


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



Air University

Air War College

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

(Editor's Note: Last weeks hyperlink to **CONFLICT 21** was incorrect, please note corrected hyperlink)

USAF CPC PRESENTS ANG "CONFLICT 21" WEBSITE

Focusing on homeland security, weapons of mass destruction issues and future total force concepts of operations (CONOPS) and other key issues, the Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC) at Maxwell Air Force Base recently unveiled the Air National Guard's (ANG) new **CONFLICT 21** website <http://c21.maxwell.af.mil> to the internet world.

According to **CONFLICT 21**'s chief, Colonel Michael Ritz, "This unclassified site is intended to be used not only by Air National Guard members, but by all members of the armed forces and Department of Defense." Colonel Ritz also serves as a CPC associate director and ANG Advisor to the Director, CPC. "This website provides it's user a window into the world of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as a forum for examining the many elements of homeland security and homeland defense," said Colonel Ritz.

A key element of CPC's mission is the promotion of research and education in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Developed by Colonel Ritz and Mike McKim of Air University's Air War College, **CONFLICT 21** provides researchers, students, military and government personnel and the general public unclassified, direct information and cross-links to a multitude of sources throughout the internet. "We hope to educate and enlighten all who make use of **CONFLICT 21** on a variety of matters critical to our nation and the world in the 21st century," says Colonel Ritz. "At the same, we want to provide a continuous flow of updated information for researchers, students and writers examining issues pertinent to those being examined by the ANG and USAF CPC now, and in the future," he concluded.

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Washington Times

October 25, 2002

Pg. 10

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Base security plans

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has ordered all military bases in the United States to draw up emergency plans for responding to large-scale attacks by mid-December, sources say.

The plans are needed on an urgent basis because of concerns that U.S. bases could be attacked in retaliation for any U.S. military action against Iraq, defense officials said.

The military services in the past did not have to spend much time worrying about attacks on U.S. bases as previous threats focused on foreign posts. All that changed with the September 11 terrorist attacks and the anthrax-filled letters from as-yet-unidentified sources a month later.

Now the services are scrambling to put together emergency plans for dealing with what Pentagon officials call "CBRNE" attacks — strikes from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-explosive weapons.

Some of the plans will call for coordinating base emergency plans with local police and fire departments, and possibly providing chemical and biological weapons suits to all base personnel, both members and their families. Overseas, U.S. military bases also are bolstering security and conducting drills to see how personnel respond to a large-scale terrorist attack. The exercise results, we are told, showed mixed success in responding to attacks.

Missile shots

Russian strategic nuclear forces conducted several missile test-firings a day after we first reported Oct. 11 that Moscow was planning large-scale strategic nuclear exercises. Two submarine-launched, long-range ballistic missiles were test-fired Oct. 12 from the Sea of Okhotsk, in the Russian Far East, and from the Barents Sea in Europe. The missiles traveled more than 4,340 miles before their dummy warheads hit impact ranges on the Kamchatka peninsula in the Far East, and Cape Kanin-Nos, in northern Russia near the Barents Sea. On the same day, strategic missile troops also fired an SS-27 land-based missile from the Plesetsk training launch site. That missile also landed at the Kamchatka impact range.
<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021025-9707640.htm>

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Washington Times
October 25, 2002
Pg. 19

Scud Igniter Found On Iraq-Bound Ship

RIJEKA, Croatia — A ship leaving Yugoslavia for Iraq was seized this week carrying what appeared to be material used in the ignition of Scud missiles, Croatian sources said yesterday. “There is evidence that the military equipment on the seized ship was headed for Iraq,” a Croatian police source said after 14 containers were unloaded from the freighter Boka Star in the port of Rijeka on Croatia’s Adriatic Coast. The ship was apprehended with the help of the United States and NATO allies.
<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20021025-75841616.htm>

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USA Today
October 25, 2002
Pg. 14

News Analysis

North Korea Often Clueless Regarding Diplomacy

By Paul Wiseman, USA Today

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea has scared the world with its nuclear weapons program, enraged Japan, ticked off its ally China and thrown its own economy into chaos — all in the past four months.

The latest moves by the Stalinist state are driven sometimes by desperation, sometimes by a proven strategy of brinkmanship to pry economic assistance from the United States and its allies.

But another factor also makes the North Koreans unpredictable as they awkwardly try to reform their economy and end their international isolation: They often don’t know what they’re doing.

After five decades of mostly self-imposed isolation, North Koreans aren’t used to dealing with the world and are not familiar with international norms, one Western diplomat says.

The world is nervously waiting to see how nimbly Pyongyang can climb the learning curve. Earlier this month, defiant North Korean officials admitted to U.S. diplomats that they’ve been developing nuclear weapons, breaking a 1994 agreement. It’s unclear why the North Koreans made the startling confession: Confronted with proof of the program by the United States, they might have felt they had no choice. But they also might be seeking assistance in return for giving up nuclear weapons.

The United States, South Korea and Japan consider a nuclear-armed North Korea unacceptable. Everyone wants a peaceful solution to the standoff. But tensions will rise if North Korea doesn’t back down.

Pyongyang’s awkwardness with the world outside is not surprising. The country has been isolated for decades by an ideology of self-reliance and violent behavior (blowing up a South Korean airliner in midair in 1987 and kidnapping Japanese to train its spies in Japanese language and culture). As it tries economic reform, it also must contend with a shortage of economists grounded in anything but discredited Marxist policies.

Kim Jong Il, who succeeded his father as head of a military dominated regime, must OK significant decisions. But Kim has led a cocooned life, his every command obeyed, his experience with the outside world limited to surfing the Internet and occasional trips to its allies China and Russia. North Korea’s recent behavior reflects its sheltered leader:

*In July, North Korea suddenly revealed a radical change in economic policy, overturning the unrealistic central planning that left its people impoverished and hungry. Overnight, wages were raised 19-fold, commodity prices 14-fold from fanciful state-set levels and the feeble won, North Korea's monetary unit, was devalued from 2.15 per \$1 to 150 per \$1. Pay in North Korean state-owned companies was suddenly linked to performance. Critics say the moves, though well intentioned, still let the state and not market forces set wages and prices, and have fueled inflation.

*In September, North Korea announced a scheme to duplicate China's success with "special economic zones" in which tax breaks and free-market policies are used to attract foreign investment.

The North Koreans selected Yang Bin, one of the richest entrepreneurs in China, to run the project in Sinuiju on the Chinese border. But Chinese officials quickly arrested Yang for tax evasion — a rebuff to an ally. Perhaps China was huffy that North Korea hired a prominent Chinese citizen without its approval or worried about competition from the new zone. What is clear is that Pyongyang never ran its plans past Beijing, an oversight that may have smothered the scheme at birth.

*In September, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a historic visit to Pyongyang to begin the movement toward normal diplomatic relations. Koizumi demanded that North Korea release information about Japanese citizens he said were abducted by North Korean agents.

To everyone's surprise, an apologetic Kim confessed that North Korea had kidnapped 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s, eight of whom have died. The confession inflamed the Japanese public, impeding progress toward normal diplomatic relations. "It seems not to have occurred to (Kim) that the government of Japan actually cares about so small a number of abducted citizens," Chuck Downs, author of a book on North Korea, wrote this week in *The Asian Wall Street Journal*.

Kim has miscalculated before. He squandered the good will generated by his June 2000 summit with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who offered aid and reconciliation. President Clinton also was eager to see North Korea shed its rogue-state status. But after the summit, North Korea dragged its feet on commitments to reunify separated Korean families, to hold a reciprocal summit in Seoul and other issues.

The South Korean public lost patience, convinced they weren't getting much back for the \$300 million in cash aid they send annually to North Korea. South Korea's leader is likely to be replaced after December elections by a president who will take a tougher line toward Pyongyang. Clinton's replacement, President Bush, has labeled North Korea part of the "axis of evil" that includes Iraq and Iran.

Now the fear is that Kim Jong Il may be miscalculating again, hoping that revealing his country's nuclear weapons program will win concessions from the United States just as it did in 1994.

The United States agreed to help North Korea build two light-water nuclear reactors in exchange for Pyongyang abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons. But North Korea has broken the '94 accord. Washington will be wary about cutting another deal, especially after the Sept. 11 attacks toughened Bush's resolve to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

"North Korea is still learning how to deal with others," says Park Young Ho of the Korea Institute For National Unification in Seoul. "They are learning what international standards of behavior are."

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-10-24-nkorea-usat_x.htm

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Philadelphia Inquirer
October 25, 2002

N. Korean Sets Terms For Talks On Nuclear Arms

By Paul Eckert, Reuters

SEOUL, South Korea - North Korea, under pressure to end a suspected nuclear weapons program, set its terms today for addressing U.S. concerns: a non-aggression pact and a guarantee of the impoverished communist state's sovereignty.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry said that "with greatest magnanimity," it had set three conditions for talks to address concerns raised by its admission that it had revived a nuclear arms program by preparing to enrich uranium. "Firstly, if the U.S. recognizes the DPRK'S sovereignty, secondly, if it assures the DPRK of non-aggression and thirdly, if the U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement.

The lengthy statement, carried by the state-run Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), used the acronym of the communist state's official title, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

The United States has ruled out negotiations with the North Koreans until they dismantle the uranium enrichment program. But Washington said it sought a peaceful solution and was maintaining contacts with the North through its U.N. mission.

“We have seen that report and we are studying it. We will not have a response this evening,” a senior State Department official told reporters yesterday in the Mexican resort of Los Cabos, where President Bush is to attend a weekend summit of the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping.

The ministry said the nuclear issue “cropped up as the U.S. has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with those weapons for nearly half a century.” Washington had aggravated its threat to Pyongyang when Bush labeled North Korea part of an “axis of evil” with Iraq and Iran and then unveiled a doctrine of preemptive strikes against states developing weapons of mass destruction.

“Nobody would be so naive as to think that the DPRK would sit idle under such situation,” it said.

Pyongyang accused Washington of failing to comply with the 1994 Agreed Framework that froze North Korea’s nuclear weapons development to defuse a crisis a decade ago.

Under the agreement, North Korea has been receiving fuel oil from the United States and Washington’s Asian allies were preparing to build two proliferation-proof light-water nuclear reactors to generate electricity in North Korea. Pyongyang also agreed to regular inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but the U.N. nuclear watchdog’s critical verification has yet to begin.

The reactors are years behind the original schedule, which had set a target of 2003 for completion, with the nuclear components delivered after the North passed IAEA inspections.

Western experts say the reactor delays are partly due to complex coordination among the United States and its allies, but mostly a result of North Korean attempts to renegotiate terms and by crises triggered by a Northern spy submarine raid on the South in 1996 and a ballistic missile test over Japan in 1998.

Pyongyang suggested Washington signed the pact in bad faith.

“It is only the U.S. that can know whether it had willingness to implement the Framework when it was adopted or put a signature to it without sincerity, calculating that the DPRK would collapse sooner or later,” the Foreign Ministry said.

Yesterday, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell had talks with South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Mexico.

Powell and Choi agreed they had a very serious problem with North Korea, a second senior State Department official said.

“Both agree that they should handle it peacefully. They and we agree the ball is in the court of the North Koreans,” the official said.

Bush, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi are to meet in Los Cabos tomorrow to try to agree to a joint approach to North Korea’s nuclear program.

In Seoul, Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of Dongkuk University’s Department of North Korean Studies, told local YTN television the statement “looks like a sign of the North’s will to resolve the issue peacefully, without leading to a crisis.”

<http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/nation/4362596.htm>

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Washington Times

October 25, 2002

Pg. 8

Depot To Incinerate Chemical Weapons

ANNISTON — Army officials plan for early 2003 to start incineration of Cold War-era chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot.

Objections from state environmental regulators over testing delayed an earlier start.

An Army status report said destruction of more than 2,200 tons of sarin, VX and mustard agent will begin sometime between January and March.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021025-82886744.htm>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced report follows article.)

New York Times

October 25, 2002

Report: U.S. 'dangerously unprepared'

Panel of experts sees seaports, power plants as most vulnerable

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 — Despite months of preparations and the spending of millions of dollars, the United States remains extremely vulnerable to a major terrorist attack, particularly at its seaports, power plants and oil refineries, a panel of national security experts has concluded.

The panel, in a report to be released on Friday, contends that local and state police officials still have little access to intelligence on terrorism suspects, that only a tiny fraction of ships and containers entering American ports are inspected and that most emergency workers are ill equipped to handle biological and chemical attacks.

"A year after 9/11, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil," says the report, which was sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. "In all likelihood, the next attack will result in even greater casualties and widespread disruption to our lives and economy.

"The need for immediate action is made more urgent by the prospect of the United States going to war with Iraq and the possibility Saddam Hussein might threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction in America."

The panel includes several members from the United States Commission on National Security — including its co-chairmen, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman — and its dire warnings reprise some of the conclusions of that earlier group.

In March 2001 the commission released a report predicting that a major terrorist attack on American soil was likely and that the country was unprepared to respond.

"We don't blame anyone for this, because it takes a long time to turn a country like this around," Mr. Rudman said in an interview. "But this involves large amounts of money and many locales. And everyone has to be on the same page. You can't assume that because the president signs a bill in the Rose Garden, everything will be fixed."

Other members of the current group included two former secretaries of state, George P. Schultz and Warren M. Christopher; two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe, retired, and Gen. John W. Vessey, retired; a former F.B.I. director, William H. Webster; and the president of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Harold E. Varmus.

