


#216

15 Nov 2002

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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Concern over Kazakhstan bio-theft bid

Tuesday, November 5, 2002 Posted: 7:02 PM EST (0002 GMT)

ALMATY, Kazakhstan (AP) -- Authorities in Kazakhstan have arrested a man who entered a former biological weapons research facility where deadly viruses are still studied and stored.

An unidentified man entered the Scientific Center of Quarantine and Zoonotic Infections around the end of the working day Monday, the center's deputy director, Alim Aikimbayev, told a news conference on Tuesday. The man intended to steal test tubes but was detained before he could get past a second layer of security protecting dangerous materials, he said.

"What worries me is that now, after the large terrorist events in the United States and Moscow, we have an attempt to enter our facility, which has absolutely no material worth but does possess dangerous pathogens," Aikimbayev said.

He was referring to the September 11 attacks and the hostage-taking raid by Chechen rebels at a Moscow theater last month.

"Terrorism, including biological, is growing, and society should be prepared for bio-terrorist acts," he said.

The center in Almaty, Kazakhstan's former capital, was part of the Soviet biological weapons industry and was involved in running a testing ground for anthrax and other agents on an island in the Aral Sea.

Kazakhstan has renounced weapons of mass destruction, and the center now conducts studies of viruses and research aimed at counteracting biological weapons if they are used.

Aikimbayev did not say how the man got into the center.

He said that the facility's physical security was recently enhanced with the help of U.S. financial aid.

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/05/kazakhstan.biological.ap/index.html>

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New York Times

November 13, 2002

Pg. 1

Arms Inspectors In Iraq Will Use High-Tech Gear

By William J. Broad

In the four years since United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq, the digital revolution has made their gear smaller, lighter, faster, more precise and easier to use. Millions of dollars in commercial and antiterrorism funds are accelerating the rush of technology, opening new vistas for weapons sleuthing.

Experts say the advances are giving the inspectors a technical edge in the hide-and-seek world of Iraqi weapons, as well as new leverage to disarm Iraq.

Among the new developments are these:

*Commercial spy satellites so powerful that their photos can reveal details of factories, buildings and arsenals.

*Miniature sensors that can constantly monitor the air, water and soil for telltale signs of weapons of mass destruction.

*Newly portable germ detectors that can quickly check installations for anthrax, plague and other deadly biological agents.

*Powerful radar systems that can penetrate the ground to scan for signs of tunnels and underground bunkers.

Human knowledge and experience will still be paramount in any inspection regime, Hans Blix, head of the United Nations inspection teams, recently told trainees in Vienna, according to transcripts made public by the United Nations. But, he went on, "powerful new means of verification" are now coming into play.

His view was supported by military analysts who pointed out that if the equipment can find strong evidence of prohibited weapons work, rather than weak or ambiguous clues, that could prove important in making the case for action against the government of President Saddam Hussein.

But even as Mr. Blix hailed technology's new power, military analysts emphasize that Iraqi weapons makers have had four years to refine their deceptions and thoroughly understand the United Nations approach.

As one Defense Intelligence Agency expert, John Yurechko, said recently of the Iraqis, "They now have experienced the inspection regime" and have whetted skills to counter it.

Weapons inspections began in Iraq in 1991, but after repeated failures of cooperation between the United Nations and Baghdad, the inspectors left in December 1998, hours before the United States and Britain began three days of air strikes.

Four years later, questions abound over what Baghdad has done during the inspection hiatus. The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a worst-case estimate, says Iraq may be rebuilding its nuclear program, renewing production of deadly nerve agents like sarin and VX, and racing to make germ weapons.

"Most elements are larger and more advanced than before the gulf war," the agency said of Baghdad's germ warfare effort.

Before the 1991 war, according to the United Nations, Iraq made at least 5,125 gallons of botulinum toxin, the deadliest substance known to science, and 2,245 gallons of anthrax agent — enough to kill everyone on earth several times over.

The United Nations now has about 250 experts trained to search Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. About 100 of them will be on the mission at any one time.

Some weapons experts say the technical edge may help newer inspectors compensate for their relative lack of experience.

But Tim McCarthy, who went to Iraq 15 times as a missile inspector and now works at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, was cautious about the new technologies, pointing out that they could also beguile with the hope of quick breakthroughs while ultimately wasting time and financial resources.

"There's lots of whiz-bang gadgets out there, and sometimes they don't get you to the central issues," he said.

A vital tool, Mr. McCarthy added, is the interview. Hundreds of Iraqi scientists are thought to know about programs to develop biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and inspectors who interview them must develop the knack to detect a lie.

"It comes down to the nose," Mr. McCarthy said.

United Nations officials would not describe the new surveillance technologies in detail, for fear of tipping their hand. For example, Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, said making public the exact specifications for, say, a laser sensor, might let the Iraqis develop ways to confuse it.

"The sensors are much more sensitive," Mr. Buchanan said. "Camera resolution is better. Equipment that might have needed a room now might fit into a briefcase."

The general advances, experts said, are driven by the same digital revolution that has drastically increased the power of computers, cellphones and cameras. In tandem with these changes, new interest and redirected government financing have brought rapid advances in weapons detection.

"Four years ago the interest in defending against chemical and biological arms wasn't nearly as great," said K. David Nokes, head of national security programs at the Sandia National Laboratories, based in Albuquerque, N.M.

Germ detectors, too, have dramatically improved. The most accurate ones map a microbe's genetic material with the same kind of equipment used to decode the human genome. In 1998, when the inspectors left Iraq, only large laboratories could do such analyses.

But by 2001, after years of biodefense funding, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California had perfected a two-pound device known as Hanaa, for Hand-Held Advanced Nucleic Acid Analyzer, which can recognize a microbe by its DNA, helping eliminate identification failures and false positives.

"Having sensitive detection technology like Hanaa is very useful," said Page O. Stoutland, a Livermore counterterrorism official. "The traditional way is to take lots of samples and then send those home. But that takes days or weeks to sort out."

By contrast, he said, Hanaa, now being made commercially, works in about 20 minutes, "letting you go back quickly if you get an interesting reading."

Miniaturization has also shrunk radiation detectors, which can help track nuclear materials. The inspectors have acquired two types made by Quantrad Sensors, a company in Madison, Wis. Its portable Ranger unit can detect several radioactive isotopes, while its Alex unit can identify a wide range of metals with potential nuclear uses.

"They're simple to use," said Martin Janiak, the company's head. "You turn them on and go."

As for the new commercial satellites, which came into being in 1999 and now number a half-dozen, their cameras can see objects on the ground as small as two feet wide, revealing roads, buildings, pipelines, bridges, tanks, jets and missiles. The United Nations is using images from at least two of the commercial craft, officials said, and began experimenting with them about two years ago.

While countries at times supply the United Nations with images from their own reconnaissance satellites, a United Nations report last year praised the new self-reliance. "Material from multiple sources," it said, "serves to provide the commission with a broader and independent assessment capability."

In September, after studying photos of Iraq, weapons inspectors identified several nuclear-related areas of new construction or other unexplained changes. "We are very curious to see what is under the roof," said Jacques Baute, leader of the nuclear inspectors.

A newer technology on the horizon is pilotless reconnaissance drones, which the Security Council has allowed under the resolution adopted last Friday on new Iraq inspections. Among other things, the American military has used the drones for photographic surveillance.

Private experts said drones or piloted surveillance craft might carry gear to help the inspectors find underground bunkers, a top issue on the agenda.

Last year, an Iraqi defector who described himself as a civil engineer said in an interview that he personally worked on secret installations for biological, chemical and nuclear arms in underground vaults. Other Western intelligence has echoed that theme.

Special radar systems can penetrate the ground. Other devices can detect variations in the earth's gravitational field, revealing underground voids. Still other sensors can detect magnetic fields generated by electrical gear in tunnels up to 100 feet deep.

Tim Brown of GlobalSecurity.org, a private group in Alexandria, Va., said it was very likely such equipment would be used in Iraq. "If they don't go in with something like that," he said, "they're not going to be perceived as serious." In a talk last month in Vienna, Mr. Blix of the United Nations said the new inspections, aided by the new technologies, could be thorough but not perfect in ferreting out hidden Iraqi arms.

"It is not possible to examine every square meter in a big country, or every basement, or every computer program, or archive, or every truck on the road," he said. "All that is attainable is a high degree of assurance that there are no malign bugs or bombs."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/13/international/middleeast/13INSP.html>

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Washington Post
November 13, 2002
Pg. 1

Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny

Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration has evidence that suggests Pakistan assisted North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program as recently as three months ago, much later than previously disclosed, according to sources in the administration and on Capitol Hill.

While the administration has taken a hard line against North Korea, demanding that it verify it has dismantled its efforts to enrich uranium before U.S. officials engage in further discussions with the communist state, it has taken a much softer tack against Pakistan. Publicly, officials have suggested that if Pakistan, a key ally in the war against terrorism, had provided help to North Korea in the past, it changed its behavior after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in New York and Washington.

But in reality, U.S. officials say, the administration believes Pakistan continued to trade nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly material in exchange for missile parts up until this summer, when the administration concluded North Korea was secretly trying to construct a facility to enrich uranium for a bomb. Administration officials would not discuss the extent of the evidence, but they said it involves highly suspicious shipping trade.

"Let's put it this way: There were still shenanigans going on three months ago," an administration official said. Intelligence officials who have briefed members of Congress have also disclosed the administration's concerns that Pakistan's illicit nuclear trade continued well into this year.

Pakistan's involvement in North Korea's program has put the administration in an extremely delicate position. Under U.S. law, if the president determines that a country has delivered nuclear enrichment equipment, material or technology without international safeguards, the United States must suspend economic and military aid. Such sanctions were imposed against Pakistan in 1979, but last year Bush waived them and other nuclear-related sanctions after the Pakistani government agreed to help in the fight against al Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban militia after the Sept. 11 attacks.

