


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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## CONTENTS

[Missile-Defense Satellites' Cost Balloons To \\$23 Billion](#)  
[U.S. Publicly Accusing 5 Countries Of Violating Germ-Weapons Treaty](#)  
[Special Czech Unit To Join U.S. Anti-Terror Effort](#)  
[Alabama To Get Response Team](#)  
[Ridge Defends His Role As 'Coordinator'](#)  
[Urgent Efforts To Prevent Thefts Of Trucks For Use As Bombs](#)  
[How The Experts Missed Anthrax](#)  
[He Routed Smallpox, Now Tackles Bioterror](#)  
[Russia Increasingly Worried About Nuclear Terrorism, Says Analyst](#)  
[U.S. Sees Saddam As Priority, Cites Biological Weapons](#)  
[U.S. Calls For Global Action To Counter Germ Weapons](#)  
[U.S. Says Iraq, Others Pursue Germ Warfare](#)  
[Factory's Taliban Boss Hated The West](#)  
[Al-Qa'eda's Atom Plans Were Spoof Science](#)  
[BMDO Gears Up For Missile Defense Intercept Try Next Week](#)  
[Hijackers' Interest In Crop Dusters Still Puzzles Terrorism Investigators](#)  
[Russia Sends Iran Reactor Shell](#)  
[Interview With A Bombmaker](#)  
[South Korea: Warning On North's Germ Supplies](#)  
[In Utah, A Government Hater Sells A Germ-Warfare Book](#)  
[Inhalation Anthrax Is Diagnosed In Connecticut Woman, 94](#)  
[Fort Detrick Burning Anthrax Waste](#)  
[Iraq Denies Work On Germ Weapons](#)

Defense Week  
November 19, 2001  
Pg. 1

## Missile-Defense Satellites' Cost Balloons To \$23 Billion

By Nathan Hodge and John M. Donnelly

A constellation of missile-tracking satellites that is key to President Bush's missile-defense plans will cost at least \$23 billion—not \$10 billion as estimated just last year, a House panel says. At issue is the proposed network of two dozen Space-Based Infrared System-Low satellites, or SBIRS Low.

In other words, the satellites, designed to track ballistic missiles in mid-flight, will cost more than half the amount the Pentagon says the entire ground-based National Missile Defense system of interceptors, radars and computers will cost to build and maintain over 20 years. The military says the NMD system's "life-cycle cost" is \$43 billion. The surprisingly high SBIRS-Low cost estimate has not previously been disclosed. The figure represents the projected effect of the Pentagon and contractors repeatedly underestimating the program's cost and complexity. SBIRS Low is the latest in a line of troubled attempts to construct a set of missile-tracking satellites. SBIRS Low would follow a missile from the end of its boost phase to re-entry, providing defensive interceptors with crucial details about where the missile is headed.

In a new draft report accompanying the fiscal 2002 defense appropriations bill, the House Appropriations Committee said the number of lines of software code estimated to support the satellites has grown from 900,000 to 3 million. In addition, the projections of satellite weight have gone "through the roof," the panel said, without specifying how much because the data is proprietary.

Significantly, the panel said, even the \$23 billion estimate, which includes the cost of maintaining the satellites, "does not capture the full breadth of risks to be faced by the program. The true program costs could be significantly higher."

### Funding cut

SBIRS Low, the committee remarked, posed the risk of a potential "rush to failure." The committee turned down the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's \$385 million request for the program and recommended taking SBIRS low off the acquisition track altogether.

The panel said ground-based radars would provide a more cost-effective alternative. Instead of cutting all funding for SBIRS Low, the committee provided a \$250 million line item for "satellite sensor technology."

Separately, the committee eliminated the Air Force's \$93.7 million request for the SBIRS High program, a higher-altitude set of satellites that would provide the initial tocsin when a missile is launched.

The committee's report said SBIRS High faces "serious hardware and software design problems" that have increased costs by a half a billion dollars. The committee would not fund any hardware procurement, but it did provide \$30 million to the research and development account for SBIRS High. It was unclear at press time when the House would take up the defense spending bill, but it is expected to occur before Thanksgiving. The Senate appropriators have not yet passed their version of the bill.

### Northrop responds

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor on SBIRS High. Teams led by TRW and Spectrum Astro, respectively, are vying for SBIRS Low work. Against the backdrop of the House committee setback, Northrop Grumman, a partner on both satellite programs, is forging ahead to sell the programs.

At a briefing last Tuesday, Carl Fischer, vice president and general manager of Northrop Grumman's newly formed Space Systems Division, touted its capabilities in space and missile-defense systems. He stressed that there are "good new stories" associated with the SBIRS Low program.

Fischer said Northrop Grumman had refocused its space-based capabilities for three new missions: homeland security, counter-terrorism and low-intensity conflict.

"We're well positioned to satisfy all of these missions, because of our sensors and because of the [ground-based] processing we do," he said.

Northrop Grumman has partnered with Lockheed Martin for the development, delivery, operation and maintenance of the ground segment hardware and software of SBIRS High, and Northrop would provide the payload. Fischer urged the trade press to look at the benchmarks that he says SBIRS High has achieved, as well as the new

capabilities Northrop Grumman had acquired through its acquisition of Aerojet General's Electronics and Information Systems group, where he previously worked.

Responding to questions about cost overruns and schedule setbacks on the SBIRS programs, Fischer acknowledged that there have been delays, "and we're disquieted about that." However, Fischer said, "I think it's important for all of us to recognize our great success on the program."

For instance, SBIRS High met 19 parameters for operational requirements, as well as 16 parameters for payload performance, he said. "The payloads work; they work well," Fischer said.

In addition, Fischer looked to cast doubt on suggestions that ground-based radar might provide a more cost-effective alternative to SBIRS Low. "As good as ground based radars are, they have physical limitations," he said.

#### **Positives**

Separately, the Lexington Institute, a think tank based in Arlington, Va., dismissed criticism that SBIRS Low had become too risky because of growth in cost, weight and complexity.

"None of these reasons is valid," Lexington said. "Changes in system complexity and the weight and cost of the satellite are within acceptable boundaries or reflect improvements demanded by the government."

Fischer said SBIRS Low is compatible with command and control aircraft such as AWACS, JSTARS and UAVs in theater.

"The exciting thing," he said, "is that many of those systems are in the Northrop Grumman portfolio of products."

That compatibility, he suggested, will help in the integration of U.S. missile defense systems. When matched with better ground processing, programs such as SBIRS Low will cut the time it takes to get information off of a sensor platform and deliver it in a useful form to the military consumer, Fischer said.

"What we're talking about as a particular strength of the Northrop Grumman is ... helping to craft a robust missile defense system, not only for homeland defense, but for theater missile defense," he said. Northrop Grumman has a part in both teams working to win the contract for SBIRS Low. It has partnered with Spectrum Astro on mission sensors design and ground segment design and integration for SBIRS Low.

New York Times  
November 19, 2001

## **U.S. Publicly Accusing 5 Countries Of Violating Germ-Weapons Treaty**

By Judith Miller

The United States has concluded that North Korea, Iraq and at least three other countries are developing germ weapons, and has decided to accuse them of violating a treaty they ratified banning such weapons, administration officials said this weekend.

The others to be cited include Iran, Libya and Syria, the officials said.

They said that Washington believes additional countries are also violating the treaty in secret, including some that are friendly with the United States, but that the administration is not prepared to identify them.

The accusations are to be made today in Geneva by John R. Bolton, under secretary of state, at an international conference aimed at strengthening compliance with and enforcement of the treaty, which dates to 1972 and has been ratified by more than 140 countries, including the United States.

The public nature of the accusations, in front of the delegates of the nations cited, is a departure in approach for the government, although in the past the executive branch has leveled charges against individual governments in testimony before Congress and in State Department reports.

Mr. Bolton is also expected to accuse Osama bin Laden of trying to develop biological weapons. His text says that Washington is worried that Mr. bin Laden may have tried to acquire germ weapons "with support from a state," which Mr. Bolton does not identify.

The decision to "name names," as Mr. Bolton's speech puts it, is part of a new strategy to persuade countries to stop developing germ weapons by embarrassing suspected treaty cheaters. "Prior to September 11, some would have avoided this approach," states the speech Mr. Bolton is scheduled to give, a copy of which was provided to The New York Times. "The world has changed, however, and so must our business-as-usual approach."

The allegations are not specific, nor is the source of any evidence provided.

But they are intended to deflect criticism of the Bush administration from those who say that it is Washington that has undermined the treaty, which it pioneered. Critics at home and abroad reproached the administration last summer for rejecting an agreement that was meant to strengthen compliance by establishing an inspection system. While most other parties to the treaty overwhelmingly supported the so-called protocol, the administration rejected it, arguing that it would have undermined American bio-defense programs and given the world a false sense of security by failing to prevent cheating.

Administration officials said they hoped that the policy of accusing countries will focus public ire not on the United States, but on the countries that have signed and ratified the treaty but are cheating on it. They also hope that the strategy will encourage countries to consider alternative measures that the United States has proposed to strengthen the treaty and compliance.

Officials, historians and arms control experts said the United States has accused North Korea and 11 other states of cheating in annual reports filed by the State Department and in periodic testimony that administration officials have given on Capitol Hill. But they said this is the first time that the United States has used an international gathering of treaty members to denounce alleged violators to their faces.

Philip Zelikow, an official in the first Bush White House and a historian of the presidency, called the denunciations "entirely appropriate."

Previously, he said, the United States had shunned open confrontations, relying on "quiet pressure" with the idea that it was more effective. For instance, he said, two defectors warned Washington that thousands of Soviet scientists were developing and stockpiling germ weapons at dozens of sites throughout the Soviet Union in violation of the treaty.

After that, American officials tried quiet persuasion to get Moscow to change its ways. "That effort was not entirely successful," Mr. Zelikow recalled. "While the leaders agreed with us, they were unable to deal with their own internal problems and end the program."

A new awareness of the dangers of germ weapons began with the Sept. 11 attacks and the anthrax letters later sent to Capitol Hill and to news organizations, Mr. Zelikow said.

In the prepared text, Mr. Bolton asks, "Will we be courageous, unflinching, and timely in our actions to develop effective tools to deal with the threat as it exists today? Or will we merely defer to slow-moving multilateral mechanisms that are oblivious to what is happening in the real world?"

But Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, a former senior official in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which has been merged into the State Department, called the approach ham-handed.

"Such finger-pointing is aimed at deflecting pressure on the Bush administration for its rejection of a serious verification system," she said. Ms. Hoinkes noted that Washington would not previously have identified a suspected cheater before listing it in annual compliance reports and having discussions with the individual states.

She and other experts on the treaty noted that Mr. Bolton's list did not include Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, and others that Washington also believes are violating the treaty.

Mr. Bolton's text makes clear that he could well have mentioned "other states," which he said the administration would be "contacting privately." Russia is one of the countries that is working in close conjunction with the administration's campaign against Osama bin Laden.

Mr. Bolton's speech says that beyond the bin Laden network, Al Qaeda, Washington's most serious concern is Iraq's germ weapons efforts.

Also extremely "disturbing," he says, is North Korea, which has a "dedicated national-level effort" to acquire germ weapons. He said that North Korea "may have weaponized" some germs, and that it has the capacity to produce "sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so."

Iran, he says, "probably has produced and weaponized" germ agents, and Libya "may be capable of producing small quantities of agent."

Syria, which has not ratified the treaty, operates a program that may "be capable of producing small quantities of agent," Mr. Bolton said.

Finally, Mr. Bolton said the administration was concerned that Sudan, which has not ratified or even signed the treaty, may be increasingly interested in developing a germ weapons program.

## Special Czech Unit To Join U.S. Anti-Terror Effort

By David Holley and Iva Drapalova, Special To The Times

PRAGUE, Czech Republic -- A Czech anti-chemical warfare unit that gained recognition for its work during the Persian Gulf War is preparing to take part in the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism.

Plans to deploy the unit, which specializes in the detection of nerve agents and the decontamination of troops and equipment, were announced this month by Czech Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik. The core of the 300-strong Czech force will be drawn from a 158-member anti-chemical unit, which will be supplemented by other soldiers providing logistical support and combat protection, Tvrdik said.

The well-equipped, well-trained unit is capable of "warning endangered forces and populations" of chemical and radiation threats, the Defense Ministry said in a written statement. The unit also will be capable of countering the effects of biological warfare, Jiri Sedivy, chief of the Czech army general staff, told reporters.

A team of 35 medical workers trained to "search out and identify biological weapons" will be part of the unit when it is sent into action, Jan Petras, chief of the Czech army's medical service, said in remarks quoted Friday by Pravo, a leading daily newspaper.

Tvrdik said details of the unit's mission are classified. He implied that the Czechs would not be sent to the front lines in Afghanistan but said they could face danger. Czech media reported that the warfare unit probably will be sent to Uzbekistan or Pakistan.

Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman volunteered use of the unit in early October, and U.S. Ambassador Craig Stapleton accepted the offer early this month.

Public support for Czech participation in the anti-terrorism effort runs high here. A Sofres-Factum poll conducted in September showed 81% of respondents were in favor of the country providing armed assistance to the U.S.

The Czech Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999, and the anti-chemical unit already was part of NATO's rapid-reaction forces.

