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
*USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER*

# *CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL*

*Air University*

*Air War College*

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

*Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved*

## **USAF CPC PRESENTS ANG "CONFLICT 21" WEBSITE**

Focusing on homeland security, weapons of mass destruction issues and future total force concepts of operations (CONOPS) and other key issues, the Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC) at Maxwell Air Force Base recently unveiled the Air National Guard's (ANG) new **CONFLICT 21** website <http://c21.maxwell.af.mil> to the internet world.

According to **CONFLICT 21**'s chief, Colonel Michael Ritz, "This unclassified site is intended to be used not only by Air National Guard members, but by all members of the armed forces and Department of Defense." Colonel Ritz also serves as a CPC associate director and ANG Advisor to the Director, CPC. "This website provides it's user a window into the world of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as a forum for examining the many elements of homeland security and homeland defense," said Colonel Ritz.

A key element of CPC's mission is the promotion of research and education in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Developed by Colonel Ritz and Mike McKim of Air University's Air War College, **CONFLICT 21** provides researchers, students, military and government personnel and the general public unclassified, direct information and cross-links to a multitude of sources throughout the internet. "We hope to educate and enlighten all who make use of **CONFLICT 21** on a variety of matters critical to our nation and the world in the 21st century," says Colonel Ritz. "At the same, we want to provide a continuous flow of updated information for researchers, students and writers examining issues pertinent to those being examined by the ANG and USAF CPC now, and in the future," he concluded.

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New York Times  
December 10, 2002  
Pg. 1

### **U.S. Is First To Get A Copy Of Report On Iraqi Weapons**

By Julia Preston

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 9 — The United States has taken possession of a copy of Iraq's declaration of its weapons programs, after persuading the four other permanent members of the Security Council to support it in insisting on seeing the document immediately, American officials said today.

In doing so, Washington reversed a decision that all 15 Council nations made on Friday to hold off on receiving the declaration until it had been screened by United Nations experts for information that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. That process would have taken 7 to 10 days, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, decided late Friday that they did not want to wait, United States officials said.

A table of contents from the declaration, released by the United States today, suggests that it includes much detailed technical information about Iraq's past secret efforts to build a nuclear weapon. It also hints at information about countries that provided Iraq with equipment for its illicit nuclear effort.

Today the Bush administration, citing an Iraqi general's comments over the weekend about his country's past arms programs, argued that President Saddam Hussein had not given up his quest to build a nuclear weapon. [Page A22.] The declaration was given to the United States by Hans Blix, a chief weapons inspector, at the behest of the Colombian ambassador to the United Nations, Alfonso Valdivieso, who is serving as Council president.

Secretary Powell called Colombian officials over the weekend to secure their cooperation with the United States' plan, American officials said. Secretary Powell returned Wednesday night from a trip to Colombia, where he announced major increases in American military aid.

A Colombian diplomat acknowledged today that his government had made a "political decision" to accede to Washington's plan and wave aside objections from some of the nonpermanent Council members, most notably Syria.

This morning, American diplomats here sent the declaration to Washington, where, they said, copies of the mountains of paper and CD-ROM's were being prepared for the four other permanent members. The diplomats said copies would be distributed through secure channels by Tuesday morning at the latest. France and Britain confirmed tonight that they had received their copies.

One section of the table of contents released today is called "enrichment by gaseous diffusion and gaseous centrifuge"; another is a 30-page section on "isotope separation by laser," followed by "enrichment of lithium isotopes."

There is also a 111-page section titled "Procurements of petrochemicals and the Design Centre," which could detail which countries gave Iraq what equipment.

The table of contents also refers to 300 pages that describe the current status of 27 Iraqi industrial sites that could have had some nuclear activity from 1991 to 2002.

The Bush administration is eager to make its own study of the 12,000-page declaration and compare it with American intelligence, to see if there are omissions or inconsistencies that would put Iraq in new violation of Council resolutions requiring it to disarm.

Most of the 10 nonpermanent members of the Council agreed — some very reluctantly — to be excluded for the time being from seeing the declaration, diplomats from those countries said. But Syria, the only Arab nation on the Council, strongly objected to favoring the permanent members, and accused Colombia, the country holding the rotating Council presidency this month, of violating basic diplomatic norms.

With the change of approach, meticulous reviews of the weapons declarations will be taking place in Washington and four other capitals at the same time as United Nations weapons analysts are poring over the documents.

Although American officials said they were only seeking to help the United Nations with the giant task of deciphering the information, Washington's move gave yet another sign that it seeks faster weapons inspections in Iraq than do Mr. Blix and other ranking international weapons inspectors.

In arguing for early access to the Iraqi document, administration officials said the United States and the other permanent, veto-bearing members — Britain, France, Russia and China — did not need to wait for the United Nations to pick it clean of data that could foster nuclear proliferation. The five are already nuclear powers, the officials pointed out.

"We would have nothing to gain in terms of proliferation from reading an unsanitized version, because we already have that information" about the structure of nuclear weapons, a United States official said.

"This is not a question of asserting some special privilege," the United States ambassador, John D. Negroponte, said today. "It's more a question of drawing on the expertise of declared nuclear weapons states," he said, to expedite the analysis of the enormous declaration.

He called it "a win-win situation for everyone."

Sergey Lavrov, the Russian ambassador, said: "The sole purpose of this exercise is to make sure that nonproliferation treaties are respected. Nothing else is behind this process."

But American diplomats and others from the permanent Council nations were determined to bar non-nuclear nations from obtaining unfiltered copies of the report. The 10 countries that are currently rotating Council members have all signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and so face legal restrictions on their access to data on nuclear weapons.

"It could have signaled to the rest of the world what Iraq still needs, and we have plenty of enemies who could supply what they need," an American official said.

Iraq alerted the Council that some of the material in the declaration could be dangerous if made public.

"I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the publication of this detailed information, in particular the parts relating to research and development and techniques for the production of agents and weapons, entails risk and is inconsistent with the norms of the weapons nonproliferation regime," wrote Iraq's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, in a Dec. 7 cover letter that came with the declaration.

Mr. Blix and his chemical and biological arms team, and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, will remove the sensitive passages from the documents and keep them in their confidential files. They expect to have completed most of that work by Dec. 19, when Mr. Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the nuclear agency, will meet with the Security Council.

Mr. Blix said today that he agreed with the United States' plan. "I have no problem," he said. "We work at the service of the Security Council."

It remained unclear when and how the nonpermanent members would have access to the nuclear information, in order to form a judgment about whether Iraq had failed to comply with its obligations.

"We are not happy," said Mikhail Wehbe, the Syrian ambassador. "It is in contradiction to the political logic, to the procedural logic, to every kind of logic the Security Council used to work on." The Council president normally acts only on the consensus of all 15 members.

Mexico was among the countries that went along without much enthusiasm today with the new arrangements.

Secretary Powell spoke by telephone on Sunday with Foreign Minister Jorge G. Castañeda.

Secretary General Kofi Annan stressed today that the United Nations weapons experts should be given time to do their work in Iraq.

"I have always maintained that the inspectors have work to do and we should allow them to do a professional job, and I have indicated they should be given the time and the space to do it," Mr. Annan said. For emphasis he added, "I do expect the Council to support the inspectors as they do a professional job."

In contrast to the increasingly bellicose language from Washington, the secretary general also made it clear that he believed that war could still be avoided.

"I have maintained that war is not inevitable and it is up to President Saddam Hussein to disarm, to cooperate fully with the inspectors and honor all his obligations to the United Nations," Mr. Annan said.

"If that is done, I would see no reason for war."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/international/middleeast/10NATI.html>

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Washington Post

Tuesday, December 10, 2002; Page A01

## **U.S. Gives Assurance On Iraq Document**

Allies Told Report Isn't Trigger for War

By Karen DeYoung and Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writers

As U.S. experts began to copy and comb through Iraq's 12,000-page declaration of its weapons of mass destruction program, the Bush administration moved yesterday to assure skittish allies that it does not intend to use the document as a trigger to begin military operations against Iraq, U.S. and foreign officials said.

"We're now on common ground with the administration" in a position of "measured skepticism" but no "crazed or precipitative reactions" about Iraq's contentions that it has no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs, said a senior diplomat from one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

The Americans have said "they might use it as a piece of the puzzle, but not as a trigger," another diplomat said. "If they want to use it even as a puzzle piece, they have to say why they don't trust the declaration, and whether they are going to give intelligence to disprove it, or ask the inspectors" to verify Iraqi claims.

The reassurances were accompanied by a substantial softening of recent administration predictions that the document is sure to be riddled with lies constituting a material breach of the U.N. resolution that was adopted unanimously last month. "We have not made any conclusions about the declaration," White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said.

"We want to be very deliberate as we move through and look at this document to determine, with the international community, what this indicates about Saddam Hussein and his disarmament," Fleischer said. Although U.S. military preparations for war continue, Fleischer said "the president hopes to avoid" that eventuality. "Combat," he said, "is the last thing this president wants to engage in."

The Iraqi government contends that it has dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs.

One of only two copies of the declaration provided by Iraq Saturday ended up in U.S. hands yesterday, despite Friday's Security Council decision that U.N. inspectors should review it before it was distributed to governments. The United States received the document after it persuaded Colombia's U.N. ambassador, the current president of the Security Council, to turn it over. The council's other four permanent members -- Britain, France, Russia and China -- acquiesced to the U.S. move.

U.S. officials said their first order of business was to make copies of the voluminous paper document for the other four council members. U.S. intelligence officials spent much of the day transferring the declaration onto CD-ROMs,

which the other four began receiving last night. The 10 rotating members of the council will eventually receive versions with sensitive weapons information excised.

The second original copy was retained by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which are conducting inspections in Iraq. They began their examination of the document yesterday, and made tentative plans to report their initial conclusions to the council on Dec. 19.

U.S. weapons and intelligence experts have been gathered in a central location in the Washington area, most likely CIA headquarters in Langley, to begin reviewing the document. Divided into separate sections covering chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles prohibited by the United Nations, the U.S. copy is to be parceled out in what one White House official called "one-inch squares" to experts in the various fields.

"We don't know what the elephant will look like when we put the pieces together," the official said.

According to informed sources, and an Iraqi-prepared index of the document made available in New York, a major portion of each section repeats the last presentations the Iraqi government made to U.N. inspectors before they withdrew from Iraq in late 1998. The 2,400-page portion on Iraq's nuclear program, for example, includes about 2,100 pages that initial review indicated was an exact copy of the earlier document.

A separate portion of the nuclear section, totaling about 300 pages and written in Arabic, is labeled as "covering the period from 1991 to 2002" and is divided into segments describing the major departments of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization and a list of nuclear facilities. Another portion covers secondary sites, including a series of companies. Additional data supplied by Baghdad on CD-ROMs also has to be integrated into the narrative, sources said.

The 118-page portion of the chemical declaration that details the post-1998 period includes major and secondary sites. An annex of 841 pages is described as listing dual-use facilities that manufacture commercial products but could produce weapons, and all Iraqi commercial chemical plants that are unrelated to prohibited arms facilities. The 528-page biological declaration is described as containing more than 100 pages of answers to questions raised by inspectors in the procurement and production areas through 1998. The index of the biological update section, with no page numbers given, promises data through 2002, including information on biological research, development and production facilities that are dual-use and those unrelated to bioweapons. A two-part annex containing supporting documents totals 732 pages.

Nearly half of the 1,240-page section on ballistic missiles is said to detail Iraq's missile projects and the status of "current activities." Another 113 pages cover forms and initial designs of systems, with an additional 11 pages on the "relationship" of the missiles with prohibited activities in other fields, likely a reference to missiles designed to carry chemical, biological or nuclear warheads.

Another chapter promises procurement details on 11 missile projects, including relations with other "states, companies, establishments and main suppliers."

As required by last month's resolution, there is a four-page chronological summary on "remotely piloted aircraft," a project inspectors believed might involve an unmanned chemical or biological weapon delivery system.

Only one Security Council member objected to the agreement to turn over the document to the United States. Syria's U.N. ambassador, Mikhail Wehbe, accused Colombian Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso of breaching council protocol by deciding that only the permanent five members would have access to the entire document. A number of senior administration officials were said to be unhappy at Friday's decision to give the inspectors first crack at the document, as suggested by UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix. Saturday morning, U.S. Ambassador John D.

Negroponte called Valdivieso to ask that the document be shared with the council's five permanent members.

A close U.S. ally that receives hundreds of millions of dollars in annual U.S. aid, Colombia also consulted with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. On Sunday night, U.S. diplomats accompanied Valdivieso to Blix's office to inform him of the decision.

*Lynch reported from the United Nations. Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32687-2002Dec9.html>

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New York Times  
December 10, 2002

## **U.S. Says Iraqi Indicated Atom Project Is Continuing**

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9 — The Bush administration today seized on an Iraqi general's admission over the weekend that his country had sought to build a nuclear weapon to argue that President Saddam Hussein had not given up his quest. At the same time, the administration conceded that it was reluctant to share with the United Nations some American-gathered intelligence about Iraqi arms programs.

Briefing reporters today, President Bush's spokesman, Ari Fleischer, said the comments on Sunday by Gen. Amir al-Saadi that "we haven't reached the final assembly of a bomb, nor tested it," proved Iraq's intentions.

General Saadi appeared to be speaking about a project that he contends was cut off during the Persian Gulf war in 1991, but his use of a present tense created some doubt.

The International Atomic Energy Agency removed all the weapons-grade nuclear material it knew about from Iraq in 1994. But the agency noted in February 1999 that Iraq had never provided key technical documents from those projects, or said how it had obtained nuclear plans and materials.

Speaking just as the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies were receiving the 12,000 pages of Iraqi declarations about its weapons, Mr. Fleischer said the United States would take its time in assessing the Iraqi declaration. But he added:

"In terms of overall Iraqi statements, you need only look at the wistful way that leading Iraqi generals describe how close they came to getting nuclear weapons. That's why the United States is skeptical of Iraqi intentions."

He added that the fact that Iraq "now for the first time has publicly talked so openly about how much it yearned to get nuclear weapons and how potentially close they came, gives reasons to pause and recognize that Iraq is a threat."

Yet Mr. Fleischer hewed close to the White House public line that the documents would be reviewed "in a very thoughtful, thorough and complete way." American officials are clearly concerned, foreign diplomats here say, that they are not viewed by other members of the Security Council as immediately dismissive of the Iraqi declaration.

But when pressed, Mr. Fleischer added, "The history of Iraq is unquestionably that they lie."

Asked about complaints from United Nations inspectors that the United States had not provided it with much intelligence about where to look for Iraqi weapons programs, Mr. Fleischer said the United States would cooperate. But he put limits on that cooperation. "We want to make sure that sources and methods are not compromised in any information that could be conveyed to the inspectors," he said.

The United States today began examining the first copy of the Iraqi declaration, and said it was sending copies, in turn, to Britain, France, China and Russia. The administration is calling in experts from many corners of the government to evaluate the declaration. The analysis, a senior administration official said, would be led by the C.I.A., but would also include the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, the national laboratories and the National Security Council.

