trade Security Administration, the Office of the Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Conventional Forces and Arms Control Policy.

Ironically, the suggested title for this deputy--"Deputy Under Secretary for Counterproliferation"--had been considered for the director of proliferation countermeasures three years before, but rejected as too vague.

### **Intriguing questions**

Did creating a deputy for counterproliferation mean that the Defense Department intended to neutralize weapons of mass destruction with advanced technology? Or was "countering" to be accomplished with more traditional military counteroffensives or with counterintelligence? Did counterproliferation--whatever it was--include traditional nonproliferation efforts, or were these activities at odds with one another?

By 1992, these questions seemed intriguing. Literally hundreds of draft view charts were composed explaining what counterproliferation might mean and what a deputy under secretary implementing it might do. But none of these briefings was ever used.

In September 1992, Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Atwood thought the better of reorganizing the department during the closing months of a presidential campaign and put a freeze on the creation of new offices. Then, two months later, President George Bush lost the election.

### **True believers**

President Bill Clinton and the new officials he brought on were eager to reorganize the government, including the offices focused on proliferation issues. Several senior Clinton defense advisers had already considered what was needed while serving as members of the Defense Policy and Defense Science Boards of the Bush administration. The Defense Science Board, in particular, had spent more than a year analyzing what new defensive and counteroffensive technologies might be developed to respond if other nations threatened to use chemical, biological, or nuclear armed ballistic missiles. The board concluded that, with enough advanced sensors, counteroffensive missile technologies, and intelligence, the U.S. military might be able to destroy the bulk of an enemy's offensive missiles before they ever left their launchers.

Two key Democratic board members--John Deutch, who later served as under secretary for acquisition and then deputy secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, and Ashton Carter, who became assistant secretary of defense for nuclear security and counterproliferation--warmly embraced the board's findings.

In an essay on intelligence requirements written for the Council on Foreign Relations prior to his appointment, Carter argued that combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with precision weapons required precise and timely intelligence. What was most critical, he argued, was to know when a nation was about to acquire one or two weapons and where these weapons might be. It was one thing, he noted, to collect intelligence on nations acquiring fissile material to make their first bomb, but:

"Planning an air strike on the nuclear facilities of a nation approaching construction of a first bomb, by contrast, requires entirely different types of collection and analysis. Military planners need to study the building the raid is supposed to destroy. The aircraft delivering the bombs will require information about the location, radar frequencies, and signal structures, and command and control of air defenses surrounding the target. If cruise missiles and other 'smart weapons' are to be used, terrain contour maps, terminal area images, global positioning coordinates, and other precision guidance information will have to be assembled."<sup>1</sup>

Although this kind of planning would naturally be useful to limit damage once a new nuclear nation went to war against the United States, in another section of his essay, titled "Attacking a Fledgling Program or Arsenal," Carter also emphasized that it would be particularly useful if the United States were planning an offensive attack.

### **The counterproliferation initiative**

Planning to fight proliferation and even to launch preemptive strikes was something new. More importantly, the idea resonated with Les Aspin, the new defense secretary, who as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee had



argued that the spread of weapons of mass destruction was now the country's number one security concern. On December 7, 1993, after months of briefings on what a counterproliferation initiative might be, Aspin announced the program before an audience at the National Academy of Sciences.

Much of his speech was straightforward. In addition to working with the State Department to try to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Aspin called on the Defense Department to work harder to protect against these weapons' possible use. But what caught most people's attention was the secretary's assertion that providing such protection constituted a new, unique military mission, and that he had formally directed the military services to "develop new military capabilities to execute it."<sup>2</sup>

Although Aspin left the Pentagon soon after announcing the initiative, he tried his best to institutionalize it. First, he established a new post for Carter--assistant secretary for nuclear security and counterproliferation. Second, he instructed the military services to identify research and acquisition programs that needed to be funded to accomplish the new counterproliferation mission. He also had his deputy, John Deutch, make counterproliferation a Defense Department acquisition priority. Finally, he saw to it that language was introduced in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994 requiring his successor to identify precisely what additional counterproliferation spending was needed.

