


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



*Air University*

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## U.S. probes Iraq's smallpox source

Friday, December 13, 2002 Posted: 5:29 PM EST (2229 GMT)

**WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. intelligence agencies believe any smallpox samples Iraq possesses came from the last domestic outbreak of the deadly disease in the 1970s, rather than from rogue Russian scientists or other external sources, U.S. officials said.**

Iraq is not believed capable of using smallpox as a weapon, and probably has only small amounts of the virus, the officials said. Indeed, U.N. inspectors, before leaving Iraq in 1998, made little mention of smallpox as a threat from Iraq.

Only the United States and Russia overtly possess samples of the deadly virus. The U.S. sample is at a government lab in Atlanta; the Russian sample is in Novosibirsk in Siberia.

But a recent U.S. intelligence assessment concluded that Russia probably has covert stockpiles of the virus, beyond its publicly known sample, U.S. officials have said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

Officials also acknowledged the CIA is investigating reports that a Russian scientist covertly supplied Iraq with samples of the virus that had been enhanced to make a weapon. Officials said they have been unable to verify any of those reports.

The U.S. intelligence assessment also concluded that North Korea and France possess small but hidden quantities of the smallpox virus.

Like Iraq, North Korea is not believed to be able to use smallpox as a weapon.

France has denied having any samples of the virus. U.S. intelligence agencies believe any French quantities are for defensive research programs aimed at limiting casualties from a smallpox outbreak, U.S. officials said.

Fears that smallpox, declared eradicated in 1980, could be used as a weapon led the Bush administration to announce Friday it would offer vaccinations to the American public, probably beginning in 2004. The disease kills about a third of its victims.

U.S. officials worry that Iraq and North Korea could develop biological weapons with their samples, and that lax security could allow the Russian stockpiles to fall into others' hands. Some reports suggest Russia supplied North Korea with smallpox for weapons.

Ken Alibek, a former top scientist in the Soviet biological weapons program who came to the United States in 1992, claimed the Soviets covertly developed smallpox as a weapon in the 1980s.

Before 1998, U.N. weapons inspectors discovered limited evidence of a smallpox program in Iraq. They found a machine labeled "smallpox" and revealed that Iraq is experimenting with a related virus that infects camels. But their 1999 report on Iraq's weapons programs does not describe any smallpox weapons.

Al-Qaida is also believed to have sought samples of smallpox for weaponization, but U.S. officials don't believe the terror network is capable of mounting an attack with the disease. Evidence recovered in Afghanistan pointed to Osama bin Laden's interest in the virus, officials said.

Over the years, there have been reports that Libya, Syria and Iran also have smallpox samples, but U.S. officials believe that likelihood is low.

Routine smallpox vaccinations ended in the United States in 1972. Experts say those last vaccinated more than three decades ago have little residual immunity. But new vaccinations could also kill a small number of the people who receive them.

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/12/13/smallpox.iraq.ap/index.html>

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New York Times  
December 17, 2002

## **Pentagon Faces Difficulties In Smallpox Shots For Troops**

By Denise Grady

As the government begins its program to inoculate half a million troops against smallpox, it is engaged in a delicate balancing act between the military's need for discipline and efficiency and its obligation to protect vulnerable recruits from an unusually risky vaccine.

Military personnel with medical conditions that increase their risk of being harmed by the smallpox vaccine will not be immunized, but may still be deployed anywhere, even to regions where it is feared that smallpox could be used as a weapon, the Department of Defense said in a memorandum dated last Friday.

The memorandum, signed by David S. C. Chu, under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, said deployment decisions would be left to individual commanders.

But if unvaccinated troops are sent to areas where an attack with smallpox is launched, they will then be inoculated in the field, because at that point the risk of the disease will outweigh those of the vaccine, said James Turner, a spokesman for the Defense Department.

It is not known how many military personnel will be exempted from the vaccine for medical reasons. Among those at increased risk are people with skin rashes like eczema and atopic dermatitis or a history of those conditions, which affect about 15 percent of Americans. They are advised to avoid the vaccine, as are people with burns, certain skin infections, chickenpox, psoriasis and severe or uncontrolled acne.

"I think the number of people with these skin conditions is a minority," Mr. Turner said.

But the presence of people in the military who must avoid the vaccine may pose logistical difficulties. Such people must also avoid close contact with others who have been recently vaccinated, because for two to three weeks the vaccination site can shed the live virus, vaccinia, used in the vaccine. Vaccinia, a relative of smallpox, can infect others, and can cause serious illnesses in pregnant women, babies under a year old, and people with immune problems or skin disorders. People who live with someone in a high-risk group are also advised to avoid the smallpox vaccine, to avoid transmitting vaccinia to the vulnerable person.

What does this mean on a military base or a ship, where personnel live in tight quarters and share showers, and those who should not be vaccinated could be surrounded by those shedding vaccinia?

Another Defense Department memorandum, dated Nov. 26, notes the need for caution, and says, "Exempt individuals should be physically separated and exempt from duties that pose the likelihood of contact with potentially infectious materials (e.g., clothing, towels, linen) from recently vaccinated people."

The memorandum says that vaccinated and unvaccinated people should not take turns sleeping in the same cots, bunks or berths, which is sometimes done on ships.

Asked how the separation might be accomplished on ships or military bases, Mr. Turner said, "Right now I'm not prepared to get into that level of detail."

"It will be interpreted by the services depending upon their unique situations," he said.

Mr. Turner also declined to say whether the military would alter training programs or routines for military personnel who get flu-like illnesses from the vaccine, which has more side effects than most other immunizations. Young people who have not had the smallpox vaccine, the vast majority of military personnel, are more likely than those who were vaccinated as children to have reactions like fever, aches and pains, headaches, swollen lymph nodes and sore arms. In previous studies, about 30 percent of participants have felt sick enough to miss a few days of work or school.

"We give a lot of vaccines to our troops," Mr. Turner said, "and a lot of these vaccines I'm sure cause similar side effects, and we deal with it."

If service members who do not qualify for a medical exemption decline the vaccine, they may be disciplined by their commanders, Mr. Turner said.

"We're not expecting that because of events last year and the actual use of anthrax," he said.

During the 1990's, several hundred service members refused to be vaccinated against anthrax, which had been ordered for all military personnel. Some were court-martialed or discharged; others resigned.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/17/health/17TROO.html>

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## The Forum

# Smallpox Plan Tries To Balance Risks

*Beginning as early as Jan. 24, millions of American workers will be asked by the Bush administration to get a vaccine to protect themselves from smallpox, a deadly disease eradicated a quarter century ago. The undertaking is huge, historic and risky. The vaccine, which hasn't been used in the general population for decades, can itself have severe — even fatal — side effects, including inflammation of the brain. As a result, a small number of the 10 million health-care and emergency workers offered the vaccine and the 500,000 frontline military troops ordered to take it might die or become seriously ill. In formulating the policy, the administration weighed those risks against intelligence showing that terrorist organizations or rogue nations may have smallpox grown from lab samples retained after the disease was stamped out. By 2004, the administration plans to offer the vaccine to all American adults on a voluntary basis. They will have to decide whether the risks from the vaccine outweigh the chances of contracting smallpox, which kills about 30% of those infected. In a meeting Monday with USA TODAY's editorial board, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson, the Bush administration's point man in the vaccination effort, discussed the upcoming vaccination program and the decisions Americans face. His comments were edited for space and clarity:*

### **Question: What kind of smallpox threat is out there?**

**Answer:** There is nothing imminent. In 1980, when the World Health Organization decided that smallpox was not a disease the world had to be concerned about anymore, it made a decision to dispose of the smallpox virus, but to leave a deposit of it with two countries: the USSR and the United States. We keep our smallpox virus under lock and key at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention headquarters in Atlanta. When the USSR broke up, Russia kept its stock. But we have some information, indications, that other countries might have it. The probability is that they do have it. Iraq and North Korea are two of those countries that more than likely have some smallpox virus. So we have to be prepared. There is no evidence that a risk is imminent, or we would be doing something else.

### **Q: Are you in close contact with the intelligence agencies about the risk? What are they saying about this?**

**A:** Yes, Jerry (Hauer, acting assistant HHS secretary for public health preparedness) and I are briefed every morning by the CIA. We are very comfortable with the fact that there is not an imminent threat of a smallpox breakout in the United States or, for that matter, in any part of the world. But that doesn't mean that we should not be prepared. Because if we aren't prepared, all kinds of consternation and pandemonium could occur in the United States.

### **Q: How much protection will the administration's plan offer?**

**A:** We think it'll offer a great deal. First, the health-care workers who would care for you and me as members of the general public in case of an attack are going to be vaccinated. Secondly, the emergency workers who would have to transport you have to be protected. So that's why we are doing it this way: to make sure that the general public would be able to be protected. We do not recommend that the general public get the vaccine because we do not believe that there is an imminent threat. There is no sense of putting people into any kind of harm's way (from the vaccine) if in fact there is not going to be a smallpox epidemic.

### **Q: If we didn't do this, what would happen if there were an exposure to smallpox?**

**A:** A lot of people ask the question: Why can't we wait? The problem is that if we wait and if we are hit by an epidemic, if there are smallpox viruses out there and if we do go to war, and if it is released in the United States, it would be much more difficult then to purchase the vaccine and to go out with plans to vaccinate the American public. So we have decided to make sure that we are prepared to protect the American public. Smallpox is a terribly lethal contagious disease. Without preparation, it would arouse tremendous pandemonium in this country and would cause tremendous economic restrictions because you would have to vaccinate, to quarantine, to limit transportation. Just an exposure would probably cost many billions of dollars of economic restructuring. It would be a terrible problem. We just couldn't allow that to happen, so we went ahead and made all those plans, and as a result, we are very well prepared. I go to bed and easily sleep. There are other things that bother me, but smallpox is not one of them because I know that we have made the preparations, that we have the vaccines and we are able to distribute that vaccine very quickly to places where we have an epidemic. Some people will die on exposure, but we will be able to limit that, and we will be able to control it because of the amount of preparation and time that has gone into this.

**Q: The potential adverse reactions of the vaccine raise liability questions. Who would be responsible for the cost of lost work time or hospitalization?**

**A:** Section 304 of the new Homeland Security law exonerated the states and the hospitals and those individuals giving the shots from personal liability. If you were the recipient of a shot, and it had adverse consequences, you could sue the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but you'd have to prove negligence. That is not going to be that easy to prove, but you do have that course of action against the federal government. If you are a hospital worker, you would be under the workers' compensation laws, and you would receive benefits under the workers' compensation laws of that particular state. If you were one of those one or two individuals who would die out of a million people vaccinated, your heirs would be able to receive wrongful-death benefits under the workers' compensation laws of that particular state. You also would have your own health policies, and they would pay you for that. Congress still may be asked when it returns to set up some kind of workers' compensation fund, as it did under the swine flu some years ago, but at the present time, this is what a person could receive.

**Q: Are you concerned that the first case of either a critical illness or even a death resulting from the smallpox vaccine could create a huge public backlash against it?**

**A:** Anything is possible, but we have spent so much time getting out the information about the vaccine, about how to take care of any side effect, about how to go through a detailed questionnaire before you administer it, that we think we can minimize any consequences. Plus, we have what is called VIG, vaccinia immune globulin, which is used as an antidote to a reaction. When you make a comparison — what are there? 52 individuals who die every day as pedestrians? — this is very minuscule compared to any other kinds of wrongful deaths happening in the United States. But that doesn't, in any way, minimize the results whatsoever. This will be a high-publicity issue. We have to worry about that, and we are worried about that.

**Q: If there is an outbreak of smallpox anywhere in the world, will you begin vaccinating all Americans?**

**A:** That decision has not been made yet. I would base it on what the doctors and our advisory committee on vaccines would recommend to me. I would have to look at the circumstances. More than likely, we would accelerate the number of people who would be vaccinated. But whether such an isolated incident would trigger mass vaccination would depend upon the circumstances. We would certainly watch it very closely.

**Q: Would one smallpox case in the United States trigger a mass vaccination?**

**A:** I would have to depend upon my experts, but as a layman and a secretary, I would have to say yes. We'd do the ring vaccination (of an infected person's likely contacts) first, surely.

**Q: You are not getting a vaccination at this stage?**

**A:** No, I'm not getting a vaccination, and I would recommend that other people in the Cabinet and other elected officials follow my lead because we are not healthcare workers, we are not first-line responders. The president is getting the vaccination because he is the commander in chief and because he's ordering the troops of the Department of Defense to get this vaccination. But at the same time, he's not recommending it to his family or to members of the White House or to his Cabinet.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20021217/4706146s.htm>

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USA Today  
December 17, 2002  
Pg. 13

## Vaccine Will Work

*Although new smallpox vaccines are being developed, the one now used is decades old. Could an enemy have engineered a version of the disease that is not affected by the old vaccine? Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, responded Monday to that issue during a USA TODAY editorial board meeting:*

Biologically, anything is possible to do. It's possible to engineer a microbe to be specifically resistant to the vaccine you're using, but it's much, much more difficult than to engineer a microbe to be resistant to an antibiotic. For example, it's pretty easy to make anthrax resistant to some of the classical antibiotics if you have people who are reasonably knowledgeable. To take something like smallpox and to make it resistant to the vaccine would take a highly sophisticated group, and even a highly sophisticated group would have trouble with it. There's no real evidence that there's anything like that now.

But we continually, at the research level and at the surveillance level, model what we could do if something like that happened. We're not satisfied saying that just because the chances are very, very low that it's off our radar screen.

All of our work we do on vaccines is done in the context of having to induce a response that's even greater than you would need for the standard run-of-the-mill microbe.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20021217/4706145s.htm>

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Baltimore Sun  
December 17, 2002

## **Inspectors Return To Nuclear Weapons Site In Iraq**

### ***Atomic agency receives samples from U.N. team***

By Associated Press

BAGHDAD, Iraq - Weapons inspectors returned for the third straight day yesterday to a huge complex where Iraqi scientists once worked on a nuclear bomb, while experts in Austria received the first samples sent by the United Nations team in Iraq.

Also yesterday, Gen. Hossam Mohammed Amin, head of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, said on Lebanese television that Baghdad would comply with a U.N. demand for a list of scientists and workers associated with Iraq's chemical, biological and ballistic missile programs. Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix asked for the list Friday.

Under U.N. Resolution 1441, which returned the inspectors, they have the right to conduct interviews inside or outside Iraq, with or without the presence of Iraqi observers.

Inspectors visited 13 sites yesterday: two of interest to teams looking at missile capabilities, two with biological weapons possibilities, one chemical facility and eight potential nuclear weapons sites.

The big complex that inspectors returned to, al-Qa'qaa, had been under U.N. scrutiny in the 1990s and was involved in the final design of a nuclear bomb before U.N. teams destroyed Iraq's nuclear program after the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

During their visit Sunday to al-Qa'qaa, about 15 miles southeast of Baghdad, inspectors said a chemical team updated information about a sulfuric acid plant, an explosives production plant and storage areas. Sunday's inspection also focused on a production unit built between 1998 and this year.

Inspectors returned to Iraq on Nov. 27 for the first time in four years.

Yesterday, a team examining Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities went to the Taji fiberglass production plant, which has become part of the Thaat Al Sawary plant.

In a statement, the team reported more than 200 workers are employed at the facility, which had "very few people" four years ago when last inspected. The plant was part of the Iraqi Scud and Al Hussein missile production system and makes fiberglass tubing.

Also for the third day in a row, inspectors visited Hatteen, a complex 40 miles south of Baghdad. Hatteen houses government factories that produce everything from cars to ammunition.

"We do not have prohibited weapons at this site, and all our activities are normal," Hussein Mohammed Khaled, Hatteen's director, told reporters after yesterday's inspection. He said the inspectors took samples of aluminum bars from the facility and that the visit went smoothly.

In Austria yesterday, experts at a U.N. nuclear agency laboratory received the first samples gathered by inspectors in Iraq and planned to begin analyzing the material immediately.

Using electron microscopes, gamma and thermal ionization spectrometers, and other tools, scientists at the lab outside Vienna, Austria, will look for evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

An initial analysis will take from two to three weeks, and findings will be interpreted at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters in Vienna, Mark Gwozdecky, spokesman for the U.N. agency, told the Associated Press. Eight samples were brought in yesterday, and 20 more samples were expected by the weekend.

The agency has said it hopes to have screening results from the first samples by the time its director, Mohamed El Baradei, reports to the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 27.