Within a week or two, officials said, the White House will begin to assemble the preliminary conclusions of those agencies. "The decision," an official said, "is how to respond to what we find. With our own intel? With the last findings of the United Nations inspectors?"

Mr. Fleischer's comments about the limits of the administration's willingness to turn over intelligence to the inspectors came as senior Pentagon and military officials assembled a list of surveillance and reconnaissance craft whose findings could be offered to the United Nations inspectors to assist in their work, officials said today.

American officials are expected to meet with members of the inspection team in coming days to discuss the possible assistance. No formal request has been received from the team, officials said, and no formal offer of help has been made.

Satellites and high-flying surveillance aircraft have been gathering intelligence for years over much of Iraq, and the Predator, a pilotless aerial vehicle, has been operating in the no-flight zone of southern Iraq in recent weeks, officials said.

Any of those tools conceivably could be put to use to help the weapons inspectors, one official said.

"We'll be having those discussions, probably this week," a Pentagon official said. "It's still a question of them asking us. There has been no agreement."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/international/middleeast/10PREX.html>

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# Expanded U.N. Teams Pick Up Pace Of Site Visits But Lack Details From Iraq

By John F. Burns

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 9 — United Nations weapons inspectors picked up the pace today, sending the largest team of nuclear experts yet for a third inspection of Al Tuweitha, the giant nuclear complex south of Baghdad and the centerpiece of Iraq's atomic-bomb project until it was itself bombed by American aircraft in 1991 during Persian Gulf war.

The inspectors also examined two related nuclear sites and a sprawling military-industrial plant near Al Fallujah, 55 miles northwest of Baghdad, where they searched two chemical plants that played a part in Iraq's chemical weapons program in the 1980's and 90's, producing phenol and chlorine. Like Al Tuweitha, the so-called Fallujah II site was placed under monitoring during the previous inspections, from 1991 to 1998.

The current round began on Nov. 27 and ran into immediate criticism from the Bush administration, which said the effort was undermanned. Today, spokesmen for the inspections teams in Baghdad were keen to emphasize that more inspectors had been sent out than on any previous day, with five teams scouring Al Tuweitha alone.

The growing momentum was aided by the arrival of 25 inspectors on Sunday to join the 17 in the initial party. The experts are divided into two groups. One works for the main weapons-inspection agency, known as Unmovic, in searching biological, chemical and missile sites. The second consists of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency and is responsible for nuclear sites.

There are now 25 weapons inspectors and 17 nuclear inspectors here, with a checklist of more than 900 sites to cover.

By Christmas, the number of inspectors is to rise to about 100, and beyond that, early next year, to a maximum of 300.

On arrival here, officials leading the inspection teams said they thought the work could take up to a year. That view was affirmed today by Mohammed ElBaradei, director general of the atomic energy agency, who said on a visit to Tokyo that it could take a year to conclude whether Iraq still had any elements of a nuclear weapons program.

Leaders of inspection teams have said that if the United States wants quicker results, it should provide the teams with more intelligence information.

Until then, the teams are likely to spend much of their time going over old sites long since rendered useless by the destruction ordered by previous inspectors, by American and British bombing in 1991 and 1998, or by the Iraqis themselves. From their experience in the 1990's, the inspectors know that once a site goes onto an inspection list, it is often abandoned, with the work shifted elsewhere, usually under the name of a different ministry or a state-run company.

For the moment, the inspectors are working without the new blueprint provided by the 12,000-page declaration on its weapons projects that Iraq delivered on Saturday to the United Nations and the atomic energy agency. In that document Iraq repeated earlier claims that it has no banned weapons materials or programs of any kind.

Work began today on reviewing the declaration in New York and Vienna, the headquarters of the atomic energy agency. A spokesman for the inspectors in Iraq, Hiro Ueki, said there were only three copies — one for the Security Council, one for weapons inspection agency in New York and one for the atomic energy agency — and that no copy was available for the inspectors in Baghdad. "Don't hope for leaks from here," Mr. Ueki said.

Some American officials appear to have concluded that a disaffected Iraqi scientist or engineer or a defector constitutes the most likely breakthrough in proving that Iraq has lied in claiming that it has no banned weapons or projects.

The precedent commonly cited is Gen. Hussein Kamel, a minister of military industrialization and a son-in-law of President Saddam Hussein. General Kamel defected to Jordan in 1995 and told C.I.A. officials about a vast range of secret weapons programs. He was later lured back to Iraq and killed.

The pervasiveness of security controls in Iraq and the close watch kept on weapons experts and the officials who supervise them make defections extremely difficult, especially because of the risks of retaliation against relatives left behind. The new United Nations mandate attempts to overcome this by providing the inspectors with the authority to take scientists out of Iraq for questioning, with their families.

Gen. Amir al-Saadi, a senior adviser to Mr. Hussein, said on Sunday that it would be "up the individuals themselves" to decide whether they would agree to leave Iraq for questioning, but he declined to say whether he would go himself.

In practice, few inspectors seem to believe that taking Iraqi scientists abroad is practicable. Any scientist inclined to go would have to leave with his extended family before his intentions became known to Iraqi security police,

something that is highly unlikely in the authoritarian context of Mr. Hussein's Iraq. Another problem is that Iraq could plant agents who would provide inspectors with false information.

At Al Tuweitha today, another Iraqi scientist, Dr. Fayed al-Biraqdar, a senior nuclear official who has accompanied the inspectors on two tours of the complex in the past week, offered a foretaste of the kind of reaction the teams are likely to meet if they propose taking scientists abroad.

"Believe me, this is a silly thing," he said, according to a Reuters report. "They know everything, and they know that this is rubbish. But if they want to interview me, they can interview me any time they like."

Asked if he would agree to leave Iraq for an interview, he replied: "Definitely not. Why should I? Why should I? I am talking now freely. This is my country, my people, my family."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/international/middleeast/10BAGH.html>

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Moscow Times  
December 10, 2002  
Pg. 4

## Putin On Arms Treaty

MOSCOW (AP) -- President Vladimir Putin submitted the nuclear arms treaty he and U.S. President George W. Bush signed last spring to the State Duma on Saturday for ratification, the Kremlin said Monday.

The Kremlin press service said in a statement that the Duma would discuss the treaty in hearings shortly.

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Los Angeles Times  
December 9, 2002  
Pg. 1

## Atomic Lab Theft Rife, Pair Allege

By J.R. Moehringer, Times Staff Writer

LOS ALAMOS, N.M. -- A "culture of theft" at Los Alamos National Laboratory costs taxpayers millions of dollars each year and endangers national security, according to two investigators recently fired by the laboratory.

Glenn A. Walp and Steven Doran, both former police officers, say they were recruited by Los Alamos officials this year to investigate corruption at the lab, which houses the nation's nuclear secrets and monitors the quality of the nuclear arsenal.

But after finding far more corruption than Los Alamos officials suspected -- including hundreds of missing items that could prove valuable to terrorists or rogue nations -- the investigators were handed identical letters of dismissal Nov. 25 and escorted from the laboratory by armed guards.

While becoming yet another embarrassment for the famously troubled laboratory, the firings have sparked outcries in Congress and conspiracy charges in the public.

"They're going to rue the day they did this," said Pete Stockton, senior investigator with Project On Government Oversight, a nonprofit group that monitors waste and fraud in the federal government. "This ranks as one of the stupidest things I've ever seen an institution do."

Laboratory officials say the investigators were fired because their overly aggressive tactics and combative attitude alienated workers. But the investigators contend they were fired because their bosses cared less about safeguarding one of the nation's most important scientific and military sites than about protecting the image of the University of California, which runs Los Alamos for the Department of Energy.

Los Alamos officials acknowledge that the FBI and the Department of Energy are looking into several leads turned up by the fired investigators. Walp and Doran say those leads include glaring lapses in security -- such as one worker who tried to buy a \$30,000 customized Ford Mustang with laboratory money, and another who used her laboratory credit card to get \$2,500 in cash at a casino.

UC officials said Friday that they will urge the Energy Department to widen its inquiry into Los Alamos to include the firings. "We want them to address the assertion that [Walp and Doran] may have been fired in retaliation for [their] investigation," said Michael Reese, spokesman for UC President Richard Atkinson.



Los Alamos -- home in the 1940s to the Manhattan Project, the nation's historic nuclear weapons program -- has been sullied in recent years by a series of security breakdowns, including the disappearance in June 2000 of classified computer hard drives that later turned up behind a copy machine, and the December 1999 indictment of Wen Ho Lee, a former lab scientist accused of leaking nuclear secrets to China.

Although nearly all charges eventually were dropped against Lee, he was found to have removed secret data from the laboratory.

"Through the years there has been ingrained within the laboratory this culture of theft," said Walp, 61, former head of the Pennsylvania State Police who was hired to lead the internal security force at Los Alamos in January. "There is an attitude that [theft] is the price of doing business."

Los Alamos workers joke about theft increasing around the holidays, Walp said, because some fill out their Christmas lists with big-ticket items from the lab. "The problem isn't with scientists," Walp said. "They're just there doing their jobs. It's the middle people."

Soon after arriving at the laboratory, Walp wrote a damning report that estimated \$3 million in equipment had been stolen since 1999. Among the missing items were more than 260 computers -- some from the most sensitive areas of the laboratory, where nuclear weapons are designed.

The report, Walp said, only served to irritate his bosses, who often told him that his first loyalty was to the University of California, not the U.S. taxpayer.

Los Alamos spokesman Jim Danneskiold dismissed the charge that the facility is rife with corruption. "There is no culture of theft here," he said. "People do not walk out of here with property."

Danneskiold said roughly one-tenth of 1% of the lab's \$1-billion inventory disappears each year, far below the percentage that large retail stores deem acceptable. Many items that appear stolen, he said, are actually stored in some forgotten Quonset hut or World War II-era shed.

Los Alamos has more than 2,000 buildings on its 40-square-mile site, he said, and things get mislaid. However, he insisted, "there is no evidence that there is any classified information on computers reported as missing."

Although Walp and Doran considered themselves investigators, Danneskiold said, they had no "investigatory powers" and were hired to only gather information and act as "liaisons with law enforcement."

"The reason for terminating their employment was that they had lost the confidence of different officials they had to work with, both inside the laboratory and outside," Danneskiold said.

Doran and Walp, however, said it was absurd to expect them to retain the confidence of workers they were questioning. "It's the most screwed-up system you ever saw in your life," said Doran, 39, whom Walp hired at the laboratory in July. "The fox is watching the chicken house."

Doran also scoffed at the suggestion that missing items were merely misplaced. "One of the missing items was a 2-ton magnet," he said. "How ... do you lose a 2-ton magnet?"

Casual attitudes about missing inventory, Doran said, should raise serious doubts about the laboratory's overall mission. "If you see the way they handle their money and their property," Doran said, "what would lead you to believe they do any better with national security?"

Walp said he suspected that Los Alamos officials generally preferred a look-the-other-way policy when he learned that one worker caught stealing \$1,800 had been asked quietly to repay the money. There was no thought of prosecuting, Walp said, although such a theft of federal property was a felony.

The most shocking case of theft, Walp and Doran said, involved two workers with access to all top-secret areas. The workers allegedly went on a brazen spree, using lab purchase orders to acquire hundreds of items, including spy gear, for reasons that remain unknown.

"It's unbelievable," said Doran, a former Marine and ex-police chief in Idaho City, Idaho. "They bought camping equipment, backpacks, lock picks, beacons, radio equipment, high-speed digital cameras, \$9,000 worth of the best knives money can buy, tractors, lawn mowers, wood chippers, floor sanders, fencing, decks, carports, high-pressure washers, air conditioning units."

Also, the two workers stole cryogenic freezers, which Doran said could be useful to anyone developing biological weapons.

More frightening, Walp said, the two workers would have been easy prey for blackmailers hoping to gain entry to the laboratory.

"These guys had keys to everything," Walp said. "There wasn't any nook or cranny in the [restricted] Black Areas they didn't have access to. All it would take would be for somebody to walk up and say, 'I know what you're doing, and either you do this for me or I'm going to the cops.'"

"Did it happen? Probably not. Could it happen? Yes."

The two workers have been placed on paid leave, Los Alamos officials said, while the FBI investigates.

Doran called it unfair and insulting that workers suspected of felonies remain on paid leave, while he and Walp were summarily fired.

Also, Doran said, he and Walp received outstanding performance reviews just before being fired. Walp even got a \$5,000 bonus.

Both Walp and Doran have hired lawyers and may file a lawsuit.

They also may testify before Congress. A spokesman for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce said the firings have prompted grave concern among lawmakers, who likely will hold hearings soon and send a team of their own investigators to Los Alamos in the next few weeks.

"For some time now, the committee has been quietly looking into operations at Los Alamos," said Ken Johnson, spokesman for Rep. W.J. (Billy) Tauzin (R-La.), the committee chairman. "But these dramatic new developments clearly warrant full-scale congressional investigation.

"Frankly, the accusations are extraordinary, and we're determined to get to the bottom of this mess."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-alamos9dec09.story>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced document follows article.)

New York Times

December 11, 2002

## **U.S. Issues Warning to Foes in Arms Plan**

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10 — The Bush administration published a new strategy today on combatting weapons of mass destruction that included a statement, clearly directed at potential opponents like Iraq. Washington is prepared to "respond with all our options" if such weapons are used against American troops or allies.

The explicit warning was contained in a six-page, unclassified version of a new presidential document that outlines the administration's approach to countering and deterring the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It underscores a longstanding American policy, but officials acknowledged that it bears considerable resemblance to a private warning that Secretary of State James A. Baker III sent to Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, before the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

In a briefing today, a senior administration official said Mr. Bush has assigned many government agencies the task of enacting the new strategy. The official said the president was spending "considerable sums" on research into new counterproliferation strategies, beyond missile defense. But he offered no examples.

The strategy document said, using the initials for weapons of mass destruction: "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force — including through resort to all our options — to the use of W.M.D. against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."

That warning was not included in a similar strategy document issued by the Clinton administration in 1993. Mr. Clinton's approach relied chiefly on nonproliferation efforts, though at various times his administration repeated warnings that attacks using weapons of mass destruction would be met with overwhelming force.

The strategy revision published today and a longer classified version reflect Mr. Bush's reliance on counterproliferation, including missile defenses and, when necessary, pre-emptive strikes against states or groups whose weaponry could pose a threat to the United States. While nonproliferation relies on laws and treaties to restrain countries from producing weapons of mass destruction, counterproliferation relies on force or physical interdiction to stop them.

American officials pointed to the interdiction today of a North Korean ship carrying Scud missiles in the Arabian Sea as an example of a more aggressive counter-proliferation strategy.

Many of the details in the strategy, including state and local preparations for emergency response in case of a chemical or biological attack, are part of the post-Sept. 11 precautions that now seem familiar. The policy also calls for tighter controls on nuclear materials, better export controls, and the strengthening of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, one of the few international treaties that the administration has endorsed.

"What's new here is that we have a comprehensive strategy," the official said. "Every administration comes under criticism for not have an integrated strategy on issues like this. We do."

