


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24 Oct 2002

*USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER*

# *CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL*



*Air University*

*Air War College*

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

*Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved*

## **USAF CPC PRESENTS ANG "CONFLICT 21" WEBSITE**

Focusing on homeland security, weapons of mass destruction issues and future total force concepts of operations (CONOPS) and other key issues, the Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC) at Maxwell Air Force Base recently unveiled the Air National Guard's (ANG) new **CONFLICT 21** website <http://conflict21.maxwell.af.mil> to the internet world.

According to **CONFLICT 21's** chief, Colonel Michael Ritz, "This unclassified site is intended to be used not only by Air National Guard members, but by all members of the armed forces and Department of Defense." Colonel Ritz also serves as a CPC associate director and ANG Advisor to the Director, CPC. "This website provides it's user a window into the world of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as a forum for examining the many elements of homeland security and homeland defense," said Colonel Ritz.

A key element of CPC's mission is the promotion of research and education in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Developed by Colonel Ritz and Mike McKim of Air University's Air War College, **CONFLICT 21** provides researchers, students, military and government personnel and the general public unclassified, direct information and cross-links to a multitude of sources throughout the internet. "We hope to educate and enlighten all who make use of **CONFLICT 21** on a variety of matters critical to our nation and the world in the 21st century," says Colonel Ritz. "At the same, we want to provide a continuous flow of updated information for researchers, students and writers examining issues pertinent to those being examined by the ANG and USAF CPC now, and in the future," he concluded.

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Washington Post  
October 22, 2002  
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### **U.S. Offers Concessions In U.N. Draft On Iraq**

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS., Oct. 21 -- The United States today formally distributed to the permanent members of the Security Council a draft resolution calling for intrusive U.N. inspections while warning that Iraq may face "severe consequences" if it fails to destroy its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

The U.S. text stopped short of requesting explicit U.N. authorization for military action against the government of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, but it represented a hardening of the administration's position on the inspections as President Bush sought to prod the Security Council into adopting the resolution.

"We've tried diplomacy. We're trying it one more time," President Bush told reporters at the White House during a visit by NATO Secretary General George Robertson. "I believe the free world -- if we make up our mind to -- can disarm this man peacefully. But if not . . . we have the will and the desire, as do other nations, to disarm Saddam. And we'll determine here soon whether the United Nations has got the will."

Bush said his administration remained committed to "regime change" in Iraq, a phrase that is code for toppling the Iraqi leader. "However, if he were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations, the conditions that I've described very clear in terms that everybody can understand, that in itself will signal the regime has changed," the president said.

The administration had delayed introducing the resolution due to the opposition of other permanent Security Council members, predominantly France and Russia, over several conditions spelled out in a previous draft. The administration introduced it today after making several concessions.

China, Russia and France nonetheless reacted coolly to the new resolution, saying they expected the administration would have dropped some of its harshest proposals for reinforced inspections before formally introducing it to the council, according to U.N. diplomats. Asked if an agreement was close, France's U.N. Ambassador Jean David-Levitte told the Associated Press before the meeting, "I don't think so."

The most significant U.S. concession was the elimination of language that could automatically trigger military action if Iraq does not cooperate with inspectors. The administration also removed a clause granting the council's permanent members the right to participate in U.N. inspections. Instead the council would order the U.N.'s chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, to employ "accomplished, dedicated and experienced experts" on U.N. missions to Iraq.

The U.S. resolution proposes that U.N. inspectors be granted the authority to invite Iraqi weapons scientists and their families out of the country for interviews and to establish "no fly" and "no drive" zones around suspected weapons sites. These zones, according to a provisional clause in the resolution, could possibly be enforced by U.S., British or U.N. forces. U.N. security guards would also be posted at U.N. bases across the country.

Under the terms of the latest U.S. draft, Iraq would be required to file a "full, final and complete declaration" of its banned weapons programs within 30 days of the resolution's adoption. It would also be obliged to allow "unrestricted" and "immediate access" to any location in the country, including eight presidential compounds where inspections have previously been subject to special procedures that could delay inspections for days.

The resolution established a timeline that would grant Blix up to 135 days before he would be required to report on Iraq's cooperation. It provides the Iraqis with 30 days to declare the status of their weapons program. The U.N. inspectors would then have up to 45 days to resume inspections, and an additional 60 days to report to the Security Council.

Although the schedule could set back the Pentagon's timetable for military action against Iraq, U.S. officials have insisted that the administration reserves the right to use force against Iraq at a time of its choosing.

The United States and France appeared close to an agreement on a resolution Thursday after the administration agreed to drop its demand that the resolution contain a trigger that would authorize use of force if Iraq had failed to comply with its disarmament obligations. The United States also moved closer to France's demand that Blix report any Iraqi violations to the Security Council before undertaking military action.

But the talks hit a snag after the administration redrafted a separate provision of the resolution that finds Iraq in "material breach" of previous U.N. disarmament resolutions and notes that the council "has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as result of its continued violations," according to diplomats familiar with the text.

French officials expressed concern that the language could be used by the United States to justify military action against Iraq.

John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, delivered the latest draft in a meeting with Britain, France, Russia and China. The five members with veto power are expected to meet again Tuesday to discuss it. State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher said that the new U.S. resolution "will accomplish our goals, identifying the violations of U.N. resolutions by Iraq, mandating and giving the inspectors authority to carry out strong, unrestricted inspections, and making sure that there will be consequences if Iraq fails to comply."

"I think we're also making clear that it's time to wrap this up," he added.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61640-2002Oct21.html>

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Washington Post

October 22, 2002

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## **Bush Pledges Diplomatic Approach To North Korea**

By Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush vowed yesterday to enlist other world powers in persuading North Korea to scrap its nuclear-weapons project but indicated he has no plans to use force as he might with Iraq.

"This is a chance for people who love freedom and peace to work together to deal with an emerging threat," he said.

"I believe we can deal with this threat peacefully, particularly if we work together."

Bush, using a more restrained tone than he does when lambasting Iraq, was addressing North Korea's confession about a nuclear program for the first time since administration officials reported it to Washington 16 days earlier. He said he would use meetings over the next week with leaders of China, Japan, Russia and South Korea to discuss how to persuade North Korean leader Kim Jong Il "that he must disarm."

"We had a bit of troubling news when we discovered the fact that, contrary to what we had been led to believe, that they were enriching uranium, the idea of developing a nuclear weapon," Bush said. "We felt like they had given their word they weren't going to do this."

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer responded coldly to an offer from North Korea for talks about its nuclear programs, saying that consultations with allies would come first. "International pressure will come to bear on North Korea to make them realize the dangers that they are pursuing, in terms of the future for them will be increasingly isolated if they go down the road that they have indicated they're going down," he said.

Bush is to meet Chinese President Jiang Zemin on Friday at his ranch in Crawford, Tex. Bush said North Korea will be central to a discussion of how the United States and China can work together to deal with "the true threats of the 21st century." He said North Korea will be discussed in meetings with other world powers during his two-day trip to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Mexico.

"The people who have got the most at stake, of course, in this posture are the people who are his neighbors," Bush said.

North Korea, which is part of Bush's "axis of evil," along with Iran and Iraq, is a more fearsome foe than Iraq because of the advanced stage of its nuclear program, its larger military and its location adjacent to South Korea, a key U.S. ally. A reporter asked Bush to explain, in terms understandable to the folks back in Texas, why he was threatening war with Iraq but pursuing a diplomatic course with Pyongyang.

"Saddam Hussein is unique, in this sense: He has thumbed his nose at the world for 11 years," Bush said, referring to U.N. resolutions requiring disarmament by Iraq. "What makes him even more unique is the fact he's actually gassed his own people. He has used weapons of mass destruction on neighboring countries, and he's used weapons of mass destruction on his own citizenry. He wants to have a nuclear weapon. He has made it very clear he hates the United States and, as importantly, he hates friends of ours."

Also yesterday, Robert Gallucci, chief negotiator of the 1994 arms-control deal with North Korea, said the United States should suspend but not scrap the agreement. Gallucci said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies program that the world was "much better off" for the agreement and that he expected the nuclear problem could be resolved with Pyongyang.

U.S. officials have said that the revelation about North Korea's nuclear program makes the agreement virtually void and that North Korea considers it nullified. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said yesterday that no announcement would be made on the administration position until after consultations with allies and Congress.

"We haven't made any specific decisions about many of the details," Boucher said. "We believe we have some leverage in this situation. We're seeking a peaceful and diplomatic solution."

Bush made his comments about North Korea during a photo session with George Robertson, NATO's secretary general, after a brief meeting. Reporters begged Bush to take more questions. "It's too many," Bush said. "I answered 15 questions." At the beginning of the session, Bush had promised to answer three questions. Counting a follow-up, he had taken four, from three reporters.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61538-2002Oct21.html>

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New York Times  
October 22, 2002

## **Bush Sees Korean Nuclear Effort As Different From Iraq's**

By Elisabeth Bumiller

WASHINGTON, Oct. 21 — President Bush said today that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, had to disarm his nation "for the sake of peace," but indicated that he saw a significant difference between North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and Iraq's pursuit of them.

In his first public remarks about North Korea since the White House announced last week that the country was conducting a covert nuclear weapons program, Mr. Bush said he would use diplomatic pressure, not threats of military action, to try to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear efforts.

“It is a troubling discovery, and it’s a discovery that we intend to work with our friends to deal with,” he told reporters in the Oval Office after a meeting with the NATO secretary general, Lord Robertson. “I believe we can do it peacefully. I look forward to working with people to encourage them that we must convince Kim Jong Il to disarm for the sake of peace.”

In contrast, Mr. Bush said he was threatening military action against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq because his case was “unique” in that he had gassed his own people and “thumbed his nose” at United Nations resolutions for more than a decade.

The president’s remarks reflected recent comments by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, that Iraq poses a greater threat to the United States, even if it does not yet have nuclear weapons, because of its record of using chemical weapons and its hatred of the United States and its allies.

Nonetheless, Mr. Bush said that he viewed North Korea’s admission “very seriously” and that he would work with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea and Russia at an economic summit meeting of Pacific nations this weekend in Los Cabos, Mexico, to exert pressure on Mr. Kim.

The No. 2 official in North Korea made a public overture to the United States today, saying he was willing to negotiate over the country’s nuclear weapons program “if the United States is willing to withdraw its hostile policy toward the North.” American officials said they were uncertain how to respond to the overture by Kim Yong Nam, the country’s nominal head of state. Mr. Kim made the offer during a meeting in Pyongyang, the North’s capital, with a South Korean delegation.

For now, the administration remains embroiled in an internal debate over how and even if the United States should negotiate with North Korea. Hard-liners in the administration argue that the North should be required to dismantle its nuclear program before any talks can begin, but some State Department officials say negotiations will be necessary before the North can be induced to move. The administration is at the same time under growing pressure from Asian allies, which are urging that talks should begin.

A 1994 arms control accord between the United States, its allies and North Korea that might have served as a framework for talks is for all practical purposes dead, and has been ever since the North Koreans admitted to the United States early this month that they were conducting a secret nuclear program. At the same time, North Korea said it had “nullified” the 1994 accord, which provided Western energy aid in exchange for the North’s promise to freeze the development of nuclear weapons. Today, senior administration officials said that because the North Koreans had walked away from the accord, the United States had no intention of honoring it.

Similarly, the European Union, which is helping finance the construction of two nuclear reactors in North Korea to generate electricity, promised under the accord, said today that it would almost certainly terminate support of the program.

“It is difficult in present circumstances to see how we can continue with our contributions unless the North Koreans make clear pretty rapidly that they are going to stop their attempts to develop nuclear weapons,” Christopher Patten, the European Union’s commissioner for external relations, said after a meeting with European foreign ministers. In Moscow today, John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control, turned over a dossier of American intelligence on the North’s clandestine project. Some American officials have suggested that Russian companies have been among the North’s suppliers, though they indicated that the Russians provided less crucial technology than did Pakistan.

After the meeting, the deputy Russian foreign minister, Georgi Mamedov, appeared to put the blame for the showdown with North Korea, at least in part, on the administration’s new doctrine of military pre-emption and its inclusion of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil.”

“We think that such statements may aggravate the situation and don’t facilitate constructive solution of the nonproliferation issues,” Mr. Mamedov said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/22/international/asia/22KORE.html>

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Washington Post

October 22, 2002

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## **Russia Resists Ending Iran Project**

### ***Moscow Balks at U.S. Offer for Curtailing Work on Reactor***

By Peter Baker, Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Oct. 21 -- U.S. officials eager to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons privately offered a potentially lucrative economic deal to Russia in exchange for halting construction of an atomic reactor and other cooperation with Tehran, but Moscow has resisted the proposal.

