


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Arms Inspectors Set To Begin

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 — The campaign to eliminate Iraq's most deadly weapons officially begins on Monday, when 18 United Nations inspectors are scheduled to arrive in Baghdad toting thick dossiers on hundreds of potential weapons sites, from warehouses to clinics to breweries to petrochemical plants.

The team plans to make its first inspection on Wednesday, when it will scour an undisclosed site for tell-tale equipment, chemicals and documents that could provide clues that Iraq has rekindled covert biological, chemical and nuclear programs since 1998, when United Nations inspectors last withdrew.

The initial searches will probably involve well-known sites long associated with Iraq's weapons programs, and are expected to be essentially warm-up exercises unlikely to produce confrontations or much evidence, according to United Nations officials and other arms control experts.

But in the coming weeks, the inspections will become increasingly aggressive and less predictable as the team gains experience, expands its fleet of jeeps and German helicopters and grows to its full size: 80 to 100 people by the end of the year. The team is led by Hans Blix, an experienced veteran of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but includes many people with less experience, including some who have never been to Iraq before.

"I think Blix is under immense, quiet pressure from the United States," said Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"If he doesn't go to core inspection areas quickly, he understands he will be in a quiet confrontation with the United States," Mr. Cordesman said.

What concerns American and United Nations officials most are two potential Iraqi innovations for hiding weapons: mobile biological weapons labs and underground or urban facilities for chemical and nuclear weapons.

Weapons experts say the new urban sites are probably housed in ordinary-looking warehouses and commercial buildings in densely populated areas, where they would be harder to detect by spy satellites and somewhat shielded from American bombs.

"It would be like something from 'The Man From U.N.C.L.E.,' where you go in a plain storefront and suddenly find yourself in a weapons lab," said David Albright, a former nuclear weapons inspector who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, referring to the 1960's television spy series.

The inspectors will be following a three-part strategy, former inspectors and United Nations officials say. First, they will search for clear evidence of weapons production that could lead directly to charges that Iraq is in "material breach" of United Nations Resolution 1441 requiring it to disarm.

But given President Saddam Hussein's expertise at hiding weapons, officials say it is more likely that violations will be documented incrementally, through painstaking detective work that could take months.

To that end, inspectors will be meticulously documenting two other types of evidence: patterns of deceit and attempts to obstruct inspections. These could range from disabling jeeps to destroying documents to refusing to account for weapons materials that inspectors are certain exist.

"The strategy is to come up with a dossier of deception," said Dr. Raymond A. Zilinskas, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is now with the Monterey Institute for International Studies in California.

A crucial point will come on Dec. 8, when Iraq is required to produce a comprehensive list of all its weapons sites and dual-use installations: industrial plants, agricultural sites, medical labs and research centers that could have both civilian and military uses. Iraq has hundreds, possibly thousands, of such sites.

The declaration must also account for weapons materials that inspectors had documented before 1998: hundreds of artillery shells potentially filled with mustard gas, Scud missiles capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads, hundreds of tons of poison gases, and seed stock for biological agents like anthrax or botulinum toxin.

"The declaration will be huge," said Gustavo Zlauvinen, the New York representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which will handle the nuclear weapons inspections. "It will take weeks to get through."

The declaration will immediately be sent to New York, where a team of 17 analysts will begin checking it against a vast archive containing a million pages of procurement records, blueprints, satellite photos and intelligence cables compiled over the last decade.

"If the declaration is patently false and everybody can see it," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said on Thursday, "if he does not let the inspectors do their job, then the president is fully ready to take the necessary step, which is military force."

Another important task for the inspectors will be to interview Iraqi scientists and search for defectors. One such defector helped inspectors discover and nearly dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons program in 1991. Many experts say the more bellicose the United States is about an invasion, the greater the likelihood of high-level defections.

"I don't think the inspectors have an idea where to look for these things," said Kelly Motz, editor of Iraq Watch, an arms control group.

"Predators and satellites are great," Ms. Motz said, referring to pilotless drones, "but you need people inside buildings."

With an economy that is heavily reliant on the petrochemical industry, Iraq has a large number of dual-use plants that could be involved in manufacturing chemical weapons. Typical of them is Fallujah II, a major producer of precursor agents for blister and nerve gases before the Persian Gulf war in 1991. The plant, northwest of Baghdad, has been upgraded in the last two years and production of chlorine and phenol, which also have civilian uses, has increased, Western intelligence officials say.

Tracking Iraq's nuclear weapons sites is considered less complicated because of the radioactivity they emit and because the United Nations compiled a detailed picture of Iraq's program in the early 1990's.

Since then, Western intelligence agencies believe that Iraq has reconstituted its program and tried to purchase specialized aluminum tubes that could be used for enriching uranium. Some experts, however, think the tubes are for benign purposes.

Inspectors are likely to check nuclear research centers at Tuwaitha and Al Furat, where construction work has been detected and which might be hiding gas centrifuge equipment for enriching uranium, Western officials assert. They will also inspect nuclear medicine clinics to account for radioactive materials that could be used in dirty bombs.

"It's much easier to detect nuclear signatures," said Mr. Zlauvinen of the atomic energy agency.

Biological weapons materials are another matter, because they can be smaller, harder to detect and easier to move. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld warned this year that Iraq had created mobile biological labs that would be difficult to bomb.

Major sites historically involved in biological weapons production include Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which was recently renovated, and the castor oil production plant at Fallujah III, which can be used to produce ricin toxin.

Western intelligence officials also say Iraq's efforts to develop missiles capable of traveling from 600 to 1,000 kilometers, or about 400 to 600 miles, have been reinvigorated. Under previous United Nations resolutions, Iraq is only allowed missiles with ranges under 150 kilometers, or about 90 miles.

British and American intelligence agencies have recently released satellite photos showing construction at two sites that might be used for building and testing longer range missiles: Al Mamoun solid rocket motor production plant and Al Rafah/Shahiyat liquid propellant test site.

At some point, the inspectors will also try to search eight so-called presidential palaces. Iraq had placed restrictions on the inspectors' access to the palaces. These are huge complexes, each with official residences, Republican Guard barracks and dozens, even hundreds, of support buildings. Mr. Hussein also has direct control of dozens of smaller office buildings and complexes that are on the inspectors' list.

Many experts said they would be surprised if inspectors found much clear evidence of prohibited activity at these or other well-known weapons sites — precisely because they are well known.

But the mere effort to gain access to the palaces could create confrontations that would fuel the Bush administration's argument for military action. Iraq has suggested in letters to the United Nations that it expects inspectors to show respect for its "security, independence and sovereignty," which some experts consider code words for restricting access to the palaces.

"This was never about purely marble palaces," said Ewan Buchanan, the spokesman for the United Nations inspection team. "It is about Iraq trying to put sites out of bounds. But there are no sanctuaries in Iraq. All of Iraq is open to inspections."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/25/international/middleeast/25INSP.html>

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USA Today
November 25, 2002
Pg. 1

Will Saddam Decide To Disarm Or Fight?

Profilers, former Iraqi officials debate whether Saddam, who is both ruthless and cunning, will give in to U.N., U.S. demands

By Gregg Zoroya, USA Today

When Iraq's war against Iran was faltering in the early 1980s, Saddam Hussein startled his Cabinet with a seemingly uncharacteristic request. He sought advice, encouraging the assembled ministers to speak freely.

Health Minister Riyadh Ahmed took Saddam at his word and suggested that he temporarily step down to appease the Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. A peace agreement would be secured and Saddam could later return to power. Saddam thanked Ahmed and then ordered his arrest. The minister was sent home to his wife in pieces, the remains stuffed into a black canvas bag.

It was a classic bit of Saddam stagecraft — tricking a lieutenant into confessing doubt, then sending the chilling message to other advisers that only servile loyalty would be tolerated. Iraqis and outsiders who have known or studied the 65-year-old leader for decades say his career has been marked by a talent for survival and holding onto power at all costs. His ambition, they say, is oversized; he sees himself as a latter-day Arab hero in the image of Nebuchadnezzar, a Babylonian king of 6th century B.C. renowned for conquering Jerusalem.

Such aspirations have driven Saddam to arm himself with weapons of mass destruction, tools that make him a power in his region, feared and respected.

The latest United Nations resolution aimed at forcing Iraq to abandon these weapons carries a strict timetable of disclosure and inspection — and a trigger for war with the United States. The resolution may force Saddam to choose finally between disarming or dying, between a heroic legacy or survival on someone else's terms.

Either choice would dramatically change the arc of Saddam's life. But experts disagree over whether he'll choose survival or legacy.

Adeed Dawisha, a native of Iraq and a political science professor at Miami University in Ohio, believes that, if facing annihilation, Saddam would relinquish his weapons. "Survival is literal," he says. "You either survive or you don't. There are no choices about that."