Rather than press Pakistan for a full accounting, U.S. officials said they have noted the latest evidence -- which Pakistani officials have argued is innocent -- and believe they have put Pakistan on notice that future violations will not be tolerated. Intelligence officials plan to closely scrutinize transactions between Pakistan and North Korea. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has personally guaranteed that questionable transactions with North Korea will cease, and U.S. officials believe he would like to halt the nuclear leakage. But they also question whether he has full control of all entities that could be doing business with North Korea. "In the end, we may find he is only partially truthful," the official said.

Several experts said it will be difficult to understand the scope of the North Korean program -- which by some estimates would not be operational for several years -- unless the administration demands that Pakistan disclose exactly what it might have provided to North Korea.

"We have asked North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear enrichment program," said Robert J. Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation in the Clinton and Bush administrations and now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "How will we know if North Korea has done that unless we know precisely what Pakistan has transferred to North Korea?"

Pakistani officials publicly insist that they have not helped the North Korean program in any way.

"No material, no technology ever has been exported to North Korea," said Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States.

Qazi said that while Pakistan has engaged in trade with North Korea, "nobody can tell us if there is evidence, no one is challenging our word. There is no smoking gun."

Last month, U.S. officials confronted North Korea with their conclusion that it had a covert nuclear program. Then, North Korea unexpectedly admitted it.

Pakistan produces highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, and U.S. officials have long suspected that Pakistani nuclear scientists had disturbing ties to the North Koreans.

In the face of Pakistan's vehement denials, U.S. officials have been publicly anxious not to suggest that Musharraf, who seized power in 1999 in a bloodless coup, is anything but a close friend and ally.

Indeed, asked last month about reports that Pakistan provided assistance to North Korea's program, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer did not confirm the reports but noted: "Many things that people may have done years before September 11th or some time before September 11th, have changed. September 11th changed the world and it changed many nations' behaviors along with it."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has been careful publicly not to suggest when Pakistan may have helped North Korea. Instead, he said that as recently as last month, he spoke to Musharraf "about the need not to assist North Korea in any way and have any kind of relationship with North Korea now that would give them the wherewithal to develop those kinds of weapons or the means to deliver them."

Powell said he purposely did not dwell on past behavior because "the past is the past and there isn't a whole lot I can do about it. I'm more concerned about what is going on now." He said, "We have a new relationship with Pakistan so that I can talk to President Musharraf in these very direct, open terms and get assurances from him."

Leonard Weiss, a former Senate staffer who specialized in nonproliferation issues, said there is "no question" that, under a 1976 law known as the Symington amendment, Pakistan would qualify for sanctions if it aided North Korea's program. But he said that if officials decide not to probe too deeply, "they avoid the political problem of having to give them a waiver."

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Chembio Suits Limit Iraq War Window

NewsMax Wires

Wednesday, Nov. 13, 2002

WASHINGTON -- A member of an Army chemical and biological response team wearing a chemical protective suit fainted under the hot lights of the Pentagon press room during a briefing Tuesday, underscoring one of the key concerns about starting a desert war with Iraq: the heat.

Just moments before she fainted, another member of the team explained that while the suits were indeed hot, they are accustomed to working in them and are trained to withstand the physical rigors of wearing them, even in a desert environment.

Nevertheless, military officials have long maintained they are not eager to get into a summer war with Iraq as temperatures can reach as high as 140-degrees -- making fighting even in standard battle gear difficult. If Iraq

unleashes chemical or biological weapons on the battlefield, all soldiers will don the two-piece suits for added protection.

But as many as one in 16 of the suits may have serious flaws, according to the General Accounting Office.

The weather in Iraq plays a heavy role in tactical U.S. war planning in Iraq. The 1991 Persian Gulf War had a six-month build-up, not only to intimidate Iraqi soldiers who had invaded Kuwait but also to allow the weather to cool down before what was assumed would be a long desert ground war.

Adding to the concern the New York Times reported Tuesday that Baghdad is trying to order vast quantities of atropine, an antidote to deadly nerve agents -- indicating Saddam Hussein may be planning a chemical attack and wants to be able to protect his own troops. The Iraqi military is believed to have large stores of chemical and biological weapons, some left over from its pre-Gulf War arsenal and more newly manufactured.

The soldier who tumbled into the first row of chairs in the room, Sgt. 1st Class Kerrethel Avery was quickly revived and led out of the room. The other soldiers suited up in various chem.-bio suits were red-faced and sweating under the television-ready lights. They were directed to unzip and stand at ease.

"I've never felt anything like that light before," Avery told reporters after the briefing, having doffed the chemical-lined suit that contributed to her downfall. She said she did not lock her knees -- a frequent cause of soldiers' fainting while standing at attention -- and had opened the suit at the cuffs to let in air.

Avery is a member of the Army's Technical Escort Unit, which does the dangerous work of explosive ordnance disposal and identifying enemy chemical and biological agents on the battlefield.

But all soldiers who deploy to a possible war with Iraq will be issued the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology.

Operating at High Temperatures

Capt. Regan Edens, also with the Army's TEU, told United Press International he had operated in his suit at temperatures as high as 137 degrees.

"It's tough but its nothing we can't handle," he said.

The suits are lighter and more durable than the version they replaced, but even so the program has been plagued with problems. In October, the General Accounting Office revealed that as many as 250,000 flawed JSLIST suits may be mixed in with the Defense Department's inventory of more than 4 million intact suits, a situation Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn., likened to a game of "Russian roulette" for soldiers who may face just such threats on a battlefield in Iraq.

A company produced more than 750,000 suits with tears in them, and at least 120,000 of them were issued to U.S. soldiers serving in Bosnia. They were recalled but the Pentagon can only document receiving 500,000.

Moreover, New York's Newsday reported last week that the suits carbon-lining can break down and become ineffective when exposed to sweat.

The suits are expected to be replaced after 45 days of use to account for the problem, according to military officials overseeing the program.

The TEU team leader, Lt. Col. George Lecakes, expressed total confidence in the JSLIST suit.

"I can tell you with 100 percent confidence they will protect my life, his life ... there's no doubt whatsoever," he said.

<http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/11/13/62335.shtml>

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Wall Street Journal
November 13, 2002

U.S. Cleared Iraq's Purchases Of Antidote For Nerve Agents

By David S. Cloud, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration is concerned that Iraq has purchased large quantities of a drug used as an antidote for nerve gas, but most of the orders were approved by U.S. officials serving on a United Nations committee that monitored Iraqi imports.

U.S. officials said Tuesday that Iraq's sizable purchases raised concerns that Baghdad was stockpiling the drug atropine for its military in case Iraq decided to use nerve agents in a possible war against the U.S. Since 1997, Iraq has signed contracts to purchase more than 3.5 million doses of the drug, according to U.N. records.

Until this month, however, the U.S. appeared satisfied that Iraq's purchases were for hospitals or other civilian medical purposes. With the support of the Bush administration, the U.N. committee that monitored Iraqi sanctions approved Iraq's purchase of one million ampules of atropine in March 2001, U.N. records show. The approval came after a seven-month delay in which the sanctions committee sought information about the drug's final use. A

spokesman for the U.N.'s Iraq program, Hasmik Egian, said a U.N. investigation showed the drug was going to health officials in Iraqi provinces.

Another one million atropine doses were approved for export to Iraq in February 1998, during the Clinton administration, U.N. records show. In addition to its use against nerve agents, atropine has multiple uses, including reviving heart-attack victims, treating diarrhea and controlling excessive salivation.

"It is true that these are medical supplies and they have basically gone through the sanctions committee without questions," said one U.S. official. "But at any given moment, it's reasonable to ask why they need this much."

U.S. officials' suspicions of the Iraqi purchases, reported by the New York Times, emerged after Iraq received U.N. approval in October to purchase an additional 1.5 million doses. One of the reasons for concern was that, unlike the earlier shipments, Iraq was also seeking to purchase a large quantity of auto-injectors, which would permit the drug to be self-administered, possibly by Iraqi soldiers to protect themselves from nerve agent.

Some of the latest purchases involve a Turkish exporter, although suppliers in other countries are also involved, officials said. The U.S. is holding talks with Turkish officials and others about whether to stop the shipments. U.S. officials acknowledge they aren't sure about Iraqi motives in buying the drugs. A U.N. official said the volume of purchases isn't excessive for possible civilian uses in Iraq, which has a population of more than 22 million.

The latest contract was approved without U.S. input because the procedures for approving Iraqi imports was changed last spring. Instead of each contract going through the U.N. sanctions committee, a list of items with civilian and military applications was devised. Anything not on the list was automatically approved. Atropine isn't on the list, but U.S. officials said they would explore adding it when the list is reviewed later this month.

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Washington Post
November 13, 2002
Pg. 8

Iraq Trying To Procure Atropine, An Antidote To Nerve Agents

Iraq has ordered 1.25 million doses of an antidote for nerve agents in what could be an attempt to protect its military personnel if President Saddam Hussein uses those weapons on the battlefield, administration officials said yesterday. At least some of the doses were ordered from Turkey, and U.S. diplomats are discussing the issue with Turkish officials.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said it was not clear whether Iraq has received any deliveries of the antidote, atropine. "This is not something you would want to be selling to Iraq at this time," Powell said.

One U.S. official said the administration had not evaluated whether the size of the Iraqi request, first reported in the New York Times, suggests the atropine will be used as a battlefield antidote. Another official said the large quantity clearly suggests an attempt to protect military personnel in the event nerve agents are used against an invading enemy.

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London Times
November 13, 2002

Britain 'Needs Missile Shield'

By Michael Evans, Defence Editor

Britain may soon need to be protected by a ballistic missile defence system, Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, said yesterday.

He said that the country could be targeted by rogue states, which were now trying to arm themselves with long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence failed, Britain may need a back-up system to pre-empt such an attack.