But that strategy makes no mention of the painful tradeoffs that the administration has already been forced to make to keep its coalition against terrorism together.

Pakistan, for example, has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and is widely believed by American intelligence agencies to have provided nuclear aid to North Korea. Yet the Bush administration lifted all nuclear-related economic sanctions against Pakistan when it needed the country's help pursuing leaders of Al Qaeda. The strategy document says that "because each of these regimes is different, we will pursue country-specific strategies that best enable us and our friends and allies to prevent, deter and defend against W.M.D. and missile threats."

Administration officials say the document has been in draft form for months, and they contend the timing of its release had no relationship to the growing confrontation with Iraq. One official noted that Mr. Baker's warning to Saddam Hussein had come "when hostilities were imminent," a point the United States has not yet reached. Nonetheless, the comparisons with the Baker letter are striking.

Mr. Baker recalled in his memoirs, "The Politics of Diplomacy," that in dealing with Iraq in the period leading up to the war in January 1991, "I purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation." (In fact, he said, President George H.W. Bush had decided not to retaliate with chemical or nuclear weapons if Mr. Hussein launched a chemical attack.)

"This is not a threat, it is a promise," Mr. Baker recalled saying. "If there is any use of weapons like that, our objective won't just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime."

The senior official who briefed reporters today said Mr. Hussein appeared to have understood the message, "and he didn't cross that line."

The current Bush administration has worried that deterring Mr. Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons may prove more difficult this time.

Mr. Bush has repeatedly stated that "regime change" is his goal. His aides have conceded in background conversations that, should Mr. Hussein fear for his own survival, he might be more tempted to reach for his most destructive weaponry.

Mr. Bush has specifically warned against that, and openly encouraged Iraqi generals not to act on any instructions from Mr. Hussein to use such weapons against American troops, Israel or other neighbors. The statement today, however, marks a more explicit version of that warning.

"The language speaks for itself," the senior official said, "and I think it does apply to any state that would use weapons of mass destruction against us."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/11/politics/11NUKE.html>

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## **National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction**

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>

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## **Preemptive Strikes Part Of U.S. Strategic Doctrine**

'All Options' Open for Countering Unconventional Arms

*By Mike Allen and Barton Gellman*

Washington Post Staff Writers

Wednesday, December 11, 2002; Page A01

A Bush administration strategy announced yesterday calls for the preemptive use of military and covert force before an enemy unleashes weapons of mass destruction, and underscores the United States's willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons for chemical or biological attacks on U.S. soil or against American troops overseas.

The strategy introduces a more aggressive approach to combating weapons of mass destruction, and it comes as the nation prepares for a possible war with Iraq.

A version of the strategy that was released by the White House said the United States will "respond with overwhelming force," including "all options," to the use of biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear weapons on the nation, its troops or its allies.

However, a classified version of the strategy goes even further: It breaks with 50 years of U.S. counterproliferation efforts by authorizing preemptive strikes on states and terrorist groups that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the long-range missiles capable of delivering them. The policy aims to prevent the transfer of weapons components or to destroy them before they can be assembled.

In a top-secret appendix, the directive names Iran, Syria, North Korea and Libya among the countries that are the central focus of the new U.S. approach. Administration officials said that does not imply that President Bush intends to use military force, covert or overt, in any of those countries. He is determined, they said, to stop transfers of weapons components in or out of their borders.

The policy sets out the practical ramifications of Bush's doctrine of preemption, contained in a national security strategy released in September, which turns away from the Cold War doctrine based on deterrence and containment. The preemption doctrine favors taking on hostile states before they can strike.

It broadens a warning that was made to Iraq on the eve of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. A letter from President George H.W. Bush promised "the strongest possible response" if Iraq were to use chemical and biological weapons against U.S. and allied troops.

But the new policy is more specific, detailing the consequences of an enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction. "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force -- including through resort to all of our options -- to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies," the document says.

The timing of the document's release yesterday sends an unmistakable message to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein about the potential consequences of using nonconventional weapons in a future war.

A senior administration official, briefing reporters on the new strategy, said those options include nuclear force. The official said the 1991 letter had its intended effect. "He [Hussein] didn't cross the line of using chemical or biological weapons," the official said. "The Iraqis have told us that they interpreted that letter as meaning that the United States would use nuclear weapons, and it was a powerful deterrent."

In the past, U.S. officials saw some advantage in keeping the world guessing about how the United States would respond to evidence that a country or a terrorist group was hiding weapons of mass destruction deep underground. And Bush administration officials were at pains yesterday to insist that there is nothing new in their formulation. Under Bush, however, Pentagon officials appear to have taken a step closer to the possible, limited use of nuclear weapons by pursuing new and more usable ones. A review of nuclear policy completed by defense officials a year ago put added emphasis on developing low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used to burrow deep into the earth and destroy underground complexes, including stores of chemical and biological arms. This has raised questions about whether the administration is lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons.

Officials deny that they are doing so. But they also argue that the strategic calculations necessary for combating terrorism and hostile nations must inherently be different from those used during the Cold War, when deterrence meant simply convincing the Soviets that the United States, if attacked, could and would wipe them out. Against today's new enemies, the administration has argued, it may be necessary to strike preemptively and with nuclear weapons that would keep fallout to a minimum.

The administration published a broader national security strategy in September, and the preparation of a separate policy on weapons of mass destruction reflects the seriousness with which the administration takes the threat of attacks from rogue states and terrorist organizations. "Every administration seems to come under criticism for not having a strategy," the official said.

The six-page strategy released by the White House yesterday was a declassified extract of a top secret directive signed by Bush in May after resolving interagency disputes dating to January. It is among the first major policy collaborations of the National Security Council and the new Homeland Security Council, whose chairman is Tom Ridge. The classified version is identified jointly as National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4.

The new strategy does not repudiate "traditional measures" of diplomacy, multinational arms control agreements and export controls. But in its classified form, and in the interagency process that drafted it, the directive is premised on a view that "traditional nonproliferation has failed, and now we're going into active interdiction," according to one participant who spoke without authority from the White House.

Active interdiction, the official said, "is physical -- it's disruption, it's destruction in any form, whether kinetic or cyber."

Explaining the new approach, one official gave the hypothetical scenario of a ship using the Philippines as a transshipment point for special weapons to Libya. "We're going to interdict or destroy or disrupt that shipment or, during the transloading process, it is going to mysteriously disappear," the official said.

The official spoke as Spanish special forces, with U.S. intelligence support, stopped a North Korean ship bound for Yemen with Scud missiles. In rare cases, previous presidents have mounted preemptive strikes against nonconventional weapons. Those episodes, including the August 1998 missile strike on an alleged Sudanese chemical weapons plant and the bombing of some targets in Iraq four months later, have generally come in retaliation for specific enemy attacks.

Bush hinted at the new approach in a Dec. 11, 2001, speech at the Citadel, speaking of active counterproliferation. By January, a draft of NSPD 17 was circulating in the State Department, the White House, the Defense Department and the intelligence agencies. State Department officials objected to some elements of the new approach but failed to carry the decision. The Homeland Security Office, represented by policy director Richard A. Falkenrath, interjected itself as jointly responsible for managing the consequences of a successful attack on the United States. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, according to one participant, objected in April to language that he believed commingled military and domestic lines of authority. Bush signed the draft unchanged in May. The intention, in theory, is not fundamentally new. The Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Directive 62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," had classified language that one former official summarized as: "If you think terrorists will get access to WMD, there is an extremely low threshold that the United States should act" militarily.

*Staff writer Bradley Graham contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36819-2002Dec10.html>

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Washington Post  
December 11, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **U.N. Sharpens Search For Iraqi Weapons**

### ***More Inspectors Arrive, Form Teams and Fan Out***

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 10 -- U.N. arms specialists ramped up their search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq today, augmenting their ranks to 70 inspectors and splitting into teams to conduct five simultaneous searches, including one of a remote uranium mine near the Syrian border.

The inspectors have become more assertive in their field visits over the past few days, breaking into small groups, moving in several directions and questioning Iraqi officials with a seemingly greater intensity, according to witnesses and Iraqis in charge of facilities that have been searched. A helicopter that will give the inspectors more mobility and greater ability to conduct surprise searches has arrived in Baghdad and should be operating this week, U.N. officials said.

As the high-stakes inspections entered their third week, 28 specialists from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, arrived here this afternoon aboard a U.N. cargo plane, joining seven of their colleagues and 20 experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency who landed on Sunday. The IAEA and UNMOVIC, which are sharing inspection duties, provided 15 inspectors and two team leaders, who have since left, for the first two weeks of field visits.

"We are deploying inspectors as fast as we can," said Hiro Ueki, a spokesman for the inspection operation. U.S. officials last week criticized the pace of inspections and urged UNMOVIC and the IAEA to quickly increase the staff here. The Bush administration also questioned the strategy of starting inspections at well-known sites that had been visited by previous inspectors. Behind the U.S. complaints lay a vow by President Bush to disarm Iraq by force if President Saddam Hussein's government fails to do so voluntarily and, more broadly, an administration goal of "regime change," or destruction of Hussein's rule.

U.N. officials said the increase over the past two days is not the result of the U.S. pressure, but of the fact that weapons experts from around the world -- summoned by UNMOVIC after a Security Council resolution on Nov. 8 -- have now reported for work. The presence of 70 inspectors and reports that more are on the way appear to put the United Nations on track to meet its goal of having 80 to 100 inspectors in Iraq by Christmas.

The experts visited 11 sites today, bringing the total number visited since inspections resumed Nov. 27 to more than 30. Several sites visited over the past few days, including today's visit to the Saddam Center for Biotechnology in Baghdad, have not been visited by previous inspectors.

Some of the sites, particularly the sprawling Tuwaitha nuclear installation, have required multiple visits. A team from the IAEA searched the heavily bombed facility, which stretches for several square miles and has scores of buildings, for the fourth time. They pursued a physical inventory of materials from Iraq's past nuclear program. Ueki said it likely would take two more days to complete the inventory.

Although the inspectors are working their way down a prearranged list of sites prepared by U.N. officials, Ueki said the contents of a voluminous arms declaration Iraq submitted over the weekend could shift the strategy. "After going through the declaration, they may make some adjustments to their inspection plans," he said.

Aside from an unannounced search of one of Hussein's palaces last week, the initial rounds of inspections have not prompted significant complaints here. In an interview published today in the weekly newspaper Rafidain, the chief Iraqi liaison to the inspections, Lt. Gen. Hussam Mohammed Amin, said Iraq is "satisfied with [the inspection process] so far because it is calm and professional."

Ueki said the inspectors still have not received a list of Iraqi scientists who have been involved in the country's nuclear, biological and chemical programs since the last inspectors left Iraq in 1998. The Security Council resolution requires Iraq to hand over such a list but does not specify a deadline.

The list is regarded by U.S. and U.N. officials as crucial in determining which scientists and weapons experts to interview. Bush administration officials have been pushing UNMOVIC to start conducting interviews soon, preferably by taking scientists and their families out of the country so they can speak freely.

The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said he has not formally asked Iraq to hand over such a list.

Diplomats at the United Nations said Blix is waiting to receive more intelligence from the United States and Britain before making a formal request.

Iraq's Foreign Ministry condemned a decision by the Security Council's rotating president to give one of the two copies of Iraq's nearly 12,000-page declaration to the United States. In a statement, the ministry accused the U.S. government of "practicing an unprecedented blackmail operation" and suggested that it would try to alter Iraq's submission.

"This American behavior aims at manipulating the documents of the United Nations in order to find a cover for aggression against Iraq," the statement said.

Hussein was shown on TV meeting with his war cabinet, which included top military commanders and his sons, Qusay and Uday. Qusay, wearing a light gray suit and sitting at his father's right, and Uday, in a blue Nehru jacket, were the only participants not wearing olive-green uniforms. "Your heads will remain high with honor, God willing," Hussein told the officers, "and your enemy will be defeated."

Among the 11 sites visited by the inspectors today was the Qaim phosphate complex, 240 miles northwest of Baghdad. The facility produced a type of refined uranium ore called "yellow cake" from 1984 to 1990 that played an important role in Iraq's nuclear program, which Iraqi officials say ended after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The facility was bombed during the war. Iraqi officials insist it no longer produces uranium. Ueki said a team of IAEA inspectors, which plans to continue the inspection at the plant on Wednesday, was verifying the status of destroyed equipment and trying to determine whether uranium extraction has resumed.

Other nuclear experts visited the Qaqaa explosives plant and the Furat chemical plant south of Baghdad. The Furat site was previously associated with Iraq's efforts to design and test gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37254-2002Dec10.html>

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Washington Times

December 11, 2002

Pg. 1

## **CIA Prepares Early Analysis On Iraq Report**

### ***Baghdad says U.S. will 'forge' pretext for war***

By Betsy Pisik and Nicholas Krlev, The Washington Times

The CIA, coordinating a rush effort by as many as eight U.S. agencies to translate and evaluate Iraq's 12,000-page weapons declaration, expects to deliver a preliminary assessment to the White House today, administration officials said.

U.N. inspectors and the other four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council were working independently to evaluate the massive report, with chief weapons inspector Hans Blix predicting an initial assessment by late next week.

Iraq yesterday charged that Washington would distort the document to provide the grounds for a military assault.

"This is unprecedented extortion in the history of the United Nations, when [the United States] forced the president of the Security Council to give it the original copy of Iraq's declaration," the Iraqi Foreign Ministry said in a statement faxed to news organizations.

After an intensive lobbying effort, the United States was given the original copy of the Iraqi report late Sunday, which is to be copied and distributed to other permanent members of the Security Council: Russia, France, China and Britain.

The United States, with large numbers of trained experts capable of translating some 500 pages of Arabic in the report, has rushed ahead in the race to determine whether it contains any new information.

"The CIA is working on it, and the analysis will obviously take time, but the agency will prepare a preliminary assessment tomorrow and will send it to the White House," an administration official said last night.

Another official said it may be a "few weeks" before the administration can complete a more detailed evaluation, comparing material in the declaration to U.S. intelligence findings.

Accusing Washington of "possibly forging what it wants to forge," the Iraqi statement said, "This American behavior aims to play with the United Nations' documents with the aim of finding a cover for aggression against Iraq."

A beefed-up U.N. inspection team meanwhile conducted its most widespread searches to date, visiting chemical and explosives facilities, veterinary-medicine institutes and uranium-mining operations near the Syrian border.

A total of 42 inspectors are now at work in Iraq and another 28 arrived yesterday, Mr. Blix said in New York. He said he expects to have 100 inspectors in place by the end of the month.

With high-speed photocopiers working overtime, the United States delivered copies of the Iraqi arms declaration to the French and British governments in Washington on Monday night. Russian and Chinese officials received their copies in New York yesterday morning.

The other 10 council members will have to wait at least until next week to receive sanitized copies, which will be edited by the U.N. inspection team to remove material that could help with the production of outlawed weapons.

The handling of the document has created bitterness among the 10 temporary members, who are elected to the Security Council for two-year terms, complicating the prospects for any future vote on military action.