Not surprisingly, the first half of 1994 was a busy one for the initiative's supporters. In addition to Carter and his deputy assistant secretary for counterproliferation, another deputy assistant secretary for counterproliferation was created within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

This new deputy was immediately put to work to answer congressional reporting requirements concerning what new spending would be required. In May, Deputy Secretary Deutch asked the military services to find \$400 million a year to fund 14 "underfunded" counterproliferation programs that his acquisition staff had identified. (These programs included development of radars that might find underground command centers, systems that could acquire mobile Scud missile launchers before they fired their missiles, and non-nuclear munitions that might interfere with an adversary's electronic command, control, and communications systems.)<sup>3</sup>

The military services were hardly enthusiastic. After months of review, they had earmarked no more than \$80 million for possible use to fund programs supporting the counterproliferation mission. The Office of the Secretary of Defense dropped any further talk of securing hundreds of millions of dollars for counterproliferation, and instead, Clinton's defense appointees began to claim that the entire defense budget was in one way or another dedicated to counterproliferation. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, contended that the counterproliferation "mission" was not a separate undertaking but was incorporated into all existing military missions.

Why was the military's initial support of the counterproliferation initiative so weak? Several Pentagon observers believe that the Clinton Pentagon simply asked the military to make too great a financial sacrifice. While Deputy Secretary Deutch was asking the military to find \$400 million in existing budget authority for counterproliferation, the White House was demanding significant cuts in overall Defense spending. This undermined the secretary's credibility.

The services also resented having counterproliferation forced on them as a separate mission requirement with little or no prior consultation. Certainly, the services could see the need to do more to prepare to fight in nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare environments. But that preparation was something they believed had to be done as part of existing military requirements to assure command of sea, air, and land.

Finally, some in the military were uneasy about the idea of preemptive war, although their concerns were generally not shared by Special Operations staffs: But what were the legal, moral, and operational ramifications of using U.S. military force before open hostilities began?

The military's concerns were amplified by the U.S. arms control community. They too suspected that the preemptive war aspect of the initiative was far more significant than publicly stated. They also were concerned that the Defense Department was abandoning its hardline opposition to lax export controls, especially over dual-use items (computers, diagnostic equipment, and other items useful for making strategic weapons). Counterproliferation was what the Defense Department would do after export controls had failed to prevent proliferation: The department's traditional use of military threat assessments to fortify other agencies' export control efforts no longer seemed to be a priority.

Finally, arms control supporters worried that nonproliferation itself was being challenged. On the one hand, counterproliferation's backers were arguing that with enough military effort (and spending), the United States could so mitigate the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction that it and its allies could prevail on the battlefield even if those weapons were used.<sup>4</sup> Yet, if this were so, existing nonproliferation taboos against their use, which the United States had always been eager to strengthen, would be undermined.

Then there was the problem of deterrence. Lacking chemical or biological weapons, the U.S. military reserved the option of deterring their use (and the use of nuclear weapons as well) by threatening U.S. nuclear counterstrikes. Yet

the more the Pentagon developed this option, the more arms control advocates worried that it would make other nations' acquisition of nuclear weapons seem justified. All of this and the initiative's feared flirtations with preventive war encouraged extensive debate.

### **Death by definition?**

Counterproliferation also prompted substantive and bureaucratic worries at the State Department, which had traditionally maintained control over proliferation issues. But the Defense Department's initiative now threatened this. In the weeks following Aspin's announcement of the Counterproliferation Initiative, debates broke out between State and Defense officials and even within the Defense Department itself over what the initiative covered. Some officials wanted all proliferation concerns, including advanced conventional weapons, to be included; others did not. There also were disagreements over who was in control of counterproliferation policy. The State Department insisted that it should be in command of the initiative since State chaired the interagency working group on proliferation. Defense, meanwhile, was just as insistent that it have a free hand because the counterproliferation initiative was its idea, and it was footing most of the bill. The Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Energy Department also had a stake in the matter, as did the intelligence agencies that were trying to budget and reorganize themselves to respond to new requirements.