Concern about the possible use of chemical or biological weapons by Afghanistan's ruling Taliban has been heightened because the Taliban has made false claims that U.S. forces are using chemical weapons in that country, reported Mlada Fronta Dnes, a leading Czech daily. It is feared that this may signal a Taliban effort to prepare a justification for use of chemical or biological weapons, the newspaper said.

The Czech anti-chemical unit is viewed with great pride here because of its performance against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. Its reports of finding traces of nerve and mustard gas in the opening days of the 1991 war initially were dismissed by U.S. military officials, but in 1993 the Pentagon formally acknowledged the accuracy of the Czech findings.

After U.S. military officials went to Prague in 1993 to review the unit's work, then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin told reporters that, "based on this assessment and an examination of the available records, team members concluded that the Czech detections were valid." But Aspin and other U.S. officials firmly rejected claims that illnesses reported by returning Gulf War veterans could have been caused by the traces of gas found by the Czechs.

Sources for the chemicals detected by the Czech unit were never established, but most explanations attributed the findings to allied bombing of facilities where Iraqi chemical weapons had been stored. Other reports speculated that in some cases the chemicals may have come from Iraqi-launched Scud missiles. It was never proved that Iraq used chemical weapons during the war.

Czech competence in chemical warfare detection dates to the days of Czechoslovakia's membership in the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. Pride in the unit's performance in the Gulf War helped ensure that it continued to receive sufficient resources and training throughout the 1990s.

A plan for reform of the Czech army released by the government in September envisions at least a doubling in size of the anti-chemical warfare unit.

Valstimila Cyprisova, a unit spokeswoman, told the Czech News Agency that U.S. interest may have been stimulated by the unit's performance in recent NATO maneuvers in Turkey.

Company commander Jiri Gajdos told the news agency after his return from those October exercises that the unit had proved to NATO allies that its equipment and troops were reliable. It was now ready, he said, "to fulfill possible alliance tasks connected with retaliatory steps against Afghanistan."

*Times staff writer Holley recently reported from Warsaw, and special correspondent Drapalova reported from Prague.*

Birmingham (AL) News  
November 16, 2001

## **Alabama To Get Response Team**

By Mary Orndorff, News Washington correspondent

WASHINGTON -- One of the Army National Guard's 32 teams being set up to respond to incidents of terrorism will be based in Alabama, the Department of Defense announced Thursday.

The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team will be made up of 22 full-time members whose job is to identify the contaminant used in the attack biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear. The first teams were created in 1998, and the Pentagon added five teams Thursday in Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Tennessee and West Virginia.

Alabama guard officials have yet to decide where in the state the new team will be based, but they said it should be up and running by 2003. State officials said they had been asking for an Alabama-based team since the program began.

"Alabama has a number of targets that could be attractive to a terrorist group nuclear plants and a stockpile of obsolete chemical weapons, all of which make us a particularly good target," said U.S. Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala. The unit will have six sections for command, operations, communications, administration/logistics, medical and survey. Members will receive 600 hours of specialized training over and above their normal Guard training. The team will have a mobile lab to help analyze samples from the scene of the attack or accident. They're required to be able to respond within 10 hours.

Gov. Don Siegelman, in a released statement, said the team "will help to bolster Alabama's safety and security." The teams are designed to assist state officials with the expertise of the U.S. military, and they can be federalized and sent on missions out of their home state.

"Before Sept. 11th we saw terrorism as something that happened in other countries. We now know every city in America is a target," said Rep. Spencer Bachus, R-Vestavia Hills.

The federal funds for the additional teams were included in the 2001 defense budget.

Sessions said it is wise for the National Guard to develop some expertise in the bioterrorism field.

"All National Guards are under constant stress to justify their missions. We have no money to waste, so a good mission strengthens the ability of any Guard to survive our budget stresses," said Sessions, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Washington Post  
November 18, 2001  
Pg. 5

## **Ridge Defends His Role As 'Coordinator'**

### ***Security Chief Sees Advantages in Not Grabbing the Helm***

By Eric Pianin and David S. Broder, Washington Post Staff Writers

Fearing that the Energy Department might soon start shipping weapons-grade plutonium to his state despite the lingering threat of terrorism, South Carolina Gov. Jim Hodges (D) recently turned to the new homeland security director for help.

Hodges urged Tom Ridge to intervene with Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham to ensure that there would be no plutonium deliveries to the Savannah River nuclear plant until a dispute over security and storage was resolved. Ridge expressed concern -- but did nothing to influence the decision when he conferred with Abraham at the Energy Department on Thursday.

"Part of my job is to coordinate," he explained in an interview. "I'm not going to make that technical decision." Though he was handpicked by a wartime president and given the broadest mandate possible to help in the recovery and to defend the nation against further acts of terrorism, Ridge is groping his way in a critical new office that is heavy on responsibility but light on line authority and budget clout.

Having been thrown into the deep end of the bureaucratic pool with little guidance on how to survive, Ridge has chosen not to make waves. That has meant being a collaborator in crisis management, rather than trying to test his authority or throwing his weight around.

A number of government veterans argue strongly that without more formal power, Ridge is being set up to fail. "You've got this magnificent person straight from central casting with terrific leadership capabilities and credibility and experience," said retired Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, director of national drug control policy in the Clinton administration. "But he has an inadequate mechanism to do the job. Six months from now, there's a danger that he will turn into little more than the speaker's bureau for homeland defense."

McCaffrey's assessment carries added weight because he experienced frustrations of his own in trying to direct the government's war on drugs with a small White House staff, limited resources and no statutory authority from Congress. Many lawmakers, including Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.), chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and Rep. William M. "Mac" Thornberry (R-Tex.), have repeatedly warned that Ridge is in danger of becoming "another drug czar" unless Congress acts to create a permanent homeland security post with a large staff and consolidated government agencies under it.

But Ridge and other White House officials disagree, saying that Ridge can do more as a senior adviser with the president's mandate and a large staff of people detailed from other agencies than as the head of a separate federal bureaucracy. Ridge is operating with a skeletal staff of about 30 aides; the operation is planned to expand to nearly 100 members by early next year, about the size of the National Security Council staff.

Since he was sworn in as homeland security director on Oct. 8 and moved into a tiny West Wing office down the hall from his longtime friend President Bush, the former Pennsylvania governor has served as chief spokesman and troubleshooter, issuing warnings and reassurances as he looks for gaps in the government's response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the mysterious appearance of anthrax spores in the mail.

"He's comfortable that his role is not to micromanage but to bring people together," said Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, a friend of Ridge's and a former governor herself.

Ridge has rarely sought to impose his will on other Cabinet members. And the few tangible accomplishments he can point to are modest.

When Michigan Gov. John Engler (R) tried to keep National Guard troops on duty helping customs agents clear the way for workers and goods to cross the bridges from Canada, he was frustrated by bureaucratic and financial barriers. "I made one call to Tom Ridge," Engler said Friday, "and the red tape got cut and the decisions were made."

In another case, Ridge shifted money in the budget so the U.S. Postal Service could quickly buy equipment to irradiate mail that might contain anthrax spores.

Ridge also coaxed Attorney General John D. Ashcroft to announce plans to create a national terrorist tracking system that would consolidate federal intelligence capabilities.

On the other hand, New Orleans Mayor Marc H. Morial (D), the head of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, said that while the bipartisan group "had great meetings with Ridge" several weeks ago, that did not prevent the administration from supporting a reduction in funds for the local law enforcement block grant, "the only pool of money we have for police overtime and other domestic costs of the war on terrorism." Morial added: "I do not know if Ridge did weigh in or could have weighed in. But the administration position did not change."

Because he is technically responsible for coordinating law enforcement and intelligence operations, Ridge has had to shoulder some of the blame for the government's failure to uncover the source of the anthrax spores in the mail or to track down the accomplices to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

"The intensity of the [anthrax] investigation I'm sure will never be appreciated because there is so much uncertainty and so much fear," Ridge said. "But the public ought to be assured that the resources of the attorney general and the FBI and state and local officials and postal inspectors are being used . . . to try to identify that source."

Ridge, 56, a decorated Vietnam War veteran and a former House member, served nearly seven years as governor before he was tapped by Bush to relieve the president and Vice President Cheney of the major worry of guarding American soil from further attacks.

In announcing the appointment during a nationally televised address before Congress on Sept. 20, Bush said that Ridge would "lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come."

Ridge was given the responsibility for coordinating nearly 50 federal agencies and departments, overseeing everything from the interaction between the FBI and the CIA on intelligence to working with governors, mayors and state agencies to prepare for potential attacks. Once the president had declared that Ridge was his surrogate on homeland defense issues, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson said, "I can't imagine any Cabinet officer would be dumb enough to challenge that."

While usually deferential to Cabinet members, Ridge abruptly summoned Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Thompson and government scientists to a damage control meeting at the White House on Oct. 24 after a

breakdown in communications between the FBI and public health officials slowed the response to the crisis in Washington, where two postal workers died of inhalation anthrax.

"It just seemed to me that [the government] wasn't moving as quickly as it has got to move in a crisis," Ridge explained. "You've got to move. You've got to be agile. You've got to share information quicker."

Postal officials credited Ridge with prodding the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to begin examining the potential health hazard to workers at the Brentwood postal distribution facility in Washington before the first case of inhalation anthrax was confirmed. Deborah Willhite, Postal Service senior vice president, said Ridge had a positive, "interactive" relationship with postal officials.

Some lawmakers, mayors, governors and police have complained about the two FBI national alerts that warned of imminent terrorist attacks that never materialized. Ridge said last week that officials are reviewing proposals for the creation of a more sophisticated federal system -- modeled after a military intelligence network -- that would call for different levels of response, depending on the quality of the warnings. He noted that they are also studying plans for alerting state and local law enforcement agencies and officials about the possibility of a terrorist attack without making a public announcement.

"I think everybody is still struggling mightily to come up with the right thing to do," he said.

Ridge concedes that he has lost sleep worrying about all of the potential threats to the country, including the possibility of bioterrorist attacks using anthrax spores or the smallpox virus. On Thursday, he said that it is "common sense" to assume that terrorists might strike again in retaliation for the collapse of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan, amid reports that Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network may have been trying to develop chemical and nuclear weapons.

"I think we have the capacity to deal with whatever any enemy or enemies can throw in our direction," Ridge said during an interview. "But there's a need to establish priorities and to build as quickly as possible the capacity to respond to the widest range of threats."

*Staff writer Ellen Nakashima contributed to this report.*

New York Times  
November 18, 2001

## **Urgent Efforts To Prevent Thefts Of Trucks For Use As Bombs**

By Evelyn Nieves with Andrew C. Revkin

SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. 17 — Well before Sept. 11, and with great urgency since then, law enforcement and transportation officials have been working to prevent one type of terrorist attack — the theft of a large truck that could be turned into a rolling bomb.

Around the country, acting at the behest of the Transportation Department, inspectors have been examining all trucks with hazardous materials placards, running background checks on drivers of tanker trucks, and stopping trucks for random inspections.

This effort is particularly intense in California, where tens of thousands of trucks rumble along highways and roads on any day.

To reduce at least one kind of truck threat, the California Highway Patrol is considering a new device that is designed to allow pursuing police officers to stop a fleeing tractor trailer or tanker truck in its tracks — with a bumper-to-bumper tap from behind.

The system, which is being tested for the highway patrol by scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, activates the truck's air brakes when a horizontal metal bar running across the rear end of the vehicle is nudged by a pursuing vehicle.

Its developers say the device could also be configured to be triggered remotely with a radio or telephone signal.

Dwight Helmick, the California Highway Patrol commissioner, said he was "very encouraged" by what he had seen in trials.

"You've got to consider the hijacked tanker truck on the top of the list of concerns," said Mr. Helmick, whose department is spending \$350,000 a day monitoring truck security. "We're trying every avenue to make sure that scenario does not occur."



Other security systems for preventing truck hijackings are being rushed through development by various companies, including systems that could track vehicles by satellite and turn off an engine by a remote signal if a truck was seen to be deviating from its route.

Increasingly, hazardous loads of chemicals are being tracked with Global Positioning System devices that send a signal via satellite to the fleet owner or private security companies.

The main use for the equipment being considered in California would be to prevent tanker trucks or big rigs loaded with explosives and intentionally crashed on bridges or into buildings.

California became aware of the need to prevent such attacks months before the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington. In January, a driver plowed his tractor trailer at high speed into the state Capitol in Sacramento, just as the state assembly was adjourning. The truck exploded in flames, killing the driver and damaging the building's facade.

The bumper device, which has been demonstrated to law enforcement officials and trucking industry representatives in California, is to be shown this week in a demonstration, the details of which have been kept under wraps.

Both law enforcement and trucking industry officials said they expected the system to spark enthusiasm, although several issues remain to be ironed out, including which trucks would have the device installed.

"Are we going to mandate that every truck in California install this?" one law enforcement official asked.

David Longo, a spokesman for the federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, which regulates truck safety and the licensing of drivers, said he had not heard of the device being considered in California. And even if it were required to be installed on trucks licensed in the state, California could not require it on the thousands of trucks crossing state lines.

Mr. Longo said that any such system could only be adopted as a new federal safety standard after extensive analysis, and undoubtedly extensive debate in Washington.

Proponents of the equipment acknowledged that the brake-triggering system would only prevent truck attacks involving a large truck that was known to have strayed from its route.