The report contends that "in virtually every major city and county in the United States," police, fire and other emergency workers lack equipment needed to communicate during an emergency — a problem that plagued New York City emergency workers after the attack on the World Trade Center.

The panel also found that most local police and fire departments did not have chemical protection gear, portable detection equipment for chemical, biological or nuclear agents or adequate training programs for dealing with such attacks. Local police departments also do not have access to terrorist watch lists provided by the State Department to immigration and consular officials, the panel found. As a result, "The cops on the beat are effectively operating deaf, dumb and blind," and "known terrorists will be free to move about to plan and execute their attacks," the report contends.

The report also focuses heavily on the vulnerability of America's seaports, asserting that the intensive efforts to improve airport and air cargo security in the wake of last year's attacks have overshadowed the potential for attacks through shipping containers, boats and container trucks.

Ninety-five percent of the trade from outside North America to the United States moves by sea, the report says, yet vulnerability studies for the nation's 50 largest ports are still years from being completed. A catastrophic attack at one of those ports could shut down American trade and cripple a large portion of the nation's economy, it concludes. "If an explosive device was loaded in a container and set off in a port, it would almost automatically raise concern about the integrity of the 21,000 containers that arrive in U.S. ports each day," the report says. "A three- to four-week closure of U.S. ports would bring the global container industry to its knees."

The report recommends establishing 24-hour operations centers in every state to link local and federal law enforcement agencies; developing global standards for security at loading centers for containers; strengthening security at oil refineries and power plants; and increasing federal spending to help local governments buy equipment and improve training.

"The federal government will have to help," Mr. Rudman said. "It's going to take a fair amount of money."

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/chronicle/a/2002/10/25/MN153053.DTL>

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America Still Unprepared — America Still in Danger

Report of an Independent Task Force

Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations

Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman,

Co-Chairs

Stephen E. Flynn,

Project Director

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_Security_TF.pdf

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Unknown arsenal poses test for US in dealing with Korea

Pyongyang remark clouds the issues

By Matt Kelley, Associated Press, 10/25/2002

WASHINGTON - North Korea's cryptic comment that it has "more powerful" weapons highlights US concern that Pyongyang may be hiding biological weapons such as smallpox or advanced nuclear weapons.

While US officials say they believe North Korea probably doesn't have thermonuclear weapons, finding out what's in the reclusive dictatorship's arsenal will require inspections.

"North Korea is a closed system," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said Tuesday. "Our intelligence on it is imperfect."

Inspecting and disarming North Korea will be one topic President Bush takes up today and tomorrow when he meets with the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea. Pyongyang has thwarted or rejected past weapons inspection efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other groups.

The United States broke off talks with North Korea this month after Pyongyang admitted having a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. That program violates a 1994 pact in which North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear weapons development in exchange for two civilian nuclear reactors and other aid.

The United States is demanding that North Korea eliminate its nuclear weapons program before any talks resume, while North Korea has said America must drop its "hostile policy."

It is unclear what the North Koreans meant by the "more powerful" remark, said US defense and intelligence officials, who said there's no public evidence North Korea has anything stronger than one or two relatively crude nuclear bombs.

The comment could have referred to the plutonium-based nuclear weapons North Korea is believed to have built, or it may have just been rhetoric, said one US official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The North Koreans are not believed to have constructed advanced nuclear weapons like those in the US, Russian, Chinese, French, and British arsenals, the official said. Those thermonuclear weapons, which are hundreds or thousands of times stronger than the weapons North Korea is believed to have, are very complex and difficult to make.

North Korea also could have been referring to biological agents, some weapons experts say.

This story ran on page A21 of the Boston Globe on 10/25/2002.

http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/298/nation/Unknown_arsenal_poses_test_for_US_in_dealing_with_Korea+.shtml

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Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting Weaknesses.

GAO-03-5, October 24.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-5>

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Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes.

GAO-03-43, October 25.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-43>

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Washington Post

October 28, 2002

Pg. 1

Gas In Raid Killed 115 Hostages

Only 2 Slain by Rebels; More Than 600 Remain Hospitalized in Moscow

By Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker, Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Oct. 27 -- The gas that Russian authorities pumped into a theater to knock out Chechen guerrillas during a pre-dawn commando raid Saturday killed at least 115 of the hostages in a tragic climax to the siege, Moscow's chief medical officer disclosed today.

Doctors said that only two hostages had died from gunshot wounds before Russian special forces stormed the theater and killed 50 militants, ending a 58-hour standoff. The rest of the civilians who were killed had been weakened by the long ordeal and died "from the effects of the gas exposure," said Andrei Seltsovsky, head of the Moscow health department. Of the 646 former hostages who remained hospitalized today, 45 were in critical condition.

The conclusion that nearly all the slain hostages died from the gas and not from their captors' bullets contradicted initial assertions by law enforcement officials that their "special means" had not been fatal, and shed new light on an operation that has begun to draw more criticism as the death toll rises.

The medical findings, and new accounts from those who were trapped inside the theater, indicated that the Chechen militants had not begun systematically killing their hostages as Russian authorities believed before launching the assault. Some specialists said security agencies used an excessive dosage of the gas, which was funneled into the ventilation system of the theater building. The government's refusal to identify the gas, even to doctors treating the freed hostages, and its decision to keep most of the hostages incommunicado in hospitals provoked new controversy today.

A penchant for secrecy, along with a disregard for the human consequences, is a long-standing feature of Russian history, and has continued to echo through the struggle over the last decade and a half to establish a more open society. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev denied the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown for days in 1986 as radioactive clouds drifted toward Europe. President Vladimir Putin's government issued deceptive accounts, refused foreign help and ignored the pleas of relatives when the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sank in 2000 after an explosion in the torpedo room, taking the lives of all 118 on board.

"Like with the submarine Kursk, the story repeats itself once again -- 'We have no problems, we can solve everything ourselves,' et cetera, et cetera," Boris Nemtsov, head of the reformist Union of Right Forces in parliament, said in an interview today. "They make terrible mistakes and that's why they implement censorship, KGB-style."

Nemtsov, who tried to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the hostage crisis, said his party would demand a parliamentary investigation of the government's conduct, questioning not the raid itself but the failure to provide adequate medical care to hostages and the refusal to release information or help relatives.

The emerging criticism contrasted sharply with the applause that first greeted news of the raid. As more information became available -- and as the government worked to try to keep it quiet -- more people began raising questions.

Lev Fedorov, an environmental activist who is head of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety, concluded today after learning more about the gas that Russian officials had mishandled it.

"The large number of deaths is on the conscience of those who did not do it right," he said, adding that he was not surprised that officials refused to give details about the substance. "We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was because in this country the state is more important than the people."

Also contributing to the disquiet in some circles was the rising death toll among the hostages. Initially put at about a dozen, then 67 and eventually 90 on Saturday, it grew to 117 today -- just one shy of the number killed aboard the Kursk -- and may climb further.

Putin visited with the special forces troops who led the raid and declared Monday a day of national mourning, but he remained quiet today as new details emerged and more relatives of the hostages complained of their treatment. Other political leaders continued to defend the raid as the only choice given the militants' threat to blow up the theater if Putin did not end the war in Chechnya.

"We found ourselves in a situation between a horrible tragedy involving the deaths of all the hostages and an incredible disgrace had we met all the demands of the hostage-takers," Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov said on ORT state television tonight.

In light of new questions, however, authorities chose to withhold information not only from the public but also from relatives, doctors and diplomats.

Officials declined to reveal the gas used, despite demands from the United States and other embassies, which wanted the information to evaluate the health implications for their citizens. Sobbing relatives were left standing vigil outside hospitals, just as they had outside the theater, because authorities would not let them see the freed hostages. Several of the former captives reported being pressured not to talk.

Although the government said Saturday that none of the 75 foreigners among the hostages had been killed, embassies today revealed that at least four had died, including women from the Netherlands, Austria and Belarus and a young girl from Kazakhstan.

"We found our child by accident when he was already dead," said Alexei Sergeyenko, the stepfather of child actor Arseny Kyrilenko, 13, who played the role of Sasha in the musical "Nord-Ost" that was playing at the theater at the time it was seized.

Sergeyenko said the family found Arseny at a Moscow morgue with no visible wounds. "The only explanation of his death is the use of gas," Sergeyenko said a few hours later. "If there was a chance to avoid the storming [of the theater], then he would have probably survived."

Anatoly Glazychev, 40, a stage manager who was among the hostages, said the gas made many people vomit, and caused older victims liver problems. "I don't consider it the right way to free the hostages," he said by telephone from his hospital bed.

Glazychev and other hostages said they smelled a pungent odor just before passing out. Chemical weapons experts said nerve gas often smells of bitter almonds, but it was not clear whether that was the substance used. Other specialists have said the substance might have been a gas known as BZ that, while not banned, is not generally used in law enforcement situations. Unsure how to treat the effects of the gas, doctors said they turned to standard military antibiotics, used when they do not know how soldiers have been afflicted.

Yevgeny Yevdokimov, the chief anesthetist in Moscow who joined chief medical officer Seltsovsky at an early evening news conference here, described the gas as an incapacitating agent often used as a general anesthesia. Exposure to high concentrations of the gas can cause loss of consciousness and impair breathing and blood flow. Health officials said the gas would not have killed so many except that the hostages had been made especially vulnerable by stress and hunger. Moreover, other experts noted that the amount required to knock out the young, healthy Chechen guerrillas might have had a far more severe effect on children or elderly theatergoers.

Just as they withheld information from Russian relatives, authorities here had still not informed the U.S. Embassy of the location or condition of Sandy Alan Booker, 49, an American from Oklahoma who was among the hostages.

"We're still looking for him," an embassy spokesman said.

Russian security services told U.S. officials that they had found Booker's identification documents, according to another source who asked not to be identified, raising the fear that he might be dead or in a coma. Jean Booker, his mother, said by telephone from Oklahoma that a U.S. official called to ask if her son had any scars or other identifying marks on his body. "They can't seem to locate him," she said.

U.S. officials today tracked down another American hostage at a Russian hospital, but now believe a third American reported by a relative to have been in the theater might not have been there.

Several former hostages reported being ordered not to talk about what had happened. Oleg Zyogonov, an editorial assistant at the Agence France-Presse news service, was told to hang up when he started to recount his experience to his office.

Such conduct drew fire from liberal politicians. Grigory Yavlinsky, head of the Yabloko party, said it may simply represent "the stupidity of the bureaucracy" or it could be a more sinister "conspiracy" to cover up information. Putin's government, he said, should at least disclose more about the gas. "The doctors have to know," he said.

For the most part, criticism has focused on government conduct after the raid rather than the decision to storm the building. Many Russian political leaders and commentators concluded that Putin and the government had no choice, especially given the fact that the Chechens had wired the theater with high-powered explosives.

But accounts by some hostages and Russian newspapers questioned the timing of the raid. Citing sources in the special forces, the newspaper *Moskovsky Komsomolets* reported that Putin decided days earlier to storm the building, and that it had been planned all along for Saturday at 6 a.m.

Although the Chechens had threatened to kill hostages starting at dawn, they also had kept lines of communications open to the end. A Chechen intermediary said in an interview Saturday that militant leader Movsar Barayev was negotiating the release of foreign hostages even as the raid began.

The intermediary, Ali Asayev, said he had U.S. diplomat John R. Beyrle on the telephone at the same time he had Barayev on the other line. However, a U.S. Embassy official said today that while Beyrle was speaking with Asayev to try to arrange the release of hostages, Barayev was not on the other line.

As the operation began about 5:15 a.m., security officials on the scene said they were moving in because the Chechen militants had begun killing hostages. The militants had shot two hostages, but that occurred about three hours earlier, when a hostage charged one of the guerrillas, according to witnesses.

As calm returned, Glazychev, the stage manager, recalled, "Everyone relaxed and realized there wasn't going to be any [more] shooting."

When the gas was pumped into the building, Glazychev said, the militants used the 90 seconds before passing out to prepare to defend the building. "If they wanted to, they had every chance to start shooting us. But they didn't do that. . . . There was hope that a solution would be found through negotiation."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28303-2002Oct27.html>

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Washington Post
October 28, 2002
Pg. 1

FBI's Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted

Attacks Not Likely Work Of 1 Person, Experts Say

By Guy Gugliotta and Gary Matsumoto, Washington Post Staff Writers

A significant number of scientists and biological warfare experts are expressing skepticism about the FBI's view that a single disgruntled American scientist prepared the spores and mailed the deadly anthrax letters that killed five people last year.

These sources say that making a weaponized aerosol of such sophistication and virulence would require scientific knowledge, technical competence, access to expensive equipment and safety know-how that are probably beyond the capabilities of a lone individual.

As a result, a consensus has emerged in recent months among experts familiar with the technology needed to turn anthrax spores into the deadly aerosol that was sent to Sens. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) that some of the fundamental assumptions driving the FBI's investigation may be flawed.

"In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I'm one of them," said Richard O. Spertzel, chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission from 1994 to 1998. "And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good."

Instead, suggested Spertzel and more than a dozen experts interviewed by *The Washington Post* in recent weeks, investigators might want to reexamine the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism, or try to determine whether weaponized spores may have been stolen by the attacker from an existing, but secret, biodefense program or perhaps given to the attacker by an accomplice.

The Defense Department and FBI refused repeated requests from *The Post* to discuss recent developments in the anthrax investigation. But in some important respects, the official version of events -- developed in part during the early, frantic days of the probe -- is at odds with the available evidence, the experts say.