In January 1994, the National Security Council (NSC) staff was asked to resolve the issue. By mid-February, the council settled the key dispute between State and Defense by brokering a set of definitions that both departments could accept but that favored State. Proliferation was defined descriptively: "The spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities and the missiles to deliver them." Meanwhile, nonproliferation was defined as Washington's comprehensive policy against proliferation, which employed the "full range of political, economic and military tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically, or protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles, should that prove necessary. Nonproliferation tools include: intelligence, global nonproliferation norms and agreements, diplomacy, export controls, security assurances, defenses, and the application of military force."<sup>5</sup>

This definition of nonproliferation reduced counterproliferation to Defense Department activities "with particular responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles."<sup>6</sup>

Although somewhat confusing, this definition had three clear advantages.

First, by keeping nonproliferation as the comprehensive term to describe U.S. efforts against the spread of weapons capable of mass destruction, the policy focus was kept on the most horrible and indiscriminate weapons and on existing international and U.S. diplomatic nonproliferation efforts in general. It gave the State Department ultimate control over any counterproliferation effort; by definition, counterproliferation was subsumed under nonproliferation.

Second, it avoided the vagueness inherent to any set of prescriptive definitions. A prescriptive definition might help clarify why weapons of mass destruction were of proliferation concern and what else might qualify and why. But those definitions were certain to generate the kind of debates over what should be included that the NSC definition memo was crafted to avoid.

Finally, by limiting proliferation to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them, the NSC definition kept conventional military systems and dual-use items that the United States wanted to export to its friends out of the web of nonproliferation export controls.

The bureaucratic advantages that these definitions offered, however, came at price. As long as proliferation concerns were limited to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, any hope of developing truly effective military countermeasures (distinct from defenses and damage-limiting measures) would necessarily remain distant. More important, the NSC definitions and their preoccupation with weapons capable of mass destruction kept counterproliferation from addressing the technical revolution in military affairs that even smaller nations were engaged in.

Thus, some of the most interesting of emerging strategic threats were placed beyond the initiative's reach. This was regrettable because some new threats (particularly those posed by conventional cruise missiles, crude information warfare, and submersibles) were precisely the ones that were most amenable to the development of effective military countermeasures and targeted export controls.

### **The concept in operation**

The military services' staffs began to take more serious steps to evaluate the damage-limitation requirements that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons might impose against U.S. forces, and in 1993 they created a Joint Program Office to address the shortcomings in U.S. preparations to fight adversaries who might use such weapons. More important, the military finally began to conduct annual war games that focused on the effects that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons might have on U.S. forces. A little more than a year after Aspin's announcement

of the counterproliferation initiative, the navy incorporated nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threats into its annual Navy War College war game, "Nimble Dancer." Serious problems were encountered in playing out these games, but the navy decided at the highest levels to continue to highlight chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons threats in follow-on war games.

Financially, however, the initiative enjoyed only mixed success. As noted before, Deputy Secretary Deutch attempted in 1994 to increase government-wide funding for counterproliferation-relevant research and hardware acquisition by some \$400 million annually. Yet even the White House requested only \$164 million. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs earmarked only a third of the \$230 million in Defense Department counterproliferation shortfalls Deutch had identified (the other shortfalls were associated with the intelligence community and the Energy Department).

Two years later, things had not improved. In fact, an internal Pentagon review in 1996 concluded that the department was still failing to fund some of the highest priority counterproliferation programs (biological agent detectors, for instance). Finally, in 1999, the department announced it would spend approximately \$1 billion over the next five years to address these deficiencies. In one controversial program, many in the military forces were vaccinated against anthrax, but the safety of the vaccine was questioned.