In Washington yesterday, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said American officials are studying a voluminous Iraqi declaration to the United Nations on Dec. 8 that reiterated Baghdad's contention it has no banned weapons.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/printedition/bal-te.iraq17dec17.story>

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## **Small Clues To The Big Picture In Baghdad**

### ***U.N. Inspections Run Gamut, From Top Secret to Seemingly Mundane***

By Peter Baker, Washington Post Foreign Service

ABU GHRAIB, Iraq -- U.N. inspectors, wearing baby-blue baseball caps and armbands, were roaming through a missile factory the other day when they came across a room with a couple of ominous warning signs posted outside: "Caution," the signs said. "Risk of Ionizing Radiation."

What's in there? the inspectors asked.

Just an X-ray machine, the plant director answered.

Show us, they said.

So, as the plant director recalled, he escorted the team into the room and put some metal into the machine. Out came the film familiar to anyone who has been X-rayed, he said.

In the three weeks they have been scouring Iraq for evidence of weapons of mass destruction, U.N. arms experts have been poking and prodding everywhere they can, testing seemingly innocent explanations, rifling through files, taking soil and water samples, measuring the air for radiation. At a distillery suspected of developing biological weapons, they smelled the alcohol. At a missile factory, they had a rocket test-fired to make sure it did not exceed range restrictions.

The inspectors in Iraq, whose ranks increased over the weekend to 105, have accelerated their schedule to full speed and now fan out early each morning to facilities throughout the Baghdad area and beyond, from a cement factory to a pesticide store, from the most secretive of military bases to government research centers. They visited 13 sites yesterday, their busiest day yet, as they worked to collect and collate information to report to the U.N. Security Council on the status of Iraq's banned weapons programs.

So far, the inspectors have disclosed few findings and drawn no conclusions. That is the work of higher-ups at U.N. headquarters in New York, where diplomats are keenly aware that the outcome of the searches could bring a decision by the Bush administration on whether to wage war on Iraq.

"It will take us some time to come up with a bigger picture," said Hiro Ueki, Baghdad spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC.

But as they settle into a routine, the inspectors have begun focusing more attention on a handful of the most critical facilities. Nuclear experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency, for instance, have learned the route to the town of Tuwaitha all too well. About 15 miles southeast of Baghdad, it is home to the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, the heart of Iraq's nuclear program.

Iraq has said it halted its nuclear weapons development program a decade ago. Inspectors have combed through the sprawling Tuwaitha facility six times so far to inventory nuclear materials, most recently on Sunday when they took samples of water and silt.

Inspectors have also spent considerable time at the Qaqaa complex not far from Tuwaitha, where they have searched for indications of nuclear or chemical weapons. They first showed up there on Nov. 30 to remove an air sampler, and then returned five more times, including yesterday, to examine an explosives production plant and a sulfuric acid plant.

More and more, inspectors are choosing to return to facilities they had already inspected. Most of the inspections yesterday, for example, were repeat visits.

However, since making a visit to a presidential palace to test their ability to get in, they have not gone to any of the dozens of others, sticking at least for now to more conventional and less provocative locations.

To avoid becoming too predictable, however, the inspectors have tried to maintain the advantage of surprise. Over the weekend, for instance, nuclear specialists showed up after dark at the Muahaweel military base south of Baghdad.

So far, they have encountered none of the intransigence that marked their predecessors' experience in Iraq during the 1990s, which led to their withdrawal in 1998 and a subsequent four-day U.S.-British bombing campaign. Iraqi officials have kept to their word in opening the gates when the U.N. teams arrive. The one time a lone duty officer did not have a key, the inspectors sealed rooms and returned the next day to find no sign of tampering.

Recognizing that demonstrating openness may be the best way to undercut international support for war, Iraqi officials urge foreign journalists to cover the inspections each day instead of turning to another subject.



"The weapons inspections carried out so far have uncovered the lies of Britain and the United States, and Iraq will continue cooperation with the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission to ensure the success of its mission," Gen. Hossam Mohammed Amin, head of the National Monitoring Directorate, the Iraqi liaison to the United Nations, told the official Al-Iraq newspaper last week.

To test that further, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, has asked Iraq to produce a list of scientists associated with its weapons programs by the end of the year, possibly so they can be interviewed outside the country. During an interview on Lebanese television yesterday, Amin reiterated that Iraq would comply.

The inspection process has taken the U.N. experts far and wide. Not long ago, they showed up at the gate of the Al Abraj distillery, which produces about 100 cases of gin, whiskey and arrak a day. About six inspectors toured the factory, 12 miles south of Baghdad, checking out the bottling conveyor belts and the steam cleaners and the storerooms filled with labels, cardboard cartons and jugs of fruit flavors.

Alber Poulos Younan, the plant director, pulled a rubber hose from the machines, let a liquid that was 96 percent alcohol spill over his hand and held it up for the inspectors to smell, as he did again yesterday for a couple of visiting journalists. Whatever else it might be, a look around left no doubt that the Christian-owned Al Abraj produces many bottles of booze.

"It's a factory for drink," Younan said. "They're looking for something special. I don't know what it is."

The answer came in what the inspectors showed most interest in -- the fermenters. Five giant, rusting 40-cubic-yard vats sat in a building with labels that were attached to the vats by other inspectors four years ago. The new inspectors checked the bar codes against their records and moved on.

Fermenters can be critical to the weaponization of such biological pathogens as anthrax. But Younan and the distillery's owner, Shakir Easa, laughed at the notion that their machines produce killer spores. "It's funny, because any simple citizen of the world comes to this place and he can tell it's just an alcohol factory," Easa said.

Another team of inspectors spent nearly three hours last weekend at a missile factory in Abu Ghraib, 25 miles west of Baghdad. The plant director, Hussein Mohammed, told the inspectors that he produces only al-Samoud liquid-rockets that travel less than the 93-mile limit imposed by U.N. sanctions, contrary to assertions by the U.S. government.

With the sound of clanging metal and the odor of industrial cleaning fluid in the air, men in white smocks and women in head scarves stared at the inspectors as they examined the 18 buildings surrounded by a fence topped with concertina wire. Hanging above them in the courtyard was a massive tile portrait of President Saddam Hussein. Mohammed said he had no advance warning the inspectors were coming. "Even as they were arriving, I learned they were here," he said. But neither, he added, did he have anything to hide. "We want the inspectors to show that we're not making any such weapons and we hope that the Security Council will take a decision to lift the blockade against the Iraqi people," he said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64225-2002Dec16.html>

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Washington Post  
December 17, 2002  
Pg. 22

## **Ex-Iraqi Worker Tells Of Fooling The Inspectors**

***Current U.N. Team Will Need a 'Defector' if It Wants to Discover the Truth, Exile Says***

By Daniel Williams, Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, Dec. 16 -- Ahmed found it odd that he was constructing a giant vat for production of specialized proteins in an unmarked complex of buildings far off the main road south of Baghdad. But he knew enough not to ask too many questions.

In long years of service to the military-industrial ministries of President Saddam Hussein's government, Ahmed had learned not to inquire about the ultimate uses of the projects he worked on, first as a nuclear construction engineer during the 1980s and then on this seemingly innocuous pot.

"This was a regime that got used to hiding things. We didn't need to know, until it became obvious what it was about," he said.



In the case of the vat, Ahmed had his suspicions. He thought it was meant to create biological weapons material. He was apparently right. U.N. inspectors dismantled the equipment in the late 1990s, after a high-level defector tipped them off to its uses. "That's what the inspectors looking around Iraq now will need," he said, "a defector."

The Bush administration is pressing the current U.N. inspection team to ferry scientists out of Iraq for interrogation. Only then, administration officials say, will they get useful information on suspected Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological arms programs. Failure of Hussein to permit scientists and their families to leave would, in the administration's view, constitute a breach of the latest U.N. resolution demanding open access to weapons sites.

Ahmed left Iraq in 1999 and lives in an Arab country. On a visit to London, he discussed his experiences in fooling earlier weapons inspectors, but asked to keep his real name out of print, because of fears for relatives still living in the country -- one reason he is an example of why the Bush administration says an interrogations-abroad program is necessary and why it might not work.

"Even if you take out their wives and kids, they have other relatives in Iraq -- brothers, cousins, mothers, fathers. Saddam can have them all killed," he said. "You would have to be able to provide the scientist and everyone else full security. They would have to believe that Saddam could not get his hands on them.

"Also, the scientists may not have anything to say. There is no new science in Iraq. The programs, if any, are in the hands of security people. Take me. I could say what I worked on, but I could not tell you the state of any program that went on after I stopped working. Only a few people have that kind of information, and they are well hidden."

Ahmed said he believes that the Iraqi government is continuing to develop biological and chemical weapons and also has become more adept at hiding the programs. "They have had lots of practice," he said.

Ahmed is no repentant defector. He proudly recounted his career in building nuclear facilities for Iraq's efforts to produce an atom bomb. "I felt that as an Arab, it was right that an Arab country have the bomb," he said. "Israel has one. So should we." He felt this way even though he said two of his cousins were executed by Hussein's security forces during the early 1980s for anti-government activities.

For all his pride, Ahmed was not fully trusted by his Iraqi overseers. No one was, he said. At first, he was told that his work was leading the way for nuclear-generated electric power. But eventually his bosses revealed the real goal. In any case, after the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the nuclear arms project stopped, he said. U.N. inspectors came. Hiding the large infrastructure necessary to produce weapons-grade material was impossible.

Nonetheless, his supervisors warned Ahmed and his colleagues to "say little and answer only as narrowly as possible -- the specifics of our particular job, not what we knew about the whole program," he said. "We also had to sign a paper swearing that we had no documents in our private possession. If someone found out otherwise, they said we would be killed."

Ahmed said that he and other nuclear workers were given other jobs throughout Iraq, and eventually he landed at the Military Industrial Commission, which is responsible for constructing weapons factories and military installations. In 1995, he said he was ordered to help construct laboratories and vats at a place called Al Hakam, southwest of Baghdad.

U.N. inspectors were still looking for weapons programs, and they interviewed Ahmed three times, he said. "Each worker simply gave a narrow account of his job. In my case, I was just building a vat," he said.

Colleagues at other places told him they were ordered to bury equipment or to move it around on large trucks, sometimes for days at a time. "It was a giant chess game in which sometimes the pieces went underground," he said.

At Al Hakam, Ahmed said he asked his supervisor what the vats would be used for. Fermentation, he was told. When he asked what ingredient would be converted into what product, he was met with "aggressive silence." The Al Hakam facility was discovered only because of information provided by Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, a son-in-law of Hussein who defected to Jordan in the mid-1990s and conveyed information about the Iraqi biological weapons program.

Ahmed never knew whether the plant had produced a germ. All the time he was at Al Hakam, production was delayed by problems in procuring proper pumps and other equipment, he said.

He left in 1997 and applied to emigrate. The government, fearful of defectors, forced him to stay in Iraq for two more years. In that time, officials surmised, he would lose contact with the programs he worked on and have nothing to offer investigators abroad. "I was very careful to cut off all ties with my former work," he said. "I wanted to leave. I stayed completely isolated. I didn't want to know anything."

Although he has been out of Iraq almost three years, he keeps a low profile. "Who knows? Saddam might think I know something I don't and try to eliminate me," he said. "I will never feel safe."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64105-2002Dec16.html>

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## **China Ships North Korea Ingredient For Nuclear Arms**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

North Korea has purchased a large shipment of chemicals from China that can be used to make nuclear-weapons fuel, U.S. intelligence officials say.

North Korean procurement agents succeeded in buying 20 tons of tributyl phosphate, known as TBP, a key chemical used to extract material for nuclear bombs from spent nuclear fuel, said officials familiar with intelligence reports of the transfer.

The officials said the chemical also can be used in commercial processes, such as making plastics, ink and paint. U.S. intelligence agencies, however, believe North Korea will use the TBP for its plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program, based on sensitive intelligence information, the officials said.

The chemical is used in a process known as plutonium-uranium extraction, or purex, which produces plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

North Korea announced last week that it planned to restart its plutonium reactors at Yongbyon.

"The fact that North Korea is importing tributyl phosphate right now is rather ominous," said Gary Milhollin, director of the private Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "It's evidence that North Korea plans to extract more plutonium."

The chemical also can be used to prepare uranium for the weapons process, Mr. Milhollin said in an interview.

North Korea has a large supply of spent reactor fuel that is under international surveillance. The reprocessing of the spent fuel means Pyongyang could produce more bombs "in fairly short order, a matter of months," he said.

The TBP transfer, which happened earlier this month, highlights the Chinese government's failure to control the export of goods related to nuclear-weapons production.

The disclosure of the transfer also followed appeals from senior Bush administration officials in recent months for Beijing's help in halting North Korea's nuclear-weapons program.

The transfer itself is an indication that China's government, contrary to some public statements, is unwilling to support U.S. efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, said administration security officials.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a summit in Beijing this month that both favored a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Mr. Jiang also said during an October meeting with President Bush in Crawford, Texas, that China favored a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, but stopped short of condemning Pyongyang's nuclear program.

The two presidents agreed at the summit to discuss curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

However, senior administration officials said China continues to export nuclear, chemical and biological weapons material and missile goods, despite claims of curbing exports by Chinese companies to rogue states or unstable regions.

White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told a visiting Chinese general last week that Beijing's help in stopping the North Korean nuclear program would be important to U.S.-China relations.

North Korea's government revealed to a State Department official in October that it was secretly developing uranium-enrichment capability to make fuel for nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang then announced it planned to restart three reactors at the Yongbyon nuclear complex that were shut down under a 1994 agreement.

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters yesterday that he did not believe China was helping North Korea's nuclear program and that Beijing was being helpful in U.S. efforts to curb North Korea's drive for nuclear arms.

"China is working with the United States to make certain that we can resolve the situation with North Korea peacefully and diplomatically, and that is being done in concert with South Korea, and Japan and Russia, as well," Mr. Fleischer said.

A White House spokesman had no comment on the Chinese-North Korean chemical transfer.

The TBP purchase is expected to lead to sanctions on the Chinese and North Korean companies involved in the sale.

U.S. officials said the company was located in Dalian, a Chinese seaport, but they did not name the company.

U.S. intelligence officials first disclosed North Korea's effort to purchase tributyl phosphate in China to The Washington Times earlier this month.

Henry Sokolski, head of the private Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said the transfer of the nuclear arms-related chemical shows the Chinese "don't understand how important this is to us."

"If China thinks this is a good way to restrain North Korean nuclear activities, they need to talk to us," Mr. Sokolski said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021217-407202.htm>

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Global Security Newswire (nti.org)

December 16, 2002

## Moscow Treaty Tops U.S. Senate Agenda, But Delays Expected

By Bryan Bender, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee plans to begin hearings next month on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia, the incoming committee chairman said last week.

Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), who will reclaim the chairmanship when the Republicans retake control of the Senate Jan. 7, told *Global Security Newswire* in an interview Friday that the Moscow Treaty would be one of his first orders of business.

Signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in May, the treaty calls for deep reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces (see *GSN*, May 24).

As of last Friday, the committee was scheduled to begin hearing testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell on the so-called Moscow Treaty as early as Jan. 14, with a vote by the full Senate to approve the treaty planned by the end of the month, according to Lugar's staff. Lugar predicted the Senate would complete its deliberations on the treaty "very soon."

Russian ratification of the Moscow Treaty, however, will probably move more slowly, according to Russian officials. Putin submitted the treaty to the State Duma for ratification last week (see *GSN*, Dec. 10) and Bush submitted the treaty to the Senate earlier this year (see *GSN*, June 21).

The Duma "will take up the ratification issue at the start of the spring session," said International Affairs Committee Chairman Dmitriy Rogozin. Several hurdles, however, could prevent Russia from ratifying the treaty next year. Speaking Friday in Washington, Rogozin said the Putin administration had not furnished plans for implementing the treaty reductions and domestic politics could also delay the process as December 2003 parliamentary elections near. Nevertheless, "most of the process" will be completed in 2003, Rogozin predicted.

In coming days, U.S. domestic politics may also affect the treaty ratification schedule. Incoming U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) is facing a challenge to his leadership and according to a Lugar adviser the leadership question could delay the settlement of Senate organizational issues such as committee structure and budget questions. The current uncertainty makes concrete planning for early next year virtually impossible, the adviser said.

### "Short and Shallow" Debate?

The United States plans to implement the treaty by reducing its number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons to fewer than 2,200 warheads by the end of 2012 and to store many of the reduced warheads. Russia is expected to do the same, although the treaty does not explicitly say how both sides should shrink their nuclear arsenals, only that they must "reduce and limit" them.

Because the new treaty lacks any verification measures, the two countries will use the existing arms control verification regimes to provide a basis for confidence and predictability in future arms reductions.