The device in its basic form also requires that a patrol car get close enough to a runaway truck to bump it. The possibility exists that the hijacker could decide to detonate his bomb as the patrol car makes its move, one law enforcement official said.

"The bottom line," said the official, "is right now we don't have any way of stopping a tanker, so you weigh the risks and the benefits of this and it comes out ahead."

Some federal transportation officials, who had not yet seen the device demonstrated, expressed skepticism. "At best, it would only do partial good," one official said.

But with the heightened terrorist threat, anything that could reduce risks, even slightly, is taking on significance, many other transportation and law enforcement officials said.

The potential for destruction from a big truck has been amply illustrated in accidental crashes involving gasoline tankers, said Ron Andenmatten, the president of Cargo Tank Concepts, a company in Brooklyn that manufactures safety equipment for gasoline tank trucks.

"What brought down the World Trade Center was not the impact, it was the heat of the fuel that eventually compromised the integrity of the steel," he said. "The same thing could happen to a bridge or what have you. Many tanker trucks hold up to 11,000 or 14,000 gallons of fuel," he added. That is as much fuel as was carried by the Boeing 757 that slammed into the Pentagon.

The bumper device was invented by Bill Wattenburg, a consultant to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who said the California Highway Patrol asked him "to solve a problem."

Dr. Wattenburg estimated that the device would cost no more than \$200, installed.

Truck bombs are nothing new to terrorists. In the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, Muslim extremists placed a rented van loaded with explosives in an underground parking garage and detonated a bomb that killed six people and injured more than 1,000. Two years later, Timothy McVeigh used a truck packed with crudely made explosives to kill 168 people in Oklahoma City.

And in 1998, Al Qaeda terrorists used truck bombs to kill 224 people in attacks on United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

# How The Experts Missed Anthrax

## *Brentwood Cases Defied Assumptions About Risks*

By Steve Twomey and Justin Blum, Washington Post Staff Writers

His name was Leroy Richmond, and he was lethargic but coherent and calm. He had been waiting in Inova Fairfax Hospital's emergency room for a while, triage having put him at low risk because his symptoms were only labored breathing, slight fever and such. Cecele Murphy, the attending physician, entered exam room 8 and began chatting with Richmond as she watched his vitals on a monitor. It was late Friday afternoon, Oct. 19.

Where do you work?

Brentwood.

It was a place Murphy did not know; Brentwood bore no notoriety yet. The patient said it was a post office and he handled Express, none of which was remarkable to the doctor. Richmond went on: Almost all of the Express Mail goes to the federal government. Half of that, he said, goes to the Senate.

"Bells and whistles went off," Murphy said.

Four days earlier, bioterrorism had been inflicted on a Senate building, via letter. No one was known to be sick and no one was thought to be at risk beyond Capitol Hill. Yet here was a listless, 57-year-old postal worker who toiled miles from the Hart Senate Office Building, where the bioterror missive had been opened.

Murphy ordered a chest X-ray. It showed mild abnormalities. She ordered a CAT scan, a more potent investigatory tool. And there, the hints of inhalation anthrax: enlarged lymph nodes in the lungs. She reached for a phone -- "almost within seconds" -- and dialed across the Potomac River.

In an extraordinary week in a year with many of them, Murphy's call to the D.C. Department of Health that night was the pivot point. It began the transformation of an unsettling but seemingly contained health problem on the Hill into a medical emergency affecting thousands of people well beyond it.

More importantly, it was the first serious crack in the medical foundation that underlay the official response to the only outbreak of bioterrorism in American history, according to interviews, statements and congressional testimony. It meant the federal government might be wrong.

Until then, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention had assured nervous postal officials that based on previous mail of the terror campaign and the CDC's knowledge of anthrax, not enough spores could escape sealed letters or packages to cause the most serious form of the disease, inhalation. Only certain Capitol Hill workers needed to take antibiotics because only people present when a letter is opened face a potentially deadly threat, the CDC believed, not those who handled a letter as it navigated the postal system.

But now, Richmond was sick with what, indeed, turned out to be inhalation anthrax. "It was becoming clear," said Ivan C.A. Walks, the District's health director, "that what were sound CDC recommendations based on prior knowledge and science had left the Brentwood workers unprotected."

Richmond would live, because of Murphy and the Inova team. But by Monday, Oct. 22, two postal workers were dead of anthrax; the Brentwood Road NE processing facility was closed; 2,000 Brentwood workers were being urged to consume antibiotics to ward off illness; and complaints were rising that officials had acted less swiftly to defend the blue-collar, often minority workers of the Postal Service than they had the white-collar world of Capitol Hill.

A close examination of the events of that week suggests that Brentwood workers were not victims of such a double standard. So confident was government that the workers faced little risk that high-ranking health and law enforcement officials had a news conference inside Brentwood on Oct. 18 -- and had to begin taking antibiotics themselves after illnesses and tests revealed that the facility was a hot spot of anthrax spores.

Rather, local and federal officials were trying to contain a disease that was not well known, being spread in a way never seen. CDC and Postal Service officials say they did the best they could with what they knew, and numerous outsiders agree, including national unions representing postal workers.

"There was not a neglect on the part of the CDC of the postal workers of our community," Walks told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which is examining the events. The CDC's assessment of the risks to Brentwood was based on "the best science," he said, science later found "not to be compatible with this form of anthrax."

Even so, others wonder whether the CDC reacted quickly enough as evidence mounted that the best science might be flawed, and whether the CDC assumed too much. Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.), chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, said Brentwood should have been shut Oct. 18, three days before it was. And Tara O'Toole, deputy director of the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, said the tragedy illustrated the need for a system within government to gather information better and anticipate all possibilities.

Whether a faster response would have saved those who died cannot be known. But during a Governmental Affairs hearing, Sen. Max Cleland (D-Ga.) said federal health officials "didn't quite know exactly what [they] were dealing with, except Brentwood became the place to pay the price."

### **Assurances of Safety**

In his truck, Clarence Raynor usually listens to WTOP as he ferries mail from Brentwood to neighborhood post offices and back, and on the afternoon of Oct. 15, the all-news station told him that a letter that might have anthrax spores had arrived in the Hart offices of Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.). Raynor, though a postal worker for only four years, knows the arteries of delivery in the city, and he knew that the Daschle letter must have passed through Brentwood. "If he's contaminated," Raynor thought, meaning Daschle, "we're contaminated." Not that Raynor, 48, is an expert in how bacteria can penetrate or float. But he knew what sorting machines do to a piece of mail. "It is shaken, bounced around, pulled at, tugged at, beat up. . . . It is not just sitting still." And he knew how the machines were cleaned, how dust and scraps were blown. "They do it with pressurized air. It's like an air hose at a service station." In the Brentwood break room, though, there was only chatter about the Daschle letter, not agitation about it, Raynor said. "It's more or less a wait-and-see game."

As he worked his routes that day, officials at an Army facility in central Maryland, working with extreme caution, were examining powder samples from the Daschle letter, received from the FBI and U.S. Capitol Police. By that evening, the agency -- the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort Detrick -- was able to report early findings in conference calls.

The Daschle contents seemed to be anthrax spores. And one more thing. Fort Detrick "had been somewhat surprised by the nature of it . . . that it was a fine powder, that it easily went into the air," said Mitchell L. Cohen, director of the CDC's division of bacterial and mycotic diseases, who participated in one of the conference calls as the CDC's liaison to the FBI. The smaller and more floatable the spores, the more likely they will be inhaled.

During the hours that followed, conflicting terms would be used publicly to describe this powder, including "weaponized" and "garden variety," and an impression was created that the Daschle attack was more dangerous than ones discovered earlier involving NBC News and American Media Inc., the publishing company in Florida where the anthrax scourge first arose.

Actually, at the time of Fort Detrick's analysis, no one knew if the Daschle spores were more dangerous than the others. No letter has ever been found in Florida, and the letter opened in the office of NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw did not have enough material to show how fine its particles were. Still another letter, sent to the New York Post, did have enough powder to analyze -- but no one had done so yet, because it apparently still lay undetected in the newspaper's mail system. Law enforcement would not have it for days.

"This was the first material that we had actually seen," Cohen said of the Daschle letter.

Despite that, the CDC reasoned that the spores of the Daschle, Brokaw and Florida letters had the same properties and, therefore, posed an equal danger. The perpetrator would have created a batch of spores and divided it among the various letters, Cohen said, adding that he knew of no discussions between the FBI and CDC about whether the criminal might have changed the nature of the weapon. Steven Wiersma, state epidemiologist for the Florida Department of Health, said he, too, assumed that the letters contained spores with the same properties.

Apparently, they did not.

After authorities found the New York Post letter, which was mailed the same day -- Sept. 18 -- as the Brokaw letter, they determined that its spores were not as fine as those in the Daschle letter, senior law enforcement officials said. The material in all the letters was the same genetically, but not in size or refinement. That difference is suggested by the eventual health toll: Only two Postal Service workers in the paths of the Brokaw and Post letters became sick, both with the milder cutaneous anthrax, but seven became sick after the Daschle letter was mailed, six with inhalation anthrax.

On Oct. 15, though, no postal worker was known to be ill. And that was crucial to the CDC. Only people in the Florida and New York destination offices had gotten some version of anthrax, suggesting that however fine the powders being sent, however floatable the Daschle material was, spores were not leaking en route, at least not enough to cause inhalation anthrax. Bolstering the CDC's analysis, the Daschle letter was heavily taped. So were the Brokaw and Post letters, postal inspectors say now, as if the perpetrator wanted to ensure that his spores reached their targets and did not ooze out flaps or corners.

The CDC had no studies to prove that sealed letters were trustworthy vessels. But Ronald M. Atlas, the president-elect of the American Society for Microbiology and a professor of biology at the University of Louisville, said he would have assumed what the CDC did, that powder could not escape a sealed envelope. Likewise, E.J. Rice, vice president for development at the Institute of Paper Science and Technology in Atlanta, said that if the CDC had called him then and asked if spores could pass through envelope paper, he would have said "we don't think there's much chance of that happening."

Rice would not say that now. The institute has since run tests of paper, he said, and saw gaps "that are in the order of 10 microns in size," bigger than the anthrax spores in the Daschle letter. The gaps do not always go all the way through, he said, but "I think there's a reasonable probability that some micro-size material could find its way through some paper."

Later, Sen. Fred D. Thompson (R-Tenn.) told Army and CDC officials that given the "billions of dollars" spent on research and preparedness, "you would think" the possibility that anthrax spores could escape a letter "would have occurred to somebody."

As health and government officials met and telephoned in the wake of the Daschle letter, hundreds of Capitol Hill workers were lining up for antibiotics, including many who had been nowhere near the Hart Building when the Daschle letter was opened. Nothing like that was happening at Brentwood. Neither people nor equipment was being checked to see if the facility was contaminated. Hundreds of postal employees kept moving the mail.

"We hadn't heard anything," worker Helen Molinos said. "We assumed everything was all right."

### **Evidence Adds Up**

The same day the Daschle letter arrived, and a thousand miles south, officials announced that anthrax spores had been detected at a mail facility in Boca Raton, Fla., through which a letter to AMI might have gone. By then, many of the mail facility's workers had been taking precautionary antibiotics for three days.

Then, on Wednesday, Oct. 17, spores were found in a mailroom at the Dirksen Senate Office Building, through which the Daschle letter had gone. And on Thursday, Oct. 18, a case of cutaneous anthrax was detected involving a letter carrier at a postal facility near Trenton, N.J., through which the Brokaw letter had gone.

All these problems might have arisen from other, still-unfound terrorist letters, letters that were not sealed tightly or were accidentally slashed in processing, shedding spores in postal facilities. Just Friday, the FBI announced that a search of Capitol Hill mail impounded after Oct. 15 had uncovered what appeared to be another terrorist letter, addressed to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.).

But the evidence of contamination and illness that was mounting immediately after the Daschle letter arrived also raised the possibility that the "sealed envelope theory," as a government investigator called it, "didn't hold water." Spores might have seeped out of the Florida, Brokaw and Daschle letters no matter how well they were taped, perhaps directly through the paper. They might have reached postal machines, people and other mail.

"Once the traces were found in the Dirksen mailroom, shouldn't that have set off an alarm that something unusual was happening, that maybe it was possible for this stuff -- the anthrax -- to get out of the packages or the envelopes, and not just endanger people once the package was opened?" Lieberman said at a hearing.

Replied Maj. Gen. John S. Parker, the commander of Fort Detrick: "The fact that the spores did, in fact, pass through porous areas in that [Daschle] envelope and create an aerosol that caused harm in this particular case was maybe a fact too far for most of us, sir."

By Wednesday, Oct. 17, postal officials were increasingly worried, despite CDC assurances. Postal authorities had been giving information to their workers about the nature of anthrax and how to be safe in handling mail, but there was anxiety on the Brentwood work floor.

"We weren't experiencing a high absentee rate at Brentwood, but people wanted to know what we knew, and people wanted to know what we were finding out in real time," said Deborah K. Willhite, a Postal Service vice president. "We wanted to make sure the facility was not contaminated."