Several ambassadors demanded at a closed-door luncheon with Mr. Blix yesterday that all 15 nations be involved in council decision-making from now on, according to a participant.

Syria had denounced the two-tier system earlier, and Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen yesterday protested the treatment of some members as "B-nations."

U.S. officials said the American copy of the report was distributed yesterday morning to counterproliferation, linguistic and weapons experts at the CIA, with some parts sent to weapons experts at other agencies.

"We've got lots of translators, analysts, experts. Every agency in the U.S. government has a role," said one U.S. official, who like others spoke on the condition that he not be identified. "The CIA is in charge. There must be six or eight agencies involved."

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the U.S. analysis would be deliberate and careful in order to "understand what it is that Iraq is purporting to declare, as well as what they have failed to declare."

One source said he had been told to expect little new information in the declaration and that Iraq appeared to have simply pieced together a number of previous declarations.

In New York, Mr. Blix said after his luncheon with the Security Council members that he expects to have a working version of the arms declaration translated by Monday, and will complete a preliminary assessment of its substance by Dec. 19.

He declined to characterize the accuracy or usefulness of the report until then. So far, he said, his experts are mostly focusing on editing out information that might aid the spread of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Blix and several council members said yesterday that they expect the sanitized version of the declaration to be distributed to the full council by early next week.

"The bottleneck, frankly, is translation. We have about 500 pages in Arabic which need to be translated," he said.

Mr. Blix, who oversees the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, said his office had already begun to coordinate efforts with experts from some of the five permanent council nations.

"We have asked the P-5, who have the experts on proliferation-sensitive matters, to advise us by Friday," he said.

"We are willing to share with them our conclusions."

*Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20021211-16072764.htm>

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New York Times  
December 11, 2002

## Scud Missiles Found on North Korean Ship

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10 — A North Korean cargo vessel flying no flag was halted on Monday in the Gulf of Aden by two Spanish warships, and a search revealed Scud missiles hidden beneath sacks of cement, senior administration and Pentagon officials said today.

American military explosives experts were summoned, and the ordnance crews were still working tonight to identify and tally the contraband cargo and to stabilize any explosive warheads or volatile missile fuel, officials said. The ship, which a senior administration official said had been tracked by American intelligence "all the way out" from North Korea, appeared to be heading for Yemen when it was stopped by the two Spanish warships an estimated 600 miles off the Yemeni coast.

But administration and Pentagon officials said it was not known whether the ultimate destination was Yemen, where the government has already deployed Scud missiles, some other nation in the region, or a private buyer like a militant group.

Late tonight, American intelligence officials said there was no clear link between Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups and the North Korean ship.

North Korea recently disclosed that it has a program to make nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium, in violation of its international agreements, but the United States has taken pains to defuse any sense that it is planning an immediate confrontation over the issue. That policy is in contrast to the administration's approach with Iraq, where the Bush administration has threatened military action to disarm President Saddam Hussein if he does not voluntarily dispose of any weapons of mass destruction.

The administration's complicated diplomatic and military relations throughout the region could be made even more difficult if and when it is determined who the customer was for the cargo, an arsenal that one official said was about a dozen Scud missiles. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration has been rewarding nations that have supported the American counterterrorism effort, coaxing some to join the campaign, and threatening others — in particular Iraq — that are believed to possess weapons of mass destruction or to be supporting terrorist networks.

"We believe this cargo vessel was headed for Yemen," one official said. "But we don't know if the intended customer was the Yemeni government, Iraq, Al Qaeda or somebody else." The Spanish warships, the Navarra and the Patino, were part of a seaborne operation initially established to halt Qaeda supporters who might be fleeing the war in Afghanistan. The Navarra signaled for the cargo ship to halt but it "did not cooperate," one Pentagon official said. "It took evasive maneuvers. It tried by all means to avoid inspection."

Warning shots were fired, officials said, and the cargo ship, whose seizure was first reported today by CNN, was cut off by the two warships and was boarded by Spanish crews.

The ship's manifest said it was carrying 40,000 sacks of cement, an official said. But a search found 20 containers, each about 20 feet by 40 feet, that were covered with sacks of cement. After clearing the sacks and discovering signs of a high-tech arsenal, the Spanish captain signaled for American explosives experts, who are expected to file a more thorough report after they complete their work, perhaps by Wednesday.

"Do you have whole missiles, or just pieces — we're not sure yet," one official said.

Pentagon officials said the Spanish warships had full legal rights to stop the ship because it was not flying a flag and its official markings were covered by paint. "It appeared as a lawless, stateless vessel," one official said.

Administration officials have said that North Korea is one of the largest proliferators of missile technology. Its customers have included Pakistan — which supplied nuclear technology in return, administration officials say — and Iran and Yemen. North Korea has sold Pakistan not only Scuds, which are shorter-range tactical missiles, but also longer-range Nodongs.

An international agreement, called the Missile Technology Control Regime, was intended to prevent the spread of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, but North Korea has not signed the pact.

In August, the Bush administration imposed sanctions against North Korea after officials concluded that it sold Scud missile components to Yemen before President Bush took office.

According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif., Yemen has 18 Scud-B missiles and used a small number of them in its civil war in 1994.

Iraq also fired Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Persian Gulf war in 1991, and should President Bush order the United States to war in order to disarm President Saddam Hussein, eliminating any Scud threat will be a critical early priority.



After the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa became an important hub for military planners. The United States and its allies, worried that Qaeda fighters would flee Afghanistan for Yemen's interior, Somalia or other lawless regions, organized the patrols in the Arabian Sea and adjoining waters. About 10 countries have provided vessels to the effort, and more than 30 ships are on patrol at all times, Pentagon officials said.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is touring the region this week to meet with American forces who have been sent there and to thank host governments for their support.

American intelligence officials said the Scuds appeared to be destined for a nation in the region, several of which already deploy them.

"Some people would like to rule out Iraq, others do not want to rule out Iraq," one administration official said.

"Yemen has Scuds. We don't really know right now where this was going."

The Scud is based on a Soviet-era design for a tactical surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 390 miles. It is not highly accurate, and of less military utility when armed with conventional explosives. Even so, a Scud killed dozens of American soldiers at a barracks near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991.

But Scuds can be armed with more lethal warheads of chemical or biological weapons, which do not require the same accuracy to perform their mission.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/11/international/asia/11MISS.html>

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New York Times  
December 11, 2002

## **U.N. Official Won't Reveal Iraq Suppliers To The Public**

By Julia Preston

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 10 — Hans Blix, a chief of the weapons team here, told the Security Council today that he was not going to release the names of foreign arms suppliers that Iraq has listed in its weapons declaration because they could be valuable to United Nations inspectors as sources of information about Baghdad's programs. Mr. Blix confirmed to the Council that there appeared to be bomb recipes in the hundreds of pages detailing Iraq's secret nuclear program, which was discovered by inspectors in 1991 and deactivated. He said he would identify by Friday any passages in the vast document that must be screened out before it can be distributed to the full Council. Iraq delivered the report, required under Resolution 1441, to inspectors in Baghdad on Saturday night.

A 300-page section of the declaration, describing industrial facilities in Iraq where there could have been nuclear activity after 1991, includes much new information that analysts have to scrutinize carefully, he said.

Mr. Blix briefed the 15 Council nations over lunch today with Secretary General Kofi Annan. On Sunday, all of them except Syria agreed to allow the five permanent members, which are all nuclear powers, to examine the declaration immediately, before the 10 rotating members, none of which are nuclear powers.

In Washington, London and Paris today, experts plunged into the trove of documents and CD-ROM's, after agreeing to assist Mr. Blix in detecting information that could be used to make an illegal weapon. Russian and Chinese diplomats said that their copies of the declaration were only just arriving today in Moscow and Beijing.

Mr. Blix turned the tables today on the United States and other permanent members, saying he wanted to receive by Friday their assessments of the information that had to be filtered out of the documents. Up to now, the Bush administration, echoed by Britain, has been vocal in its complaints that Mr. Blix is moving too slowly with his inspections.

Both Russia and China said they doubted that they would have their assessments ready by Friday.

Mr. Blix said he wanted to give the filtered declaration to all 15 Council members on Monday. As soon as the declaration is so widely distributed, it is certain to leak out and become public.

Mr. Blix, the chairman of the United Nations chemical and biological weapons team, explained that he would, at least initially, remove the suppliers' names from the document that will be made public because inspectors found in the past that suppliers could provide vital information about what Baghdad was buying and where.

If the inspectors "were to give the names publicly, then they would never get another foreign supplier to give them any information," he said after the Council session.

Diplomats have indicated that disclosing the suppliers could be embarrassing to several nations, even perhaps the United States, which provided arms to Iraq during its long war with Iran in the 1980's.

Mr. Blix said he would abide by whatever the Council ultimately decided about the suppliers. The plan is for Mr. Blix's team and the International Atomic Energy Agency to keep the risky information confidential.

Mr. Blix said the most important part of the declaration is contained in 3,000 of its 12,000 pages, about 500 of which are in Arabic and must be translated.

Weapons analysts here will not even begin to assess the far more interesting issue of the accuracy of the declaration until next week. Mr. Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the atomic energy agency, will give their first evaluation to the Council Nov. 19.

A senior Mexican official sought today to clarify remarks by Mexican diplomats here that indicated they were reluctant to back the United States plan to have Washington and the other permanent members see the declaration first.

The official said that Jorge G. Castañeda, the foreign minister, had in fact proposed to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that Colombia, which holds the Council presidency this month, should decide whether to turn over the declaration to Washington on behalf of the nonpermanent members.

Mr. Castañeda also talked to Mr. Blix on Saturday to make sure he agreed, the official said.

"We have nobody in the whole country that can go through this declaration in three days and see if there are weapons cookbooks in there," the official said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/11/international/middleeast/11NATI.html>

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Washington Times  
December 11, 2002  
Pg. 12

## **Iraq's Arms In '91 Confirmed**

### ***General says Saddam was close to having nuclear bomb***

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

President Bush's recent declaration that Iraq was close to making a nuclear bomb in 1991 has been bolstered by an unlikely source — Baghdad.

A key architect of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs has told reporters his quest for a nuclear bomb was nearly achieved when allied planes struck in January 1991, destroying much of the country's weapons-making facilities.

The statement of Iraqi Gen. Amar al Saadi also conflicts somewhat with the last assessment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which downplayed reports that Baghdad nearly built the bomb.

Gen. Saadi, a London-educated chemical engineer and top weapons adviser to Saddam Hussein, strongly suggested Iraq's well-funded nuclear weapons programs was close to a bomb in 1991. It marked the first public confession from a member of Saddam's inner-circle that the hard-line regime was bent on becoming a nuclear power.

"We haven't reached the final assembly of a bomb nor tested it," Gen. Saadi said, suggesting key components were ready for assembly. "So if you want to follow that, there's no guarantee that you would succeed. We don't know. It's for others to judge. It's for the IAEA to judge how close we were."

Then, in a bit of bravado that leads some Pentagon officials to believe Iraq deceived IAEA inspectors before 1991, Gen. Saadi said, "If I tell you we were close, it is maybe promotional."

In a press conference Sunday in Baghdad to explain Iraq's 12,000-page weapons declaration, Gen. Saadi said bomb makers had reached the point where triggers for a bomb were being made. He referred to one facility where the "final shaping of the device" was under way.

"Now, in the nuclear jargon, device is the — it's the bomb," he said.

Iraq's lengthy declaration, which reached the United Nations on Sunday night and is now being analyzed by U.S. weapons experts, contains 2,081 pages on Iraq's nuclear quest.

In a sense, Gen. Saadi's statement that Iraq came so close, but failed to build the bomb, shows how effective the Desert Storm air campaign was in destroying bomb-making sites. The allies further disrupted the program with the defections of key Iraqi scientists, who led the Vienna, Austria-based IAEA to secret caches thought safe by Gen. Saadi's department.

"The intelligence community is often well behind estimating when a country will have nuclear weapons and this appears to be another one," said a Pentagon official.

The CIA's latest assessment of Iraq's weapons program said that after Saddam's troops invaded Kuwait in 1991 he commenced a rush program to divert highly enriched uranium from nuclear reactors to hasten construction of a bomb. But Iraq only had a few months before the allies began the air campaign and the task was not completed. "In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear program — unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments," the CIA said in October.

Mr. Bush often cites Iraq's desire to own nuclear weapons as a key reason to disarm the country.

He misstated one fact in September when he asserted that the IAEA's 1998 report said Iraq was six months away from the bomb. "I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied — finally denied access [in 1998], a report came out of the Atomic — the IAEA — that they were six months away from developing a weapon."

Mark Gwozdecky, the agency's chief spokesman, later rebutted those remarks. "There's never been a report like that issued from this agency," he said.

But Iraqi Gen. Saadi's assessment on Sunday seems to support Mr. Bush's contention that Iraq was dangerously close in 1991 and could reach that point again, absent intense international scrutiny.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021211-68416665.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

December 11, 2002

Pg. 1

## **U.S. Wants Iraqi Scientists Questioned**

***Officials push a plan for U.N. inspectors to summon arms experts alone and in groups, in hopes that a few will divulge secrets.***

By Robin Wright, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- The United States, in a bid to keep Saddam Hussein guessing, has proposed that U.N. inspectors adopt a strategy of summoning key Iraqi scientists individually and in groups of as large as 50 to multiple interviews both in and outside Iraq, Bush administration officials said Tuesday.

The goal is to get to at least five or six key specialists in each of the four categories of Iraq's alleged arms programs — nuclear, chemical weapons, biological weapons and ballistic missiles — to obtain detailed evidence to the United Nations about Baghdad's arsenal.

Discussions between the U.S. and the U.N. about the plan are continuing, particularly about how to persuade the scientists to take the multiple risks involved in revealing military secrets. The U.S. is seeking to protect the scientists, engineers and technicians from retaliation by confusing Hussein's regime about whom or what the United Nations is after, U.S. officials say.

The Bush administration hopes that the scientists will produce enough corroborating information to convince the international community that Iraq is still hiding weapons systems — even if the U.N. team is unable to verify that in its site inspections, administration officials said. The White House insists that Iraq is still pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq insists that it is not.

The United States has identified more than 500 specialists from an estimated 18,000 scientists, engineers and technicians who have worked on Iraq's deadliest weapons during the last two decades, the sources said.

The strategy for interviewing them reflects concern among several senior U.S. officials that a major break appears unlikely within the next three to four months — Washington's preferred time frame for a denouement in the inspections.

"Now that the Iraqi declaration is in, the scientists will become a hugely important tool," said a senior State Department official who requested anonymity.

The hardest part, officials say, will be getting the first scientist to agree to talk. "We're looking for that one person who will deliver the chicken farm. We're looking for one string to pull so we can begin to unravel the whole thing," the State Department official said.

"Chicken farm" refers to the 1995 defection of Hussein's son-in-law, an event that led to the discovery of a chicken farm with several containers full of hidden Iraqi arms documents — the most important discovery in the U.N.'s disarmament effort. The son-in-law was later lured back to Iraq and killed.