Arms control experts said Senate plans for dispensing of the treaty quickly signals that there will be little debate, despite widespread criticism that the agreement is little more than a pledge to de-alert some nuclear weapons, while keeping thousands of weapons in storage.

"I expect the discussion to be short and shallow," Joseph Cirincione, director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Most Republicans want to support the president and most Democrats are too intimidated to point out that this treaty is not much of a treaty. I expect there will be very little debate."

He criticized the document for not requiring the destruction of any nuclear warheads and for not being legally binding. "It's hardly worth ratifying," Cirincione said. "It is so full of loopholes and ambiguities you can't really call this a legally binding agreement. It devalues treaties as legally binding diplomatic instruments."

For example, "what is an operationally deployed strategic weapon?" he asked, "It is not defined in the treaty. This treaty does not destroy one nuclear weapon. It provides guidelines for taking them off alert and putting them in storage."

The result, critics charge, will be U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals that will remain as large in 10 years as they are today. "No conceivable U.S. military mission in 10 years will require 2,000 100-kiloton weapons ready to fly in 15 minutes notice," Cirincione said, noting that thousands more warheads would be kept in storage.

Lugar said Russia in particular has said it would like to reduce its nuclear weapons much more substantially. "The Russians would like to go lower than 1,700 but the dilemma is money," he said. "A very substantial new increment is needed," he said.

"If you're really worried about nuclear terrorism, this isn't going to help you," Cirincione said of the treaty.

[http://www.nti.org/d\\_newswire/issues/newswires/2002\\_12\\_16.html#4](http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_12_16.html#4)

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USA Today  
December 17, 2002  
Pg. 10

## Experts wary as smallpox vaccine plan advances Critics call effort too sweeping, risky, costly

By Steve Sternberg, USA Today

President Bush's plan to resurrect smallpox vaccination for millions of Americans provoked criticism Monday from experts who say the plan is too sweeping, will cause needless illness and will soak up resources that could be better used to meet other public health needs.

The administration fears that bioterrorists, Iraq or other rogue countries may unleash the virus, which kills 30% of its victims, against the United States. To prepare, the Bush Administration on Friday proposed a program to vaccinate 510,000 troops, 500,000 health workers and up to 10 million first responders, including police, firefighters and emergency medical technicians. These volunteers would serve as shock troops during a smallpox attack.

In an interview Monday with USA TODAY's editorial board, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson said that plans for the first wave of vaccinations have been submitted by every state but Colorado, which is now racing to completion. The states have identified about 440,000 health workers for voluntary vaccination. Thompson said about 5 million of a possible 10 million first responders will probably be vaccinated in a second wave. The vaccination program will begin in late January and end four months later. After that, he said, other Americans who want vaccinations will be able to obtain them. The administration recommends against vaccination for members of the public.

But even health experts who favor preparedness say the benefits of vaccination are hard to calculate because the risks of an attack are unknown. "What's my chance of getting a disease that only exists in a test-tube somewhere around the world? I have to call the CIA and ask them," says Craig Smith, an infectious disease specialist at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Ga.

Ronald Atlas, of the American Society of Microbiology, called the president's plan to inoculate troops who might serve in Iraq "a wise decision."

But he questioned whether Americans would be willing to accept the risk of widespread use of a vaccine that causes severe side effects in one of every 20,000 recipients and kills one or two per million.

"When you have parents saying, 'I want my children vaccinated now,' " he says, "you know they haven't come to grips with the risk, or they've become caught up in the rhetoric of a war with Iraq or fear of a bioterrorist attack." Before smallpox vaccinations ended in 1972, he said, as many as 10 children died each year from side effects of the vaccine, which was accepted because the smallpox death toll was far greater.

"I certainly do not concur with the notion that the general public ought to have access to the vaccine at this time," says William Schaffner of Vanderbilt University.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Bill Winkenwerder said that there were no deaths among thousands of soldiers vaccinated between 1945 and 1990, but he concedes soldiers are a healthy population.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20021217/4706252s.htm>

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Wall Street Journal Online  
December 17, 2002

## **IAEA's ElBaradei Believes Iraq Isn't Mission Impossible** *Chief of Atomic Energy Agency Says Inspectors Can Find Nuclear-Arms Program if Any Exists*

By Jody Shenn and Carl Bialik, The Wall Street Journal Online

Mohamed ElBaradei faces a tough task overseeing the search for a nuclear-weapons program in Iraq, but the International Atomic Energy Agency's director-general was once witness to a diplomatic success many thought impossible.

As a special assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister in 1978, he sat in on the Israel-Egypt peace talks that culminated in the Camp David accord. "I was able to see firsthand how you manage international affairs, how you cut a deal," Mr. ElBaradei said in an interview from the IAEA's offices in Vienna late last month. "It was a very intense and interesting period."

Former inspectors and other critics of the monitoring regimes of the United Nations-linked agency believe that Mr. ElBaradei now faces similarly steep odds in completing the task given him by the Security Council. His charge: uncovering and disarming any nuclear program that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has developed.

The fact-finding mission's success depends chiefly on Iraq's cooperation, diplomats and former inspectors said. Yet Baghdad previously thwarted the IAEA, which monitors nuclear activity in its 134 member states. Under Mr. ElBaradei's predecessor, the agency failed to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons efforts in the years before the Gulf War and was slow to uncover the program's scope even after the war.

Despite the skepticism, Mr. ElBaradei remains confident that the nuclear inspections that began with his landing in Baghdad in late November will succeed. Critics who think Mr. Hussein's nuclear ambitions are impervious to inspections fail to understand how much the U.N.'s latest resolution strengthened the efforts to disarm Iraq that began in 1991, Mr. ElBaradei said.

While there will "always be some uncertainty" in a country with Iraq's vast size and demonstrated history of noncompliance, U.N. Resolution 1441 makes for a "whole different ball game," the career diplomat said. "I think that it has to be understood that [thanks to the resolution] Iraq cannot hide an entire program."

Limited access to Mr. Hussein's palaces helped scuttle U.N. inspections in 1998. But this time around inspectors can make unannounced visits to any location in Iraq, talk more freely with Iraqi scientists and tap more easily into intelligence from key countries, such as the United Kingdom and the U.S. And just as important, Mr. ElBaradei said, there's now more pressure on the Iraqis to comply than after the Gulf War, when they successfully withheld a lot of information.

"The fact that we had hiccups in early 1990s was because the Security Council wasn't united," Mr. ElBaradei said.

"[The difference now] is that the Security Council, or in other words the international community, is behind us."

With the U.S. threatening to invade Iraq, the IAEA chief says the inspections offer a peaceful alternative that many countries find especially attractive in a world beset by terrorism and a region spiraling downward into violence.

With a resume steeped in international law, diplomacy and arms control and fluency in English, German, French and Arabic, Mr. ElBaradei lobbied hard on the airwaves and in diplomatic backrooms of both the Western and Arab worlds for the resumption of inspections. This fall he visited Washington five times during a six-week period as he worked to overcome the Bush administration's considerable skepticism toward the inspections. And just ahead of the Security Council's Nov. 8 vote on inspections, he appeared on al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite-TV network based in Qatar. To convince his Arab audience, Mr. ElBaradei said he has cast the inspections as a product of Iraq's actions and as a way to avoid a U.S.-led war that would shake the region.

In his lobbying, Mr. ElBaradei teamed up with Hans Blix, his predecessor at the IAEA and now his counterpart at the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or Unmovic. Mr. Blix, a former Swedish politician, oversees the chemical and biological side of inspections and has been the more public face of the inspections, in part because Unmovic was created specifically to deal with the Iraqi situation.

Mr. ElBaradei has called for both consequences for Iraqi noncompliance and the "suspension" of some trade sanctions if Baghdad passes the test -- raising his credibility on both sides. But he also has promised to defer to the Security Council in drawing conclusions from what his inspectors find. "[Mr. ElBaradei] has a clear sense of where his role ends and where the Security Council's begins," a Western diplomat familiar with his thinking said.

Mr. ElBaradei must deliver a report on Iraq to the Security Council by Jan. 26, two months from the resumption of the inspections, or at any point his team encounters what he deems to be major Iraqi obstruction. He told reporters

Friday, however, that it will likely take "something like a year" to prove or disprove Iraq's assertions that it no longer has a nuclear-weapons program.

### **Getting to the World Stage**

Born in Egypt in 1942, Mr. ElBaradei followed his father into the legal profession, gaining a law degree in 1962 at the University of Cairo, and later a doctorate in international law at the New York University School of Law.

"He was brilliant, probably one of the three best students I ever had," said Thomas Franck, a NYU professor who taught the head of the IAEA during his studies at NYU law school and later recruited him for the U.N.'s training institute. Helping his former student with the task at hand, Mr. Franck said, are "his fairness and incisiveness, his ability to reason above conflict and to see law as a neutral force for resolving conflict."

Mr. ElBaradei began his career in Egypt's Foreign Ministry after graduating from law school, later serving on two occasions as the Egyptian ambassador at its U.N. missions in New York and Geneva. Beginning in 1980, he headed an international law program for the U.N. Four years later he joined the IAEA.

At the IAEA, Mr. ElBaradei rose to become top legal counsel and held foreign-affairs positions before succeeding Mr. Blix in 1997. His responsibilities cut across all aspects of the agency's work -- from implementing safeguards under the U.N.'s Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 to promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. The agency disseminates about \$100 million annually in assistance in areas not directly related to energy or weapons, such as nuclear medicine.

Some of the skepticism now confronting the IAEA chief stems from his long tenure at the agency. Its bureaucratic mindset and Mr. ElBaradei's apparent comfort with its ways are seen by some as hindering his efforts to disarm Iraq, said David Albright, a former nuclear inspector. "There's a cultural problem at the IAEA. They don't rock the boat," Mr. Albright said.

Critics also point to talks with Iraqi representatives that Mr. ElBaradei hosted in Vienna in late September. They produced a preliminary agreement on resuming inspections, but lacked many of the more intrusive rights subsequently granted to inspectors under the U.N.'s resolution. In defense of his effort, Mr. ElBaradei said international laws and existing agreements often limit what the IAEA can demand.

Some say Mr. ElBaradei will be well-served in the Iraqi inspections by the skill he has shown in navigating and harnessing the IAEA's bureaucracy -- where the sovereignty of member states is said to often trump broader concerns. David Kay, a former inspector who worked with Mr. ElBaradei for eight years, said he'd be glad to have Mr. ElBaradei in a "bureaucratic fight" because he knows the ropes.

While Mr. ElBaradei is loath to discuss it, his Egyptian nationality and knowledge of Arabic are also key advantages, helping him in his appeals to the Arab world. In addition to his appearance on al Jazeera, he met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and representatives of the Arab League during a late-November trip to Egypt. Mr. ElBaradei's nationality has also served as a counterpoint to the Arab League's claims that there aren't enough Arabs among the inspectors in Iraq, Western diplomats said. The Arab League's U.N. ambassador declined to comment on how his organization's misgivings reflect on Mr. ElBaradei, and instead cited the IAEA chief's reputation for being an honest broker.

Mr. ElBaradei has noted that his team in Iraq includes a number of Arab inspectors, but he prefers to emphasize the importance of impartiality and competence over national origin. As to his own background, he points out that as an international civil servant he has spent more of his life in New York, Geneva and Vienna than in Egypt.

### **'Redouble Our Efforts'**

The transgressions of Iraq and other IAEA member countries have cast considerable doubt on the relevance of the cash-strapped agency, whose annual budget of \$250 million has remained flat for years due to U.N. budget caps. But it isn't because of a lack of commitment on Mr. ElBaradei's part. He has been crucial to a push that started in the late-1990s to bolster the IAEA's nuclear-monitoring rights, a person familiar with the talks said. In addition, he continues to press member state North Korea to follow the safeguards agreement. The IAEA successfully detected nuclear material not disclosed to it by the country in the early 1990s, but has since failed to gain Pyongyang's full compliance.

Battling the spread of nuclear weapons, Mr. ElBaradei has urged nuclear powers within the IAEA to trim their arsenals and tried to draw such nonmember states as Israel, India and Pakistan, which have nuclear capabilities, into the organization. He also has called on world leaders to work hard to settle regional disputes -- like those between India and Pakistan and in the Middle East -- that he said naturally lead to nuclear proliferation.

"I think what we see now indicates that we have to redouble our efforts," Mr. ElBaradei said. "Is this the type of world we want to see, a world where every year countries are acquiring nuclear weapons?"

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Newark Star-Ledger  
December 9, 2002

## **In Iran, Grim Reminders Of Saddam's Arsenal**

By Farnaz Fassihi, Star-Ledger Staff

TEHRAN, Iran -- The first sign that something was dreadfully wrong came with the smell of grass. Then chocolate. Morteza Aminpour and his fellow soldiers knew what the strange smells meant, and they ran.

"Everyone screamed and warned of a chemical attack. But what could we do? We didn't have masks or any preventive equipment. We all started running toward the hills because we heard it's better to be on heights. I coughed blood all night and woke up with blisters all over my body the next day."

That was 15 years ago. Today, Aminpour, a handsome man with wavy, black hair and brown eyes, sits cross-legged on a narrow metal bed at Sassan Hospital here. Each year, his condition has deteriorated and he expects not to live much longer.

He gets oxygen from plastic tubes inserted in his nostrils. His breathing is labored and he pauses for a few minutes between sentences.

Aminpour, who has two daughters, ages 9 and 7, is among the more than 100,000 Iranian soldiers who were victims of Saddam Hussein's biological weapons during the nation's eight-year war with Iraq.

The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns nor the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans.

The nerve gas killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 90,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions.

Aminpour, now 33, was exposed to mustard gas during the Fao Peninsula battle in which Iraq unleashed 100 tons of chemical agents against Iranian troops.

Aminpour, who was 18 at the time of the attack and serving his two-year mandatory military service, now suffers from severe lung failure, skin rashes and blisters and is gradually losing his eyesight. He has been in and out of the hospital for the past year.

He knows he is dying a slow death. The doctors have told him there is no cure and all they can do is try to ease the pain.

"I sometimes wish I was killed with a bullet," Aminpour says. "It would've been over right then. I've been in pain for ... years and who knows how many more years I'll be alive."

Aminpour's symptoms developed gradually, as physicians say is the case with victims of mustard gas. After the initial outbreak, he was well enough to attend university classes and to obtain a bachelor's degree in business administration. He even held jobs at several companies before his illness became too severe last year.

At times, as many as 60 percent of the beds at Sassan Hospital in Tehran, designated to treat victims of chemical weapons, are occupied by veterans, according to Hamid Jamali, the physician responsible for their care.

"For years and years we were crying for help and saying Saddam is using chemical weapons against our troops, but the world looked the other way," Jamali said.

"Now suddenly everyone feels threatened by Saddam Hussein. But who gave Saddam chemical bombs? The United States and Europe. So as first victims of such attacks, we blame the U.S. equally for our suffering."

Victims here also blame the United States for supplying Iraq with lethal ingredients during the war with Iran and for giving Saddam the green light to continue that war.

Iraq used chemical weapons not just on Iranian troops, but also against two civilian Kurdish villages of Halabjeh in northern Iraq and Sarvdasht in northeastern Iran near the border, according to the government. Several thousand people were killed and hundreds are still seeking medical treatment.

"We have teenagers referred to us who were 2 or 3 years old at the time of the attacks in Sarvdasht who are now showing clear symptoms of mustard gas contamination. We have many cases of children developing leukemia and lymphoma from these bordering cities," said Hamid Sohrabpour, a lung specialist who headed Iran's chemical exposure team for a decade during the war.

Sohrabpour says Iran's grim experience with treating and recognizing patients of chemical attacks can offer invaluable lessons at a time when war with Iraq seems likely and the threat of chemical attacks by terrorist groups like al Qaeda is feared around the world.



"Iran probably has the most experienced team of physicians in dealing with chemical victims because no other country has had to treat thousands of victims in recent memory. We are more than willing to share it with our colleagues around the world," said Sohrabpour, who trained at Cornell University in New York.

In fact, Iran has been educating teams of physicians and nurses as part of its obligation to The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague, responsible for implementing the U.N.-brokered 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention.

The OPCW has already held four clinical courses in Iran for medical experts from around the world to talk to Iranian medical teams, review the medical files of victims and to examine hospital patients. It is planning to hold another one in May.

<http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?base/news-5/1039417903119860.xml>

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## 4 Arrested in France With Items Suggesting Chemical Attack Plot

By JOHN TAGLIABUE

PARIS, Dec. 17 — In the latest sweep against suspected Islamic radical groups here, French officials said today they arrested four people early Monday and seized chemicals and a military personal protection suit suggesting they may have been preparing a chemical terrorist attack.

The interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, said that three men and a woman, all of North African origin, were being held on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks. He said chemicals found in an apartment in the northern Paris suburb of La Corneuve, where the four were arrested, were being analyzed by police experts.

A police official said forged documents, a computer and large amounts of dollars and euros were also seized. The official said results of the analysis of the chemicals contained in two large containers would come as early as Wednesday.

Mr. Sarkozy, addressing the assembly or parliament, said some of the four were thought to have attended training camps in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The presence in the apartment of the military suit for protection against chemicals was particularly unsettling to investigators, he said.

The raid was the most recent in several waves of arrests in France in recent weeks as the authorities remain on high alert to thwart possible attacks by radical Islamic groups.

Mr. Sarkozy said the men, two Algerians and a Moroccan, were believed to have spent time in Chechnya and that they were in contact with an Algerian, Rabah Kadre, who was arrested in London in November and charged there together with two other North African men with possessing materials to prepare terrorist attacks.

The arrests in Paris came at the behest of France's top antiterrorism judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière. In recent interviews, Mr. Bruguière has suggested that Chechnya has increasingly assumed the role once held by Afghanistan as a training ground for Islamic radicals later deployed in the West.

News accounts in Britain suggested that Mr. Kadre, 35, and the men charged with him were plotting to attack the London underground with bombs or poison gas during rush hour.

Agence France Presse, citing French officials, identified one of the men as Ben Ahmed Mirouani, 29, an Algerian, who was detained with his wife, also Algerian.

Le Monde, the Paris daily, quoted French investigators as saying that the men arrested had been in contact with a band of Algerians, five of whom went on trial in Frankfurt in April, accused of planning to blow up a Christmas market in France and of being part of an Islamic terrorist group trained in Afghanistan.

French investigators believe the so-called Frankfurt group may have ultimately answered to Amar Makhulif, also known as Abu Doha. British investigators have identified Mr. Makhulif as an associate of Osama bin Laden, a recruiter of fighters for camps in Afghanistan and a leader of the Los Angeles airport plot by Ahmed Ressam, another Algerian who is a confessed terrorist.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/17/international/europe/17CND-PARI.html>

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## **Bush Is Expected To Say Iraq Failed To Meet U.N. Terms**

By David E. Sanger with Julia Preston

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 — The White House is expected to declare on Thursday that Iraq has violated the United Nations resolution requiring it to disclose all its weapons of mass destruction, senior administration officials said today.

At a national security meeting scheduled for Wednesday morning, President Bush will consider whether to declare Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations, the officials said.

A senior State Department nonproliferation official, John S. Wolf, met this morning with Hans Blix, the head of the United Nations inspection team for chemical and biological weapons, to describe the deficiencies that American intelligence agencies say they have found in the Iraqi declaration that says Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles.

The issues confronting Mr. Bush — particularly the question of whether the time is right to declare a "material breach," which could provide what Washington sees as a legal justification for going to war — were discussed in detail at a meeting of his senior national security advisers in the White House situation room this afternoon, according to several officials. The president did not attend the meeting of the group, known as the principals, which usually includes the secretaries of state and defense, Vice President Dick Cheney and other officials.

In interviews tonight, those officials refused to say what options the group had decided to present to Mr. Bush. But a consensus appeared to be developing that Iraq's failure so far to explain what happened to its chemical and biological weapons programs after 1998 — and its contention that all work on nuclear weapons stopped a decade ago — should be characterized as evidence that Iraq is engaged in what one official called "not so passive resistance" to a full inspection by the United Nations.

American intelligence officials say the extensive arms documentation that Iraq issued earlier this month lacks evidence that it disposed of chemical and biological weapons that United Nations inspectors had identified prior to 1998, or that the inspectors suspected still existed when they left Iraq under duress that year.

Administration officials have not produced evidence that Iraq has nuclear weapons, but say President Saddam Hussein is thought to have acquired equipment that would aid in the development of such arms. The officials said they did not expect that the violations would be described by Mr. Bush as an immediate cause for war, but rather as a "serious matter" and evidence that Iraq was again engaging in hide-and-seek with inspectors.

"What you will see will be a patient White House, very concerned about another failure by Iraq to cooperate but willing to allow the weapons inspections to go ahead," said one administration official familiar with the debate.

Another said the administration would use the omissions to step up pressure on the United Nations to demand interviews with Iraqi scientists outside of Iraq, fully expecting that Mr. Hussein would resist those interviews. Today's meeting between Mr. Wolf and Mr. Blix, which was not announced publicly, was the first time the administration had laid out to the United Nations its assessment of the inadequacies of the Iraqi declaration. Though Mr. Wolf did not fully disclose the data backing up the United States analysis of the Iraqi document, "we gave him the thrust with some examples," one administration official said of the session. The American ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte, was also present.

Senior White House officials insisted tonight that the principal advisers, who include Mr. Cheney, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, had made no specific recommendations to Mr. Bush. Asked if the group had agreed that Iraq was in "material breach" of its obligations, Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said, "No such decisions have been taken by the United States government at any principals' meeting, whether today or at any other time."

The debate over how to characterize Iraqi violations is important because it may determine how many allies join the United States in any eventual conflict.

Mr. Bush, some aides expect, will take a cautious approach, denouncing Iraq but stopping short of any pre-emptive action. Most likely, some officials say, is that the president will declare that what Washington sees as Iraq's failure to account for missing chemical and biological weapons, and Baghdad's declaration that all its nuclear weapons research has stopped, are the latest in a series of steps that violate Security Council Resolution 1441.

"I don't expect the president will say that this alone is casus belli," a cause for war, said one administration official. "But it builds the case."

The immediate effect of the administration's declaration, officials say, will be to put enormous new pressure on Iraq, the Security Council and the United Nations inspectors, especially in the matter of interviewing Iraqi scientists.

The administration's private insistence that Iraq has committed a new and grave violations of its promises puts it on a course to differ sharply with Secretary General Kofi Annan and most if not all the other permanent members of the Security Council, including Britain, Washington's closest ally.

Once again today, Mr. Annan repeated his admonition that the weapons inspectors should be allowed to carry on with their work at their own pace. "I think as I've said before: we need to give Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei time to analyze these documents," Mr. Annan said, referring to Mohamed ElBaradei, the chief of the team performing nuclear inspections. "I think we should wait for that." He added that the inspectors "have a mandate and they should carry on with it."

Mr. Blix is to provide his first assessment of the Iraqi declaration to the Security Council on Thursday. The White House is planning a simultaneous announcement of its views.

Mr. Blix informed the Council late Monday that he would not give a full assessment of the vast declaration when he and Mr. ElBaradei meet the group on Thursday. Rather, Mr. Blix said, he intends to provide a preliminary overview and a guide for the 10 nonpermanent Council members to study the documents.

Administration officials were adamant last night that Mr. Bush has made no final decisions, though as one official said earlier in the day, "It's clear that Thursday will be a big day for us." The debate, said one participant, "isn't over whether Iraq falsified its claims — it's over how to prove that, and how best to bring along the maximum number of allies to the same conclusion."

In an effort to convince other members of the Security Council, several senior officials said they thought Mr. Bush would defer the question of whether the omissions themselves are a sufficient legal pretext for military action, under the American interpretation of Resolution 1441.

The Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, insisted this week that only the weapons inspectors had the authority to determine whether a serious breach had been committed or not.

"It is not for Russia or anybody else to make any judgments" until the inspectors render their evaluations, Mr. Lavrov said. If something happens that Mr. Blix "believes is a violation, he comes to the Security Council," he added. "There is no other way, and everybody knows it."

French diplomats have also argued that it is up to Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei to evaluate Iraq's conduct, not individual Council nations. France will also stick to the letter of Resolution 1441, which says that "false statements or omissions in the declarations . . . and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach."

In the view of France, the clause means that missing data and less than candid statements are not enough to cause a "material breach," diplomats said today, if there is no other pattern of defiance by Baghdad.

British leaders have also accepted that interpretation, which was fundamental to getting France's accord for the resolution.

The 10 rotating members of the Security Council received their copies of the declaration this evening, after the documents had been filtered by United Nations experts for information that could provide a guide for making weapons of mass destruction. The five permanent members, all nuclear powers, received the declaration on Dec. 8. <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/international/middleeast/18PREX.html>

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Los Angeles Times  
December 18, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **Arrests In France Raise Concern Of Chemical Attack**

***Four people are held in seizure of unidentified liquid and protective suit. Group is linked to London terror detainee.***

By Sebastian Rotella, Times Staff Writer

PARIS --French police have arrested four suspected Islamic extremists in possession of suspicious chemicals and a special anti-contamination suit, authorities said Tuesday, worsening fears that Al Qaeda is plotting a large-scale terrorist attack in Europe during the holidays.

Anti-terrorism police made the discovery Monday in an apartment and a basement storage room of a housing project where they arrested three Algerians and a Moroccan, authorities said.

The raid in the heavily Muslim Paris suburb of La Courneuve was part of a crackdown across France that has produced more than 20 arrests in recent weeks. The three men and one woman captured Monday allegedly have ties to a suspect in an alleged plot in London involving chemical products, according to Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy.

Police in the La Courneuve raid found "two 13-kilo [29-pound] containers, empty, two vials of liquid that is now under analysis and a military suit for nuclear, bacteriological and chemical protection," Sarkozy told legislators Tuesday.

Until technicians at a military laboratory identify the substances seized in the raid, it is impossible to know whether the materials are lethal.

Still, the presence of the anti-contamination suit makes it more likely that the suspects were experimenting with toxic products, according to European law enforcement officials.

Police identified only one of the four suspects, Mirwani ben Ahmed, who had been wanted on charges related to a foiled plot to bomb a cathedral in Strasbourg during the Christmas holidays in 2000. Ben Ahmed, 29, is believed to have undergone training in the use of chemical weapons, a French law enforcement official said.

Sarkozy called the case "very serious." The interior minister said the suspects "had spent time in Chechnya."

Referring to the London suspect, Rabah Kadre, Sarkozy said the men and the woman "were in relation with ... Kadre, arrested [in November] for planning an attack using chemical products."

"With these four [suspects] here, it was better to arrest them before rather than after," Sarkozy said. "When you find people with this kind of material, there is no doubt that arresting them was the right move."

The fear of a massive terrorist attack extends beyond France into Britain, Germany and Italy. European counter-terrorism officials interviewed Tuesday said they were scrambling in response to a threat that has escalated with the approach of the Christmas holidays, the backdrop for past Al Qaeda attempts.

Arrests in France and elsewhere have revealed that a cadre of combat-hardened extremists has been returning to Europe from Chechnya, where Muslim rebels are fighting Russian rule, and other places where they took refuge after the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan last year, according to investigators. The extremists appear intent on carrying out the major strikes threatened against Europe by Osama bin Laden and his associates, investigators said. And persistent intelligence information has raised the specter of a possible chemical attack, they added.

"The French are very worried about a chemical attack," said a counter-terrorism investigator in a neighboring European nation. "Everybody is very worried. This is the fear. There is a strong fear of a spectacular attack. And after Sept. 11, what could be spectacular? A chemical attack."

Sarkozy's comments about Kadre were significant because the interior minister asserted that the London suspects arrested last month had been involved in a plot to use chemical weapons. Kadre, the alleged leader of a London-based network dominated by North Africans, was arrested shortly after returning to the British capital from Slovakia. British tabloids claimed that he was the lead man in an imminent poison gas attack on the London subway, but British authorities denied those reports.

Prosecutors in Britain have not made public any evidence outlining a specific plot. Kadre and two other suspects pleaded not guilty Monday at a hearing in London.

Nonetheless, investigators in other countries have offered a different picture. Although European investigators say no chemical weapons were found in connection with the London plot, they say suspicions linking the London suspects to an eventual chemical attack were credible. In a rare interview published last week, the director of France's lead counter-terrorism agency said there was intelligence information about chemical weapons in the British case.

Indeed, the British arrests last month resulted partly from information passed on by French investigators, according to several European sources.

A crackdown here led by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France's top anti-terrorism magistrate, has taken aim at one of the most violence-prone networks operating in Europe. Its alleged leader, an Algerian named Abu Doha, is behind bars in Britain awaiting extradition to the United States on charges that he masterminded an attempt to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of millennium celebrations in 1999. He has also been linked to the plot involving the Strasbourg cathedral.

The testimony of the convicted would-be bomber in the LAX plot, as well as wiretaps in Italy, showed that members and associates of the network allegedly led by Abu Doha had trained with crude poison gas in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and discussed the use of chemical weapons.

Kadre had assumed Abu Doha's role as a key figure in the network, investigators say, and allegedly was at work reorganizing Al Qaeda in Europe.

A top Al Qaeda suspect said to be commanding a campaign targeting Europe is Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian reputedly knowledgeable about chemical warfare, according to German and Italian intelligence officials.

French authorities must now clarify whether the suspects arrested Monday had the means and expertise to carry out a major attack. It is reasonably difficult for terrorists to prepare and unleash chemical weapons, especially harder-to-obtain agents such as VX, a nerve agent.

In addition to the vials and the protective suit, police found fraudulent identification papers and \$5,000 in cash at the housing project, authorities said.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-terror18dec18,0,5028203.story?coll=la%2Dhome%2Dheadlines>

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Christian Science Monitor

December 18, 2002

Pg. 1

## **Arms Threats Now On Three Fronts**

*As the US readies a reply to Iraq's weapons report, concern also shifts to growing nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea.*

By Peter Grier, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – Every nation on President Bush's "axis of evil" list is now challenging the United States on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Thus at a time when it wishes to focus on Saddam Hussein, the administration is having to conduct something approaching a three-front diplomatic antiproliferation war.

From Iraq to North Korea to Iran, each "axis" nation presents a different kind of problem. Each will require a different prevention approach.

The White House is likely to take a hard line with Iraq, a mixed threats-and-blandishments tack with North Korea, and a softer political stance with Iran.

Whatever their success, the world may have reached a crucial point in its decades-long effort to keep the genie of WMD capped in its bottle. "Things are becoming more tense all around and we may not have a choice to concentrate on Iraq exclusively.... That really does stretch everybody but nevertheless, that is the way the world is playing it out," said Sen. Richard Lugar (R) of Indiana, incoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at a recent Monitor breakfast.

Some experts worry that the unfolding of a series of slow-motion crises could cause the US to lose focus on the war against terrorism. The US military is no longer large enough to fight two regional wars at one time, they say. The time of senior officials only stretches so far.

But Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, writing in the current issue of the journal *Foreign Policy*, says that many successful strategies have violated the one-adversary-at-a-time rule. The US successfully fought both Germany and Japan in World War II, for instance. The cold war involved militarily deterring the Soviet Union while building up the economies and confidence of Western Europe and Japan.

In these instances the fronts were different, but the enemy was the same, writes Mr. Gaddis: authoritarianism and the conditions that produced it.

"The Bush administration sees its war against terrorism and tyrants in much the same war," according to Gaddis.

On its primary worry, Iraq, the administration this week appeared to be consolidating its evidence for a final push to convince the UN Security Council that Mr. Hussein's massive arms declaration isn't worth the paper it is printed on. There are reports that the US will send the UN a detailed report, complete with rebutting intelligence, as early as tomorrow. While officials won't confirm this publicly, they have begun speaking out about the declaration in more forceful terms.

On Monday, Secretary of State Colin Powell slammed Hussein's submission, saying US doubts about his trustworthiness had been "well founded."

Perhaps more important, Mr. Powell also said that the US would give Iraq "no second chance" to amend the document in an attempt to head off an invasion. Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix has hinted he might be inclined to ask Iraq about gaps in the documents - an approach the White House worries would launch a round of negotiations with Iraq.

On North Korea, US rhetoric has been more circumspect. While he denounced Iraq Tuesday, Powell also said that the US had "no plans" to attack North Korea, and saw no indication that Pyongyang was ready to attack South Korea.

But while the US may not be threatening military action on the Korean peninsula, it is still taking something of a tough line with the unpredictable North Korean regime. The White House is refusing North Korea's demand that it directly negotiate a non-aggression pact - saying that Pyongyang must live up to the treaties it has already signed and first dismantle its newly admitted nuclear weapons programs.

Thus the administration seems to be walking a fine line in its attempts to both prod and soothe the North Koreans. "The point of US policy [in North Korea] should be to avoid that moment in time when you have to choose between them building a nuclear stockpile or you launching a military attack," says Joel Wit, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Iran, meanwhile, presents a difficult antiproliferation case. This week the US publicly identified two facilities in central Iran as possible parts of a nuclear production infrastructure, and accused Russian sources of helping Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear weapon. The problem for the US is that the Iranians say they will welcome international inspections of the facilities, and that all their nuclear activities are peaceful.