As for the operational implementation of counterproliferation, the Defense Department initially did some planning and actually considered two offensive campaigns.

In 1993 the United States acted on intelligence that the Chinese were shipping chemical weapons-related materials to Iran. The White House considered interdicting the shipment, but the suspect ship, the Yin He, turned out not to be carrying the illicit materials.

Second, during the 1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea, the U.S. Air Force briefed Defense Secretary William Perry on how it might bomb the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, although the White House chose a diplomatic approach instead. In exchange for several billion dollars in oil and nuclear energy assistance, North Korea pledged not to operate its known nuclear facilities, eventually to allow inspections, and ultimately to dismantle the facilities.

The two largest counterproliferation operations that the services actually executed came four years later. In 1998, U.S. cruise missiles were fired against a suspected Sudanese chemical weapons plant and against Iraqi chemical, biological, and missile production plants.

Neither campaign was a clear success. Following the attack against Sudan, evidence emerged that the plant U.S. missiles destroyed was a pharmaceutical facility, not a weapons factory. As for Operation Desert Fox against Iraq, its effects were only temporary. As Gen. Anthony Zinni, the commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, publicly noted, bombing Saddam's biological and chemical plants could hardly stop those programs because making chemical and biological weapons is relatively easy.

None of these events helped the initiative bureaucratically. Unable to secure large sums for a new, separate, counterproliferation mission, Defense Department officials began arguing that nearly the entire defense budget was targeted against the threat of proliferation.

In 1996 Defense Secretary Perry eliminated the posts of assistant secretary for counterproliferation and deputy assistant secretary of defense for counterproliferation. By 2000 all that remained within Defense was a counterproliferation directorate. Its most public function was to coordinate proliferation-related meetings with nato and other nations. The bulk of the initiative's acquisition activities, which focused on passive biological and chemical weapons defenses, continued.

The initiative's emphasis clearly had shifted. Originally the initiative was animated by the prospect that offensive military operations might neutralize or roll-back the threat of strategic weapons proliferation. Seven years later, however, the initiative had been reduced to a less heroic but still critical concern of limiting whatever damage U.S. expeditionary forces might suffer if, as seemed likely, chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons were used against them. In short, the word counterproliferation had survived, but the hope that the initiative might neutralize the proliferation threats the United States and its allies faced, had not.

#### **NOTES:**

1. Robert D. Blackwill and Ashton B. Carter, "The Role of Intelligence," in *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*, Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds. (New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 234.
2. "Remarks by Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, December 7, 1993," reprinted in *The Counter-Proliferation Debate* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 1993).
3. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs," May 1, 1994, p. ES-2.

4. See, for example, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), p. iii; and Ashton Carter and Celeste Johnson, "Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative To A Revolution in Counterproliferation Affairs," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1999, pp. 83-90.

5. Daniel Poneman, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls, Memorandum for Robert Gallucci (Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, Department of State) and Ashton Carter (Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, Department of Defense), "Agreed Definitions," February 18, 1994.

6. *Ibid.*

*This article is adapted from Best of Intentions: Americas Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (2001), by Henry D. Sokolski. Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C., served in the Defense Department as Secretary Dick Cheney's deputy for nonproliferation policy from 1989-93.*

## **Pakistan Navy Tests Missile From French-Made Sub**

KARACHI (Reuters) - The Pakistan navy said on Saturday it had test-fired a conventional anti-ship missile from a newly acquired French submarine.

A naval statement said the successful missile test from the submerged submarine "has added tremendously to the anti-surface capabilities of Pakistan Navy."

The sub-surface missile was launched from the French-made submarine renamed Khalid 80 nautical miles south west of Karachi.

It said a separate missile test was also carried out from an Atlantic aircraft of the navy in the same area.

Both missiles were from the Exocet family, the navy said, but gave no details on the distance they can travel.

The missile tests come two weeks after the navy said it may consider arming submarines with nuclear missiles in future "for deterrence" against India....