Mr Hoon gave strong indications in a speech to the Foreign Policy Centre in London that the Government was seriously considering joining the Americans in deploying a missile defence barrier against rogue states such as Iraq.

He said: "The reality is that once a ballistic missile has been launched against us, deterrence has failed and the only recourse left to us is to try and shoot it down.

"There may come a day when we need to decide to add a further capability to our current range of responses by acquiring missile defences for the UK and for Europe as a whole, in the way the US has already decided," he said. Mr Hoon said that the Ministry of Defence planned to address the issue in the same way as it had developed the Strategic Defence Review published in 1998 which laid down the Government's requirements for the Armed Forces for the next 15 years.

The Defence Secretary said that Britain's nuclear deterrent, consisting of the Royal Navy's four Trident ballistic missile submarines, was still needed to deter states with large nuclear capabilities.

Russia, he said, continued to keep up-to-date and effective nuclear systems and more countries were acquiring nuclear weapons all the time.

However, he said, there were now additional actors to consider, people who could be far removed in attitudes and values from the cautious and conservative members of the old Soviet Politburo.

He said: "Where an individual or tiny clique has seized power and acquired a WMD (weapon of mass destruction) capability, how might they react if facing the loss of power?" Mr Hoon said that a defensive system against a limited ballistic missile attack "might serve to reinforce and complement the deterrence provided by our conventional and nuclear weapons".

He said: "We have a new problem — of the rogue state with a limited but dangerous capacity. It is in the interests of all responsible states to confront this."

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-10-478559,00.html>

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New York Times
November 14, 2002
Pg. 1

Iraq Tells The U.N. Arms Inspections Will Be Permitted

By Julia Preston

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 13 — Iraq said very reluctantly today that it would allow United Nations weapons inspectors to begin work in the country and would "deal with" a Security Council resolution obligating it to disarm. In their nine-page letter, however, the Iraqis seethed with hostility toward the United States, and repeatedly denied President Bush's assertions that they have weapons of mass destruction, setting the stage for further confrontation between Washington and Baghdad.

In Washington, Mr. Bush had no specific reaction to the Iraqi letter but stressed again that "there's no negotiations with Saddam Hussein."

"We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit, period," Mr. Bush said during a meeting with his cabinet. The United Nations secretary general, Kofi Annan, struck a markedly different tone, urging patience on the White House before it begins any military action if Iraq balks at the rigorous weapons inspections approved on Friday with a 15-to-0 vote in the Security Council.

Even right after that vote, it was clear from speeches by delegates here that some Council members would view war as justified only if Iraq flagrantly violated the new inspections regime. There appears to be a growing gap between those nations and the Bush administration.

Administration officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, indicated that they were content for now to wait until Dec. 8 — the deadline for Iraq to submit a complete list of its weapons programs — before making an issue of violations.

"There's no use being taunted into an argument now over what he's got," a senior official said, referring to Mr. Hussein. "There will be time for that next month."

Once that list is submitted, it will be up to Hans Blix, the head of the United Nations weapons inspectors, to check it. Administration officials have said that only then will they pass the most sensitive American intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs to Mr. Blix.

Forgoing diplomatic niceties, the letter raged against the Americans and the British, co-authors of last Friday's resolution, calling them the "gang of evil" and accusing them of "the biggest and most wicked slander" against Iraq. The United Nations, the letter said, "has now been transformed into a kitchen house for big power bargaining, providing cover for war, destruction, blockades and starvation to be inflicted upon peoples."

The letter to Mr. Annan was signed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri of Iraq, but Council diplomats said it had the tone of Mr. Hussein.

Today, most Security Council nations welcomed Iraq's begrudging assent, calling it adequate to meet a requirement in Friday's resolution, which gave Baghdad seven days to agree to its terms.

Mr. Annan, who met today in Washington with Mr. Bush and other senior administration officials, said he was satisfied that Iraq had provided the necessary agreement. The letter arrived two days before the Friday deadline.

"What is important is that they have said yes," Mr. Annan said here late this afternoon after returning from Washington.

The letter said, in an English translation provided by Iraq, "We hereby inform you that we will deal with Resolution 1441, despite its bad contents." It added, "We are prepared to receive the inspectors, so they can carry out their duties, and make sure that Iraq had not developed weapons of mass destruction, during their absence since 1998." United Nations inspectors withdrew from Iraq in December 1998, on the eve of bombing by the United States and Britain in punishment for Baghdad's failure to cooperate with the inspectors.

No passage in the letter said plainly that Iraq would give unconditional cooperation for the inspections. Instead, it said Iraqi officials would be watching to see if the inspectors "perform their duties in compliance with international law.

"If they do so, professionally and lawfully, without any premeditated intentions," it said, "the liars' lies will be exposed to public opinion, and the declared objective of the Security Council will be achieved."

By Dec. 8, Baghdad must present a complete declaration of all of its prohibited weapons programs. Any omissions or false statements could be the basis for "serious consequences," possibly a military attack, according to the resolution.

In its letter, Iraq repeatedly dismissed as lies the Bush administration's accusations that it has used the hiatus since the last weapons inspections to make biological and chemical arms and to work on a nuclear weapon. "Such fabrications are baseless," the letter said.

The letter arrived here only one day after the Iraqi Parliament recommended unanimously that Mr. Hussein reject the resolution, but left the decision in his hands.

Several Security Council diplomats dismissed the abrasive language in the letter as intended for the domestic audience in Iraq, allowing Mr. Hussein to say that in order to avert war, he had been forced to agree to the resolution, but had not bowed to the United States.

"The important thing in this is trying to spare our people from any harm," the letter said.

Mr. Blix confirmed today that his chemical and biological weapons team, — together with the inspectors for the nuclear program — would arrive in Baghdad on Nov. 18.

Just as Iraq said it was waiting to see how the inspectors would perform, Mr. Annan said the United Nations wanted to see how Iraq would cooperate.

"I think the issue is not their acceptance, but performance on the ground," he said in Washington. "So let the inspectors go in, and I urge the Iraqis to cooperate with them and to perform, and I think that is the real test we are all waiting for."

He said he did not want to jump to conclusions about the belligerent tone of Iraq's message.

"I will wait to see whether it is an indication that they are going to play games, or it is a message they are sending to their own people," said Mr. Annan, a veteran of many skirmishes over the inspections between the United Nations and Baghdad.

While the United States had no official reaction to today's letter, the other four permanent, veto-bearing Council nations accepted it.

"Iraq has now taken the first step," said the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw. "I welcome that."

But he added: "We must remain vigilant. Iraq's intentions are notoriously changeable." He said it was only the threat from Washington and London of all-out war to disarm Iraq that had brought it to accept the Security Council's will.

The French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, also guarded, said France "took note of Iraq's acceptance," and insisted that Paris wanted to see Iraq cooperate fully with the inspections.

Russia, which was the least enthusiastic among the Council powers about the threats of force in Friday's resolution, was the most enthusiastic about Iraq's response.

"We were sure Iraq would comply, as the decision is opening the way for the situation in Iraq to be settled politically," Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov told a Russian television station today.

The deputy representative from China, Zhang Yishan, announced in the Council this morning that "Iraq has decided to accept" resolution 1441 and "welcomes inspectors to come back." China is a permanent member that holds the rotating presidency of the Council for November.

Arab nations embraced Baghdad's decision with relief, pleased that Mr. Hussein had not provoked a crisis just days after they hailed Resolution 1441 as his last chance to avoid war with the United States.

In the letter, Baghdad parroted — but reversed — the words Mr. Bush used in a speech to the General Assembly on Sept. 12, when he summoned the United Nations to confront Iraq or become irrelevant.

Berating the Council nations that supported the American-British resolution, the letter said, "We fear that the United Nations organization may lose the trust and attachment of peoples, that is if it has not fallen to that place already.

"He who remains silent in the defense of truth is a dumb devil," the letter says, referring to the 15 nations on the Security Council.

Iraq's ambassador, Mohammed A. Aldouri, adopted a somewhat milder tone here this morning, saying Iraq was "eager" to see the inspectors work "in accordance with international law, as soon as possible."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/international/middleeast/14IRAQ.html>

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Washington Post
November 14, 2002
Pg. 28

Inspectors' List Of Sites Ready

'Road Map' Includes More Than 1,000 Locations in Iraq

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 13 -- With Iraq's announcement today that it will accept tough, new United Nations inspection terms, a team of disarmament experts will likely arrive in Baghdad on Monday to restart their surveillance cameras, install their communications equipment and begin the most intrusive weapons inspection operation in modern history.

Armed with tips and evidence amassed by Iraqi defectors, former U.N. arms experts and U.S. and British intelligence agencies over the past decade, the U.N. inspection team has created a road map of more than 1,000 sites that inspectors will potentially visit in their search of Iraq's suspected chemical, biological and nuclear weapons arsenals.

Over the next two months, U.N. inspectors will be zeroing in on a priority list of more than 100 sites, including an upgraded missile launch facility at Al-Rafah, a former nuclear power plant at Al-Furat and a chlorine production facility in the town of Fallujah outside Baghdad that once produced precursors for Iraq's nerve and blister agents, according to U.S. and U.N. sources. Inspectors are also expected to visit at least one of eight presidential compounds to test whether Iraq is willing to provide full compliance, officials said.

U.S. and British intelligence agencies maintain that these and other sites damaged by U.S. warplanes or destroyed by U.N. weapons inspectors have been rebuilt and expanded since the inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, on the eve of a U.S.-British bombing campaign.

"We have a plan of action which we cannot obviously lay out in detail," Mohamed El Baradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in an interview. "But we will have to go and visit some of the facilities which have been relevant in the past" . . . and conduct "no notice inspections" at previously unknown sites. "We would not want to work in an expected fashion; we will have to do some surprise visits to facilities that we might not be expected to visit."