That day, the Postal Service called the D.C. Department of Health and the CDC in Atlanta and asked whether Brentwood workers should be given nasal swabs, to detect whether they had been exposed to anthrax spores. Rima Khabbaz, a CDC infectious disease specialist assigned to the Washington outbreak, said the answer was no. Spores might have been leaking from envelopes, Khabbaz said in an interview, but it was unlikely the totals reached 8,000. That is the number that decades-old studies with monkeys had suggested was the threshold for inhalation anthrax. (The current outbreak has raised the possibility the threshold is not that high.) At worst, the CDC thought, postal workers might get cutaneous anthrax, which is easily treated. The side effects of giving them precautionary antibiotics might be worse than the disease.

"In all instances, we try to balance the risks and benefits of a public health action," Cohen said.

Whatever the CDC's beliefs, the Postal Service decided to act anyway. On Thursday, Oct. 18, Daryl Louder, a battalion chief and program manager for the hazardous materials response team of the Fairfax County fire department, got a call from a Postal Service doctor. The service had already hired a private company to do lab tests for anthrax spores at Brentwood, but the results would take time. The doctor wondered if Fairfax could do a faster check, however tentative, to see just how bad things might be.

That evening, two Fairfax workers in protective gear took samples at Brentwood, as the unprotected employees of the 24-hour plant went about their jobs, some noting the contrast. The quick results were negative. But by nature, field tests are rough and, Louder said, about 10,000 spores are needed to get a positive.

By this point, Joseph P. Curseen Jr. and Thomas L. Morris Jr., both Brentwood workers, were feeling the symptoms of the disease that would kill them. And the next afternoon, Leroy Richmond walked into the emergency room at Inova Fairfax.

### **No More Doubts**

At 7 a.m. Sunday, Oct. 21, Khabbaz called Walks at home on his cell phone. "Ivan, it's confirmed," Walks recalled her saying. "He has inhalation anthrax."

Although Richmond's illness had been suspected since Friday night, Brentwood had stayed open as his case was analyzed and as the Health Department prepared for what was eventually set in motion: mass testing and preventive drugs. Walks's deputy, Larry Siegel, said the CDC was "justifiably suspicious" that the Inova case was inhalation anthrax and it was "astounded, really" when it was confirmed.

That afternoon, Brentwood postal worker Terrance Braxton was home watching the Redskins beat Carolina for their first win. There was a news break: A co-worker had anthrax. Braxton was "stunned." They weren't safe after all. Morris died that evening.

Curseen died the next day.

New York Times  
November 18, 2001

## **He Routed Smallpox, Now Tackles Bioterror**

By Sheryl Gay Stolberg

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 — In 1980, D. A. Henderson did what no one else in history has ever done. He wiped a disease, smallpox, off the face of the earth. Now, smallpox is back — not as a naturally occurring killer but as a potential bioterrorist weapon. And D. A. Henderson is back, too.

At 73, the man who led the global effort to make the world safe from one of its deadliest scourges has re-emerged as the director of a new government program to make the nation safe from bioterrorism. His challenge is to prepare the United States for a germ attack at a time when the country is already deep into a war against terrorism.

"D. A. has, in essence, been the man for all seasons in science," said Dr. Michael T. Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. "I think he is obviously in his final season, but it may be the most important season he ever had."

It is a season that is quickly becoming fraught with complications for Dr. Henderson, who has spent the past decade waging a determined, passionate — and, critics say, misguided — campaign to destroy the last remaining vials of the smallpox virus, in part to prevent it from being misused. This week, the Bush administration decided to retain the virus so scientists can use it to develop a range of new vaccines and treatments for the disease.

The decision means that the smallpox germ will very likely outlive Dr. Henderson, who is now in the uncomfortable position of having to defend the White House stance.

"There is a lot of concern about what D. A. in his new, highly exalted position, is going to say," said Dr. Peter Jahrling, a virologist at the Army's bioterrorism preparedness laboratory in Fort Detrick, Md., who has been Dr. Henderson's chief opponent in the destruction controversy. "Is he actually going to change his tune?"

In an interview on Friday, just as the administration was announcing its decision, Dr. Henderson answered that question with diplomacy, if not enthusiasm. "I'm a member of the administration at this point in time," he said simply, "and so I necessarily have to be in accord with the administration's position."

Formerly the director of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, a research institution that he founded in 1997, Dr. Henderson has been warning about bioterrorism since the mid-1990's. On Nov. 1, Tommy G. Thompson, the secretary of health and human services, named Dr. Henderson to head the new Office of Public Health Preparedness. The appointment came as the administration was facing criticism for lack of coordination in its handling of the recent anthrax attacks, which killed four Americans and sickened more than a dozen.

"He really didn't want to do it," Tara O'Toole, who now directs the biodefense studies center, said. "But he didn't see any honorable way to say no."

A burly man with a full head of white hair, silver-rimmed glasses and a deep, gravelly voice, Donald Ainslie Henderson has a physical presence as towering as his reputation.

On a recent afternoon, he was seen in his government office, a spartan affair with a cardboard nameplate propped atop a fax machine. Standing against the sky-blue window treatments, suspenders pressed close against a stark white shirt, he exuded confidence, looking like the president in a Hollywood movie.

People in public health sometimes refer to Dr. Henderson as "the old man," borrowing the term soldiers use for generals they respect. He is uniformly described as a gracious mentor, albeit a demanding one.

"He does not suffer fools gladly," said Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, a bioterrorism expert at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit foundation in Washington. "And he is accustomed to the power of command."

Those who know Dr. Henderson well wonder how his new mission will go. He does not like bureaucracies, yet he is now in the belly of a bureaucratic beast.

The labyrinthine Health and Human Services Department is a collection of agencies. President Bush has yet to fill the top posts at two, the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug Administration. And an important position at the parent agency, the job of assistant secretary for health, is also vacant. It will be up to Dr. Henderson to draw these agencies together and form alliances with law enforcement and intelligence authorities.

"He believes that rules are for mere mortals to follow," said Jonathan B. Tucker, the author of "Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox" (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).

"Sometimes I think he can rub people the wrong way because he is such a formidable personality and is so confident. Some people perceive that as arrogance," he said, adding that that was not his own experience of Dr. Henderson. "I think that's the risk of his approach. But of course, he has great credibility, given his history."

That credibility goes a long way on Capitol Hill. Last week, when Dr. Henderson appeared before a House committee, he was introduced by Representative Billy Tauzin, Republican of Louisiana, as "a real American hero." The lawmakers then gave him a standing ovation; he shook his head and tried to wave off the applause. "In truth," he said later, "it's a little embarrassing."

An ancient, contagious and particularly hideous disease, smallpox kills a third of those infected with it, and Dr. Henderson is one of the few doctors in this country today to have actually seen a case.

The World Health Organization's smallpox eradication program, which Dr. Henderson ran from 1966 to 1977, was, he said, the effort of countless public health workers who toiled under grueling conditions, often living in villages without electricity and running water, in nations torn apart by war. They operated under the principle of "ring vaccination," containing outbreaks by vaccinating every patient infected, and everyone around those patients, moving outward in concentric circles until the virus stopped spreading.

Dr. Henderson's admirers say he should win a Nobel Prize, yet he was recently passed over for another prestigious award, the Lasker Foundation Award for public service. The prize went to Dr. William Foege, a former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention who participated in the smallpox eradication effort and devised the ring vaccination strategy.

Despite the lack of official recognition, experts on smallpox say there is little doubt that the eradication effort, conducted in partnership with the former Soviet Union at the height of the cold war, succeeded in large part because of Dr. Henderson's cunning and derring-do.

When the Ethiopian health minister refused to cooperate with him, Dr. Henderson sneaked into the country and befriended the personal physician of the emperor, Haile Selassie. When Dr. Henderson believed the Russians were providing him with inferior smallpox vaccine, he went to Moscow — against direct orders from his superiors, who feared a diplomatic disaster — and demanded a better one.

"He created a lot of very loyal employees who were willing to go the extra mile," Dr. Tucker said. "If vaccine had to be sent out on Christmas Day, people would come in on Christmas Day to get the job done."

The world's last case of smallpox occurred in 1978, in England, when the virus escaped in a laboratory and infected a medical photographer. Two years later, it was declared eradicated worldwide. Nations that held samples of the virus were encouraged to either destroy them or transfer them to one of two official repositories that still exist, one in Russia and the other at the Centers for Disease Control, in Atlanta.

Dr. Henderson became dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, a post he held until the first Bush administration, when he served as science adviser to the White House.

When Bill Clinton was elected president, Dr. Henderson took a job in the health and human services agency, working as science adviser to Donna E. Shalala, Mr. Thompson's predecessor. But he left in 1995, saying he was not being consulted on issues of importance to him.

That year, Dr. Henderson said, he learned of the work of Ken Alibek, who ran the Soviet Union's biological weapons program and claimed to have developed smallpox as a weapon. But while Dr. Henderson became more concerned about bioterrorism — enough so that he founded the Johns Hopkins center — he nonetheless advocated destroying the official smallpox stocks, for several reasons, he and those close to him say.

First, the eradication program was an international effort, and other nations wanted the virus destroyed.

"We had countries around the world saying, 'Why are Big Brother United States and Big Brother Russia keeping the virus?' Dr. Henderson said. Second, he said, there was a danger that the virus could escape, as it did in England. Third, by destroying its stocks, the United States could make possession of it a crime.

But national security experts and military scientists countered with the argument that has prevailed: only by keeping the virus would the United States be able to develop better treatments for a smallpox attack. Dr. Jahrling, of Fort Detrick, said recently that Dr. Henderson viewed destruction as "the crown jewel in his career" — a contention that Dr. Henderson dismissed in Friday's interview as "mythology."

Dr. Henderson may not stay long in his new job; he said he was committed to remaining with the government only as long as it took to create a bioterrorism preparedness program that others might carry out. Asked how long that might be, he replied by saying that he had promised the World Health Organization he would stay in Geneva for 18 months. He stayed 11 years.

More than anything, Dr. Henderson said, he would like to figure out a way to persuade the countries of the world to come together to condemn the use of germs as weapons. Of smallpox, he said, "We've got to put the genie back in the bottle."

Aerospace Daily  
November 16, 2001

## **Russia Increasingly Worried About Nuclear Terrorism, Says Analyst**

With the integrity of Russia's nuclear security system continuing to erode, Russian nuclear specialists are increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear material, or possibly even commandeering nuclear weapons, according to Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information.

"The recent disclosure by the head of the Russian nuclear weapons security organization - that terrorist groups had been spotted and thwarted reconnoitering two Russian nuclear weapons storage facilities over the last six to eight months - confirms what I've been hearing in my private discussions with Russian specialists since Sept. 11," Blair said at a press briefing held by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in Washington Nov. 14.

"The specialists are now calling with some urgency for an investigation of the ability of terrorists to penetrate their nuclear control systems, either physically or electronically," he said.

Their fears include the terrorist-induced failure of security or safeguards that could result in the unauthorized use of one or more Russian nuclear weapons - the worst case involving an illicit launch at the United States.

This "gloomy picture" of Russia's nuclear security being should be cause for serious concern in the U.S., Blair said. Although Russian scientists have not yet identified an "Achilles Heel" in their security systems, they are still very concerned, particularly if terrorists were able to obtain help from within.

Russia's two top military and defense officials, fearing the growing threat of insider corruption, wrote letters to the U.S. government in late 1999 and early 2000 requesting assistance to shore up security at some of their country's 123 major nuclear storage sites, according to Blair.

"Terrorists, if aided by insiders, clearly have a better chance of capturing or diverting nuclear weapons, either in storage or possibly those that are being carried around in transportation in Russia at any given time," Blair said. He said there are upwards of 1,000 Russian nuclear weapons being transported around the country at any given time.

### **Electronic terror**

In addition to worrying about terrorists seizing physical control of a mobile nuclear weapon in the field, the threat of electronic infiltration is also very real, according to Blair.

An exploitable weakness was even discovered in the U.S. nuclear submarine launch control system just a few years ago, as the result of secret Pentagon study, he said

"It became evident that terrorist hackers could gain access to the submarine broadcast communications network of the United States, and by seizing control electronically, could illicitly disseminate a strategic launch order to U.S. Trident ballistic missile submarines on patrol," he said. Such an order could result in the launch of up to 200 nuclear warheads from a single vessel.

"The vulnerability was deemed so serious that submarine launch crews had to be given elaborate new instructions for validating any launch orders that they might receive," he said.

Blair recommended that President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agree to sponsor a joint investigation of these and other terrorist threat scenarios involving nuclear arsenals. He said the investigation should focus on a wide range of concerns, including the possible theft or capture of Pakistani nuclear bombs, the diversion of bomb-grade raw plutonium or uranium, and the fabrication of a working nuclear bomb by terrorists.

The scenario of a clandestine enrichment of uranium into bomb-grade quality in small laboratories, using off-the-shelf commercial centrifuges and easily obtainable low-enriched uranium, has been sketched out for Blair in his discussions with the Russians, he said. Such a process might be possible, they said, in a small laboratory operated by terrorists with help from nuclear experts.

Blair also recommended that more attention be paid to the possible terrorist use of radiological dispersion weapons - so-called "dirty bombs" consisting of nuclear waste detonated by conventional explosives - as well as the possibility of terrorist attacks on key nuclear facilities using planes or other vehicles to cause a meltdown.

-- *Jefferson Morris*

Washington Times  
November 20, 2001  
Pg. 1

## **U.S. Sees Saddam As Priority, Cites Biological Weapons**

By Alexander G. Higgins, Associated Press

GENEVA — The United States yesterday said Saddam Hussein's drive to develop offensive biological weapons was "beyond dispute," laying out a case that could make Iraq the next front in President Bush's global war on terrorism.