Meanwhile, the domestic politics of Iran are in turmoil, with a nascent reform movement and student protesters trying to wrest power from the ruling theocracy. It's this situation - not the prospective development of WMD - that should be the immediate focus of US policy in Iran, say some. "Something rather dramatic is going on in Iran. It may be the beginning of a second revolution," said former Clinton administration national security adviser Samuel Berger at a recent Monitor breakfast.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1218/p01s02-usgn.html>

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DefenseNews.com  
December 17, 2002

## **Past Decade Has Brought U.S. Troops No New Advantage Against Biological Threats**

By William Matthews

U.S. troops, whose numbers increase daily in the Persian Gulf region, may face an array of biological weapons that they are no better armed against than were their counterparts 12 years ago, according to the Defense Department.

"We are preparing for imminent engagement" with Iraq, but have no new products licensed since the last war with Iraq, said Anna Johnson-Winegar.

"That's not a happy story to have to tell," especially since the Defense Department has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on vaccine and antidote research, said Johnson-Winegar, who is a senior adviser on chemical and biological defenses to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Military medical officials worry about 13 biological threats that range from bacteria-like plague and Q-fever, to viruses including smallpox, equine encephalitis, ebola and Marburg. In addition, a half dozen biological toxins may have been weaponized, and there is growing concern about microbes that could be made deadly through genetic engineering.

Biological and chemical weapons were a serious concern in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and have become an even greater worry in the region since then. But the process for developing and licensing new vaccines, antidotes and other medical countermeasures remains painfully slow.

Typically, it takes 12 to 15 years for new vaccines and drugs to move from prototype to licensed product, Johnson-Winegar said. Even the fastest-moving new products take three years, she said.

Congress has appointed a committee of scientists and government policy experts to search for ways to speed up the process, and Johnson-Winegar was among the first to address them during their opening session Dec. 16 in Washington.

"Anthrax and smallpox are No. 1 and No. 2" on the Defense Department's list of top biological weapons worries, she said. And as the military gears up for possible war with Iraq, anxiety about biological weapons is rising.

A Dec. 16 report from the Pentagon quotes "a U.S. intelligence official" as stating that Iraq "has both more, and more dangerous, biological agents than it had available during the 1991 conflict."

On Dec. 13, President George W. Bush ordered smallpox vaccinations for 500,000 troops, including those most likely to be sent to Iraq.



In July 2000, however, the military was forced to scale back an effort to immunize all troops against anthrax. The services blamed a vaccine shortage, but the anthrax vaccination program also was plagued by widespread fear of debilitating side effects from the inoculations. Some military personnel quit the service rather than take the shots. Iraq is believed to possess weaponized anthrax, and there is evidence that Iraqi scientists worked with camel pox in what may have been an effort to develop smallpox as a weapon, according to John Parachini, a biological weapons expert at Rand Corp., a public policy research organization. And in 1998, Iraq reported to the United Nations that it possesses concentrated botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.

Confronted with such threats, the U.S. military is working to develop better countermeasures, such as multi-agent vaccines that would be effective against several pathogens, and alternative vaccine delivery systems, including skin patches and inhalants, said Carol Linden, director of medical, chemical and biological defense research for the Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.

In an effort to accelerate the countermeasures effort, the Army has considered adopting a scheme of "technology readiness levels," a process developed by NASA to help determine which space technologies were most likely to mature most quickly, Linden told the committee.

The Army also holds out new hope for help from the commercial sector, she said. Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, finding commercial partners for developing vaccines and antidotes "was a big challenge," she said. But the 2001 terrorist strikes and the anthrax attack that followed raised "a big spike in interest" because it pointed to a potentially lucrative commercial market for medicines that are effective against biological weapons, she said.

But commercial interest may be transitory, warned Parachini. "The vaccine business is not very lucrative" because there is no recurring demand for the product. Once an individual is vaccinated, there is no need to be vaccinated again. And in many instances, the threat of infection is limited to a small category of people — troops on a particular operation, for example — making it hard for companies to profit by producing exotic vaccines, he said.

For that reason, a Rand panel known as the Gilmore Commission has recommended creating a government-owned vaccine production facility that would be operated by commercial contractors, Parachini said.

The committee, known formally as the Committee on Accelerating the Research, Development and Acquisition of Medical Countermeasures Against Biological Warfare Agents, expects to present an interim report to Congress in March, Johnson-Winegar said.

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New York Times  
December 18, 2002

## **Company Says It Will Test A Safer Smallpox Vaccine**

By Andrew Pollack

A California biotechnology company said yesterday that it had acquired the American rights to a Japanese smallpox vaccine it says is safer than the one the Bush administration plans to use.

The company, VaxGen, said it hoped to begin clinical trials early next year and to win approval from the Food and Drug Administration to begin sales in 2004. If the vaccine is approved, the company plans to market it commercially, hoping it will appeal to millions of consumers who want some protection against bioterrorism but fear the side effects of the existing vaccine.

On Friday, the administration announced plans to use stocks of an existing vaccine to immunize half a million troops and up to 10 million civilian health care and emergency workers by late spring, and to make a newer version of the vaccine available to the public by 2004. But scientists have warned that the vaccine can cause serious side effects in a small number of recipients, including brain inflammation and death.

By contrast, the Japanese vaccine was tested in 50,000 small children in the 1970's and was approved there in 1980. It caused no serious side effects and fewer cases of fevers and redness on the arm than conventional vaccines, VaxGen said. But the Japanese vaccine did produce the characteristic scab on the arm, a sign of effectiveness, in more than 90 percent of the children.

Still, some American experts say there is not enough data to show that the vaccine is safe and effective. Like the conventional one, the Japanese vaccine consists of a live vaccinia virus, a cousin of the smallpox virus. But the Japanese virus is attenuated, chosen to be weak and to produce fewer signs of brain inflammation than the conventional vaccines in animal tests.

Dr. Lance K. Gordon, the chief executive of VaxGen, said he had been working on spurring interest in the Japanese vaccine for four years. Dr. Gordon, an immunologist, was formerly the chief executive of OraVax, now known as



Acambis, the company that has contracts from the United States government to produce 209 million doses of a new version of the conventional vaccine. Dr. Gordon helped negotiate the first of those contracts.

But he said the Acambis vaccine, while produced with more modern methods than the existing vaccine, would not be much safer because it used the same strain of virus. He added that its risks would be acceptable if there were a bioterror attack, but that in the absence of an attack, "it's certainly likely that the adverse events will outweigh any risks from smallpox."

Dr. Gordon's comments raise the question of whether the government should have considered the Japanese vaccine when it decided to build its stockpile. But government officials say they had to go with what had been proved to work.

"We had to build the stockpile based on proven efficacy and proven acceptability to the F.D.A.," said Dr. Philip Russell, special adviser on bioterrorism vaccines in the Department of Health and Human Services. Acambis declined to comment.

Dr. Russell said that since the Japanese vaccine had been developed after smallpox was eradicated in Japan, "there's no historical proof that it works." He also said the vaccine was made in an unusual type of cell culture that might not pass muster with the drug agency.

Nevertheless, he said the government was pleased that VaxGen had licensed the vaccine because it might provide an option for the future.

VaxGen executives said it was not clear whether the government would buy any of its vaccine for the stockpile. But investors apparently saw a big opportunity in the potential for commercial sale, and VaxGen's stock rose \$1.87, or 12 percent, to \$17.60 yesterday.

Dr. Donald Francis, the president of VaxGen, conceded that the testing in Japan in the 1970's might not have been extensive enough to detect serious complications, which are rare even in the conventional vaccine.

Moreover, since the Japanese vaccine is a live virus, it is not likely to be recommended for people who should not take the existing vaccine, like those with compromised immune systems or certain skin disorders, VaxGen executives said.

The National Institutes of Health is searching for safer smallpox vaccines. One candidate, on which it is starting research, is made from a strain of virus known as M.V.A. that is so weak it is said not to be able to replicate in humans.

VaxGen, based in Brisbane, Calif., is mainly known for its experimental AIDS vaccine, which is in the final stages of clinical trials.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/science/sciencespecial/18VACC.html>

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Washington Times  
December 19, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **Pentagon Plans Defense Against Mideast Missiles**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The Pentagon is planning to build a second missile-defense interceptor system near the East Coast or in Europe to counter missile threats from the Middle East, Bush administration officials said yesterday.

President Bush announced Tuesday that the Pentagon will build a limited missile-defense system by 2004, situated in the West and primarily aimed at defending the United States against long-range missile attacks from North Korea or China.

The plans call for deploying a single system with 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and four interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California by 2005.

Administration officials familiar with detailed plans for a broader defense system say the plans call for another interceptor site in Maine, oriented toward missile threats from Europe and the Middle East.

Additionally, interceptors could be set up in Britain, Hungary or Poland, NATO allies whose governments privately have indicated they would be willing to cooperate with and provide bases for a missile-defense system.

Deploying interceptors in Europe is likely to further upset Russia, which yesterday criticized the already-announced U.S. missile-defense plans.

Moscow's Foreign Ministry said in a statement made public yesterday that the missile-defense plans, including the use of space for components, have entered "a destabilizing new phase."

The statement said that abandoning the principles of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "may lead only to a weakening of strategic stability, to a senseless new arms race in the world."

Russia expects the United States to focus on making strategic arms cuts and combating terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the statement said.

"Moscow counts on the United States to pay priority attention to the realization of precisely this strategic partnership program agreed upon at the highest level and to enlist its friends and partners in it, not in a destabilizing race in strategic defensive arms, including in space," the statement said.

China's government has not responded publicly to Mr. Bush's deployment decision.

In the past, China has opposed U.S. missile-defense programs as upsetting international stability, and Beijing fears the neutralization of its arsenal of about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency, said the initial missile-defense system of interceptors in Alaska and California could be expanded with additional interceptor sites.

"Anything is possible, but there are no firm plans beyond 2005," Col. Lehner said. "After 2005, it may be necessary for adding ground-based interceptors or sea-based missiles or [airborne laser]. But it's just too early to know. All our focus is going to be on this initial capability."

The CIA estimates that Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria could emerge as long-range missile threats and that the initial West Coast system will be unable to knock out missiles from those countries, the officials said.

More interceptor sites therefore will be needed and could be built in the 2010-2015 time frame, the officials said.

Iran has the Shahab-3 medium-range missile that can reach Europe, but not the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies believe the Iranians also are working on an intercontinental-range missile, which the Tehran government has denied.

Defense officials said the West Coast system to be deployed by 2005 could protect most of the United States, with the exception of southern Florida, from missiles launched from East Asia.

The Pentagon announced yesterday that it plans to deploy the first six interceptors in Alaska and four at Vandenberg by 2004. An additional 10 interceptors would then be deployed in Alaska in 2005.

The plans also call for deploying three warships equipped with the Aegis battle management system and SM-3 interceptor missiles, although such missiles will be less effective than the ground-based interceptors against long-range missiles.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021219-86065308.htm>

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## Rumsfeld to Get Smallpox Vaccination

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Filed at 6:59 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Joining President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said Wednesday he would be vaccinated against smallpox along with about a half-million troops.

"I certainly intend to" get the vaccination, Rumsfeld said on CNN's "Larry King Live." "It's hard to ask people to do something that you're not willing to do yourself."

Bush on Friday ordered about 500,000 U.S. troops in "high-risk parts of the world" to be vaccinated against smallpox, a deadly disease that had been declared eradicated. U.S. officials fear hostile countries like Iraq and North Korea are harboring secret stashes of the virus and could use it as a weapon or pass it to terrorists.

The president said he would be vaccinated as well, sharing Rumsfeld's view that a commander should be willing to take the shots he orders for his troops.

The military has not gotten any reports of soldiers refusing the smallpox vaccinations, which began Friday with about a dozen personnel. In the years before last fall's anthrax mail attacks, hundreds of pilots and other military members left the service because they had refused to receive inoculations against anthrax.

The smallpox vaccination is much more dangerous than the anthrax shots. One or two out of every 1 million vaccinated against smallpox will be killed by the vaccine, and 15 will face life-threatening complications.

"A smallpox epidemic is so vicious and kills so many people so rapidly ... that after a great deal of thought, I concluded that the U.S. military people who have potential vulnerability ought to take it," Rumsfeld said. "And unless a person has some weakened immune system, the statistics are such that I think that the balance is appropriate."

<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Rumsfeld-Smallpox.html>

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Washington Post  
December 19, 2002  
Pg. 26

## **Sources Say Iran Lays Groundwork For Nuclear Bombs** ***Secret Use of Front Companies Is Cited***

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

In the past five years, Iran has used a web of phony trading companies to obscure an increasingly sophisticated drive to secretly build large facilities that could produce the materials needed for nuclear weapons, according to U.S. government officials and information obtained by an Iranian opposition group.

Two recently disclosed sites, near the cities of Natanz and Arak south of Tehran, appear designed to help produce enriched uranium or plutonium, the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons. Until the facilities were revealed in August by the opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the Iranian government had not disclosed their existence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an arm of the United Nations. The facilities likely will not be operational for a couple of years, but experts said their existence suggests Iran has other secret nuclear facilities. Iran had rebuffed efforts by the IAEA to examine the two sites, but now has invited inspectors in February.

Iranian officials have denied the plants are part of a weapons program, arguing they were necessary to wean Iran from its dependence on its vast oil and gas reserves for energy. "America's claim is totally baseless," Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said yesterday. "Our aim is not building atomic weapons."

Russian and Ukrainian scientists have been identified as assisting the secret projects, and officials from the front companies have procured materials in India and China, the Iranian opposition group said. U.S. officials have not been able to determine whether the Russian involvement in the Iranian program is officially sanctioned, but they have pressed Russian officials to halt any cooperation in Iran's nuclear efforts.

Russia is helping Iran build a reactor at a nuclear plant on the Persian Gulf coast at Bushehr, which will become operational late next year or in early 2004. Russia's atomic energy minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, said this week his country had no involvement in the two secret facilities. Rumyantsev said continued participation in the Bushehr project was contingent on Iranian assurances that all spent fuel would be returned to Russia.

Bush administration officials, while expressing "serious concerns" about the Iranian sites, have not let revelations deter them from their focus on Iraq. Much like the nuclear crisis involving North Korea -- and the aid that Pakistan, a U.S. ally, appears to have provided the North Koreans -- the administration has adopted a low-key posture that relies heavily on diplomatic pressure.

"We've always found it curious as to why Iran would need nuclear power when they are so blessed with other means of generating electricity," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said Monday. "We have had conversations with Russia that we are concerned about this and that some of the support they are providing might well go to developing nuclear weapons within Iran, and it will continue to be a matter of discussion with us and the Russians."

While the Iranian opposition group has been labeled part of a foreign terrorist organization -- the Iranian Mujahidin, based in Iraq -- by the State Department, it often has disclosed reliable information about Iran's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. U.S. officials consider its information on the two nuclear projects, including the front companies, credible and began to press the IAEA to inspect the facilities after the group revealed their existence. U.S. officials and other experts said Iran's aggressive push illustrates how easy it is for a determined nation to covertly make huge strides in pursuit of nuclear weapons. By using front companies, they say, Iran has been able to procure materials and equipment necessary for producing weapons-grade fuel from foreign companies without raising suspicions, while at the same time appearing to remain within the nuclear power regime established by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

"The problem is that Iran is not cheating," said Henry D. Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a research group. "They haven't broken any rules, and they won't until they have weapons."

In a speech in September to the general conference of IAEA in Vienna, the president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, declared that Iran, "on the basis of Islamic tenets, beliefs and human affinity, has always condemned the possession of weapons of mass destruction." Aghazadeh pledged "complete transparency of my country's nuclear activities."

But the National Council of Resistance of Iran, through information from its sources in Iran, says funding for the facilities does not appear in the government budget but was directly provided by the Supreme National Security Council, the country's key policymaking body. Front companies further disguised the construction and purposes of the projects, the resistance group said.

A company called Kala Electric, based in Tehran, obtained materials and equipment for the project in Natanz, described by the resistance group as a fuel fabrication plant and by other experts as an enriched uranium facility. The Natanz project, which was started two years ago, is spread over 25 acres, with sections 25 feet underground and protected by eight-foot thick concrete walls. Kala Electric officials traveled repeatedly to India and China last year, the resistance group said.

