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
USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

Air University

Air War College

Maxwell AFB, Alabama



Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

USAF CPC PRESENTS ANG "CONFLICT 21" WEBSITE

Focusing on homeland security, weapons of mass destruction issues and future total force concepts of operations (CONOPS) and other key issues, the Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC) at Maxwell Air Force Base recently unveiled the Air National Guard's (ANG) new **CONFLICT 21** website <http://c21.maxwell.af.mil> to the internet world.

According to **CONFLICT 21**'s chief, Colonel Michael Ritz, "This unclassified site is intended to be used not only by Air National Guard members, but by all members of the armed forces and Department of Defense." Colonel Ritz also serves as a CPC associate director and ANG Advisor to the Director, CPC. "This website provides it's user a window into the world of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as a forum for examining the many elements of homeland security and homeland defense," said Colonel Ritz.

A key element of CPC's mission is the promotion of research and education in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Developed by Colonel Ritz and Mike McKim of Air University's Air War College, **CONFLICT 21** provides researchers, students, military and government personnel and the general public unclassified, direct information and cross-links to a multitude of sources throughout the internet. "We hope to educate and enlighten all who make use of **CONFLICT 21** on a variety of matters critical to our nation and the world in the 21st century," says Colonel Ritz. "At the same, we want to provide a continuous flow of updated information for researchers, students and writers examining issues pertinent to those being examined by the ANG and USAF CPC now, and in the future," he concluded.

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New York Times
December 6, 2002
Pg. 1

U.S. Tells Iraq It Must Reveal Weapons Sites

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 — Less than 72 hours before Saddam Hussein is required to declare any weapons of mass destruction he holds, the Bush administration set stiff demands today, saying at the White House and the Pentagon that Iraq must physically take inspectors to the weapons and make available all the people who developed and worked on them.

Mr. Hussein, the Iraqi president, appeared on Iraqi television today to urge "patience" in dealing with the United Nations inspectors, and said his objective was to allow the inspectors to do their work so that he could "keep our people out of harm's way." But he gave no indication that he planned to lead the inspectors to suspect sites or hidden caches of weapons, as the White House demands. [Page A17.]

At the White House, President Bush's spokesman, Ari Fleischer, dismissed Iraq's claims that it possesses no nuclear weapons, citing the testimony of past weapons inspectors and intelligence experts. But he offered no new evidence to back up the administration's declarations that the Iraqi government had simply moved its weapons of mass destruction out of sight.

"The president of the United States and the secretary of defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it," he said.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, speaking at the Pentagon, said Iraq's leaders faced three choices. "They could decide that the game's up, and Saddam Hussein and his family could leave the country — which would be a nice outcome," he said, planting anew an idea for a way out of war: exiling the Iraqi leader.

Alternatively, he said, Mr. Hussein could "open up his country and say: 'Here are our weapons of mass destruction. Here's where they're located. Here are the people who made them.'" Or, he said, "He could follow the pattern of previous years" and "continue to lie and deceive and deny."

Officials in the White House left no doubt they thought Mr. Hussein would reach for the third option.

The coordinated statements from Washington came as administration officials worried that Mr. Hussein might get the upper hand in a public relations war if he dropped a blizzard of papers on the United Nations this weekend, filled with descriptions of "dual use" plants that could be used to make ordinary chemicals or pharmaceuticals — or weapons.

But the big question the White House now confronts is how to respond to the Iraqi information, and whether to counter it with declassified American intelligence information to prove that Mr. Hussein omitted the most damaging evidence of his weapons programs.

Mr. Fleischer said today that the task facing the United Nations inspectors was a virtually hopeless one without the active aid of the Iraqi government or defectors with knowledge of the weapons programs. In Iraq, a country the size of France, a hundred inspectors could not be expected to succeed by themselves, he said.

Administration officials stopped just short of endorsing Vice President Dick Cheney's statement in August — which he has never repeated since — that "a return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever" of Iraqi compliance, and could create "false comfort" that Mr. Hussein was somehow "back in his box." But the clear implication of today's comments was that many members of Mr. Bush's national security team retain that view.

In preparation for the deluge from Iraq, officials at the White House, are already planning for how to deal with the information Mr. Hussein delivers, hoping to farm it out quickly to the national laboratories, the Central Intelligence Agency and other government experts for examination. They have made clear that Washington will not respond to the disclosures until they have fully analyzed them.

As for whether the United States will reveal any intelligence information on Iraqi weapons, one intelligence official said, "There's an institutional resistance to making our most secret stuff available, even to some of the governments that might demand it." Other experts say the administration's troubles are deepened by the fact that there is no single piece of clear evidence that would back up the claims Mr. Fleischer and Mr. Rumsfeld made today.

Mr. Fleischer did not point to any particular piece of evidence in making his assertions today, and it is not clear what intelligence the administration is using as a basis for its deductions. It is also unclear how much of this information has been shared with the United Nations.

"I don't think they are going to be able to replicate Adlai Stevenson's feat during the Cuban missile crisis," said Kenneth M. Pollack, an Iraq expert at the C.I.A. and the White House during the Clinton administration. He was referring to the photographs Mr. Stevenson produced proving that the Soviet Union was moving missiles into Cuba. "It's unlikely we have satellite photos of Scud missiles in Baghdad," Mr. Pollack said. But he suggested that other data, including some provided by Iraqi defectors, could bolster the administration's case.

Briefing reporters today, Mr. Fleischer contended that secret talks under way with 15 nations that the United States had identified as potential partners in any coalition against Iraq had resulted in "good responses."

But he declined to name any of the countries, even though some of the most critical, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have been the subject of intense lobbying by Mr. Bush and a team of officials he has dispatched around the world.

Some of those allies have asked for more intelligence, officials say, so that they can justify aiding the United States. The weapons inspectors, too, have put some pressure on Washington.

Hans Blix, one of the chief inspectors, said this week that after Iraq's declaration was delivered, "it will be the moment for those who say they have evidence to put this evidence on the table." One of his deputies, Demetrius Perricos, said the United States should hand over more information to the inspectors, saying he did not believe he was "being served the intelligence that national authorities have."

The intelligence that has been made public so far about Iraq's activities since inspectors were withdrawn in 1998 is sketchy. The C.I.A. has said Iraq bought specialty aluminum tubes that could be the cylinders for centrifuges, the key equipment in the enrichment of uranium. But other experts inside the American government have described other uses for the tubes.

Similarly, the agency has declassified satellite photographs of a site previously used to manufacture arms. The pictures show reconstruction work on the buildings, but not what is happening inside. So far, it is unclear if inspectors, during their first week of surveys, have found anything in these buildings.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/06/international/middleeast/06IRAQ.html>

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New York Times
December 6, 2002
Pg. 1

U.S. Is Pressuring Inspectors In Iraq To Aid Defections

By Patrick E. Tyler

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 — The Bush administration has stepped up pressure on Hans Blix and the United Nations weapons inspection team to identify key Iraqi weapons scientists and spirit them out of Iraq so they can be offered asylum in exchange for disclosing where Saddam Hussein is hiding weapons of mass destruction, according to administration and United Nations officials.

High-level negotiations on the issue became visible when Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser, met with Mr. Blix in New York on Monday and pressed the issue of interviewing Iraqi scientists. The administration is offering to set up a witness protection program for defecting Iraqi scientists, thus enabling a more aggressive approach.