The Americans told the Russians that if they cut off all avenues of nuclear proliferation to Iran, the Bush administration would work to lift restrictions on the import of spent nuclear fuel to Russia, officials from both countries said today. Russia believes it can make billions of dollars by storing and reprocessing radioactive material from around the world, but it has been blocked by the United States.

Such a trade-off could eliminate a major dispute that has aggravated American presidents and soured U.S.-Russian relations for years. Russian scientists are working to complete construction of a light-water nuclear reactor at the Iranian coastal city of Bushehr, a project U.S. officials believe has served as cover for the transfer of weapons technology. Russia has defied all U.S. pressure to cancel work at Bushehr and denied any clandestine aid to Iran. By proposing an exchange for spent fuel, Washington hoped that incentives might work where badgering had not. Yet the suggested deal appeared to be foundering, at least in part because of the mistrust engendered by what Moscow perceives as the broken U.S. promises of the past year.

In an interview today, Yuri Bespalko, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, noted that the United States has not lived up to its commitment to remove Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Moscow, made last year after Russian President Vladimir Putin threw his support behind the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The Jackson-Vanik amendment bars countries that lack market economies and open emigration policies from enjoying normal trade relations with the United States.

"Americans are being rather sly when they offer this kind of swap," Bespalko said of the latest proposed exchange. Russia, he added, would rather keep the existing \$800 million Bushehr project than rely on another U.S. promise of future benefits. "It's better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush," he said.

U.S. officials appeared uncertain how vigorously to pursue the deal, with some considering it unlikely to happen and others still sensing the prospect of an agreement with Russia.

"I don't think the Russians themselves have a coherent position on it," said a senior U.S. official who asked not to be identified. "We're picking up different vibes from different people." In part, he said, that may stem from U.S. ambivalence.

Clearing the way for Russia to import spent nuclear fuel would be controversial with environmental groups and some members of Congress. Critics contend that Russia would contaminate its environment while not keeping the spent fuel sufficiently secure. Environmentalists and Russian civic groups failed to block the Russian parliament from adopting a plan last year to import spent fuel that the government said could bring in \$20 billion over two decades.

Washington controls the disposition of spent fuel from all U.S.-built reactors in the United States and other countries -- as much as 90 percent of the world's spent fuel.

The Bellona Foundation, a Norwegian environmental group that described the potential U.S.-Russian deal on its Web site, criticized it as worse for the cause of nonproliferation than permitting Russia to complete the Bushehr plant.

"There's already too much nuclear material in Russia, and they lack good control over it," said Nils Bohmer, a nuclear scientist with Bellona.

The Iran issue was on the agenda for talks beginning today between visiting Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton and Russian officials. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said Moscow's position had not changed and insisted again that it had complied with all international nonproliferation obligations.

"Russia is not providing any weapons technologies and is not even negotiating any such projects with Iran," he said on Ekho Moskvyy radio.

Rumyantsev also disputed criticism from environmentalists that Russia cannot adequately guard spent fuel against terrorists. "We have dealt with the problem for 50 years and so far, knock on wood, we have never had situations" such as that, he said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61614-2002Oct21.html>

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## Chemical Warfare Is Focus Of Joint Training In Kuwait

U.S., German, Czech and Kuwaiti military forces began a joint exercise in Kuwait aimed at recovering from a missile attack that disperses VX nerve gas.

“It went very well,” U.S. Army Maj. Bob Agans said. “If there was some kind of incident we had to provide support for, I’d feel pretty confident.”

There are about 10,000 U.S. armed forces personnel based in Kuwait.

Although those involved are careful to say the training is important for any chemical catastrophe, including spills or leaks, concern about a possible U.S.-led war against Iraq has had Kuwaiti authorities preparing for possible Iraqi retaliation.

Kuwait has been obtaining gas masks and testing civil defense sirens. Civilians have been signing up this month for first-aid training and to staff emergency communication service, aid with evacuations, help put out fires and perform other tasks that might be needed.

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New York Times

October 22, 2002

## North Korea’s A-Arms Project Jeopardizes Aid, Japan Says

By James Brooke

TOKYO, Oct. 21 — Japan will stop financing two nuclear reactors in North Korea and suspend talks on normalizing relations if there is no progress on ending the North’s clandestine nuclear weapons program, Japan’s lead negotiator said today.

“Of course the negotiations would halt,” the official, Katsunari Suzuki, told Japanese reporters. If Japan determined that North Korea “is carrying out nuclear development, then we must suspend at a minimum, and in certain cases, must think about terminating it,” he added.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, however, issued a caution about the normalization talks, which are to start Oct. 29 in Malaysia, saying, “One must not assume they are doomed from the start.”

The warnings to North Korea came after a whirlwind visit here by James A. Kelly, the American diplomat to whom North Korea confirmed that it had been pursuing a project to make bombs with enriched uranium, in violation of a 1994 accord with the United States. Today Mr. Kelly, an assistant secretary of state, met with Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Shigeru Ishiba, Japan’s senior military official.

“We are now in sync with the Japanese,” an American diplomat said after Mr. Kelly left for Washington at the end of his five-day trip to Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. “They have said they are not going to give any money without resolution of the nuclear issues.”

North Korea, hobbled by half a century of Communist economics, relies heavily on American, European and South Korean aid to feed its 22 million people. Aid from its longtime allies, China and Russia, has dried up as these countries now largely conduct trade according to market principles.

“A friend of mine at the Foreign Ministry who met with the North Koreans about 30 times said all they want to talk about is money, money, money,” said Hatsuhsa Takashima, a Foreign Ministry spokesman. “They are desperate to get another source of money.”

He noted that the agreement signed last month by Prime Minister Koizumi and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Il, went into great detail about the kind of loans to be extended to North Korea. Deferring to sensitivities in Japan, which ruled Korea during the first half of the 20th century, the North Koreans dropped the historically loaded word “compensation,” using the more neutral phrase “economic cooperation.”

But since that agreement, Japanese public opinion has turned sharply against North Korea. This is partly because of the revelation that North Korea has been cheating on its promise not to pursue nuclear weapons, and partly because of the news that most of the Japanese kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 70’s and 80’s are dead.

“Japan has made it very clear that it would give no money until the abductions are solved,” Mr. Takashima continued. He was referring to two Japanese demands: that five abductees living in North Korea be allowed to move to Japan with their children, and that North Korea give a full accounting for 45 others whose families believe were kidnapped.

“For the first time, Japanese diplomacy is being initiated by public opinion,” Satoshi Morimoto, professor of international affairs at Takushoku University, said today. “If people are scared of the abduction issue and the nuclear programs, we cannot independently conduct talks with North Korea.”

Today, in the first day of debate in the new session of Parliament, opposition members jumped at the chance to criticize Mr. Koizumi for his trip last month to Pyongyang.

“It is a serious breach of trust to the state and to the people of Japan that you signed a diplomatic document that counters the facts,” said Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the largest opposition group, the Democratic Party.

At the time of the signing, reporters visiting Pyongyang noted that the prime minister and his aides made little mention of nuclear issues. American diplomats now say that President Bush had briefed Mr. Koizumi on North Korea’s secret bomb-making program one week before he flew to North Korea.

Today Mr. Koizumi defended himself in Parliament, saying that the information provided by President Bush had enabled him to take up the nuclear issue with the North, and that he had “strongly demanded to Chairman Kim Jong Il that his nation take a responsible attitude.”

In the next step toward forging an alliance to push for dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program, President Bush is to meet Friday at his ranch in Texas with President Jiang Zemin of China and on Saturday in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico, with Prime Minister Koizumi and South Korea’s president, Kim Dae Jung.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/22/international/asia/22JAPA.html>

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Aviation Week & Space Technology

October 21, 2002

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## Emerging Weapons Aim To Foil Hardest Targets

By Robert Wall, Washington

A massive, 30,000-lb. “Daisy Cutter” replacement and other new weapon concepts are emerging to help U.S. forces defeat targets they haven’t been able to destroy with existing conventional munitions.

Although many of these efforts are still embryonic, the Pentagon appears to be on the verge of a revolution in weapons technology on a scale not seen since the 1991 Persian Gulf war. At that time, the military embarked on a full-court press to field all-weather, near-precision weapons such as the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Standoff Weapon and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, and the inertially guided Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser.

But those weapons left some targets immune to attack, which developers hope to fix by introducing new systems-- some huge, some small, others with extreme endurance and those that can act like a sleeper spy, remaining dormant for long periods in enemy territory only to be activated at the right time. Afghanistan has already heightened interest in these technologies and a new war with Iraq, in which the Pentagon could again find itself hunting Scud ballistic missile launchers and attacking underground structures, would add urgency.

In recent years, the Pentagon has focused on defeating underground and hardened targets. Now, fleeting targets and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction facilities have been added to the mix. Moreover, the military is looking at more innovative ways to destroy the underground facilities than just building bigger and more effective penetrator bombs.

Nevertheless, size still matters to the Air Force, which has been exploring a 30,000-lb. penetrator bomb (known as the “Big-BLU”) to be dropped from the B-2. The added mass would give the weapon much greater penetration to hit targets deep underground. Currently, the Air Force uses 5,000-lb.-class GBU-28s and GBU-37s as its largest bunker busters.

Additionally, USAF has begun investigating whether a similar size weapon could be used in a blast-only configuration, to replace the BLU-82 Daisy Cutter blast weapon dropped from MC-130s. The Pentagon has depleted its BLU-82 supply during the Afghanistan war. Initially, the service wanted to replace the bomb with a similarly sized 15,000-lb.-class weapon. But Steven F. Butler, director of engineering at the Air Armaments Center at Eglin AFB, Fla., says a 30,000-lb. version makes more sense, especially if the bombers are configured to drop such a penetrator. One advantage of putting the weapon on a bomber is that they would be able to operate at higher altitudes and be less vulnerable to air defenses than the low-flying MC-130s.

To thwart underground targets containing weapons of mass destruction, the Pentagon also has tried to rush its Agent Defeat technology program. “We really have been pushing on accelerating this one,” said Cindy M. Wilson, who oversees Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. The program is currently in three phases and would involve a J-1000 penetrator warhead with two-stage, high-incendiary fills. At the end of the demo, the military would have 20 weapons remaining for operational use.



Additionally, the Air Force is exploring whether it should add a booster to penetrator bombs to increase their impact velocity and thereby be able to defeat even harder targets or those farther underground. The most likely application would be the 2,000-lb. BLU-109, Butler said. With larger weapons, such as Big-BLU, there would be less payoff. A problem for penetrator weapons is that the military still hasn't fielded the type of fuzes it needs to make these bombs most effective, Butler said. The Air Force has been working on a multiple-event fuze to control when various elements of a warhead detonate, but the device isn't in service.

Furthermore, the military is exploring different means to deny an adversary the use of underground structures if they can't be destroyed. One method drawing increased attention involves directed-energy weapons. The Air Force has been reluctant to talk about its highly classified radio-frequency pulse weapons efforts, but Butler said directed-energy (DE) applications are "viable now in niches. It is the new gun in town" that could be used today.

The introduction of DE technology still faces hurdles, such as the need for proper models so planners can determine whether to employ a conventional warhead or a DE weapon, Butler said.

Beyond traditional weapons, Butler believes there may be room to exploit robotics to attack underground facilities by dispersing bug-like devices over a target complex. Those bugs would then "infect" the target and try to cut off electricity or air-conditioning, or disable the facility through other means.

The focus right now for senior military planners is less on the weapon than on the supporting elements needed to better utilize existing munitions. "The thing we're lacking is the ability to generate the target [information] we need to employ precision," said Rear Adm. James M. Zortman, commander of the Naval Air Force Atlantic fleet.

Especially with fleeting targets, it takes too long to obtain weapon coordinates to attack them, planners frequently complain.

The weapons community has been pursuing several initiatives to address that shortfall. Both the Air Force and Navy have separate hypersonic-speed missile developments underway that would put a weapon on target much faster, although a fielded system is still several years away.

Moreover, to tackle the problem, the Office of Naval Research has made time-critical strike one of its areas of emphasis in the Future Naval Capabilities activity, a research area on which the Navy wants to spend at least \$500 million annually to help modernize the service, says Mike B. Deitchman, director of strike technology at ONR. The time-critical strike element will focus on weapons, sensors and tools to more rapidly pass information to an aircraft or ship firing ordnance.