A profile of the attacker issued by the FBI last November described an angry, "lone individual" with "some" science background who could weaponize the anthrax spores in a basement laboratory for as little as \$2,500. The FBI acknowledged that the sender may not have been a native English speaker but emphasized that there was no "direct or clear" link between the attacks and foreign terrorism.

More recently, investigators appear to have abandoned the idea of an amateur attacker, but they continue to focus on a lone, domestic scientist, probably an insider. Attention has centered on medical doctor and virologist Steven J. Hatfill, a former U.S. Army scientist identified by the Justice Department as a "person of interest" in the investigation. Hatfill vigorously denies any involvement.

Scientists suggested that the loner theory appeared flawed even in the opening days of the investigation. The profile was issued three weeks after U.S. Army scientists had examined the Daschle spores and found them to be 1.5 to 3 microns in size and processed to a grade of 1 trillion spores per gram -- 50 times finer than anything produced by the now-defunct U.S. bioweapons program and 10 times finer than the finest known grade of Soviet anthrax spores. A micron is a millionth of a meter.

"Just collecting this stuff is a trick," said Steven A. Lancos, executive vice president of Niro Inc., one of the leading manufacturers of spray dryers, viewed by several sources as the likeliest tool needed to weaponize the anthrax bacteria. "Even on a small scale, you still need containment. If you're going to do it right, it could cost millions of dollars."

Possible Foreign Source

Also early in the case, U.S. authorities dismissed the possibility that Iraq could have sponsored the attacks because investigators determined that the spores had been coated with silica to make them disperse quickly, rather than the mineral bentonite, regarded by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command as Iraq's additive of choice.

In fact, however, Iraq's alleged preference for bentonite appears to be based on a single sample of a common pesticide collected by U.N. authorities from Iraq's Al Hakam biological weapons facility in the mid-1990s. By contrast, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned in declassified documents as early as 1989 that Iraq was acquiring silica to use as a chemical weapons additive.

In 1998, Iraq reported to the United Nations that it had conducted an artillery test of a live biological agent that used silica as a dispersant. And U.N. and U.S. intelligence documents reviewed by The Post show that Iraq had bought all the essential equipment and ingredients needed to weaponize anthrax bacteria with silica to a grade consistent with the Daschle and Leahy letters.

Daschle, Leahy and a few other senators and representatives have received periodic FBI briefings on the investigation, and Leahy said last week that the agency "has not foreclosed the possibility of a foreign source of this attack." However, the FBI's continued focus on Hatfill shows the agency's preoccupation with a domestic loner. Bush administration officials have acknowledged that the anthrax attacks were an important motivator in the U.S. decision to confront Iraq, and several senior administration officials say today that they still strongly suspect a foreign source -- perhaps Iraq -- even though no one has publicly said so.

That Iraq had the wherewithal to make the anthrax letters does not mean it is the guilty party. Still, the FBI's early dismissal of the possibility may have prematurely closed a legitimate line of inquiry.

"Iraq almost certainly had their anthrax spores in a powdered form," Spertzel said. "They had used silica gel to aid in dispersibility of [wheat] smut spores, and also indicated they were looking at it as a carrier for aflatoxin," a carcinogen.

Outer Limits of Technology

Since the attacks one year ago, scientists have been able to identify the anthrax bacteria used in the Daschle and Leahy letters as the "Ames strain," a virulent anthrax used in U.S. biodefense programs.

Analysts are examining lab variants of the Ames strain to find possible sources for the original spores, but scientists and biowarfare experts say the additive used to disperse the spores may be as instructive as the spores themselves. Even the sparse evidence made public by the investigation -- the uniformly tiny particle size and the trillion-spore-per-gram concentration -- has been enough to show many researchers that whoever weaponized the spores was operating at the outer limits of known aerosol technology. The mailer was brutally efficient in making a very special product for a very special mission.

The anthrax mailer needed a powder that could negotiate the U.S. postal system without absorbing so much moisture that it would cake up. At the end of the trip, the coated spores had to be light and supple enough to fly into the air with no delivery system beyond the rip of a letter opener through an envelope.

Finally, the spores had to be small enough for potential victims to inhale them deep into their lungs so that only a tiny number of spores would be needed to kill -- far fewer than the dosages anticipated by the U.S. government for the cruder aerosols of the past.

The answer was silica -- the same silicon dioxide that comprises substances ranging from beach sand to window glass. The attacker needed a special kind of silica, however, because the aerosol that delivered the spores was as sophisticated as any on the market.

“You need to get a drug into the bloodstream as an alternative to injecting it,” said pharmaceutical scientist Richard Dalby of the University of Maryland’s Aerosol Lab. “You need the drug to get much deeper into the lung, where the membranes are thinner, and to do that, you need smaller particles.”

The pharmaceutical industry is the leader in this technology, Dalby added, but “there’s only been an interest in generating tiny particles for that purpose for about the last 10 years.”

Several sources agreed that the most likely way to build the coated spores would be to use fine glass particles, known generically as “fumed silica” or “solid smoke,” and mix them with the spores in a spray dryer. “I know of no other technique that might give you that finished product,” Spertzel said.

According to William C. Patrick III, the former chief of product development for the U.S. Army’s now-defunct bioweapons program, U.S. government scientists made biological agents using spray dryers, but did not spray dry anthrax.

Fumed silica grains are between 0.012 and 0.300 of a micron in size, and will readily adhere to the surface of any larger particle, such as an anthrax spore. Coated particles will easily disperse, because the grains act as tiny “ball bearings,” enabling the larger bits to skid past one another.

Under an electron microscope, fumed silica would look like cotton balls strung together into strands that branch out in every direction. Their extremely small size gives them an aerodynamic quality, and their high surface area allows them to readily trap moisture, acting as a natural desiccant.

“If you packaged this stuff in a container, it would float out, and it’s highly dispersible and messy to deal with,” said C. Jeffrey Brinker, a University of New Mexico chemical engineer and a senior scientist at the Sandia National Laboratories.

Moreover, Brinker added, simply by shaking the particles in a jar, they acquire an electric charge, which causes them to repel one another and not clump together. A few passes through a mail-sorting machine would create the same effect. The particles would float, but they would remain separated.

“This concept of using something that would serve as a desiccant and a carrier at the same time is new,” said Harvard University chemical engineer David Edwards. “It’s a diabolically brilliant idea.”

Fumed silica has myriad uses, mostly as a thickening agent in products including ceramics, house paint, toothpaste and cosmetics. It is not widely known as an aerosol additive.

“If you’re going to put it into the lung, there has to be a mechanism to clear it, otherwise you just fill up somebody’s lung with silica after repeated dosings,” said Dalby, of the Aerosol Lab. The anthrax mailer, he noted, obviously wasn’t worried about giving his victims silicosis.

Some fumed silicas are extremely difficult to make, but at least two -- Aerosil and Cab-O-Sil -- are readily available and sold commercially in bulk. Either product, in theory, could be used to coat anthrax spores. Aerosil is based in Germany and Cab-O-Sil, in Boston. Both firms have offices around the world.

Ken Alibek, a former deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program now running an Alexandria biotechnology firm, said the Soviets used Aerosil in agent powders, and a classified Defense Department memo in 1991 said Iraq had “imported approximately 100 MT [metric tons] of Aerosil during the last 8-9 years.” Spertzel said the United Nations reported in the 1990s that Iraq had 10 metric tons of Cab-O-Sil, probably destined for its chemical weapons program.

Expensive Equipment

The United Nations also documented the presence of three Niro Inc. spray dryers in Iraq in the 1990s. Spertzel said two were destroyed, and the third was scoured and sterilized before inspectors could examine it.

In spray drying, a technician mixes fumed silica and spores with water, then sprays the mist through a nozzle directly into a stream of superheated air shooting from a second nozzle into an enclosed chamber. The water evaporates instantly, leaving spores and additive floating in space.

“Surface tension will pull those little [silica] particles together onto the big one,” said California Institute of Technology chemical engineer Richard Flagan. “You will end up with some degree of coating.”

Whoever made such an aerosol would “need some experience” with aerosols and “would have to have a lot of anthrax, so you could practice,” Edwards said. “You’d have to do a lot of trial and error to get the particles you wanted.” It would also help to have an electron microscope to examine the results.

This would mean at least several hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment, several experts said. Niro’s cheapest spray dryer sells for about \$50,000. Electron microscopes cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

In all, said Niro’s Lancos, “you would need [a] chemist who is familiar with colloidal [fumed] silica, and a material science person to put it all together, and then some mechanical engineers to make this work . . . probably some containment people, if you don’t want to kill anybody. You need half a dozen, I think, really smart people.”

One way to assemble such a team would be with “the knowing complicity of the government of the state in which it [the agent] is made,” Spertzel said. Another way to acquire the agent, several sources acknowledged, would be to steal it from a biodefense program that uses live biological agents for research or training purposes.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 bans offensive biowarfare research, but it clearly allows signatory nations to undertake biodefense programs using small quantities of live agents.

The Daschle and Leahy letters each contained 1.5 grams of anthrax powder or less, well within the boundaries of what researchers describe as “laboratory quantities” of agent. It is impossible to account publicly for all the anthrax powder that may exist in the United States, because most of the defense projects that use it are classified.

The Post asked the Defense Department whether the U.S. armed forces have made any anthrax powder comparable to that which was mailed to the Senate. The department declined to comment, citing the ongoing anthrax investigation.

There is, however, no public evidence that the Army has used spray-dried agents in recent biodefense projects, choosing instead to test small amounts of irradiated -- and therefore nonlethal -- anthrax bacteria that had been dried with older technologies.

In a written response to questions about the U.S. interpretation of the weapons convention, the Defense Department said its personnel may use live biological agents in a number of research settings: for vaccines and treatment; protective clothing and containment; alarms and detection; and decontamination.

The department “does not set quantitative thresholds for the agents or toxins in its possession,” but “these quantities are generally small,” the response said. “DOD continues to evaluate its procedures to ensure dangerous materials are safely stored and properly disposed of when no longer required.”

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28334-2002Oct27.html>

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Washington Times

October 27, 2002

Pg. 4

Military Officials Fear U.N. Will Weaken Resolution On Iraq

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

Pentagon officials are expressing disappointment in the drawn-out negotiations at the United Nations, fearing President Bush will sanction a watered-down resolution that commits the United States to months of unproductive weapons inspections in Iraq.

Officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, say Secretary of State Colin L. Powell appears so determined to win approval of some type of Security Council resolution that the result could be a win for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

The officials, some saying they are “pessimistic,” paint this scenario: France and Russia get their way, and the council approves a weak resolution with flexible deadlines. Saddam Hussein remains in power. Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix declares Iraq is disarmed, when in fact the regime has played a shell game with its weapons of mass destruction.

“The problem is with the criteria that has to be met,” said one Pentagon official. “It gives [Saddam] the ability to bob and weave.”

The casualty, they fear, will be President Bush’s options for war in 2003.

After Mr. Bush’s stern warning to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 12 to enforce 1991 cease-fire resolutions long ignored by Saddam, the White House pressed for a new resolution that authorized force if weapons inspections again failed.

But in the ensuing weeks, as France and Russia balked, Mr. Powell has acceded to water-downed language and backed off the administration’s policy of “regime change.”

The United States wanted the United Nations to demand that Saddam allow his weapons scientists to leave Iraq, with their families, for questioning by arms inspectors. The thinking was that Saddam would never allow the best eyewitnesses to his nuclear-bomb program to leave his control. His defiance would then trigger the use of force to remove him from power.

But that tough language now seems certain to be left out of any U.N. resolution.

Mr. Bush has spent much political capital urging the nation to support a war to oust Saddam and prevent the dictator from one day obtaining nuclear weapons. "If Bush does not follow through, his political future sinks," said one military officer.

Interviews with Pentagon officials revealed frustration with the pace and content of negotiations at the United Nations.

"This is getting deferred, and we're now going through a U.N. Kabuki dance," said one official. "What has caused the momentum for action to slow?"

There is a suspicion among some hard-liners at the Pentagon that in the private sanctum of the White House, Mr. Powell has convinced Mr. Bush that he must get a new resolution if he wants to ultimately use force.

Mr. Powell is on record, however, as saying the administration believes it does not need a new resolution. Its position is that a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions enacted after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and after Iraqi troops were forcibly evicted, provide sufficient authority to topple Saddam and disarm Iraq.

After its defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Baghdad agreed to unconditionally get rid of its nuclear-, chemical- and biological-weapons components — something it has not done.

On the Iraq debate, the administration has two main camps. There are the Pentagon hard-liners, led by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and supported by Vice President Richard B. Cheney. And there are the State Department centrists, led by Mr. Powell. The Powell wing earlier this year succumbed to the hard-liner position that Saddam must go. But the timeline, and diplomatic and military method, are still being debated.

Officials say Mr. Bush has decided that the only way to disarm Saddam is to depose him. But he has not selected a final war plan.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld publicly declines to discuss the nuts and bolts of drafting a new U.N. resolution. This may stem from his doubts that any new round of inspections would work with a bellicose Baghdad. "Inspections don't work, really, in a situation that's hostile," said Mr. Rumsfeld, an apparent reference to Iraq's blatant maneuvers to block the work of inspectors before they left in 1998.