A United States official at the United Nations said that the talks on how to handle Iraqi scientists were continuing and that the initial message to Mr. Blix, a chief arms inspector, was that Washington wanted him to "make it a priority" to use the full powers conveyed by the Security Council resolution passed on Nov. 8.

The resolution demands that Iraq provide "unimpeded" and "unrestricted" access "to all officials and other persons" that inspectors decide they want to interview "inside or outside Iraq."

The purpose of this inspection tool, perhaps the most aggressive tactic in a decade of Iraq inspections, is to achieve a breakthrough in gathering fresh evidence about Iraq's weapons program at a time when Baghdad is under mounting criticism from senior American officials for previously concealing its weapons programs and lying about them. Private tips and defectors have contributed to most of the American intelligence gathered on Iraq's secret nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, United States officials said.

It is not clear what intelligence the administration is using as a basis for its deductions or how much of this information has been shared with the United Nations.

The push by Washington for defectors has further pressurized the atmosphere surrounding the first week of inspections as Iraq prepares to make what the Security Council has said must be a full disclosure of its secret arms programs.

A senior administration official tonight said that "the United States is concerned with the safety, welfare and nonintimidation of people who may wish to cooperate" with inspectors. "We take this issue seriously," the official continued, "and we hope the international community would also attach the same importance to the issue."

The reliance on the United States to take over from the United Nations the handling of Iraqi defectors is a very delicate issue, senior administration officials said.

The United Nations is keen to protect its mission from activities that might compromise it, and the handling, debriefing and resettlement of defectors is traditionally a function of intelligence agencies.

Senior Iraqi officials have begun to assail the inspection mission as a tool of American intelligence and war preparation. On Wednesday, Iraq's vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan, referring to the inspectors, said that "their work is to spy to serve the C.I.A. and Mossad," the Israeli intelligence agency.

According to the arrangements under discussion in Washington and New York, United Nations inspectors could identify Iraqi scientists who are believed to have crucial knowledge of weapons programs. They would be flown out of the country, perhaps with their families.

American officials would then debrief the Iraqis, feed any useful information back to the United Nations teams and then help resettle the Iraqi scientists in a country willing to take them. Those who wanted to return to Iraq could, but American and United Nations officials said the risks of return would be high for any Iraqi taken outside the country. American officials say Iraqi intelligence agencies routinely kill any Iraqi suspected of cooperating with foreign countries.

An intense argument is under way, however, on almost all of the details of a protection program. Some American officials want the United Nations team to be aggressive in identifying scientists and demanding that they leave the country, perhaps without the scientists' permission. Mr. Blix is said to be arguing that the United Nations cannot, in effect, abduct people against their will. His view is being backed by most of the United Nations hierarchy and the State Department in Washington, officials said.

But there were strong contrary views in the Pentagon and White House, officials said.

"I don't see how they can do their mission," Richard Perle said of the inspectors, "if they cannot interview" scientists and other officials associated with secret programs. Mr. Perle is chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory body to the Pentagon. He said the Security Council provision demanding access to Iraqi weapons scientists and their families "was the only innovation in the entire resolution, and if they don't use it, they will fail."

Similar strong views have been expressed by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

"If you go back and look at the history of inspections in Iraq," Mr. Rumsfeld said on Tuesday, "the reality is that things have been found — not by discovery, but through defectors."

United Nations officials, uneasy with soliciting or demanding defections, have been searching for a means to conduct private interviews with Iraqi scientists inside the country. American officials have asserted that this is out of the question since the inspection teams are under intense surveillance by Iraqi intelligence. The officials said they were aware of a large number of scientists who have knowledge of Iraqi weapons programs. Some would like to see Mr. Blix submit a list of names to the Iraqi government and demand to interview those individuals.

Still, Mr. Blix is said to be resisting any idea that the United Nations can force Iraqi scientists to take the life-threatening step of leaving Iraq for interrogation.

"That's where the problem is," said an administration official sympathetic to the concerns Mr. Blix and other United Nations officials have expressed. "Taking someone against their will is contrary to the whole United Nations concept. You'd fracture the U.N. consensus."

The Security Council resolution authorizes the inspectors "to facilitate the travel of those interviewed" and their family members outside of Iraq. This provision was intended to protect the inspectors from retribution, but even this protection has raised questions.

"Let's say for argument's sake that you are a senior government official," a United Nations expert said. "It is one thing for you to say that it is part of your job to agree to go out of the country to be interviewed, but why would you pull your wife out of her job and the kids out of school? If you wanted to assure Saddam that you had no plans to defect, you would leave them there to reassure him."

Advocates of an aggressive approach argue that the inspectors could order scientists to report with their families, giving them no choice so Mr. Hussein could not blame them. Once out of the country, the scientists could make their own choices. But United Nations officials ask how many family members count in a country built on clans where extended families can run to the dozens or hundreds?

"We are conscious that this is potentially a key issue," a United Nations official said. "But many of us think that defections are best done by a welcoming government. There is no U.N. mechanism for this. The U.N. has no capacity to grant asylum. Any government, and the United States in particular, has all of that capacity."

Mr. Bush's national security advisers were scheduled to meet today to further discuss the questions of how to handle Iraqi scientists.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/06/international/middleeast/06INSP.html>

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Washington Post

December 6, 2002

Pg. 1

Hussein To Allow Further Intrusions

Inspections Will Quell U.S. Claims, Iraqi President Says

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 5 -- President Saddam Hussein said today that his government will continue to tolerate intrusive U.N. arms inspections with the hope they will disprove U.S. allegations that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, suggesting the intense anger here over a surprise search of one of his palaces would not lead Iraq to eject the inspectors.

The Iraqi leader alternated between magnanimous and caustic in his first public comments since the inspections began a week ago. In a rambling, seemingly extemporaneous televised address to top government and military officials, Hussein said he would comply with the searches "to keep our people out of harm's way" in the face of "unjust, arrogant, debased American tyranny."

Iraqi and U.S. officials alike have criticized the inspectors' performance in their first week on the job. Hussein's support for them today -- and the absence of much of the bellicose rhetoric that often infuses his speeches -- appeared to be an attempt, at least in part, to defy U.S. characterizations of him as a dangerous, war-hungry tyrant and cast himself as tolerant and peace-minded.

"Some might claim we didn't give them the proper chance to resist, with tangible evidence, the American allegations that Iraq produced weapons of mass destruction during the period of the inspectors' absence," Hussein said, according to an English translation of his speech provided by the Information Ministry.

Hussein did not make clear to whom he was referring, but it could have been the inspectors, members of his own inner circle or other Arab leaders, several whom have acquiesced to U.S. requests for support in the event the Bush administration carries through on its threats of war.

"For that reason we shall provide them with such a chance," Hussein said of the inspectors, who have returned to Iraq after a four-year hiatus. But, he said, "if the weaklings remain weak and the cowardly remain cowards, then we shall take the stand that befits our people, principles and mission."

Hussein's speech, delivered to commemorate the first day of the major Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr ending the month of Ramadan, contrasted sharply with recent criticism not only by President Bush and his spokesman, but also

by Hussein's own senior lieutenants. One of Iraq's two vice presidents, Taha Yassin Ramadan, accused the U.N. monitors Wednesday night of being U.S. and Israeli spies and of trying to provoke a confrontation by conducting an unannounced inspection of a presidential palace.