The U.S.-generated plan underscores a growing awareness that getting Iraqi scientists to talk will be far more difficult than it appears, according to former U.N. inspectors, Iraqi defectors and U.S. officials. The Iraqi regime has such a tight hold on its arms experts that there has not been a major defection by a top scientist since 1994 or by a top official involved in the weapons industry since 1995, according to other Iraqi defectors and former U.N. arms inspectors.

Many Iraqi specialists would be willing to talk, said Khaidar Hamza, who worked on Iraq's nuclear program and defected in 1994. "The majority of scientists don't like the government or the thuggish family running the country, confiscating property, enriching themselves, restricting movement, threatening their families," Hamza said. Yet waiting for scientists or engineers to approach the U.N. teams will be "waiting for the impossible," said David Albright, a former nuclear inspector in Iraq who now is president of the Institute for Science and International Security.

"No one will volunteer due to the fear of consequences," added Martin Indyk, who dealt with Iraqi defectors while on the Clinton administration's National Security Council.

In the early 1990s, two Iraqi arms specialists slipped notes to U.N. inspectors offering to talk, but nothing came of either case.

But any attempt by Baghdad to block access — or to say arms specialists are not available, have retired, are dead or cannot be found — will amount to a material breach of the U.N. resolution authorizing inspections, U.S. officials are already warning.

"If anyone should show up black or blue, that would also be seen as a sign of poor Iraqi cooperation," the State Department official said.

An 11,807-page arms declaration that Iraq handed over to inspectors over the weekend is supposed to provide a full list of all personnel involved in the various programs.

Speed will be essential once scientists are interviewed because Hussein's regime has long had a team in place, headed by Hussein's son Qusai, to move research, clean up development facilities or eliminate evidence after past defections, according to former defectors, former inspectors and former U.S. officials.

"Getting a defector would be the best source of information, but you'd have to get a defector and act within 24 to 48 hours, go to that facility before it can be sanitized — and that's very hard," said Kenneth Pollack, an Iraq specialist on the National Security Council during both the Clinton and current administrations.

The administration is particularly sensitive to fears among Iraqis that they might be seen as selling out their country, particularly if American intelligence runs the program, U.S. officials and former inspectors say. Working with the United Nations, on the other hand, would allow them to appear to be part of an international effort to save Iraq.

"Iraqi scientists are not going to go to the CIA. If they do, they're done as Iraqis. They might as well just plan to move to Detroit and open a 7-Eleven. Those who believe in Iraq and want to help in a post-Saddam Iraq will want to go to the U.N. and be able to say they didn't betray their country," said one well-placed U.S. official who requested anonymity.

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice heads a team working on a plan to expedite the process of "finding who knows where the skeletons are buried" while winning U.N. agreement to the plan, he added.

Last week, chief U.N. inspector Hans Blix warned that he didn't want to become a "defection agency," although U.S. officials say that Blix generally agrees on the importance of questioning scientists and other potential human resources in Iraq.

To keep the plan from appearing to be a CIA-run operation, the Bush administration is urging the U.N. to organize a cadre of arms specialists from around the world to do the interviews. In the past, the CIA has debriefed most Iraqi defectors.

Countries mentioned by U.S. officials include Australia, which has many specialists on chemical weapons; Central European nations that developed major arms industries during the Cold War; and India, which has a nuclear program.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-scientists11dec11.story>

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# U.N. still awaits list of scientists Inspectors asked Iraq last month for names of weapons officials

By Vivienne Walt, USA Today

BAGHDAD, Iraq — Iraqi officials have yet to hand over a list of the country's weapons scientists to U.N. monitors, even though the United Nations asked them to do so two weeks ago.

"We are still waiting for the list of names," said Hiro Ueki, spokesman for the U.N. weapons inspectors.

Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix asked Iraqi officials last month to name scientists who could be interviewed by his staff. Experts say the scientists will ultimately prove to be one of the richest sources of information about Iraq's suspected mass-destruction weapons.

The United Nations is downplaying the significance of the delay. "Cooperation has to be judged over time," Ueki said. "It is only the beginning of the process."

When weapons inspectors were last in Baghdad, they did not ask to talk to Iraqi scientists or other officials. But they received critical information from two scientists who had defected after the Gulf War in 1991.

Under a U.N. Security Council resolution passed unanimously last month, Iraq is obliged to name its weapons scientists and allow U.N. inspectors to interview them. But the resolution has no deadline for providing the list. No U.N. staff member has been dispatched to Baghdad to interview scientists, according to Ueki. He said even known Iraqi weapons officials had not yet been interviewed.

The U.N. inspectors resumed their hunt for Iraq's suspected chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and long-range missiles Nov. 27, nearly four years after they were withdrawn from the country ahead of U.S. and British bombing attacks.

This week, CIA and White House officials began to review a 12,000-page document Iraq provided to the United Nations. Iraqi officials said the document provides proof that it is not creating weapons of mass destruction. The United States received a copy of the document shortly after it was turned over to the United Nations. The United States said it would share the document with Russia, Britain, France and China, the other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Iraq accused Washington of using "unprecedented blackmail" to get a copy of the declaration.

In private meetings last weekend, Secretary of State Colin Powell and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte persuaded Alfonso Valdivieso, the Security Council president and Colombian ambassador to the United Nations, to turn the declaration over to U.S. officials first.

The Iraqi statement said the action proves the United States is bent on going to war no matter what inspectors find. "This American behavior aims at manipulating United Nations documents to find cover for aggression against Iraq," the statement said.

Under pressure from Washington to work faster, the inspectors continued to increase their workload. Tuesday, they visited 10 locations. The daily average before Tuesday was two visits. U.N. nuclear scientists paid their fourth visit to Iraq's biggest atomic research and production facility, Al-Tuwaitha.

The United Nations has been increasing the number of inspectors in Iraq since they arrived last month. About 25 inspectors landed in Baghdad on Tuesday, increasing the number to more than 60. U.N. officials say they hope helicopters will further speed up their work, though six requested aircraft have yet to arrive.

The helicopters are needed to transport teams to remote areas. Ueki said Tuesday that the order for the aircraft was delayed by the U.N. purchasing system. He said the monitoring commission has plenty of money because its funds have not been used since the inspectors left Iraq in 1998. The United Nations plans to open two field offices for inspectors in northern and southern Iraq, though Ueki could not specify when they would be operating.

Meanwhile, a U.S. F-16 bombed an anti-aircraft missile system that Iraqis moved into the no-fly zone in southern Iraq on Tuesday, according to U.S. Central Command. The no-fly zones, established after the Gulf War, are forbidden to Iraqi aircraft. The zones were set up to protect Kurds and Shiite Muslims, members of Iraqi opposition groups, from attack. Allied strikes have accelerated in recent weeks.

*Contributing: Bill Nichols in Washington*

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20021211/4690873s.htm>

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## **Chinese General Told Threat Against U.S. Unacceptable**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The White House told a visiting Chinese general yesterday that comments he made in 1995 suggesting China would use nuclear weapons against Los Angeles were unacceptable.

The discussion came during a meeting between Chinese Lt. Gen. Xiong Guankai, deputy chief of staff for intelligence, and White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

The meeting was part of the appeal by the Bush administration to warn China against making further nuclear threats and to make clear to Gen. Xiong that China should not miscalculate in thinking it could win an arms race with Taiwan, or that it could coerce the island into reunification.

An additional message for the general was that Chinese help in getting North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program is important to U.S.-Chinese relations.

Gen. Xiong is in Washington with a delegation of Chinese officials who met Monday at the Pentagon with defense officials as part of a strategic dialogue that had been put on hold after last year's aerial collision between a Chinese jet and U.S. EP-3E spy plane.

Miss Rice "chose to meet with Gen. Xiong to underscore our view of international security and particularly the issue of Taiwan," a senior administration official said of the meeting.

Other administration officials said plans for the meeting sparked a dispute among officials on the National Security Council staff who opposed the meeting because it would be viewed as rewarding a foreign general who threatened to attack the United States.

Gen. Xiong told former defense official Charles Freeman in 1995 that the United States would not come to Taiwan's defense in any conflict with China because it "cared more about Los Angeles than Taipei," the Taiwanese capital. The remark was reported to the White House at the time as a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against the United States.

Miss Rice and two aides met with Gen. Xiong and three other Chinese military officials in her office at the White House West Wing.

"She stressed that the United States does not support Taiwan independence but that we have the means and will to meet our commitments to Taipei," the senior official said.

Miss Rice also told Gen. Xiong that the administration is committed to its obligations under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for the United States to meet Taiwan's defensive needs.

The Bush administration announced last year it was selling guided missile destroyers and submarines to Taiwan to bolster its forces against China's military buildup, especially of short-range missiles.

Miss Rice also said that "any differences must be resolved peacefully and without resort to force or coercion," the official said.

She said "there is no justification for the continued buildup of Chinese missiles along the Taiwan Strait," the official said, noting that "it is the Chinese buildup of missiles and other forces that increases tensions in the region."

"And we believe that enhancing peace and stability in the region should be begun with the end, and then the reversal of this buildup," the official said.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin suggested to President Bush in Crawford, Texas, in October that China would be willing to reduce the missile deployments opposite Taiwan if the United States curbed arms sales to Taiwan.

U.S. officials said the offer was an informal suggestion rather than a serious proposal.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021211-27417625.htm>

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## **Mustard Agent Stockpile To Be Disposed Of Faster**

*Officials OK destroying chemical without robotics*

By Joe Nawrozki, Sun Staff

State environmental officials approved yesterday a slight change in the accelerated plan to dispose of the mustard agent stockpile at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

The [Maryland Department of the Environment](#) issued the permit modification to the operators of the Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, where 1,623 tons of the agent will be destroyed by next September.

Officials hastened the destruction of the agent, stored in metal containers on the sprawling Harford County military installation, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The agent - a banned, carcinogenic chemical weapon that blisters the skin, eyes and lungs - is not paired with explosives, fuses or other devices that could detonate it.

Jeff Lindblad, spokesman for the facility, said the MDE gave the Army the go-ahead to remove the toxic material manually, rather than with robotics, through an enclosed containment portion of the plant.

"There is no change in the technology," Lindblad said, "but what we will be doing is skipping a step in the process of destroying the mustard agent."

Lindblad said the accelerated destruction will begin in March. Before the mustard agent is destroyed, state officials will test the disposal facility's design and operational procedures.

"The thinking after 9/11 was to quicken the destruction process by two years because the agent is stored in one location," Lindblad said. Officials have refused to tell area residents and others where the nearly 2,000 steel canisters of mustard agent are stored.

The agent is normally in a thick, molasses-like state. It freezes at 51 degrees and becomes more stable in storage. The emptied containers will be decontaminated by September 2004, state officials said.

Lindblad said mustard agent is neutralized by vigorously mixing it with hot water and a caustic solution.

Hydrolysate is the byproduct of that process.

Chemical giant DuPont has signed a \$30 million contract to remove the byproduct from APG to the company's Chambers Works plant in Deepwater, N.J., where it will be treated using bacteria-filled sludge.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.apg11dec11.story>

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New York Times  
December 11, 2002

## **Still Suffering From '88 Gas Attack, A Village Distrusts Iraq's Arms Report**

By C. J. Chivers

HALABJA, Iraq, Dec. 10 — Hamida Hassan shivered on a hospital mattress, knees drawn up near her ribs. She suppressed another cough, stretched herself to full length and gestured to doctors to undo her clothes.

"I am just a woman," she said. "No one will believe my words. But if you see my body you will know whether Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons or not."

Slowly doctors pulled away her robe. Ruined skin appeared: a white crosshatch of grafts over her collarbone and shoulders, giving way to disfigured breasts and scars across her navel and waist. Doctors say her lungs are also scarred.

Ms. Hassan, now a chronic hospital patient at age 32, was struck with what was believed to be mustard gas when the Iraqi Air Force attacked this village in 1988.

She has not seen the Iraqi government's declaration to the United Nations about its weapons of mass destruction, but she is certain of what it contains. "Saddam Hussein is lying," she said in her cold hospital room. "He is telling the world lies."

As the United Nations reviews the 12,000-page Iraqi disclosure of its prohibited weapons and missile programs, the declaration in which Baghdad claims to have no such weapons anymore, the people of Halabja have already reached a conclusion. They talk about it as if it were a book of nonsense.

Their verdict comes from experience. Halabja has the ignoble fame of being synonymous with chemical attack. Its name also recalls a bald official lie.

On March 16, 1988, waves of Iraqi warplanes dropped gas canisters in this Kurdish village of roughly 50,000 people, bathing neighborhoods in what is believed to have been a misty cocktail of nerve and blister agents — sarin, tabun, mustard, VX — and perhaps the biological agent aflatoxin as well. Before nightfall the dead littered basements and the streets, and a grotesque human exodus was stumbling away.

The survivors remember the response of President Hussein's spokesmen when news of the attack reached the outside world. They blamed Iran.

Mr. Hussein's government finally admitted the truth last week, but 14 years later, in a land isolated by sanctions and geography, there has still been no precise survey of the aftermath. Estimates of the dead range from 3,200 to 7,000. An additional 15,000 to 20,000 people were injured, Kurdish doctors say.

Survivors suffer from a range of afflictions that a study by Kurdish doctors says occur in higher rates in Halabja than in neighboring cities: tremors, atrophy, respiratory ailments, reproductive failure, skin diseases, mental illness and blindness. They are alike in a simple way.

"One thing all of us know, and that is never believe Saddam Hussein," said Hussein Star, 45, whose face and crown were spotted with pink burns after mustard agent settled on his head. When Mr. Star removes his turban to expose where his hair was seared away, he looks as if he has been scalped.

Halabja is in Iraq's northern autonomous zone and is controlled by Kurds, not by Mr. Hussein. In 1988 it had the misfortune of being along the front line separating Iran and Iraq, who were in the eighth and final year of a war. Kurds believe that they were attacked because they were suspected of assisting Iran.

But no one outside Iraq's central government is certain of the rationale even now. Dr. Fouad Baban, an Iraqi Kurd who has studied the victims, identified 250 villages and 31 suspected bases of Kurdish guerrillas that Iraq gassed in 1987 and 1988. Some were far from Iran.

Still, none had a toll as high as Halabja's, where signs of the suffering remain in every direction: here a darkened eye, there a scorched limb, in the other room hacking coughs from a man with involuntary shakes. Bitterness is common currency.

"We live in a bad psychological state," said Abdulrahman Ali Muhammad, 62, whose hands and forearms are burned and whose limbs tremble. "We are angry. We are filled with hate. We have too many wants."

Aras Abid Akram, who lost 22 family members, offered a widespread feeling. "We, the people of Halabja, wish death upon Saddam Hussein," he said.

Each household has a tale of loss. Aqlima Muhammad embraced her 5-month-old son, Sarkher, as the attack began. She woke up 15 days later in Tehran, her left eye blinded, her skin aflame.

Sarkher was gone. He has never been found. The only trace of her husband is a photograph taken by the Red Crescent Society in an Iranian morgue. "Of course Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons," she said. "If he didn't want to have chemical weapons, what happened to me?"