Another front company, Mesbah Energy Co., also located in Tehran, has performed a similar role for the Arak facility, which was started in 1996 and appears designed to produce heavy water necessary for weapons-grade plutonium. The Arak facility, along a river near the central Iranian city, appears to be 87 percent completed and ready for testing in April.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, Washington representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, said the purpose of both facilities had been disguised through misinformation and official secrecy. The Natanz plant was officially described as a project for eradicating deserts, while senior authorities in the governor's office in Arak province have been instructed not to disclose the location of the other site, he said.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a research group, said both facilities suggest there may be other hidden sites. The Natanz site is too large for a country's first enriched uranium facility, which indicates that Iran may already be operating a smaller pilot plant, he said. The Arak heavy water plant only makes sense if it is paired with a reactor, which has not yet been located.

"At this point, we have more questions than answers," Albright said.

An arm of Iran's atomic energy agency, the Center of Atomic Research, also uses a front company, Kaavosh Yaar, to procure materials from foreign countries, the Iranian resistance group said. Revenue from the sale of liquid nitrogen, a product of the center, is deposited in the bank account of another company, Saakht Iran, which in turn hires all contracted and nonofficial personnel of the atomic energy agency, it said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8865-2002Dec18.html>

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Inside The Pentagon

December 19, 2002

Pg. 1

## **U.S. Officials Mull A Military Role In Enforcing Smallpox Quarantine**

By Elaine M. Grossman

The Bush administration is taking initial steps to plan for a potential military role in enforcing a massive quarantine, if smallpox or another highly contagious virus were to break out somewhere in the United States, defense officials tell *Inside the Pentagon*.

Talks have begun among various federal agencies that could delineate a role for U.S. troops, should local and state law enforcement authorities become overwhelmed, officials say.

This week a congressionally mandated commission on homeland security said the military should begin preparing for the possibility that "rapid-response" forces will be needed in such a case.

The commander of U.S. Northern Command -- the military organization assigned to defend the American homeland from attack -- must have "dedicated, rapid-reaction units with a wide range of response capabilities such as an ability to support implementation of a quarantine," states a new report from the Gilmore Commission. The panel was created four years ago to advise the president and Congress on domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.

The possibility of a biological attack on the United States is receiving increased attention as the nation contemplates war against Iraq, which experts fear may have "weaponized" smallpox, anthrax or other biowarfare agents. On Dec. 13, President Bush announced a plan to vaccinate almost 500,000 military personnel against smallpox, beginning immediately, and to start inoculating up to 10 million medical workers and emergency responders shortly thereafter.

Administration officials say the nation soon will have stockpiled enough smallpox vaccine to inoculate all Americans within days after an outbreak occurs. The vaccine is believed to be effective as many as four days after exposure to the disease. Without rapid treatment, this once-eradicated virus is deadly.

"Our government has no information that a smallpox attack is imminent," Bush said last week. "Yet it is prudent to prepare for the possibility that terrorists who kill indiscriminately would use diseases as a weapon."

Existing public health plans call for local and state officials to institute and enforce a quarantine, if necessary, in which individuals who may have been exposed to a contagious disease -- but show no symptoms -- are confined and physically separated from those who have not been exposed.

But some federal officials, public health analysts and national security experts anticipate a large-scale quarantine would almost surely incite public panic and could require the use of federal troops to restore order. Defense officials emphasize military forces would act solely in a support role to federal civil authorities in such a domestic mission.

### **Controlling the spread**

In the case of even a limited outbreak of a highly contagious disease like smallpox, plague or yellow fever, health officials may call for a broad geographic area to be sealed off, officials say. That is because an infected individual might come into casual contact with dozens of people days before developing or identifying symptoms. Simply breathing within six feet of another person can spread the smallpox virus.

A common example of a large quarantine is the creation of a perimeter around a city like Cincinnati, OH, so that no one may leave or enter on foot or by vehicle, train, aircraft or boat. Such a quarantine might be lifted for individuals who remain symptom-free for a period of time, or could be eliminated en masse after an outbreak has been contained, sources said.

But depending on the extent of the outbreak, a quarantine could remain in place -- potentially in multiple U.S. cities or regions simultaneously -- for weeks, months or even years.

"Is there any doubt in your mind if a single case of smallpox is discovered that the troops would be in there in a flash?" asks Stephen Dycus, a specialist in national security law on the faculty of Vermont Law School. "I don't have any doubt, because smallpox or pneumonic plague are highly contagious," and both have a latency period that increases the risk of a rapid spread, he said.

"As soon as word gets out, there's going to be panic in the population," Dycus said in a Dec. 17 interview. "There will have to be quarantines on a massive scale."

Experts imagine scenarios in which large numbers of parents, seeking to protect their families, attempt to flee a city in which one or more smallpox cases have been identified. Conversely, a mother or father who is out of town during an outbreak would almost certainly want to return to a quarantine zone to care for their children.

Although local and state health officials are the first line of defense -- and a governor can call up the National Guard under Title 32, if necessary, to enforce a quarantine -- Pentagon and federal civil authorities are concerned state and local law enforcement capabilities may quickly become overwhelmed.

Particularly in situations where smallpox has been discovered simultaneously in multiple cities, the federal government anticipates getting involved in the response.

Guidelines for "isolation and quarantine" published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention note that federal regulations authorize action by CDC "in the event that measures taken by local and state health authorities are insufficient to prevent the spread of smallpox to other states."

Title 42 of the U.S. Code says health regulations "may provide for the apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease in a communicable stages," who is moving from one state to another or in contact with a person in transit. "Such regulations may provide that if, upon examination, any such individual is found to be infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary," states the law.

Title 42 suggests the U.S. surgeon general, with approval from the secretary of health and human services, has the authority to make and enforce regulations in this regard. However, experts say in the case of a bioterrorism attack, health policy decisions that begin on a local or state level would likely elevate quickly to the U.S. president.

The Posse Comitatus Act, which generally prevents U.S. military forces from engaging in domestic search and seizure, includes exceptions that allow the use of federal troops to restore civil order in national emergencies. Legal experts believe an outbreak of smallpox may well justify the involvement of U.S. troops.

### **How much force?**

But if military personnel are deployed to enforce a quarantine, what level of force could they use to stop the movement of individuals seeking to leave or enter a quarantine area? Experts cite concerns about domestic missions for a military generally trained to use lethal force more readily than local law enforcement.

Should troops be allowed to shoot someone trying to escape quarantine, given the risk of widening a limited smallpox outbreak into an epidemic?

"You should use the lowest degree of force necessary to achieve the end in view," says Eugene Fidell, a former Coast Guard judge advocate general now in private practice. He says a bio-terror attack "strikes me as a 21st century equivalent of a natural disaster that could potentially involve the breakdown of civil order."

But the U.S. military should plan for non-lethal force in such a case, using devices for crowd control, rubber bullets and warning shots, he said.

Fidell described a massive quarantine as "a siege in the public interest."

CDC envisions the creation of a "cordon sanitaire" or "line around a quarantine area guarded to prevent spread of disease by restricting passage into and out of the area," according to the organization's published guidelines.

Concentric circles of quarantine might be established that allow for various levels of restriction.

If just a single case of smallpox has been discovered, "isolation and quarantine measures can be implemented on a voluntary basis," CDC states. But a wider outbreak may necessitate "population-wide quarantine measures which restrict activities or limit movement of individuals," according to CDC.

Prior to a smallpox attack, CDC recommends public officials identify "relevant legal authorities, persons and organizations empowered to invoke and enforce" a quarantine, build "public trust and compliance with government directives," and vaccinate "personnel required to implement and enforce quarantine measures."

As the federal government kicks off its inoculation campaign, the other two imperatives have barely begun implementation, experts note.

Dycus says CDC draws upon a confusing set of statutory and regulatory authorities in planning to handle communicable disease outbreaks. He says a number of critical factors remain undecided:

- \* Whether CDC has the authority to mandate that persons -- citizens, legal and illegal residents, and visitors -- undergo physical exams or inoculations, or take pharmaceutical drugs;

- \* Who has the authority to declare a quarantine or determine the criteria for ordering one; and

- \* Who will determine the geographic scope, duration, or allowable activities in a quarantine.

The Gilmore Commission -- named for its chairman, James Gilmore, the former Republican governor of Virginia -- also advises the federal government to review the statutory basis for establishing quarantines.

The new U.S. national strategy for homeland security "appropriately calls for a review of legal authority for use of the military domestically," states the panel's fourth report, released Dec. 16. "But other legal and regulatory issues must be addressed, not the least of which are quarantine, isolation [of those symptomatic or exposed], mandatory vaccinations, and other prescriptive measures that may be called for in the event of a biological attack."

The Gilmore Commission recommends the president direct the attorney general to conduct such a review of applicable laws and regulations immediately, and "recommend legislative changes before the opening of the next Congress."

### **Informing the public**

Dycus and others say public information is among the most important elements currently missing. If the federal government recognizes the need to plan for a potential smallpox quarantine, "we should do it openly," he says.

Others say a massive quarantine may actually be unworkable, with panicked individuals perhaps triggering the very spread of disease that the quarantine aims to contain.

Planning should focus on less Draconian measures, says retired Air Force Col. Randy Larsen, director of the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. The kind of small-scale quarantines the World Health Organization used to eradicate smallpox in African and Indian villages in the early 1970s will not work in today's "densely populated, highly mobile, unvaccinated" U.S. population, he told *ITP* this week.

The Gilmore Commission notes that following the 2001 anthrax mailings, which resulted in deaths in New York, Washington and Florida, "only 44 percent of those instructed to complete a 60-day course of Cipro actually did so. This does not bode well for quarantine, isolation, vaccination or other public health measures."

The federal government should focus its planning on a public information campaign and massive inoculations, to be implemented immediately upon discovering a large-scale smallpox attack, Larsen says.

Mass vaccinations of the entire public would be difficult but not impossible, following the model of getting 100 million Americans to the voting booths every Election Day, Larsen says. Both quarantines and public inoculations should be highly recommended, but made voluntary, he says.

"Many health care workers will say that people must be forcibly quarantined," Larsen wrote in a July white paper. "I disagree. Those who do not receive the vaccine will not be a threat to those of us who choose to vaccinate our families."

Public health experts note, though, that additional people may be at risk. The smallpox vaccine is not recommended for pregnant women, young children, or those with skin conditions or weak immune systems. The latter includes people with the AIDS virus, many cancer patients and those who have recently received organ transplants. But these individuals would be encouraged to take the vaccine if risk of smallpox exposure were high.



"Imposition of large-scale quarantine . . . should not be considered a primary public health strategy in most imaginable circumstances," a group of physicians wrote in a December 2001 article in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*. "In the majority of contexts, other less extreme public health actions are likely to be more effective and create fewer unintended adverse consequences than quarantine."

A broad information campaign is an essential part of the federal government's planning for responding to a smallpox outbreak, one defense official said this week, speaking on condition of anonymity. "But will it be effective?"

Probably not," said the official, noting that more rigorous alternatives must be planned in case they become necessary.

-- *Elaine M. Grossman*

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San Antonio Express-News  
December 18, 2002

## **Test Of Anti-Chemical Warfare Device Set For S.A.**

By Don Finley, Express-News Medical Editor

With heightened concerns that chemical and biological weapons could threaten American troops, the Army and Pittsburgh researchers will test in San Antonio an experimental, highly portable device that may keep people with badly injured lungs alive.

"This was actually being developed before we knew we were going to have a problem with people like Saddam Hussein, and that we could well have our soldiers exposed to agents that could severely damage the lungs," said Dr. Brack Hattler, who developed the device.

Hattler, a professor of surgery at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, said the device would undergo human testing in Europe within the year.

However, for the next two years, the Defense Department is spending \$2 million to study its use in battlefield-type injuries in animals at Brooke Army Medical Center.

The U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research at Fort Sam Houston, which is responsible for combat casualty care research, is overseeing the study.

Engineers from Pittsburgh will be temporarily assigned to San Antonio during pre-clinical testing of the device.

The key to the device is a catheter, which is inserted through the leg or neck and threaded over a thin wire to the central vein to the heart. A balloon at the end is covered by tiny, fibrous tubes that pass oxygen.

The catheter is connected to a control box not much bigger than a shoebox, Hattler said. The control box sends oxygen through the tubes and extracts carbon dioxide. It also fills and deflates the balloon rapidly with helium so that it beats up to 600 times a minute, mixing the oxygen releasing fibers with the red blood cells.

"This catheter rejuvenates the blood by adding oxygen and removing carbon dioxide before the blood reaches the lungs," Hattler said. "So if the lungs are severely damaged and cannot do the work, they don't have to because it's already done for them"

In early testing, the device was able to replace 40 percent to 60 percent of the patient's lung function, Hattler added.

The alternative treatment for such injuries — which can also include gunshot wounds and other forms of trauma, as well as infection — is a bulky ventilator. A field medic with a little extra training can use the catheter, Hattler said.

The Food and Drug Administration must approve the catheter after clinical trials, so it's unlikely to be available during the next couple of years, Hattler said.

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UPI.com

December 18, 2002

## **Experts: Nuke Use Unlikely In Iraq**

By Scott R. Burnell, UPI Science News

WASHINGTON -- A public opinion poll released Wednesday shows Americans support nuclear retaliation for Iraqi biological or chemical weapons use, but analysts said the far-reaching consequences likely would lead to a conventional response.



The Washington Post said its nationwide poll of 1,200 adults, conducted in partnership with ABC News, revealed 60 percent of the respondents favor using nukes if American troops come under unconventional attack. Thirty-seven percent opposed such a response, and 3 percent had no opinion.

The deterrent value of a nuclear counterstrike, however, is less than certain, said Stephen Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. While the United States made fairly clear statements about retaliation during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's Saddam Hussein reportedly still was ready to use chemical weapons, Schwartz told United Press International.

Revenge would seem to be the only motivation for using nukes to respond to a weapon of mass destruction, Schwartz said.

"If you're interested in achieving a certain military objective, we've got more than enough conventional weapons to do that," Schwartz said. "People might feel better (using a nuke) but step back for a second and think about what that really means."

The actual physical after-effects of a nuclear detonation would depend on the bomb's size, whether it was detonated at ground level or in the air, weather conditions and other factors, said Edwin Lyman, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, an anti-proliferation think tank in Washington.

"It's hard to imagine a lack of effects on other nations," Lyman told UPI. "A nuclear response would not be manageable in any sense of the word."

Prevailing wind patterns create a very high probability Iran would receive fallout from a nuke used in Iraq, Lyman said. Other Persian Gulf countries, almost all being major oil producers, could also see radioactive contamination, he said.

Areas even further downwind, including Russia and China, might not escape the fallout cloud, Schwartz said.

The prevalence of oil fields in the area also must be taken into account, Schwartz said. Some scientists in the 1960s thought an underground nuke could help free oil and natural gas reserves from marginal deposits and, he said, while the concept basically was correct, the resulting gas was radioactive. Similar results in the Gulf could seriously impair oil production.

Despite the training U.S. troops receive in dealing with a nuclear battlefield, their very presence in the area certainly would make commanders think twice about an extreme response, Lyman said. Training against chemical or biological attacks is more effective, he said, perhaps to the point where casualties would fall short of warranting an atomic warhead.

Some military planners envision a nuclear "bunker buster" bomb to eliminate deep underground facilities, Schwartz said, but even this kind of precision attack would lead to fallout. Even drawing-board weapons of this type are not guaranteed to get far enough underground to keep the blast from reaching open air, meaning mass civilian casualties are quite likely. Such a toll easily could turn the Iraqi people against what would otherwise have been a welcome change, he said.

The repercussions of a nuclear attack certainly would go beyond devastation on the ground, at the very least ending any chance of U.S.-led coalitions, Schwartz said.

Crossing the nuclear threshold, even after a chemical or biological provocation, would show the United States is no longer content with its overwhelming conventional advantage. The rest of the world would once again scramble to obtain such weapons as a hedge against U.S. attack, he said.

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New York Times  
December 20, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **Powell Says Iraq Raises Risk Of War By Lying On Arms**

By Steven R. Weisman with Julia Preston

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 — Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, citing a new assertion by United Nations inspectors that Iraq has failed to disclose information about its illegal weapons, said today that Saddam Hussein's government was in "material breach" of Security Council resolutions and "well on its way to losing this last chance" to avoid a war.

In one of the toughest warnings to Mr. Hussein since United Nations inspectors arrived in Baghdad to search for evidence of chemical, biological and nuclear arms, Mr. Powell also said Iraq needed to comply on disclosure within weeks rather than months.

In the 12,200 pages of documents it released on Dec. 7, Iraq continues its "pattern of noncooperation, its pattern of deception, its pattern of dissembling, its pattern of lying," Mr. Powell said. "If that is going to be the way they continue through the weeks ahead, then we're not going to find a peaceful solution to this problem."