"Their work is to spy to serve the CIA and Mossad," Ramadan, who is known for his fiery barbs, said to a delegation of Egyptian businessmen, evoking language reminiscent of Iraq's disputes with inspectors in the 1990s.

Ramadan said the inspectors went to Sijood palace hoping the government would not allow them to enter. That could have been interpreted as a "material breach" of the Nov. 8 U.N. resolution that calls for Iraq to relinquish weapons of mass destruction and authorizes unannounced searches of any site in the country. The resolution states that Iraq could face "serious consequences" if it fails to comply.

The resolution includes "several land mines," Ramadan said, "and the aim is that one of them will go off."

The Foreign Ministry also issued a statement condemning as "unjustified and unnecessary" the inspectors' two-hour visit to the palace on Tuesday, during which they opened cupboards, closets and a refrigerator. And today, an official Iraqi newspaper said in a front-page editorial that the inspectors were at a "dangerous crossroads."

"The work of the inspection teams in coming days will reveal the extent to which UNMOVIC and IAEA will hold onto their international identity that dictates they do not submit to the American, British and Zionist pressure and blackmail and be transformed into a spying eye for America and Britain," al-Jumhuriya newspaper said of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the two bodies charged by the U.N. Security Council to conduct the inspections.

Bush and other U.S. officials have also voiced doubts about the inspections, suggesting that the searches have not been aggressive enough. On Monday, Bush said he was "not encouraged" by the inspections, and on Wednesday he said Hussein "is not somebody who looks like he's interested in complying" with the U.N. resolution.

Disputes have long plagued the inspection process in Iraq. U.N. inspectors first arrived in 1991, shortly after the end of the Persian Gulf War. They have been credited with destroying tons chemical and biological weapons and dismantling the country's nuclear weapons program. But the monitoring ended in 1998 because of disputes over the inspectors' access to weapons sites and Iraqi objections that the United States used some of inspectors as spies.

Hussein delivered his speech this morning to top members of his Baath Party and senior military commanders gathered in an ornate hall in one of his Baghdad palaces. As is common here, the address was not broadcast live for security reasons but was aired later in the day on national television.

The television footage showed a line of military leaders, in olive uniforms and black berets, lining up to salute Hussein and kiss him on the shoulders. After brief remarks by Izzat Ibrahim, vice chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, the Iraqi leader launched into his address. Clad in a gray, double-breasted suit and sitting in an armchair, he spoke for about 30 minutes apparently without notes.

Much of the talk consisted of Hussein's rhetorical staples: harkening back to Iraq's past as the cradle of civilization and center of great empires as well as criticism of Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Genghis Kahn, Hussein said at one point, "did not commit more than what the criminal Zionists are presently doing in Palestine." He also took issue with Arab nations -- although he did not refer to them specifically -- for not being more critical of U.S. policy, accusing them of "plain cowardice." And he urged Iraqis to be patient in the face of the inspections and American threats, insisting that tolerance would not constitute a retreat but "a reassembly or mobilization of forces to make them act in a new framework and with superiority at a later stage."

After a week of searches, the inspectors took a break today and plan to do so Friday as well because of the three-day Eid al-Fitr holiday. On Saturday, Iraq is expected to submit a declaration to the U.N. Security Council specifying any weapons of mass destruction it might possess and outlining its civilian nuclear, chemical and biological programs. Iraqi officials said the document will assert that Iraq no longer has any banned weapons.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16206-2002Dec5.html>

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Washington Post
December 6, 2002
Pg. 7

N. Korea's Defiance Over Inspections 'Very Serious'

The United States said yesterday that the situation in North Korea is "very serious" and that the government there had embarked on a dangerous course after defiantly violating agreements not to develop nuclear arms.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld met South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jun and they spoke with reporters a day after North Korea rejected a call by the International Atomic Energy Agency to open its nuclear arms program to inspections.

Rumsfeld said the defense chiefs discussed military contingency plans for the peninsula, but refused to give details. They stressed that the crisis should be resolved using political pressure on North Korea.

The United States says North Korea admitted in October to enriching uranium secretly for a weapons program but will neither confirm nor deny whether it has nuclear weapons.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16450-2002Dec5.html>

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Birmingham (AL) News

December 5, 2002

Scientist Defends Study On Incinerators

Delay in Anniston just increases danger, lead researcher says

By Mary Orndorff, News Washington correspondent

WASHINGTON -- The lead scientist on the latest study of accidents at chemical weapons incinerators said Wednesday that delaying start-up at the Army's facility in Anniston would only increase the danger to the community.

Charles Kolb, chairman of the National Research Council committee, also said criticism that the report, issued Tuesday, ignored the Army's plans to accelerate incineration in Anniston is unwarranted.

"Unfortunately, we had a very specific statement of task that was negotiated with the sponsor, which was the Army," Kolb said. "That restricted us to commenting on things that actually happened (at older incinerators). We were restricted from commenting on planned operations (in Anniston)."

The report, paid for by the Pentagon but requested last year by U.S. Rep. Bob Riley, found that accidental leaks in Utah and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean over the last several years were serious but not enough to derail the next generation of incinerators planned for Alabama, Oregon and Arkansas. The Army plans to start incinerating 2,254 tons of toxic but obsolete chemical agents and munitions next year that are now stored at the Anniston Army Depot.

Kolb, president of Aerodyne Research Inc. in Massachusetts and an expert in chemical physics, said that because the first munitions into the furnaces are the leakiest and most volatile, the number of chemical agent releases from the storage areas is reduced quickly.

"The risk to the community drops dramatically. I can't see any reason to unnecessarily delay the acquisition of that benefit," Kolb said.

But the Calhoun County Commission last year asked Kolb's panel of scientists and engineers to analyze the Army's plan to incinerate pieces of M55 rockets with gelled sarin still intact. The proposal, nicknamed "chop and drop," is a modification from the original design to drain sarin from the rockets, and destroy the agent and the rocket separately.

The change requires a permit modification from the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, a decision that is pending. Outgoing Gov. Don Siegelman objected to the new method because it has not been tested on such a large scale. It could increase the number of rockets destroyed from one per hour up to 34. But the Army has said it would only gradually increase the rate if it remains safe for workers and the community.

Riley, who is in transition from a member of Congress to the governor's office, is scheduled to meet with Kolb next week about the report and will comment in detail then, a spokesman said.

"I'm pleased the report found that the technology is in fact safe," Riley said through a spokesman.

Riley hasn't said whether he will continue Siegelman's objection to the permit modification, a significant hurdle that could delay start up of the incinerator.

Kolb said the National Research Council in past reports has said the ideal method of incineration is to use separate furnaces for the chemical agents and the munitions. But he doesn't automatically rule out that they could be burned together without endangering the community.

"It violates no laws of physics. Those furnaces are more than hot enough and it stays in there long enough," Kolb said. "But you still have to prove you can do it safely."

Kolb's report recommends that any deviation from standing operating procedure be thoroughly tested.

A separate committee of the National Academy of Sciences is studying the issue of gelled sarin in the M55 rockets. That report is due out in late spring, according to the staff officer in charge.

The National Research Council report released Tuesday also is critical of the poor relationship between the Army, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Anniston community. They've tangled for years over how best to prepare residents in case of a leak from the incinerator, and major differences of opinion remain over what steps should be taken and who should pay for them.