But others, like Sandy Berger, national security adviser under President Clinton, believe Saddam will cling to his weapons at all costs. "To the extent that he has legitimacy within Iraq, it is based on defiance. And for him at this point to give up his weapons and capitulate to the West, to the international community led by the United States, would be a profound demonstration of weakness."

Saddam's past offers clues as to how he'll react to the U.N. inspection scheduled to resume Wednesday. According to a CIA psychological analysis, the Iraqi leader will back down when forced to preserve his power, as he seemed to this month in reluctantly accepting the U.N. resolution. But the same psychological assessment says he is also capable of recklessness, particularly if the world moves by force to strip away any weapons of mass destruction he is thought to be hiding.

He can be expected to attempt to stall and manipulate the inspections process, but predictions are more difficult whether he feels he has run out of room to maneuver.

'He is the target now'

"He knows he himself is the target now," Gen. Wafic Samarai says. "This is a very, very dangerous situation," the exiled former Iraqi general says, speaking through a translator from his home in London.

"The man is a survivor," says Jerrold Post, who helped create the CIA program of profiling dangerous world leaders and who now heads the political psychology program at George Washington University. "When he does become quite dangerous is when he's backed into a corner. And then he can lash out."

A cornered Saddam is capable of unleashing biological or chemical weapons against allied troops, some analysts say. Or he could deploy terrorists to use those weapons against civilian targets in the USA, Israel or other countries he views as enemies. When his troops were routed from Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, he issued orders to set the Kuwaiti oil fields ablaze, creating an ecological disaster out of spite.

Hassan Al-Alawi, a former Iraqi information chief who fled in 1979, says Saddam will take as many people as possible — Americans, Israelis, maybe Iraqis — with him if he falls. "He will use all his weapons," Al-Alawi says.

Saad Al-Bazzaz, Saddam's former broadcasting chief who left after the Gulf War and now lives in London, cites an Arabic proverb to explain why Saddam would lash out if cornered: "If I die thirsty, rain should not come to others."

The Iraqi leader has regularly quashed internal dissent. Tales of summary executions and mass imprisonment are legion. Saddam himself once told a European interviewer that these actions were natural responses to those who challenge his government. He has authorized brutal force to repress the Shiite and Kurdish populations within Iraq, in the latter case using chemical weapons to wipe out the Halabja village in 1988.

This calculated violence has kept him in power for 23 years. He fought a long and costly campaign against Iran in which an estimated 1 million people died. In 1990 his armed forces invaded, occupied and plundered Kuwait, a

southern neighbor. That led to the Gulf War, in which a U.S.-led coalition liberated Kuwait but stopped short of deposing Saddam.

From the beginning of his rule, Saddam has displayed a stunning mix of guilt-free ruthlessness and messianic ambition. Soon after he took control of Iraq, he galvanized power with a cunning bit of orchestration at a now infamous Baath party leadership meeting in Baghdad. Saddam trotted out a tortured political opponent who named dozens of alleged conspirators then sitting in the hall. Each was whisked away to trial and execution. Those left behind, and alive, wept with relief.

“The kind of megalomania that defines (Saddam) has absolutely no space for anyone but him,” political science professor Dawisha says.

“His strategic objective remains what it has been for decades, and that is to assert control over that region of the world,” says Berger, who suspects Iraq is working to develop nuclear weapons.

And yet, on occasion, Saddam has chosen discretion rather than aggression. During the Gulf War, many observers believed that Saddam refrained from using chemical and biological weapons because the alternative would have led to a massive U.S. retaliation.

His main weakness, analysts say, is a narrow worldview that has led to miscalculations. He might not have expected the United States to attack him after his forces invaded Kuwait. He relies almost exclusively on a small circle of family and trusted advisers who know better than to challenge him.

In the days before the U.S.-led military coalition began bombing Iraq in 1991, one of Saddam’s generals gave an assessment of the expected outcome: Baghdad faced large casualties if Saddam did not withdraw his forces from Kuwait.

The leader ignored the general’s advice. Instead, Saddam sent his 400,000-man military — one of the most powerful in the region — into battle against nearly 700,000 U.S.-led coalition troops. Iraq’s military was devastated, and he lost control over large chunks of his country. Almost 12 years after his forces were removed from Kuwait, U.S. and British jets patrol over northern and southern Iraq, where Saddam’s defiance of post-Gulf War restrictions on Iraqi aircraft has provoked regular attacks on military targets. Crippled by international sanctions and embargoes, the nation remains largely isolated.

“While he is psychologically in touch with reality,” political psychologist Post wrote of Saddam in an early profile, “he is often politically out of touch with reality. Saddam’s world view is narrow and distorted, and he has scant experience out of the Arab world.”

A documentary by French filmmaker Joel Soler, to be broadcast Tuesday on Cinemax, portrays Saddam as a tyrant who is obsessed with self-image and hygiene, likes to be kissed near the armpit and enjoys fishing with hand grenades.

Experts say Saddam is ruthless but not clinically insane. Post’s analysis said Saddam has a “strong paranoid orientation (and) is ready for retaliation and, not without reason, sees himself as surrounded by enemies.” But he is not psychotic, Post says.

“I see nothing in his conduct to suggest he’s a madman,” says Stanley Crossick, director of the European Policy Center in Brussels. “Just look at how this guy has survived. He is a very astute man. He’s simply made miscalculations.”

Observers describe a tireless leader, who puts in 14-hour days and has a photographic memory. In early November, Saddam told an Egyptian journalist he could outlast Bush’s desire to oust him.

A modernizer

Saddam never amassed power by playing to religious fundamentalists in his country, as leaders in other Arab countries have done. He tried instead to build a modern economic power in the Arab world. Iraqis once were among the most educated and highly paid in the region. Saddam built roads and schools and brought electricity to many towns. But the war with Iran and the Gulf War put an end to modernization efforts.

“He’s probably conducted the most effective Arab attempt to go modern ever,” says Said Aburish, a Middle East scholar and author of the 2000 biography *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge*.

Partly because of that, for years U.S. presidents regarded Saddam as a secular Mideast leader who could act as a counterweight to radical Muslim clerics who seized power in 1979 in neighboring Iran. Washington, which viewed Iran as a bigger danger in the 1980s, tilted toward Saddam through his eight-year war against Tehran.

In Baghdad, there are still signs of the former Western acclaim. Among the hundreds of gifts displayed at the Saddam Hussein Museum in Baghdad is a pair of bronzed cowboy spurs from President Reagan during the 1980s. Saddam was born into the Sunni Muslim minority, on April 28, 1937, in a small village near Tikrit, a town on the Tigris River about 100 miles north of Baghdad. The name Saddam has been variously translated as meaning “the fighter who stands steadfast” or “he who confronts.”

His father died before he was born, and his mother remarried. Impoverished, Saddam earned money as a child selling watermelons to train passengers passing through town. According to author Aburish, at age 10 Saddam fled his abusive stepfather and went to live in Tikrit with his uncle, Khairallah Tulfah. The town, on a main artery linking Baghdad to northern Iraq, is renowned as the birthplace of Saladin, a Kurdish sultan who liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders in the 12th century.

Politically minded uncle Tulfah had a strong influence on his nephew. The uncle, who would become governor of Baghdad, authored a tract that Saddam later had republished. It was titled *Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies*.

The family moved to Baghdad when Saddam was 12. In the capital, he scraped by, selling cigarettes on the streets and earning tips by opening and closing taxi doors for passengers.

Official details of Saddam's life as a teenager are sketchy, but it seems clear that was when he became an admirer of the greatest pan-Arab leader of his time, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. "From Nasser's model, (Saddam) learned that only by outrageously confronting imperialist powers could Arab nationalism be freed from Western shackles," Post said in his profile, written before the Gulf War.

Saddam was soon drawn to the Baath Arab Socialist Party, a hotbed of Arab nationalism. During the 1960s, Saddam married his first cousin Sajida, the first of four wives. He has two sons and three daughters, all in their 30s.

As a young party tough, the 22-year-old Saddam took part in a botched assassination attempt on Iraq's military leader, Abdel Karim Qassim. The coup plotters accidentally shot each other. Wounded in the leg, Saddam escaped to Cairo, where he remained until the Iraqi government was overthrown in 1963. Years later, Saddam authored a television series about his early years to inflate his role in the assassination attempt.

He returned to Iraq after the Baath party formed a short-lived government. When it was overthrown, he spent two years in jail as a political prisoner. After a new Baath party government was created in 1968, he assumed leadership roles and became president in 1979 — after pushing aside the ailing predecessor.

Rarely seen in person

Saddam's concern for his safety has intensified in recent years. Today in Iraq, Saddam is seen everywhere and nowhere to be seen. Baghdad's bookstores stack volumes of Saddam's writings and speeches in their windows. Murals, paintings and statues of the leader grace nearly every public building. The larger-than-life statue commemorating the Gulf War at the foot of the city's communications tower — Saddam Tower — shows him in military uniform looming over the debris of U.S. missiles. A giant portrait of Saddam in Arab headdress is displayed in the VIP reception hall at Iraq's border with Jordan.