The Air Force is investigating several other technologies, including ultralong-endurance loitering munitions. The service has been working with Lockheed Martin on the powered Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System (Locaas) that can find and attack a Scud launcher or similar target. But the service now is interested in a munition that could fly a lot longer, perhaps days, Butler said. The device would require highly efficient propulsion systems. To support such a development project, the service is investigating compact, high-lift-over-drag airframes, flash laser radar seekers and smaller antijam GPS receivers. By loitering over an area, the weapon could strike a target immediately if it emerges.

Another concept under study is "sleeping weapons" that would be an evolution of unattended ground sensor technology. The armed tactical unattended ground (Atug) device would be air-dropped and remain in position until cued by an outside source, at which point it would eject a missile or warhead to attack a nearby target. Butler said a notional Atug would weigh 2,000 lb., including a 1,000-lb. weapon. The device would be engineered so it doesn't explode unless triggered from the outside, to avoid proliferating more mine-like equipment.

One technology that could represent a major breakthrough if it were engineered well involves automatic target recognition algorithms, said Donald C. Baker, the Army's deputy program executive officer for tactical missiles. He told industry representatives at a Precision Strike Assn. conference that it would be ideal "if we could find some way to take the man out of the loop."

But not everyone in the military agrees. Maj. Gen. Dan Leaf, the Air Force's requirements chief, thinks removing human intervention and moving to fully automatic operations is a mistake. Instead, the technology should be used to help cue operators and make their job easier, he said.

While much of the Pentagon's focus has been on ground targets, some Air Force officials continue to advocate for a new air-to-air weapon to replace the AIM-120 Amraam and, eventually, the AIM-9X Sidewinder to attack lower radar-cross-section threats. Interest in a new dual-range weapon has fluctuated over time and recently was slated for a 2006-07 development start. But that has been pushed back, and interest at higher echelons of the service is ebbing. Butler noted that Amraam will likely undergo extensive upgrades to address more modern threats.

The delay could derail the missile concept entirely. Butler indicated that the maturation of DE technology means a new missile may not be required.

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New Yorker  
October 28, 2002

## Talk of the Town

# Saddam On The Couch

For decades, Dr. Jerrold Post has been treating patients in the usual way, providing fifty-minute doses of psychotherapy in his home office in Bethesda, Maryland, surrounded by the requisite framed diplomas, primitive artifacts, and Kleenex boxes. But many of his most challenging cases have been referred to him by the evening news. As the director of George Washington University's Political Psychology program and the founding director of the C.I.A.'s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, Post is a pioneer in the field of political-personality profiling. He may be the only psychiatrist who has specialized in the self-esteem problems of both Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

Some people regard the extension of psychology into the realm of world affairs as a kind of quackery. But to Post, a short, amiable grandfather with a thatch of gray hair, psychology is no longer on the periphery of political life. "Terrorism is really at the nexus of psychology and politics," he said the other day in his office, "because terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare waged through the media." He pointed out that the world today seems increasingly subject to the whims of relatively unknown and unstable rulers. (Post calls them "pop-up leaders.") "We have satellite photography that can zero in on the dimples on a golf ball," he said, "but we can't peer into the minds of our adversaries."

Since last year's terrorist attacks, Post has been consulting confidentially with the Defense Department and the F.B.I. Next month, his conclusions about the mental health of Saddam Hussein and other despots will be published in a collection of essays called "Know Thy Enemy," which he helped write and edit.

Post's diagnosis of Saddam Hussein, which appears in a chapter that was co-written with an Israeli historian named Amatzia Baram, may surprise some readers. Saddam "is not a madman," the doctor insists. "It's too simple to just say he's crazy." Baram, who has been studying Saddam for more than twenty years, says, "He may be a psychopath, but he's very sane." Post points out that although Saddam is "dangerous in the extreme," he remains "a judicious, effective political calculator who is by no means irrational, but is using different premises of rationality." As a result, the authors suggest, "we can do a lot to predict" his behavior. And although Post does not want to appear critical of the officials who are charting our Iraq policy, he is worried that some recent steps by the Bush Administration may prove, as he puts it, "counterproductive."

In the style of classic psychological case studies, the chapter on Saddam opens with a detailed portrait of the patient's miserable childhood, beginning with his prenatal history. Under a subheading, "The Wounded Self," the authors reveal that Saddam was born in 1937 to a severely depressed mother. A recent widow, she was so distraught over the loss of both her husband and an older son that she tried repeatedly to abort Saddam and to commit suicide. A neighboring Jewish family, according to Baram, intervened and saved Saddam's life. (Baram says that this family, who now live in Tel Aviv, refuse to be identified because they are afraid of being blamed for allowing Saddam to be born.) Saddam's mother handed him off to a relative until he was three years old, when she remarried. Although she took the boy back, Saddam's new stepfather apparently despised and abused him. "These early experiences can be seen as profoundly wounding Saddam's emerging self-esteem," the authors write. From the age of ten, Saddam was reared by an uncle, who encouraged him to dream of becoming a nationalist Arab hero, like Saladin. Saddam's childhood experiences, the authors conclude, led him to grow up believing that the only reliable means of survival was ruthless force.

Post believes that Saddam suffers from "malignant narcissism," and considers him to be a crafty survivor who will cling to power at any cost. He believes that Saddam is unlikely ever to be persuaded to yield his weapons of mass destruction, as the United States has called on him to do. Post also says that it's unrealistic to think that Saddam will accept any negotiated settlement that involves his own exile or removal from power. As he puts it, "This is a man who will always be power maximizing." And he is concerned that the President's talk of "regime change" may be dangerous. "To the extent that Saddam comes to believe he has no way out, it backs him into a corner," Post said. "I'd worry about exaggerated retribution."

Post emphasizes that what he can offer is only an informed psychological opinion of Saddam, and not a medical diagnosis. After all, he has never been able to ask Saddam whether he's had recurring dreams about showing up naked in math class. But the doctor says that he'd prefer never to see the Iraqi leader on his couch. In the first place, after the years he has spent studying Saddam, there's very little about him that he still finds puzzling. And there's one thing he says he knows for sure: "If Saddam Hussein was in my office, I'd run."

— *Jane Mayer*

Los Angeles Times

October 23, 2002

Pg. 1

## Heat Won't Preclude Iraq War

*Unlike in 1991, analysts say, new technology means the Pentagon is prepared to battle Saddam Hussein in the spring or even summer.*

By John Hendren, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon is prepared to invade Iraq even if political negotiations and Saddam Hussein's maneuvers drag on into winter and rule out action during the coolest months, defense officials and military analysts say.

For months, military analysts have spoken of a winter war as essentially the only option and suggested that it would be impossible for U.S. troops to fight in the searing Iraqi summer.

With an eye on the calendar, President Bush rushed to secure a tough resolution on Iraq from Congress and is pushing for a second one in the United Nations. Administration officials have grown increasingly impatient as the U.N. negotiations have dragged on for weeks. Bush has warned that once a resolution is adopted, he will tolerate no delay in inspections for chemical, nuclear and biological weapons after U.N. teams return to Iraq.

Yet even as diplomacy forges ahead on the presumption that the "weather window" for an attack will close in March, the Pentagon is ready to fight a war in the spring, one that could even spill over into summer, when temperatures in Iraq can hit 120.

Advances in weapons technology and military tactics over the last decade have dramatically altered the calculations for waging a second Persian Gulf war, making weather far less a determining factor than it was during the first conflict, in winter 1991.

Improved surveillance, new satellite-guided bombs that can plunge to their targets through thick cloud cover and less restrictive chemical-protection suits have made U.S. troops and their equipment more weatherproof than ever.

"We would prefer to get it done by May for lots of reasons, strategic as well as weather, but there's less constraint" than during the '91 war, said Michael Vickers, a former Green Beret and CIA operations officer now with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank in Washington. "Even if Saddam manages to delay this until, say, May, it doesn't necessarily preclude conflict until next November. We might be willing to launch the campaign in the summer."

Gulf dwellers tend to scoff at the notion that the weather should affect U.S. plans.

"I think if you come from Texas or Arizona, the weather is not that different," said Bader Omar Dafa, Qatar's ambassador to Washington. A potential command center for U.S. air power is now rising in the Qatari desert.

Certainly, Pentagon planners say, U.S. forces would have to alter their strategy for a later attack. But in the end, a strike decision would be largely a matter of how as opposed to when.

"There are times when weather can be a detractor and when there's an optimum window. But we are capable of being an all-weather force," a senior defense official said. "Would we hate it? Sure. But putting a window on it isn't right."

As part of their contingency planning, military strategists say, officials at U.S. Central Command are already mapping weather patterns in Iraq, using technology to explore the nuances of their effects on warfare. A testing facility at Florida's Eglin Air Force Base, for example, can simulate any weather, from conditions in Antarctica to those in the tropics.

Under one option, U.S. and allied forces could rely mostly on air power during the hot months and employ special operations soldiers on land only in key operations, military analysts and defense officials say. Under the worst-case scenario, American and allied forces would simply prepare for high numbers of heat casualties in brief fighting that most analysts predict would last less than a month.

"You can work around it when you employ air power with the amount of effectiveness the U.S. Air Force and the Navy are capable of," said Col. William F. Burnette, vice commander of the Air Force Weather Agency at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. "We don't want thousands of guys crapping out in chem suits on the ground."

The Pentagon has more than a million new chemical protection suits and masks — more than enough for the 250,000 or so U.S. soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen most analysts believe would be required to topple Hussein's regime. That's an improvement from 1991, when soldiers complained that supplies were inadequate and the suits suffocating, although Gulf veterans say problems remain.

Iraqi military defectors and senior U.S. defense analysts say there is a significant chance that Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons if attacked, because unlike the '91 war, which aimed only to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait, an invasion now would be aimed at toppling Hussein. Although the Iraqi leader denies having chemical or biological arms, the U.S. suspects that he does and notes that he has used chemical arms on Iranian soldiers and Iraqi Kurds in the past.

In the Gulf War, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf relied heavily on weather reports, which he considered so sensitive that his press briefers often declined to describe the weather in Iraq to reporters. On Oct. 29, 1990, nearly three months before the war was launched, Schwarzkopf asked for a detailed study of how the weather would affect military operations.

He wanted meticulous information on rain, sandstorms, wind and temperatures through April. He wanted precise daylight hours because the short light of winter gives U.S. planes and ground troops with night-vision equipment the power to "own the night," in the words of one pilot.

The analysis came back nine days later: "The bottom line was that mid-February is an extremely advantageous time for U.S. forces to attack," Schwarzkopf wrote in his autobiography. Opting to launch an air war with the goal of saving the optimum time for a ground invasion, U.S. forces went in on Jan. 17.

There was ample reason for avoiding summer fighting. The Tomahawk missiles and heat-seeking devices that were celebrated for their effectiveness in the Gulf War sometimes fail in extreme heat. The bulky Gulf-era protective anti-chemical suits and masks would have made it punishing, if not impossible, to rappel down a rope from a helicopter or even to turn a wrench under the sweltering Iraqi summer sun.

Yet fighting in the Iraqi winter also has its disadvantages. In the Gulf War, inclement weather often limited AC-130 gunships' ability to offer close support to ground troops. The laser-guided bombs that made their debut in 1991 were ineffective when there was heavy cloud cover.

In the last decade, technological advances have solved many such problems. AC-130s have been equipped with thermal imaging cameras that can see through the haze common in the Iraqi winter. U.S. soldiers have patches taped on their helmets that identify them to aircraft even in low light.

Surveillance planes, such as U2s, now use airborne sensors that can penetrate clouds with radar. And when weather defeats laser-guided bombs, warplanes can now use the satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions used in Afghanistan, which can find their targets through heavy cloud cover.

Despite advances in defending against the heat, the problems posed by temperatures that can top what amounts to 140 degrees for soldiers in heavy gear and armored vehicles are myriad. The vision-distorting flush that radiates off the white sand grows so intense that even T. E. Lawrence, the British adventurer better known as Lawrence of Arabia, conceded, "After a while I could not endure it."

Beyond the summer heat and winter clouds, there is the ubiquitous, choking sand. In 1991, American equipment operators strapped pantyhose over vehicle air intakes until small-bore grates were delivered. The problem is worst in the sweeping thunderstorms from February to April and the sandstorms that rake the desert from April through summer's end.

It was just such swirling sand that Delta commandos encountered in Iran in 1979 on their way to try to rescue hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Eight commandos and pilots died when a plane and helicopter collided in a sandstorm before ever leaving the ground. The debacle put an end to further rescue attempts. Now, using commercial satellites, Air Force weathermen can pull down data on dust storms as well.