"In terms of being able to disarm a country, unless that country is cooperative, it strikes me as a very, very difficult thing to accomplish," the defense chief said. "I can't quite imagine how that could happen, except through the cooperation of the country."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021027-75554930.htm>

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Washington Post

October 26, 2002

Pg. 21

Blix Warns Iraq On Arms Inspection Subterfuges

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Hans Blix, who heads the United Nations group that would carry out inspections in Iraq, warned earlier this month that if his inspectors return to that country the Security Council "will not tolerate" Saddam Hussein's past practice of moving and hiding prohibited weapons programs, according to a transcript released yesterday of his closed-door lecture to specialists in Vienna preparing to join his group.

Given just three days after his meeting Oct. 4 in Washington with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, Blix said, "I am sure the council will not tolerate any 'cat and mouse' game" as practiced by the Iraqis in the mid-1990s that led eventually to the withdrawal of inspectors.

But other than reporting the facts of any Iraqi "hide and seek" operation back to the U.N., he said, the "consequences . . . peace or armed action" would be up to the council and "is not our decision."

Blix also criticized Iraq for providing "misleading" declarations about its weapons programs in the past. He said that denials of immediate access to facilities "suggest that relevant material or documents of computer diskettes were being concealed," and warned that "denial of access would be an extremely serious matter."

U.S. critics of past U.N. inspections in Iraq have questioned whether Blix, a senior Swedish diplomat and past director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would be tough enough to handle a reinforced inspection and monitoring program in Iraq that they say was ineffective in the past. Blix is scheduled to appear before the Security Council on Monday to give his views on draft resolutions by the United States and Russia, plus amendments by France, and to answer questions.

In speaking to his employees, Blix reflected a toughness about his approach to the task and even the possibility that inspections could fail, positions that he had displayed in his private session with Powell, Rice and Wolfowitz. Blix told his audience that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, an open critic of inspections because he believes Hussein has hidden his programs, was right when he said, "the absence of evidence [of a forbidden weapons program] is not the evidence of absence." If an inspector cannot find anything, Blix said, "you cannot necessarily draw the conclusion that there is nothing. This is what Iraq has sometimes claimed we must do."

Instead, he said, Iraq's declarations about weapons of mass destruction programs, missiles and other delivery systems plus data about commercial chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and machinery that can also be used for weapons "do not by themselves constitute evidence but form the normally indispensable starting point for verification."

It will be up to Iraq to produce documents, contracts, instructions and people to support its claims. He pointed out that in the case of biological programs, Iraq had provided "misleading" information about whether they had been "weaponized," and inspectors only learned the truth later from defectors who described the programs.

Blix said his new organization, U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), during its three years of existence has received declarations with "scant or contradictory evidence or no supporting material . . . which have regrettably often been found to understate or mask" programs.

Blix told his people that inspectors are not spies and "are not soldiers. They cannot shoot their way in, nor should they shout." In contrast to language in early drafts of the U.S. Iraq inspection resolution that called for armed U.N. security forces to accompany inspectors, Blix told the group they "cannot use force and they must, at all time, respect instructions regarding safety." If they are denied access, he said, "they should explain and argue. . . . They can also protest, videotape for evidence and report."

Be "somewhat flexible," he said, "but do not be pushed around."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20078-2002Oct26.html>

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Washington Post
October 27, 2002
Pg. 18

New Yugoslav-Iraqi Ties Alleged

U.S. Says Defense Firms Developing Cruise Missile for Baghdad

By Nicholas Wood, Special to The Washington Post

BELGRADE, Oct. 26 -- Yugoslav defense companies have been working for two years on the development of a cruise missile for Iraq, according to a document delivered by U.S. diplomats to Yugoslav government officials this month.

The allegations were made in a "non-paper," or aide-memoire, accompanied by a stern letter to the country's top officials from the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade. The letter asked Yugoslavia to end its breach of the U.N. arms embargo on Iraq, according to a senior Yugoslav official who has knowledge of the U.S. document.

The official said the document asserts that Yugoslav scientists have been working on the development of a turbojet engine for a medium- to long-range cruise missile called CM 1500. It also alleges that Yugoslav scientists have made repeated visits to Iraq since early 2001 to complete work on the project, and that the contracts were arranged by the state defense conglomerate, Yugoimport.

The claims followed a State Department announcement this week that the same company had cooperated with a Bosnian aviation firm to help repair and sell spare parts for MiG fighter planes destined for Iraq.

The revelations were made after a raid by NATO troops on an aviation plant in the Bosnian Serb Republic on Oct. 11. The Yugoslav government has since dismissed the head of Yugoimport, Gen. Jovan Cekovic, as well as a deputy minister of defense, Ivan Djokic.

Senior government officials have publicly sought to play down the extent of any deal between the two countries.

The Yugoslav president, Vojislav Kostunica, said Thursday that the contracts boiled down "to overhauling older-generation aircraft engines, rather than to selling state-of-the-art weapons."

But sources within the Yugoslav government said the evidence presented by the United States directly contradicted those claims and suggested Yugoslav firms had been working to update Iraq's military arsenal and equip Iraq with a weapon that could accurately target neighboring states.

In February 2000, the U.S. document alleges, Yugoimport concluded a contract with a company called Al Fatah for the development of a cruise missile. Until now, Iraq has had access only to ballistic missiles, which are more difficult to control.

Yugoimport, the document states, then worked with five smaller private companies to fulfill the contract.

The companies were named Infinity, Brunner, GVS, Temex and Interdeal. They were all said to be associated with or controlled by active or retired Yugoslav army officers. Brunner was assigned to develop an MM 400 turbojet engine for use in a cruise missile. The company is also alleged to have helped build a facility in Libya that manufactures rocket propellant, and to have assisted the Libyan government in obtaining U.S. software designed to improve the accuracy of rockets.

The paper goes on to say that some of the directors of these companies, as well as some from Yugoimport, met with representatives of an Iraqi trading company called Al Rawa at the beginning of 2001 and that Yugoslav scientists employed by the firms have been based in Iraq intermittently since then.

A senior security adviser to Kostunica refused to comment on the claims made in the U.S. document. The Yugoslav government has closed Yugoimport's office in Baghdad and formed a commission to investigate whether U.N. sanctions on Iraq have been breached.

Yugoslav officials appear to be divided on how to deal with the U.S. allegations. Some are pushing for a public inquiry, while others favor a more discreet approach.

Milos Vasic, a defense analyst in Belgrade, said Yugoslav scientists had the expertise to develop such technology but he questioned whether Iraq had the resources to build a missile.

"The problem is not whether they have the know-how, but how they could get the high quality materials that are needed for it," he said.

In Croatia, meanwhile, the Interior Ministry confirmed today that several crates of gunpowder that could be used in mortars, artillery shells and rockets were seized from a freighter in the port of Rijeka. Western officials said police will try to determine whether the powder could be used in Iraq's weapons program.

On Friday, the Belgrade daily newspaper Blic published documents suggesting that Yugoimport had also exported several thousand tons of munitions and explosives to countries in the Middle East, including Iraq and Syria.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24696-2002Oct26.html>

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London Sunday Times

October 27, 2002

Israeli SAS Goes On A Scud Hunt

By Tony Allen-Mills, Washington

An Israeli commando force is hunting for Scud missiles in western Iraq as America shows increasing signs of losing patience with the failure of the United Nations to reach agreement over action against Saddam Hussein.

Unit 262, Israel's equivalent of the SAS, is on a mission to foil any pre-emptive attack by Iraq on Israel that would undermine US war preparations.

The Israelis decided to act despite America's recent promise to Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, that the US would protect Israel from missile strikes, as it tried to do during the 1991 Gulf war.

Senior officials in Washington expect an imminent showdown at the UN if no consensus is reached on a new resolution governing the return of UN weapons inspectors to Baghdad. "It feels as if the crunch will come this week," said one.

The Israelis, too, believe war is looming ever closer. They are understood to have deployed two teams of 24 commandos. They have detected at least one Scud base in western Iraq.

"Western Iraq is as big as Wales, and finding Scud missiles is extremely difficult," said an Israeli security officer.

"The Iraqis pre-prepared their Scud-launching locations and hid the remaining missiles in the desert. One well-aimed missile with a chemical warhead could cause a catastrophe."

During the Gulf war 39 Scud missiles were launched from western Iraq, mostly at Israel. Carrying half a ton of conventional explosives, they caused great damage but few injuries.

Scud hunting is not the Israeli special forces' first mission inside Iraq. The same unit has planned at least twice to assassinate Saddam near the town of Tikrit. One operation was called off 24 hours before it was due to start after six soldiers were killed in a rehearsal.

On this mission the commandos hide by day and operate at night, when Iraqi missile convoys are most likely to be susceptible to ambush. They are provided with data from the Israeli spy satellite Ofek-5, which transmits images of Iraqi targets to Israel every 60 minutes.

“The Ofek-5 photos have such good resolution that the commandos can read the registration plates of vehicles moving towards them from Baghdad,” said a military source. There would be little danger of an Iraqi missile attack at the outset of a conflict, said Brigadier-General Yaacov Amidror, an intelligence officer. “But after the first 10 days, when Saddam feels threatened, the situation will become dangerous.”

As another precaution Israeli air force officers are working with their Jordanian counterparts to detect low-level Iraqi planes flying towards Israel.

America is reported to be infuriated by the lack of co-operation from other allies. Washington was particularly incensed by the circulation last Friday of alternative draft UN Security Council proposals separately drawn up by Paris and Moscow. After six weeks’ negotiations over the text of a new resolution, Washington believes the compromise text it has submitted should remain the sole basis of discussion.

Paris and Moscow want to force Washington to return for a second Security Council debate should Saddam try to obstruct inspectors. If the French or Russians attempted to replace the American draft with their own, it would cause “intense irritation” in Washington, one official warned.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s ambassador to the UN, said the continuing discussion on the rival texts “shows that they’re genuinely trying to conduct a negotiation”. But he added: “I think they need to realise that the US and the UK are pretty firm about what they want to see in the text.”

Washington remains determined that Baghdad should be threatened with “serious consequences” should it cheat or obstruct inspectors.

Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, said France would work with America on Washington’s resolution, but would present its own if no agreement could be reached.

The struggle to produce a resolution has narrowed the window of military opportunity for Pentagon planners who had been hoping to mount a campaign this winter. But Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, is believed to be convinced that Saddam’s regime is near collapse and that a short, sharp shove will force him out.

<http://search.thetimes.co.uk/cgi-bin/ezk2srch?-aSTART#>

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Jane’s Defence Weekly
October 30, 2002

USAF Takes New Look At ‘Big BLU’-Style Bomb

By Andrew Koch, JDW Bureau Chief, Washington DC

US Air Force (USAF) interest in a very large new bomb for striking underground bunkers in Iraq and terrorising frontline troops is growing, senior service officials say.

“We are looking very seriously at both very heavy penetrators and blast weapons,” said Steven Butler, director of engineering at the USAF’s Air Armament Center. He added that the air force would prefer to create a ‘family’ of large weapons, each capable of distinct tasks, rather than a single bomb type.

The USAF has considered a Northrop Grumman concept since the mid-1990s to build a 30,000 lb (13,608kg) deep penetrator called ‘Big BLU’, but has yet to approve the idea because of cost (Jane’s Defence Weekly 27 March).

However, with the possibility of another Gulf war looming and Iraq known to have numerous hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), building a specialised ‘Big BLU’ for high-value targets may now be worth the investment. Butler said one variant of the weapon would be a penetrator for striking HDBTs that US intelligence has repeatedly identified as a major challenge. The weapon’s weight, when combined with a streamlined shape, could provide it with greater penetrating power than existing GBU-28 5,000 lb (2,268kg) bunker busters. However, convincing the service’s senior leadership is not assured. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John Jumper, for example, told JDW that “the future of countering deeply buried targets lies in speed” rather than size.

Gen Jumper noted that existing USAF munitions can attack 90% of the current required targets and said most of the remainder could be handled by special operations forces on the ground. His vision is to one day field weapons dropped from very high altitude over even space that are capable of M10 speeds - so fast they may not need to carry explosive warheads because the energy created by impact would cause massive damage.

The USAF is exploring several high-speed solutions for this mission, including hypersonic missiles and weapons dropped from a future long-range strike platform. The service is not expected to field any of the solutions until at least the end of the decade and the Department of Defense may need something to use in the meantime.

Butler said the concept has a second benefit because another variant could replace the 15,000 lb (6,810kg) BLU-82 that has been used to great effect against frontline troops and as part of larger psychological operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (JDW 19 December 2001). He said: "We are essentially out of them or almost out of them". A production capability for the weapon has long been closed. Rather than try to re-build that old production line, the USAF could build a new weapon capable of similar effects.

Butler added that 'Big BLU' could be equipped with a device enabling the users to select the required explosive power and direction that explosion takes. This 'dial-a-yield' concept would help reduce the risk of collateral damage by allowing warfighters to use only the destructive power required for each individual job. The bomb could be dropped from B-52s, the B-2 and probably B-1 bombers, an improvement over existing BLU-82s that are dropped from the MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft. The service could field the 'Big BLU' within four months of project go-ahead, officials said.

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New York Times
October 28, 2002

Official Silence On Gas Raises Vexing Questions

By Steven Lee Myers

MOSCOW, Oct. 27 — The light gray gas filtered down like a mist in the theater hall before sunrise on Saturday, and the effect on hostages and hostage-takers alike was nearly instant. Most simply lost consciousness, as their breath and blood slowed and Russian security troops began to surge through the theater.

Some of Russia's top health officials said tonight that the gas was a nonlethal anesthetic, like the ones used in general surgery. But in the chaos of a predawn commando operation against heavily armed guerrillas, the result was all too lethal. Of the 117 hostages confirmed dead so far, all but one appear to have died from the effects of the gas, according to the Health Committee of Moscow.