But Saddam almost never appears in public. "When we went to meetings, we were instructed not to shake hands with him, not to approach him or hug him," says Khidhir Hamza, a scientist who ran Saddam's nuclear weapons program before fleeing in 1994.

"We were asked if we had had a cold," he says from his home in Virginia. Officials were often driven to meetings in vehicles with blacked-out windows, so they would not know Saddam's whereabouts. "It was more and more difficult to locate where Saddam is," Hamza says. "We were driven round and round in circles in dark cars." Fearing assassination, Saddam uses lookalikes in fake motorcades and rarely sleeps in the same location twice. "There are eight presidential residences," an Asian diplomat in Baghdad says, "but he probably sleeps in none of them."

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20021125/4649599s.htm>

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U.S. News & World Report
December 2, 2002

Washington Whispers

By Paul Bedard

The Baghdad flu

Iraqi scientists are trying to create immune suppressors that could make it easier to infect people, we're told. Administration sources say they would be used to "soften up" a population before introducing something really nasty, like smallpox.

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The Inspectors' Arsenal

By Jim Krane, Associated Press

NEW YORK--Advances in technology have given inspectors from the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency the ability to quickly sniff out telltale microbes or molecules that could signify chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq.

"Sensors have gotten much more sensitive over the last four years," said Ewen Buchanan, chief spokesman for the inspection team, which is to return to Iraq Wednesday after being ousted in 1998. "A lot of equipment that might've required a whole room has been shrunk and is more usable in the field."

In the 1990s, U.N. inspectors dismantled Iraq's nuclear program and destroyed stocks of chemical and biological weapons and longer-range missiles forbidden by postwar U.N. resolutions.

But some weapons are believed to have survived — or been rebuilt.

The 100 or so inspectors — backed by a tough U.N. Security Council resolution — plan to ferret out any remaining arms by draping Iraq in a surveillance net that knits together particle detectors, satellite imagery, ground-penetrating radar, sensors and cameras that beam live video back to Vienna, Austria.

Most important, analysts say, is knowing where to point the gadgets.

Inspectors will need a detective's intuition, prescient intelligence and tips from Iraqi scientists and defectors. They also will need to be able to recognize what, say, a Scud missile's turbo pump looks like, Mr. Buchanan said.

"We can assume Iraqis have moved all sensitive pieces of evidence," said former U.N. inspector Victor Mizin.

"Without some data provided by the [Iraqi] government, the inspections won't find anything meaningful."

Still, inspectors are bringing in plenty of high-tech sleuthing gear, all funded — like the entire inspection process — by the sale of Iraqi oil, Mr. Buchanan said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's 20 nuclear weapons inspectors will scout sites with gamma radiation detectors mounted on helicopters or held in the hand, spokesman Peter Rickwood said.

The agency owns more than 100 analyzers like the FieldSpec by Germany's Target Systemelectronic, a hand-held scanner that can detect radioactive isotopes.

Atomic energy agency inspectors also will wield a portable sensor known as the Ranger, developed by Quantrad Sensors of Madison, Wis. It uses X-ray fluorescence to pick out alloys useful in nuclear weapons.

The agency will install as many as 700 digital cameras in suspected weapons factories that will beam real-time video to the agency's headquarters. It also will install water sensors in 50 places and air sensors in others, Mr. Rickwood said.

While the agency tracks nuclear items, the U.N. inspectors will seek banned missile components and the remnants of leader Saddam Hussein's biological arsenal — including anthrax and botulinum toxin — and chemical agents sarin, VX and mustard gas.

Ground-penetrating radar — perhaps mounted on a helicopter or unmanned drone — may be used to reveal buried weapons and underground bunkers, officials said.

One hand-held scanner that probably will find its way into Iraq is the \$9,000 Chemical Agent Monitor, or CAM, made by Smiths Detection, a British defense contractor. The 4-pound device uses ion mobility spectrometry, the same technology used in airports to find traces of explosives or drugs on luggage.

Others available for use in Iraq are the Handheld Advanced Nucleic Acid Analyzer (HANAA) and Chemlab hand-held detectors built at the Department of Energy.

Inspectors seeking pathogens probably will use portable detectors like Idaho Technology's \$55,000 Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID). The company donated a pair of the scanners to the United Nations and was training inspectors in their use last week, said Kim Woodhouse, the Salt Lake City company's marketing manager.

The machines can detect nine bioweapons in about 20 minutes by using a polymerase chain reaction, which immerses a sample in a chemical bath designed to identify the agent.

The machines are so sensitive that they can detect pathogens if a suspected bioweapons lab has been cleaned up. All they need is one microorganism, live or dead, said Rocco Casagrande, a U.N. weapons inspector. Mr. Casagrande is a scientist with Surface Logix, a Boston biotech firm.

"You look for places that haven't been cleaned very well — any kind of crack or crevice that it could be hiding in," he said.

If Iraq is determined to conceal some of its weapons, inspectors will have a tougher time finding some programs — like a biological weapons lab — than, say, a nuclear weapons program for enriching uranium. Further complicating the search, raw materials for the world's most lethal weapons have vital civilian uses in medicine, pesticides and vaccines. Some, like anthrax, occur in nature.
<http://www.washtimes.com/business/20021125-52292877.htm>

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Defense Week
November 25, 2002
Pg. 1

New Systems Could Improve Next 'Great Scud Hunt'

By Ann Roosevelt

The Army says it has new and improved systems to find mobile Scud launchers in Iraq before or just after they are launched.

One system in particular, the Battlefield Ordnance Awareness sensor, provides greater Scud-hunting capabilities than were evidenced during the 1991 Gulf War, said the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, or SMDC, in a six-page written statement for *Defense Week*.

The Battlefield Ordnance Awareness system, or BOA, can identify missiles, rocket and artillery types and their locations just after launch, providing more accurate and timely location of threat systems than in Desert Storm, the command said.

The BOA's passive infrared optical sensors emplaced in high-altitude aircraft will be able to detect and report events "as dim as cruise-missile kicker motors and small-arms fire," an Army fact sheet said. The BOA sensors have been used on aircraft and one day could be mounted on satellites, such as the developmental Space-Based Infrared System.

The equipment generates and reports information "on the time, type, rate and precise location of ordnance events that can be used for targeting, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, [and] battle damage assessment," it said. In 1999, BOA sensors collected data at Fort Rucker, Ala., and were used in a simulation during that year's Roving Sands, an annual air-defense exercise in New Mexico, the Army said. Most recently, the equipment was used in a trial at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.

Find and attack

Another key new capability is called the Tactical Exploitation System, or TES—a computer system that enables corps commanders to see a fused picture of intelligence that previously had been available only at higher echelons and also enables them to directly access sensor data for the first time at that level of command. These capabilities allow commanders to improve the location and targeting of missile-related systems, the Army said.

Moreover, the Army antimissile command has taken part in Navy Fleet Battle exercises and Joint Forces Command exercises, demonstrating cross-service sensor tasking and integrated joint targeting, as well as handing off sensors from one service to another.

"The Army TES is now the basis of the Navy Fires Network, the Marine Corps Tactical Exploitation Group and the Air Force ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance] Manager," the command said.

One problem targeting mobile Scuds during the Gulf War was that satellite data was sent first to the United States before being dispersed to combatant commanders. This caused delays in taking action or reliance on outdated information.

Satellite data is now routed directly to soldiers through the development of the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), manned by Army and Navy personnel. Currently, these systems are deployed in several locations worldwide. The exact locations are classified, the Army said.

The JTAGS station reports missile launches and other infrared events of interest directly from satellite sources. It provides real-time alert, warning and cueing of ballistic missile launches for missile-defense shooters, while providing launch points to potential attack operations personnel.

Not to be overlooked, the command said, is the fielding of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs.

"The use of systems like the armed Predator UAV will greatly enhance our ability to find and attack mobile Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) in future conflicts," the command said.

UAV video, not available during the Gulf War, has made contributions in several conflicts since then—in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Eleven long years

Eleven years ago, Saddam Hussein rained Scuds on Israel and took aim at Saudi Arabia.

Attacks on known Scud sites and production facilities kicked off during the first minutes of the Gulf War. Coalition aircraft and eventually Special Operations Forces on the ground subsequently trolled for mobile Scud launchers and associated vehicles.

After the war, claims of destroying mobile Scuds were disproved, because little wreckage was found and there was no accurate count of how many mobile missiles there were before the war. The Pentagon believed some fixed Scud sites and production facilities were destroyed along with decoys and other vehicles, to include some fuel tankers identified as Scud launchers by Gulf War commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf

U.N. weapons inspectors found 62 complete missiles, parts of 88 other missiles and 10 launchers of various types after the war, according to the U.K. Center for Defense and International Security Studies Web site. Iraq was also suspected of hiding other missiles.

Saddam is believed to have perhaps a couple dozen Scuds left in his inventory in various states of assembly.