"I am quite sympathetic with Anniston on that. The federal government should get its act together," Kolb said.

Kolb will present the findings of the 134-page report in a public meeting in Anniston on Dec. 17.

http://www.al.com/news/birminghamnews/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html_standard.xml?/base/news/103908332140440.xml

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Norfolk Virginian-Pilot

December 5, 2002

Drill Pushes Emergency Responders To Limit

By Dennis O'Brien

PORTSMOUTH -- The Portsmouth Naval Medical Center on Wednesday fine-tuned its planned response to a massive terrorist attack, with a mass-casualty treatment drill designed to overload hospital resources.

The exercise was designed to push hospital staff and emergency responders beyond the breaking point, so that contingency planners can shore up weak spots long before real victims of a mass-casualty attack show up for treatment. The hospital conducted a similar exercise last December.

Wednesday's drill tested first responders' ability to juggle patients from bombings at the Portsmouth Federal Building and at the Sewells Point Branch Medical Clinic, a nerve-gas attack on the hospital grounds and a suspected anthrax attack within the hospital itself.

"A large portion of what we're drilling here isn't so much the treatment -- it's the logistics of patient flow through the hospital," said Capt. Martin Snyder, head of surgery at the medical center.

The sorting begins outside the hospital, where victims -- even of an apparently conventional bombing attack -- are screened for exposure to chemical or biological weapons. If nerve gas, anthrax or another agent were mixed with the explosive, victims of the attack could contaminate the hospital and its staff.

Those found to be exposed to unconventional weapons would be decontaminated in a pop-up station erected in the hospital parking lot before being admitted to a triage station in the emergency room.

There, victims are sorted out by the gravity -- and treatability -- of their injuries.

"If the O.R. rooms are filled up, you have to make a decision -- sometimes difficult decisions," Snyder said. "Do I take someone off the table to treat a different patient? Have I spent too much time on one patient?"

The drill was far more extensive than last year's. In addition to hospital staff, participants included the Coast Guard, Portsmouth police, ambulance and fire crews, Maryview Medical Center, and agents from the FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

Not only did staffers have to deal with treating the victims of the attacks, but also the "worried well" -- victims' loved ones, the general public and panicked people who are healthy but show up at the emergency room because they are afraid they have been exposed to a deadly chemical or pathogen.

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New York Times

December 9, 2002

Pg. 1

A Top Iraqi Aide Defies U.S. To Find Proof Of Weapons

By John F. Burns

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 8 — An Iraqi general who is a top adviser to President Saddam Hussein challenged the United States and Britain today to produce any evidence they have that Iraq still has any weapons of mass destruction or programs to develop them. But he strongly implied that American intelligence has been right in contending that Iraq came close to building at least one Nagasaki-sized atom bomb by 1991, at the time of the Persian Gulf war.

Adopting a posture of punchy self-confidence and defiance, the Iraqi officer, Gen. Amir al-Saadi, said at a news conference that Iraq's 12,000-page declaration to the United Nations Security Council denying any banned weapons or programs was "entirely accurate."

The long declaration landed at United Nations offices in Vienna and New York, and arms experts immediately began the daunting job of determining whether the material reveals any illegal activity.

With the comments of General Saadi, Mr. Hussein seems to be gambling that the American threat of war will prove to be a bluff.

The Bush administration has alerted the C.I.A. and national laboratories to be ready to go into overdrive, homing in on a few crucial Iraqi claims that the United States believes it can show to be false. But in private, administration officials concede that there is no single piece of dramatic intelligence that Iraq has continued to try to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

General Saadi implied that Mr. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, who have led the pressures for Iraq to meet its disarmament obligations or face attack, will be shown to have no hard evidence.

"We hope they will be investigating, that it will satisfy them, because it's entirely accurate, it's truthful," General Saadi said, referring to the Iraqi declaration. It was produced under a 30-day Security Council deadline and handed over at the United Nations headquarters here on Saturday night, a day ahead of the United Nations' deadline of today.

With the declaration's mass of top-secret technical detail and its history of Iraq's weapons programs going back to the 1980's, it is expected to establish a new base line in the confrontation between the United States and Iraq, helping to settle one way or another whether there will be war.

"If they have anything to the contrary, let them come up with it to the Security Council," General Saadi said. United Nations inspectors are in Iraq hunting down any secret weapons programs that may survive; they are swooping down every day on plants, research institutes and laboratories suspected of harboring banned programs.

"Why play this game?" General Saadi asked.

The United Nations weapons inspectors continued their daily missions today, visiting a government mining and survey company in Baghdad that has past association with uranium processing, and a pesticide plant west of Baghdad. Pesticide production can be converted to production of chemical weapons.

The Iraqi officer spoke mostly in English, aiming mainly at television audiences in the United States, but he took care to offer his rebuke to the Bush administration in Arabic, too.

"We don't understand the rush of judgment," he said. "A superpower should study and take its time in judging, especially as everyone is looking on it as it prepares for a huge military campaign, for an aggression against Iraq. It should behave wisely."

The Bush administration has said it intends to take time to analyze the documents, and no doubt will seize on the most startling of the admissions that came out of General Saadi's news conference: his suggestion of how far Iraq had progressed by 1991 toward acquiring a nuclear bomb.

All the work came to an end, he said, on Jan. 17, 1991, when the first President Bush ordered the bombing of Iraq to begin, five months after Iraq invaded Kuwait.

On that topic, the 64-year-old general, a chemical engineer who rose to become Mr. Hussein's most trusted lieutenant in the secret weapons hierarchy, seemed proud, even regretful, that the gulf war with the United States, and the bombing of Iraq's most coveted nuclear sites, had disrupted its most ambitious weapons venture of all.

The general was asked how close Iraq had come to acquiring a nuclear weapon. Speaking in English acquired during doctoral studies at the University of London in the 1960's, he replied, "We haven't reached the final assembly of a bomb, nor tested it," and added, "If you follow the documents we have given, there is no guarantee that you would succeed."

Yet he danced close to the idea that considerable progress had been made. "We don't know, it's for others to judge, it's for the International Atomic Energy Agency to judge, how close we were," he said. "If I tell you we were close, it's subjective, maybe promotional."

That Iraq made headway toward acquiring a nuclear weapon, and its cloak-and-dagger stratagems, has been chronicled in detail by the international atomic agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

A C.I.A. report made public in October said Iraq began a crash program to build a bomb immediately after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, planning to divert highly enriched uranium from internationally safeguarded research reactors that France and the Soviet Union supplied.

A British government dossier published in September gave other details. It said that after the Kuwait occupation, Iraq planned to build a "gas-centrifuge cascade" to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium from a Soviet-made research reactor, also using fuel from the Osirak reactor that Israeli jets bombed in 1981. The British said the aim was to produce a bomb with a 20-kiloton yield, similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki in 1945.

But what made General Saadi's remarks the more stunning was that it was the first time any Iraqi official other than a defector had spoken so candidly, in public, about a project that would have made Iraq the Arab world's instant military superpower.