U.S. soldiers might be able to fight in any weather, but their performance will inevitably suffer in summer, and the number of heat casualties would rise, according to soldiers who know the region. During the winter fighting of 1991, heat illness accounted for less than 1% of sick-call visits to Navy clinics, which treated all U.S. service members, but summer illnesses could range from painful heat contractions to delirium and even death.

Nevertheless, the armed forces have made some advances that blunt the heat. The Gulf War-era chemical gear — a bulky mask and a charcoal suit with a strap-on hood — has been replaced by an improved mask and a sleeker, one-piece suit designed to seal out chemicals but cool the wearer by allowing heat to pass through the fabric. New Humvee-mounted biological agent detection labs, as well as the Fox chemical detection vehicles, are air-conditioned — to protect the equipment, not the soldiers, Army officials say.

There are advantages to fighting in the summer: Clear weather expands the options for warplanes. And there are also regions in Iraq where the cold grows lethal. Schwarzkopf acknowledged in his autobiography that he had underestimated the severity of the weather in Iraq's mountainous northwest, where two members of a U.S. "Scud-

busting” mission to take out Iraqi missiles on the ground died of exposure in freezing temperatures in the war’s early days.

Schwarzkopf relied on combat weathermen like Air Force Master Sgt. Jeffrey Johnson to keep him informed.

Johnson had no computer and needed five or more colleagues to help lug 800 pounds of TV monitors and antennas to intercept satellite reports. None of the instruments could detect a sandstorm.

Johnson, of the Air Force’s 10th Combat Weather Squadron, remembers looking at the printout of a satellite picture in the desert and seeing a thunderstorm. Minutes later, the rains kicked up a dust storm that blotted out the sun.

“In the middle of the day, it was like it was 2 in the morning. It was just pitch black. It was unreal,” Johnson, 39, recalled in an interview from Ft. Bragg, N.C. “That was probably the scariest day of my life. You wanted to tap your shoes and say, ‘There’s no place like home.’ “

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-springwar23oct23004432.0,1065935.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dworld%2Dmanual>

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(Editor’s Note: Hyperlink for referenced GAO report follows article.)

Washington Times

October 23, 2002

## **Anthrax vaccine cited in leaving military**

By Jerry Seper, The Washington Times

The Defense Department’s anthrax immunization program has hurt the Pentagon’s ability to retain pilots and aircrew for the National Guard and reserves, the General Accounting Office said yesterday.

The GAO, the investigative arm of Congress, concluded in a report that a “significant number” of pilots and aircrew members who received the required anthrax immunization vaccine cited the program as a major factor in reducing their participation in Guard and reserve activities or leaving military service altogether.

“Anthrax is a serious threat that our soldiers might face on the battlefield,” said Rep. Dan Burton, Indiana Republican and chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, which requested the study.

“At the same time, this vaccine has been controversial, and it has caused serious reactions in some individuals,” he said. “The Defense Department needs to do a better job giving accurate information to our military personnel so they can make informed decisions.”

Anthrax is one of the bacterial agents most readily available to terrorists and U.S. enemy states worldwide.

Five persons across the nation died from exposure to anthrax-laced letters. More than a year later, the government has yet to make an arrest in the case. The FBI has consistently maintained that the investigation is on track and that thousands of leads have been pursued by a task force of investigators.

The GAO, in reaching its conclusion, investigated the views of pilots and other aircrew members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

Investigators said an estimated 37 percent of the pilots and aircrew members surveyed had received one or more anthrax shots as of September 2000 and that of those recipients, 85 percent reported experiencing some type of adverse reaction, displaying symptoms such as redness, itching, chills, fever, nausea and dizziness.

At the time of the inquiry, the GAO said, two-thirds of the sample survey did not support the anthrax vaccine program nor any future immunization programs planned for other biological warfare agents.

“Now more than ever, an experienced and well-trained military is critical,” Mr. Burton said. “I hope the DOD will take the GAO’s recommendations seriously and direct the establishment of an active surveillance program to identify and monitor adverse events associated” with the program. The DOD is the Defense Department.

From March 1998 and March 2002, more than 525,000 U.S. military personnel were vaccinated against anthrax.

The Defense Department has sought to immunize all 2.4 million service members by 2004, at a cost of \$130 million. The immunization series calls for six injections of the vaccine over a period of 18 months, followed by annual booster shots.

The U.S. military is the only force in the world requiring all its military troops to take the anthrax vaccinations.

Concerns have also been raised about the vaccine’s effectiveness against massive doses of weaponized anthrax anticipated in an intentional biological warfare attack. In addition, the only FDA-approved manufacturer, the Michigan Biologic Products Institute, has repeatedly been cited for quality control problems.

The Anthrax Vaccine Expert Committee, a civilian panel of physicians and scientists set up to monitor the safety of the vaccinations, concluded in a report in April that the vaccinations over a two-year period had not shown a high frequency or unusual pattern of serious reactions.

The committee said that when it reviewed and medically evaluated 602 reports of adverse reactions, it concluded that the number was not excessive and that no deaths had been reported.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021023-60656530.htm>

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## **Anthrax Vaccine: GAO's Survey of Guard and Reserve Pilots and Aircrew.**

GAO-02-445, September 20.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-445>

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Christian Science Monitor

October 23, 2002

Pg. 1

### **Saddam Hussein: 'Not A Lunatic'**

#### ***Part sleepless workaholic, part methodical murderer, he works best when cornered***

By Peter Ford, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

PARIS - In the high-stakes game of geopolitical chicken in which Washington and Baghdad are engaged, President Saddam Hussein is not going to blink first, according to biographers of the Iraqi leader and others who have studied his character and behavior.

"He can bob and weave, but he becomes dangerous when he is backed into a corner and he can lash out," says Jerrold Post, a former CIA analyst who pioneered political-psychological profiling of foreign leaders.

Adept at tactical maneuvering, determined to retain power, but aware that bowing to the Americans would destroy his self-image as the new Nebuchadnezzar, President Hussein would fight to the end if it came to war, experts say. In the meantime, as pressure mounts, expect some fancy diplomatic footwork. "Saddam has always been much better with his back to the wall," says Patrick Cockburn, a British journalist who coauthored a recent biography of the Iraqi leader. "Maybe it's because his vanity has been punctured, maybe because he is better at accepting advice." Hussein's notorious brutality and his mistakes in launching costly wars against neighboring Iran and Kuwait have earned him the sobriquet "madman of the Middle East."

Nothing could be further from the truth, says Said Aburish, a Palestinian writer who once worked for the Iraqi government and who has written an account of Hussein's life.

"He is not a lunatic," Mr. Aburish says. "In fact he is very consistent – the most methodical Arab leader of the 20th century." Having set himself a goal, whether it be agricultural development, the perfection of a weapon of mass destruction, or the status of the undisputed leader of the Arab world, he is steadfast in pursuing his purpose. He is also a workaholic, reportedly sleeping only four hours a night.

The Iraqi president has shown that persistence, and patience too, in his efforts over recent years to mend fences with neighboring countries and to cultivate foreign governments further afield.

Showing a much more sophisticated grasp of international affairs than he displayed in the run-up to the Gulf War, Hussein has restored his reputation among Arab leaders – he was welcomed back into the fold of the Arab League two years ago – and dangled economic incentives such as trade deals in front of key UN Security Council members China, Russia, and France. The effect has been to complicate the creation of the sort of international coalition that he faced in 1991.

The Iraqi leader has always been skilled in domestic politics, with a good instinct for whom to choose as allies and when to drop them. He has showed special mastery of the extreme violence that has characterized Iraqi political life since the British carved a new country out of the Ottoman Empire in 1921.

Hussein first made his mark on Iraqi politics in 1959, leading an attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Abdul Karim Kassem. Twenty years later, on assuming the presidency, he had 21 senior officials of his Baath Party – potential rivals – murdered en masse. On one celebrated occasion in 1982 he interrupted a cabinet meeting to step outside with his health minister, Reyadh Ibrahim Hussain, who had overseen the purchase of a defective batch of penicillin for the Army, says Aburish. The president shot the offending minister dead in an anteroom, then returned to finish chairing the cabinet session.



Such behavior, mimicked by ever-present security forces, has instilled great fear throughout the population – giving the president absolute power over his country. “There are no restraints,” says Mr. Cockburn. Such power “went to his head,” suggests Aburish, pointing out that in his earlier days Hussein was known for not standing on ceremony and for working efficiently on ambitious development plans for the country’s oil industry, its transport sector, and its schools.

Twenty years ago, Aburish remembers, government offices were hung with photographs of a small room in a modest village house – Hussein’s birthplace in the poverty-stricken region of Tikrit. Today, the offices are decorated with grandiose portraits of the president. “It reflects a certain transformation in the character of the man,” says Aburish.

Aburish also points to the way Iraqi officials a few years ago stopped using the traditional Arab hug and kiss on the cheek in greeting the president, and instead began kissing his lapels. “That’s what you do to a holy man,” he says. Such signs appear to confirm what expert observers have long seen as Hussein’s “exaggerated sense of his own heroic role in history,” as Cockburn puts it, illustrated by his dedication to rebuilding the ancient city of Babylon even at the height of the Iran-Iraq war.

The Iraqi leader has made no secret of his ambition to build on his deep nationalism to become the undisputed leader of the Arab people, defying the West in the fashion of the late Egyptian president Gamel Abdul Nasser.

Behind the grand vision and the iron fist, however, some analysts suggest that Saddam Hussein might actually be an insecure man. “I firmly believe that the man is shy,” says Aburish. “He avoids eye contact, there is no small talk in him,” and those who have met him have noted his limp handshake.

“His grandiose facade masks underlying insecurity,” Dr. Post, the former CIA analyst, who now teaches psychology at Georgetown University, argued in testimony to Congress before the Gulf War.

That may account for Hussein’s intensely secretive habits. The day before the Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait in 1990, fewer than a dozen people knew of the war plan, according to Saad al-Bazzaz, who headed Iraqi radio and television at the time. In 1972, when Hussein nationalized the oil industry, he told local industry employees of his intentions only two hours before the official announcement.

That approach probably means that few people even in his inner circle know how he intends to play his hand now. But in Post’s view, the Iraqi president sees the weapons of mass destruction he is alleged to control as central to his self-image as a world-class politician.

“Big boys have big toys,” says Post. “The chances of his yielding on weapons of mass destruction are between zero and none. But he is quite prudent, and I see no chance of him giving such weapons to terrorists or launching a direct attack on the US,” because that would bring catastrophic retaliation from Washington.

Those weapons, if he possesses them, give Hussein a degree of power – and he would do anything to hold onto them, since “power is the only language he understands,” Post argues. “He is impressive, a very wily guy, a quintessential survivor, and if he can stave off disaster by making a show of open inspections, he will.”

But Washington’s talk of regime change, not just disarmament, “is backing him into a corner. He doesn’t have to be paranoid to think that we are out to get him,” Post adds. If Hussein were attacked, “we could reliably predict the use of such weapons [of mass destruction] against Israel and US ground forces.”

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1023/p01s04-wome.html>

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Christian Science Monitor

October 23, 2002

Pg. 1

## **The Brains Behind Iraq’s Arsenal**

***US-educated Iraqi scientists may be as crucial to Iraq’s threat as its war hardware.***

By Mark Clayton, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

If UN inspectors return soon to Iraq, it won’t be just weapons of mass destruction they’re hunting. Perhaps an equally crucial mission will be to find the people who know how to build them.

As the US and United Nations wrangle over a new inspection regime, former weapons inspectors warn against becoming preoccupied hunting for missiles, bombs, and laboratories – and instead focusing more on finding Iraq’s top weapons experts.

Over the years, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein has assembled an army of microbiologists, chemical engineers, and nuclear physicists who, if questioned carefully, may reveal as much about weapons development as any search for petri dishes or aluminum tubes.

Indeed, unlike military hardware, “human capital,” will not be easy for Mr. Hussein to replace, says David Kay, the UN’s former top nuclear-weapons inspector in Iraq. “Facilities you can destroy,” he says. “But Saddam has the money to repurchase the best equipment. The one thing they don’t have in abundance is the embedded human capital.”

One irony is that if inspectors do locate any of the bombmakers, a translator may not be necessary. That’s because many in Hussein’s weapons-development brain trust apparently got their training at universities in the US, Britain, and Europe.

Just ask Khidir Hamza, who received his master’s degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his PhD in nuclear physics from Florida State University. As Hussein’s director of nuclear weaponization, he became the highest-ranking scientist to defect in 1994.