[http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010310/wl/pakistan\\_missiles\\_dc\\_1.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010310/wl/pakistan_missiles_dc_1.html)

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**Stars and Stripes First Person**

## **Anthrax Vaccine Victims' Advocate: 'I Don't Want Them To Feel Alone'**

By Dave Eberhart, Stars and Stripes Veterans Affairs Editor

*(Stars and Stripes Omnimedia is a privately owned news source and is in no way affiliated with the U.S. government.)*

"These people feel trapped into accepting treatment from the same system that injured them," Redmond Handy tells me somberly in the lobby of the military medical center. Handy looks like a G-man in his trench coat and military haircut. The black nylon bag he carries bulges with files on what he calls his "people," young servicemen and women who have had serious reactions to the controversial anthrax vaccine.

He lays out the ground rules: no pictures, no names, no branch of service, no identification of gender, and minimal particulars on medical conditions--as these, too, may reveal the patient's identity. Even the location of the medical center where we stand must be cloaked.

It is little consolation when he assures me that his people will go on the record after they are safely retired, with the issues of perpetual care and disability retirement percentages fixed.

Handy sets off briskly on his rounds with me following--no camera, no notebook, no pen. "They are scattered around the hospital," my guide says. It is late evening and the hospital is relatively deserted. "It's better at night," he reveals conspiratorially.

After a lot of travel down long, buffed corridors, we come to the first ward. Handy leads me past the charge nurse's desk.

### **Paralyzed, Depressed**

"Don't we have to check in or something?" I ask. "I don't," he replies, stopping before a closed door. After a couple of raps, an older gentleman, the patient's father, opens the door, smiles at Handy and gestures that we should enter. On the bed to the left, the patient lies uncovered on the patient's side, eyes closed, facing the wall.

From my pre-visit briefing I know that the patient rapidly declined after the sixth anthrax shot. The patient is now paralyzed on one side of the body. It has affected speech and the patient has been depressed.

The bedside table has pictures of the patient's new baby. More pictures of the newborn fill a cork bulletin board on the wall the patient faces. Handy knows the father, as well as the patient from previous visits. His bedside manner is reverent as he confers with the father. There is no good news about the patient's condition.

The next patient we visit is much worse off--almost totally paralyzed, with only some movement in one hand. As with the first patient, this servicemember's decline quickly followed vaccination. With this victim, the symptoms began in earnest after only the third shot. The patient's breathing is helped by a tube protruding from an incision at the base of the neck.

"We almost lost [the patient] last week," Handy had revealed in his pre-visit briefing. "What's the prognosis?" I had asked, afraid to learn the fate of this young person who had been healthy and vigorous. "[The] mother told me last visit that the doctor said that there is nothing more they can do."

The patient's mother is on hand tonight. She never leaves, sleeping in a nearby room right in the hospital.

"It doesn't take a rocket scientist to know why [the patient] is like this," she says angrily, before quickly regaining her composure. She is by nature a gentlewoman but scared for the patient. Twenty-four hour care is needed into the foreseeable future, and that is going to require a real commitment from the government. The doctors don't highlight the vaccine in the medical jargon that fills the patient's charts and records, she says--not a good sign.

### **Watching 'Survivor'**

The patient pays little attention to the visitors, but watches "Survivor" on the television set affixed to the wall. The contestants are running, jumping and squealing. I wonder what the patient is thinking--

A telephone call reveals that patient number three is not presently on any ward of the hospital proper but resting at the nearby military guesthouse. Handy and I take a break in the hospital's cafeteria, which features a late-evening snack menu.

Over the weekend the patient has been rehydrated with intravenous fluids, Handy tells me. It is the patient's fifth trip to the medical center. As with the patient we had just left, this one's suffering began shortly after the third shot in the vaccination regime. The condition, involving a paralysis of the internal organs, steadily worsened over the ensuing months.