"The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no U.N. inspections to improve all phases of its offensive biological weapons program," said Mr. Bolton, who was in Geneva for an international conference to review a proposed treaty on biological weapons. "The existence of Iraq's program is beyond dispute." In addition to Iraq, Mr. Bolton said Washington strongly suspects that North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and Sudan also are seeking to develop germ-warfare programs.

But he refused to say whether any of the named states have assisted Afghanistan-based Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden in his reported quest for biological weapons.

Mr. Bolton's comments were the latest in an escalating series of remarks recently by senior Bush administration officials singling out Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The administration has been internally divided over whether to expand the war on terrorism to Iraq.

Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, on Sunday left open the possibility that Iraq could become a target in Mr. Bush's war on terrorism.

"We do not need the events of September 11 to tell us that [Saddam Hussein] is a very dangerous man who is a threat to his own people, a threat to the region and a threat to us because he is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction," she said.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, briefing reporters at the Pentagon yesterday, lumped Iraq with bin Laden's al Qaeda network and the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization as critical to the international network of "terrorist-sponsoring states."

"There is no question but that there has been a good deal of interaction" among these groups, Mr. Rumsfeld said. Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan told the official INA news agency yesterday that Iraq "was capable of standing up to the challenges posed by the United States in a bid to undermine [Iraq's] security and weaken its resolve."

The Iraqi newspaper Babel, which is run by Saddam's elder son Uday, said that the failure so far of the U.S.-led campaign to capture bin Laden increased the chances Washington would go after Iraq.

Iraq "will be the focus of attention of the U.S. administration, as will be Syria, Somalia and Sudan," the paper theorized.

In Geneva, Mr. Bolton told the 144 nations that have signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention that the United States finds North Korea's biological weapons program "extremely disturbing."

He said the United States believes that North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a biological weapons capability and that it has "developed and produced and may have weaponized" biological agents.

He also said the United States was "quite concerned" about Iran, Libya, Syria and Sudan, all of which appeared to have biological weapons programs.



Mr. Bolton said the United States knows "that Osama bin Laden considers obtaining weapons of mass destruction to be a sacred duty and wants to use them against the United States."

"We are concerned that he could have been trying to acquire a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support from a state," he added.

But he said the United States was "not prepared to comment whether rogue states may have assisted" bin Laden in the plan.

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian ambassador to the conference, said the accusation that his country was developing biological weapons is "unjustified and baseless."

The United States, which has rejected a legally binding inspection plan under the treaty, said it would rather set up a mechanism under which the U.N. secretary-general would order inspections when violations are suspected.

Other countries, including Japan, said the binding commitment is necessary if the treaty is to be effective.

American officials in July rejected more than six years of negotiations on enforcement measures of the 1972 treaty, arguing they were ineffective.

Mr. Bolton was speaking at the start of a three-week meeting in Geneva planned as a review of the agreement. He was presenting to other countries the new U.S. approach since the United States has come under an anthrax attack. The emergence of anthrax-tainted letters in the United States in the weeks after the September 11 terrorist attack has thrust the issue of biological warfare into the spotlight.

Mr. Bush has demanded that all 144 countries that have signed the treaty enact "strict national criminal legislation" against violations of the treaty and apply strict extradition requirements.

New York Times  
November 20, 2001

## **U.S. Calls For Global Action To Counter Germ Weapons**

By Elizabeth Olson

GENEVA, Nov. 19 — Countries that have signed the global pact banning biological weapons began their periodic review of the treaty today, promising that the anthrax attacks in the United States would lead to a vigorous and concerted effort to combat germ weapons.

The atmosphere was markedly changed from the bitterness and anger last summer when the United States abruptly pulled out of seven years of negotiations aimed at a mechanism to deter cheaters. American officials, invoking the anthrax scare, came to Geneva seeking to deflect the criticism by naming countries they believe are violating the 1972 accord, and offering proposals to tighten global controls to curb proliferation of such weapons.

The proposals, presented by John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control, urge each country to enact legislation that makes using biological weapons a crime, and to ease extradition processes. Other measures would empower the United Nations secretary general to order inspection of sites when treaty violations are suspected.

Despite the evident concern over anthrax, it took only a few speakers to underscore the fundamental difference in approach between the United States and some of the other 144 signatories, many of whom want to strengthen the existing pact rather than rely on individual or bilateral arrangements.

"The threat of disease as a weapon of war and terror, the threat of biological weapons, is not speculative, it is a threat that is a 'clear and present danger,'" said South Africa's representative, Peter Goosen, and "should be condemned in the strongest possible terms."

But it "should also have been instrumental in underlining the importance of the work that had been undertaken to negotiate a legally binding protocol to strengthen the implementation of the convention," he added.

Senior arms control officials have gathered for three weeks to check progress on the pact, which bans germ weaponry but has no verification process to deter or detect cheating. Other opening day speakers, including those from the European Union, backed the multilateral approach on the ground that it legally binds signing countries.

Mr. Bolton protested that it was useless to add more paperwork if countries were already flouting their obligations. He argued that it was better to ensure that existing obligations were met, which he said was not the case with Iraq and North Korea. Those two countries have germ warfare programs, and Iran, Libya and Syria are also likely candidates, he said. Syria has not ratified the treaty, but the other countries have.

"The purpose of naming the names today was to put the international spotlight on them," he said. "Prior to Sept. 11, some would have avoided this approach. The world has changed, however, and so must our business-as-usual approach."

Although Mr. Bolton said that Osama bin Laden "could have been trying to acquire a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support from a state," he said he would not now name any countries that had assisted him. Such suspect countries could include China, Egypt, Israel and Russia, according to biological warfare experts who track what kind of potentially dangerous materials countries acquire and stockpile. Mr. Bolton defended Washington's rejection of the negotiated inspection scheme as unworkable because it could have undermined American biodefense programs, compromised export-control programs intended to hinder proliferation and risked loss of proprietary information.

Washington Post  
November 20, 2001  
Pg. 8

## **U.S. Says Iraq, Others Pursue Germ Warfare**

By Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States singled out Iraq and five other countries yesterday for pursuing germ warfare programs, but said it still opposes the draft protocol for enforcing compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

John R. Bolton, undersecretary for arms control and international security, said at a biological weapons conference in Geneva that the existence of a germ warfare program in Iraq is "beyond dispute." Bolton said the United States believes North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and Sudan are pursuing such weapons.

"The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no U.N. inspections to improve all phases of its offensive biological weapons program," Bolton said. "The existence of Iraq's program is beyond dispute."

Bolton's allegations about Iraq, while not new, were one of a series of comments about Iraq made by leading Bush administration officials in recent days, and they appeared designed to further build a case for international action against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein even as the administration asserted that it was still focused on Afghanistan. Concern about Iraq's weapons programs has been building since 1998, when it barred weapons inspectors from the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM).

But some supporters of the bio-weapons protocol said that Bolton's unusual decision to target specific countries at an international conference was also an effort to divert attention from the administration's rejection of the broad international agreement on verification measures.

"He's trying to distract attention from the problems the U.S. has created by not agreeing to the verification protocol," said Joseph Cirincione, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Everyone agrees that it's a compromise verification protocol, but everyone decided that it was better to go forward and improve it over time rather than stop it in its tracks -- except the United States."

Administration officials say those measures are intrusive for innocent countries and companies while being inadequate for uncovering violations by rogue states.

"The time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over," Bolton said. "We will continue to reject flawed texts like the BWC draft protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the United States."

He said signatories to the biological weapons convention should enact their own legislation criminalizing germ warfare activities, establish mechanisms for international investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks or weapons incidents, and improve cooperation with the World Health Organization.

The highlighting of allegations about Iraq comes in the context of heightened U.S. anxiety about biological weapons and the willingness of America's foes to use them. Many members of the Bush administration favor making Iraq the next target in the U.S. war on terrorism, alleging that one of the key hijackers in the Sept. 11 attacks met with Iraqi intelligence agents and that Hussein has the means and willingness to launch an attack on the United States.

"Beyond al Qaeda, the most serious concern is Iraq," Bolton said yesterday. "Iraq's biological weapons program remains a serious threat to international security."

In Washington, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld also reinforced the Iraq critics yesterday. Asked at a Pentagon briefing about the Philippines, Rumsfeld found a way to mention Iraq in his reply. "There is no question but that there has been a good deal of interaction between the terrorists in the Philippines and the al Qaeda and people in Iraq and people in other terrorist-sponsoring states over the years," he said.

Even before the Sept. 11 attacks, some members of the administration, such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, have favored taking action to promote a change in the Baghdad government.

On Sunday, Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser, left open the possibility that Iraq could become a target in Bush's war on terrorism.

"We do not need the events of Sept. 11 to tell us that [Saddam Hussein] is a very dangerous man who is a threat to his own people, a threat to the region and a threat to us because he is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction," she said.

Bolton said that he wanted to "name names," something usually not done face to face at international conferences.

"Prior to Sept. 11, some would have avoided this approach," he said. "The world has changed, however, and so must our business-as-usual approach."

He said that the North Korea's biological weapons program was also "extremely disturbing." He said that North Korea "likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so."

He said the United States believes Iran has probably produced and "weaponized" biological warfare agents, even though it has signed the biological weapons convention. He said Libya's and Syria's biological weapons program were in the research and development stage and that they may be capable of producing small quantities of warfare agents. Sudan, he added, had expressed "growing interest" in developing a biological weapons program.

But Bolton failed to mention several other countries whose biological weapons activities were described in a Pentagon report issued in January. They include Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan and India.

China, for example, was cited in the report for maintaining "some elements of an offensive biological warfare program" even though it joined the weapons convention in 1984. The report said China had made "inaccurate and incomplete" declarations about its program. Many biological weapons experts believe Egypt, Algeria and Taiwan should also be on the list.

Bolton said the United States would contact other states privately regarding concerns about biological weapons.

London Mirror

November 20, 2001

## **Factory's Taliban Boss Hated The West**

***Exclusive: He disappeared 7 months ago with half his staff***

By Gary Jones in Kabul

A deadly Taliban anthrax factory was found in Kabul by The Mirror yesterday.

The two-storey lab was used to create vaccines from highly dangerous wild bacteria. Its discovery fuels fears that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terror group is behind the US anthrax alert.

A source who worked at the plant said: "There's no doubt the Taliban were planning chemical or biological warfare against the West. I believe anthrax may have been first on their list."

The factory, which was bombed by US B-52s, was headed by anti-West mullah Qari Abdullah. He and about half of his staff vanished seven months ago. They are now believed to be in the US and Europe.

On a tour of the plant The Mirror saw an incubator to develop the bacteria, hundreds of test tubes ready for samples and the word "anthrax" scribbled on a container.

Yesterday in Washington the FBI were urgently investigating a suspected anthrax letter sent to Democrat Senator Patrick Leahy. Four people have died from the bug.

The factory, discovered by The Mirror yesterday, was officially set up for the production of vaccines for cattle using wild anthrax bacteria. But we learned that the Taliban became extremely proficient in using the bug.

It is now feared that rogue Taliban linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terror group could have developed anthrax spores into the form being used to terrify the US where four people have died from the bacteria.

Dr Abdul Quader Raoufi, 58, current vaccines chief at the Afghan factory, told us: "We'd rather have been running the labs on our own."

"But the mullahs were in charge of everything and we couldn't stop them learning about our activities. There was always a danger information could get into the wrong hands."

A source who worked at the factory added: "There's no doubt the Taliban were planning chemical or biological warfare against the West."

"I believe anthrax might have been first on their list."

We were alerted to the factory - the Institute of Veterinary Vaccine Production - by a highly-placed source in the Northern Alliance.

After being directed there by an official of the Ministry of Agriculture we were ushered through locked gates for a guided tour by Dr Raoufi. During US air strikes, 13 B-52 bombs landed all around the premises at Badram Bagh, outside Kabul, although none scored a direct hit.

It is not clear if the fighters deliberately targeted the lab. All the equipment needed to make vaccines was hidden away the day before the bombardment began.

Photographer Andy Stenning and I were shown every room. Glass was scattered throughout the building and doors blown off their hinges.

At the end of one corridor on the second floor we were led into a small office where our eyes were immediately drawn to the word "Anthrax", scribbled on a test-tube.

Hundreds of glass vessels were kept in a large cabinet in readiness for the latest batch of vaccines.

Elsewhere, there was a walk-in incubator to develop bacteria, a cold-room where vaccines were stored, a viral vaccine store and an expensive French-made viral vaccine harvesting machine.

On one door were the words "to be safe than sorry", the word "better" having fallen off.

The lab was first built in Charikar, in the northern province of Parwar, in 1993/4 with equipment from India.

A number of experiments were carried out, including the development of wild bacteria.

Three sheep were infected to study the results. Their carcasses were buried 30ft in desert land on the Shomali Plains away from possible contamination of water supplies.

Our source, who refused to be identified, said: "This was very dangerous work, though we knew what we were doing.

"We developed the technology of how to keep anthrax bacteria and how to develop it for use in vaccines.

"At the time, we created three million doses. It was essential work to keep our country's cattle healthy." The source said the present anthrax alert was "especially worrying", and added: "Someone with the necessary technical expertise is behind this evil."