At the United Nations, both the chiefs of the weapons inspection teams and France, a veto-bearing permanent member of the Security Council, appeared to lend crucial international support to the United States' assessment that Iraq had let the world down once more.

Hans Blix, the chief of the chemical and biological weapons inspection teams, said that "an opportunity was missed" by Baghdad to come clean about new arms programs and that making a full disclosure would have been better for Iraq. Mr. Blix told the Council in a closed briefing that there were "inaccuracies" in Iraq's claim that it destroyed a huge stockpile of anthrax it built up from 1988 to 1991. It was the first time the inspectors suggested that Iraq had lied.

Mr. Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the nuclear inspectors, agreed that Iraq was "cooperating well" in terms of allowing inspectors access to sites.

But Mr. Blix, speaking for all the United Nations inspectors, said, "The absence of evidence means, of course, that one cannot have confidence that there do not remain weapons of mass destruction."

Mr. Powell's blunt words came as President Bush met with Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander of American forces in the Middle East, to discuss plans for moving more troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon has already been given approval for an additional 50,000 troops in the region, doubling the number there now.

In addition, American and Turkish officials met today to work out the details of site surveys to be conducted by the United States at 10 to 15 bases and ports in Turkey in the next several days, a senior military official said.

Military officials said the changes would allow Mr. Bush to begin an offensive if necessary by late January.

Administration officials said this evening that tough talk from Mr. Powell and disclosures of troop plans were all part of a calculated move to increase pressure on Mr. Hussein, as well as on dissidents who might cooperate with weapons inspectors or even on those who might be willing to oust him.

"We're stepping up everything, including military preparations, to send Iraq a message," an administration official said. "The pressure is going to be built up even more."

Mr. Powell's unusually explicit talk of the possibility of force was seen in Washington and at the United Nations as notable for coming from the figure considered the most reluctant of those around Mr. Bush to go to war. Mr. Powell is also known as the administration's principal advocate for seeking United Nations support before military force is used.

The United States ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte, expressed the American reaction there today, calling the declaration "an insult to our intelligence and indeed an insult to this Council."

Among those providing support for the American reaction was France, which up to now has been especially eager to avoid war by forcing Iraq to disarm through the inspections.

Today it publicly criticized the declaration as incomplete and full of inconsistencies, although it stopped short of saying the document was in breach of resolutions.

Over all, the negative reaction to the Iraqi declaration was an early vindication of the administration's strategy: allowing Mr. Hussein to show by his own actions that he will not give up his secret weapons peacefully.

Most members of the Council, including the United States, insisted that the failings of Iraq's arms declaration made it urgent to support the weapons inspectors in their search for evidence in Iraq.

At the same time, pressure increased sharply on Washington to share with the inspectors secret intelligence about Iraq's arms programs that the administration so far has withheld from the inspectors in order to use for its denunciations of Mr. Hussein.

Mr. Negroponte pledged to the Council and the inspectors today that Washington would open the flow of intelligence data.

At the request of the United States and several other nations, the inspectors agreed to brief the Council more frequently in January than was previously scheduled. The change of plan will give Washington more opportunities in coming weeks to judge whether Iraq is continuing to try to foil the inspections.

At the State Department, Mr. Powell discussed the specific nature of what Iraq had failed to disclose; a two-page list of omissions was distributed.

Amplifying an assertion by Mr. Blix about the existence of an anthrax stockpile, Mr. Powell said that records dating from the 1990's inspections showed that Iraq could have produced 27,500 quarts of anthrax. The Iraqi declaration, he pointed out, is "silent on this stockpile, which alone would be enough to kill several million people."

Mr. Powell also said that although Iraq had earlier admitted manufacturing about 20,000 quarts of botulinum toxin, a biological agent, its declaration showed these and other potential supplies to be missing. Also missing from the declaration were known stockpiles of precursors of poison gas.

In the nuclear sphere, he said that based on unspecified intelligence since 1998, when United Nations inspectors left Iraq, it was known to have built mobile biological weapons production units, and to have tried to obtain aluminum tubes for the enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons. These efforts, too, remain undisclosed by Iraq.

The failure to provide details about these programs, Mr. Powell said, "has brought it closer to the day when it will have to face" the consequences outlined in the United Nations Security Council resolution approved in November. "The world will not wait forever," he said, adding that until Iraq fully cooperates with the United Nations, "we should be very skeptical and, I'm afraid, we should be very discouraged with respect to the prospects for finding a peaceful solution."

Administration officials had criticized Iraq's disclosure of its weapons programs almost immediately after it was issued less than two weeks ago. In fact, few officials or experts expected Iraq to disclose much, so their dissatisfaction was mixed with a feeling of vindication on that score.

In the early 1990's, it took months, even years, for inspectors to pry information from Iraq about its biological and chemical weapons. Today Mr. Powell made it clear that the latest process would not be allowed to drag out that long.

The next target date for decisions on Iraq, some administration officials said, is Jan. 27. That is the date that Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei are to make their first full report on their inspections. Not coincidentally, some officials say it is approximately the time when the military would be ready to attack.

There had been a debate in the administration over whether to label the latest Iraqi failure a "material breach." In the end, Mr. Powell and Mr. Negroponte both used that term today.

It was significant because the word "breach" applies to Iraq's obligations to disarm under the cease-fire of 1991. Determination of an Iraqi breach would effectively permit a return to military force by the United States and its allies.

Yet, although he used the term, Mr. Powell made it clear that a number of steps needed to be taken before war would be considered.

First, he called for a further effort to "audit and examine" the Iraqi declaration of Dec. 7 and an accelerated effort to interview Iraqi scientists and other experts "outside Iraq, where they can speak freely." He said any Iraqi effort to block such interviews would be considered another material breach.

The secretary said inspectors should also "intensify their efforts" in Iraq, even though some officials say that without Iraqi cooperation or help from scientists, the odds of their finding solid evidence of arms programs are not large. While saying the United States would take steps to share with inspectors its information on weapons and weapons sites, Mr. Powell was vague about them — deliberately so, officials said. The United States could provide highly sensitive intelligence information, and possibly help from agents inside Iraq to spirit cooperating scientists out of the country along with the families.

Mr. Blix has expressed reservations about such interviews, especially if they are conducted outside the country, saying that he would not go along with "abductions."

[http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/19/international/19CND\\_IRAQ.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/19/international/19CND_IRAQ.html)

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Washington Post  
December 20, 2002  
Pg. 45

## **Iraq Wavers On Scientists' Travel**

### ***U.S. Wants Interviews Conducted Abroad***

By Peter Baker, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 19 -- Senior Iraqi officials declined to commit today to allowing weapons scientists to leave the country for interviews with U.N. arms inspectors as demanded by the Bush administration, saying President Saddam Hussein's government will "cross that bridge when we come to it."

The statement, by Hussein's main science advisers, suggested that Iraq hoped Hans Blix, chief of the U.N. arms inspection team, would shield it from U.S. pressure on the interviews. So far, Blix has been reluctant to use the authority conferred on him by a Nov. 8 Security Council resolution and take Iraqi scientists and their families out of the country for questioning. U.S. officials have insisted repeatedly that interviews abroad represent the best way to get the truth about Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. officials in Washington have said that Iraq's agreement on the outside interviews is central to whether Hussein will be judged as complying with the U.N. resolution and, ultimately, whether the Bush administration decides on war to destroy his three-decade-old hold on power in Baghdad.

Senior aides to Hussein have said Iraq is compiling a list of scientists and technicians involved in Iraq's weapons programs and will turn it over by the end of the month, as Blix requested last week. However, a top aide dismissed what he called the "hypothetical question" of whether Iraq would comply if inspectors want to question the scientists outside Iraq.

"I'm not sure we'll face that because both of them, Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, are lawyers and they know what that entails," said Gen. Amir Saadi, Hussein's top aide for weapons science. He referred to Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is working alongside Blix's team, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Saadi said the prospect of taking scientists out of a sovereign nation presents "serious problems" under international law and expressed concern that Blix might be pressured into turning over a copy of Iraq's list of scientists to U.S. authorities. "This is a confidential list," Saadi said. "Will he make it public? Will he give it to other countries?" Iraqi authorities have repeatedly voiced fears that information gathered by U.N. weapons inspectors could be turned over to U.S. or other intelligence agencies. Contacts between a previous U.N. inspection team and U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies were a major irritant to Iraq before those inspectors were pulled out in 1998.

The scientist issue heated up as the Bush administration accused Iraq of already being in "material breach" of the U.N. resolution because of what it called gaps in Baghdad's 12,000-page declaration about weapons programs. While disclaiming any intention to immediately attack, U.S. officials made clear that evidence of further defiance, such as refusing to release the scientists, could figure in a broader case they would bring to the U.N. Security Council.

Iraqi officials maintained the U.S. attitude showed that President Bush was simply looking for an excuse for war. "Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction," Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan told Radio France Internationale. "I think the United States is well-placed to know this in the first place, but the United States is looking for a pretext for an attack."

Neither side is saying how many scientists might be covered by the Blix request, nor how they might be removed from Iraq. The resolution also authorizes the U.N. team to take out scientists' immediate families to help protect against retribution. But it remains unclear whether U.N. officials could remove everyone close to scientists who leave -- potentially large groups of people.

Likewise, U.N. officials have not settled on what would happen if Iraqi scientists refused to travel. According to Saadi, the officials have not discussed the issue with Iraq during the last month, beyond Blix's letter requesting the list.

Blix has expressed skepticism about allowing his team to become a channel for defections. Iraqi officials have taken comfort from that. And while denouncing today's U.S. statements, Saadi and a colleague, Gen. Hossam Mohammed Amin, were careful at a news conference not to differ with Blix's assessment that there is nothing new in the report. "There is nothing new in it that we didn't have before," Saadi said. "There is nothing, in fact, that they don't know about Iraq's program, full stop. They know everything."

Nearly all the 12,000 pages were taken from previous declarations to the United Nations; only a few hundred pages in Arabic were newly drafted, and they have not been fully translated yet, he said.

Saadi said it was unrealistic to expect Iraq to account on paper for all the chemical and biological weapons it said it destroyed in the 1990s: "Can anyone reach zero, having gone through a war, a devastating war, and a month of disturbances?"

While Iraq has embraced the inspectors since they arrived to resume their work Nov. 18, they experienced their second instance of delay today as they tried to search a military guesthouse north of Baghdad. Under the U.N. resolution, Iraq is required to allow unconditional access to any site; it has granted that access on nearly every occasion so far, in contrast to the past. But today the inspectors were kept outside the guesthouse gate for 15 to 20 minutes before being admitted.

Last Friday, inspectors could not immediately get into locked rooms at a suspected biological weapons facility because the duty officer said he did not have keys. The inspectors sealed the rooms and returned the next day, finding no evidence of tampering overnight.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14953-2002Dec19.html>

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Omaha World-Herald  
December 20, 2002

## **Pentagon Wants Broader Duties For StratCom**

By Jake Thompson, World-Herald Bureau

WASHINGTON - The role of the U.S. Strategic Command would dramatically expand beyond its nuclear weapons targeting duties under a proposal the Pentagon has sent to President Bush.

If approved by Bush, the Strategic Command, which has its headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, would shoulder new responsibilities for missile defense, cyberwarfare, tracking global hot spots and targeting such threats as facilities producing weapons of mass destruction for quick attacks.

It could become the planning and intelligence coordinating headquarters for a U.S. military that faces new challenges of terror and world turmoil.

Nebraska lawmakers, briefed by Pentagon officials Thursday, hailed the proposal as a sharp boost to the Strategic Command's role in national defense. That role already grew this year through StratCom's merger with the U.S. Space Command.

The proposal broadens the Strategic Command's role beyond nuclear war planning, said Rep. Doug Bereuter, a senior member of the House International Relations Committee.

"It's a very major enlargement," said Bereuter, R-Neb. "And as far as I know, there's no reason why the president's not going to accept this."

"It significantly enhances the responsibilities of StratCom," agreed Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb.

The expansion also is likely to bring new jobs and businesses to the Omaha area. "It is sure to drive additional economic activity in the area," said Sen. Ben Nelson, D-Neb.

The Pentagon wants the Strategic Command to assume four key additional responsibilities, according to background materials provided by Nelson.

First, it takes on a new global-strike mission, which would involve planning non-nuclear attacks anywhere in the world.

Targets might include weapons facilities buried deep underground or sites containing weapons of mass destruction, according to Pentagon materials given to Nebraska lawmakers.

Second, the Strategic Command would gain new duties under the missile-defense program that Bush outlined this week. Bush aims to deploy a rudimentary missile-defense system by 2004, although several tests of a prototype haven't been successful.

The president wants to turn a test facility at Fort Greely, Alaska, into a missile-defense site and outfit Vandenberg Air Force Base in California with missile interceptors to shoot down enemy warheads.

StratCom would be charged with tracking any launch of a ballistic missile at the United States and would decide how to intercept it, Bereuter said.

Rep. Tom Osborne, R-Neb., said that given Nebraska's history in national defense, "StratCom is uniquely qualified to undertake the coordination of our nation's missile-defense system."

Third, the Strategic Command would pull together military intelligence and other data about confrontations around the world, such as civil wars. The information would be shared with U.S. military commanders near the areas of conflict.

Finally, the command would be charged with new information-operations duties, such as thwarting cyberwarfare attacks on U.S. computer systems.

It would play a role in offensive electronic warfare against U.S. foes, psychological warfare and attempts at military deception, according to the Pentagon.

Since the merger of StratCom and SpaceCom was announced earlier this year, officials have suggested that several of those responsibilities might come to the new StratCom. But Thursday's briefings were the first confirmation.

The president is expected to consider the plan within the next few weeks, and a Senate aide said StratCom could assume its new charge within 18 months.

If that happens, StratCom will be positioned to grow even more, said Nelson, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee who was briefed Thursday by Adm. James O. Ellis Jr., commander of StratCom.

"He was very enthused about the additional responsibilities and how it strengthens the defense of our country," Nelson said of Ellis. "It is clear that the Department of Defense has a long-term vision for StratCom and Offutt Air force Base."

Hagel, Nelson and Bereuter said it should virtually erase fears that Offutt would be considered for closure under any future round of military base closings.

The expansion demonstrates that the years of work business, civic and political leaders in Omaha, Papillion and Bellevue have put in to build up and protect Offutt have paid off, Hagel said.

"This is a massive investment for the Defense Department, for our country," Hagel said. "Quality of life is a factor. I do think a lot of credit should go to the communities around Offutt."

Rep. Lee Terry, echoed Hagel, saying the changes would bolster Offutt's "capabilities and viability."

[http://www.omaha.com/index.php?u\\_np=0&u\\_pg=54&u\\_sid=599877](http://www.omaha.com/index.php?u_np=0&u_pg=54&u_sid=599877)

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Washington Times

December 20, 2002

Pg. 3

## **Panel To Probe China's Nuclear-Related Sales To N. Korea**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

A congressionally mandated commission will investigate Beijing's sales of nuclear material to North Korea, as China's Foreign Ministry said yesterday that reports of the transfer are groundless.

Roger Robinson, chairman the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, said the panel plans to hold hearings on transfers of Chinese militarily useful goods to North Korea next month.

"There is a burgeoning nuclear crisis unfolding on the Korean Peninsula that demands enhanced export-control vigilance, particularly on the part of Pakistan, China and Russia," Mr. Robinson said in an interview. "The role of China-based suppliers of militarily relevant items to North Korea warrants commission scrutiny."

In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao was asked about the transfer to North Korea earlier this month of a specialty chemical used in producing nuclear weapons. The sale was first reported in The Washington Times on Tuesday.

"I myself have also read the report carried by Washington Times," Mr. Liu stated. "The newspaper often publishes ill-intentioned and irresponsible reports and these reports are also groundless. We think this report is not worth comment."

U.S. intelligence officials told The Times that North Korea earlier this month received a shipment of 20 tons of a specialty chemical known as tributyl phosphate, or TBP, from China.

The chemical has both commercial and military applications and U.S. intelligence officials believe the TBP will be used to extract material for nuclear bombs from North Korea's stockpile of spent nuclear-reactor fuel.

Intelligence reports of the TBP purchase stated that the material was sold by a Chinese company in Dalian, a Pacific coast port.

The chemical shipment coincides with a recent announcement by Pyongyang that it will restart its nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, which in the past were used to make one or two plutonium-based nuclear bombs.

The TBP also can be used in the process of creating fuel for uranium-based nuclear weapons, according to arms specialists.

U.S. officials said the TBP transfer has raised new concerns that China is secretly assisting North Korea, while publicly saying it does not want to see nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Robinson said the reported TBP transfer is "a troubling development that fits a pattern of Chinese supply of dual-use and even proscribed items to North Korea."