What unfolded in the theater appears to have amounted to a risky test of a previously undisclosed chemical agent that ended with disastrously unintended consequences.

Andrei P. Seltovsky, the chairman of the health committee, said tonight that he did not even know the name of the gas, parrying questions toward what he called the "competent authorities," strongly suggesting that the gas was developed by the military or security forces as part of some secret program.

More than a day and a half after the raid, officials refused either to confirm that or to identify the gas, rebuffing even a direct request from the United States Embassy. Experts in Russia and the United States said that its use — and the official silence enveloping it — were raising troubling questions about Russia's compliance with the international treaty banning chemical weapons.

Lev A. Fyodorov, who once worked in the Soviet chemical weapons agency and is now the president of the Social and Ecological Union for Chemical Safety, said the gas appeared to be a Valium-based agent developed for the military during the Soviet era, and still a state secret.

Vil S. Mirzayanov, a former colleague of Mr. Fyodorov's at the chemical weapons agency who was twice imprisoned for reporting in 1991 that the Soviet Union had continued to develop and test chemical weapons after publicly denouncing them, said that in 1988 the agency had altered the molecular structure of an incapacitating agent, BZ, which the United States studied extensively in the 1960's.

The agency — known as the State Scientific and Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology — discovered that the new substance proved to be an effective anesthetic after tests at Moscow's main military hospital, Mr. Mirzayanov said in an interview tonight.

Neither he nor Mr. Fyodorov could say definitively what type of gas was used, however, based on the limited information released. They and others said it was possible it would fall into a gray area in the chemical weapons treaty.

The treaty, which Russia has signed and ratified, bans all forms of lethal gas and strictly monitors dozens of chemical components that can be used to make them. It does allow the use of some chemical agents, like tear gas, for "law enforcement, including domestic riot control." At the same time, however, it explicitly requires that such agents have effects that "disappear within a short time following termination of exposure."

The experts said the mounting death toll — along with the fact that hundreds remain hospitalized, many in grave condition — was evidence enough that the effects were anything but short term.

Mr. Mirzayanov said that at a minimum, the use of the gas violated the treaty's spirit. He said anesthetic gases were extremely difficult to use, requiring precise concentrations to prevent overdoses. Having commandos pump gas into

an open theater, filled with people of varying ages and physical conditions, was comparable, he said, to having an amateur administer anesthesia to a patient.

"It may be less a crime than taking hostages," he said in a telephone interview from New Jersey, where he lives and works as a consultant, "but it is also a crime to use this in this way."

Mr. Fyodorov, by contrast, said he believed the agent was not one prohibited by the treaty. He said other countries, including the United States, continued to research similar nonlethal agents.

According to survivors and health officials, none of the victims suffered the sorts of blistering, convulsions or internal bleeding associated with the most lethal chemical weapons, like VX or sarin, which are prohibited. The health officials said the stress of 57 hours of captivity, along with hunger and poor sanitary conditions, compounded the effects. Echoing the statements of doctors who treated the victims, Mr. Fyodorov said the deaths appeared to result directly from poisoning from overexposure, with symptoms including breathing disorders, loss of blood pressure and shock to the heart, liver and kidneys.

"This weapon was developed to be used on healthy men who serve in the army," he said, explaining why so many died. "It was used here on some of the so-called risk groups — women, children, people with liver and kidney problems."

Amy E. Smithson, an expert in chemical weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center, an arms research organization in Washington, said the official explanations of the gas left many unanswered questions about Russia's compliance with the treaty, including whether the military had developed the gas and the method in which it was used.

"This is kind of like pornography: you know it when you see it," she said of the gray areas in the treaty. "There are going to be people on both sides who will argue that the treaty does not prohibit it. But how it was used, I think, is going to make it a huge debate."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/28/international/europe/28GAS.html>

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Wall Street Journal
October 28, 2002

APEC Calls For North Korea To Halt Weapons Program

By Jeanne Cummings and Christopher Cooper, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

LOS CABOS, Mexico -- At U.S. urging, the 21 nation members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapons program, but the statement fell short of the sort of "condemnation" Bush administration officials said they were seeking.

Despite two days of talks, the U.S. and its Asian allies appeared to make little ground on opening a discussion about what, if any, sanctions should be imposed if Pyongyang doesn't abandon its program, as it promised to do in a 1994 agreement with the administration of former President Bill Clinton.

As a result, President Bush left the APEC sessions Sunday no closer to achieving a clear framework for confronting Pyongyang's surprising admission it is trying to build a nuclear weapon than when he arrived here Friday.

The meetings also served to illustrate how differently the U.S. and its Asian allies and trading partners -- particularly South Korea, Japan and China -- view the threat level from North Korea. The administration's go-slow approach also may reflect an internal split over what to do about North Korea, with Mr. Bush's more hawkish aides in favor of scrapping the 1994 framework agreement, while administration moderates counsel a more cautious approach.

Key to the debate is the plutonium North Korea has produced, the bulk of which, because of the 1994 agreement, is under international control. Officials with the Pentagon and the White House say North Korea managed to secretly divert a portion of that material, which it has used to manufacture a small number of plutonium-based nuclear weapons in their arsenal. Some State Department officials fear North Korea might attempt to add to that arsenal if it begins to feel backed into a corner or if the 1994 agreement is scrapped and U.S. fuel-oil shipments called for in the agreement are suspended.

The upshot: This situation isn't likely to be resolved anytime soon. "It's a tricky and complicated problem that I wish would go away in a week or two but I have a feeling that it's going to be with us for a while," one senior State Department official said.

North Korea's uranium-enrichment program apparently began in the late 1990s. But because the program remains in its infancy, many administration officials say the U.S. has ample time to fashion a cogent policy. There was more urgency in 1994, when North Korea had a stockpile of plutonium and had begun making weapons. Then, the U.S. came close to taking military action against North Korea; such intervention isn't being considered this time, the State Department official said.

In addition, while White House officials have called the new situation “dangerous,” they note that the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea has effectively contained President Kim Jong Il for decades and will likely continue to do so for some time.

Asian allies are unconvinced that there has been a seismic change in Pyongyang’s threat to them militarily. North Korea’s poverty is a deeper worry. Japan, North Korea, and China fear further isolation and economic sanctions imposed on the nation could produce a stream of refugees that would destabilize the region.

After a trilateral meeting on Saturday, Mr. Bush, South Korea President Kim Dae Jung and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi issued a statement calling on North Korea to “dismantle this program in prompt and verifiable manner,” and it said the Pyongyang’s “relations with the international community” hang in the balance. Chinese President Jiang Zemin issued a similar joint statement with President Bush on Friday after their meeting at the president’s ranch in Crawford, Texas.

But the U.S.-Japan-South Korea document offered evidence of the administration’s struggle at this juncture to get its allies to embrace any specific retaliation if North Korea ignores the world community. For instance, the statement says talks aimed at normalizing relations between North Korea and its neighbors will continue, albeit with new emphasis on the current crisis. Those discussions “can serve as important channels to call upon the North to respond quickly and convincingly” to international demands to disarm, the statement reads.

The U.S. has been gently introducing the idea of retaliating by ending a fuel-assistance program and economic aid for construction of two nuclear reactors, two programs began in 1994 in exchange for North Korea’s promise to end its nuclear program. But officials are loath to broker a deal that doesn’t include Europe, Russia, and China, as well, since such a split could give North Korea an escape hatch.

U.S. diplomats have also flatly dismissed demands from Pyongyang for new negotiations that would presumably replace the 1994 agreement. “You can’t violate an agreement and then show up and say, ‘We violated this agreement, what will you pay us for this violation in order to get out of the violation?’” the senior U.S. official said. On Sunday, North Korea said it needs military arms to fight against “U.S. imperialists.” It was unclear if the statement in North Korea’s official Rodong Sinmun newspaper was a response to the demands of the U.S., South Korean and Japanese leaders.

Separately at the APEC summit, the leaders of the Pacific Rim nations united behind a breakthrough deal to stifle fund flows to terrorists, tighten security at airports and protect people and trade from fresh attacks.

At a retreat to discuss how to nurture business without giving in to terror, impeding trade or hurting the poor, APEC leaders reached a landmark deal to enforce ways to curb furtive financing of groups such as Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is suspect No. 1 in the Sept. 11, 2001, strikes against the U.S. and this month’s bombings in Bali, Indonesia, in which almost 200 people were killed.

“Terrorism is a direct challenge to APEC’s goals of free, open and prosperous economies,” the group said in a statement. “We are united in our determination to end the threat that terrorism poses to our shared goals.”

The decision to monitor alternative remittance systems such as the ancient Middle Eastern honor-based hawala,” believed to have been used by Mr. bin Laden and the Sept. 11 hijackers, and halt misuse of charities was a first by a multilateral group. “There is a total recognition from the 21 economies present here that terrorism is a serious threat,” said President Vicente Fox of host nation Mexico. “No one is safe from the clutch of the terrorists’ claws.”

President Bush also met with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri and praised the steps she has taken to combat terrorism, but added that Jakarta still has a long way to go, a senior Bush administration official said. Mr. Bush expressed condolences over the terrorist bombing in Bali. A senior official said the U.S. is prepared to help Indonesia in its efforts to locate those responsible for the bombing.

Ms. Megawati called for nations to stand firm against terror attacks and to lift travel bans imposed on her country after the Bali bombing. “Clearly we must fight terrorism that might take place wherever, whenever and by whomever,” she said, urging every effort to avoid policies that would harm the livelihood of the 210 million people in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

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London Sunday Times
October 27, 2002

Koreans May Have Five Nuclear Missiles

By Michael Sheridan, Seoul

The United States has been warned by the Chinese that North Korea may have between three and five working nuclear weapons, twice the CIA's estimate.

Diplomatic sources say the Chinese based their figure on intelligence reports and told American officials last week that a confrontation with North Korea's erratic dictator, Kim Jong-il, would spell disaster.

The Americans now face a critical dilemma after North Korean officials admitted during a stormy meeting in Pyongyang that they had a secret programme to make nuclear weapons with uranium.

The position is complicated by links between Kim and the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, both identified by President George W Bush as leaders of an "axis of evil" that also includes Iran.

The timing of North Korea's announcement threw the Bush administration off balance as it sought United Nations backing to punish Iraq for trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

Baghdad buys short-range missiles, artillery and ammunition from North Korea. Diplomats say the two regimes share knowledge about US radar capabilities, electronic warfare and countermeasures gleaned from Iraqi engagements with British and American warplanes.

However, the unfolding Korean crisis highlighted the complexity of combating weapons proliferation when it emerged that Pakistan — a US ally in the war on terror — is suspected of having supplied Pyongyang during the 1990s with both uranium and the technology for making centrifuges to enrich it for weapons.

Nuclear weapons are made with either plutonium or uranium. The CIA has long maintained that Kim had enough plutonium to make one or two weapons before his plutonium extraction programme was shut down under a 1994 agreement.

But the Chinese appear to have concluded that he obtained enough uranium from a second clandestine programme to make several more devices. Evidence has emerged to suggest the CIA is coming round to this theory.

South Korean intelligence officials, quoted by the local press, say the United States has informed their government that it estimates Kim has enough enriched uranium — about 70lb — to make two warheads.

Experts believe the North Koreans have succeeded in miniaturising their weapons to make warheads for their ballistic missiles. The latest generation of North Korean missiles is capable of hitting anywhere in Japan. Although the missiles could also reach Alaska, the chief worry for US planners is that 37,000 troops in South Korea and bases in Japan could be prime targets.

The administration of President Bill Clinton considered a surgical military strike against North Korea's plutonium reactor site at Yongbyon in 1994. But a deal was reached under which the North would receive two light-water reactors and 500,000 tons of oil a year in exchange for freezing its nuclear weapons programme.

North Korea admitted to the new uranium programme after accusing the Americans of failing to deliver on the deal. Progress on the reactors, originally due for completion in 2003, is far behind schedule. The US blames the delay on North Korea's attempts to renegotiate the deal and on provocations, including a 1996 spy submarine raid on the south and Kim's decision to test-fire a ballistic missile over Japan in 1998.

"There's no military option this time," said a western diplomat who has studied the case. "The Americans have admitted to their allies they don't really know where the damned weapons are."

Unlike the massive, conspicuous Yongbyon reactor, facilities to enrich uranium require less space and can be hidden underground. Pyongyang is honeycombed with tunnels and US analysts believe the North Korean military has excavated 11,000 caves over the past 50 years of confrontation.

There is a risk of confrontation if the 1994 agreement is buried by both sides. In that case, the north would be free to resume plutonium extraction from Yongbyon and if it did so, the Americans would probably be tempted to destroy the site.

Just how high the stakes are has been made clear by James Lilley, the CIA's first station chief in China and subsequently ambassador to Beijing.

Lilley has said North Korea has 12,000 artillery pieces in place and could devastate Seoul on the first day of war, while suicide pilots would hit South Korea's nuclear reactors, causing "unbelievable destruction".

This weekend the leaders of South Korea, Japan and China were locked in talks with Bush and his team to work out a common strategy to avert a doomsday miscalculation.

In recent weeks the Chinese have ordered new controls on exports of missiles, chemicals, technology and "dual-use" biological agents.

Bush and President Jiang Zemin of China said after a summit in Crawford, Texas, last Friday, that they both opposed any nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and would seek a peaceful resolution.

South Korea, facing presidential elections in December and the probable ascent of a more hawkish leadership, is arguing for dialogue. But the US wants sanctions and a break in aid, while Japan has said it will give no more money to Pyongyang until the nuclear issue is settled.