El Baradei, an Egyptian arms expert who will head the United Nations' efforts to uncover Iraq's nuclear weapons program, said that these former sites represent only a piece of the broader picture of Iraq's weapons program. El Baradei and his counterpart, Hans Blix, the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for ridding Iraq of chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles, said the U.N. inspectors will set up an elaborate system of soil, water and air sampling equipment to detect any traces of chemicals or radioactive materials.

Inspectors will also appeal to U.N. member states to turn over intelligence on Iraq's efforts to purchase weapons-related equipment, and question hundreds of Iraqi scientists involved in Baghdad's previous weapons efforts to see whether they can provide credible evidence they have not been "moonlighting" in prohibited programs, El Baradei said.

But El Baradei and other senior U.N. officials say the key to identifying a secret weapons program is securing unimpeded access to any site in the country. "If there is a piece of equipment, it will have to be installed; and if it

has been installed and is being used, we will have a chance to bump into it," said Jacques Baute, the head of the IAEA's Iraq action team.

Under the terms of a 1991 cease-fire agreement ending the Persian Gulf War, Iraq is obliged to allow U.N. inspectors to eliminate its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons program and any missile with a range of more than 90 miles. The former U.N. inspections agency, UNSCOM, destroyed more Iraqi weapons than the U.S.-led coalition forces in 1991 before it left Iraq in 1998, following confrontations over access to sites.

But Iraq retained massive stores of growth media and chemical precursors that could have been turned to chemical and biological weapons programs. U.S. officials suspect that Iraq has also developed longer range missiles and other delivery systems capable of threatening U.S. interests.

Blix and El Baradei will travel to Iraq on Monday with a team of nearly 30 logistical and technical specialists to set up communications and check on the status of an elaborate remote monitoring system that kept tabs on pieces of Iraqi equipment that could easily be converted from civilian to military uses. A team of about a dozen weapons inspectors are scheduled to arrive Nov. 25 to begin conducting spot inspections. A full team of 85 to 100 inspectors should be working in Iraq by the end of December.

Reports issued last month by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee charged that Iraq has been engaged in an ambitious program over the past four years to rebuild facilities either torn down by previous U.N. inspectors or destroyed by U.S. and British warplanes.

The reports include the names of more than a dozen locations suspected of participating in banned weapons programs. One of them is the Al Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant, where Iraq previously produced motors for the Badr-2000 solid propellant missile, which is capable of traveling 430 to 620 miles.

Although U.S. warplanes and U.N. inspectors have destroyed several structures at the site, the Iraqis have begun to rebuild them. "The Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to mix solid propellant for the Badr-2000," according the CIA report. "The only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles."

U.N. officials say that much of the information published in the report -- including an account of weapons-related equipment and materials sought from overseas suppliers by Iraq -- provides a helpful guide to future weapons inspections. But they also struck a note of caution, pointing out that Iraq will have plenty of time to sanitize those sites. "Where sites have been indicated publicly, it is not likely that they will contain anything proscribed when inspectors arrive," Blix told a team of recruits in Vienna last month.

El Baradei said that while his inspectors could easily detect whether Iraq has reconstituted an industrial-scale nuclear weapons program, it will be much harder to uncover evidence of Iraq's efforts to obtain weapons-grade nuclear fuel from a foreign supplier. He said that although he will begin inspections in "a couple of weeks' time," it could take as long as three months before the entire U.N. monitoring system will be up and running. "We need to take our time," El Baradei said.

El Baradei and Blix have repeatedly pleaded with Washington and London to provide them with fresh intelligence they have collected on Iraqi efforts to procure key ingredients that can be used for either conventional or nuclear weapons programs.

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New York Times
November 14, 2002

Bush Administration Halts Payments To Send Oil To North Korea

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — The Bush administration said today that it would stop financing monthly shipments of fuel oil to North Korea, which are required under a 1994 arms control agreement, to punish North Korea for pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program.

But the White House, in a bow to its closest Pacific allies, Japan and South Korea, said it would not demand that a tanker carrying this month's shipment of 42,500 metric tons of oil turn around before reaching North Korea. The ship is just days from port, officials said.

The compromise decision, made by President Bush during a meeting of the National Security Council today, underscores the administration's desire to maintain a united front with its allies in pressing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, administration officials said.

Japan and South Korea have resisted the administration's urgings to cut ties to North Korea, arguing that engagement is the best way to change its behavior.

The administration will make its case against future fuel shipments at a meeting of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization in New York on Thursday.

Japan, South Korea and the European Union also sit on the organization's board. Though the organization operates on a consensus basis, the United States carries a powerful bargaining chip: it pays for almost all of the oil costs, which amounted to \$86 million in the last fiscal year.

The energy organization does not have enough money to buy the December shipment, officials said. While South Korea or Japan could foot the December bill, they are expected to adopt the United States' position opposing future shipments, at least temporarily, American and Asian diplomats said.

"One of our goals here has been to present North Korea with a united front," a senior administration official said.

"We are interested in maintaining that consensus when we come out of that meeting."

But the future of that consensus remains in doubt. Should the standoff continue deep into the frigid Korean winter, pressure may grow in South Korea to resume oil shipments. Some officials in the Bush administration also want to preserve elements of the 1994 agreement, though more hard-line officials contend that it should be scrapped.

The 1994 agreement called on North Korea to freeze and then dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for help in building two light-water nuclear reactors and for the annual delivery of 500,000 metric tons of fuel oil. North Korea admitted last month that it had violated the pact by developing a program to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs.

The president's decision on future shipments was praised by a number of lawmakers in Congress, although some urged him to take an even harder line.

"I'm pleased to hear that the Bush administration isn't going to fund further fuel oil shipments to North Korea," said Representative Edward J. Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat who is co-chairman of the Bipartisan Congressional Task Force on Nonproliferation.

"But if all the Bush administration does is step aside and let the South Koreans or the Japanese pick up the tab," he said, "it hasn't really accomplished very much. The most important thing the president could do right now is to announce today that the United States will not support the continued construction of two light-water reactors."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/international/asia/14KORE.html>

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Washington Post
November 14, 2002
Pg. 22

Crisis Could Push N. Korea To Expel Nuclear Inspectors

By Doug Struck, Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO -- In the countryside of North Korea, two men -- one Egyptian, one Chinese -- watch the still waters of a pool in a cold, nearly vacant building. Hundreds of silvery canisters sit in the clear water 30 feet below. Each contains highly radioactive metal that once fueled a power plant, metal that could be forged into the fearsome heart of a nuclear bomb.

The men re-run timed photos from poolside cameras, using a computer to detect changes in the image and confirm that nothing entered -- or left -- the water while they slept at a nearby dormitory. Assured, they make the rounds of other buildings, checking locks and seals on machinery and doors of the decrepit nuclear industrial complex.

They or their colleagues -- a new team is sent in about every six weeks from the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency -- have been doing this chore at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear plant 25 miles north of Pyongyang without interruption since Nov. 11, 1994.

But diplomats here and analysts are worried that these international inspectors could be evicted from North Korea, and their crucial surveillance of the spent nuclear fuel aborted, following a decision by the United States and the other members of the executive board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. The board decided to cut off future shipments of much-needed heavy fuel oil unless North Korea takes verifiable steps to dismantle a newly disclosed, separate program to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel.

President Bush, in a meeting with senior advisers Wednesday, decided to inform the other members of what is known as the KEDO board -- South Korea, Japan and the European Union -- that the United States will allow the current November shipment to be delivered but will not approve a December shipment unless North Korea takes the necessary steps. U.S. officials, who have closely consulted with allies in recent weeks, said they expect the other members to agree, and a decision will be formally announced as early as today when the KEDO board meets in New York.

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, KEDO is helping build nuclear power plants for North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear arms program. The agreement also provides that 3.3 million barrels of oil are to be shipped to North Korea each year.

In the growing diplomatic standoff over the demand to end the uranium enrichment program, one of the biggest risks is that the nuclear fuel quarantined under international inspection after the last major nuclear row in 1994 could be freed up and made into weapons.

"If North Korea decides they want to really rattle sabers, they could expel the IAEA and threaten to reprocess the fuel. That would be a very serious situation," said C. Kenneth Quinones, who helped set up the inspection program in North Korea in 1994.

If the oil flow is stopped, analysts and diplomats say, North Korea may evict the inspectors from Yongbyon. With some repair of the rusting infrastructure, the government could begin reprocessing the spent fuel rods from the pool into plutonium for atomic bombs in six to eight months, according to some estimates. The 8,000 spent fuel rods could conceivably make 30 or more atomic weapons, according to Quinones.

"North Korea can quickly un-can the stored fuel rods to begin extracting plutonium, allowing it to build up a nuclear force far more quickly than would be possible through uranium enrichment," said Timothy Savage, a visiting fellow at Kyungnam University in Seoul.

North Korea also could unlock the IAEA seals on the old nuclear plant at Yongbyon, and, with a major overhaul, restart the Soviet-era reactor to begin churning out even more potential weapons fuel.

Before the U.S. decision on the oil was announced, a parade of U.S. officials who had come for consultations privately advocated stopping the shipments, and said Congress would do so next year anyhow.

But Japan and South Korea disagree; they have told the Americans that it would be a mistake to end the oil flow and the 1994 Agreed Framework under which the shipments were sent. They argue that move could prompt an escalation of brinkmanship by North Korea.

"Unless we find some better alternative, it's very risky for all of us to throw it away," said Katsunari Suzuki, in charge of the North Korean negotiations for Japan. "It's better than nothing."

There are gaps in perceptions, the Japanese Defense Agency head, Shigeru Ishiba, acknowledged in parliament Monday. He warned that U.S. pressure to halt the KEDO oil shipments could cause disarray.

And it may escalate North Korea's moves, others say.