Taliban political chiefs were quick to realise the potential of the lab after they came to power in 1996.

The following year they moved it from Charikar, where the Alliance had a stronghold, to Kabul.

At the time, the move surprised many as it was thought the Taliban had little interest in developing vaccines for use by the nation's farmers. In fact, Taliban soldiers destroyed huge tracts of fertile land so they could set up military bases without interference from a hostile local population.

Our source said: "The Taliban were very keen to take control of the laboratory.

"They moved the staff and all equipment down to the capital without warning. They wanted the laboratory there very badly."

Ten different kinds of vaccine were made at the unit. They were divided into four sections - pox vaccines, Newcastle, anaerobic and aerobic. Mullah Abdullah, previously famed for his ability to recite from the Koran, was brought in to head the operations.

Dr Raoufi said: "He and his Taliban superiors were interested in the technical detail of what happened here, although they had no background in science.

"They were also keen on the laboratory making money. Their priority was certainly not the interests of the people and the farming community at large.

"Sometimes many of their officials would turn up unannounced to see what we were doing.

"The minister himself would look round, then go away."

Dr Raoufi revealed that the vaccine institute, set up with help from the Red Cross and one of Afghanistan's most modern buildings, once had 45 staff.

But more than half left, many saying they meant to work abroad.

Dr Raoufi said: "I don't know what happened to these people.

"I'm told most went to work in America and Europe. They knew their skills were in demand elsewhere in the world." Referring to the disappearance of Mullah Abdullah, he added: "I've no idea what happened to him. He wasn't well liked. We didn't have a lot to do with him.

The production of vaccines at the Kabul factory was so successful that some samples were sent to Geneva where the Red Cross congratulated the Taliban on their work.

Veterinary expert Dr Raoufi - who was anti-Taliban but forced to wear their traditional turban and long beard - is dedicated to improving livestock conditions.

Yesterday he was at pains to reassure the West as it remained in the grip of bio-terrorism fears.

He said: "Anthrax production is under control. There is no danger because the vaccine is inactivated.

"These vaccines are to help people, not endanger them. I want to tell the world that what we are doing is safe. We are responsible."

However, he admitted that the Taliban could have obtained the knowledge to handle and develop anthrax. Dr Raoufi said: "Sadly, some use what is meant to be good for their own destructive ends."

London Daily Telegraph  
November 20, 2001

## **Al-Qa'eda's Atom Plans Were Spoof Science**

By Roger Highfield, Science Editor

Documents found last week in an al-Qa'eda safe house in Afghanistan that purport to be instructions on how to build a nuclear weapon were shown yesterday to be based on a spoof scientific article.

The "plans" were discovered in a ruined house in Kabul after the Taliban fled the city, and included notes ostensibly showing how to create a nuclear device.

Although the partly burnt documents may well confirm that al-Qa'eda was trying to get hold of weapons of mass destruction, they also indicate that the group had little idea what it was doing and absolutely no sense of humour. Jason Scott, of the internet newsletter rotten.com, said he had searched the internet for the phrases used in the documents, which were in English, and found they were the same as a well known 1979 spoof article. Among the tell-tale references were to "theory of operation - the device basically works".

The original, entitled How To Build An Atomic Bomb In 10 Easy Steps, described how to create a device for between \$5,000 (£3,000) and \$30,000 that "is a great ice-breaker at parties, and in a pinch, can be used for national defence".

The original was one of a series run by the Journal of Irreproducible Results. Yesterday, a former editor, Marc Abrahams, confirmed that the documents, shown in a report by BBC reporter John Simpson, were from the article, though in a different format. "I have a copy of the issue and I have also seen footage of the BBC report and it is clear it is the same text," said Mr Abrahams.

"It is very clearly a piece of humour writing the Taliban were poring over," said Mr Abrahams.

Defense Daily  
November 20, 2001  
Pg. 2

## **BMDO Gears Up For Missile Defense Intercept Try Next Week**

By Kerry Gildea

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) plans to conduct the next intercept flight test in its ground-based midcourse missile defense program on Nov. 29, program sources said.

All of the preliminary ground checks indicate the test will go on time, but that will still be subject to the final pre-flight reviews that will take place over the course of the next week, sources said.

The test will follow the same profile as the flight test conducted this past summer, including the use of a single balloon decoy.

During the July 14 test a modified Minuteman ICBM target provided by Lockheed Martin [LMT] was launched from Vandenberg AFB, Calif. A prototype interceptor carrying a Raytheon [RTN]-built Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) was launched on a Lockheed Martin payload launch vehicle about 20 minutes later and 4,800 miles away from the Ronald Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll.

About 10 minutes after its launch, the kill vehicle distinguished the target from the balloon decoy and intercepted it at an altitude of more than 140 miles, during the midcourse phase of the target warhead's flight.

Boeing [BA] is the lead systems integrator for the overall program, formerly called the national missile defense program.

The hit marked the second successful intercept for the program. During an intercept try on July 8, 2000, the kill vehicle did not separate from the booster. The missile defense interceptor hit a target in its first try on Oct. 3, 1999, but then failed in the second test on Jan. 19, 2000, when the EKV's infrared seekers failed due to moisture in the seekers' coolant system.

Following the July 14 intercept, BMDO started gearing up for this next test. The addition of more complex countermeasures will be integrated into future test scenarios, according to Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of BMDO.

The flight tests cost about \$100 million each.

Critics of the program have argued these missile defense tests are unrealistic and do not simulate a real-world scenario. In particular, they have charged that an enemy would use more sophisticated countermeasures and decoys than the single balloon that BMDO has been including in its flight test profiles to date.

Also, there have been allegations from some program opponents that BMDO is rigging the tests. But, those allegations have been rejected by BMDO and several other independent review groups.

Following the July test, allegations surfaced that the systems used in the test were only able to operate because BMDO had placed a beacon on the target to relay its location. But, BMDO and independent review team officials later explained that the beacon did not play any role in the kill vehicle's ability to locate and hit the target. The beacon, they said, was used solely for radar purposes to provide a midcourse check on the target because the more sophisticated radar capabilities planned for the missile defense architecture are not yet available.

Because there currently is no sophisticated missile defense X-Band radar capability available for the flight tests, a FPQ-14 range radar in Kaena Point, Hawaii is used to provide a midpoint target tracking update, BMDO officials said. However, it is not powerful enough to obtain that data without the use of a beacon on the target, they explained.

Since the summer test, BMDO and the contractor team have been tweaking the overall ground based missile defense test system before each intercept test. For example, Raytheon made some minor changes to its EKV, a move that slightly pushed back the schedule for the next intercept by about a month.

The changes Raytheon made to the EKV are primarily software changes based on lessons learned from the previous intercept tests, according to program officials. Also, BMDO wanted to conduct additional ground tests before the next intercept attempt, BMDO officials said last month.

Wall Street Journal  
November 19, 2001

## **Hijackers' Interest In Crop Dusters Still Puzzles Terrorism Investigators**

By John J. Fialka, Tom Hamburger and Gary Fields, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON -- Seven months before he crashed an airliner into the World Trade Center, Mohamed Atta was asking crop dusters in Florida an odd question about their planes: How far can they fly?

Such aircraft normally aren't flown long distances. But this summer, a Middle Eastern man who gave his name as "Sam" hung around crop-dusting firms in Saskatchewan, Canada, for days -- and asked the same question. And sometime before he was arrested in August, suspected terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui did crop-dusting research on his computer.

The interest shown in crop dusting by the Sept. 11 hijackers and possible associates is one of the enduring mysteries of the recent terrorist attacks. Once discovered, it caused the first major post-Sept. 11 scare and prompted authorities to ground crop dusters for five days.

Yet two months later, investigators still don't know what these men were up to, despite thousands of interviews in the U.S. and Canada about their ventures into agricultural aviation. Were terrorists planning to spread anthrax from a crop duster? That would be very difficult to do effectively, because anthrax droplets need to be small enough to float, and crop dusters are designed to spray droplets that don't. Perhaps they wanted to load a crop duster's 800-gallon pesticide tank with another harmful agent, investigators speculate; or maybe they wanted to load a plane with explosives and crash it into something. Several strange inquiries, all along similar lines, have raised such concerns among authorities.

Mr. Atta's first known crop-dusting visit came in February. He and two other men who appeared to be of Middle Eastern origin drove to the municipal airport in Belle Glade, Fla., near Lake Okeechobee, and walked into South Florida Crop Care's hanger. James Lester, who cleans and loads crop dusters for the company, says Mr. Atta pointedly quizzed him about how much fuel and chemicals the planes could hold, and became pushy when Mr. Lester rebuffed his requests to sit in one of the planes. Finally, after Mr. Atta followed so closely behind that "he stepped on my heel," Mr. Lester told him he was too busy to talk anymore.

Later that month, Mr. Atta went to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farm Credit Service office in Homestead, south of Miami, and inquired about borrowing money to buy a crop duster, people familiar with the matter say. He was told to check with the nearby Community Bank of Florida, which later received a call from someone who wanted to buy a crop duster -- an unusual request, since few farms use crop dusters in the area.

Several weeks later, a man that South Florida Crop Care general manager J.D. "Will" Lee believes was Mr. Atta returned to that airfield. This time, he wanted to know how far a crop duster could fly on a tank of gas, Mr. Lee recalls. "Nobody asks about the range of crop dusters -- it doesn't make any sense," says Mr. Lee, who related his account to the FBI.

Mr. Atta and various men, apparently Middle Eastern, made repeated visits to the airfield throughout the spring and summer, employees there say. They usually stood off at a distance to watch crop dusters being loaded, taking off and landing, once videotaping them.

In March, Mr. Atta and a man investigators suspect was Marwan al-Shehhi -- the other hijacker-pilot who crashed into the World Trade Center -- landed a small plane at an airport near tiny Copperhill, Tenn., by the Georgia border. Danny Whitener, a pilot, says Mr. Atta questioned him -- again, in an aggressive manner -- about a nearby chemical plant that he had just flown over, asking what chemicals were there. Informed that it was mostly empty, Mr. Atta became angry and accused Mr. Whitener of lying, Mr. Whitener says. He also asked Mr. Whitener about a nearby dam and two nearby electric power plants, both of them nuclear.

A month later, Mr. Atta and a companion returned by car, says John Rutkosky, then the airport's manager. This time, Mr. Atta asked Mr. Rutkosky about the range and fuel capacity of a British-made Hawker jet and a Gulfstream turboprop parked there.

In Canada, a Middle Eastern man started showing up at crop-duster businesses in June, first visiting Farmair Ltd., in Regina, Saskatchewan, where he spoke to owner Norm Colhoun. He had an Arab-sounding name, but the men he encountered cannot remember it; they said he told them to call him Sam. Mr. Colhoun says the man asked for a pilot's job, claiming to have flown crop dusters in Syria and Russian passenger jets. Told there were no openings, he hung around for the day, observing and asking "funny questions" -- including the planes' range, says Mr. Colhoun. Later in June, the same man turned up 60 miles south at Arndt Air Ltd., a crop-dusting company in Weyburn. It didn't have any pilot openings, either, but he showed up every day for a week, says maintenance director Dan McGonigle. Messrs. McGonigle and Mr. Colhoun compared recollections, and both concluded they'd encountered the same man. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police are continuing to look for him.

"He watched what we did, how we operated," recalls Mr. McGonigle, who figured Sam was "an airport bum" who liked to hang around airplanes. The company offered him a job as a ground-crew member, but he was only interested in a pilot's job. After studying flight manuals he found lying around, he persuaded company officials to let him fly a crop duster. But as Sam taxied onto the runway, it was obvious he was having trouble steering. Halfway down the runway, he stopped, jumped out and ran into a nearby grass field, Mr. McGonigle says.

Meanwhile, Mr. Moussaoui was trying to learn to fly in Norman, Okla. A French citizen of Moroccan descent, he had paid Airman Flight School \$5,000 in February for a three-month course. Investigators since have determined that he was in contact with suspected terrorists overseas at the time. At some point, he downloaded a complete crop-dusting manual onto his laptop computer, including information about wind patterns and chemical dispersal. On Aug. 17, after he aroused suspicions at a flight school near Minneapolis for insisting on paying \$8,300 in cash to learn to fly a Boeing 747 before he knew how to fly a small plane, the FBI arrested Mr. Moussaoui on immigration charges. He remains in custody in New York as a material witness in the hijacking investigation; his lawyer's identity isn't known.

In Florida, Mr. Atta continued visiting South Florida Crop Care. Then, in late summer, he went to a Delray Beach pharmacy in search of treatment for reddened, burning hands, which pharmacist Greg Chatterton says appeared irritated by chemicals, though Mr. Atta wouldn't say what had happened. Mr. Lee, the Belle Glade crop duster, says Mr. Atta's last visit was several days before the Sept. 11 attacks.

Right around that time, Mr. Colhoun in Saskatchewan received a strange call. It wasn't Sam, Mr. Colhoun says, but his accent was similar. The caller was inquiring about a crop duster Mr. Colhoun had for sale. Among the questions: "How far will this fly on a tank of gas?"

Mr. McGonigle says Sam himself called on Sept. 15 and said he was just checking in. When Mr. McGonigle mentioned the terrorist attacks, he says, Sam only mumbled in response. After a bit more small talk, the call ended. Sam hasn't called back since.