As usual, the burden of suffering will fall on most of North Korea's 22m people, not on the tiny elite around its dictator. International agencies say that existing stocks of food will run out by the end of January unless more aid is granted.

Last week the first snows fell here, making the prospects for midwinter in Korea very bleak indeed.

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Washington Times

October 28, 2002

Pg. 15

Nukes Defended As Check To 'U.S. Imperialists'

SEOUL (AP) — North Korea, under fire from the United States, Japan and South Korea for breaking its promise to give up nuclear weapons, said yesterday that it needed its weapons to fight the "U.S. imperialists."

The blast of vintage Cold War rhetoric from the isolated Stalinist state came one day after U.S., Japanese and South Korean leaders demanded North Korea stop trying to make fuel for atom bombs.

It was not clear whether the statement in North Korea's official Rodong Sinmun newspaper was a response to leaders from the three nations, who met during the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Mexico.

Another North Korean paper said yesterday that the Pyongyang government was willing to talk with the United States to allay fears about the nuclear weapons program, but only under certain conditions.

President Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung demanded Saturday that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program "in a prompt and verifiable manner."

The statement said, "U.S. imperialism looks down upon those countries weak in military power, forces them to accept its brigandish demands and makes them a target of its military intervention and aggression."

"As a stick is the best to beat a wolf, so are arms to fight with the imperialists," said the paper. "It is essential to readily cope with the moves of the reactionaries all the time."

It also said that victory does not depend on weapons, but on "political and ideological readiness."

Meanwhile, North Korea's Minju Josun newspaper reiterated the North's willingness to talk about its nuclear weapons program if Washington promises not to invade and takes other conciliatory steps.

"If the U.S. gives legal assurances of nonaggression, including no use of nukes against [North Korea] through the nonaggression treaty, [North Korea] will be ready to clear the U.S. of its security concerns," said Minju Josun.

The two reports were carried by North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency.

The North's appeal for a "nonaggression treaty" with the United States came as U.S. officials tried to muster international pressure on the communist state to drop its nuclear program.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said Washington has no plans to open negotiations.

Earlier this month, North Korea admitted it had a secret program to manufacture weapons-grade uranium, violating a 1994 deal in which it gave up efforts to make atom bombs in exchange for fuel oil and two modern nuclear power plants.

The United States spends \$100 billion annually on fuel oil for North Korea, while South Korea and Japan have agreed to pay about \$4.5 billion for the power plants.

Both North Korea and the United States have declared the deal "nullified," though the Bush administration has not decided whether to keep sending shipments of fuel oil.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20021028-30670962.htm>

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Newsweek

November 4, 2002

Pg. 6

Periscope

Al Qaeda's New Threats

Even as the United States steps up precautions against future terrorist attacks, fears are growing that would-be attackers are adapting their tactics to circumvent heightened security measures. Confessions from captured Qaeda operatives and evidence seized recently from terrorist hideouts indicate that one consequence of improved security

in the United States and allied countries is that terrorists may be turning toward softer targets, like the Bali nightclub bombed by suspected Qaeda sympathizers two weeks ago.

One U.S. intelligence concern is that Qaeda sympathizers, frustrated by their inability to pull off another 9-11, could turn to Palestinian-style suicide-bombing attacks on U.S. interests both overseas and inside the United States. U.S. counterterrorism experts have visited Israel and Jordan to learn how Mideastern security officials handle the suicide-bombing threat. Some American officials are also expressing renewed alarm about terrorists' using crop-dusting planes to spread biological or chemical agents. U.S. officials say that recent attacks in Bali, Kuwait (shooting at Marines) and Yemen (an explosives-laden dinghy attacked a French oil tanker) could represent a new war on U.S. and Western economic interests.

The threats made against the U.S. economy in a recent video clip by Ayman Al-Zawahiri seem to tie in with fresh evidence collected by U.S. intelligence from Qaeda detainees, terrorist safe houses in Kuwait and at least one captured Qaeda leader. A warning recently sent by homeland-security officials to U.S. railroads mentioned potential threats to oil-industry facilities, shipping and nuclear-power plants, as well as passenger and freight trains. The railroad warning specifically mentioned threats to bridges, engines and hazardous-materials cars. A U.S. official said that computers seized from suspects arrested after the Kuwait shooting contained detailed information on the U.S. rail infrastructure, including pictures of passenger and freight cars. An Amtrak spokesman said that the passenger railroad had not received information about a specific threat to its operations, but customers may notice "increased vigilance" at Amtrak stations and on trains.

U.S. officials say they hope recent arrests of Qaeda suspects in the United States and overseas have disrupted current and future terrorist plots. Intelligence sources say that Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged Hamburg-based 9-11 fixer (and would-be 20th hijacker) has begun talking to American interrogators. British security services made a breakthrough last week when they arrested Abu Qatada, a radical imam with bin Laden connections who had disappeared from under their noses earlier this year. Though Abu Qatada had eluded Britain's elite M.I.5 counterintelligence unit for months, a friend of the mullah's told NEWSWEEK that he was located after his wife visited him and inadvertently gave away his hideout by switching on her mobile phone.

-- *Mark Hosenball with Tara Pepper*

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Washington Times

October 28, 2002

Pg. 17

Al Qaeda Nukes Are Reality, Intelligence Says

By Neil Doyle, Special To The Washington Times

LONDON — Soon after September 11 last year, the notion that al Qaeda might have nuclear weapons was largely dismissed by intelligence professionals.

It is, however, a working assumption in security circles now that the terror group does have nuclear capabilities. Al Qaeda's secret nuclear stash is assumed to be somewhere in Afghanistan, although finding it is proving to be as hard as locating Osama bin Laden.

The first clue came during Christmas, when low-grade uranium-238 was discovered in tunnels near a former al Qaeda base in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

U.S. officials said that enough material was found to make one "dirty" radiological bomb, which involves combining nuclear materials with conventional explosive to spread contamination over a wide area.

The black market in radioactive materials has been booming for some years, and the archives are littered with stories of smuggling.

In March 2000, for instance, customs officers in Uzbekistan stopped a truck, destined for Quetta in Pakistan, that was carrying 10 lead-lined containers filled with strontium-90, enough to manufacture scores of dirty bombs.

The uranium found in Kandahar is in theory suitable for a radiological weapon, but not a fission bomb.

That the retreating fighters from al Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban regime chose to leave this behind when they took to the mountains fueled suspicion that their nuclear crown jewels went with them.

Geoff Hoon, the British Defense secretary, hinted as much early this year, when he said: "We are certainly aware that he has some material that could contribute to a nuclear weapon."

There is no consensus among experts on whether al Qaeda possesses working nuclear warheads, as Osama bin Laden contended in an interview after September 11.

Rose Gottemoeller, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant energy secretary for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration, said: "I believe that the chance that al Qaeda controls actual warheads is virtually nil.

"It is much more likely that they have acquired some nuclear materials, but here the range could be very wide: from depleted uranium or low-level radioactive sources [such as those used in smoke detectors], all the way up to weapons-usable material — highly enriched uranium or plutonium."

"I think it more likely that they have some kind of lower-level sources than weapons-grade material, but this cannot be excluded," Miss Gottemoeller added.

"The origins for the lower-level materials could be very broad, virtually worldwide; weapons-grade material is much more precious, therefore proliferating countries tend to hold on to it.

"It is possible such material could have come to him from a former Soviet nuclear facility, not only in Russia, but in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, etc."

A minority of specialists holds that al Qaeda already may enjoy command and control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal via close links with the country's Inter-Services Intelligence, the agency credited with creating the Taliban. Others suggest that theft of military hardware is a more likely possibility. One former Soviet GRU (military intelligence) agent says he knows for certain that al Qaeda possesses small atomic warheads.

"Mossad [Israeli intelligence] reported that bin Laden bought tactical nuclear weapons from some former Soviet republics," he said. "They are not the suitcase-type bombs that people often refer to, but more the warhead-type munitions. These are the payloads of short-range missiles, torpedoes, and the like." He declined to elaborate.

Others believe that pilfering military warheads is unfeasible, but that al Qaeda might have bought some of Russia's missing Cold War-era "suitcase nukes" on the black market.

In 1997, the Red Army's former chief, Gen. Alexander Lebed, acknowledged that 84 such devices were missing from the military's inventory.

Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADMs), as portable nuclear weapons are formally known, are miniaturized warheads that were developed by the United States during the Vietnam War. They were designed for use against key infrastructure targets, such as bridges and dams. The Soviets soon followed suit and produced their version in huge quantities.

They were secretly buried near targets in the West by specially trained GRU agents as part of a Soviet strategy to knock out key government and military targets and hamper response to a nuclear attack.

According to informed sources, these weapons constantly circulated around the world in diplomatic baggage, and large numbers were buried along Russia's borders for use as nuclear land mines in the event of invasion. They were often disguised as boulders.

Each has a yield of about 1 kiloton — equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

It has been estimated that one ADM could immediately kill 100,000 people if it exploded in a major city center, with hundreds of thousands dying from cancer in the fallout.

ADMs have a shelf life of about eight years, after which they need to be retrieved and sent to a laboratory for refurbishment.

One source said that a semi-skilled operative could set one off easily, given the right codes. They can be set to detonate using an built-in timer or can be triggered remotely with a mobile phone call.

Academics are not sure that terrorists have gotten their hands on ADMs, but few will rule out the possibility.

Robert Sherman, director of strategic security at the Federation of American Scientists, said that this is "more likely than getting a ballistic missile warhead."

Paul Rogers, professor and head of the Center for Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in Britain, said:

"There were unconfirmed reports that one or two Soviet-era tactical nuclear weapons had got to Iran a few years ago. Apart from that, I do not have any evidence that al Qaeda has access to such weapons."

However, one senior Western intelligence contact is adamant that the terrorists do have a number of these weapons — nine, to be precise. The price on the deal is put at \$30 million, plus 2 tons of opium per nuke.

"Reliable sources report that not only atomic munitions were sold by the Russian underworld and smuggled into [Central Asia] during the conflict between the U.S. and the Taliban, but that several Russian nuclear technicians were hired by the Islamic fundamentalists to try and make the weapons operational," the Western source said.

According to Mr. Rogers, an ADM would cause cataclysmic damage: "The effect of the [New York City World Trade Center] plane-fuel explosion and the gravitational forces of collapse of the two towers was about 600 tons of TNT equivalent, so an ADM would destroy a couple of city blocks, or a major bridge, or an airport terminal."

Western cities, however, may not be high on the target list if al Qaeda is holding these as weapons of final resort.

The group may be planning to use them to achieve bin Laden's ultimate goal: the creation of an Islamic superstate.

This could be achieved by using nuclear weapons to destroy the oil industry in the Middle East and trigger an unprecedented global economic meltdown, according to a report published late last year by Decision Support Systems Inc., a private-sector intelligence and risk-management consultancy.

In a "limited number of strategic positions," a small nuclear device would expose the Middle East's oil infrastructure to massive radiation, with sand spreading fallout on a vast scale. In addition, hydrostatic shock waves transmitted through pipelines could destroy production and delivery facilities over wide areas.

With most of the world's oil reserves inaccessible, the United States no longer would have an economic interest in the region. And there is a precedent for such a plan: Iraq's attempt to destroy the oil fields in Kuwait during the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

Few experts doubt the feasibility of such a plan. Mr. Sherman said: "If you presume perfect accuracy — that is, hand placement within inches of where intended — there are very few objects that would not be severely damaged by a small nuke.

"I presume that someone with a detailed knowledge of the oil field could cause a cascading effect with great damage."

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20021028-9543907.htm>

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Newhouse.com

October 25, 2002

Sniper Suspect May Have Been Exposed To Chemicals Linked To Gulf War Syndrome

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

WASHINGTON -- The alleged Washington sniper, John Allen Muhammad, may have been exposed to chemical weapons that have been linked to Gulf War Syndrome, an illness which experts said can result in unexplained bouts of intense violence.

Muhammad, arrested early Thursday as a prime suspect in the Washington area shootings, served with the Army's 84th Engineer Company during the Persian Gulf War, military officers said.

That unit, attached to the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, helped inspect, catalog and destroy extensive stockpiles of Iraqi chemical weapons at a depot near Khamisiyah, Iraq, in March 1991 following the cease-fire March 3, Pentagon records show.

According to Defense Department and CIA documents, the 84th Engineers worked handled the Iraqi chemical weapons stored in bunkers at the Tall al Lahm Storage Depot South and Tall al Lahm Ammo Storage Facility near Khamisiyah.

The 84th Engineers also helped demolish Iraqi rockets filled with the deadly nerve agent Sarin during March 10-13, 1991, Pentagon documents show. The process of blowing up the rockets may have vaporized dangerous amounts of the nerve agent, Pentagon investigators later concluded.

According to a final Pentagon report on the issue, "U.S. troops may have been exposed to chemical agents that are a suspected cause of Gulf War Syndrome."

Gulf War Syndrome is the name now applied to a variety of complaints that can range from mild headaches and dizziness to illnesses such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig's Disease.

Out of the roughly 540,000 American troops who served in Desert Storm, some 175,000 are thought to have some form of the neurological and neuro-immune illnesses that have been documented so far.

"Once it came out that he had a military background, I said this must be a Gulf War veteran," said Dr. William E. Baumzweiger, a Los Angeles neurologist and psychiatrist who specializes in treating Gulf War Syndrome patients.