"If America stops the oil shipments, North Korea will consider the 1994 Agreed Framework completely dead and will restart the nuclear program. Definitely," said Kim Myong Chol, the former editor of People's Korea magazine in Tokyo, who often reflects Pyongyang's line. "And if America imposes economic sanctions -- depending on the nature of the sanctions -- North Korea could regard that as an act of war."

Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, the State Department point man on the issue, has said the United States will not negotiate with North Korea until there is "a complete and visible dismantling" of North Korea's uranium enrichment program.

The United States contends that a unified diplomatic front to isolate North Korea will force it to capitulate. But others who have dealt with North Korea for years say North Korea's traditional pattern is to increase the stakes, not to back down.

North Korea also has other cards to play, they point out.

The North's response might be as mild as halting the program under which the U.S. military has made regular trips to North Korea since 1996 searching for the remains of more than 8,000 American servicemen who died in the Korean War, an action it has taken twice before.

But North Korea could act more drastically and eject the 1,400 South Korean and Uzbek KEDO workers now pouring the concrete for the foundations of a light-water reactor power plant on the eastern coast under the 1994 pact.

"If they feel the United States is going to end the fuel shipments, they would most likely respond by evicting KEDO," said Quinones, speaking from Centreville, Va. Quinones said he believes that both sides will try to avoid an escalation of tensions. Both have shown some willingness to contain the confrontation, he said.

But the light-water plant is five years behind schedule, and North Korea may feel it will never get power from the completed project anyway, he said. North Korea has long protested that the United States removing the spent fuel would

considerably ratchet up the crisis. The Clinton administration was on the verge of ordering military strikes against North Korea in 1994 over just those sorts of preparations by Pyongyang after the IAEA detected possible diversions in its nuclear power plant fuel.

The most incendiary escalation of the stakes would be a test-firing of a long-range missile by North Korea, similar to one it launched in 1998 that alarmed Japan and its neighbors. North Korea warned last week that it may end its moratorium on such tests, adopted in 1999 as a gesture to the United States.

"North Korea could test-fire long-range missiles off the coast of Washington or New York in the Atlantic Ocean, and it would be legal under international law," Kim said. "It all depends on the American response. We're just at the beginning of a crisis. We're on a threshold."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51865-2002Nov13.html>

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Washington Times
November 14, 2002
Pg. 19

India Seeks U.S. Help In Nuclear Development

NEW DELHI — India and the United States have agreed to set up a body to facilitate the transfer to India of sophisticated civilian and military technology and to discuss cooperation in the space and nuclear sectors, officials said.

Agreement on the issues was reached during discussions here between high-level delegations led respectively by Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha and Kenneth Juster, U.S. undersecretary of commerce for exports, a joint statement said.

The United States had long prohibited the export to India of any sensitive high technology that could have military applications.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20021114-42432818.htm>

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GovExec.com
November 13, 2002

Defense Officials Outline Top Research Priorities

By Molly M. Peterson, National Journal's Technology Daily

Developing "modeling and simulation" technologies to predict, evaluate and test responses to potential terrorist threats is a top research priority for federal counterterrorism agencies, officials from the Pentagon and the White House Office of Homeland Security said on Wednesday.

"Modeling and simulation [applications] with a degree of precision we've never had before would be most helpful to us," Tom Hopkins, director of technology development for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), said during a homeland security summit sponsored by Silicon Graphics Inc.

Hopkins said those technologies could help national security officials combat "asymmetric" threats posed by terrorist groups that might use unconventional devices as weapons of mass destruction.

Modeling and simulation tools also are crucial to protecting the nation's critical infrastructure systems, according to Lee Holcomb, the Office of Homeland Security's infostructure director.

"Today, decision-makers really don't have an integrated set of modeling and simulation for the national infrastructure," Holcomb said, adding that those technologies would help security officials better understand the complex interdependencies among critical infrastructure elements such as telecommunications networks, the national power grid and the financial system.

"This is an area where I think high-performance computing and visualization will be extremely important," Holcomb said.

He added that security officials probably would earmark research dollars for developing an "intelligent" power grid with automated defenses against potential attacks.

Another top research and development priority, according to Holcomb, is improving communications capabilities for local police, firefighters and other "first responders" in the event of a terrorist attack. Holcomb said first responders need "real-time, fused data" from various sources, including sensors and surveillance systems that could alert them to the presence of biological or chemical toxins.

"We need portable detectors that they can take with them out into the field," he said.

Hopkins said DTRA also relies heavily on sensors and other surveillance technologies to study and combat nuclear, chemical and biological threats. For example, he said a "networked collection of sensors and detectors" is part of a test bed the agency is building in Albuquerque, N.M., to develop faster warning systems for airborne pathogens.

"Using humans as canaries is unacceptable," Hopkins said, adding that the experimental system also collects and analyzes data from state and local health surveillance networks.

Holcomb said developing better technologies for filtering airborne pathogens and chemicals is also an "extremely important" research priority.

Homeland security officials also are looking for "knowledge management" technologies that could fuse geographic, video, audio and text-formatted data "in an intelligent way" in order to quickly detect and share information about terrorist threats, Holcomb said.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

November/December 2002

Pg. 103

NRDC Nuclear Notebook

Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2002

By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen

The five major nuclear powers currently have more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in their arsenals, as shown in the table below. But this does not include a number of intact Russian nuclear warheads of indeterminate status—possibly as many as 10,000. Of the more than 30,000 intact warheads belonging to the world's eight nuclear weapon states, the vast majority (96 percent) are in U.S. or Russian stockpiles. About 17,500 of these warheads are considered operational. The rest are in reserve or retired and awaiting dismantlement.

We estimate that since 1945, more than 128,000 nuclear warheads have been built worldwide—all but 2 percent of them by the United States (55 percent) and the Soviet Union or Russia (43 percent). Since the Cold War ended, more and more warheads in U.S. and Russian stockpiles are being moved from operational status into various reserve, inactive, or contingency categories. The destruction of warheads is not required under current arms control agreements. For example, the 2002 Moscow Treaty (the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) contains no verification provisions and completely ignores non-operational and non-strategic warheads. The result is that stockpiles are more opaque and more difficult to describe with precision.

The United States has produced some 70,000 warheads since 1945, of which, 60,000 have been dismantled (more than 12,000 of them since 1990). The U.S. arsenal contains approximately 10,600 intact warheads. Of this number, nearly 8,000 are considered active or operational. In addition, several hundred warheads await disassembly at the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas, including the W56 and W79 warheads, around 36 B53 bombs, and some excess non-strategic B61 bombs. These warheads should have been dismantled by 2000, but for various reasons, the schedule has been extended.

As detailed in the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the plan is to reduce the number of "operationally deployed strategic warheads" to 1,700– 2,200 by the end of 2012. With the possible exception of the Minuteman III W62, there will be no further dismantlement of warheads beyond those specified in the 1994 NPR. The reduction of operationally deployed warheads will be accomplished by transferring warheads from active delivery vehicles to either a "responsive force" or to "inactive reserve." An example of inactive reserve warheads are those that do not have limited life components, such as tritium. Any additional disassembly before 2014, according to the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, would compete with planned refurbishments of the nine warhead types in the enduring stockpile. If current plans are fulfilled, by 2012 we estimate that the United States will have approximately 10,000 intact warheads—essentially the same number as today.

Russia has not released information about the size of its stockpile. We estimate that since 1949 the Soviet Union/Russia has produced about 55,000 nuclear warheads, and that about 30,000 warheads existed in 1990–1991. The U.S. Defense Department and CIA estimate that Russia dismantled slightly more than 1,000 warheads per year

during the 1990s, so that its remaining stockpile of intact warheads may be around 18,600. Only around 8,600 of these are thought to be operational. As many as 10,000 nuclear warheads are believed to be in non-operational status: in reserve for possible redeployment or retired and awaiting dismantlement.

The Moscow Treaty limits Russia's operationally deployed strategic warheads to no more than 2,200 by 2012, but because of limited resources and funding, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to sustain that many. Russia had pressed for a limit of 1,500 warheads, and if significant numbers of warheads are not refurbished and returned to operational forces, the stockpile could shrink to as few as 1,000 strategic warheads and no more than 1,000 tactical warheads over the next 10 years.

Britain is estimated to have produced approximately 1,200 warheads since 1953. Its current stockpile is thought to consist of some 200 strategic and "sub-strategic" warheads on Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The government declared in July 1998 that there would "be fewer than 200 operationally available warheads," of which 48 warheads would be on patrol at any given time on a single SSBN. The British arsenal peaked in the 1970s at 350 warheads.

France maintains approximately 350 warheads, down from 540 in 1992. France has produced more than 1,260 nuclear warheads since 1964. It has dismantled its land-based ballistic missiles and retired its nuclear bombs for delivery by naval-strike aircraft. The M51 sea-launched ballistic missile scheduled for deployment in 2010 was initially slated to carry an entirely new warhead (the TNO, or tête nucléaire océanique), but will instead be equipped with a more robust version of an existing design (probably the TN-75).

China is estimated to have an arsenal of around 400 nuclear warheads, down from 435 in 1993. China is thought to have produced some 600 nuclear warheads since 1964, and U.S. intelligence and defense agencies predict that over the next 15 years China may increase the number of warheads on primarily U.S.-targeted missiles from 20 to between 75–100.

India and Pakistan, the world's two newest declared nuclear powers, have fewer than 100 nuclear warheads between them, most of which are not yet operationally deployed. We estimate that India has produced enough fissile material for 45–95 nuclear warheads but may have assembled only 30–35, and that Pakistan has produced fissile material sufficient for 30–52 weapons and assembled 24–48 warheads. Both countries are thought to be increasing their stockpiles.

Israel has neither confirmed nor denied possession of nuclear weapons, although U.S. intelligence reports for many years have labeled Israel a de facto nuclear power. Some unofficial reports estimate Israel's arsenal to have as many as 200 warheads, the first of which reportedly was assembled in 1967.