On one of the nearly deserted cafeteria's tables Handy spreads three sheets of photos, several pictures on each. The first sheet of pictures shows the patient in civilian attire, smiling for the camera--tanned, fit, happy.

The second sheet is a montage of shots of the patient in working and dress military uniform, looking like a recruiting poster. Three rows of ribbons on a dress uniform denote service in hostile zones. The beaming servicemember stares at me from the sheet, a person clearly proud to wear the country's uniform.

The pictures on the third sheet were all taken after the vaccine had taken its toll. The patient is tall, impossibly thin, a gray alien compared to the vigorous individual I've seen on the first two sheets.

### **Unpopular Diagnosis**

I am told that the patient has lost more than 40 pounds from an already delicate frame. Most nourishment keeping the patient alive enters the emaciated body via a feeding tube. Regular foods don't digest, are regurgitated or are lost in bouts of debilitating diarrhea.

The patient typically scored 290 out of 300 on the physical fitness test, Handy tells me. But then came the first three anthrax shots.

Mystified and alarmed doctors at the servicemember's base sent the dangerously ill patient to a top-notch civilian hospital known for tackling the tough cases. The specialist the patient saw there is unhesitating in his conclusion that the servicemember's illness was triggered by a severe reaction to "a vaccine."

I read the volatile words on a copy of the medical form. I am not allowed to make copies.

The diagnosis was not popular with the command, I am told by Handy. "The drug protocol [the patient] was given by the civilian specialist was canceled," he reveals.

After another phone call to the guesthouse, we are told that the patient is too tired for visitors at this late hour.

I am enormously relieved, as I am afraid and somehow ashamed to face the patient with the stick legs and protruding collarbones.

Instead I talk to the patient on the phone. Incredibly, the brave patient's thoughts and concerns are not self-centered. The patient wants to talk about the others the patient has met--those with less visible injuries and undiagnosed conditions in a special coping program the patient must attend regularly.

**'They Have to Fight...'**

"They have to fight harder for recognition," the patient says. The patient describes other military members, young people in their 20s and 30s suffering with conditions a much older person might have: daily muscle/joint pain, fatigue, night sweats, disorienting memory loss. Some of these people are afraid to drive cars, I am told.

Handy has helped the patient tell the patient's history to certain members of Congress. He says that the initial treatment by the military was "barbaric." The patient has been promised an inspector general's investigation.

Near the end of our conversation, I am asked to report that the patient's condition is "chronic and long-term--up to two years so far."

"I'd like to be treated fairly. We all do," the patient says before signing off.

Redmond H. Handy testified before the House Government Reform subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations in March 1999 and the House Armed Services military personnel subcommittee in September 1999 about the impact of the Defense Department's Anthrax Vaccination Inoculation Program (AVIP) on military readiness and recruitment.

A self-taught researcher, he has studied AVIP for three years in consultation with bio-warfare and medical experts and been interviewed or quoted by People Magazine, CNN, the Jim Lehrer News Hour, USA Today, the Associated Press, Insight Magazine and numerous local network affiliates. He also has written or contributed to articles in a number of newspapers.

Handy has cosponsored a Reserve Officer's Association resolution recommending that the current remaining vaccine stockpile not be used.

**'Shield of Dreams'**

He currently testifies before medical boards and at the trials of service members refusing the anthrax vaccine because of concern about their health. He will be on hand at the scheduled court-martial in May of Capt. John Buck, the first Air Force doctor to refuse the vaccine.

Handy was a full colonel before he retired in May 1999 in protest of the AVIP. Handy calls it the Pentagon's "shield of dreams," and cites studies showing anthrax is not the threat the DoD advertises.

Handy's "people" are not alone.

A copy of this story was delivered to the commanding officer of the military hospital. Another copy was sent to the Pentagon. As of this writing, there has been comment only from the military hospital's PAO who pointed out that the rough draft had mistakenly identified Capt. John Buck as an Army doctor rather than an Air Force doctor. It should also be noted that the patients interviewed were very positive about the quality of care at the hospital.