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Boston Globe
November 22, 2002
Pg. 2

US Farms Called Vulnerable To Terrorism

By Stephen Smith, Globe Staff

LAS VEGAS - They scarcely seem like the classic tools of terrorists: mooing cows, oinking pigs, and clucking chickens. But specialists in public health and agriculture warn that the nation's livestock and crops remain particularly vulnerable to terrorists, threatening the US agricultural system with viral and bacterial infections that could cripple the economy.

Computer models show that an infection such as foot and mouth disease, which decimated Britain's beef industry in 2001, could sweep through 44 states within two weeks of its introduction at a handful of farms in a single state, resulting in 48 million livestock being put to premature deaths.

Although many of the infections, including foot and mouth, pose no direct threat to human health, the economic consequences would be ruinous, specialists said at the Harvard-sponsored BioSecurity 2002 conference, and would seed considerable doubt about the safety of the nation's food supply.

Foot and mouth virus ravaged agriculture as well as tourism in England, forcing quarantine measures against 10,000 farms and the destruction of 6 million cows, sheep, and pigs.

"It is a perfect weapon for doing the kinds of things terrorists do," said Dr. Thomas J. McGinn III, assistant state veterinarian in North Carolina. "As a target, you can imagine why they would hit something like this and as a weapon, they could spread it wherever they want."

Federal authorities consider the threat so significant that defense against agricultural bioterrorism has a special place in the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Also, last summer, in an exercise conducted at the behest of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 40 veterinarians, emergency planners, and military authorities convened for a boardroom drill to assess the potential impact of bioterrorism targeted at farms and food processing sites.

The exercise, dubbed Silent Prairie, assumed that the destruction could begin with something as common as a cotton swab dabbed with viral particles.

The dean of the Harvard School of Public Health is so troubled by those threats that he called for the creation of an agency akin to the US Centers for Disease Control to monitor the welfare of the nation's crops and plants. Barry R. Bloom, the Harvard dean who served on a panel evaluating the threat of bioterrorism, told hundreds of public health, military, and private security authorities at the conference that the United States is woefully lacking in its ability to swiftly identify contaminants being introduced into livestock and plants.

"There's relatively little surveillance," Bloom said. "It's an enormous task, and we're not prepared."

That remains the case even though the potential for terrorists to cause illness and fear by infecting the food supply became dramatically evident 18 years ago, when members of a fringe religious cult spiked salad bars at 10 Oregon restaurants with salmonella. The result: 750 people became ill.

The damage that could be wrought by a more widespread attack, initiated at multiple sites, is profound, Bloom and other specialists said. Agriculture generates \$1 trillion in economic impact annually, accounting for 13 percent of the gross domestic product.

Farming is an exceptionally porous industry from a security standpoint, with 24,000 livestock ferried out of just one state, North Carolina, every day, destined for markets across the world. If terrorists chose a virus such as foot and mouth disease, it would spread with stunning efficiency. Studies have shown that the virus can be carried by the wind up to 40 miles; once introduced to a herd, it is 100 percent infectious.

"If someone's determined enough to get something in, they will get it in," said Dr. Cindy S. Lovern, assistant director of emergency preparedness and response for the American Veterinary Medical Association. "Foot and mouth disease can be brought in on a Q-Tip or the bottom of your boot. That's why it's so critical to find it fast and to treat it quickly."

Foot and mouth is often not fatal to animals, but in the short term produces hideous blistering, and in the long term, impairs their use as productive livestock. The disease rarely produces severe illness in humans, although people can transmit it to animals. Specialists at the BioSecurity conference conjured scenarios in which other viruses and bacteria (including plague, anthrax, and tularemia) could be introduced into animal populations, with the ultimate goal of spreading illness to humans. That probably would prove not to be a particularly efficient mode of transmission but would spawn considerable fear. Early detection of a biological attack is paramount, specialists said. But the arrival of West Nile virus, blamed for sickening 3,700 people this year and killing more than 200, demonstrates how unprepared the nation is for animal disease outbreaks. Until Dr. Tracey McNamara began testing dead crows near the Bronx Zoo, the emergence of West Nile had gone undetected. "We still haven't done what needs to be done," McNamara said. "Everybody pays lip service that animals can serve as sentinels of disease outbreak and bioterrorism, but it seems to be a hard concept to fund."

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New York Times
November 24, 2002
Pg. 1

In North Korea And Pakistan, Deep Roots Of Nuclear Barter

By David E. Sanger

Last July, American intelligence agencies tracked a Pakistani cargo aircraft as it landed at a North Korean airfield and took on a secret payload: ballistic missile parts, the chief export of North Korea's military.

The shipment was brazen enough, in full view of American spy satellites. But intelligence officials who described the incident say even the mode of transport seemed a subtle slap at Washington: the Pakistani plane was an American-built C-130.

It was part of the military force that President Pervez Musharraf had told President Bush last year would be devoted to hunting down the terrorists of Al Qaeda, one reason the administration was hailing its new cooperation with a country that only a year before it had labeled a rogue state.

But several times since that new alliance was cemented, American intelligence agencies watched silently as Pakistan's air fleet conducted a deadly barter with North Korea. In transactions intelligence agencies are still unraveling, the North provided General Musharraf with missile parts he needs to build a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching every strategic site in India.

In a perfect marriage of interests, Pakistan provided the North with many of the designs for gas centrifuges and much of the machinery it needs to make highly enriched uranium for the country's latest nuclear weapons project, one intended to put at risk South Korea, Japan and 100,000 American troops in Northeast Asia.

The Central Intelligence Agency told members of Congress this week that North Korea's uranium enrichment program, which it discovered only this summer, will produce enough material to produce weapons in two to three years. Previously it has estimated that North Korea probably extracted enough plutonium from a nuclear reactor to build one or two weapons, until that program was halted in 1994 in a confrontation with the United States.

Yet the C.I.A. report -- at least the unclassified version -- made no mention of how one of the world's poorest and most isolated nations put together its new, complex uranium project.

In interviews over the past three weeks, officials and experts in Washington, Pakistan and here in the capital of South Korea described a relationship between North Korea and Pakistan that now appears much deeper and more dangerous than the United States and its Asian allies first suspected.

The accounts raise disturbing questions about the nature of the uneasy American alliance with General Musharraf's government. The officials and experts described how, even after Mr. Musharraf sided with the United States in

ousting the Taliban and hunting down Qaeda leaders, Pakistan's secretive A. Q. Khan Nuclear Research Laboratories continued its murky relationship with the North Korean military. It was a partnership linking an insecure Islamic nation and a failing Communist one, each in need of the other's expertise.

Pakistan was desperate to counter India's superior military force, but encountered years of American-imposed sanctions, so it turned to North Korea. For its part, North Korea, increasingly cut off from Russia and China, tried to replicate Pakistan's success in developing nuclear weapons based on uranium, one of the few commodities that North Korea has in plentiful supply.

Yet while the United States has put tremendous diplomatic pressure on North Korea in the past two months to abandon the project, and has cut off oil supplies to the country, it has never publicly discussed the role of Pakistan or other nations in supplying that effort.

American and South Korean officials, when speaking anonymously, say the reason is obvious: the Bush administration has determined that Pakistan's cooperation in the search for Al Qaeda is so critical -- especially with new evidence suggesting that Osama bin Laden is still alive, perhaps on Pakistani soil.

So far, the White House has ignored federal statutes that require President Bush to impose stiff economic penalties on any country involved in nuclear proliferation or, alternatively, to issue a public waiver of those penalties in the interest of national security. Mr. Bush last year removed penalties that were imposed on Pakistan after it set off a series of nuclear tests in 1998.

White House officials would not comment on the record for this article, saying that discussing Pakistan's role could compromise classified intelligence. Instead, they noted that General Musharraf, after first denying Pakistani involvement in North Korea's nuclear effort, has assured Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that no such trade will occur in the future.

"He said, 'Four hundred percent assurance that there is no such interchange taking place now,'" Secretary Powell said in a briefing late last month. Pressed about Pakistan's contributions to the nuclear program that North Korea admitted to last month, Secretary Powell smiled tightly and said, "We didn't talk about the past."

A State Department spokesman, Philip Reeker, said, "We are aware of the allegations" about Pakistan, though he would not comment on the substance. "This administration will abide by the law," he said.

Intelligence officials say they have seen no evidence of exchanges since Washington protested the July missile shipment. Even in that incident, they cannot determine if the C-130 that picked up missile parts in North Korea brought nuclear-related goods to North Korea.

But American and Asian officials are far from certain that Pakistan has cut off the relationship, or even whether General Musharraf is in control of the transactions.

Yet in the words of one American official who has reviewed the intelligence, North Korea's drive in the past year to begin full-scale enrichment of uranium uses technology that "has 'Made in Pakistan' stamped all over it." They doubt that North Korea will end its effort even if Pakistan cuts off its supplies.