"There is no doubt that a small but significant number of Gulf War veterans become homicidal" because of Gulf War Syndrome, said Baumzweiger, until recently a staff psychiatrist and neurologist at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles. He is a leading expert on Gulf War Syndrome.

He said in such cases "there was always a bizarre strangeness about the violence in that it seemed to come out of nowhere, there were no personal problems or longstanding history" to explain it. The violence, he said, "appears to just come out of thin air."

Experts on Gulf War Syndrome said Muhammad's behavior fits precisely the patterns exhibited by some other Gulf War veterans.

“This kind of bizarre story, where he is on the one hand killing people and on the other hand writing notes to the government basically pleading for help, that’s a typical story you see in Gulf War veterans,” Baumzweiger said. During his active-duty military service as John Allen Williams during 1985-1994, Muhammad, now 41, rose to be a sergeant and qualified as “expert” on the M-16 carbine. He was also expert in the use of hand grenades, according to military officers who reviewed his records Thursday.

Muhammad earned the standard medals and ribbons given to soldiers “if you haven’t gotten in trouble,” said one officer familiar with his records. These include the Army Service Ribbon and the National Defense Service Medal. He qualified as a combat engineer, a metal worker and water transport specialist, and attended the noncommissioned officers professional development course when he was promoted to sergeant.

“There’s nothing unusual, he was a pretty average joe,” said the officer, who asked not to be identified.

But as troops came home from the war in 1991, they began to report unexplained medical symptoms. It can take as long as five years for Gulf War Syndrome symptoms to appear.

For five years after the Gulf War, the Pentagon refused to acknowledge that some troops might have been suffering medical problems as a result of chemical contamination. Since then, teams of investigators have verified that soldiers were in fact exposed, and their treatment at Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers has been authorized. Under increasingly severe pressure from Congress and the public, the Pentagon finally admitted it knew of some chemical contamination and acknowledged the veterans really were sick.

It was not immediately clear Thursday whether Muhammad ever exhibited any symptoms of Gulf War syndrome or sought help from veterans agencies.

VA officials acknowledged that because of budget restrictions and growing demands, veterans who apply for mental health care can wait a year or more to be seen by a primary care doctor.

“Sad to say, but true: There are those who work for the VA who treat veterans like second-class citizens,” said Dick Vargas, a clinical social worker who works with mentally disabled veterans at the VA medical center in Brockton, Mass.

In the first years after the Gulf war, hundreds of veterans came to the VA for help. Most of them were turned away, VA officials have acknowledged.

(Reporter Peter Shellem of The Patriot-News in Harrisburg, Pa., contributed to this story.)

<http://www.newhouse.com/archive/story1a102502.html>

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Jane’s Defence Weekly

October 30, 2002

Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defence: The ‘Standard’ Response

The US Navy is fighting for a piece of the action in ballistic missile defence, writes Michael Sirak

On 14 October, the radar aboard the US Navy’s (USN’s) Aegis destroyer USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), tracked a ballistic missile target as it sped westward over the Pacific Ocean from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, toward a point in space at which a prototype ground-based interceptor missile launched from a US test range in the Marshall Islands collided with and obliterated it.

The ship’s role in this exercise - the seventh intercept test of the nascent Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, formerly known as the National Missile Defense programme - was not significant. Indeed its Lockheed Martin SPY-1 radar tracked the modified Minuteman II missile only in an offline mode, meaning that the GMD operators did not use its data to plot the course of the interceptor missile.

Still, the exercise heralded a new era for sea-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) development. Freed from the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, from which the USA withdrew in June, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which is responsible for all BMD developmental activities within the US Department of Defense (DoD), is moving with the navy to explore sea-based concepts and new ways of operating naval assets in concert with future airborne and land- and space-based BMD components.

Together these will form the overarching, layered and integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that the MDA intends to field beginning later this decade. It will shield the USA and its forward-based troops, along with allies and friends, from ballistic missiles of all ranges by attacking them at all phases of their flight.

Sea-based systems have great promise, according to US defence and industry officials. “The navy will play the central role in the emerging [BMDS] architecture,” said one US government analyst. “The challenge is for [the] OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to align the emerging MDA architecture with what the navy can operationally execute.”

It is the MDA-navy dynamic that will play a central role in the capabilities that emerge. The USN is still adjusting to the fact that the MDA will have the pre-eminent role in developing the BMD systems that it will operate.

“We in the navy find ourselves, in a sense, spectators of the process in which we have a lot at stake, but which we can’t directly influence,” said Vice Adm Michael Mullen, the deputy chief of naval operations (CNO).

Efforts to bring sea-based BMD elements to maturity have made great strides in the last year. Chief among the successes, the officials note, was a series of flight-tests of the USN’s nascent Raytheon Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor, used in concert with Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Weapon System (AWS): a suite of battle management, and command-and-control capabilities, the AN/SPY-1 radar and the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System tube. During each test, the SM-3’s kinetic warhead (KW) collided with a target in space and destroyed it, emboldening advocates to call on senior DoD officials to place greater near-term emphasis on fielding sea-based BMD options.

The participation of naval assets will grow in future GMD tests and other exercises in the missile defence testbed that the MDA is establishing in the Pacific Ocean to evaluate BMD components. The agency says it also expects to incorporate land-based sensors like the US Army’s Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar in BMD exercises of navy systems.

Despite progress, there have been some setbacks and significant challenges remain. The OSD cancelled the Navy Area programme and its Standard Missile SM-2 Block IVA (SM-2 Blk IVA) missile in December 2001, citing cost and performance issues as the reason. This has left the USN without a system to defend ships and littoral areas against shorter-range ballistic missiles (Jane’s Defence Weekly 12 December 2001).

The MDA has not yet chosen a successor and DoD and industry officials say the agency’s current focus is less on finding a replacement than on pursuing a sea-based boost-phase system and getting the SM-3 to the field.

Because the SM-3’s inaugural flights were successful, the MDA has spoken of it providing a limited operational capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the near term.

However, the agency, in co-operation with the navy, must determine how sea-based capabilities will fit into the BMDS. It has yet to decide whether to evolve the SM-3 to defeat longer-range missiles or to opt for a new interceptor and new sea-based capabilities beyond the AWS and the Aegis platforms.

Beyond the engineering challenges there are questions of how to move the capabilities from developmental to operational systems and which office will pay for them. The MDA has emerged as a pioneer in implementing the department’s new spiral acquisition approach that blurs the traditional lines of developmental and operational assets. Under this paradigm, it intends to expand developmental assets to the point at which they have a residual operational capability while their refinement continues. At that stage, the agency may opt to procure operational elements. At the moment, however, neither the MDA nor the navy has the funds to commit to large-scale procurement and no end in this trend is visible.

These issues have ramifications outside the USA. Allies like Japan, which is in a co-operative development programme with the MDA to improve the SM-3 missile, and Germany and the Netherlands, which have expressed interest in the SM-2 Block IVA, wait on the sidelines to see how US action will impact them.

BMD is a central element of the navy’s Sea Shield concept, one of the three core components of its new Sea Power 21 vision, which seeks to exploit its asymmetric advantages like information superiority, sea control, mobility, stealth, reach, precision and firepower (JDW 19 June). The other two components are: Sea Strike, projecting offensive power; and Sea Basing, allowing US access to foreign theatres. Sea Shield envisages projecting defensive firepower, including BMD capabilities, to protect the US homeland, while assuring allies and dissuading and deterring potential adversaries in multiple theatres.

Sea-based BMD capabilities offer inherent advantages over fixed land systems, say DoD officials. BMD ships would have the ability to manoeuvre and deploy to areas of conflict or in preparation for anticipated hostilities.

They could position themselves on or near a threat axis for optimal missile engagement and could attack the missiles early in their flight, including during the boost phase when the missiles are most vulnerable and could rain debris, including a dangerous payload, back on the country of origin, on intercept.

Forward-deployed BMD radar on ships would allow the defence to track a missile earlier in its flight, have more time to distinguish warheads from decoys, and cue interceptors of other BMD systems so they can engage the missile sooner and, if necessary, more often. Further, ships require no basing rights or overflight permission while traversing international waters and are self-sustaining.

For a threat emanating from the Middle East against the US homeland, for example, navy ships could be positioned in the Black Sea, said US Air Force Brig Gen Richard Lewis, director of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization. It develops BMD operational concepts and architecture in support of the MDA.

“We know just from the trajectory and the physics of any missile threatening the United States, that there are only certain paths that they can fly. By treaty we cannot go into the Black Sea with an offensive weapon, but we would like to do sea-based and boost-phase [intercept] out of there possibly.”

Boost-phase intercept, however, raises the issue of debris falling potentially on friendly countries and not just on the adversary. The BMDS command-and-control must address this, Gen Lewis said.

Perhaps, equally important, is the fact that the navy systems envisaged to date leverage the service’s existing AWS and Standard Missile infrastructure, both of which have long histories of operational use. The navy operates 27 Aegis cruisers and 35 Aegis destroyers. It plans to buy 23 additional Aegis destroyers.

The MDA’s current sea-based activities focus on developing the SM-3 as part of its Sea-based Midcourse Defense (SMD) element. The agency envisages the SM-3 intercepting missiles during their ascent after booster burnout. When accompanied by GMD, it will provide a complete mid-course layer. By engaging missiles in early ascent, sea-based systems also offer the possibility of reducing the defence’s susceptibility to countermeasures.

In addition to enhancing the SM-3’s capabilities so it can engage more sophisticated and longer-range missiles, the agency says it intends to get assess the extent to which it can modify the interceptor to attack missiles at lower altitudes in space. The agency believes that this could compensate in part for the coverage gap left by the termination of the Navy Area programme.

On 25 January, the MDA and navy conducted Flight Mission-2 (FM-2) at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Hawaii as part of the SMD Aegis Light Exo-atmospheric Projectile Intercept (ALI) experiments.

The test was intended to validate the performance of the KW’s guidance, navigation and control. Although not a goal of the exercise, the KW did intercept the Aries target missile. Approximately six months later, on 13 June, FM-3 took place, resulting again in the destruction of an Aries missile. This time target intercept was the principal goal. Based on the two successful missions, the MDA has moved the SM-3 from the ALI experiments to the Aegis Midcourse BMD test programme, which will place the SM-3 in more difficult scenarios and against more sophisticated targets like separating warheads and decoys.

Three SM-3 tests are planned in Fiscal Year 2003 (FY03). The MDA expects the next test to occur before the end of 2002. During this mission, the agency wants the SM-3 to engage a target missile in its ascendant phase, earlier on in its trajectory than it did in the previous two flight-tests.

SM-3 engineers want to evaluate the SM-3’s ability to strike the missile at a more precise aimpoint near the missile’s front end. These tests will also explore the desirability of operating the SM-3 closer to the atmosphere, bringing down its minimum engagement altitude by about 20%, according to industry officials.

The MDA has yet to announce definitively the extent to which it intends to evolve the SM-3 as opposed to looking toward a new missile. Dean Gehr, Raytheon’s senior business development manager for Missile Defense Systems, said the SM-3 has a “tremendous amount of growth” potential. It could incorporate technology from the company’s GMD Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, like a two-colour infra-red seeker and computer algorithms so it can better distinguish warheads from decoys.

A liquid-fuelled divert-and-attitude-control system could supplant the current solid-fuelled system of the interceptor’s KW for increased manoeuvrability, although housing liquid fuel aboard ship would raise operational safety issues.

Further refinements are expected from the Japanese-US research, which has centred on developing a lightweight nose cone, advanced KW and enhanced propulsion and sensor capabilities. Gehr said the three-stage SM-3 currently uses a 53cm first-stage booster and a 34cm booster for its second stage.

Tests have shown the feasibility of converting the second stage to a 53cm system to give the missile increased power and range. Further, the ability to integrate it with a network of offboard sensors like the THAAD will extend its reach.

“Clearly from a sea-based missile standpoint, the evolution of the SM-3 is the path ahead,” said Vice Adm Philip Balisle, commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command. “That missile has great potential. It is demonstrating a good capability now, but its potential in the future is even greater.”

Conversely, others like Philip Coyle, who headed the Pentagon’s operational test and evaluation office under the administration of former president Bill Clinton, believes that the navy “will require a new missile that is twice as fast as any existing version of the Standard Missile . . . a new, more powerful Aegis radar system to track targets; a new launch structure to accommodate the new, larger missiles and probably new ships” to engage long-range threats.

Upon cancellation of the Navy Area programme, the MDA commissioned industry and government teams to study successor options to the SM-2 Blk IVA.

The teams found the most promising to be a modified Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile with a booster and a programme to modify the SM-2 Blk IV - which lacks the infra-red sensor of the IVA model - to give it terminal BMD capabilities. Both options were envisaged as hit-to-kill systems, unlike the SM-2 family, which has blast-fragmentation warheads.

Earlier this year the MDA said it intended to pursue the SM-2 Blk IV route and conduct tests to assess its ability to defeat short-range ballistic missiles "as high in the endo-atmosphere as possible through a combination of software and hardware modifications".

Now, however, the DoD and industry officials say the agency is leaning toward developing a 'multi-use' boost-phase interceptor with a speed of around 6km/s that could be launched from navy ships, but could also be operated from land, even airborne and potentially have space applications.

"We have initiated experiments this year to demonstrate the capabilities of a kinetic-energy boost system," said Pat Sanders, programme executive officer for the MDA's overarching BMDS. "We expect to conduct tests to intercept a boosting missile no later than 2005." Later, the same interceptor booster may be evaluated with a different kill vehicle for mid-course use, DoD officials said.