The general devoted a large part of the one-hour news conference to spelling out details of Iraq's nuclear program as described to the Security Council. He said that 2,087 pages of the declaration were devoted to nuclear weapons and that the declaration included sections on the two methods Iraq used to try to obtain a domestic supply of weapons-grade fuel, electromagnetic isotope separation and gas-centrifuge enrichment. He cited a passage on Iraq's work to develop a "trigger" for the bomb and to achieve "the final shaping of the device."

He explained, "In scientific jargon, 'device' means the bomb."

General Saadi seemed well chosen for the role he played today. He is also one of the Iraqis most trusted by Mr. Hussein, whom he now serves with the title of presidential adviser.

He has an encyclopedic knowledge of the secret weapons programs and how far advanced they were — in nuclear weapons, in deadly chemical and biological agents that were in the process of being "weaponized" and packed into bombs and missiles warheads, and in missiles that were rapidly advancing to the stage where they could have achieved ranges of as much as 1,850 miles.

In the mid-1990's, when the crisis over Iraq's attempts to hide its weapons programs from United Nations inspections peaked, he was the official heading the Military Industrialization Commission, in overall charge of all the clandestine programs. In that position, he clashed frequently with the international weapons inspectors, as Iraqi denials that it had any banned programs, and the repertoire of harassment and obstruction faced by the inspectors, were swept away by United Nations discoveries of projects Baghdad had disclaimed.

The breakthrough came in 1995, when the military industrialization minister, Gen. Hussein Kamel, who was Mr. Hussein's son-in-law and General Saadi's immediate boss, defected to Jordan and, in debriefing sessions with C.I.A. experts, laid out a blueprint of the secret programs. General Kamel was later lured back to Baghdad and killed in a shootout at his sister's home.

General Saadi's remarks at the news conference were peppered with frustration at the work imposed on Iraq in compiling its dossier, and the threats made by the United States if it made a single mistake in accounting for its banned programs.

He said the requirement that Iraq account for all so-called dual use programs and materials, meaning civilian enterprises that use processes and resources similar to the weapons projects, meant that Iraq had to list in the declaration thousands of undertakings that had nothing to do with weapons, like canneries, refineries, dairies and fertilizer factories.

Reporters focused many of their questions on attempts to get General Saadi to say whether the declaration contained any new disclosures. They inquired about any banned weapons or weapons programs that Iraq has not previously admitted to the United Nations inspectors, whether from 1991 to 1998, when the inspections regime collapsed in the face of Iraqi obstruction, or after 1998.

Iraq might have tried to avoid war by admitting it had some secret programs until recently, but had scrapped them all. That might have allowed Iraq to square its insistence in recent weeks that it has no secret programs with whatever fresh intelligence evidence the United States and Britain can bring forward.

General Saadi rejected that route, at least until an American television reporter posed the question about new programs for the third or fourth time.

"I recommend that you read the declaration," the general said, apparently sarcastically, because the declaration will not be made public for some days, if then.

"Is there new evidence?" he asked. "I'm not going to answer that."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/09/international/middleeast/09IRAQ.html>

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Washington Times
December 9, 2002
Pg. 1

N. Korea Seeks Aid From China On Nukes

Attempts to buy fuel component

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

North Korea is trying to buy a chemical from China used in the production of nuclear-weapons fuel that U.S. intelligence officials say is a sign the communist government in Pyongyang is continuing to secretly develop nuclear arms, The Washington Times has learned.

North Korean government agents were tracked by U.S. intelligence to several Chinese companies that make the chemical, known as tributyl phosphate, or TBP, said officials familiar with classified intelligence reports.

"This shows they are moving ahead with their uranium [nuclear-weapons] program," an intelligence official said.

The chemical has commercial uses, but U.S. intelligence agencies believe the North Koreans want the TBP as part of the uranium-based nuclear-arms development program, which the CIA estimates is about two years away from being able to produce fuel for nuclear bombs.

The TBP "will be used to turn spent [nuclear] fuel into weapons-grade uranium," the official said.

A CIA spokesman declined to comment.

The Chinese companies involved in the North Korean chemical deal were not identified. However, Chinese companies have been sanctioned by the Bush administration at least three times in the past year for similar weapons-related sales to Iran and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence agencies also have detected recent activity at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility that may signal the communist government in Pyongyang is preparing to restart the reactor, which was shut as part of a 1994 agreement, an intelligence official said.

A State Department intelligence bureau report made public last month stated that North Korea has not reloaded the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and had stopped construction of larger 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt reactors at the site. "It is not producing fuel at the fuel fabrication facility at Yongbyon, and it has forgone reprocessing spent fuel," the bureau said in written answers to questions from the Senate intelligence committee.

North Korean government officials in October confirmed U.S. intelligence reports that the government is developing uranium-based nuclear arms, despite promises to freeze nuclear-weapons development under the 1994 agreement.

The disclosure led the United States to cut off fuel oil shipments last month. The oil was meant to help North Korean energy shortfalls until the electrical-power-generating reactors are built during the next several years.

North Korea responded to the cutoff by announcing that the 1994 accord was nullified.

Asked about the North Korean nuclear-arms program on Thursday, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said he discussed the issue with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jun during meetings at the Pentagon.

North Korea's continuing efforts to build nuclear weapons in violation of arms agreements will be a topic of discussion in talks in the region by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who is visiting the South Pacific this week. Mr. Armitage will make stops in South Korea, Japan, Australia and China.

On Friday, the State Department announced that a year-end meeting of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization would be postponed until next month. The meeting of the organization, which deals with energy issues in North Korea, had been scheduled to discuss how the United States, Japan and South Korea would respond to North Korea's nuclear program.

The Bush administration is waiting until after South Korea holds presidential elections, set for Dec. 19, before deciding how to deal with the growing nuclear showdown with the North.

The administration is especially concerned that the candidate of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party, which has taken a conciliatory line toward the North Korean nuclear-arms program, will be elected.

Diplomatically, the administration is working within the 41-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to curb sales of weapons goods, including TBP, to North Korea.

"There's no question but that the situation in North Korea is very serious," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters last week.

"They have violated several agreements and proceeded on a very dangerous course."

Nuclear-arms specialists say TBP is used in purifying uranium and also can be used for making new plutonium fuel at the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

TBP also is used for reprocessing spent plutonium fuel.

Leonard S. Spector, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif., said the reported North Korean chemical dealing could mean several things.

"Depending on their timing, these activities could signal that, in response to the new confrontation with the United States, North Korea is getting ready to exploit the demise of the Agreed Framework," Mr. Spector said.

The 1994 Agreed Framework was supposed to have halted all work on North Korea's nuclear weapons in exchange for the United States, Japan and South Korea providing the North with two nuclear-electrical-power reactors.

Mr. Spector said the North Koreans may be sending signals through the attempted purchase of TBP as "a way for Pyongyang to turn up the heat a little, without going to the brink."

Mr. Spector said he believes that as long as North Korea allows nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, "the North Koreans want a deal, not a blowup."

North Korea announced last week that it had rejected a request from the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities, including those at Yongbyon.

The international nuclear agency announced Nov. 29 that North Korea should immediately permit nuclear inspections and "give up any nuclear-weapons program, expeditiously and in a verifiable manner."

"The [North Korean] government cannot accept the Nov. 29 resolution of the IAEA board of governors in any case and there is no change in its principled stand on the nuclear issue," North Korea's central news agency said, citing a Dec. 2 letter from Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun.

President Bush had said North Korea is one of three "axis of evil" states. The others are Iraq and Iran.