1945-2002

1945 -- U.S.: 6; Total: 6

1946 -- U.S.: 11; Total: 11

1947 -- U.S.: 32; Total: 32

1948 -- U.S.: 110; Total: 110

1949 -- U.S.: 235; Russia: 1; Total: 236

1950 -- U.S.: 369; Russia: 5; Total: 374

1951 -- U.S.: 640; Russia: 25; Total: 665

1952 -- U.S.: 1,005; Russia: 50; Total: 1,055

1953 -- U.S.: 1,436; Russia: 120; U.K.: 1; Total: 1,557

1954 -- U.S.: 2,063; Russia: 150; U.K.: 5; Total: 2,218

1955 -- U.S.: 3,057; Russia: 200; U.K.: 10; Total: 3,267

1956 -- U.S.: 4,618; Russia: 426; U.K.: 15; Total: 5,059

1957 -- U.S.: 6,444; Russia: 660; U.K.: 20; Total: 7,124

1958 -- U.S.: 9,822; Russia: 869; U.K.: 22; Total: 10,713

1959 -- U.S.: 15,468; Russia: 1,060; U.K.: 25; Total: 16,553

1960 -- U.S.: 20,434; Russia: 1,605; U.K.: 30; Total: 22,069

1961 -- U.S.: 24,111; Russia: 2,471; U.K.: 50; Total: 26,632

1962 -- U.S.: 27,297; Russia: 3,322; U.K.: 205; Total: 30,824

1963 -- U.S.: 29,249; Russia: 4,238; U.K.: 280; Total: 33,767

1964 -- U.S.: 30,751; Russia: 5,221; U.K.: 310; France: 4; China: 1; Total: 36,287

1965 -- U.S.: 31,642; Russia: 6,129; U.K.: 310; France: 32; China: 5; Total: 38,118

1966 -- U.S.: 31,700; Russia: 7,089; U.K.: 270; France: 36; China: 20; Total: 39,115

1967 -- U.S.: 30,893; Russia: 8,339; U.K.: 270; France: 36; China: 25; Total: 39,563

1968 -- U.S.: 28,884; Russia: 9,399; U.K.: 280; France: 36; China: 35; Total: 38,634

1969 -- U.S.: 26,910; Russia: 10,538; U.K.: 308; France: 36; China: 50; Total: 37,842

1970 -- U.S.: 26,119; Russia: 11,643; U.K.: 280; France: 36; China: 75; Total: 38,153
1971 -- U.S.: 26,365; Russia: 13,092; U.K.: 220; France: 45; China: 100; Total: 39,822
1972 -- U.S.: 27,296; Russia: 14,478; U.K.: 220; France: 70; China: 130; Total: 42,194
1973 -- U.S.: 28,335; Russia: 15,915; U.K.: 275; France: 116; China: 150; Total: 44,791
1974 -- U.S.: 28,170; Russia: 17,385; U.K.: 325; France: 145; China: 170; Total: 46,195
1975 -- U.S.: 27,052; Russia: 19,055; U.K.: 350; France: 188; China: 185; Total: 46,830
1976 -- U.S.: 25,956; Russia: 21,205; U.K.: 350; France: 212; China: 190; Total: 47,913
1977 -- U.S.: 25,099; Russia: 23,044; U.K.: 350; France: 228; China: 200; Total: 48,920
1978 -- U.S.: 24,243; Russia: 25,393; U.K.: 350; France: 235; China: 220; Total: 50,441
1979 -- U.S.: 24,107; Russia: 27,935; U.K.: 350; France: 235; China: 235; Total: 52,862
1980 -- U.S.: 23,764; Russia: 30,062; U.K.: 350; France: 250; China: 280; Total: 54,706
1981 -- U.S.: 23,031; Russia: 32,049; U.K.: 350; France: 274; China: 330; Total: 56,034
1982 -- U.S.: 22,937; Russia: 33,952; U.K.: 335; France: 274; China: 360; Total: 57,858
1983 -- U.S.: 23,154; Russia: 35,804; U.K.: 320; France: 279; China: 380; Total: 59,937
1984 -- U.S.: 23,228; Russia: 37,431; U.K.: 270; France: 280; China: 415; Total: 61,624
1985 -- U.S.: 23,135; Russia: 39,197; U.K.: 300; France: 360; China: 425; Total: 63,417
1986 -- U.S.: 23,254; Russia: 40,723; U.K.: 300; France: 355; China: 425; Total: 65,057
1987 -- U.S.: 23,490; Russia: 38,859; U.K.: 300; France: 420; China: 415; Total: 63,484
1988 -- U.S.: 23,077; Russia: 37,333; U.K.: 300; France: 410; China: 430; Total: 61,550
1989 -- U.S.: 22,174; Russia: 35,805; U.K.: 300; France: 410; China: 435; Total: 59,124
1990 -- U.S.: 21,211; Russia: 33,417; U.K.: 300; France: 505; China: 430; Total: 55,863
1991 -- U.S.: 18,306; Russia: 28,595; U.K.: 300; France: 540; China: 435; Total: 48,176
1992 -- U.S.: 13,731; Russia: 25,155; U.K.: 300; France: 540; China: 435; Total: 40,161
1993 -- U.S.: 11,536; Russia: 22,101; U.K.: 300; France: 525; China: 435; Total: 34,897
1994 -- U.S.: 11,012; Russia: 18,399; U.K.: 250; France: 510; China: 400; Total: 30,571
1995 -- U.S.: 10,953; Russia: 14,978; U.K.: 300; France: 500; China: 400; Total: 27,131
1996 -- U.S.: 10,886; Russia: 12,085; U.K.: 300; France: 450; China: 400; Total: 24,121
1997 -- U.S.: 10,829; Russia: 11,264; U.K.: 260; France: 450; China: 400; Total: 23,203
1998 -- U.S.: 10,763; Russia: 10,764; U.K.: 260; France: 450; China: 400; Total: 22,637
1999 -- U.S.: 10,698; Russia: 10,451; U.K.: 185; France: 450; China: 400; Total: 22,184
2000 -- U.S.: 10,615; Russia: 10,201; U.K.: 185; France: 470; China: 400; Total: 21,871
2001 -- U.S.: 10,491; Russia: 9,126; U.K.: 200; France: 350; China: 400; Total: 20,567
2002 -- U.S.: 10,600; Russia: 8,600; U.K.: 200; France: 350; China: 400; Total: 20,150

Nuclear Notebook is prepared by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Hans M. Kristensen of the Nautilus Institute.

<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd02nukenote.html>

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Military Smallpox Vaccinations Planned

Bush to Order Pentagon Action, but Safety Concerns Delay Civilian Inoculations

By Bradley Graham and Mike Allen

Washington Post Staff Writers

Friday, November 15, 2002; Page A16

Senior administration officials said yesterday they expect President Bush will order the inoculation of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops against smallpox but delay action on vaccinating civilians to review safety concerns.

An administration official said that although Bush has not made a final decision, his top advisers have endorsed the plan, which was recommended by the Pentagon. An announcement could come within days but certainly within two weeks, the official said.

"The military is most likely to come into contact with the disease," the official said. "The odds of exposure are highest abroad, and it wouldn't need to be use of it by an enemy. It could be during inspection and confiscation of weapons stocks."

Questions of whether and how to proceed with vaccinating U.S. troops and civilians have confronted Bush for weeks. Driving the argument for a renewed national effort to protect Americans against smallpox have been

heightened concerns about biological warfare and intelligence reports about covert stocks of the smallpox pathogen in at least four nations -- Iraq, North Korea, Russia and France.

But worries about the vaccine's safety have prompted Bush to hesitate over approving the resumption of routine vaccinations, which stopped in the United States in 1972. Use of the vaccine has led to serious -- and occasionally fatal -- complications in a small percentage of recipients.

"This decision hasn't been easy because this isn't a benign vaccine," another administration official said.

Officials said the White House sees serious risks to ordering civilian vaccination, especially with the oldest and youngest vaccine recipients. "The arguments are much more complex than with the military," an official said. "With civilians, you have to consider the possibility of vaccinating people after the fact."

Because soldiers are generally younger and healthier than the general population, Bush is said to have fewer reservations about authorizing the Pentagon to proceed with its inoculation program.

"With the military, you have fewer risky cases. And you also have extensive health and medical records that make it easier to screen out anybody who might be vulnerable to adverse effects from the vaccine," an official said.

Pentagon officials have developed a plan for inoculating as many as 500,000 troops out of the 1.4 million soldiers on active duty. The first shots are earmarked for medical specialists and other emergency support troops. Next in line would be troops designated for deployment in the Middle East and other areas in which the risk of combat is considered high, defense officials said.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld strongly favors the inoculation program, considering it critical to ensuring the protection of U.S. forces, according to aides. Given the prospect of a war with Iraq as early as next year, Pentagon officials are eager to begin the vaccinations. Although there is no conclusive evidence that Iraq would be willing to use smallpox in a war with the United States, there are no reliable devices for detecting the release of the virus, so delaying inoculations until after an attack is not much of an option, officials said.

Senior federal health officials also have urged making the vaccine available in stages to U.S. civilians, beginning with about 500,000 people who work in hospital emergency rooms, then inoculating an estimated 10 million other health care workers, police, firefighters and paramedics. Ultimately, the vaccine would be offered to the public on a voluntary basis.

But the probability that some people would die of the vaccine's side effects has remained a major stumbling block for Bush and some senior advisers, officials said. The vaccine has caused life-threatening complications for 15 out of every 1 million people who have been inoculated for the first time.

Smallpox is one of the deadliest and most contagious diseases in history, killing about 3 out of 10 people who contract it. But the World Health Organization declared the disease eradicated in 1980.