In an interview, Dr. Hamza recalled a meeting in the late 1970s when he and other Iraqi scientists sat down to plan the nation’s new nuclear-weapons development plan. With him at the table were Husham Sharif and Moyesser al-Mallah, both US university-educated nuclear experts, he says.

“Most of the nuclear era’s earlier programs, the core personnel, were US trained,” he says. “We were telling them actually where to send the [Iraqi] students.”

### **A grand education plan**

When the 1980s arrived, however, British-, Soviet-, and European-trained nuclear scientists had begun filling the ranks. By decade’s end, only about half the 30 or so top Iraqi nuclear experts were US educated, he says. That diversification was part of Hussein’s grand education plan.

But Hussein “wised up, Hamza says, “when he found out that East European- and Soviet-trained personnel were totally useless. He needed English-speaking university experts. So he spread it among the US, Britain, and Canada.” Even after the Gulf War, many Iraqi students continued to attend US universities to study nuclear physics and engineering. Dr. Kay, the former weapons inspector, discovered this during a 1993 visit to the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. In his lecture to a roomful of nuclear-engineering graduate students, he was surprised to find nearly a dozen young Iraqis.

“This was after the Gulf War – and they were here quite legally,” he says. “I was talking about what we had learned about Iraq. They asked very good questions. Most of them intended to go back home.”

A recent study of PhDs earned in the US corroborates some of that personal observation. Researchers at Georgia State University in Atlanta found that from 1990 to 1999, 1,215 science and engineering PhDs were granted to students from five of the seven countries listed by the US State Department as sponsors of terrorism.

Still, that’s only about 2 percent of degrees granted to foreign-born students, with Iraqis earning 112 science and engineering PhDs. Of those, 14 were in sensitive fields like nuclear or chemical engineering or microbiology.

There’s no clear indication how many returned to Iraq.

But small numbers may be misleading. It takes only one or two gifted students to run an entire weapons program, experts say. “It isn’t a large number, and we know a number of people don’t plan to go back [to Iraq],” says Paula Stephan, coauthor of the Georgia State study. “Having said all of that, it’s still a positive number, right?”

Even so, few suggest simply closing all university doors to foreign students, who make up a key component of US graduate programs. Instead, the Bush administration has taken steps to scrutinize student visa applications. Students applying from a few dozen nations to study “sensitive” fields like nuclear physics will get extra scrutiny. A new visa tracking system is also in the works to ensure students who do come to the US actually enroll.

Yet even these new systems may not catch students who apply to attend US universities as a history major, say, and then a year later switch to nuclear engineering, Kay says.

What they need to be alert to is a new generation of young experts to succeed the likes of Abdul Nassir Hindawi, who received his PhD in microbiology from Mississippi State University in Starkville in 1969. In the 1980s, he became the architect of Hussein’s bioweapons program. He tried to defect and was arrested in 1998.

In fact, one of the reasons more Iraqi scientists don’t defect is that Hussein may slaughter a defector’s entire family, Hamza says. Many scientists are especially fearful during an interview with weapons inspectors – particularly if an Iraqi government watcher is present.

### **Fear factor**

Charles Duelfer, former deputy chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), who helped lead the search for weapons, says it was not unusual to come across American-trained Iraqi experts.

“Even when we found these people, it was often clear that they were frightened of saying the wrong thing,” Duelfer says. The problem is that if questioning is done under past rules, “these people will remain terrified.”

With this perhaps in mind, the Bush administration has proposed to the UN that scientists and their families be plucked from Iraq for interviews abroad where they won't have to fear retaliation. In the end, say experts, human intelligence will be crucial. "If you can take out the key people, you've taken their program away from them," says Richard Spertzel, who oversaw the dismantling of Iraq's bioweapons program in the 1990s. "But first they have to find them."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1023/p01s01-wome.html>

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Washington Post  
October 23, 2002  
Pg. 21

## **N. Korea Calls For Talks On Arms**

### ***'Tough Counteraction' Is Threatened if U.S. Won't Agree***

By Paul Eckert, Reuters

SEOUL, Oct. 22 -- A defiant North Korea, facing pressure to scrap a nuclear weapons program, warned the United States today that it would take unspecified "tougher counteraction" if Washington did not accept talks on the issue. Breaking its silence about the U.S. disclosure last week that the communist state had acknowledged it was secretly pursuing a uranium-reprocessing program, North Korea said Washington must "opt for reconciliation and peace." "If the U.S. persists in its moves to pressurize and stifle [North Korea] by force, the latter will have no option but to take a tougher counteraction," the official party daily Rodong Sinmun said in a statement carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency.

In Moscow, U.S. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton sought to step up the diplomatic pressure on North Korea, saying its uranium-enrichment program was "real and dangerous."

Bolton was in Russia as part of a tour of Asian and European capitals to enlist support to halt North Korea's arms program by diplomatic means. He was going on to London and Paris.

He told reporters that he had passed on to Russian officials confidential information about the North Korean program and that he expected the issue to be discussed when President Bush and Russian leader Vladimir Putin meet Saturday in Mexico.

"I should tell you that our very careful, very deliberate, very prudent assessment of the information we have is enough to convince us that this program is real and dangerous, no matter what the North Koreans say," he said.

"What we've said is that they are seeking production-scope capability to produce weapons-grade uranium and that that effort is a violation of the nonproliferation treaty and a grave cause of concern to us, to the states in the region and to the world as a whole," Bolton said.

On Monday, North Korea's number two leader, Kim Yong Nam, told South Korea's visiting unification minister that the North was ready for dialogue.

The U.S. ambassador in Seoul, Thomas C. Hubbard, said today that Washington sought to preempt a crisis through diplomacy, but that North Korea had exhausted its credibility with the secret nuclear program, which violated a previous negotiated settlement.

"We have very little basis for trust in North Korea, very little basis for confidence that further dialogue will lead to a solution," he said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2597-2002Oct22.html>

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## **Kurd Militants Linked to al-Qaida**

Tue Oct 22, 12:42 PM ET

By *BRIAN MURPHY*, Associated Press Writer

SULAYMANIYAH, Iraq (AP) - An Islamic militant faction in the U.S.-protected Kurdish safe haven was created by Osama bin Laden ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) from terrorist cells shifted from Afghanistan ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) just before the Sept. 11 attacks, a top Iraqi Kurdish leader claimed Tuesday.

Local intelligence sources also support U.S. allegations that the Ansar al-Islam group has conducted chemical weapons tests, said Barham Salih, prime minister of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK.

The PUK, the second largest of the pro-Western Iraqi Kurdish political groups, controls eastern parts of the semiautonomous region where Ansar al-Islam operates.

"We have very solid information corroborating (an al-Qaida link) from our own sources," said Salih, who was the target of an assassination attempt in April by suspected Ansar al-Islam gunmen.

He declined to give further details on the evidence gathered. But he said clues suggest bin Laden had a direct role in creating an al-Qaida foothold in northern Iraq.

According to Iraqi Kurdish evidence, the core of Ansar al-Islam, or Supporters of Islam, was created 10 days before the Sept. 11 attacks as part of bin Laden's plans to disperse his terrorist network ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) before an expected U.S. strike on al-Qaida's command in Afghanistan, Salih said.

"This was part of a deliberate process preparing for the Sept. 11 attack to set up alternative bases for al-Qaida away from Afghanistan," Salih told The Associated Press. "They were anticipating apparently a reaction from the Americans and others. Setting up a base here was part of the contingency planning."

Salih added there is "clear evidence" that Ansar al-Islam conducted limited tests of chemical weapons on farm animals.

U.S. authorities in August said they did not launch attacks against Ansar al-Islam because the tests were crude and not considered a wider threat. American and British warplanes have protected the Iraqi Kurdish region for about a decade.

"It's a serious security ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) concern for us," said Salih. "We're talking about a small number of people, hardened terrorists who are willing to die for what they consider their cause ... They want to impose their will upon people and their values upon people by terrorism, by violence, by sabotage, by assassinations."

Ansar al-Islam has been driven back to several villages along the Iranian border about 300 kilometers (187 miles) northeast of Baghdad. It is estimated to have just several hundred fighters, including Arabs and Iraqi Kurds, who have waged sporadic clashes with Patriotic Union forces.

An AP reporter was barred by Ansar al-Islam militiamen from entering its stronghold in the village of Biyara last week. The outpost had a full array of weapons, including automatic rifles and mortars.

The fighters, who declined to give their full names, said supplies come over the border from supporters in Iran. The Iranian government has strongly denied any links to Ansar al-Islam.

Salih would not comment on the level of Iranian assistance to choke off the group's lifeline. But he said both sides "share a common interest for security."

About 30 alleged Ansar al-Islam followers are jailed in the Patriotic Union's main city of Sulaymaniyah. One suspect was found with a jacket packed with explosives for a possible suicide blast, officials said.

Last month, the group's leader, Mullah Najm al-Din Faraj Ahmad, was arrested in the Netherlands en route from Iran to Norway.

Ansar al-Islam has been denounced by moderate Islamic groups in the Iraqi Kurdish region, where political leaders are seeking to put aside differences before a possible U.S. military strike against Saddam Hussein ([news](#) - [web sites](#)).

"They are very much on the margins of political life here. But they are a security threat," Salih said. "It drains our resources and diverts our resources from urgently needed issues such as rehabilitation of our economy and ... promoting our civil society."

[http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20021022/ap\\_on\\_re\\_mi\\_ea/iraq\\_kurds\\_al\\_qaida\\_2](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20021022/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_kurds_al_qaida_2)

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Washington Post  
October 23, 2002  
Pg. 27

## **No More Caving On North Korea**

By James A. Baker III

Surprise, surprise -- North Korea now admits it has a secret program to develop nuclear weapons. Analysts have suspected for years that the North had already assembled, or was capable of assembling, one or two bombs. Now there are credible reports that Pyongyang may be no more than a year away from mass producing up to six a year. The leaders of North Korea starve their people to maintain the world's fifth-largest military force and with it personal power over a bankrupt country. They earn hard currency by selling advanced missile technology in

violation of the international missile technology control regime. Potentially just over the horizon is the ultimate proliferation nightmare -- ballistic missiles fitted with nuclear warheads.

This is exceedingly dangerous and enormously troubling. What it is not, however, is surprising. Rather, it is the natural and foreseeable result of the 1994 Framework Agreement between the United States and North Korea. The government of North Korea holds power by force. All it understands is force, strength and resolve. By acceding to blackmail threats and signing the Framework Agreement, the United States turned a policy based on strength into one based on accommodation, compromise and appeasement.

North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985. That treaty required Pyongyang within 18 months to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and allow inspection of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Instead, North Korea secretly escalated its nuclear weapons development program.

Little-noticed but intensive diplomacy by the first Bush administration forced the North Koreans on Dec. 26, 1991, to end six years of intransigence on signing the safeguards agreement and allowing inspections. In a follow-up meeting in January, the United States bluntly warned Pyongyang that it either had to live up to the international agreements it had just signed or face further isolation and economic deprivation.

Pyongyang then refused to live up to the agreements it had signed and -- after a change of U.S. administrations -- threatened to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty and, worse, to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." That's when the Clinton administration signed the 1994 Framework Agreement. "This agreement will help achieve a longstanding and vital American objective," President Clinton said at the time, "an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula."

But in reality, our policy of carrots and sticks had given way overnight to one of carrots only -- fuel oil to help run North Korea's beleaguered economy, two new nuclear reactors and diplomatic ties. Moreover, Pyongyang was given another five years to do what it had already agreed to do in 1991 -- allow a full inspection of its nuclear facilities.

This agreement was an abrupt policy flip-flop, and in the end has, in my view, proved to be a mistake that has made stability on the Korean peninsula less, not more, likely.

Given their track record before 1994, there was substantial reason to question whether the North Koreans would ever keep their side of the Framework Agreement. The worst part is that it sent this dangerous message to other would-be proliferators in capitals such as Tehran and Baghdad: "Sometimes crime pays."

But those who criticize have an obligation to suggest an alternative approach. So what should we do now? Instead of caving in to Pyongyang's belligerent threats, I think the United States should go to the U.N. Security Council and obtain political and economic sanctions against the North for breach of its solemn international obligations, much as we did against Iraq in 1990; beef up our forces in South Korea to whatever extent necessary; and quietly make it clear to the North Koreans that for more than 40 years the U.S. nuclear deterrent kept the peace in Europe against an overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority, and we are quite prepared to do the same on the Korean peninsula to fulfill our security obligations to South Korea and Japan.