The CIA released an unclassified assessment of the North Korean nuclear-arms program last month.

The agency concluded that North Korea could build several plutonium bombs right away and add one bomb every year until 2005 if the Agreed Framework collapses. Beginning in 2005, North Korea could begin large-scale production of nuclear weapons — up to 50 bombs a year.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021209-32546824.htm>

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New York Times
December 9, 2002

U.N. Teams Begin Analysis Of Documents From The Iraqis

By Julia Preston with Mark Landler

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 8 — Enormous troves of documents containing Iraq's declarations on its weapons programs arrived at the United Nations offices in Vienna and New York today. Arms experts immediately began the daunting job of determining whether the material reveals any illegal arms activity.

A 2,100-page report detailing Iraq's nuclear activities, packed into a green suitcase, arrived in the evening at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Inspectors there lost no time assembling a team of six people, including three Arabic speakers, to scrutinize it and translate the Arabic portions.

"We have a small team that is going to screen it in order to assess the amount of effort we need to put in in the upcoming week," said Jacques Baute, the leader of the nuclear agency's team for Iraq.

Other documents arrived at the United Nations Headquarters around 8:30 p.m. after being ferried by the weapons team from Baghdad to Cyprus and from there through Frankfurt to New York. The bundles were headed for the offices of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which monitors chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles. Hans Blix, the director, was to take a first look to figure out how to organize the work ahead.

Mr. Blix's team also received the copy of the declarations destined for the Security Council under the terms of its Resolution 1441, which set up the toughened weapons inspections that began in Iraq on Nov. 27. The 15 nations on the Council, including the United States, decided on Friday not to take possession of their copies until Mr. Blix has removed for his confidential safekeeping any information that might be used by rogue nations or terrorists to make prohibited weapons.

[But United Nations officials and diplomats said that in a surprise decision late Sunday, the Security Council agreed to give the United States, Russia, France, China and Britain full access to Iraq's declaration, The Associated Press reported. The decision means that Washington will not have to wait to begin its own analysis and translation.

[Under the agreement, the other 10 Council members, including Syria, will only see the declaration once it is translated, analyzed and gleaned of sensitive material — including possible instructions on bomb-making.]

Mr. Blix and the director of the nuclear inspection team, Mohamed ElBaradei, are keenly aware that analyses of the declarations, which run more than 12,000 pages in all, would take many months under ordinary circumstances. But they will have to move much more quickly to satisfy the demands of the United States and other countries that are skeptical that President Saddam Hussein has really been truthful about his secret arms projects.

United Nations officials said the long down time the inspectors had before going back to work in Iraq could now pay off, since they have been able to study and absorb Iraq's previous arms declarations. Before the inspections were suspended in December 1998, Iraq made three declarations on long-range missiles, three on chemical weapons and five on its biological programs, a United Nations official said.

"The silver lining in the fact that we have not been inspecting is that we have instead been familiarizing ourselves with our data base," said Ewen Buchanan, the spokesman for the weapons team here.

The documents will be turned over in New York to a team of about 15 experts headed by Jean-Louis Rolland, a former French military officer who is a chemical weapons expert and now is chief of the analysis unit of the

weapons team here. They will make an initial assessment to determine how much of the documentation is new and how much was included by Iraq in past declarations.

A new requirement under Resolution 1441 is for Iraq to submit a complete declaration of all of its civilian chemical and biological industries that could possibly be taking part in secret weapons programs. Iraqi officials and Mr. Blix had raised doubts about whether Iraqi officials could mobilize the necessary documents on those industries by the 30-day deadline set by the resolution. But Iraq appears to have provided a mountain of paper in the appointed time. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in a statement, hailed the declaration and said it confirms Iraq's "commitment to act in compliance" with the resolution.

By contrast, the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, said he would not rush to judge the declaration, but he said past Iraqi declarations had turned out to be "a pack of lies."

The atomic agency said that an initial assessment of the report would be made in 7 to 10 days and that Mr. ElBaradei would present the results to the Security Council on Dec. 19.

"We are going to begin immediately the painstaking and systematic process of checking the veracity of the document against the facts that our inspectors find on the ground," the agency said in a statement.

Mr. ElBaradei, who left Vienna for Japan on Saturday, pleaded for patience with the review process, saying his agency needed time "to do a proper job."

Atomic agency officials said their preliminary analysis indicated there were some new elements in the documents — a claim made by Iraq officials before the delivery. The agency officials did not give details.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/09/international/middleeast/09NATI.html>

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Washington Post

December 9, 2002

Pg. 16

Iraq Lacks New Proof Of Arms Destruction

U.S., U.N. Had Demanded Evidence for Claims

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 8 -- The 12,000-page arms declaration Iraq submitted to the United Nations offers no new evidence to support Iraq's contention that it destroyed biological and chemical weapons in the 1990s, a top adviser to President Saddam Hussein said tonight.

Gen. Amir Saadi challenged the United States to disprove Iraq's contention that it no longer has any weapons of mass destruction. "If they have anything to the contrary, let them forthwith come up with it," he said.

The Bush administration and U.N. inspectors had demanded that the declaration, which was flown today from Baghdad to U.N. headquarters in New York, support Iraq's claims that it had destroyed its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. U.S. and U.N. officials have long been skeptical of Iraq's assertion and insisted on seeing proof that Baghdad eliminated tons of bacteriological and nerve agents it covertly produced and weaponized in the 1980s.

The lack of new evidence could prove to be a key point of contention as U.N. arms experts pore through the hefty declaration and the Bush administration prepares its formal response to the submission. In a 1999 report to the Security Council, arms inspectors said their most significant unresolved issue with Iraq was its failure to fully account for the biological and chemical weapons it had acknowledged producing.

"Iraq's past declarations were not accepted as a full account of the scale and the scope of Iraq's [biological weapons] program," the inspectors wrote.

Saadi, however, said today that the Iraqi government was unable to find any documents about the destruction beyond those it already had turned over to the United Nations over the past decade. "Those documents have not been increased, not by a single document," he said at a news conference. "We have done all researching we could and we could not find any more."

The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, recently expressed doubt about Iraq's claims that it did not have more thorough evidence. "The production of mustard gas is not like marmalade," he said on a trip to Baghdad last month. "You have to keep some records."

Saadi's comments provided the most detailed description yet of the contents of Iraq's submission, a document that could determine whether Hussein's government is deemed to have violated a recently passed U.N. Security Council resolution, an act that U.S. officials have said could trigger a U.S. military campaign to topple the Iraqi leader.

In a series of declarations in the 1990s, Iraq acknowledged making three types of biological weapons, including one that spreads anthrax bacteria. Iraq also admitted to developing nearly four tons of VX nerve gas and between 100 and 150 tons of Sarin, both highly lethal compounds. But inspectors never were able to verify claims by Hussein's government that it destroyed everything it manufactured.

Saadi insisted today that all of Iraq's biological and chemical agents had been eliminated. Iraq contends that much of it was done in secret, without U.N. inspectors present.

"It's not just a claim," he said. "It's a fact."

But, he said, Iraq erred by destroying not just the forbidden compounds but also documentation of its manufacture and destruction. Iraq's biological weapons program "was totally and completely removed before the inspectors arrived in Iraq," he said. "When you remove something completely, it no longer exists and if you want to do it properly, you also remove all the evidence that it ever existed. That's what we did, and retrospectively, it was a mistake."