The Department of Health and Human Services, which is responsible for maintaining U.S. vaccine stockpiles, has set aside for the military about 1 million of the 2.7 million doses licensed for use by the Food and Drug Administration.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56710-2002Nov14.html>

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Washington Times

November 15, 2002

Pg. 11

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Missiles left open

U.S. intelligence agencies continue to closely watch Russian strategic nuclear missiles and recently spotted a rare sight: a trainload of missiles left in the open.

Several new SS-27 strategic nuclear missiles were spotted on a train at a Russian missile field in a remote part of eastern Russia. The missile train was photographed by a U.S. spy satellite. What was unusual was that the train was stopped and the missiles were left in the open, raising fears that they could be stolen or sabotaged, U.S. intelligence officials tell us.

Intelligence analysts believe the reason the new missiles were left vulnerable is that the missile base was not ready to receive them. Construction was under way to expand the size of the missile silos to accommodate the new SS-27s.

A recent Defense Intelligence Agency analysis made public by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence states that Moscow's new ballistic-missile production over the next five years includes SS-26 short-range missiles, SS-27 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched SSN-23 and Bulava-30 long-range missiles.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021115-9748711.htm>

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Washington Post
November 15, 2002
Pg. 1

Europeans Warn Of Attacks

Intelligence Alerts Heighten Concern

By Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign Service

BERLIN, Nov. 14 – Normally circumspect European intelligence and law enforcement officials have issued a wave of stark warnings in the last two weeks in an echo of U.S. fears that another terrorist attack may be on the way, including the possibility that al Qaeda could employ chemical or other weapons of mass destruction against European targets.

The statements – by officials in Britain, Germany and France, as well as by the head of Interpol, the international law enforcement agency – represent a breadth of concern that the continent has not experienced since immediately after the attacks in New York and at the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, that killed more than 3,000 people and galvanized international efforts to combat terrorism.

Some European politicians, fearing public panic, have attempted to play down any clear and present danger. But the release Tuesday of a tape-recorded statement attributed to Osama bin Laden threatening Britain, France, Italy and Germany, as well as Canada and Australia, has compounded the sense of threat.

"There is very real concern," a German official said today. The surge in alerts from agencies and officials in different countries, he added, should be read as an expression of anxiety among European intelligence analysts that runs parallel to that expressed by U.S. intelligence agencies.

The United States has issued numerous threat assessments since Sept. 11, 2001, a policy whose wisdom was quietly questioned in Europe because officials believed the information was too vague to warrant alarming the public. But the frank tone in Europe in recent days signals a concern that there is now sufficient intelligence to signal that danger may be gathering.

"The threat is higher today than yesterday and will be higher again tomorrow," Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France's leading anti-terrorism judge, said today in an interview with Europe 1 radio. "The operational cells and networks are still working in Europe. . . . People in Europe, and especially in France, need to know that the risk is real and high." One German official said that intelligence and law enforcement agencies seem willing to buck the caution of their political superiors to get that message out. The starkest and most specific warning was issued by Hans-Josef Beth, head of Germany's international counter-terrorism unit. He told a meeting of the German-Atlantic Society in Berlin last week that Abu Musab Zarqawi, an al Qaeda leader trained in the use of toxins, could be planning an attack in Europe.

"Something big is in the air," said Beth, noting that Zarqawi "has experience with poisonous chemicals and biological weapons."

Zarqawi, a Jordanian, has been sentenced to death in his own country for planning bombings. He is believed to have traveled extensively since the Sept. 11 attacks, including in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey, European officials said. He is believed to have carried a poisonous substance disguised as an ointment into Turkey.

"This guy is very dangerous, especially with regard to the mixing of toxins and biological material," a senior German intelligence official said in a briefing for reporters.

Intelligence officers fear that Zarqawi's movements may indicate he is attempting to prompt al Qaeda followers to travel to Europe for new attacks. "We know people have come to Western Europe," the German intelligence official said. He said the information was based in part on interrogation of al Qaeda suspects captured in Arab countries after visiting Europe in recent months. "We are in a stage where we have some facts, but we are lacking concrete details."

Beth's comments were followed by a similar warning from his boss, August Hanning, head of Germany's federal intelligence service. "We have to count on a new attack, an attack of a much larger dimension," Hanning said on the German public television station ZDF. "There is a big threat, also in Germany."

On the day Beth first spoke in Berlin, the British Home Office issued an alert that al Qaeda could employ a "dirty bomb" or launch a poison gas attack. The Home Office, or interior ministry, also warned that al Qaeda could use

boats or trains to infiltrate cities. And the home secretary said Islamic terrorists, employing tactics seen recently in Tunisia, Pakistan and Indonesia, could carry out car bombings or assassinations.

"As we have seen with the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, the theater siege of Moscow, the attack on a French ship off Yemen, the scale of the attacks in Bali, today's breed of terrorist is looking for ever more dramatic and devastating effects," said a 35-page Home Office report.

The alert was withdrawn 30 minutes after it was released and journalists were asked to return the document. A milder draft that made no mention of dirty bombs or poison gas was substituted. British news reports suggested that politicians ordered the first document pulled back. Political leaders in Germany and France also have issued statements saying the threat level, while serious, is not new. But professional intelligence officials rejected that assertion.

"It is a fact that the situation has grown more critical," Hanning said when confronted with charges of alarmism at a conference outside Munich last week.

"All intelligence experts are agreed that al Qaeda is preparing a major terrorist operation, simultaneous attacks that would not target the United States alone but several countries at the same time," Ronald Noble, the head of Interpol, said in an interview with the Paris daily newspaper Le Figaro last week.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57037-2002Nov14.html>

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Washington Post
November 15, 2002
Pg. 29

Key U.S. Allies Cut Off Oil Aid To North Korea

By The Associated Press

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 14 -- Key U.S. allies today backed a decision by the Bush administration to suspend future oil deliveries to North Korea as punishment for continuing its nuclear program.

The decision was announced after a day-long meeting of the four parties that operate an eight-year-old oil assistance program -- Japan, South Korea, the European Union and the United States.

The United States decided to suspend oil shipments Wednesday night, ahead of the meeting today of the board members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, known as KEDO, which runs the program.

A statement from KEDO's executive board said the suspension would begin after the December shipment and "future shipments will depend on North Korea's concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly enriched uranium program."

Bush decided to suspend the oil shipments after North Korea acknowledged last month that it was secretly developing a uranium-based bomb. Bush's only concession was to agree to allow a vessel already en route to North Korea to deliver what would be the last U.S. oil shipment unless Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57138-2002Nov14.html>

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Global Security Newswire
November 15, 2002

U.S., Europe Hold Divergent Views Of WMD Threat

By Bryan Bender, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States and its European allies have different perceptions of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, but have begun to bridge a conceptual divide that has hampered trans-Atlantic cooperation in nonproliferation efforts, a panel of European experts said yesterday.

The United States, particularly in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax letter spree, tends to exaggerate the threat from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, they said. Meanwhile, European governments — which disagree even among themselves about the extent of the threat — tend to

underestimate the potential that terrorists or rogue states will acquire and use these weapons against Western targets, according to the experts.

Still, they agreed Europe has been slow to come to terms with the full extent of proliferation dangers and if European nations compile a collective assessment, they would likely find themselves more in line with the U.S. view that the threat is substantial, growing and requires immediate and cooperative threat reduction measures. The government and private experts presented their analysis in opening a two-day conference on nonproliferation sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

They cited a variety of reasons why European governments have not reflected the same level of urgency as the United States in addressing the proliferation threat, including the fact that continental Europe has not suffered a major terrorist attack; the anachronistic view in some European capitals that the key to security remains having good neighbors; a less globally focused foreign policy than Washington; a more multilateral approach and greater faith in international consensus; and perhaps even a "fatigue" with security issues given Europe's history of a war. Yet they also cited recent examples they believe demonstrate that European views, however divided they may be, are maturing and that the differences in perception with the United States are narrowing.

The European Versus American Perspective

"There is a gap" between the United States and Europe on the assessment of the WMD threat, said Paolo Cotta-Ramusino of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

He noted that the divergent views are not a new phenomenon, but date back at least to the end of the Cold War a decade ago, when the United States began addressing the proliferation threat posed by former Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems — a decade in which Europe took relatively little action on the proliferation front. Last year's terrorist attacks in the United States make it appear that the trans-Atlantic differences are more pronounced, several experts said. In other words, the killing of 3,000 people on U.S. soil led directly to U.S. urgency about the WMD threat, while no comparable event has taken place in Europe.

Until recent terror alerts in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy about the potential for an impending attack by al-Qaeda operatives or associates, European countries have not been as vigilant as the United States, which has lived with terrorist alerts on a regular basis since the events of Sept. 11, and the still-unsolved anthrax attacks. "We have not been receiving high threats," said Therese Delpech of the French Atomic Energy Commission. The lack of a Sept. 11-type attack in Europe, added Tomas Ries of the Finnish National Defense College, "makes all the difference."

He said Europe remains largely in a "state of delusion" when it comes to the threat of catastrophic terrorism. While numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies in recent years, the European public still lacks the attentiveness to large-scale terrorist threats that the United States has exhibited since Sept. 11, he said.

At the same time, European governments are sometimes accused of adhering to an outdated definition of national security, according to Delpech. Europeans "still don't understand that ... borders are irrelevant," she said. European countries, perhaps with the exception of the United Kingdom, also have a historically "provincial view of security," focused primarily on the immediate geographic area.

"The United States has a global security view," said Dieter Dettke of Germany's Freidrich Ebert Foundation.

He also believes that a major difference between the U.S. and European approaches lies in divergent views of when a coalition is required to address collective threats. Washington ascribes to the tenet that the mission should determine the coalition — and has been criticized at times for being unilateralist — while "for Europe it's the other way around."

Europeans are also more concerned than the United States with matching military and other security efforts to thwart terrorist attacks with "soft" approaches that include reliance on humanitarian aid, political reform, nation-building and other activities likely to have a longer-term effect on reducing the ranks of militant terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, the experts said.