These are connoisseurs of Iraqi lies. They remember not only how Mr. Hussein's government blamed Iran for gassing Halabja, but also how Iraqi generals offered amnesty to villagers who came home after other attacks and then arrested the first waves of returnees, who have never been seen again.

They listened with knowing disgust when the Kurdish news media reported on Monday that Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, one of Mr. Hussein's longest serving confidants, admitted for the first time that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran, and in Halabja.

The judgment here was that it was an insincere gesture to try to convince the United Nations that Iraq had changed its ways. The villagers did not need Mr. Aziz to tell them what happened. "We saw by our own eyes," said Muhammad Amin Khadir, 51. "We were in our basement, underground, and when we looked outside we saw the colored clouds, yellow and bluish-gray."

As Mr. Khadir spoke, one of his adult sons, Abdullah, sat cross-legged beside him, wearing a Tweety Bird sweatshirt, picking his toes.

Mr. Khadir gently kneaded his son's shoulder. "He cannot speak even a word," he said. "Now he is a mute, and mentally ill. He was very good as a boy, very smart. But after the chemical bombs he became this way. Today he is 25, and he is less than a child."

Abdullah didn't seem to hear a thing. "Look at my son," Mr. Khadir said. "Nobody should believe Saddam Hussein. Nobody, not in all the world."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/11/international/middleeast/11KURD.html>

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## **Israel Vaccinates Soldiers and Health Workers**

By **JUDITH MILLER**

TEL AVIV, Dec. 7 — Israel has successfully vaccinated more than 15,000 soldiers and public health workers against smallpox on a voluntary basis since July with virtually no severe side effects, senior Israeli officials say.



In interviews, Israeli military and public health officials said the immunizations had been carried out under a crash program to protect the country from a possible Iraqi attack with smallpox or other lethal germs. As a result, thousands of the country's public health professionals are now prepared to immunize the entire country against the deadly virus within four days should a single smallpox case be diagnosed anywhere in the world.

The Israeli experience has encouraged vaccination advocates in the Bush administration, which has been debating a similar program for months, American officials said.

The Bush administration is expected to announce this week a decision to begin vaccinating up to 500,000 troops and an equal number of public health workers, law enforcement officials and others who respond to emergencies against the highly contagious virus. Before the World Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated in 1980, it killed about a third of those infected.

"The United States has much to learn from Israel's experience," Leonard J. Marcus, the director of the health care negotiation and conflict resolution program at the Harvard School of Public Health, concluded in a recent report on Israel's medical response to bioterrorist threats.

Israel has traditionally been extremely secretive about its defenses against biological weapons. But officials said in recent interviews that they had decided to discuss their program in some detail so that Israel's actions would not be misinterpreted and to allay public fears at home and abroad about the safety of the vaccine.

"After Sept. 11, there was a profound change in our psychology," said Boaz Lev, the director general of Israel's Ministry of Health. "Although there was no new information on which to base our vaccination decision, the potential terrorist threat increased dramatically, especially in the minds of doctors."

Dr. Lev said that while Israel's decision to begin revaccinating its population was initially spurred by reports that the United States was contemplating such a step, Israel had now "jumped far ahead" of the American biodefense effort. He declined to say how many soldiers had been vaccinated, but he said that for soldiers and civilians alike the program was now voluntary.

Israel uses the Lister vaccine strain, different from the strain used by the United States. Dr. Lev said that Lister was less virulent than the American strain and has fewer side effects. He said Israeli doctors and health professionals had screened out those with health conditions that precluded safe inoculation, like pregnant women and people with ailments that suppress the immune system.

Though as many as 30 to 50 percent of potential volunteers initially resisted being vaccinated, experts said, volunteer rates rose sharply after public health officials began discussing the program's risks and benefits, and after medical professionals began being vaccinated.

Dr. Marcus concluded in an October report that after being inoculated, 5 percent of those vaccinated reported side effects like fevers, headaches, muscle pain, fatigue and weakness. Medical literature suggests that one in a million people is likely to die from the smallpox vaccine, and one in roughly 250,000 is likely to suffer serious side effects. There were only two problematic cases in Israel so far — one a woman with an immune disorder. She was not vaccinated but was infected by her husband, who was. She responded quickly to treatment and recovered fully, Dr. Lev said.

Israel ended its vaccination program later than most countries. Until 1980, Dr. Lev said, smallpox vaccination was mandatory. Inoculations of soldiers continued until 1996.

Israel ended vaccinations partly to dispel the perception that it had turned the virus into a weapon, as had the former Soviet Union.

Some Israeli doctors and public health experts contend that Israel's \$2 million vaccination program should be even more ambitious and comprehensive. Aryeh Eldad, the leader of a team that advised the Health Ministry on epidemiological control in its vaccination program, resigned this summer to protest the ministry's rejection of his recommendation that all Israelis be immediately inoculated.

Dr. Lev hinted that a broader program might be in the offing. He added that even if the threat posed by Iraq receded, terrorist groups and other states could continue to threaten Israel.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/international/middleeast/10ISRA.html>

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## **President Reviving Program to Provide Smallpox Vaccine**

*By Ceci Connolly*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, December 12, 2002; Page A01

Three decades after smallpox vaccinations were halted in the United States, President Bush has decided to revive a nationwide inoculation program, beginning with military personnel and emergency responders considered most vulnerable to a biological attack from the deadly virus, administration sources said last night.

As early as next week, the Pentagon could begin inoculating as many as 500,000 soldiers headed to the Persian Gulf region as the first step in a campaign that eventually will make the vaccine available on a voluntary basis to all 280 million Americans, the sources said.

In a White House announcement scheduled for Friday, Bush plans to endorse the incremental vaccination plan crafted by his health advisers months ago. It moves quickly from the military to as many as 10 million civilian health care workers and emergency personnel deemed at highest risk of encountering the virus. Vaccinations for them would begin as early as January, a health official said.

The philosophy behind the plan is to vaccinate the cadre of medical and emergency rescue personnel who would investigate and treat an outbreak of the disease before rapidly opening mass vaccination clinics across the United States.

"Preparing the emergency response teams is the highest priority," said one administration official involved in the development of the policy.

Other Americans would be offered the vaccine as more is produced and licensed, perhaps some time in 2004, officials said. "Americans who feel they would like to be vaccinated will have access to it," said one administration official.

The growing possibility of hostilities overseas and fears of a bioterror attack at home were the primary reasons Bush decided to move forward with a vaccine that is known for its serious -- and sometimes fatal -- side effects.

"We know al Qaeda is interested in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons," the official said, explaining Bush's thinking. "There is also the potential certain states around the world may have illegal stockpiles and would want to use them."

Bush was confronted with the difficult task of weighing the return of one of history's deadliest scourges against the dangerous complications associated with the vaccine. National security advisers, most prominently Vice President Cheney, have voiced fears that although smallpox disappeared from the globe more than 20 years ago, a handful of rogue states or terrorist groups may have acquired it. Because smallpox is highly contagious and difficult to detect, experts consider it to be one of the most potent biological weapons.

About one-third of the people who contract smallpox die; many others suffer painful, severe health problems. The vaccine, though effective in preventing the disease, can cause reactions that range from a mild rash to high fever to death.

Recent clinical trials found that 30 percent of the people immunized missed at least one day of work or school because of side effects. Historical data show that between 15 and 50 of every 1 million people vaccinated will suffer life-threatening complications and that one or two of them will die.

Pregnant women and people with weakened immune systems should not receive the vaccine. That includes cancer patients who have received chemotherapy, people who test positive for HIV and anyone who has undergone an organ transplant.

In an interview with ABC News that aired last night, Bush obliquely referred to those risks. "I think it ought to be a voluntary plan," he said. "In other words, I don't think people ought to be compelled to make the decision which they think is best for their family."

Laura Bush sounded more enthusiastic in the interview, saying she would not have qualms about vaccinating the couple's twin daughters, who are 21.

"If the vaccine were available, which I think it will be, I would feel like that was certainly safe for them to do," she said. "I know there's a slight risk. That's what people weigh when they make the decision whether or not to have their children vaccinated."

Even before news of Bush's decision, Sen. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) was pressing for a similar approach.

"This country, at the community, state and federal level, must expedite response plans, because I think the risk of smallpox in the United States is increasing," he said yesterday at a conference on bioterrorism. "We should get going."

Frist, pointing to the increasing chance of war with Iraq, said the threat of a smallpox attack is greater today than just two weeks ago.

"If [Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein] has smallpox, I think he will use it and use it smartly and effectively," said Frist, a surgeon who advocated offering vaccine to every American. "A vaccinated population, even a partially vaccinated population, is a protected population. And a protected population is a population that is less vulnerable."

In late October, the Food and Drug Administration licensed the first 1.7 million doses of vaccine, which have been reserved for the Department of Defense and hospital workers.

Vaccine administered within four or five days of exposure will protect patients from the disease, according to experts at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. About 1.5 million volunteers would be needed to vaccinate the entire country in a week's time, the CDC projects.

If every health care worker, police officer, firefighter and EMT in the nation volunteered for the program, a total of about 10 million people would be vaccinated before an outbreak. However, state and federal health officials predict many health workers who are themselves in high-risk groups will not participate in the vaccination program.

In recent weeks, many of the people who will be called upon to implement Bush's policy have expressed frustration over the delays and lingering questions.

Susan Allan, director of the Arlington County health department, said public health workers have struggled to decide whether they should be vaccinated. Among the unanswered questions they are asking: Would vaccinated health workers put their own family members at risk of infection from the inoculation site? Would vaccine recipients miss work? What happens if a person is seriously injured by the vaccine?

Some of the fiercest criticism has been aimed at the administration's refusal to create a compensation fund for people who suffer side effects from the vaccine.

The Service Employees International Union, the nation's largest union of health care workers, has attacked an 11th-hour provision in the Homeland Security Act that grants liability protection to vaccine makers and people who administer it but offers no direct compensation for people who suffer complications from the vaccine.

Victims would have to sue the federal government and prove negligence, a high hurdle given the vaccine's well-known complications, said George Hardy, executive director of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers.

"Forcing people who are trying to do the right thing for the country to take care of themselves is wrong," said Vermont Gov. Howard Dean, a physician and Democratic presidential hopeful.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42888-2002Dec11.html>

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Washington Post  
December 12, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **U.S. Frees Ship With North Korean Missiles**

### ***Stand Is Reversed After Yemen Protests Seizure of 15 Scuds***

By Glenn Kessler and Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States yesterday agreed to release a ship containing North Korean missiles bound for Yemen after strong protests by the Yemeni government suggested that Monday's seizure of the vessel by Spanish and U.S. forces would affect Yemen's cooperation in the war on terrorism.

The unflagged ship, carrying 15 Scud missiles along with conventional warheads and rocket propellant, had been tracked for weeks by the United States before it was intercepted in the Arabian Sea 600 miles southeast of Yemen. The delivery appeared to violate a commitment made by Yemen in July of last year, before the Sept. 11 attacks, not to purchase any more North Korean missile equipment in exchange for avoiding sanctions for previous suspect deals with North Korea.

But in a flurry of phone calls between Yemeni officials and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Vice President Cheney, Yemen successfully argued that the ship was carrying equipment that predated that commitment. The vehement Yemeni response -- which included summoning the U.S. ambassador to the foreign ministry in Sanaa, Yemen's capital -- surprised U.S. officials, who had assumed Yemen could plausibly deny any knowledge of the shipment, insist it was living up to its previous agreement and would not demand delivery of the missiles.

The sudden reversal by the administration, one day after it hailed the seizure as a successful example of halting the spread of dangerous weapons, underscored the tension between the twin U.S. goals of stemming weapons proliferation and enlisting allies in the fight against terrorism. It also illustrates the difficulty of executing a global policy of preemption against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, which the administration codified in a new national security strategy that was released by the White House on Tuesday, the day the seizure was made public. Since Sept. 11, 2001, Yemen, along with Afghanistan and Pakistan, has become a central partner in the war on terrorism, giving unprecedented access and intelligence to U.S. Special Forces tracking hundreds of al Qaeda members in the tribal areas of Yemen along the border of Saudi Arabia. By deciding to meet Yemen's demands to allow the missile shipment to go through, the administration clearly signaled that the broader goal of containing an

al Qaeda foothold on the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula was of higher priority than deterring what it views as North Korea's efforts to sell weapons.

Similarly, the United States has soft-pedaled evidence of Pakistani involvement -- as recently as July -- in North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program in exchange for missile parts, even as the United States has demanded that North Korea end its program.

U.S. intelligence satellites and Navy ships had been tracking the ship, the So San, since it left North Korea in the middle of last month. U.S. officials contacted Yemen several days before the seizure, and Yemen denied any knowledge of the shipment, officials said.

Once the seizure was made public, a U.S. official said, "Yemen realized, 'We've got enough leverage with the U.S. to get our ship back.' "

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told reporters the cargo was being returned to Yemen because "there is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea."

"While there is authority to stop and search, in this instance there is no authority to seize a shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen," Fleischer said, adding that Yemen assured the United States it "would not transfer these missiles to anyone."

Powell said Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh insisted the cargo was "the last of several shipments contracted a long time ago."

But U.S. officials said that in July 2001, the Yemeni government wrote the then-U.S. ambassador in Sanaa that it was "neither the policy nor practice of the government of Yemen to import" such materials from North Korea.

Robert J. Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the letter was critical to a U.S. decision not to press for sanctions against Yemen for buying Scud missile components. Sanctions were imposed on North Korea.

"The reason we sought such a commitment is because we found it hard to imagine that Yemen has a security need for such missiles," Einhorn said.

One U.S. official said the most recent shipment appeared to be a clear violation of the commitment made in the letter. "But it's a question of what is a commitment or an assurance," the official said. "Is it a binding treaty? In the eyes of the Yemen government, no. There will be some difficult days ahead in the U.S.-Yemen relationship."

"This reversal really exposes an inconsistency," Einhorn said. "We have a commitment not to import missiles. We agree not to sanction based on that commitment. We have a policy to discourage North Korean exports. We successfully interdict the ship. Then we reverse ourselves. What kind of signal is this sending?"

Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.) said he was "puzzled and troubled" by the administration's decision to turn the Scuds over to Yemen, which he said could "come back to haunt us." He noted Yemen "has a questionable record that includes past support of terrorist organizations."

Yemen, despite its cooperation with the United States since the Sept. 11 attacks, is considered a hotbed of Islamic extremism that the government has trouble controlling. It was the site of the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden two years ago, as well as a similar attack on a French tanker in October.

The United States and its allies have boarded a number of suspect ships headed to the Middle East in recent months but in nearly all cases nothing turned up. The one exception, before the Yemen shipment, was the seizure last month of a ship carrying patrol craft with missile launchers bound from China for Iraq. The United States purchased the ship and its cargo to prevent it from traveling to Iraq, a U.S. official said.

The feeling at the Pentagon, said one defense official, was that the ship interception had been a successful military and intelligence operation, but that the diplomatic follow-up was raising some questions.

"It was a surprise to me, that we so readily" agreed to turn over the missiles to Yemen, said retired Rear Adm. Eric A. McVadon, a former defense attaché in Beijing who is an expert in Asian weapons proliferation issues. He questioned Powell's rationale that the shipment was permitted to proceed because the United States has good relations with Yemen.