"In Kim Jong Il's view, what's the difference between North Korea and Iraq?" asked one senior American official with long experience dealing with North Korea. "Saddam doesn't have one, and look what's happening to him."

A Meeting of Minds in 1993

Pakistan's military ties to North Korea go back to the 1970's. But they took a decisive turn in 1993, just as the United States was forcing the North to open up its huge nuclear reactor facilities at Yongbyon. Yongbyon was clearly a factory for producing bomb-grade plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.

When North Korea refused to allow in inspectors headed by Hans Blix, the man now leading the inspections in Iraq, President Bill Clinton went to the United Nations to press penalties and the Pentagon drew up contingency plans for a strike against the plant in case North Korea removed the fuel rods to begin making bomb-grade plutonium.

In the midst of that face-off, Benazir Bhutto, then the prime minister of Pakistan, arrived in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. It was the end of December, freezing cold, and yet the North Korean government arranged for tens of thousands of the city's well-trained citizens to greet her on the streets. At a state dinner, Ms. Bhutto complained about the American penalties imposed on her country and North Korea.

"Pakistan is committed to nuclear nonproliferation," she said, according to a transcript issued at the time. However, she added, states still have "their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, geared to their economic and social developments."

Ms. Bhutto's delegation left with plans for North Korea's Nodong missile, according to former and current Pakistani officials.

The Pakistani military had long coveted the plans, and by April 1998, it successfully tested a version of the Nodong, renamed the Ghauri. Its flight range of about 1,000 miles put much of India within reach of Pakistan's nuclear warheads.

A former senior Pakistani official recalled in an interview that the Bhutto government planned to pay North Korea “from the invisible account” for covert programs. But events intervened.

Months after Ms. Bhutto’s visit, the Clinton administration and North Korea reached a deal that froze all nuclear activity at Yongbyon, where international inspectors still live year-round.

In return, the United States and its allies promised North Korea a steady flow of fuel oil and the eventual delivery of two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors to produce electric power. That was important in a country so lacking in power that, from satellite images taken at night, it appears like a black hole compared to the blazing lights of South Korea.

But within three years, Kim Jong Il grew disenchanted with the accord and feared that the nuclear power plants would never be delivered. He never allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to begin the wide-ranging inspections required before the critical parts of the plants could be delivered.

By 1997 or 1998, American intelligence has now concluded, he was searching for an alternative way to build a bomb, without detection. He found part of the answer in Pakistan, which along with Iran, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Egypt was now a regular customer for North Korean missile parts, American military officials said.

A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, who had years ago stolen the engineering plans for gas centrifuges from the Netherlands, visited North Korea several times. The visits were always cloaked in secrecy.

But several things are now clear. Pakistan was running out of hard currency to pay the North Koreans, who were in worse shape. North Korea feared that without a nuclear weapon it would eventually be absorbed by the economic might of the South, or squeezed by the military might of the United States.

In 1997 or 1998, Kim Jong Il and his generals decided to begin a development project for a bomb based on highly enriched uranium, a slow and difficult process, but relatively easy to hide.

Talking, but Not Changing

They did so even while sporadically pursuing a better relationship with Washington. In the last days of the Clinton administration, the North negotiated with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright for a deal to restrict North Korean missile exports in return for a removal of economic penalties, a de-listing from the State Department’s account of countries that sponsor terrorism and talks about diplomatic recognition. The deal was never reached.

President Clinton even considered an end-of-term trip to North Korea, but was talked out of it by aides who feared that the North was not ready to make real concessions. The nuclear revelations of the past few weeks suggest those aides saved Mr. Clinton from embarrassment.

“Lamentably, North Korea never really changed,” said one senior Western official here with long experience in the topic. “They came to the conclusion that the nuclear card was their one ace in the hole, and they couldn’t give it up.”

American intelligence agencies, meanwhile, suspected that North Korea was restarting a secret program. In 1998, satellites were focused on a huge underground site where the C.I.A. believed Kim Jong Il was trying to build a second plutonium-reprocessing center. But they were looking in the wrong place: after American officials negotiated access to the suspect site, they found only a series of man-made caves with no nuclear-related equipment, and no apparent purpose. “World’s largest underground parking lot,” one American intelligence official joked at the time. Rumors of a secret enriched-uranium project persisted, however. The C.I.A. and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee evaluated the evidence but reached no firm conclusion.

But there were hints. One Western diplomat who visited North Korea in May 1998, just as world attention focused on Pakistan, which had responded to India’s underground nuclear tests by setting off six of its own, recalled witnessing an odd celebration. “I was in the Foreign Ministry,” the official recalled last week. “About 10 minutes into our meeting, the North Korean diplomat we were seeing broke into a big smile and pointed with pride to these tests. They were all elated.

“Here was a model of a poor state getting away with developing a nuclear weapon.”

When the Clinton administration raised the rumors of a Pakistan-North Korea link with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who succeeded Ms. Bhutto, he denied them. It was only after General Musharraf overthrew Mr. Sharif’s government, and after Mr. Bush took office, that South Korean intelligence agencies picked up strong evidence that North Korea was buying components for an enriched-uranium program.

The agencies passed the evidence along to Washington, according to South Korean and American officials. It looked suspiciously similar to the gas centrifuge technology used in Pakistan. “My guess is that Pakistan was the only available partner,” said Lee Hong Koo, a former South Korean prime minister and unification minister.

A. H. Nayya, a physics professor at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, who has no role in the country’s nuclear program, agreed: “The clearest possibility is that the Pakistanis gave them the blueprint. ‘Here it is. You make it on your own.’ “

Under American pressure, Dr. Khan was removed from the operational side of the Pakistani nuclear program. He was made an “adviser to the president” on nuclear technology.

Here in Seoul, nuclear experts working for the government of President Kim Dae Jung say they were subtly discouraged from publicly writing or speculating about the North's secret programs because the Korean government feared that it would derail President Kim's legacy: the "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea and encouraging investment there.

By this summer, however, the C.I.A. concluded that the North had moved from research to production. The intelligence agency took the evidence to Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, who asked for a review by all American intelligence agencies.

Such a request is usually a prescription for conflicting interpretations. Instead, the agencies came back with a unanimous opinion: the North Korean program was well under way, and had to be stopped.

Telling the North, 'You're Busted'

After sending senior officials to Japan and South Korea in August to present the new evidence, Mr. Bush decided to confront the North Koreans. On Oct. 4, James A. Kelly, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, was in North Korea and told his counterparts that the United States had detailed information about the enriched-uranium program.

"We wanted to make it clear to them that they were busted," a senior administration official said.

The North Koreans initially denied the accusation, but the next day, after what they told the American visitors was an all-night discussion, they admitted that they were pursuing the secret weapons program, several officials said.

"We need nuclear weapons," Kang Sok Joo, the North Korean senior foreign policy official, said, arguing that the program was a result of the Bush administration's hostility.

Mr. Kelly responded that the program began at least four years ago, when Mr. Bush was governor of Texas. The Americans left after one North Korean official declared that dialogue on the subject was worthless and said, "We will meet sword with sword."

Since then, the North Koreans have been more circumspect. They have talked publicly about having the right to a nuclear weapon, even though they have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and an agreement with South Korea to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration has been uncharacteristically restrained. President Bush led the push for an oil cutoff, but also issued a statement on Nov. 15 saying that the United States had no intention of invading North Korea. His aides hoped that the statement would give Kim Jong Il the kind of security guarantee he had long demanded -- and a face-saving way to end the nuclear program.

Mr. Bush's aides say the way to deal with North Korea, in contrast to their approach to Iraq, is to exploit its economic vulnerabilities and offer carrots, essentially the strategy the Clinton administration used. Many here in Seoul believe it may work this time.

"The North Koreans are a lot more dependent on us, and on the West, than they were in the 1994 nuclear crisis," said Han Sung Joo, who served as South Korea's foreign minister then.

But the reality, officials acknowledged, is that Mr. Bush has little choice but to pursue a diplomatic solution with North Korea.

Kim Jong Il has 11,000 artillery tubes dug in around the demilitarized zone, all aimed at Seoul. In the opening hours of a war, tens of thousands of people could die, military officials here say.

"Here's the strategy," one American official said. "Tell the North Koreans, quite publicly, that they can't get away with it. And say the same thing to Pakistan, but privately, quietly."

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New York Times
November 26, 2002
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U.N. Monitor Says Iraqis Are Denying Having Arms Cache

By Julia Preston

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 25 — Iraqi officials have told United Nations inspectors in Baghdad that they have no weapons of mass destruction and expressed reservations about inspections of President Saddam Hussein's palaces, Hans Blix, one of the inspections chiefs, said here today.

Briefing the Security Council, Mr. Blix said Iraqi officials had pledged to cooperate fully with the inspections, but had also raised a host of skeptical questions about a declaration of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons due on Dec. 8.