The international effort to disarm Iraq illustrates the trans-Atlantic foreign policy divide, Dettke added. Germany believes Iraq can be contained and that continuing the current approach is "less risky" than forcing it to dismantle its weapons programs, which could interfere with the overall war on terrorism and even if successful, breed future terrorists.

Where U.S. and European views on the WMD threat intersect most is in London, officials said. The United Kingdom, the most vocal supporter of U.S. security policies, recently outlined weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat it faces.

WMD "is not under terrorism, it is on top of it" as perceived threats, said Simon Fraser of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

He said, however, that a common European assessment of the threat, what he called a "shared perception," is sorely required. "European thinking is ... behind the United States." Such an assessment is "desperately needed," Ries added, blaming its absence on the lack of a recognizable European leader to lead the way.

"The Americans may hype the threat, but the truth is the Europeans overlook it," Delpech said.

A Meeting of the Minds

While WMD threat assessments in Washington and European capitals tend to differ, the experts underlined several reasons to believe that the two sides are coming closer together.

For one, "our strategic vacation is over," said Delpech. She cited the terrorist alerts spreading across Europe, while others highlighted recent attacks — in Indonesia, Tunisia, against a French oil tanker — to demonstrate a heightened awareness about the potential for mass casualty attacks in the future.

Meanwhile, European governments and their publics have begun in recent years to extend their security view outward, Dettke said. Germany now has more than 10,000 troops stationed overseas — in Afghanistan, patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa for terrorist fugitives and elsewhere — a dramatic change from its largely passive military history of the past half a century.

According to Delpech, another sign of this is the European Union's commitment to set up a rapid reaction force by next year to respond quickly to crises, including outside of Europe.

A major test of European seriousness in addressing the WMD threat, however, will be whether European countries live up to their pledge earlier this year to help the Group of Eight economic powers contribute \$20 billion during the next decade to secure former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and radiological materials, numerous conference participants said.

Delpech expressed confidence that France, set to become the rotating head of the G-8 next year, will get countries to provide precise figures for their contributions to the global partnership.

"Closer cooperation over the Atlantic is an absolute necessity," she said. Europe must "put parochial differences aside."

But even if there is a meeting of U.S. and European minds about the seriousness of the proliferation threats, Fraser warned that the next hurdle is for both sides to agree on what to do about each of them.

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_11_15.html#3

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New York Times
November 15, 2002

No Agreement On Bioweapons Inspections

Countries meeting in Geneva to discuss strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention failed to resolve a dispute on inspections to verify compliance with the pact, which prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of the weapons. Last year the United States blocked attempts to set guidelines, saying the proposals would not deter development of biological weapons.

Alison Langley (NYT)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/15/international/europe/15BRIE3.html>

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Global Security Newswire
November 15, 2002

IAEA Chief Will Look For 'Pattern' Of Obstruction By Iraq

By Bryan Bender, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The international official responsible for dismantling Iraq's suspected nuclear weapons program said yesterday that he would look for a "pattern" of obstruction before reporting Baghdad's noncompliance with the new inspections regime.

"If there is a pattern of lack of cooperation, then we have to report to the Security Council and the Security Council will decide if that is a material breach," Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. If, however,

"there is minor omission and this is clearly not intentional, we are not running to the Security Council to say that it's a material breach."

His comments — just four days before he is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in advance of the inspection teams along with Hans Blix, chief of the U.N. team responsible for locating and destroying chemical and biological weapons — mark the first clear indication of what will be considered a breach of Iraq's pledge to cooperate fully. ElBaradei's views appear, however, to be at odds with the Bush administration. The White House has said that any indication of Iraqi intransigence will be considered a breach of its obligations.

U.S. President George W. Bush said Wednesday that a policy of "zero tolerance" would be followed regarding Iraqi noncompliance. "We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit, period," Bush said before meeting with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in Washington.

Bush has pledged to lead a coalition to forcibly disarm Iraq and overthrow its leader, Saddam Hussein, in the event that Baghdad does not comply with U.N. Resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the Security Council last week, warning of "serious consequences" if the regime once again fails to live up to its international agreements and does not provide irrefutable evidence that it is free of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 8).

ElBaradei, meanwhile, outlined five "interrelated prerequisites" that he believes are necessary for the new round of inspections to work. They include:

- * immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of all the authority provided for in the U.N. resolution;

- * ready access to all sources of information — including timely intelligence information from U.N. members;

- * unified and unequivocal support from the U.N. Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in the case of noncompliance;

- * active cooperation from Iraq, including demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and allow inspectors to fulfill their mission without conditions; and

- * the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspections teams, free from outside influence.

In an apparent caution to the Bush administration, ElBaradei said, "Efforts by national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very fabric of the process, let alone credibility."

The IAEA head also ruled out making any requested adjustments to the makeup of the agency's inspection team.

The Arab League has proposed that Arab countries be better represented. "Diversity is necessary," ElBaradei said, but "the key is competence and impartiality."

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_11_15.html#2

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Russia says nuclear material missing

Small amounts of weapons-grade gone from atomic facilities

ASSOCIATED PRESS

MOSCOW, Nov. 15 — The head of Russia's nuclear regulatory agency says small amounts of weapons- and reactor-grade nuclear materials have disappeared from the country's atomic facilities.

"INSTANCES OF the loss of nuclear materials have been recorded, but what the quantity is is another question," Yuri Vishnyevsky, head of Gosatomnadzor, said at a news conference on Thursday. "Of those situations that we can talk about in actuality, they involve either grams of weapons-grade or kilograms of the usual uranium used in atomic power plants."

"Most often, these instances are connected with factories preparing fuel: Elektrostal in the Moscow region and Novosibirsk," Vishnyevsky said.

He did not give further details on when the losses were discovered or how the material might have gone missing.

The International Atomic Energy Agency lists two known thefts of uranium from Elektrostal, in 1994 and 1995. In both cases, the uranium was seized by Russian police.

The agency also lists the 1994 seizure in Germany of 400 grams of plutonium brought in from Moscow.

A few grams of Uranium-235, the most common weapons-grade nuclear material, would not be sufficient to make a bomb. But reactor-grade uranium can be enriched to weapons-grade through a complicated process believed to be possessed by some countries trying to develop nuclear weapons, such as Iraq.

Russia's nuclear security has been a high concern in the decade since the Soviet Union's collapse brought financial troubles that reduced funding for state facilities and induced poverty that could motivate nuclear workers to sell atomic materials.

Worries have risen in the wake of increasing terrorism, including last month's attack on a Moscow theater by Chechen gunmen who held hundreds of hostages to press their demand that Russia withdraw troops from Chechnya. "After Sept. 11 of last year, the situation with regard to security at all Russian nuclear facilities changed for the better, but it still has not reached perfection," Vishnyevsky said.

He estimated that bringing security to its ideal level at Russian nuclear operations would require about 6 billion rubles, or 200 million.

Vishnyevsky made his statements in the course of criticizing a proposed law on technological regulation now being considered by the Duma, the lower house of parliament.

He presented a letter to the Duma from a number of prominent scientists criticizing the proposed law for calling for "the minimal necessary demands for security at the same time that in the whole world and in our country the demands for security in using atomic energy should be the maximum."

<http://www.msnbc.com/news/835441.asp?0sl=-12>

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British Advised to Hold Breath in Terror Gas Strike

November 15, 2002 06:36 AM ET

By Dominic Evans

LONDON (Reuters) - Britain unveiled plans on Friday to advise civilians on how to deal with a terror attack -- including tips such as running away from poison gas or using handkerchiefs as improvised masks. Acknowledging the now "permanent threat" of attack, chief medical officer Sir Liam Donaldson said posters -- and mock exercises in public to test the response of emergency services -- could alarm people, but might also save lives.

He was responding to a damning report which said hospitals and ambulance services in England and Wales were ill-prepared to tackle possible chemical, biological or nuclear attacks.

Britain, Washington's close ally in its declared war on terrorism, has been on alert ever since last year's September 11 attacks.

Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has warned that the next strike could be with weapons of mass destruction, reinforced the need for vigilance this week, saying he received almost daily intelligence of alleged threats to British interests.

Donaldson said the National Health Service had responded to the increased risk of attacks in Britain by stockpiling drugs, vaccines and chemical antidotes -- including 30 million smallpox vaccines -- and distributing emergency breathing equipment.

But it was now time to raise public awareness.

"If everybody is saying now this is a permanent threat -- however non-specific -- it's really important we move into a new era where we take the public with us," Donaldson said.

"Initially it will be alarming for people to see these things, but it does give the information which would be able to provide some protection for people if the worst were to happen."

The posters, which should be ready early next year, will offer simple advice to increase chances of surviving incidents like a chemical gas attack -- like leaving the scene quickly, not taking deep breaths, and breathing through a handkerchief.

HOSPITALS ILL-PREPARED

Donaldson was responding to a report which found that many National Health Service organizations assigned to tackle major incidents like train or plane crashes felt they were poorly prepared for the new threats since September 11.

Twenty-one percent felt unready to handle a chemical attack. The figure rose to 30 percent for a biological attack, 38 percent for an attack such as a "dirty bomb" involving radioactive material, and 53 percent for nuclear attack.

In London, perhaps the most likely target of any attack, ambulance services were "still not well prepared for incidents involving radioactivity," the report said. Failures in planning also meant mass casualties "would challenge the NHS in London."

The report, by the spending watchdog National Audit Office, said the real picture might be worse as checks with a small sample of replies showed they had overstated their preparedness to tackle major incidents.

Levels of personal protection equipment and decontamination equipment were "unsatisfactory," the report added, citing one third of hospitals who complained that a five million pound government allocation earlier this year was insufficient.

Gas masks were widely distributed among civilians in Britain during World War II.

http://www.reuters.com/news_article.jhtml?type=search&StoryID=1746462

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