"We have good relations with Pakistan," said McVadon, "and we certainly didn't like it" when China shipped M-11 short-range ballistic missiles there several years ago.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42786-2002Dec11.html>

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# U.S. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent From Iraqis

## *Analysts: Chemical May Be VX, And Was Smuggled Via Turkey*

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration has received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq last month or late in October, according to two officials with firsthand knowledge of the report and its source. They said government analysts suspect that the transaction involved the nerve agent VX and that a courier managed to smuggle it overland through Turkey.

If the report proves true, the transaction marks two significant milestones. It would be the first known acquisition of a nonconventional weapon other than cyanide by al Qaeda or a member of its network. It also would be the most concrete evidence to support the charge, aired for months by President Bush and his advisers, that al Qaeda terrorists receive material assistance in Iraq. If advanced publicly by the White House, the report could be used to rebut Iraq's assertion in a 12,000-page declaration Saturday that it had destroyed its entire stock of chemical weapons.

On the central question whether Iraqi President Saddam Hussein knew about or authorized such a transaction, U.S. analysts are said to have no evidence. Because Hussein's handpicked Special Security Organization, run by his son Qusay, has long exerted tight control over concealed weapons programs, officials said they presume it would be difficult to transfer a chemical agent without the president's knowledge.

Knowledgeable officials, speaking without White House permission, said information about the transfer came from a sensitive and credible source whom they declined to discuss. Among the hundreds of leads in the Threat Matrix, a daily compilation by the CIA, this one has drawn the kind of attention reserved for a much smaller number.

"The way we gleaned the information makes us feel confident it is accurate," said one official whose responsibilities are directly involved with the report. "I throw about 99 percent of the spot reports away when I look at them. I didn't throw this one away."

Like most intelligence, the reported chemical weapon transfer is not backed by definitive evidence. The intended target is unknown, with U.S. speculation focusing on Europe and the United States.

At a time when President Bush is eager to make a public case linking Iraq to the United States's principal terrorist enemy, authorized national security spokesmen declined to discuss the substance of their information about the transfer of lethal chemicals. Those who disclosed it have no policymaking responsibilities on Iraq and expressed no strong views on whether the United States should go to war there.

Even authorized spokesmen, with one exception, addressed the report on the condition of anonymity. They said the principal source on the chemical transfer was uncorroborated, and that indications it involved a nerve agent were open to interpretation.

"We are concerned because of al Qaeda's interest in obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, and we continue to seek evidence and intelligence information with regards to their planning activity," said Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge. Johndroe was the only official authorized by the White House to discuss the matter on the record.

"Have they obtained chemical weapons?" Johndroe said. "I do not have any hard, concrete evidence that they have." Pressed on whether the information referred to a nerve agent, Johndroe said "there is no specific intelligence that limits al Qaeda's interest to one particular chemical or biological weapon over the other."

One official who spoke without permission said a sign of the government's concern is its "ramping up opportunities to collect more, to figure out what would be the routes, where would they be taking the material, how would they deploy it, how are they transporting it, what are the personnel?" The official added: "We're not just sitting back and waiting for something to happen."

A Defense Department official, who said he had seen only the one-line summary version of the chemical weapon report, speculated that it might be connected to a message distributed last week to U.S. armed forces overseas. An official elsewhere said the message resulted only from an analyst's hypothetical concern.

Prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency, last week's "Turkey Defense Terrorism Threat Awareness Message" warned of a possible chemical weapons attack by al Qaeda on the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey. Incirlik is an important NATO facility from which a U.S.-led coalition in 1991 launched thousands of bombing runs to force Iraq to withdraw its army from Kuwait. Turkey has given conditional agreement to its use in the event of a new war with Iraq.

According to two officials, a second related threat report was distributed in Washington this week. The CIA message, transmitted before the daily 3 a.m. compilation of the Threat Matrix, described a European ally's warning that the United States might face a chemical attack in a big-city subway if war breaks out with Iraq. A U.S. government spokesman said the European ally offered little evidence and "the credibility of the report has not been determined."

Among the uncertainties about the suspected weapon transfer in Iraq is the precise relationship of the Islamic operatives to the al Qaeda network. One official said the transaction involved Asbat al-Ansar, a Lebanon-based Sunni extremist group that recently established an enclave in northern Iraq. Asbat al-Ansar is affiliated with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and receives funding from it, but officials said they did not know whether its pursuit of chemical weapons was specifically on al Qaeda's behalf.

The government is also uncertain whether the transaction involved a chemical agent alone or an agent in what is known as a weaponized form -- incorporated into a delivery system such as a rocket or a bomb. The latter would be a more efficient killer, but chemical weapons are deadly in either form. Among the reasons for suspecting VX was involved is that it is the most portable of Iraq's chemical weapons, capable of inflicting mass casualties in a quantity that a single courier could transport.

After initial denials, Iraq admitted in the 1990s that it had manufactured tons of VX and two less sophisticated nerve agents, Sarin and Tabun. Its remaining chemical arsenal was limited to blister agents, such as mustard gas, that date back to World War I.

First developed as a weapon by the U.S. Army, VX is an oily, odorless and tasteless liquid that kills on contact with the skin or when inhaled in aerosol form. Like other nerve agents, it is treatable in the first minutes after exposure but otherwise leads swiftly to fatal convulsions and respiratory failure. The United States, a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, destroyed the last of its stocks of VX and other chemical agents on the Johnston Atoll, 825 miles southwest of Hawaii, in November 2000.

U.S. military forces, hazardous materials teams and some ambulance systems carry emergency antidotes. They usually come in autoinjectors containing atropine and an oxime -- drugs that reverse the neuromuscular blockade of a nerve agent. Atropine-like drugs have other uses, such as in anesthesia and in treating cardiac arrest, and are often stocked in hospitals.

During inspections by the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, in the 1990s, Iraq denied producing any chemical weapon other than mustard gas. Faced with contrary evidence, it eventually acknowledged the manufacture of 3.9 tons of VX and 3,859 tons in all of lethal chemicals. The Baghdad government also admitted filling more than 10,000 bombs, rockets and missile warheads with Sarin. It denied having done so with its most potent agent, VX, but an international commission of experts assembled by UNSCOM said the scientific evidence suggested otherwise.

UNSCOM said in its final report, in January 1999, that it could not account for 1.5 tons of the VX known to have been produced in Iraq, and that it could not establish whether additional quantities had been made.

The U.N. Security Council ordered Iraq in April 1991 to relinquish all capabilities to make biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as well as long-range missiles. The declared basis for the present threat of war is the U.S. view, shared by the Clinton and Bush administrations, that the Baghdad government never came close to complying.

In 1998, the Clinton administration asserted that Iraq provided technical assistance in the construction of a VX production facility in Sudan, undertaken jointly with al Qaeda. In retaliation for al Qaeda's August 1998 truck bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton ordered the destruction of the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan's capital.

Clinton's advisers released scant public evidence about al Shifa, and the Tomahawk missile attack was widely regarded as a blunder. Top Clinton administration officials, and career analysts still in government, maintain there was strong evidence behind the strike but that it remains too valuable to disclose. During last year's New York trial of the embassy bombers, prosecution witness Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a onetime operative who broke with al Qaeda, offered limited corroboration. He named al Qaeda and Sudanese operatives who had told him they were working together to build a chemical weapons plant in Khartoum. He said nothing about Iraqi support for the project and named a site near, but not in, the al Shifa plant.

Only once has a chemical weapon been used successfully in a terrorist attack. During the morning rush hour on March 20, 1995, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo placed packages on five subway trains converging on Tokyo's central station. When punctured, the packages spread vaporized Sarin through the subway cars and then into the stations as the trains pulled in.

In all, the Sarin contaminated 15 stations of the world's busiest subway system, putting 1,000 riders in the hospital and killing 12 of them. Though the attack spread great terror in Japan, it took fewer lives than its authors expected because the Sarin reached many victims in a form that was not sufficiently concentrated.

"Psychologically, use of nerve agent in the United States would send people over the deep end, but it probably wouldn't kill very many people," said an official whose responsibilities have included the assessment and disruption of the threat.

Others said the panic induced could have serious economic consequences, rendering many Americans unwilling to enter a facility of the sort that had suffered a chemical attack.

In general, al Qaeda's pursuit of chemical and biological weapons is well known to U.S. intelligence. A central player in the effort has been Midhat al Mursi, an Egyptian who is among the most-wanted al Qaeda operatives but who remains at large. He ran a development and testing facility for lethal chemicals in a camp -- in Derunta, Afghanistan -- that was eventually renamed "Abu Kebab" after Mursi's nom de guerre.

The Derunta operation is not thought to have progressed beyond unsophisticated poisons, including the cyanide used in videotaped experiments on dogs. Unconsummated plots by al Qaeda and its allies in Jordan just before the turn of the millennium, and in Britain last month, also involved cyanide.

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## **U.S. Approved Sale Of Atropine**

### ***Iraq Imported Millions Of Doses Of Antidote For Nerve Agents***

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

With U.S. approval, Iraq imported more than 3.5 million vials of the drug atropine over the past five years, despite concerns that it could be used to inoculate Iraqi soldiers participating in chemical warfare, according to U.N. sources and confidential U.N. documents.

Between late 1997 and November 2001, French, Russian and Italian companies signed at least five contracts through the U.N. oil-for-food program to sell Iraq more than 3.5 million ampuls of the nerve agent antidote, which is also used to treat heart attacks. More than 2 million units of the drug have already been delivered to Baghdad, U.N. sources said. The rest is awaiting delivery.

The disclosure comes as the United States is struggling to convince the U.N. Security Council to place new restrictions on the sale of the drug because of Pentagon concerns that the Iraqi army may use the drug to protect its soldiers if it mounts a chemical attack against U.S. troops.

On Tuesday, John R. Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, listed atropine and the antibiotic ciprofloxacin (also known as Cipro), among 36 categories of items that should be subject to U.N. Security Council scrutiny before they can be shipped to Iraq. In 1999, a Jordanian firm, Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co. Ltd., sold Iraq an unknown quantity of Cipro, a broad spectrum antibiotic that is used to treat exposure to anthrax and a host of other infections, according to U.N. documents.

Until May, the United States had the right to prohibit or monitor sales of atropine to Iraq but rarely exercised it. The United States relinquished its authority as part of a council agreement to ease restrictions on the import of civilian goods into Iraq.

The Pentagon became alarmed about the potential military uses of atropine after discovering that Turkey had been approached by Iraq to supply it with massive quantities of atropine and auto-injectors, which are designed to treat victims of pesticide or nerve agent poisoning. A senior Turkish official said that Ankara is investigating the report, which was first disclosed in the New York Times. Until now, however, it was not known that Iraq had succeeded in buying supplies of atropine or that they were obtained through the U.N.-sanctioned oil-for-food program.

U.N. officials said the quantities of atropine purchased by Iraq were consistent with dosages used for medical purposes. More than 3.4 million vials, the vast majority, contained 0.6-milligram doses of atropine sulfate, an amount typically used to speed up the heart rate of heart attack victims.

Chemical warfare experts said a dose of 2 milligrams is typically administered to victims of nerve agents or pesticide poisoning. On the battlefield, they said, the drug would probably be administered with auto-injectors. U.N. officials said Iraq has never imported auto-injectors through the oil-for-food program, which permits Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and humanitarian goods.

"The advantage of an auto-injector is that somebody can give one to himself, he can give it to his buddy right there. It doesn't require medical care," said Frederick R. Sidell, a retired U.S. Army expert on chemical warfare. But Sidell said that the lower doses used for heart treatment could be easily converted to military uses if administered with a common needle and syringe. "You just give three times as much. For any casualty who is mildly exposed it might be enough."

The United States has cited the Turkey case to underscore the importance of preventing Iraq from obtaining a host of items that could be used to develop long-range missiles and chemical, biological and conventional weapons. Those

items, which are listed in the document Bolton presented council members, include global positioning systems, radio intercept devices, night vision technology and communications jamming equipment.

Asked why the United States had not previously added atropine or auto-injectors to the list of items requiring Security Council review, John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, "I honestly don't know the answer." But he said that the United States has received a commitment from the other council members to consider placing new restrictions on them before the end of the month.

Russia and France have signaled that they are willing to add atropine and some other items to the United Nations' 302-page list of dual-use products that require Security Council scrutiny. But they have made it clear that they want other items taken off the list. Russia, for instance, has proposed easing restrictions on trucks that it sells to Iraq. A spokeswoman at the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, which oversees all sales to Iraq through the oil-for-food program, declined to name the companies that sold the medicines to Iraq. But confidential U.N. documents and U.N. sources revealed that the Italian company Alfa Intes Industria Terapeutica Splendore signed a contract to sell about 3,000 ampuls of atropine sulfate to Iraq in late 1997.

The French pharmaceutical company Laboratoires Renaudin sold nearly one million ampuls of atropine to Iraq in July 2000. A more recent shipment of 1.5 million ampuls of atropine from French and Russian sources was placed on hold by the United States, but it was then approved under the recent procedures without any plans for monitoring its use. It was approved in October and is awaiting delivery to Iraq.

"If a particular item is not on the goods review list, the contract gets approved," said Ewen Buchanan, a spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for reviewing contracts.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42783-2002Dec11.html>

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New York Times  
December 12, 2002

## **70 U.N. Arms Monitors Extend Scope Of Searches Into The Iraqi Desert**

By John F. Burns

Teams of United Nations weapons inspectors began their third week of surprise visits to Iraqi industrial and scientific sites today in a mood of growing confidence that they can counter doubts voiced by senior Bush administration officials about their work.

In the first week after they started work on Nov. 27, the inspectors made two or three site visits a day. They have now stepped up the pace, visiting eight sites today. On Tuesday, their busiest day so far, they went to 13. After initially rarely ranging more than 100 miles from Baghdad, and mostly much less, they have begun long-distance probes hundreds of miles into the Iraqi desert.

From an initial group of 17 inspectors, there are now more than 70 experts in nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, as well as missile experts; by Christmas, this number is expected to rise to nearly 100.

Setting out early each morning, the inspectors set course for some of the 900 "declared" sites on their checklists, meaning sites where Iraq has conducted weapons work in the past, or has laboratories or plants with "dual use" capabilities that could be turned from civilian purposes to weapons-related work.

With foreign reporters following them on every inspection, the United Nations teams have covered a wide range of installations representing all the major weapons programs Iraq had under way in the 1990's, when its defeat in the Persian Gulf war led the Security Council to impose a wide-ranging ban on Iraq's possession or development of weapons of mass destruction.

Among these sites have been the principal centers of Iraqi work on nuclear weapons, on deadly biological toxins like botulinum and anthrax, and on chemical weapons like VX gas.

The scattered irregularities found so far -- mostly involving the unnotified transfer of equipment monitored by earlier groups of inspectors in the 1990's -- have almost all been quickly resolved. Iraqi officials and scientists have identified other sites to which the parts have been moved, allowing the inspectors to confirm, in most cases, that the equipment is at the new locations.