Suggesting that the declaration was too broad to finish by that deadline, the Iraqis wondered if they had to include every detail of their civilian chemical industries, down to "the production of plastic slippers," Mr. Blix said. He said he had responded with a curt warning that if Iraq was going to claim to be clean, it would have to provide convincing evidence.

The weapons chief gave a glimpse of his tough stance and Iraq's ambivalent reaction in his first report to the Council since he and Mohamed ElBaradei, the top nuclear inspector, traveled to Baghdad a week ago, beginning a new round of inspections after a four-year hiatus. The first contingent of 19 United Nations experts arrived in Baghdad today, saying they planned to conduct the first inspections on Wednesday.

On a day when many Council nations expected a show of unity to support the inspections, some diplomats were surprised that the United States wanted to add several items that it said could be used for military purposes to a list of restricted imports to Iraq.

When debate produced no accord on whether or how to revise the list, the Council voted tonight to extend the mandate for United Nations monitoring of Iraqi oil sales until Dec. 4. It was set to expire at midnight tonight. The program, called oil for food, uses Iraqi oil revenues to buy food, medicine and other civilian goods for the population.

At the behest of the Pentagon, American officials said, the United States ambassador here, John D. Negroponte, insisted on adding several medical and communications items to the list of goods that must pass United Nations review. They included global positioning scanning devices, equipment to jam radio intercepts and special 7-inch injectors to administer the drug atropine, as well as the drug itself. It is used to resuscitate heart attack patients, but can also be a treatment for victims of attacks with chemical nerve agents.

The United States was also seeking to block large-scale imports of Cipro, a strong antibiotic that can be used to treat anthrax infection, administration officials said.

Mr. Negroponte said the United States believed that those goods "did not have a benign, civilian or purely humanitarian purpose." He said Washington insisted on extending the debate for nine days in order to set a timetable for revising the list of goods before it would approve renewing the oil-for-food program.

Other Council diplomats were frustrated that the United States insisted on the revisions to the list as the deadline approached. The list has been the subject of long and contentious debate in the past, and most Council nations were hoping to avoid getting into it again until sometime next year, to avoid undermining the weapons inspections.

"We would like to have a solution to this, and everybody must try to come together," Ambassador Peter Ole Kolby of Norway said in support of the program, with a diplomatic hint of frustration.

Mr. Blix said he had told Iraq to expect aggressive surprise inspections.

"The Council has authorized us to go anywhere anytime, and we intend to do so without telling anyone in advance,"

Mr. Blix said he had informed Iraq, in comments that were praised by American officials.

While saying they would do nothing to delay the inspections, the Iraqi officials, led by Gen. Amir Hammudi al-Saadi, also observed that entering "into a presidential site or a ministry was not exactly the same thing as entry into a factory."

Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the Council on Nov. 8 to give the inspectors a new, forceful mandate, authorizes them to inspect the vast compounds around Mr. Hussein's nine palaces.

Most Council nations were pleased by Mr. Blix's report, which was endorsed by Mr. ElBaradei, that the inspections were moving forward as planned in the resolution.

"So far so good," said the Chinese ambassador, Wang Yingfan, speaking for the 15-nation Council.

But differences among the Council powers surfaced in the discussion after Mr. Blix's briefing, diplomats said. The Russian ambassador, Sergey Lavrov, took issue with Mr. Blix's statement that "many governments" believed that there were still programs to build weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

"I can only think of a few," Mr. Lavrov said, according to diplomats in the session, making it clear that Russia was not one of them.

Mr. Blix noted that the inspections teams would begin their work 19 days after Resolution 1441 was passed, considerably faster than the 45 days the Security Council allowed. He said he and Mr. ElBaradei expected to provide a comprehensive report to the Council on their progress on Jan. 27.

He said the inspection chiefs had stressed that Iraq's Dec. 8 declaration had to be complete, disclosing any prohibited program. He said past declarations by Iraq "left it an open question whether some weapons remained."

Mr. Blix said today that the Iraqis acknowledged that there were some discrepancies and gaps about long-range missiles in documents they had already provided to the inspectors. Iraqi officials volunteered to correct the information soon.

Secretary General Kofi Annan received only today an 11-page letter Iraq sent to him on Saturday picking apart the Council resolution clause by clause, calling it a violation of international law and an excuse for the United States to go to war.

Speaking in Paris, Mr. Annan said Iraq should cooperate with the inspections. "That is the only way to avoid conflict in the region," he said.

Melissa Fleming, spokeswoman for the nuclear inspectors, said in Baghdad that they would carry out the inspections with "suspicious minds," on the lookout for Iraqi deception.

Mr. ElBaradei, in Cairo, reminded Baghdad that if the inspectors gave a positive report, their work could be "an alternative to war, not a precursor to war."

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New York Times
November 26, 2002
Pg. 1

Signing Homeland Security Bill, Bush Appoints Ridge As Secretary

By Richard W. Stevenson

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 — President Bush signed legislation today creating a Department of Homeland Security and named Tom Ridge, the former Pennsylvania governor who has been the White House's domestic security coordinator, to run it.

Mr. Bush's signature on the bill, which won final Congressional approval last week after a bitter political fight, set in motion a vast bureaucratic reorganization that the president said would "focus the full resources of the American government on the safety of the American people."

By nightfall, 60 days before he was required by law to do so, Mr. Bush had sent to Congress his detailed plan for bringing the department into being. The plan called for getting the department largely up and running by March 1, with the process to be completed, at least in organizational terms, by Sept. 30.

In announcing that he would nominate Mr. Ridge as the first secretary of homeland security, Mr. Bush was entrusting him not just to oversee what is sure to be a difficult merger of disparate government agencies but also to elevate defense of Americans at home to a new level in the face of what officials say are ever-evolving terrorist threats.

"He has a monumental task in front of him," said Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, the Connecticut Democrat who was one of the original proponents of creating the cabinet-level department. "It's like asking Noah to build the ark after the rain has started to fall."

Mr. Bush also began filling other top posts in the department. He nominated Gordon R. England, a former military contracting executive who is the Navy secretary, to be Mr. Ridge's deputy, and Asa Hutchinson, a former Republican congressman from Arkansas who is the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, as undersecretary for border and transportation security.

The birth of the department flowed from a bipartisan consensus after last year's terrorist attacks that the nation needed to do more to protect its citizens at home. It will require the largest reshuffling of governmental responsibilities since the founding of the Defense Department after World War II, a process sure to encompass turf battles and culture clashes even as the country parries a steady stream of terrorist threats and girds for possible war with Iraq.

It will bring together nearly 170,000 workers from 22 agencies with widely varying histories and missions, like the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the federal security guards in airports and the Customs Service. The goal is to improve security along and within the nation's borders, strengthen the ability of federal, state and local authorities to respond to an attack, better focus research into nuclear, chemical and biological threats and more rigorously assess intelligence about terrorists.

"The continuing threat of terrorism, the threat of mass murder on our own soil, will be met with a unified, effective response," said Mr. Bush, who had at first resisted calls for creation of the new cabinet-level department and embraced them only after political pressure mounted last spring.

"Dozens of agencies charged with homeland security will now be located within one cabinet department with the mandate and legal authority to protect our people," he said as he prepared to sign the bill in the East Room before an

audience of cabinet members, Republicans and Democrats from Capitol Hill and law enforcement officials from around the country. "America will be better able to respond to any future attacks, to reduce our vulnerability and, most important, prevent the terrorists from taking innocent American lives."

But Mr. Bush also injected a note of caution, saying, "No department of government can completely guarantee our safety against ruthless killers, who move and plot in shadows."

Led by Clay Johnson, the White House personnel director, a transition team has been working since summer to allow the administration to move quickly to deal with details like establishing systems for better evaluating intelligence reports.

To help oversee the integration into the new department of one of its most troubled components, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Mr. Bush today named Michael Garcia, an assistant commerce secretary and former federal prosecutor, as acting immigration commissioner. The service has come under widespread criticism for failing to keep track of immigrants, most recently in a report last week by the General Accounting Office that said immigration authorities had been unable to find nearly half of more than 4,000 registered immigrants the government wanted to interview after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

With many agencies struggling to deal with deeply entrenched problems, experts said improvements to domestic security would not take place with the stroke of Mr. Bush's pen today or even the submission of the reorganization plan. They said it could be years before the department could be expected to operate at full effectiveness.

"The first challenge is to lower expectations," said Paul C. Light, who studies government organization at the Brookings Institution, a liberal-leaning research organization. "People should think they will be safer, but remember we have a long way to go."

Some Democrats also suggested that there were risks that the reorganization could be a distraction to some of the agencies most directly involved in domestic security, especially since government employee unions are already concerned that Mr. Bush wants to scale back Civil Service protections for workers in the new department. Moreover, some Democrats said, the administration is not providing the department with the money it will need to do its job effectively.

"We didn't reorganize the Pentagon in the middle of World War II," said Representative David R. Obey of Wisconsin, the senior Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee. He said the administration was "shortchanging" the department in areas like safeguarding nuclear materials and assisting state and local governments with the financial burden of the roles they must take on.