### **The Crop-Duster Index By the Numbers**

Agriculture-aviation businesses in the U.S.: 2,500 Agricultural aircraft in the U.S.: 5,000 Pilots trained to fly them: 5,500 Cost of a state-of-the-art crop duster (in dollars): 1,000,000 Minimum feet above the ground they can fly: 3 Speed they can fly in miles per hour: 140

### **By the Years**

Release year of the industry's least-favorite movie, "North by Northwest," featuring a crop duster chasing Cary Grant: 1959

Year by which most such planes, technically speaking, stopped being dusters; liquids had replaced most powdered pesticides and fertilizers: 1960

Year the National Agricultural Aviation Association issued antiterrorism tips, including locking up aircraft, blocking hangars with heavy equipment and installing hidden starter switches: 2001

*Source: National Agricultural Aviation Association*

Washington Post  
November 17, 2001  
Pg. 24

## **Russia Sends Iran Reactor Shell**

ST. PETERSBURG -- A Russian factory shipped its first nuclear reactor shell to Iran yesterday as part of a project that has raised strong U.S. protests.

Officials at the Izhora factory in St. Petersburg presided over a ceremony dedicated to the completion of the 317-ton, cylindrical reactor body for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Russia signed a contract in 1995 to build the first reactor at the Bushehr plant. It is to be completed by 2003 for an estimated \$ 800 million.

The United States, which accuses Iran of sponsoring terrorism, has urged Russia to abandon construction of the reactor, fearing Iran could use the nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. Russia and Iran have said the plant will be used only for civilian purposes and will be under international control.

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said Thursday during a visit to the factory that his country would sign a contract for a second reactor after the first is delivered, state-controlled ORT television reported.

*Associated Press*

Newsweek (Web exclusive)  
November 21, 2001

## **Interview With A Bombmaker**

### ***Saddam Hussein's former atomic-bomb developer says Iraq is on course to gain 'full nuclear status'***

Khidhir Hamza is a rarity: a high-level Iraqi defector with an insider's knowledge of Saddam Hussein's weapons capabilities. As he detailed in his autobiography from last year, "Saddam's Bombmaker (with Jeff Stein)," Hamza was the overseer of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. In the 1960's, he studied nuclear physics at MIT and Florida State University but was forced to return to Baghdad in the early 70s when the Iraqi government made thinly-veiled threats against his parents.

He spent the next 20 years enduring nightmarish outbursts from Hussein, who once forced him to watch a videotape of colleagues who had supposedly betrayed the regime being shot to death by a firing squad. By 1994, he'd seen enough, and fled Iraq before making his way to the American embassy in Budapest, Hungary. Hamza, who now



lives in hiding somewhere in Virginia with his wife and children, recently spoke with NEWSWEEK'S Suzanne Smalley about the two decades he spent developing deadly weapons.

**NEWSWEEK: What was it like working under Saddam Hussein? In your book you talk about colleagues who dared to challenge his authority being tortured and killed. How did his mind seem to work?**

Khidhir Hamza: He is a man who came to power through murder and intimidation. Talking to him you feel this immediately. He talks in a transparently dismissive and haughty manner. He is literally a bully in private. In public, especially on TV, he is the gracious and smiling father figure. But the worst part of dealing with him is getting him angry.

**Do you believe that Hussein is helping to finance Al Qaeda? Did any of your experiences in Iraq give you reason to believe that Hussein has ties to bin Laden operatives?**

When I left Iraq in 1994, bin Laden was not on the world's radar yet and there was no reason for me to hear about him. But knowing Saddam, it would be the perfect organization for him to support. There were sightings of bin Laden in Baghdad...before the African Embassy bombings in 1998. Recent Iraqi defectors do confirm training foreign Islamic fundamentalists.

**You were educated at MIT and Florida State and then forced to return to Iraq to make an atomic weapon. Were any of the other 12,000 people you worked with making the bomb also educated in the West? Did your colleagues and you ever comment on the irony of the way your education was being channeled against the countries that had hosted you?**

It was not meant to go against the U.S. or the West. We started with a modest program to achieve strategic parity with Israel. But Saddam had other ideas. When they became clear at the onset of the Gulf War we gave up. It took me three years to plan an escape without immediately jeopardizing my family's safety.

The problem for the scientists was that we were not sure of the reception we would get if we attempted defection. Muayad Naji attempted defecting to the U.S. in 1993. He escaped to Jordan with his family. Denied a visa by the U.S. embassy, he was trying to find a country to accept him. This gave enough time for Iraqi intelligence to arrange a hit on him. He was murdered in front of his family by two Iraqi agents in one of Amman's major streets. To compound the terror, the murderers were released by the Jordanian government on a promise of a trial in Iraq. A year later when I left, I was denied a visa despite the fact that the head of the Iraqi opposition vouched for me. It took another year and a harrowing time for my family before the U.S. agreed to help. Not a single major scientist in the military program managed to escape after my experience. Dr. Nasser Hindawi, the real brain behind the bio-warfare program [and educated in the U.S.] , is still languishing in jail because of an attempt to escape.

**What about the U.N. weapons inspections? Were they a farce?**

Actually the inspectors did a good job of uncovering the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, despite many lapses initially. However, the mandate they were under limited their scope. Monitoring the knowledge base was not within [the UN's] scope. When I left, I was surprised by how little follow-up they had on the scientists. It was remedied to a degree later, but it was too late. The long process alerted Saddam and he kept the scientists mostly out of reach. Later he kicked the inspectors out to preserve what he had and to have more room to rebuild his weapons program. If you know what to do, equipment is replaceable. For Saddam, who has a very extensive purchasing network all over the world, this is especially easy. Also, Iraq has good knowledge in manufacturing some of the major pieces of equipment, including fermenters for the bio-warfare program.

**How did Saddam view America's dependence on oil and what did he think it could do for him?**

The invasion of Kuwait was meant to control the Gulf oil. This is the next step in the danger Saddam presents the region. If he nuclearizes his forces he will be invincible to attempts to remove him from power. This will encourage him to terrorize the region the way he did before the Gulf War. His invasion of Kuwait was based on the claim that it flooded the world market with cheap oil and thus damaged Iraq's oil income. [The U.S.] did not take him seriously then, but when he is back fully weaponized, this time they will.

**You believe that with some Russian brainpower Hussein could go nuclear. Were there any Russian scientists working with you in Baghdad? Do you think the West would know if Hussein had nuclear capabilities?**

Russians worked in the chemical weapons program but until I left there were no Russians in the nuclear program. However, I describe in my book how the Russian scientists were desperate for work when I visited Russia in 1990. Iraq did use a German engineer to help in the uranium enrichment program in the late 80's. If Russian scientists are employed, Iraq can cut considerably the time needed to produce bomb grade uranium in large quantities. I have no direct knowledge that this is happening now but I think this is a logical move that Iraq was considering for sometime. Saddam may choose to detonate one [a nuclear weapon]. This will make him an instant hero in the Arab and Muslim world. And it will also provide him with the deterrence he needs to have more of a free hand in the region.

**You say that if the embargo were lifted, as Russia, China, and France have pushed for, Saddam could easily "cross the nuclear bomb finish line." Could you explain the correlation?**

Lifting of the sanctions will allow Iraq to trade more or less freely with the outside world. It will also allow Iraq to control and keep the revenues of its oil sales. Most of the nuclear weapons components and support structure can be achieved with conventional engineering and dual use equipment. With open borders and large revenues these are easily obtained. Thus, Iraq will be able not only to produce the three bombs that German intelligence estimates it will have in 2005, but a much accelerated rate of production and eventually full nuclear status at least as large as that of India and Pakistan.

**The bomb program employed more than 2,000 engineers, 300 of whom held Ph.D.s in the hard sciences. Were they all Iraqi? What percentage were educated in the West?**

All of the leaders of the Iraqi nuclear program are trained in the West.

**You write that Hussein was very close to having atomic capability when you defected. Do you think he could have achieved it by now? Can you convey how close he was in terms that the average person would understand?**

The German BND [intelligence network] accumulated a very thorough analysis of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. They used information from various sources including defectors and aerial and satellite surveillance. Their report, which was published last December, estimates that Iraq will possess three nuclear weapons by 2005. This is assuming that Iraq will use only existing uranium stockpiles and no foreign input. Iraq already had a workable nuclear design when I left. A minor enrichment capability is all that is needed to provide the nuclear core for three weapons.

**How far do you think Hussein would go to punish America? How mentally unstable did he seem to you?**

America did the one unforgivable sin with Saddam. It humiliated him but kept him in power. It is like playing with a highly poisonous snake. Keeping it hungry and confined but alive waiting for a chance to strike back. There was a serious misunderstanding of his stamina and ability to survive. But one thing about Saddam is clear to all those who know him: He never forgives and never forgets. Remember the attempt on former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait? He was no longer in office, but Saddam could not let go. Also, the murder of his two sons-in-law despite his personal promise of forgiving and forgetting if they came back from Jordan. He could do neither. His two daughters are still under house arrest the last we heard. If Saddam can unleash any disease in the U.S. with deniability, my guess is that he will not hesitate for one minute. I don't think that he is suicidal or mad. He is calculating and determined and evil. But under pressure he can go into a rage.

New York Times  
November 21, 2001

## **South Korea: Warning On North's Germ Supplies**

North Korea has stockpiled at least 2,500 tons of material for use in biological and chemical warfare and perhaps twice that amount, said South Korea's defense minister, Kim Dong Shin. He said the material included anthrax bacteria and the smallpox virus and that the North had the means to mass-produce biological and chemical weapons. The smallpox disease has been wiped out worldwide and the only known stocks of the virus are in the United States and Russia.

*Don Kirk (NYT)*

New York Times  
November 21, 2001

## **In Utah, A Government Hater Sells A Germ-Warfare Book**

By Paul Zielbauer with William J. Broad

SALT LAKE CITY, Nov. 19 — At the "Crossroads of the West" gun show here last weekend, weapons dealers sold semi-automatic rifles and custom-made pistols, and ammunition wholesalers unloaded bullets by the case. But perhaps the most fearsome weapon for sale in the cavernous, crowded exposition center was a book.

Next to the Indian handicraft booth, Timothy W. Tobiason was selling printed and CD copies of his book, "Scientific Principles of Improvised Warfare and Home Defense Volume 6-1: Advanced Biological Weapons Design and Manufacture," a germ-warfare cookbook that bioterrorism experts say is accurate enough to be dangerous.

Mr. Tobiason, an agricultural-chemicals entrepreneur from Nebraska with a bitter hatred for the government, said he sold about 2,000 copies of his self-published book a year as he moved from gun show to gun show across America. The book, which includes directions for making "mail delivered" anthrax, suggests that the knowledge necessary to start an anthrax attack like the one that has terrorized the East Coast is readily accessible.

While Mr. Tobiason's instructions fall short of what would be needed to produce the highly refined form of germ spores found last month in letters to Congressional leaders, experts find much to worry about.

"The guy who wrote this is very smart, very dangerous," said Ken Alibek, a former top official in the Soviet germ-weapons program who is now president of Advanced Biosystems, a consulting company in Manassas, Va. "We shouldn't ignore this.

"It's not sophisticated," he said of Mr. Tobiason's anthrax formula, "but this process is going to work."

F.B.I. officials theorize that the culprit behind the recent attacks might have been a home-grown loner with sufficient scientific knowledge and a deep grudge. Mr. Tobiason denies any knowledge of the anthrax-laced letters, and federal officials say he is not a suspect. But he is part of an American subculture of people with a profound mistrust of government, some of whom traffic in the intricacies of germ warfare.

Federal officials said they monitored Mr. Tobiason for years before the attacks began last month; indeed, there are indications that they recently stepped up surveillance of him and others who have shown inclinations toward antigovernment violence.

The talk from Mr. Tobiason and some who stopped by his table at the gun show reflected the conspiratorial view of government that some investigators believe may have been an ingredient in the anthrax attacks.

"I don't trust him completely, and I don't trust the government completely," a former nurse named Linda said of Mr. Tobiason after buying a \$10 CD from him last weekend. One element of her mistrust of the government was the F.B.I., which she said is "taking away civil liberties all the time."

Mr. Tobiason, who is 45 and lives in an aging Dodge Caravan in which he travels the country, traces his own anger at the federal government to patent laws he said cheated him out of money and to what he said was surveillance by the F.B.I.

"If this government continues to do this to people," he said, referring to what he called years of F.B.I. harassment, "they're going to have a lot more Tim McVeighs and Tim Tobiasons."

The sale of survival and doomsday books is not unusual at gun shows and elsewhere, and the Internet is filled with advice on how to make explosives. What makes Mr. Tobiason's writings more dangerous, germ-warfare experts who have read it say, is that it offers anyone with \$10 the ability to build crude biological weapons capable of killing thousands of people.

Those experts say Mr. Tobiason's 250-page book does not give specific directions for producing the finely milled anthrax that was sent to Tom Daschle, the Senate majority leader, and, in fact, contains some errors. The book deals mostly with the production of wet anthrax, though it does suggest a way to grind clusters of anthrax into microscopic pieces, which can settle into the lungs.

But Dr. Alibek said Mr. Tobiason's work "could be a step on the road," for someone intent on producing highly lethal anthrax.