How "natural and foreseeable" was it that the Framework Agreement would produce a nuclear-armed North Korea, not "an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula"? Consider this: Subject only to editing to change tenses and time references, omit extraneous material and provide logical transitions, the preceding four paragraphs are word-for-word from my diplomatic memoir, "The Politics of Diplomacy," written in 1994, immediately after the Framework Agreement was signed, and published in 1995.

I would offer only a few additional observations.

I believe we will be able to get the full support of the U.N. Security Council for the economic and political sanctions elements of this more muscular policy approach. None of the permanent member countries, Russia and China included, wants to see a nuclear-armed North Korea. The United States has properly begun preliminary consultations with those powers and with Japan and South Korea.

We've wasted eight years at considerable cost to our nonproliferation efforts, but what should have been done in 1994 can still be done today.

*The writer was secretary of state from 1989 to 1992.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2516-2002Oct22.html>

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San Diego Union-Tribune  
October 19, 2002

## **Shots Given To Gulf-Bound Troops**

By Jeanette Steele and James W. Crawley, Union-Tribune Staff Writers

Marines bound for the Persian Gulf are getting anthrax vaccinations as the military resumes widespread use of the vaccine for the first time since mid-2001.

Among them are several hundred Marines from a command unit at Camp Pendleton that will be leaving soon for Kuwait, said Capt. Alison Salerno, a base spokeswoman.

Others who will be vaccinated include the 2,200 Marines of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Pendleton and the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station. They're scheduled for Persian Gulf deployment this year or in early 2003.

Officials won't say how many of the 172,500 Marines throughout the Corps will receive the shots.

It's part of a Pentagon decision to resume anthrax vaccinations for selected military members from all four services who are being sent into high-threat areas.

Marine Corps headquarters issued an order Sept. 20 to resume immunizations for those Marines bound for the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The Corps cited "current intelligence assessments (that) indicate the anthrax threat remains real."

The Marines started getting the shots late last month.

A spokesman at San Diego Naval Medical Center at Balboa Park referred all questions to the Pentagon, which declined to provide information about the Navy's policy.

Salerno said the Marines are deciding whether to expand the program.

A shortage of the anthrax vaccine caused mass immunizations to be suspended in mid-2001, but supply is not a problem now, she said.

BioPort, a Michigan firm and the nation's sole manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine, received approval to restart production in January after previously falling out of compliance with government quality standards.

The Pentagon, through its Web sites, says Marines deploying to the Persian Gulf will get the shots, but most Navy personnel aboard ships there will not be vaccinated. Nor will personnel flying over the region, unless they are based in certain countries.

Shots apparently are planned for troops assigned to ground units or bases in the gulf region. Personnel aboard ships and aircraft are less likely to be affected by anthrax.

Several years ago, at least 37 members of the military were court-martialed for refusing to take the shot.

No one at Pendleton or Miramar has declined to be vaccinated since the program resumed, Marine officials said.

The Marines cite a climate of acceptance after anthrax-tainted letters killed five Americans late last year and after a study by the National Academy of Sciences pronounced the vaccine to be safe.

"We're finding great tolerance from Marines," Salerno said. "Not only has the threat become more credible in the area they are going to, but also the Defense Department has made a real effort to show this is a safe and effective vaccine."

However, a Washington, D.C., attorney who defended several San Diego-area Marines who refused the shots in the past said he has received calls from service members, though none from area Marines or sailors.

Because the anthrax threat "is a little bit closer to home, some of the people who were on the fence may lean more toward taking (the shot)," said the lawyer, Mark Zaid.

But, he added, "it's no safer than it was before."

The Pentagon embarked on a program in 1998 to inoculate all 2.4 million service members against anthrax, a biological weapon thought to be held by Iraq.

The campaign faltered because of supply problems and because it came under fire from Congress. Additionally, hundreds of service members left the military because they feared the vaccine posed a health risk.

Six shots, given over 18 months, and annual boosters are required for full immunity. People who already have received some shots will continue the series where they left off, officials said.

The punishment facing Marines who might refuse the vaccine – officially called disobeying a lawful order – is still court-martial, Salerno said.

[http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20021019-9999\\_2m19anthrax.html](http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20021019-9999_2m19anthrax.html)

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San Francisco Chronicle

October 22, 2002

Pg. 1

## **Resurgence For Nuclear Labs**

*Scientists designing weapons for terror war, planning underground tests*



By James Sterngold, Chronicle Staff Writer

Los Alamos, New Mexico -- The nation's nuclear weapons laboratories, dismissed until recently as a relic of the Cold War, have become a critical element in the Bush administration's more forceful security and military policies, moving into areas of research and development considered virtually taboo.

The labs, operated by the University of California, are designing advanced bunker-busting weapons, manufacturing a new generation of nuclear components to update old warheads and are quietly preparing for renewed nuclear testing deep under the Nevada desert.

With their budgets at the highest level in years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Alameda County and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico are also on the cutting edge of 21st century war work, like combatting bioterrorism, protecting the nation's infrastructure from crippling terrorist attacks, and developing a laser that simulates the intense heat of a nuclear explosion.

"I would call this a new chapter," said John Browne, director of the Los Alamos laboratory, which oversaw the design and testing of the first atomic bomb in 1945. "Our mission is shifting as we enter the 21st century."

The resurgence at the weapons labs is not being welcomed in all quarters. Some experts worry that the expanded mission, primarily focusing on the most lethal weapons ever created, could escalate the already dangerous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the age of terrorism.

"The key question is whether the labs are suffering from mission creep," said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the nonpartisan Arms Control Association and a critic of the new policies. "The counterterrorism mission has not changed the labs, it's the Bush administration's nuclear posture."

But the change in fortune at the labs, though hardly noticed, has been little short of remarkable.

Just two years ago, the weapons labs, owned by the Department of Energy, hit the lowest point in their storied half century histories. With a series of security and management scandals tattering their can-do reputation, including the bungled case of Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee -- there were calls for drastic reductions in the labs' budgets and a major shrinking of staff and facilities.

"I actually had a fear for the future viability of the lab," said Michael Anastasio, a nuclear weapons designer who was recently named Livermore's director. "It just feels very different now. It's a positive tone as opposed to a going out of business tone."

### **Budgets Climb**

With barely a whisper of dissent, budgets for weapons work have soared to roughly \$6 billion in the current fiscal year from their low of about \$3.2 billion in fiscal 1995. With numerous construction projects under way, new hiring and expanded programs, that number is expected go even higher in coming years.

(In addition to Los Alamos and Livermore, the third government weapons lab is the Sandia National Laboratory, based in New Mexico, which focuses on weapons related engineering, and is operated by Lockheed Martin Corp.) And the budgets appear likely to continue their rapid growth if, as proposed, the Department of Homeland Security begins to fund some lab programs directly. UC, which was in danger of losing its management contract after the disasters of the Wen Ho Lee nuclear secrets case, the mysterious discovery of hard drives packed with nuclear secrets behind a copying machine, and massive cost overruns on a laser project, has had its entire contract renewed for five years and is receiving its largest financial bonuses ever.

"They took their blows, but at the end of the 10 rounds they came out victorious," said Harold Agnew, a former director of Los Alamos, who is now an influential government weapons adviser favoring nuclear testing. "They gritted their teeth and they got through it."

Lab officials point with pride to some of their recent work, including the development of an extensive data base on strains of anthrax which helped identify the exact form used in the deadly attacks last year. During the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, the labs provided special sensors to detect any biological attacks.

And, though the labs will not confirm this directly, their research is believed to have played an important role in producing the evidence, confirmed by Pyongyang two weeks ago, that North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons in defiance of a previous accord.

"A lot of our people felt all our research and development is not just nice to have but critical to our country now," said Browne, the current director at Los Alamos.

More controversial are the earth penetrating "bunker-busting" bombs that are intended to burrow 100 feet into the ground before detonating.

Lab scientists say they are simply old warheads encased in new missiles. Critics, however, argue that the modifications required to make them work under such extreme conditions effectively make them new kinds of weapons, and well beyond the labs' mandate -- called "stockpile stewardship" -- which is to maintain existing weapons, not develop new ones.

Los Alamos is also designing and manufacturing a critical weapons component known as a “pit,” a melon-size plutonium core that creates the primary explosion in a hydrogen bomb. Those pits will eventually be installed as replacements in aging weapons already in the stockpile, extending their lives and preventing them from being withdrawn from active deployment. This is referred to by officials as “remanufacturing,” though some critics have argued that it, too, goes beyond the mandate of the labs, since the “pits” will be updated and are not just replicas. One congressional staff member said the effort is like “replacing carburetors in old Corvettes with fuel injection.”

### **Nuclear Testing**

Old or new, such research and development raises the likelihood of renewed nuclear testing, 10 years after President Bush’s father signed a law stopping the practice. At the behest of the administration, Congress has agreed to spend millions of dollars to accelerate the preparedness of the Nevada Test Site. The spending will reduce the time it takes to put together a nuclear test from the current time period, three years, to perhaps six months. The White House has yet to ask Congress for approval of a test, but many regard the higher level of preparedness as a major step in that direction.

The issue is fraught with international implications. The United States never ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, considered a cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regimen, but America’s adherence to the prohibition, signed into law by President Bill Clinton, acts as a brake on other countries, particularly Russia. While not publicly arguing for new weapons testing, lab officials stress that the more the military demands, the greater the need to test.

“My view right now is there is no need to go back to testing,” Anastasio said. “But if the country demands more of us, the need for testing goes up.”

Agnew, the government adviser, said that introducing even a reworked weapon without testing is unthinkable. “Certainly, you have to test whether it’s going to survive after it goes into the ground,” he said. “No amount of computer testing can do the job.”

Don McCoy, a senior weapons scientist at Los Alamos, said that if the new plutonium “pits” are deployed, even if it is in old warheads, “it would be the first weapon put into the stockpile without a test,” which he said carries a great risk.

### **Entrepreneurs**

At the same time, the labs have received millions of dollars to develop ways of preventing other nations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction and detect and plan responses to an attack with biological weapons. Many of those programs have been in place for years, but now they are being expanded, which some critics have described as opportunistic.

“They have a lot of good scientists, but they’re also great entrepreneurs,” said Bob Civiak, who was a specialist on the lab budgets for a decade at the Office of Management and Budget. “When they sensed the mood was changing, that’s when the entrepreneurship side of the labs took over, and they did pretty good.”

Sidney Drell, a professor emeritus of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and a highly regarded nuclear weapons adviser to the government, said the security fears since Sept. 11 had been seized on by the labs in many ways typical of how they operate.

“There’s no doubt it gives them more ways to touch the till,” as well as expanding security research, Drell said. “The two go hand in hand.”

There is nothing hidden about all this growth. On a recent morning, George Miller, a senior Livermore lab official and former weapons designer, led a visitor around the lab’s \$4 billion laser project, whose enormous cost overruns two years before had nearly crippled the lab. Now, busy workers have nearly completed the facility, known as the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and Miller spoke not of past management snafus but of how the most powerful laser in the world will advance weapons research by creating bursts of heat similar to those when a nuclear bomb explodes.

The primary function of the facility is to simulate how a nuclear blast affects the materials inside a bomb, thus determining whether aging weapons in the nuclear stockpile still function as originally designed. The size of a football field, NIF is already the most powerful laser in the world, although just four of its 192 laser beams are operational at this point.

The new environment is an illustration of how the whole definition of national security has changed, to the great benefit of the UC labs. With nuclear weapons seen as one kind of deterrent in a world where states along the “axis of evil” possess weapons of mass destruction, weapons research will likely remain the single largest budget item for the labs.

### **Rationale**

But with the nation aware that it is vulnerable to terrorist attacks involving a variety of destructive weapons, national security can mean everything from developing stockpiles of vaccines to preventing attacks on the power grid, natural gas pipelines or even crops and livestock -- all of which the labs are involved with.

As a further endorsement of the labs' role, the Bush administration last month issued its first "National Security Strategy," a philosophical rationale for pre-emptive military attacks which dismissed the old anti-ballistic missile and nuclear test ban treaties as failures.

In lieu of nuclear nonproliferation, the document called for "counterproliferation" by, for example, developing powerful new weapons to eliminate stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of enemies.

That's another area of research and development being worked on by UC labs.

"The fundamental restraints are diminishing on this work," said Gary Resnick, the new head of bioterrorism research at Los Alamos, who was in the wing of the Pentagon hit by the terrorist attack one day earlier.

"This is not about today's bandwagon," he added. "It's a long-term challenge about the interaction between humans and society."