The bill came to Mr. Bush's desk only after generating deep partisan differences through much of the year. The idea of a cabinet-level department was first pushed more than a year ago by Mr. Lieberman and other Democrats on the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Mr. Bush said at the time that the job could be better done, at least initially, by an office within the White House rather than by creating a new bureaucracy.

Mr. Bush endorsed the idea in June, after pressure grew in both parties to address weaknesses in the government's performance in battling terrorism. But the two parties in Congress then became enmeshed in an argument over whether to grant the president broad powers to hire and fire federal workers and move them among jobs. Republicans said Democrats were obstructing the bill at the bidding of union leaders representing government employees, an assertion that Republicans used to attack two incumbent Democratic senators in the election this fall, Max Cleland of Georgia and Jean Carnahan of Missouri. Both lost, and Democrats largely gave in to Mr. Bush's demands after the election, leaving them with some bitterness about what they viewed as politicization of the issue by Mr. Bush and his party.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/26/politics/26BUSH.html>

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Philadelphia Inquirer
November 26, 2002

U.S. Tests Scud Missile At Calif. Base

The U.S. military launched a Scud missile yesterday to obtain data for use in developing missile-defense systems. The test at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., was conducted to obtain flight data and did not involve an intercept attempt, Missile Defense Agency spokesman Chris Taylor said. The Scud was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s and is in the arsenals of at least 25 nations, including Iraq.

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Powell Says Pakistan Warned On N. Korean Ties

Musharraf Told He Will Face 'Consequences' if Nuclear Transfers Continue

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

MEXICO CITY, Nov. 25 -- Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said today Pakistan understands that "consequences" will apply if the United States discovers that the Pakistani government continues to make suspect nuclear transfers to North Korea.

Powell's statement, made to reporters while traveling here for a conference with Mexican officials, suggested a public hardening of the administration's stance toward its ally in the fight against terrorism. Previously, Powell had said that he had been assured by Pakistan that it is not currently engaging in such transactions, but he had not raised the possibility of U.S. action against Pakistan.

Powell has privately delivered this message to the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, making it clear that the United States would be watching Pakistan's behavior closely.

"In my conversations with President Musharraf in recent months, I have made clear to him that any, any sort of contact between Pakistan and North Korea we believe would be improper, inappropriate and would have consequences," Powell said. "He has assured me on more than one occasion that there are no further contacts."

The administration has evidence that Pakistan continued to receive missile parts from North Korea in exchange for possible nuclear plans and materials as recently as three months ago, according to reports in Washington last week. Powell said today he could not discuss reports of recent transactions.

Since the administration confronted North Korea with evidence of its secret program to build nuclear weapons using enriched uranium, officials have sought to isolate the communist state until it agrees to dismantle the program. But officials have taken a much softer stance against Pakistan, despite increasing evidence that it played a key role in the development of the North Korean program. In large part, this is because officials believe it is essential to maintain Pakistan's cooperation in the war against terrorism.

"President Musharraf understands the seriousness of the issue," Powell said, adding that he has discussed it both "face-to-face" with Musharraf and on the phone, including several times in the past month. "Whenever he and I communicate with each other, I reinforce the point," Powell said.

Under U.S. law, a nation must face sanctions if it allows the transfer of uranium enrichment technology without international safeguards, unless the president issues a waiver. "There are laws that apply, and we will obey the laws," Powell said. He declined to specify exactly how Pakistan would be sanctioned if the illicit trade continues.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39256-2002Nov25.html>

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In An Age Of Biowarfare, US Sees New Role For Nukes

Bush administration mulls resuming nuclear testing and developing tactical warheads to deal with threats like Iraq.

By Brad Knickerbocker, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

As United Nations inspectors fan out across Iraq - looking for evidence of Saddam Hussein's secret arsenal - the United States is rethinking the future of its own weapons of mass destruction.

Among the issues being discussed by US officials and the experts who advise them in this era of stateless terrorism and other forms of "unconventional warfare" are these: The resumption of nuclear weapons testing; ambivalence over controlling chemical and biological weapons at a time when advancing technology offers new opportunities to control the battlefield; and the possible development of tactical nuclear bombs to go after the kind of hardened targets that more than 70 countries - especially Iraq - now use to hide their most threatening weapons.

All of this would be happening even if the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had not occurred, even if war with Iraq were not as close as it is today. But the earthshaking events that have marked the beginning of the 21st century focus attention on the most intimidating military assets belonging to the world's lone superpower.

The US hasn't test-fired any nuclear devices since 1992. Officials figure it would take two to three years to be ready to resume testing. The administration wants to reduce that to a shorter period - not only to ensure that its aging stockpile of warheads is dependable, but also to allow the testing of any newly designed weapons.

The Pentagon's congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review calls for a "revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will ... be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required."

More recently, a senior official urged reconsideration of the 10-year US moratorium on testing.

"We will need to refurbish several aging weapons systems," said defense undersecretary Edward Aldridge in an October memo to senior nuclear policymakers. "We must also be prepared to respond to new nuclear-weapon requirements in the future." Congress recently authorized the nation's nuclear weapons labs to weigh the benefits and costs of being able to test such weapons within six months.

While highly precise conventional arms - laser-guided bolts from the blue - made headlines in Afghanistan, many experts say they will never completely replace nuclear weapons.

"To ensure that enemy facilities or forces are knocked out and cannot be reconstituted, attacks with nuclear weapons may be necessary," the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Va., reported last year.

"The United States may need to field simple, low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons for possible use against select hardened targets such as underground biological weapons."

Several of that report's authors are now officials in the Bush administration, including Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Defense Science Board chairman William Schneider.

One of the attractions of small nuclear weapons, in the eyes of some theorists, is that they can more effectively destroy biological or chemical stockpiles than can conventional explosives.

In Geneva recently, Stephen Rademaker, US assistant secretary of state for arms control, said he was "very pleased" with international adoption of measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. He warned, however, that the 1972 treaty banning such weapons is "inherently unverifiable." This implies that the US needs to know as much as possible about any biological or chemical threats it may face.

The difficulty here is that even preparing to defend against such weapons requires research on the weapons themselves. In its examination of biomedical sciences and the pharmaceutical industry - both involved in Pentagon projects - the Federation of American Scientists reports that "an immense amount of time and money [is] being invested" in new technologies that could "significantly complicate the control of chemical and biological weapons." Arms-control advocates also worry that defending against such weapons - especially those in underground bunkers - may increase the pressure to develop small, tactical nuclear weapons.

At this point, although official discussions have escalated, there is no rush to resume a nuclear arms race that had abated in recent years.

"Candidly, I cannot detect any plausible nuclear warfighting scenarios in the 'axis of evil' context," says John Pike, director of , an analysis organization in Alexandria, Va., (referring to Bush's characterization of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea). "I am guessing that much of this is a discussion about [China]."

As is often the case with what could be a politically wrenching change in military strategy and doctrine, those in uniform tend to be more cautious than their civilian bosses. "In my experience, there is little to zero interest among military leaders in actually using nuclear weapons," says Larry Seaquist, a retired Navy warship captain and Pentagon strategist. "They recognize that nuclear employment, by breaking the half-century taboo since the two weapons used [on Japan] in 1945, would take us into a whole new world."

"They also recognize that the calculus of nuclear weapon use is totally different in these rogue-nation situations like Iraq than it was in the cold war," says Captain Seaquist. In other words, the old balance-of-terror nuclear regime of "mutual assured destruction" that kept the United States and the former Soviet Union from blowing each other up doesn't necessarily work with rogue states such as Iraq or with stateless terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1126/p02s02-usmi.html>

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Washington Post
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Pg. 29

Nonessential Nukes

'Peaceful' fuels are potential deadly weapons.

By Edwin S. Lyman and Paul L. Leventhal

There is growing alarm over a gathering storm of nuclear dangers: terrorists pursuing homemade atomic bombs, Iraq capable of going nuclear as soon as it acquires smuggled nuclear material, India and Pakistan embarked on a nuclear arms race, North Korea acknowledging a new nuclear weapons program, Japanese political leaders openly boasting of nuclear weapons capability as Japan prepares to open a huge plutonium plant.

These threats have a common thread. Each reflects the outcome of a long history of missed opportunities by the United States and other nuclear suppliers to halt commercial production and use of explosive nuclear materials. These materials are "peaceful" fuels for nuclear reactors, but they are also suitable for making nuclear weapons. Access to them or to the technologies for producing them provides the wherewithal for nations and groups to go nuclear.

Today the amount of plutonium in civilian nuclear power programs rivals that in nuclear arsenals, and bomb-grade uranium remains the fuel of choice for operators of research reactors. The ability of international inspections and national physical protection measures to keep these fuels from being diverted or stolen is problematic at best. Even if these were essential fuels, needed to keep the lights on, factories running and medical science advancing, they would be too dangerous to use. But they aren't essential: Nuclear power and research needs can be met without the weapons-suitable fuels, because low-enriched uranium fuels, unsuitable for weapons, are readily available or under active development.