Senior navy officials, however, continue to speak of the need for a sea-based terminal BMD capability "sooner rather than later" and have proposed a path to get there. "The cancellation of the Navy Area missile defence programme left a huge hole in our developing basket of missile-defence capabilities," said Adm Mullen. "Cancelling the programme didn't eliminate the warfighting requirement.

"The nation, not just the navy, needs a sea-based area missile defence capability, not to protect our ships as much as to protect our forces ashore, airports and seaports of debarkation" and critical overseas infrastructure including protection of friends and allies.

The service intends to begin funding a next-generation anti-air warfare (AAW) interceptor in FY04, which it calls the 'Extended-Range Active Missile', to fill the air-defence gap left by the termination of the SM-2 Blk IVA. It will have a range approaching 200nm (JDW 28 August). Unlike the dual-mission SM-2 Blk IVA, the new missile will be configured solely for AAW.

The navy, however, wants the design to allow for the easy evolution to a separate terminal-phase BMD variant. "Our hope is that we will create a product there, that while fulfilling our air-defence needs, makes it an option for them [the MDA] to leverage if they choose to do it," said Adm Balisle. "They will have to make that decision in the context of the contribution to the [BMD] family of systems."

Adm Mullen said the service wants to field a BMD capability as soon as possible. It is considering creating a surveillance squadron of Aegis baseline 1 cruisers in the FY07 timeframe that would be able to deploy in a contingency to provide a forward-based sensor. As work on the SM-3 progresses, and it becomes ready for limited operational deployment, the surveillance squadron would form the basis for the first of two "missile defence surface actions groups". Each would consist of two SM-3-equipped Aegis baseline 1 cruisers.

According to Adm Balisle, one group would operate in the Pacific, while the second pair of ships would patrol Atlantic waters. The navy would configure the cruisers to the BMD role while they are offline receiving a major baseline 1 mid-life conversion upgrade.

The navy and the MDA are exploring the option of creating a dedicated BMD test ship that would relieve the operational burden of using the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG-70), an operational asset. Adm Balisle said it would offer more schedule flexibility to meet the increased testing pace they envisage and keep sea-based development on schedule. It would also be more cost-effective.

Options include using an Aegis baseline 1 cruiser, he said. It would operate from the PMRF and support the MDA's Pacific missile-defence testbed activities.

Work continues in other areas. The MDA wants to build a sea-based X-band radar to support the GMD system and have it in place in the Pacific missile defence testbed by 2006.

Lockheed Martin continues to upgrade the AWS. As part of this work, the company is developing for the MDA a next-generation AN/SPY-1E active solid-state S-band multifunction radar system (JDW 8 May). It expects to have a prototype array around 2006. The navy is expected to co-fund the effort in the coming years.

The four-face SPY-1E is envisaged as part of a notional S- and X-band radar suite that will provide the enhanced capability for mid-course BMD engagements as well as advanced AAW applications. Raytheon is pursuing the X-band part, known as the High Power Discriminator radar, a trainable system. The S-band will provide low-elevation fence search, volume search, tracking, mid-course guidance and discrimination, while the X-band is better suited for precision track, discrimination, handover and kill assessment.

As a further refinement to increase the inherent BMD capacity of its systems, the navy expects to incorporate BMD functionality into the third spiral of its Co-operative Engagement Capability sensor-fusion network in the latter part of this decade, said Capt Bradley Hicks, who heads the Network Systems/Integration Branch, within the CNO's Naval Surface Warfare Directorate.

While chemical lasers have matured to the point at which their use in BMD is feasible, safety concerns preclude the navy from operating them aboard ship. Solid-state lasers do not present that danger, but industry officials say they are not at a level of technological maturity or power level at which they can be deemed feasible for sea-based BMD. In addition to navy participation in the Pacific missile defence testbed, Henry Cooper, who directed the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, a predecessor of the MDA, from 1990-93, advocates the creation of an East Coast testbed that could focus on the test and evaluation of sea-based systems. It could build upon the infrastructure of existing US range assets in the area, such as Wallops Island, Virginia, Cooper believes. Further, it would be in the vicinity of the major naval base at Norfolk, Virginia.

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Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
October 28, 2002

Iraq Moves WMD Matériel To Syrian Safe-Havens

Exclusive. Analysis. With input from GIS (Global Information System) stations and sources in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere.

Highly-authoritative, experienced GIS sources have reported that the Iraqi Government and Armed Forces have moved substantial caches of chemical weapons and related materials to safe-havens across the border into Syria, to avoid any chance of discovery by United Nations (UN) inspectors.

Iraq moved stockpiles of chemical weapons and nuclear matériel as well as key production machinery and key experts to the Hsishi compound near Kamishli, in Syria, along with strategic weapons, ammunition, military fuels and other defense matériel, gold reserves, national archival records and national art treasures. It is believed that the moves took place in late August and early September 2002.

It is also understood that some of the matériel, production machinery and experts moved into Hsishi compound were from the al-Qaim facility, which had been based near the H-3 base area in Western Iraq. The al-Qaim facility had been involved, before 1991, almost exclusively in uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons, but since it was reconstituted after the bombings of the 1991 Gulf War it was engaged in chemical and biological weapons development work, along with some nuclear-related activity. It is believed that some of the warhead materials for the chemical and biological weapons were at the al-Qaim facility, and that this is now in Hsishi.

The move reflects the earlier breakthroughs in strategic relations between Iraq and Syria, given the fact that Syria is strategically dependent on Iran, which has traditional rivalries and hostility with Iraq. The movement of Iraqi strategic combat matériel into Syria is the first tangible evidence of the accords which have been struck between Baghdad, Tehran and Damascus in the escalation of the war against Israel and the US. The evidence provided a pointed reminder to those US White House security policy officials who had decried suggestions by some other White House staffers that Iran could be persuaded to help the US in its war against Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein.

The series of agreements between Iraq and Syria for the movement of Iraqi strategic assets into Syria were described in detail in the newly-released book, *The High Cost of Peace: How Washington's Middle East Policy Left America Vulnerable to Terrorism*, by Yossef Bodansky. [See review in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily*, October 21, 2002.]

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily had earlier indicated that the Saddam Administration had long been taking steps to ensure that the Iraqi so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs — including ballistic missile development, chemical and biological weapons programs, and nuclear weapons and nuclear-related “dirty” weapons — were protected from both discovery and destruction. The earlier steps had included the long-term policy of undertaking much of the research and development (R&D) for Iraqi weapons in Libya, in programs which often overlapped Libyan and Egyptian strategic weapons development. As well, the security options included, and continue to include, the placement of WMD matériel, laboratories and operational launch options on riverine barges operating on the Tigris-Euphrates rivers system.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported on April 4, 2002, that Iran and Iraq had achieved a working accommodation on deployment in a new war against Israel [see references, below], but the new move to place Iraqi CW matériel inside Syria reflects the first physical evidence of the implementation of this understanding. The April 4, 2002, report noted:

Iran's al-Quds military forces — forces earmarked for the liberation of "al-Quds": Jerusalem — were reported on April 3, 2002, to be preparing to move by land across Iraq, with permission from the Iraqi Government, to bolster anti-Israeli forces (Syrian and Iraqi) in the area of the Golan Heights.

Iraq's al-Quds force of armor and mechanized infantry, under the command of Qusay Hussein al-Takriti, is now preparing to move into position at the junction of Syria, Jordan and Iraq from the major military base at H-3, one of the two major "H" bases named after the old pipeline stations in Iraq's al-Anbar region. Both "H" bases were re-opened in early 2001, with their airfields refurbished, and with SA-6 surface-to-air missile systems installed. The al-Quds forces, under Qusay since mid-2001, include key Iraqi special forces units and the Hummarabi division of the Republican Guard, equipped with T-72 tanks. The total Iraqi al-Quds force is five to six divisions. Jordanian sources advise that the quality of the Iraqi special forces units, which have been operating in the area for about a year, including incursions into Jordan and through Jordan to the West Bank, are of a high quality. Based on information from various sources, it was understood that the Iraqi al-Quds forces were expected to move quickly across the top of Jordan into Syria and take up positions, as they did in earlier conflicts, in the area of the Golan Heights, facing the Israeli-occupied area.

Significantly, the Iraqi CW dumps inside Syria are (a) sufficiently close to the Iraqi al-Quds forces to be safeguarded by Iraq, and (b) ready for operational use against Israel.

Given the ongoing Syrian dependence on Iran, the latest move would indicate that the Iranian commitment to Iraq's military plans to escalate the war against Israel as part of any Iraqi response to a US attack continues to be in effect. Although there has been no recent evidence of an actual commitment by the Iranian clerical leadership to the provision of Iranian troops to a new war against Israel — or, indeed, the Iraqi comfort level in having Iranian al-Quds forces physically transit Iraqi territory — it is clear that the clerical leadership in Iran has continued its commitment to providing practical support for Iraq's war against both the US and Israel.

Significantly, Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Asad visited Kamishli and, reportedly, Hsishi Compound, in early September 2002, presumably to check on the Iraqi deployment.

As well, GIS sources indicated that the arrest by Turkish security forces of individuals with enriched uranium in September 2002 was connected with the supply of raw matériel for the Iraqi nuclear program, and that this was destined for Hsishi, not necessarily for immediate weapons use, but to re-start the Iraqi weapons program after the UN/US weapons inspectors had searched and destroyed any Iraqi capability left in-country, either through the UN program or through a US attack. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 1, 2002, reported:

Turkish paramilitary police were reported on September 28, 2002, to have seized more than 15 kg (33 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium and detained two men accused of smuggling the material. Officers in the southern province of Sanliurfa, which borders Syria and is about 250km (155 miles) from the Iraqi border, were reportedly acting on information from an informant when they stopped a taxi cab and discovered the uranium in a lead container hidden beneath the vehicle's seat. Authorities said that they believed the uranium came from an east European country and had a value of about \$5-million. Israel Radio quoted Turkish police as saying that the uranium originally came from a former Soviet state.

It was not immediately clear when the seizure operation was carried out. The Turkish Anatolian News Agency only gave the first names of the suspects, which appeared to be Turkish. Police in Turkey seized more than one kg of weapons-grade uranium in November 2001; that had been smuggled into Turkey from an east European nation.

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Washington Times

October 24, 2002

Pg. 19

Arms Control Treaties Astray

By Rich Lowry

Experts are puzzled about why North Korea has admitted to its covert nuclear-weapons program. What irrational demons could be driving Kim Jong-il to make such a damaging concession?

There's much that is odd about Kim Jong-il: His authorship of six operas, his perm, his isolation that led the Economist magazine to headline a picture of him emerging for a summit meeting with the legend "Greetings, Earthlings."

But the nuclear revelation is not at all strange. Kim Jong-il simply wants to prompt another bout of U.S.-supported arms control on the Korean Peninsula.

Arms control has been a great boon for dictators the world over, especially the Clinton administration's 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. Since the first serving was so tasty Kim Jong-il is understandably back — in his obnoxious way — asking for more.

Naivete is built into the very DNA of arms control, as Henry Sokolski has argued in his history of arms control, "Best of Intentions."

The venerable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for instance, is fatally starry-eyed. It talks of "the inalienable right" of signatories to develop nuclear technology, and urges "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technological information."

Cheating? Don't be silly. Mr. Sokolski quotes a Dutch NPT negotiator explaining that for parties to the treaty, there should be "a clear presumption" that nuclear material and know-how won't be diverted to weapons programs.

According to Khidhir Hamza, an Iraqi scientist who defected, Iraq used this presumption of innocence to build its massive nuclear program, with the International Atomic Energy Agency lending a hand.

Mr. Hamza writes: "Few of Iraq's suppliers — or the IAEA itself — ever bothered to ask a simple question: Why would Iraq, with the second-largest oil reserves in the world, want to generate electricity by burning uranium?"

Iran signed onto the NPT for the same reason. An official close to "Supreme Leader" Ali Khamenei said in a candid moment: "The reason that Iran becomes a signatory to international conventions is to pave the way for access to modern technology."

A circularity applies to all these agreements: They work so long as no one wants to violate them, in which case they simply don't work.

The danger is mistaking airy sentiments and assurances with reality. This was a mistake that the Clinton administration inflated almost to a strategic doctrine: Don't verify, if you can trust instead.

Pyongyang signed the NPT in 1987. By the early 1990s, it was clearly in breach of the agreement and had begun to stiff inspectors from the IAEA.

The Clinton administration's reaction was to reward North Korea by meeting in 1994 to provide 500,000 tons a year of heating oil, undertake a general warming of relations and amazingly enough, build two light-water nuclear reactors.

This was justified on grounds that light-water reactors — in contrast to heavy-water reactors — are inappropriate for making weapons. But it's not so.

According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a light-water reactor "would routinely discharge in spent fuel as much as a few hundred kilograms of plutonium each year. If the fuel burn-up was reduced, perhaps during a national security crisis, the reactor could produce significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium."

The safety of the reactors, in other words, is dependent on North Koreans not cheating — their obvious penchant for which is what prompted the reactor giveaway in the first place.

But President Clinton was not willing to push too hard for the return of inspectors (which was supposed to be one of the points of the agreement), partly because that would risk blowing up all his negotiating handiwork.

So, North Korea got aid, and we settled for empty promises — in a classic arms-control dynamic. After all this, the Bush administration is still being urged to "engage" with the North.

Indeed, if promising to build two nuclear reactors didn't work, maybe we should offer four instead. And they say Kim Jong-il is crazy?

Rich Lowry is a nationally syndicated columnist.

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