Richard Spertzel, a former head of biological inspections in Iraq for the United Nations, said Mr. Tobiason's instructions would produce "a low- grade product" at best but added that the book, "ought to be damn near illegal, if it's not now."

Mr. Tobiason's work, which he said was drawn from military and biology books he borrowed from the University of Nebraska library, is written in mostly dispassionate, technical terms.

But his anger is hardly hidden. The cover of his germ-warfare manual includes the introduction: "Why pay to recruit troops and build factories to wage war and kill for you when nature can do it for free? Or, if you can make Jell-O, you can wipe out cities. Enjoy!"

In an interview on Saturday, Mr. Tobiason said he had made small amounts of pathogens including anthrax, though he said he had never used them to harm anyone.

He has written about a dozen books on military history and germ warfare and said he planned another soon that would describe how to make "huge scale" germ weapons.

"It will have some planet killers in it," he said at a Sizzler Restaurant after the show. "It will allow anyone to arm themselves with biological weapons in their basements."

Mr. Tobiason said he writes "to fight against dishonest government," and said that if he wanted to, he could initiate a far more deadly biological attack than the recent one.

"It would be a hard thing to do, but I'm prepared to do it," he said.

He said he would kill innocent people if he had to to defend himself. "All my morals and ethics are gone, just like the government's."

Mr. Tobiason has distributed his work widely. In June, he said, he left copies of his book at the offices of dozens of United States senators, including Mr. Daschle, a Democrat from South Dakota, Fred Thompson, Republican of Tennessee, and Chuck Hagel, Republican of Nebraska.

Mr. Tobiason said he was trying to get the attention of lawmakers for his complaints about the government. If Congress granted him a public hearing, he said, he would drop his plans to publish his next book. But other than a visit by federal agents, Mr. Tobiason said, his book did not get him any notice.

Mr. Tobiason, who grew up in Columbus, Neb., left Columbus High School during his junior year and enlisted in the Navy.

He said that he had been an antisubmarine warfare specialist aboard the carrier Enterprise and that he had spied on Soviet submarines and used electronic tricks to create phantom images on Russian military radar.

He was absent without leave for three months in the early 1980's, he said, because of bitter disagreements with a ranking officer. He surrendered to the F.B.I. in Memphis after 92 days, he said, and eventually received an "other than honorable" discharge with full medical benefits.

Ronald Callan, Mr. Tobiason's high school biology teacher, described him as an above-average science student who was quiet and lacked self-confidence. "You could tell he was looking for something more in life," Mr. Callan said.

In the mid-1980's, he started an animal-feed company, Designer Phosphate and Premix, in Silver Creek, Neb., and garnered \$3 million in sales, said Mayor Bill Lee of Silver Creek, who worked for Mr. Tobiason at the time.

But Mr. Tobiason, whose knowledge of chemistry and microbiology is largely self-taught, had grander plans. He developed a phosphate-based feed additive, only to learn later that the government determined it was dangerous to cattle, he said. Not long after, Mr. Tobiason and others said, he patented a bubbling herbicide that killed tree roots in pipes and sewers and sold the patent to an herbicide manufacturer.

Max Jenny, a retired farmer who invested \$20,000 in Mr. Tobiason's company, called him sloppy with finances but a wizard with chemicals. "I don't know where he got that education," Mr. Jenny said, "but I don't know anyone who is better at it than he was."

Designer Phosphate and Premix went bankrupt in 1992 and Mr. Tobiason became outraged because, he said, the government let his phosphate-based additive be patented by a larger agricultural company.

At about the same time, some of Mr. Tobiason's behavior began concerning people in Silver Creek. He once told Mr. Lee he knew how to make anthrax and could "destroy people without firing a shot."

Mr. Tobiason's neighbors, Deb and John Cave, said he mixed chemicals in a garage. Deb Cave said she called the F.B.I in 1998 after spotting Mr. Tobiason driving a minivan covered with sticker with slogans like, "I love explosives," and "Make your own bombs." An agent eagerly took down her observations, she said.

Mr. Tobiason's younger brother, Todd A. Tobiason, 37, a corporate pilot for an Omaha company, said he did not consider his brother dangerous but would have preferred that he had never published his writings.

"I don't think he's doing anything with it," Todd Tobiason said. "He's just got a grudge against the federal government and this is his way of getting back at them."

Mr. Tobiason believes that F.B.I. agents follow him everywhere, including once, he said, to the supermarket. There is no doubt that the F.B.I. has been interested in him since at least the late 1990's.

At a December 1998 gun show in Wichita, Daniel Rupp, then an investigator in the federal public defender's office in Kansas, said he had a talk with Mr. Tobiason that prompted him to call the F.B.I.

"He threatened to destroy cities," Mr. Rupp, 51, now with the public defender's office in Salina, Kan., said on Friday. "He threatened to make Oklahoma City look like nothing. At the end, I said, 'Hope to see you next year,' and he said, 'You won't. You'll just read about it in the papers.'"

Mr. Rupp said the F.B.I. asked him to meet Mr. Tobiason again wearing a hidden microphone, but his supervisor at the time, fearing a conflict of interest, would not allow it.

Mr. Tobiason said an F.B.I. agent once told him bureau psychologists believed he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. "I'm not completely nuts," he joked to passers-by at the show Saturday. But asked about his mental health over dinner later, he said, "I probably show some symptoms of schizophrenia."

At the gun show over the week, Mr. Tobiason spoke as if on a mission. "I'm not going to stop," he said, "until everyone in this country knows how" to make those weapons.

On Sunday the show ended, and Mr. Tobiason left Salt Lake City in his Caravan, loaded with his computer, CD's and a laundry basket of biology and chemistry library books. His itinerary includes gun shows in Las Vegas and Reno, Nev., Phoenix and Del Mar, Calif., before heading back to Nebraska for Christmas.

New York Times  
November 21, 2001

## **Inhalation Anthrax Is Diagnosed In Connecticut Woman, 94**

By Paul Zielbauer

A 94-year-old woman from Oxford, Conn., appears to have contracted the inhaled form of anthrax, the rarest and most deadly form of the disease, state and federal officials said late yesterday afternoon.

Investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrived in Connecticut early yesterday evening and began interviewing the woman's family, friends and neighbors, said Gov. John G. Rowland. A team of anthrax specialists from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was on its way from Atlanta last night.

The stricken woman, Otilie W. Lundgren, who was in critical condition late last night at Griffin Hospital in Derby, has been tested five times for anthrax since noon Friday, when she arrived with symptoms resembling those of an upper respiratory infection, hospital officials said. Each test indicated the presence of anthrax. The C.D.C. last night was beginning the most sophisticated tests, on Mrs. Lundgren's DNA, to confirm the diagnosis. Results are expected to be available today.

If those tests are positive, it would be the fourth confirmed case of inhalation anthrax in the New York region. It is a baffling case because Mrs. Lundgren, a widow, was hardly an obvious target. "It's difficult to explain how the person contracted anthrax," Mr. Rowland said. '

The details of Mrs. Lundgren's case — an older woman living alone — are oddly similar to those of the mystifying case of Kathy T. Nguyen, a Bronx woman and hospital worker who died on Oct. 31 from inhalation anthrax. In the weeks since her death, investigators have been unable to learn how she was exposed to anthrax. Two postal workers in New Jersey who contracted the disease have been released from hospitals.

More anthrax was discovered yesterday in Washington, where Lt. Dan Nichols, the spokesman for the Capitol police, said traces of spores had been found in the offices of two Democratic senators, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut.

The amount of contamination was so small, said Dr. John F. Eisold, the Capitol physician, that no treatment was recommended for the staff members who work in those offices. "We don't view this as a public health risk," Dr. Eisold said.

In Connecticut, all five tests performed on Mrs. Lundgren indicated she had anthrax, said Dr. Stephanie Wain, director of Griffin Hospital's pathology and laboratory medicine department.

The first, a test in which blood samples are placed in cultured broth, came back positive early on Saturday, Dr. Wain said. Mrs. Lundgren, whose condition was deteriorating, was immediately placed on antibiotics. A second test, called a motility test, which determines whether the suspect bacteria are moving — anthrax does not — returned positive on Sunday, Dr. Wain said.

Doctors conducted a second, more thorough motility test on Monday, she said. It also indicated that Mrs. Lundgren was infected with bacillus anthracis — anthrax.

Alerted by Griffin's doctors, the state's Department of Public Health rushed to Derby later that day and conducted three tests: a fatty acid test that fingerprints the bacteria in question; a phage study, in which a bacteria-eating virus is introduced to the bacteria; and a direct fluorescent antibody test, which identifies the exact type of bacillus organism present.

All three tests were positive for the inhaled form of the disease. The chances that Mrs. Lundgren's tests results are wrong are "very small," Dr. Wain said.

Inhalation anthrax is extremely rare in humans, but if left untreated is often fatal. Once the spores are inhaled and germinate, the bacteria attack the lymph nodes. It is difficult for people to catch the disease in nature, though it can be acquired from sick animals or goat hair. The early symptoms are much like those of flu and other respiratory diseases.

If subsequent tests confirm that Mrs. Lundgren has inhalation anthrax, the case will be treated as a criminal act, officials said. "If the confirmation tests are positive, the F.B.I. is going to be working with the people from our state on a criminal investigation," said Connecticut's public health commissioner, Joxel Garcia.

"I myself am praying" for the tests to be wrong, Dr. Garcia said. "I love my lab, but I would love that they were wrong."

The news that anthrax had appeared in Connecticut caused great alarm among state and local leaders. Mr. Rowland called Mrs. Lundgren's case "an anomaly" and urged public calm.

"I'm shocked because I'm trying to figure how it could have occurred, and that alarms me," he said. "I will do all I can along with our public safety officials and any other leads we can get from this preliminary investigation and follow up to make sure people are safe." There is no evidence at this point that anybody else has been exposed, Mr. Rowland said.

Mrs. Lundgren lives in a house in the rural part of Oxford, a picturesque town in the Naugatuck River Valley. Although she still drove a car, Mr. Rowland said, her travels were mostly limited to local shops and activities. By yesterday evening, as F.B.I. agents were conducting interviews, a team of forensic biologists from the state's Department of Environmental Quality had sealed her home on Edgewood Road and were testing for signs of anthrax, state officials said.

"I've talked to 10 people already, and nobody can believe it," said State Representative Themis Klarides of Ansonia, Conn., whose district includes Oxford. But she cautioned, "We can't panic until we know where it came from."

Washington Post  
November 22, 2001  
Pg. B3

## **Fort Detrick Burning Anthrax Waste**

Fort Detrick in Frederick County has a new job in the anthrax investigation: disposing of contaminated material. An incinerator normally used for destroying medical waste from Army biological warfare defense laboratories is burning the protective suits and other equipment used by workers cleaning up buildings in Washington where anthrax spores were found, base spokesman Charles Dasey said yesterday.

The post has been receiving and burning about 2,400 pounds of the material daily since Monday, shipped by the Environmental Protection Agency to the post in tractor-trailers, Dasey said.

Washington Times  
November 23, 2001  
Pg. 23

## **Iraq Denies Work On Germ Weapons**

BAGHDAD — Iraq yesterday denied U.S. accusations that it has developed and produced biological weapons and said it is Washington that has been researching germ warfare.

"Iraq ended its biological program in 1991 in compliance with the convention that it joined in the same year," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

"The United States has unleashed in the past few years a new program for secret researches for biological weapons and not Iraq," he said.

Washington Post  
November 23, 2001  
Pg. 24

## **Pakistan Releases Nuclear Scientists**

By Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Nov. 22 -- Two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists detained on suspicion of links with Osama bin Laden's terrorist network have been released, the government said today. Chief government spokesman Gen. Rashid Quereshi confirmed that Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid had been freed but would not say when. Mahmood, a pioneer in Pakistan's efforts to enrich uranium, a key ingredient for nuclear weapons, and Majid, who worked for Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission until 1999, were detained last month for questioning. Both had made frequent trips to Afghanistan, government officials said. The two scientists denied passing any nuclear secrets to the Taliban or bin Laden. They said their visits to Afghanistan were in connection with a charity organization that worked with farmers and students. Neither man has been charged with any offense, and Pakistani officials said there was nothing to suggest that they passed on nuclear information or materials to anyone in Afghanistan. However, Pakistani officials said the two met bin Laden at least twice during visits to Afghanistan's southern city of Kandahar in connection with the construction of a flour mill. Pakistan has nuclear weapons, and until the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, it had supported Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement. Pakistan insists it has not leaked nuclear information, and says its nuclear weapons remain well protected.

Washington Post  
November 22, 2001  
Pg. 44

## **Russia Destroys Chemical Arms**

MOSCOW -- Russia said it had destroyed all of its "category three" chemical weapons -- the lowest level -- ahead of schedule, calling it evidence of a commitment to destroy a vast arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union.

"The destruction of chemical weapons of the third category . . . has today been fully completed," said former prime minister Sergei Kiriyenko, head of a government commission responsible for destroying Russia's 40,000-ton stockpile of nerve and chemical agents. "That means all our bombs and ammunition and the rest are no longer weapons . . . [and] can never again be used as weapons." Russia's chemical weapons were now "simply boxes containing poisonous substances," he said.

Although Russia completed the move before an April 2002 deadline, it remains unlikely to meet the April 2007 target date to destroy all chemical weapons -- including the most potent. It has asked that the deadline be extended to 2012.

--Reuters