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/10/22/MN29299.DTL>

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Albuquerque Journal

October 20, 2002

Pg. 1

## **LANL Adds New Element To Nukes**

By Adam Rankin, Journal Northern Bureau

Los Alamos National Laboratory has announced it was the first lab in the Western Hemisphere, and possibly the world, to use a radioactive material other than plutonium or uranium to achieve a nuclear chain reaction, which can lead to a nuclear explosion if it is not controlled.

"It is common knowledge that plutonium and uranium can be used in a nuclear weapon. It is not common knowledge, however, that neptunium can also be used to make a nuclear weapon," said Kevin Roark, a lab spokesman.

The experiment, 12 years in the making, was completed in late September and gives nuclear scientists for the first time a clear indication of how much neptunium is needed to create a critical mass, or a nuclear chain reaction. Scientists now know it takes about 30 percent less neptunium than previously thought, or about 60 kilograms, to generate a nuclear chain reaction.

The criticality experiment was done at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Technical Area 18, the only site in the country capable of doing nuclear chain reaction experiments. The work supports the Department of Energy's Criticality Safety Program and the National Nuclear Security Administration's Non-proliferation and Emergency Response programs.

Lab scientists used neptunium-237, the most stable of 20 isotopes, or variations, of neptunium with a half-life of about 2 million years.

The whole experiment took only about four days, but the technical preparation, dealing with security issues and gaining clearance from the Department of Energy to do the work took about 12 years.

Scientists formed about 6 kilograms of neptunium into a sphere, which did not have enough mass in itself to sustain a chain reaction.

To help drive the reaction, scientists placed the neptunium sphere in a bed of several bowl-shaped shells of highly enriched uranium, which they slowly raised with a mechanized device toward another group of highly enriched uranium shells at a fixed position above.

The uranium helped drive the neptunium to a critical mass, and the scientists could carefully control the reaction's rate by raising or lowering the neptunium and uranium assembly away from the fixed uranium shells to prevent the reaction from going "supercritical." That is when nuclear chain reactions become explosive.

Roark explained that since the reactivity of enriched uranium is well established, the critical mass of neptunium can be calculated from measurements taken during the experiment.

He said the team of scientists plans to do more experiments with neptunium, using different configurations and materials, to establish the full range of masses capable of generating nuclear chain reactions.

The critical mass can vary depending on how many neutrons the subatomic particle that splits atoms and releases energy in a chain reaction get reflected back into the reaction to split more atoms and release more energy.

Rene Sanchez, one of the scientists involved in the experiment, said the purpose of the work was primarily to determine safety limits for technicians working with neptunium, a byproduct of nuclear power generation.

“We wanted to know how many kilograms can be put into a container before it goes critical,” he said.

But the information is also essential for nuclear non-proliferation, because it defines more clearly how much neptunium might be required to make a nuclear weapon.

“That wasn't the intention of this experiment, but a byproduct, that it could have the potential to be used in a nuclear weapon,” Sanchez said.

Roark said the lab was involved in getting the Switzerland-based International Atomic Energy Agency active in a global monitoring program of neptunium that began in 1999.

But no monitoring was in place before then.

“Who knows what has happened (with neptunium) during all those years,” Sanchez said.

To get an idea of how much neptunium is out there, Sanchez said the 100 nuclear power plants across the country can produce about 12,000 kilograms of neptunium in a decade.

But in the United States, neptunium is not easy to obtain, because the country does not reprocess its spent nuclear fuel. Reprocessing is necessary to separate neptunium from other spent radioactive fuels, something many European and Asian countries do.

“There is a lot of neptunium out there in the world,” said Steve Clement, a member of the experimental team.

In addition to providing information on the safe handling of the element, he said, “We want to be able to account for that material and track that material to be sure that it does not fall into the wrong hands.”

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USA Today

10/22/2002 - Updated 06:30 PM ET

## **Pediatricians study nuclear terror impact**

By Marilyn Elias, USA Today

“Dirty bombs,” sabotage of nuclear power plants and nuclear war would appear to be way off the agenda of U.S. children's doctors.

But not anymore. Doctors are turning their attention to nuclear terrorism and its possible impact on children.

A top military scientist Tuesday briefed pediatricians on the potential threat. “There's no intelligence that says any of these scenarios will occur,” says U.S. Army Col. Robert Eng, director of the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute in Bethesda, Md. He spoke at the American Academy of Pediatrics meeting in Boston.

But Eng was invited “because we want our members to be prepared for all medical risks that could affect children,” says Yale Medical School pediatrician David Schonfeld.

Some of the threats aren't nearly as catastrophic as parents fear, Eng said, pointing to dirty bombs as an example.

A dirty bomb combines radioactive material with conventional explosives, which enables it to spread radiation over several city blocks when detonated. Eng says the radiation in smaller “dirty” bombs would dilute rapidly, minimizing radiation exposure. But shrapnel from the explosion could cause injuries or deaths, he says.

Nuclear power plant sabotage or nuclear bombs could pose a far greater threat. “Damage would be most intense near the site itself, but fallout causes the majority of casualties in our modeling of what would happen,” Eng says.

Children are particularly vulnerable to radiation for two reasons:

\*Radiation damages infection-fighting white blood cells. Pre-adolescent kids have developing immune systems, so they're already at a disadvantage and liable to suffer serious infections from radiation exposure, Eng says. The U.S. government has been stockpiling antibiotics for potential emergencies, he adds.

\*Radiation causes cancer, but often not until years after exposure. Children live longer than adults, so they're more likely to face these cancers. Chernobyl showed that thyroid cancer is a particular danger for kids exposed to radiation, Eng says. Federal agencies are stockpiling potassium iodide pills, which help protect against thyroid cancer, and are offering the pills to states with nuclear power plants.

Some parents think driving away from any explosion would be the best way to protect their kids from fallout. But that's wrong, Eng emphasizes. “You have no idea how winds will shift, and cars offer little shield against radiation.” Instead, it's best to go indoors, close all windows, turn off the ventilation system and stay off upper levels, where fallout will gather, Eng says.

Right now this is all hypothetical. But the publicity about North Korea's nuclear weapons program and other news items may prompt children to ask questions. Parents should inform themselves and reassure kids they're safe, says

child psychiatrist Milton Anderson of the Ochsner Clinic Foundation in New Orleans. "This is grownup business, and they need to hear there's no immediate danger," he says. For more information, Eng advises visiting [www.hps.org](http://www.hps.org) and click on "ask the experts" or [www.afri.usuhs.mil](http://www.afri.usuhs.mil) and click on "pocket guide for responders to ionizing radiation terrorism." [http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-10-22-nukekids-usat\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-10-22-nukekids-usat_x.htm)

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**October 22, 2002**

## **Agencies collaborate with industry on nuclear supercomputer**

From [National Journal's Technology Daily](#)

The Energy Department and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will join forces with Sandia National Laboratories and the technology firm Cray to develop a supercomputer as part of the department's Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Dubbed "Red Storm," the \$90 million project will be part of the NNSA's plan to provide a computer system that can simulate nuclear weapons operations. It will complement the NNSA's advanced simulation and computing program, which joins the NNSA with U.S. computer manufacturers in order to produce more powerful computing systems. "The Department of Energy has a successful history of advancing high-performance technical computing through mutually beneficial partnerships with the U.S. computer industry," Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in a press release. "Red Storm will serve the nation's security mission and be instrumental in assuring continued confidence in the nuclear stockpile."

The project is scheduled to be fully operational by 2004.

<http://207.27.3.29/dailyfed/1002/102202td1.htm>

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## **Doctor Accused of Helping Taliban**

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

**Filed at 5:13 a.m. ET**

LAHORE, Pakistan (AP) -- The family of a prominent orthopedic surgeon being detained by Pakistani security forces said Tuesday he has been accused of helping prepare chemical and biological weapons for Taliban fighters and Islamic militants.

Dr. Amer Aziz was picked up in Lahore for questioning by security police Monday for allegedly treating Taliban and Islamic militants in various hospitals.

The family said the doctor told them he was also being accused of helping prepare chemical and biological weapons. On Tuesday, his brother, Kamran Aziz, strongly denied the newest allegations, saying "How can he have some knowledge of chemical or biological weapons if he is an orthopedist?"

His family said they don't know where he is being held and plan to plead with government officials for his release. Kamran Aziz said his brother had traveled to Kabul a few years ago, but it was as part of a delegation overseeing the building of new hospital.

On Tuesday, several staff and colleagues at the Surgi-Med hospital in Lahore, one of several where Aziz practices, said on condition of anonymity that Aziz was known for having a "soft spot" for Islamic fighters in Afghanistan. However, they expressed dismay over the new allegations regarding chemical and biological weapons.

Dr. Nasrullah Chaudhry, who shares a private practice with Aziz, said his partner has been under security surveillance in recent months.

"Some foreigners who seem to be FBI men had been visiting him in the last two to three months. They also questioned him several times here at the hospital," he said.

Despite strong opposition by hardline Islamic groups, Pakistan is a key supporter of the U.S.-led coalition in the war on terror.

The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad said it had no information about the case and would not comment on judicial matters.

<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Pakistan-Doctor.html>

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## **Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director Warns Of WMD Attacks**

Anthrax or potential terrorist attacks on U.S. chemical facilities are greater threats to the United States than the more-hyped threats of "dirty bombs" and smallpox, according to Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Calling weapons of mass destruction the "greatest threat to national security," Younger noted they become more threatening as enemies are less likely to engage in pitched battle against U.S. armed forces.

"We can expect to see [WMD] on the battlefield and we can expect to see that in the United States territory," he said. "We know that the terrorists know how to use some of these weapons. They haven't yet. Why is that?"

Speaking at last week's Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis conference in Washington, the DTRA director said that after talking with "scores" of people it is most likely that U.S. adversaries "just haven't gotten around" to using weapons of mass destruction.

While nuclear weapons pose a "grave threat" to the homefront, he said biological weapons and the potential to sabotage a chemical facility is "what I worry about most domestically."

Deadly materials sustain our everyday lives, Younger said. Chlorine is used for water treatment, phosgene for plastics manufacturing, hydrochloric acid for microelectronics. All are transported by railroads through major urban centers.

"The release of those chemicals into the environment could cause grave damage," he said. "There could be hundreds of thousands of casualties by lunchtime today and there is very little we could do about it. Once those materials are released into the environment, they spread -- if not by wind, by simple fusion -- and unless you are a marathon runner, it's unlikely that you'll get away from them."

Treatment is possible, but labor-intensive and could come too late, he said.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, more than 120 chemical facilities in the United States could spread contaminants to a million or more nearby residents. Also, the Army surgeon general has identified the threat to chemical plants as second only to bioterrorism threats in the United States, and a 2002 Brookings Institute report ranked chemical facilities No. 3 in terms of fatalities that could occur from a terrorist attack. Finally, an Argonne National Laboratory, IL, study conducted last year noted that "the failure to identify and evaluate opportunities to reduce the risks from these types of relatively rare accidents could ultimately lead to thousands of fatalities, injuries, and evacuations."

Biological weapons also "can cause great havoc" with anthrax posing a greater threat than small pox because of the latter existing in limited supply, Younger said.

"One can argue whether it extends beyond two officially sanctioned storage sites in the United States [Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta] and in Russia" at the Vector laboratory in Siberia, he said. "Nevertheless, it is not as easy to make or to disseminate" as anthrax.

The anthrax used in last fall's attacks on the Senate and throughout the country "was made as well as anthrax can be made on the planet today," Younger said. "Indeed, there are industrial states that have told me that they don't believe they could make anthrax as pure as the anthrax that was sent to the United States Senate."

No one has been apprehended in the anthrax case even though "some of the best scientific minds in this country have been applied to that problem," Younger said.

Nuclear weapons pose a separate challenge, he said. While security at Russian nuclear weapons sites must be improved, it is unlikely that someone could "casually walk into a nuclear storage site and make off with a weapon," he said.

Even if a terrorist obtained a nuclear weapon, he or she probably would lack the technical know-how to use it, he said.

"It's not unlike ordering a block of steel in your garage" and trying to manufacture one with hand tools, according to Younger.

So-called dirty bombs, ones laced with radioactive materials, also present difficulties for terrorists. While such weapons are "economic weapons" that can cause property values to plummet, damage would be limited to the



immediate vicinity of the blast. Furthermore, poorly packaged bombs containing the necessary amount of radioactive material would kill those transporting them, Younger said.

The DTRA director called for the government to examine terrorists' motives in launching a WMD attack.

"It's very clear that they are operating under a very different set of cultural norms than the ones we are used to," he said. "We need to understand those norms. We need to understand how to operate in their spaces. Most of all, we need to convince them to stop doing whatever it is they're doing. Otherwise, this will be a very long war."