"It strains credulity to imagine that the Chinese government is in the dark on such shipments," Mr. Robinson said. The China commission is made up of six Republicans and six Democrats and has already investigated Chinese arms proliferation.

Its last report, made public in July, stated: "China provides technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to terrorist-sponsoring states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan."

The State Department's intelligence bureau stated in written answers to questions posed by the Senate Intelligence Committee that China's record of sales to rogue states has improved in recent years.

"There is still room for improvement, and we expect transfers of [weapons of mass destruction] and missile-related technology to continue," the Bureau of Intelligence and Research stated.

"Many of the firms engaged in proliferation activities are spin-offs from state-owned defense industries, but they may operate without the authorization of the Chinese government."

The report said China's government has been unable to "police producers and vendors adequately."



The TBP sale contradicts what Chinese officials have been saying publicly about nuclear proliferation. "China has steadfastly pursued a policy of not advocating, encouraging or assisting any other country in developing weapons of mass destruction," Sha Zukang, a Chinese representative to the United Nations, told an arms-control conference in London on Tuesday.

Mr. Sha said China has created a new set of controls aimed at tightening the management of nuclear exports. China in the past several years has sent North Korea long-range missile technology despite promises to the United States not to transfer such know-how.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021220-97566833.htm>

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New York Times  
December 20, 2002

## Scientists Favoring Cautious Approach To Smallpox Shots

By Denise Grady

*This article was reported by Denise Grady, William J. Broad and Donald G. McNeil Jr. and was written by Ms. Grady.*

Unless a smallpox attack seems highly likely, the public should not be vaccinated, doctors and scientists warned yesterday in a series of articles posted on the Internet.

The five articles, to be published in The New England Journal of Medicine on Jan. 30 but online now at [www.nejm.org](http://www.nejm.org), generally express cautious acceptance of the administration's plan to begin vaccinating millions of health care and emergency workers. But because of the risks of the vaccine, the experts do not advocate mass vaccination when the risk of an attack appears low.

Government health officials have not recommended vaccinating the public but have said they would make the vaccine available to those who insist on having it, possibly as early as next year.

One article, based on a recent nationwide poll, reported that much of the public was ignorant or confused about the disease and the vaccine, and might make fatally wrong decisions if there was a real outbreak.

Another report described the difficulties encountered by doctors at a Cleveland hospital when a patient appeared with symptoms much like those of smallpox. Other articles addressed questions of how many people would be infected in possible attacks, and how likely newly vaccinated people are to infect others with vaccinia, the virus in the vaccine.

The journal did not solicit the articles, said Dr. Edward W. Campion, senior deputy editor. All were submitted independently by the authors, he said, adding, "We did rush to get these out as soon as we could because we want to inform the debate."

These were the articles' major findings:

### Public Perceptions

Americans believe that smallpox is less dangerous than it really is, and that the smallpox vaccine is more dangerous than it really is, according to the nationwide survey.

The survey, by the Harvard School of Public Health, found that many Americans had serious misconceptions about the disease, misconceptions that could prove fatal because people exposed to the virus could make the wrong decisions and seek treatment too late.

"It has been a long time since Americans have had experience with smallpox and we have a shocking lack of basic understanding of it," said Dr. Robert J. Blendon, the Harvard professor of health policy and political analysis who led the study.

In an interview, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, a top health adviser to President Bush, agreed that "the level of correct information the public has isn't high" and the government "needs to continue to hammer away at it."

The survey found that 78 percent of Americans think there is a treatment for smallpox, and 87 percent think they are likely to survive an outbreak even if they become infected. Of the respondents who were vaccinated in their youth, 46 percent believed that their old vaccinations would still protect them.

In fact, there is no treatment for smallpox, and in past outbreaks the disease has killed about 30 percent of those infected, while leaving many survivors blinded or scarred. And the immunity from inoculations received before 1972, when American doctors last routinely gave them, has probably worn off.

At the same time, the respondents seemed very nervous about smallpox vaccine. Twenty-five percent said it was likely they would die from it, and 41 percent said it was likely to make them seriously ill.



In fact, although the live vaccinia virus that protects against smallpox is the most dangerous vaccine in use, in the past it has caused only about 15 life-threatening illnesses per million vaccinations, and 1 or 2 deaths. Fifty-eight percent of those surveyed did not realize that vaccine given in the first two or three days after exposure — before symptoms appear — can still stop someone from becoming sick. Only 16 percent believed there were enough doses of smallpox vaccine for everyone in the United States. Federal health officials have repeatedly said that there is more than enough because existing stocks can be safely stretched through dilution. This combination of misconceptions is particularly dangerous, Dr. Blendon said, because, in a crisis, people would make the wrong decision.

"If people don't know that vaccine will help them if they get it immediately after exposure," he said, "and if they think there is a treatment, they would delay to see if they got sick." In a real outbreak, a two-day delay could mean the difference between life and death.

The survey found misconceptions about the disease's communicability. Although 89 percent of the respondents correctly said that smallpox was contagious, 67 percent thought it was likely that they could contract it by passing within a few feet of a carrier. Most medical experts believe that the virus is passed in closer contact, by talking face to face, for example, or sharing bed linens.

Sixty-one percent said they would choose vaccination if it were offered. But that number climbed to 75 percent if a respondent's doctor decided to be vaccinated; it dropped to 21 percent if a respondent's doctor refused vaccination. The poll of 1,006 adults was done between Oct. 8 and Dec. 8 by ICR/International Communications Research. The margin of sampling error was plus or minus three percentage points.

Dr. Blendon said a three-pronged public education effort was needed to counteract the widespread misconceptions about smallpox and its vaccine. Most important, he said, would be televised appearances by apolitical celebrities. After Rock Hudson's death, "Elizabeth Taylor was incredibly important in explaining AIDS to the public," Dr. Blendon said.

Second, he suggested pamphlets in doctors' offices. Third, he suggested asking newspaper editors to incorporate short boxed articles with basic smallpox facts in their coverage.

Dr. Fauci, the adviser to Mr. Bush, said he thought public education efforts were already working. A few months ago, ignorance about smallpox was almost total, he said, and now much of the public realizes that there is a vaccine but that it is risky. Two government Web sites, [www.smallpox.gov](http://www.smallpox.gov) and [www.cdc.gov/smallpox](http://www.cdc.gov/smallpox), are "flooded with public information," he said.

### **Risks and Benefits**

In another article, researchers at the RAND Center for Domestic and International Health Security made a detailed calculation of smallpox vaccination costs and benefits that came to the same conclusion as the administration did in announcing its plan last week: that health workers should be vaccinated now but that it would be dangerous to extend the immunizations to the general public unless the risk of an attack is high.

The study estimated that if 60 percent of Americans were immunized, 482 people would die from side effects of the vaccine. That is too high a price, the researchers said, if the chance of a major smallpox attack is low.

The researchers found that some 25 people would die if nearly all 10 million health care workers in the United States were vaccinated against smallpox. They judged that cost acceptable because health care workers would come in close contact with sick people during a smallpox outbreak, making them unusually vulnerable.

"Vaccinating health workers presents a modest risk and could pay many benefits," said Dr. Samuel A. Bozzette, the study's lead author. "In contrast, a public vaccination campaign is certain to entail significant harm, so it should only be contemplated if the government concludes that the chances of a widespread attack are considerable."

The new report was based on an analysis that weighed six different possible attacks against six vaccination policies. At the lowest level of protection studied — no vaccinations until the first smallpox victims are identified — the researchers said the deaths could range from zero (in the event of a hoax) to nearly 55,000 (in the event that a group of highly skilled terrorists sprayed the virus in 10 airport terminals).

The other extreme looked at vaccinating health workers and the general public before any attack. This would produce 482 deaths from complications of the vaccine, the researchers said.

Only in the case of airport attacks did the deaths from smallpox exceed those from medical complications, the study said, so only in that case would mass vaccinations save lives.

After using a computer model to weigh these kinds of tradeoffs, the scientists chose to endorse the middle path — a policy of vaccinating all eligible health care workers and emergency responders before an attack. Under the administration's plan, that is up to 10.5 million people.

The study assumed that 2.72 vaccinated people in a million would die of complications, while the usual estimate is 1 or 2 in a million. The researchers said they based their estimate on a review of vaccination records.

The study noted that a mass vaccination campaign would exclude millions of people at high risk of complications, including pregnant women, babies younger than a year old and people with H.I.V. or other immune disorders or weaknesses.

But another article, by Dr. Thomas Mack of the University of Southern California, questions the need to vaccinate millions of health workers, saying 15,000 would be enough. Dr. Mack argues that outbreaks can be stopped quickly by vaccinating exposed people, and that unless the risk of an attack is high, there is no real need to expose workers to the vaccine's risks.

### **A Troubling False Alarm**

Dealing with a potential smallpox victim may be far more complicated than doctors realize, says another report in the medical journal, this one from MetroHealth Medical Center in Cleveland.

One afternoon last May, Dr. Jennifer Hanrahan, an infectious disease specialist, was asked to examine a man with a severe, mysterious rash on his face, head, hands and legs.

He had also been sick with a headache, backache, fever, nausea and vomiting. Doctors suspected chickenpox. But some of his symptoms did not match that diagnosis: he had been sick for four days before the rash broke out, the rash was lasting too long, he had sores on the palms of his hands and all the sores on his body seemed to have erupted at the same time, rather than in stages.

Those symptoms fit the description of smallpox. If he had smallpox, a long list of health workers and others would have to be vaccinated.

Dr. Hanrahan called the local health department, which notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. The C.D.C. wanted digital photographs of the patient's lesions e-mailed to Atlanta immediately, but the doctors lost time tracking down a digital camera.

Meanwhile, unsettling test results came back: the disease was not chickenpox.

After seeing the digital pictures, the C.D.C. wanted samples from the sores shipped overnight to Atlanta.

"This was the hard part," Dr. Hanrahan said.

The clock was ticking, but small, maddening details had to be worked out. The hospital had to call around to find a Federal Express station that would handle biological materials. Special shipping forms had to be typed, so staff members had to search for a typewriter.

The specimens were not ready to ship until 9:23 p.m. — but the last flight was at 9:45. Doctors called for a police escort to the airport. They arrived on time, only to be told that the station did not accept biological specimens after all.

"That's a hurdle hospitals should be aware of," Dr. Hanrahan said, adding that the agent, seeing the police escort, made an exception for the specimens.

The next afternoon, at 3, the C.D.C. delivered its verdict: negative for smallpox. The rash was caused by a herpes virus infection that had taken a highly unusual course.

"If we had tested for herpes, we would have had the answer within an hour," Dr. Hanrahan said. "To be honest, we never thought of it. We see lots of herpes. This was not what it normally looks like."

From now on, she said, any patient who comes in with an unusual rash will be tested immediately for chickenpox, herpes and syphilis, and a digital camera and a typewriter will be quickly available.

### **Is the Vaccine Contagious?**

A great concern of public health experts is the possibility that newly vaccinated people may make others sick by infecting them with vaccinia, a virus related to smallpox that is used to make the vaccine.

The virus is shed from the vaccination site for two or three weeks, and people who come in contact with it can become very ill if they have certain skin disorders or a weakened immune system. Doctors have been especially worried that vaccinia would be brought into hospitals by vaccinated workers and then spread among vulnerable patients.

In another article, Dr. Kent A. Sepkowitz, director of infection control at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in Manhattan, said that at first he feared there could be vaccinia epidemics in hospitals. But after studying the medical literature, he concluded that he had overestimated the threat and that medical workers could be vaccinated without endangering patients as long as the workers followed instructions like keeping the vaccination site covered and washing their hands often.

When he searched medical journals going back to the early 1900's, Dr. Sepkowitz said, "I think the key feature to me, looking back at these articles, is the paucity of outbreaks."

Dr. Sepkowitz said he thought hospital outbreaks would be far less likely today because patients with rashes are routinely isolated, and there is more emphasis on hand washing and covering vaccination sites.

"My main mantra is that if we go slowly we'll do fine," he said. "But if hospitals are asked to vaccinate quickly and we don't have time to figure out what we're doing and deal with surprises that are in store, we could make a mess."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/20/health/20SMAL.html>

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London Times  
December 20, 2002

## **Pakistani Scientist 'Offered Saddam Nuclear Designs'**

By James Bone

A Pakistani scientist approached Iraq soon after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait to offer nuclear weapon designs and help in procuring bomb components, according to a document found by United Nations weapons inspectors. The revelation, which provoked an inconclusive inquiry by inspectors, has raised new concerns about Pakistan's role in the proliferation of nuclear technology. It follows allegations that Pakistan helped North Korea to develop a nuclear bomb and that Pakistani nuclear scientists met Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, in Afghanistan.

The offer by the Pakistani scientist, found in Iraqi archives, was made in October 1990 as a US-led coalition prepared to repel the August invasion of Kuwait. Iraq had already embarked on a crash programme to develop a nuclear bomb, but told the UN it had not pursued the scientist's offer — a claim UN investigators are inclined to believe. The document revealing the contact between the scientist and Iraq is referred to twice in the Iraqi declaration of its nuclear capability, which *The Times* has obtained.

The file first came to the attention of UN weapons inspectors after the 1995 defection of President Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, General Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of Iraq's secret weapons programmes. After he defected to Jordan, Iraqi officials led UN inspectors to a cache of 1.5 million pages of documents hidden in packing crates at General Kamel's chicken farm in Iraq, the Haider House Farm, in an apparent effort to get rid of incriminating evidence that they assumed he would provide to Western intelligence.

Among them was a file of correspondence between Iraq's Mukhabarat secret service and Department 3000 of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), a secret Iraqi nuclear programme that was codenamed Petro-Chemical 3. "Included was a few pages relating to an approach made by a foreign national who offered assistance, for financial reward, in nuclear weapon design and in the procurement of material that may be required," Iraq's declaration says. "The Iraqi team pointed out to the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Team (IAEA AT) that no external assistance was received by the former Iraqi nuclear programme, other than that already declared to the (team) and is documented."

A source familiar with the case said that the document identified the scientist as a Pakistani. The handwritten paper seems to be a record of a meeting between him and an Iraqi contact. "He made the unsolicited offer to a contact of the Mukhabarat procurement network and there was a communication between the Mukhabarat and Department 3000, where IAEC procurement was handled," the source said.

The document triggered an investigation by UN nuclear inspectors, who approached Pakistan. Islamabad told them it could not identify the scientist, but some UN Security Council diplomats suspect that Pakistan does know who it is. Inspectors thought that the matter was important enough to brief the five permanent members of the Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — on their 1997 inquiry. Evidence of contact between a Pakistani scientist and Iraq will only fuel fears that Pakistan is willing to share its technology with so-called "rogue nations". The US suspects Pakistan of having supplied North Korea with gas centrifuge technology to make weapons-grade uranium for its nuclear bomb in 1997/98.

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-4924-519790,00.htm>

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## **Russia Destroys Mustard Gas at Facility**

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Filed at 6:15 a.m. ET

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia has destroyed close to a ton of mustard gas in a new facility built to help eliminate the country's huge arsenal of chemical weapons, the Russian Munitions Agency said Friday.

It was the first consignment of chemical weapons to be destroyed at the facility in Gorny, in the Volga River region of Saratov about 450 miles southeast of Moscow, which began operating this week.

Munitions Agency spokesman Dmitry Timashkov said that 1,848 pounds of the gas had been destroyed at the plant on Thursday night. The operation was monitored by international inspectors.

Russia has been trying to convince other nations of the seriousness of its efforts to liquidate its 44,000-ton arsenal of chemical weapons, the largest in the world. The program was long delayed by lack of funding from the Russian government, and some disarmament partners including the United States have suspended promised funding in hopes of spurring Moscow to action.

The Gorny plant is on the site of one of Russia's seven former chemical weapons production facilities. It holds 2.9 percent of Russia's chemical weapons stocks, according to the Interfax news agency, and is to work out destruction techniques that can be applied at other plants.

Its construction was delayed by both funding problems and opposition from local residents who feared the environmental consequences of chemical weapons destruction. Construction was accelerated after donations from European Union governments.

The government had planned to build six more chemical weapons destruction sites at former production plants, but that program has been scaled back to Gorny and two others: Kambarka and Shchuchye, both in the Ural Mountains region. Shchuchye is being funded partially by the U.S. government.

Russia is scheduled to destroy 400 tons of chemical weapons, or 1 percent of its arsenal, in 2003, 20 percent in 2007, 45 percent in 2009, and the rest in 2012, Russian officials have said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Russia-Chemical-Weapons.html>

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