Saadi said the declaration, which was required of Iraq under a Security Council resolution passed unanimously last month, includes an extensive history of the country's weapons programs and an account of civilian nuclear, chemical and biological activities since U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Much of the document, he said, lists "dual-use" facilities and technologies that could have civilian and military functions.

Among them, he said, were breweries, leather tanneries, hospital laboratories and food-processing facilities because of the chemicals and fermentation units used there. "Even dairies that produce cheese -- they're included," he said.

"We hope that it will satisfy because it is currently accurate, as they've asked for, and comprehensive and truthful," he said. He called on the Bush administration, which says Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction, to provide evidence to the two agencies inspecting Iraq: the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"They are here," he said. "They could check it. Why play this game?"

During television news shows, Sens. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), Richard D. Lugar (R-Ind.) and Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.), along with former vice president Al Gore, were all highly skeptical of Iraq's weapons report, saying they doubted Hussein would tell the truth about whether he has developed weapons of mass destruction.

"We are in possession of what I think to be compelling evidence that Saddam Hussein has, and has had for a number of years, a developing capacity for the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction," said Graham, chairman of the Senate intelligence committee.

Graham also warned that the Iraqi leadership would lash out at Americans if attacked.

"One of the ways [Hussein] will display that danger is by energizing a series of terrorist attacks inside the United States of America," he said. "We need to be certain that we've done everything, in the days and weeks that remain, to decapitate the capability for that kind of terrorist attack inside the U.S."

Saadi, 64, a British-trained chemist who serves at Hussein's senior-most science adviser, expressed indignation that some U.S. officials suggested that the declaration was an attempt to flood U.N. inspectors with paper, instead of saying that Iraq had to go to great lengths to compile an 11,807-page document as well as additional data on at least 10 compact discs within the one-month window mandated by the Security Council. "It's not a telephone directory," he said on three occasions in a 45-minute news conference.

Without divulging specifics, he provided a basic outline of the declaration's section on nuclear weapons research. It starts with an 80-page introduction that outlines the development of Iraq's nuclear program, organizations and finances, he said. Then a 363-page chapter details technologies employed by Iraqi scientists, including "electromagnetic isotope separation" and "uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion."

Finally, Saadi said, there is a 333-page chapter on "device development."

"In the nuclear jargon," he said, "that's the bomb."

He said Iraqi researchers, whose nuclear-weapons work ended with the 1991 Persian Gulf War, had "not reached the final assembly of the bomb."

The United Nations does not plan to immediately release the declaration because of concerns that some of the data might help other nations produce chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Saadi said Iraq would not object if U.N. inspectors wanted to take Iraqi scientists outside the country for questioning, a tactic permitted by the resolution and encouraged by U.S. officials. "Some things are like medicines -- bitter pills," he said.

Although Saadi, arguably Iraq's top weapons expert, pointedly refused to answer whether he would leave if asked, he said Hussein's government would continue to comply with the inspections.

"Of course, nobody is happy being inspected," he said. "When you are frisked at the airport, are you happy? Do you feel comfortable? But it's for your own safety."

Staff writer Marc Kaufman in Washington contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28283-2002Dec8.html>

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Wall Street Journal
December 9, 2002

Ironic Chemistry: The U.N. Boosts Saddam's Threat

By Stephen D. Bryen

If inspections in Iraq fail, as is probable, the U.S. will use military force in order to oust Saddam Hussein from power. Saddam will likely deploy his chemical and biological arsenal. The Iraqi army's chemical weapons corps is experienced, having launched many attacks in the war with Iran. Such weapons, also used against Kurdish civilians, are mixtures of chemicals and agents. One such "cocktail" is called "Blue Acid," consisting of mustard gas, cyanide and nerve gases, predominantly sarin. A declassified 1992 intelligence report says that Iran disassembled unexploded Iraqi chemical weapons and found mixtures of three nerve agents -- tabun, sarin and soman, plus yellow rain, micotoxins, mustard gas, cyanide and a number of other chemicals.

Under a secret U.S. program supporting Iraq against Iran, some Americans saw Iraq launch chemical attacks against Iranian positions. In a little-noticed book published in 1999, by Rick Francona ("Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace"), the author describes the 1988 battle for control of the Faw peninsula. "The Iraqi use of chemicals at Al-Faw was unmistakable," says Col. Francona, who toured overrun Iranian positions with Iraqi officers. "What I saw were used atropine injectors all over the place. And atropine is used as an antidote for only one thing: nerve gas."

Over the last month the U.S. has tried to reverse a U.N. decision made last May which allows Iraq to buy atropine and atropine auto-injectors designed for military use. Atropine is the only effective antidote to nerve gas, and no army will use nerve gas if it can't protect its own units. This is because of the risk that agents may leak when loaded into missiles and shells, and the danger of wind shifts in battle.

U.S.-made auto injectors contain atropine sulphate and pralidoxime in two separate chambers inside a single injector. These counteract nerve gas and help restore muscle strength. Atropine lasts about six months to a year in field use, and up to five years if stored properly. Before the Gulf War, Saddam tried to buy 1.5 million militarized atropine injectors from the U.S. His supply of injectors from the Soviet Union had dried up, and all Iraq could get were out-of-date Eastern European atropine injectors from the 1950s. In Spring 1988, the State Department was promoting this sale to Iraq just as it was turning a blind eye to the atrocities being committed by Iraq against Iranians and Kurds. Thanks to Pentagon action, State's initiative was blocked.

Saddam didn't use chemical weapons in the Gulf War for two reasons. One: his troops lacked atropine auto injectors. Captured Iraqi documents show that Iraqi forces were equipped with gas masks and training in the use of chemical weapons. But they didn't have atropine for the troops. (Saddam secretly supplied atropine pills to key government officials and his own family, but pills work too slowly to be of much use.) Two: Saddam believed the U.S. did have chemical weapons and would use them if Iraq used theirs.

For many years the U.S. said officially there was no Iraqi nerve gas or other chemical weapons in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations and those U.S. forces were never exposed to any of these agents. However, recent medical studies demonstrate that the brain damage suffered by some Gulf War veterans is nearly identical to the brain damage suffered by victims of the Tokyo subway sarin attack launched by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. These revelations forced the official admission that chemical weapons were in the KTO in bunkers at a place called Khamisiyah. Evidence shows there were some 6,240 mustard gas-filled 155mm artillery shells and 2,160 sarin-filled SAKR-18 rockets in the bunker. Khamisiyah had been bombed and it is possible residues of the nerve gas got into the air exposing our troops to small doses of the agents.

Iraqi troops now have large stocks of atropine auto injectors, clearing the way for the use of chemical weapons against U.S. forces if war breaks out. The U.S. military is better prepared for a chemical weapons attack than in 1991, with better training, equipment and a strategy to take out Iraq's artillery and rockets. But when chemical weapons are unleashed there is collateral damage to civilians. Moreover, Iraq directly threatens neighbors like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel with chemical and biological warfare. Ironically, the U.N. and its not-so-smart "smart sanctions" has made it easier for Saddam to use weapons of mass destruction again.