The byword of United Nations officials who have briefed reporters, in Baghdad and by telephone from New York, has been caution, with the officials saying the inspectors, and experts outside Iraq, need time to determine whether



there is any evidence that Iraq has resumed work on banned weapons programs, as the Bush administration has alleged.

"We haven't disclosed anything, but that doesn't mean that we haven't found any trace of evidence to suggest to our inspectors that there may be something" that indicates new Iraqi work on banned weapons, one United Nations official with access to inspectors' reports said. "It's just that we cannot tell you anything yet."

The deadline for an initial report to the Security Council by the chiefs of the two separate inspection teams is Jan. 25. That is 60 days from the start of work by the teams from the New York-based United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission -- or Unmovic -- responsible for checking biological, chemical and missile sites, and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, which is charged with checking nuclear sites. Yasuhiro Ueki, spokesman for the two teams in Baghdad, said this was likely to be the first occasion for public disclosure of findings, unless Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei -- the heads of the two inspection teams -- "feel they have something they need to say before that."

United Nations officials who have spoken to reporters about the inspections have been sensitive to criticisms from Washington.

These have followed on from the policy split of last summer, when hawks in the administration were deeply reluctant to enmesh American policy on Iraq with a resumption of United Nations weapons inspections. Since inspections started, some senior officials in Washington have implied that the program could quickly founder in a morass of Iraqi harassment and deceit, accompanied by United Nations indecisiveness, as happened in the 1990's. The critical American officials have called for the new round of inspections to be rapidly intensified, and for the United Nations teams to use the full range of powers written into the tough new inspections mandate approved by the Security Council on Nov. 8.

A number of these powers, like the right to swoop down on sites across Iraq in helicopters and the power to fly Iraqi scientists and their families outside Iraq for questioning, have not been invoked so far. Others, like the right to "freeze" inspection sites and prevent movement of people or materials in or out during the inspections, have been imposed, as far as accompanying reporters have been able to determine, with a wide latitude for the Iraqis.

United Nations officials in Baghdad say their ability to surprise the Iraqis, and their need to, will come together in the weeks ahead as weapons experts complete their analysis of the 12,000-page Iraqi weapons declaration delivered last weekend, and as helicopters become available to the inspection teams.

So far, 34 days after the new weapons inspection mandate was approved by the Security Council, only one United Nations helicopter has reached Baghdad, a transfer from the United Nations administration in Kosovo.

Mr. Ueki said contracts for more helicopters, to total about six, were "in the final stage of the bidding process" with private companies that charter aircraft to the United Nations. He was unable to say when they would arrive.

An example of the handicaps facing the inspectors came on Tuesday, when a team of nuclear inspectors set out on a 240-mile trip across the desert to a phosphate complex at Al Qaim, on the Syrian border, where the Iraqis produced about 100 tons of uranium as a byproduct in the 1980's.

The desert journey of more than five hours would have allowed accompanying Iraqi officials to alert the complex by radio that an inspection was imminent.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/12/international/middleeast/12BAGH.html>

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New York Times  
December 12, 2002

## **U.S. Wants List Of Allowed Imports To Iraq To Be Tightened**

By Julia Preston

The Bush administration, convinced that Iraq has been using gaps in United Nations monitoring to import goods to use in war, wants a list of restricted material to be revised by the end of next week, a United States official said today.

Last week, the Council voted unanimously last week to set a deadline of Jan. 4 for any revisions.

John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security, met with representatives of the 14 other countries on the Security Council on Tuesday to press the administration's case for the changes. But the

Council is preoccupied with the huge declaration of its weapons programs that Baghdad presented last weekend, and is reluctant to move at Washington's pace, several Council diplomats said in a meeting here today.

A copy of the roster of 38 changes the Bush administration wants made indicates that it is trying to block Iraq from obtaining any new equipment that it might use for its military. United Nations weapons inspections are under way in Iraq that will determine whether the United States will lead a military campaign to disarm the country.

Washington wants to amend what is called the goods review list, which specifies which items must be examined by United Nations monitors before they can be imported into Iraq. The list is part of the oil-for-food program set up to ease the privations suffered by ordinary Iraqis under economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The United Nations uses revenues from sales of Iraqi petroleum primarily to buy food, medicine and other goods for civilians.

According to its roster, the administration is seeking to add to the United Nations list a range of communications equipment, including jammers to block satellite-positioning systems, ultra-wide-band radios and broadcast equipment.

The administration is seeking to tighten import restrictions on missile components and to add several medicines to the list that could serve as antidotes to chemical weapons agents, including atropine, pralidoxime and sodium nitrite. Washington is also proposing to add medical equipment that can be used to purify toxins and certain viral pathogens, which it suspects Iraq is seeking for biological warfare.

The administration's goal is to get United Nations weapons inspectors, who are responsible for reviewing the list of goods that Iraq requests for import, to check more closely the amounts Iraq is seeking of certain items and to ask more questions about Baghdad's final purposes, the American official said.

United States officials also receive copies of Iraq's requests under the program, and have developed the amendments based on specific items Baghdad has asked for since the goods review list was approved earlier this year.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/12/international/middleeast/12NATI.html>

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Pg. 38

## **White House Orders Plans To Debrief Iraqi Scientists**

By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writers

The White House has told the CIA and the Defense and State departments to develop a comprehensive plan to quickly move large numbers of Iraqi scientists outside the country -- lured by the possibility of asylum or compelled by what would amount to United Nations-issued subpoenas -- for United Nations interviews about Baghdad's weapons programs, administration officials said.

The orders, emanating from national security adviser Condoleezza Rice over the last two weeks, are strongly backed by top civilians in the Defense Department who are anxious to speed up an inspections process they see extending inconclusively for months and possibly years. The defense officials believe that it is only through such an aggressive approach that they will be able to quickly and definitively confront President Saddam Hussein of Iraq over his banned weapons programs.

A senior Bush administration official who favors the approach said yesterday that a preliminary U.S. assessment of Iraq's latest weapons declaration, handed over to the United Nations on Saturday, has proven that the interviews are "essential." The 12,000-page document, the official said, is "almost the opposite of full disclosure. It's full nondisclosure."

Iraq has denied possessing any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or long-range missiles.

The U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq adopted unanimously last month requires the Baghdad government to provide the names of all former and current personnel associated with its weapons programs, and to give inspectors immediate, unimpeded access to them, including the right to interview them outside the country. Iraqi failure to ensure that they and their families, if they choose, comply with U.N. demands could constitute a material breach of the resolution that many U.S. officials believe is inevitable.

Although Iraq has so far not impeded inspections on the ground, including allowing entrance into one of Hussein's previously restricted palaces, the inspectors' newly enhanced interview power is "the most significant authority contained in the resolution" and "the one thing that is most likely to produce overt Iraqi opposition," the senior

official said. For that reason, "it can't be a voluntary program," the official said, comparing the interview summonses to grand jury subpoenas.

Under this formulation, refusal by the interviewees to provide information under questioning would also constitute an Iraqi breach, as would previously unrevealed weapons discoveries made on the basis of their disclosures.

But the haste with which the plan to compel interrogations of large numbers of Iraqis outside the country is being put together, and the pressure on U.S. intelligence officials and U.N. inspectors to make it their top priority, has raised concerns in both the CIA and the State Department, administration officials said. While they agree on the importance of the interviews, those agencies, along with some allied foreign governments and U.N. officials, have suggested that attempts to short-circuit the inspection process with a quickly conceived operation that could involve hundreds of Iraqis and their families could endanger lives while undermining both the inspections themselves and ongoing U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq.

National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said no decision has been made on how, or whether, to push for U.N. implementation of a U.S.-written program for accelerated interviews. "We have said we want the inspectors to use all the tools at their disposal. . . . Each step along the way will prove [Iraqi] willingness to comply" with the disarmament resolution, McCormack said.

Internal administration disagreements over how to deal with the Iraqi threat have arisen at virtually every decision point since President Bush's acceded to a new round of U.N. inspections to achieve Iraqi disarmament, even as the United States has simultaneously continued to prepare for war in the event Iraq does not cooperate. The disagreements have become more urgent as preparations for an attack -- that, from a military point of view, would optimally be fought by spring -- threaten to outpace inspections that are only beginning to get underway.

Part of those war preparations included the transmission Tuesday of an official U.S. request to Hungary for use of an air base in the southern part of that country to train Iraqi opposition members for participation in a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq. The administration has asked opposition organizations to produce the names of as many as 10,000 Iraqis to serve with U.S. military forces as interpreters, guides, spotters and guards for prisoners of war. Most of these Iraqis identified so far are from the Iraqi diaspora or are living in the northern part of Iraq that is not controlled by Hussein. But the administration has been reluctant to admit them into the United States, even after extensive vetting, for fear some might be Iraqi agents or army deserters guilty of earlier human rights abuses.

Hungary's ambassador to Washington, Andras Simonyi, said that the request was for use of Taszar air base in southwestern Hungary. A former Soviet facility, it was used as a logistical and training base for U.S. forces in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Simonyi said the administration had asked Hungary for use of Taszar as its "contribution" to a possible war against Iraq. Hungary's government could approve the request on its own, he said, but has chosen to seek a consensus with Hungarian opposition parties and would soon begin internal discussion of the request.

Rice traveled to New York early this month to impress on Hans Blix, the director of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the need to move quickly on the interviews with Iraqi scientists. Blix, sources said, told her they were moving expeditiously to begin that process, but the Americans were free to propose any idea they thought was better.

The possibility of mass interrogations has "lifted the spirits" of those inside the administration by possibly providing "a way out" for those who have always regarded the U.N. resolution as "a trap" to put off a U.S. invasion, said one informed source. "It's the same internal battle being fought on new terrain."

The importance many inside the administration attribute to the interviews, and a proposal to interrogate large numbers of Iraqi scientists outside the country within a short period of time was first reported yesterday by the Los Angeles Times.

"I know they want to move quickly," the source said of those favoring the new proposal. "But there is a tradeoff here between moving quickly . . . and not putting so much pressure on Blix that you have an open rift between him and one or more members of the Security Council. . . . You don't want an open rebellion from UNMOVIC on this."

Blix has yet to ask the Iraqis officially for a list of scientists although, as he told reporters Tuesday, "I have put them on notice that we will ask them for names of people who were active in the different programs."

CIA officials, who want to work hand in glove with U.N. inspectors conducting the interviews, and arrange for entry into the United States for those Iraqis who feared returning to Iraq, have cautioned that those inside the administration favoring quick movement may not have considered all the complications.

"It's more difficult than people believe," said another official with knowledge of the plan. "Getting the list of names is easy, but getting folks together" in families inside Iraq, "and deciding who knows what is the real problem. The mechanics of pulling this off is still being looked at."

The senior administration official countered that these problems, and others, have been taken into consideration.

"There will be lies," he said. "One reason to get started is you may find you want to do this with quite a few people. You may find you may want to go back and ask for something based on something somebody else told you." Any

Iraqi taken outside the country would be free to return, he said, while acknowledging that "it puts a burden" on them of possible retaliation from Hussein. "We didn't create the situation where it's a death sentence to give information to inspectors," he said.

"I don't think it's complicated," the official said. "It's a little brutal. It's a little rough." But "it has always been a dangerous thing [for Iraqis] to be inside that [weapons of mass destruction] program."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42884-2002Dec11.html>

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## U.S. Military Chief Visits Secret Base

Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited one of Russia's secret missile-defense bases near Moscow, a sign of deepening military cooperation between the United States and Russia. An American official said General Myers, left, was the first American allowed to visit the base in Solnechnogorsk, part of the city's defensive system. He met with senior Russian military officials to discuss issues including Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea.

*Steven Lee Myers (NYT)*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/12/international/europe/12BRIE4.html>

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## North Korea Says It's Reactivating Nuclear Plant

Experts Think Move Is Aimed at Pressuring U.S.

*By Christopher Torchia*

Associated Press Writer

Thursday, December 12, 2002; 7:47 PM

SEOUL, South Korea — Renewing fears of a nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea said Thursday it will reactivate a nuclear power plant that U.S. officials suspect was being used to develop weapons.

The North said it had no choice after the U.S.-led decision last month to suspend annual oil shipments of 500,000 tons. The announcement also came shortly after a ship carrying North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen was intercepted in the Arabian Sea. After hours of awkward negotiations, U.S. officials let the shipment go.

It wasn't clear whether the interception influenced the decision. After the interception, an editorial in the North's official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, said: "It is necessary to heighten vigilance against the U.S. strategy for world supremacy and 'anti-terrorism war.'"

"We can only speculate that yesterday's incident and North Korea's electricity shortage in the winter propelled North Korea to make a response," said Kim Sung-han of the state-run Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul.

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said his country would revive the old, Soviet-designed reactor and resume construction of other nuclear facilities to supply desperately needed power. KCNA, the North's state-run news agency, quoted the spokesman but did not name him.

"Our principled stand is that the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula should be resolved peacefully," the spokesman said. "It's totally up to the United States whether we will freeze our nuclear facilities again."

The nuclear program was suspended under a 1994 deal with Washington, averting a possible war on the Korean Peninsula. Experts say North Korea could quickly extract enough plutonium from its old facilities to make several nuclear weapons.

The decision to suspend oil shipments, which were a key provision of the 1994 deal, was designed to pressure North Korea to give up a more recent nuclear program based on uranium enrichment.

The United States says the uranium-based program violated a nuclear arms control clause in the 1994 pact.

"Our country faced an immediate problem in electricity generation because the United States has virtually abandoned its obligations," the North Korean spokesman was quoted as saying in comments that were monitored by South Korea's Yonhap news agency.

Although the spokesman left open the possibility of dialogue to solve the standoff, American and South Korean officials have long feared that North Korea might reactivate its plutonium-based nuclear program. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has sought to reconcile with North Korea. His government urged North Korea to reverse its decision.

"The government expresses deep regret and concern that the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement could create tension on the Korean Peninsula," Seok Dong-yun, a South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, said in a statement.

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has said he believes North Korea already has one or two nuclear weapons.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was in China for talks, said Thursday that China shares American concern about North Korea's nuclear program and is expected to urge "different behavior" on its isolated, secretive ally.

U.S. officials say North Korea told them in October that it had a secret program to enrich uranium to make nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has vowed to try to solve the problem through diplomacy.

Under the 1994 pact, North Korea agreed to freeze the plutonium program in return for two modern, light-water reactors built by a U.S.-led consortium. North Korea often complained about delays in construction of the reactors, which are several years behind schedule.

North Korea had a 5-megawatt plutonium reactor and two bigger reactors, with capacities of 50 megawatts and 200 megawatts respectively, under construction when it signed the 1994 agreement with the United States.

About 8,000 plutonium fuel rods were separated from the frozen 5-megawatt reactor and sealed for permanent disposal. Experts say North Korean scientists could quickly reprocess the spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. Inspectors are monitoring the rods.

At the height of the confrontation over North Korea's plutonium-based program in 1994, a North Korean negotiator threatened to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire." Fearing war, residents of the South rushed to stores to stock up on food and other supplies.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43867-2002Dec12.html>

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