The current generation of nuclear power reactors already operates on low-enriched or natural uranium. Plutonium fuels are being introduced simply to draw down surpluses that never should have been created in the first place. Development of the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor provided the original rationale for producing civilian plutonium, but the breeder has caused enormous cost and safety problems everywhere it has been tried, and it should be abandoned. Continuing efforts to convert research reactors from bomb-grade to low-enriched uranium fuels should be accelerated and completed. Of equal importance is the need to get rid of the explosive fuels already produced. This can be accomplished by denaturing bomb-grade uranium into low-enriched fuel for power reactors -- something already being done with 500 tons of surplus Russian weapons uranium -- and by disposing of plutonium (which cannot be denatured) in highly radioactive or highly diluted waste.

But two great obstacles stand in the way of eliminating the commercial use of explosive nuclear materials. First is the average citizen's unwillingness to dwell on the dangers of nuclear explosives going astray. Who, after all, wants to contemplate his own nuclear annihilation? Yet unless there is a popular push on governments to adopt available solutions, there can be little hope of stemming the flows of these city-busting explosives.

Second is the reluctance of nuclear experts and policymakers to acknowledge and deal aggressively with a global cancer of their own making. Diplomatic efforts begun by the Ford and Carter administrations to steer the world clear of civilian use of plutonium and bomb-grade uranium were mostly abandoned after they met fierce resistance from the nuclear industry and bureaucracy both at home and abroad. Having failed to prevent the unnecessary spread of explosive nuclear fuels, policymakers now seek to make a virtue out of managing them. But as the situation with India and Pakistan suggests, controlling nuclear weapons made from civilian fuels could be an exercise in managing the unmanageable, with horrific consequences. Managing these fuels once they are obtained by Saddam Hussein or by terrorists is out of the question.

The United States and Russia are ideally positioned to lead the way as they prepare to dispose of tons of surplus weapons plutonium. But their nuclear bureaucracies share a devotion to plutonium, and they now plan to introduce weapons plutonium as fuel in their commercial power plants. Moreover, a program to convert all research reactors in the world to low-enriched fuel is now threatened by a plan to import Russian weapons uranium for use in some U.S. research reactors instead of having it denatured. These are precisely the wrong examples for the world and raise risks of nuclear terrorism in both countries.

The situation has the makings of what the late historian Barbara Tuchman described in "The March of Folly": the pursuit of disastrous policies contrary to self-interest. To qualify as folly, she wrote, "a policy must have been seen as counter-productive in its own time" and "a feasible alternative course of action must have been available."

Calamitous nuclear folly on a global scale can still be averted. Alternatives to explosive nuclear fuels are readily available. If we are to avoid a world awash in nuclear weapons, we must stop the folly and pursue the alternatives. *Edwin S. Lyman is president of the Nuclear Control Institute. Paul L. Leventhal is the institute's president emeritus and co-editor of the book "Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons."*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39212-2002Nov25.html>

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Savannah Morning News
November 24, 2002

Soldiers Learn Their ‘NBCs’

A trip through tear gas chamber burns the importance of wearing a gas mask into a soldier's mind.

By Noelle Phillips, Savannah Morning News
FORT STEWART -- Spc. Elton Jeffrey coughed.
He hacked.

Tears streamed and snot dripped.

He wanted desperately to wipe his eyes, but a sergeant stopped him.

Jeffrey, an artillery soldier, had just learned the value of his gas mask during a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons training exercise.

“It feels like someone threw a fire on your face at first,” Jeffrey said.

At least once a year, every unit at Fort Stewart hauls its troops to a white, cinder-block building known as the CS chamber. Inside, troops like Jeffrey jog, knock off pushups or count off jumping jacks as tear gas smolders in coffee cans.

Then, an instructor orders them to remove their masks and the soldiers sprint for the exit.

The purpose is to prove to troops that they can still breathe inside the masks while performing strenuous work, said Staff Sgt. Kiley Pyron, the sergeant in charge of this training for the field artillery battalion.

As Staff Sgt. Kenny Butler, an engineer, put it, “If the gas chamber feels that bad, I don’t want to know what the real stuff feels like.”

Although it’s regular training for Fort Stewart soldiers, it becomes ever more grave as they deploy to Kuwait and prepare themselves for a possible war against Iraq.

The 3rd Infantry Division has more than 4,000 troops in Kuwait for a training mission. Should President George W. Bush decide to attack Iraq, it’s likely the division would lead the ground invasion.

Experts believe Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein would use chemical and biological weapons against U.S. soldiers as a last-ditch effort to save himself.

It’s a threat that scares many, especially family and friends of soldiers stationed in the Middle East.

Last week, Maj. Gen. Buford Blount, the division commander, addressed the chemical and biological weapons threat during a meeting with community leaders from Hinesville and Savannah.

U.S. intelligence officers in Iraq are warning Hussein’s generals to hold back if he gives the order to fire chemical or biological weapons, Blount said.

“We’re putting a lot of pressure on the military side,” Blount said. “If you do it, you will not be here for the new regime.”

Also, a recent General Accounting Office report concluded that a number of defective chemical protection suits had been distributed throughout the Army. But Blount said the division’s supply had been checked and defective suits had been removed.

Hopefully, those measures will reduce the odds of U.S. troops facing chemical or biological attacks, he said.

Meanwhile, at Fort Stewart, the training continues.

Classes about nuclear, biological and chemical weapons involve lots of repetition, recitations and hands-on drills.

Instructors hope the practice becomes second nature should soldiers ever face the real thing.

Before entering the chamber last week, soldiers went through classes to review how to use charcoal wipes to absorb chemicals on the skin or to practice the buddy system for removing contaminated chemical suits and masks. They also learned how to wash contaminated equipment and vehicles.

The instructor explained how to roll the gas mask’s hood over another’s head to get started.

“It should look like a lion’s mane,” Staff Sgt. Gregory Fowler said to younger soldiers nearby. “Arrrgghh!”

Later, two of those younger soldiers, Spc. Enzo Llufire and Pfc. Eugene Demonstoy, struggled to remove Llufire’s chemical suit pants over his bulky rubber protective boots. Llufire started to sit as Demonstoy tugged on his pant leg, but the instructor saw it.

“No. Un-uh,” she shouted. “We’re in a contaminated environment.”

Fowler understood the importance. During Operation Desert Storm, he spent two weeks wearing a charcoal-lined chemical protection suit.

“It sucks,” he said. “It’s hot.”

The Army's protective suits have improved since the Gulf War -- the charcoal is now integrated into the fabric so they're not as heavy and messy. Gas mask improvements make them easier and faster to use, Fowler said. Still, some military experts believe the suits are too hot to use in the heat of a Kuwaiti summer. That's why most predict any U.S. attack will come in the winter months.

In hot temperatures, soldiers said they sweat so much in the suits that it pools in their boots and gloves. Sgt. James Dennison said he once passed out after wearing it for several hours during an Oklahoma summer.

Running is difficult in the suits and masks because it's harder to get oxygen, Fowler said.

"If you're getting shot at though, adrenaline will take over and you won't think of anything but getting undercover," he said.

Perhaps, a shot of that adrenaline kicks in when soldiers race from Fort Stewart's chamber.

Some walk out quietly and calmly. More moan. Some let go with defiant screams.

Others, who've learned tricks to avoid the burning, tease their buddies who either panicked and forgot, or just didn't know.

It's a rite of passage for a younger soldier to suffer stinging around his eyes at least once.

When Sgt. 1st Class Kathi McElroy, a platoon sergeant in the 92nd Engineer Battalion, emerged, there was nothing to mock. After all, the former drill sergeant knew better than to inhale after ripping off her mask.

"If you do, you'll be slinging snot everywhere," she said.

McElroy hopes the experience hammers home what really could happen on the battlefield.

Her battalion has increased its training in recent months by requiring soldiers to strap gas masks onto their hips all day on Mondays. Senior leaders test the soldiers' awareness by periodically sounding a gas attack alarm.

"I think people take it more seriously now with the clear threat in Iraq," McElroy said.

<http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/112402/LOCgastraining.shtml>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced correspondence follows article.)

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Pg. 6

Lab Practices Decried In Watchdog Report

Enforcement of a federal law meant to track the movement of dangerous pathogens among U.S. laboratories is fraught with problems, posing an "urgent and potentially serious public health threat," congressional auditors said in a letter.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, charged with enforcing the law, said it is already working to fix the problems.

The General Accounting Office investigation was prompted by last fall's anthrax attacks, when it became clear no one knew how many U.S. labs had the microbe sent through the mail. That made it harder to pinpoint the source of the anthrax and the person who mailed it.

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Homeland Security: CDC's Oversight of Select Agent Programs.

GAO-03-315R, November 22.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-315R>

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