Mr. Bryen was director of the Defense Technology Security Administration in the Reagan administration

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Time

December 16, 2002

Notebook

Nuclear Terror: No Entry

How concerned is the government that a terrorist could smuggle nuclear material into the U.S.? Concerned enough that the U.S. Customs Service is quietly installing new technology to better detect radiation at mail facilities, airports, seaports, rail yards and across the U.S. border. The new "radiation-portal-detection systems," costing \$100,000 to \$150,000 apiece, will supplement current technology, which consists of radiation "pagers" worn on the belts of customs personnel. Containers and vehicles will pass through the devices, which can pick up a wider variety of radioactive emissions than the pagers, from weapons-grade plutonium to medical waste that could be used as shrapnel in a "dirty bomb." And unlike the pagers, which only check containers singled out for inspection, the new portal devices will be routinely applied to all cargo, not just the high-risk kind. Customs is installing the devices at the exit gates of the nation's major seaports and at key traffic choke points, such as international bridges, tunnels, rail crossings and U.S. Postal and private parcel-shipping facilities. One prototype has already been deployed at a busy commercial crossing along the U.S.-Canadian border. More will follow — but to foil terrorists, Customs isn't advertising where or when. And no photos are permitted.

-- Elaine Shannon

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101021216-397506,00.html>

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Christian Science Monitor

December 9, 2002

Pg. 1

Next Moves For US On Iraq Weapons List

Barring a smoking gun, US likely faces a long process in trying to prove pattern of deceit.

By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – Iraq's submission of a 12,000-page declaration of its weapons inventory presents the US with both opportunities and pitfalls as it tries to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein to reveal everything he has and keep its own options for war open.

Tuesday US officials will start combing through the Iraqi report - a veritable Manhattan phone book in Arabic and English, clogged with information on every last chemical factory that churns out rubber sandals - to look for inconsistencies and omissions.

In theory, the Bush administration will compare what's in the declaration to its own purported "solid" intelligence of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. It could then point out these discrepancies to United Nations weapons inspectors, or even go for a dramatic return, evidence in hand, to the UN Security Council. To the extent the US finds clear and substantial contradictions, it would help buttress its case domestically and internationally for the necessity of "regime change" in Iraq.

In practice, however, the process will likely be more difficult than that. For one thing, no one knows just how much evidence the US has of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, though that can be a tactical advantage for Washington. Will there be a "smoking gun" omission, for instance?

If there isn't - and many experts don't think there is - the US would have to prove a pattern of deceit. That risks getting bogged down in minutiae. By pointing out every last petri dish and aluminum tube that could be used for military purposes, the Bush administration could get involved in a PR war with Mr. Hussein over details that detract from the overall threat the US believes he represents.

"This is a delicate moment for the Bush administration, and the way they play the coming days is going to set in motion what ends up happening on this whole Iraqi crisis for the months ahead," says Lawrence Korb, a Pentagon official in the Reagan years. "They've got themselves in this situation where, before going to war, they're going to have to let the inspections play out for a while."

Needle in a haystack

With the UN program accelerating - the number of inspectors may jump from 50 now to about 100 by Christmas - the US could find the months ahead more a matter of needle-in-haystack searching and technical reporting rather than warfare, some experts say.

"It's very possible Iraq could be in 'material breach' of the UN resolution and it not lead to war but to more robust inspections," says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. The UN resolution passed Nov. 8 says that "false statements or omissions" in Iraq's declaration would constitute a "material breach" - diplomatic parlance for a justification for military action - if the problems were accompanied by a lack of Iraqi cooperation to address them.

Rather than the Iraqi declaration triggering a "showdown," Mr. Cirincione believes the information sets up a round of delicate technical, intelligence, and diplomatic work "that will take weeks to play out."

That may suit the White House fine, since all the elements of the American military buildup in the region are not in place for a possible war, military experts say. But what would constitute a clear defeat for the US would be Iraqi success at using its declaration to cover up its weapons programs. After having declared repeatedly it knows Iraq still has such programs, the US now must provide proof or risk losing the opportunity to finally deal with a regime most of the world agrees constitutes a serious threat.

"After what we've been saying, the rest of the world is going to ask, 'Where's the beef?' and will want something convincing," says Rear Admiral (Ret.) Stephen Baker of the Center for Defense Information here.

The US faces the difficult task of deciding how to reveal the information it has, information that experts in and out of government say comes at least in part from either defectors or is gleaned from sources inside Iraq.

The issue is causing a not-so-private tug-of-war between the Bush administration and the UN inspections team. Divulging such information is delicate because it could threaten individuals whom the Iraqi regime could surmise are the only likely sources, and it could tip off the Iraqi regime to destroy evidence before inspectors have a chance to get to it.

Protection for Iraqi scientists

How the US and Iraq handle any forthcoming information could also cause Iraqis with information, like scientists, to clam up rather than risk their lives. That is why the US is insisting that inspectors take advantage of a provision in the UN resolution that calls for removing key information holders - and their families - from the country for debriefing. Last week Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, met with Hans Blix, who heads the UN inspection effort, to press the US position.

But Mr. Blix responded by calling on the US to turn over whatever information it has. Most analysts believe the US, having bought into the UN process, will have to do just that. "Sure it's a risk, but we're going to have to take that risk and turn over what we have," says Mr. Korb, now an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

"Otherwise, we're never going to have much support from the international community for going after Saddam."

The US may be gleaning some of its intelligence from special operations forces already in Iraq. "We have a list of 10,000 nuclear scientists, chemical engineers, and technicians inside Iraq," says Admiral Baker. "I assume we've got some information from someone. But the question is how do we use it?"

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1209/p01s01-usgn.html>

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U.S. Concerned About Nuke Smuggling in Central Asia

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By Adam Tanner

GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, Germany (Reuters) - Radioactive material that could potentially be used to make so-called "dirty bombs" has been seized at border posts in Central Asia in the past 12 months, a senior Defense Department official said Monday.

The smuggled material, contaminated metals, was confiscated at checkpoints along the Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan borders, Harlan Strauss, director of International Counterproliferation Programs at the Defense Department, told Reuters.

"It is possible to be reprocessed and to be utilized in a way that radioactive material can be used for a dispersal device or a small weapon to contaminate an area," he said.

Dirty bombs scatter radioactive material using conventional explosive devices.

"There continues to be movement of material across borders which is of concern," Strauss said on the sidelines of a conference on terrorism.

"We have recently, particularly in Central Asia, stopped some shipments of radioactive material exiting the region. In this case it was contaminated metals. How radioactive is a question of debate and discussion. Where it was going was unclear because the papers were not legit."

The United States has been concerned since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 that instability and economic hardship could prompt low-paid scientific workers to smuggle material that could be used to make nuclear or biological weapons.

Worries that a fundamentalist Islamic group such as al Qaeda could acquire such destructive items have increased hugely since last September's attacks on the United States.

Over the past decade at least 88 pounds (40 kg) of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium has been stolen from poorly protected nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, according to a report published by Stanford University's Institute for International Studies earlier this year.

While most of this material was subsequently retrieved, at least 4.4 pounds of highly enriched uranium stolen from a reactor in Georgia remains missing.

In Russia, U.S.-funded radiation detectors installed at eight border crossings have detected more than 275 cases involving contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo and other radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation concern, a General Accounting Office official told a U.S. congressional committee in October.

The United States has spent about \$86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear and other metals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction.

<http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=1875435>

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