-- *Jeremy Feiler*

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Global Security Newswire (nti.org)

October 23, 2002

## Georgia Wraps Up Search For Radiological Sources

By Bryan Bender, Global Security Newswire

KAHATIJ, Georgia — As it wraps up five months of scouring the countryside for hundreds of radiological power units from the Soviet era, Georgia is seeking new international assistance to establish a single storage facility for so-called "orphaned sources" to ensure the materials are properly secured and remain out of reach of potential terrorists (see GSN, June 10).

Georgian officials, in completing an intensive search operation this month sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, are confident they have identified most of the radioactive strontium, cesium, cobalt and other radiological sources located in Georgian territory under the government's control.

One continuing concern, however, is the worrisome number of radiological sources located at a primate research facility in the northern Abkhazia region of the country, which is seeking independence and has been largely inaccessible to Georgian and international authorities during the past decade.

Still, President Eduard Shevardnadze's government says Georgia's highly publicized experience in locating and securing orphaned radiological materials should be seen as a test case for other former Soviet republics and nations across the globe as they come to grips with growing threats of catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of radiological materials (see GSN, June 25).

### Search Mission Ending

At a former Soviet military base here near the border with Azerbaijan, Georgian authorities — along with experts from IAEA, the United States, France, Turkey and India — will by the end of this month complete a nationwide search that began in June to find orphaned radiological sources left behind by Soviet armed forces.

With the help of two mobile, multichannel radiation analyzers provided by Germany and India, as well as handheld radiation detectors operated by IAEA-trained Georgians, the multinational team today made a final sweep of this abandoned base, named Vaziani, where the Soviet Union once deployed nuclear weapons.

While the team only gathered low-level radiation readings today, to date more than 225 sources containing radiological materials have been found in Georgia as part of three search missions. Among the sources found were six highly radioactive thermal nuclide generators that used strontium to provide Soviet forces with power in remote areas and to operate communications devices, said Andrei Chupov, program management officer at the IAEA who oversees technical cooperation in Europe, Latin America and West Asia.

Cesium sources, widely used in calibration devices, have also been found, in addition to cesium chloride that was used in agricultural experiments, he said. Both materials were identified during earlier searches at this sprawling base, which remains littered with abandoned radiation suits, rocket fins and what appear to be aerial bombs rotting in a watery ditch.

According to Zuran Tavartkiladze, Georgia's first deputy minister of environment, only 15 percent of the country has been searched, but he noted that an estimated 80 percent of the most populated areas are now considered free of radiological threats, which in several recent cases resulted in harmful exposures in rural communities. An estimated 90 percent of the area inside the four Soviet military bases that were located in Georgia has also been searched, officials said.

In addition to public safety, however, the recovery of the materials has been deemed critically important by the IAEA to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring radiological materials that could be used to construct a radiation dispersal device. The United States has reported suspected terrorist plans to disperse radiological materials through a conventional explosion (see GSN, Sept. 3).

"This is a transit country and we do not want problems for other countries," Tavartkiladze said in an interview in his Tbilisi office yesterday. Indeed, in 1999 and 2000 Georgian officials seized 3 kilograms of low-enriched uranium that had been passing through Georgia en route to Turkey, officials said. The material is now stored at the Center of Applied Research for the Atomic Energy Commission outside of Tbilisi, where Georgia had its only nuclear reactor before it was decommissioned in 1999. The 40 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel for that reactor has been removed for safe storage to the United Kingdom.

### **Single Storage Facility for Radiological Sources Needed**

The hundreds of radiological sources that have been recovered in Georgia with IAEA technical assistance and \$125,000 of U.S. seed money — now kept in various storage facilities whose locations cannot be reported due to security concerns — must be kept secure for years to come, Tavartkiladze said.

As a result, Georgia is seeking to build a central storage facility in the western part of the country as soon as possible, the minister said. The proposal is awaiting presidential approval, which is expected soon, officials said. Georgia, however, lacks the resources to fund the project and to ensure adequate security at such a facility. "We don't have the money to build this facility," Tavartkiladze said. "We hope [the IAEA and the international community] will find some money for it."

He added that it is the government's desire that the recovered strontium, considered the most dangerous of the orphaned sources, be transferred to Russia for safe keeping, something the government is currently trying to negotiate with Moscow.

### **Other Radiological Sources Remain Out of Reach**

Despite the apparent success in locating the orphaned sources in Georgia, authorities acknowledge that there remain other radiological sources in areas of the country that are not under central control. Moreover, the search missions may have missed other materials that could still pose an environmental hazard, or be attractive targets to terrorists seeking to build a so-called dirty bomb.

The main concern involves orphaned sources located in the breakaway region of Abkhazia, where the primate research facility, in Sukhumi, houses cesium sources and is controlled by separatists.

Georgian, U.S. and IAEA officials visited the facility in April and continue to try to reach a breakthrough with rebels so the materials can be recovered and properly stored or disposed of.

The facility's security is considered wholly inadequate. "It is a very dangerous situation with sources in the research institute," Tavartkiladze said. "Storage conditions are not in accordance with international standards."

There may be even more worrisome materials in Abkhazia, according to other officials, possibly including uranium located at the Institute of Physics, also in Sukhumi. For example, in 1994 Russian authorities seized a variety of materials and isotopes, including 2 kilograms of uranium, plutonium and other transuranium sources, according to Russian press reports. The material was suspected of coming from the institute.

Lerry Meshki, head of the Environment Ministry's nuclear and radiation service, telephoned the head of the Abkhazia physics facility today at the request of Global Security Newswire. He reported that the director denied that any materials were taken from the institute. "I don't really know the whole story," Meshki acknowledged.

Tavartkiladze, the environment minister, added, "We have more problems in Abkhazia because we don't control it." Moreover, Georgian officials admit that their searches for orphaned sources could very well have missed some of the radioactive materials. Vast tracts of the country have not been searched, particularly in the mountains and in scarcely populated areas because it is too costly.

At the same time, Russia — considered to retain ownership of the materials — has been unwilling or unable to provide Georgia and international authorities with data on how many sources may have been left behind or where. "The Russians say they do not have documents," Tavartkiladze said. "They said they now have no information, but they said they would give us anything they find." With such a lack of data, he said, "We do not know where to search."

Other obstacles could be hampering the search mission. Some of the Georgian personnel operating handheld detection devices today said they did not cover all of their assigned territory because small arms fire heard in the vicinity — said to be U.S. special forces training Georgian military units on the other side of a mountain — made them fearful of proceeding further.

### **The Georgia Model?**

Nevertheless, Georgian officials believe their experience over the past months could provide many useful lessons for other former Soviet republics as well as nations across the globe seeking to clean up orphaned sources or otherwise secure dangerous radiological materials.

Tavartkiladze, who just returned from two weeks of training at Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, said his U.S. counterparts believe "we have good cooperation and are a good example for others."

He said that many orphaned sources likely exist in other former Soviet states. "We are not unique," he said. "We have been more open. That is why we have found more sources."

IAEA assistance "has been very effective," added Shukuri Abramidze, director of the Center of Applied Research for the Atomic Energy Commission, where the decommissioned research reactor is located. "We have realized some projects, such as searching for radiological sources," said Abramidze, who also worked as the chief Soviet nuclear physicist in Iraq from 1979 to 1980. "They have helped us to do everything."

While Georgia is considered a prime example of the benefit of international cooperation in securing nuclear and radiological materials and knowledge, officials also assert that there is much more work to do here before its nuclear and radiological house is in order. "This is only 10 percent of our activity in Georgia, said the IAEA's Chupov.

[http://www.nti.org/d\\_newswire/issues/2002/10/23/11s.html](http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/10/23/11s.html)

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## Smallpox I: Officials Watch, Experts Debate What Israeli Vaccinations Can Teach

By David McGlinchey

*Global Security Newswire*

As the United States grapples over how, and indeed if, to administer the smallpox vaccine, U.S. officials are watching with interest as Israel immunizes its first responders, officials said last week (see [GSN](#), Sept. 18). Experts say the Israeli experience will offer some valuable lessons for the United States, but opinion is divided as to how much the United States can learn (see [GSN](#), Oct. 16).

Since Israeli first responders began receiving the vaccine in September, there have been no reported complications from the vaccine, according to an Israeli Defense Ministry spokeswoman. As many as 10,000 have been inoculated so far, Israeli Health Ministry director-general **Boaz Lev** said Tuesday.

The immunized first responders come from all corners of Israel, including "health organizations, hospital emergency rooms, health clinics, and emergency forces, the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], the police force," the spokeswoman said. "There were two cases [of side effects], but when we checked them, one was the flu, one was allergic to a cat."

**Jerome Hauer**, director of the U.S. Office of Public Health Preparedness, recently said the United States is keeping an eye on the Israeli vaccinations. The U.S. Health and Human Services Department is in contact with the Israeli government, according to department spokesman Bill Pierce.

### ***Data Can Help U.S. Plan***

Some experts are saying that the Israeli results could provide the best-known data on the smallpox vaccine, which might give U.S. officials invaluable guidance to develop an immunization plan. The United States faces questions on everything from medical side effects, to the scope of potential inoculations, to compensation for those sickened or killed by the vaccine (see related [GSN](#) story, today).

"This is real life, better than any clinical study," said **Charles Pena**, a defense policy analyst for the Cato Institute. "We need to look at their experience," said **Mohammad Akhter**, executive director of the American Public Health Association. "To see what kind of complications they have, what kind of additional medical assistance they need, what kind of side effects, how they do it."

The data gathered from Israeli inoculations could provide statistical support for vaccinations in the United States. Current information on the vaccine is drawn from data sources that are too small, according to Pena.

"If the Israelis don't encounter huge problems with side effects and deaths, we ought to use that as a sample database," he said. "What a lot of people don't understand is that the data for [smallpox vaccinations] is based on very small sample sizes."

Pena said that studying results from Israel does not necessarily support a wide availability of the vaccine, a position he supports (see [GSN](#), June 26).

"If it turns out that lots of people die and the side effects are much worse than expected," Pena said he would withdraw his support for wide vaccinations, but "assuming people aren't dropping like flies after they are vaccinated, you make the vaccine available."

Not all experts agreed, however, that the number of Israeli inoculations will be large enough to draw any statistically meaningful conclusions. U.S. health officials already understand that side effects do not occur often, according to Paul Offit, chief of the Philadelphia Children's hospital's infectious diseases section and a member of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices which advises the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The medical community is still concerned about administering a vaccine that they know will cause fatalities, even if it is

only a few per million. It is doubtful whether a sample size under 200,000 people would add much data of scientific value, he said in an interview yesterday.

"I think that there is enough data on this vaccine to give us a pretty good idea of the side effect rate it is going to have. It's rare," said Offit.

A lesson that can be learned, he said, was the effect of the vaccine on those who had not received it years ago; the United States stopped vaccinations in 1972. If a person has already been vaccinated it is "much less likely" that they will suffer side effects, "so, I think here we'll learn something," Offit said.

The inoculation of healthy, young, emergency first responders, however, might limit the information the United States can gain, according to Akhter.

It is important to get significant data for inoculations "with women, with different age groups," he said.

The lack of sickness to this point, no matter the sample group, was nevertheless a good sign, according to Akhter.

"It is very encouraging," Akhter said. "It should give our people a little more courage to go forward."

How to go forward, however, is the subject of a debate that has occupied public health experts for months.

U.S. health officials, the Centers for Disease Control and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices have been debating who will receive the vaccine in the United States. Last week the committee recommended that 500,000 first responders receive pre-emptive inoculation (see [GSN](#), Oct. 17).

#### ***What Does Israel Know?***

Lev told a committee of the Knesset — the Israeli parliament — that a campaign to vaccinate the entire population should begin soon, according to a report yesterday in the [Jerusalem Post](#).

The debate and lack of action in the United States is frustrating, Pena said.

"If the Israelis are potentially worried about smallpox being used as a bioweapon, we ought to be — we seem less concerned," Pena said. "We're debating the problem, the Israelis are doing something about it."

"Israeli intelligence is generally very good," Akhter said. "We should heed the warning and proceed, we simply cannot sit and wait."

Some medical professionals — including Offit — have noted that the risks of vaccinations are significant, especially without knowing all the repercussions or even the threat of an attack. Others say that waiting only increases the time a potential biological terrorist has to plan an attack. Israeli officials, meanwhile, are willing to help the U.S. learn more about the vaccine in order to build a plan.

Without discussing specifics, an Israeli official said this week that the two countries have an excellent record working "issues of mutual concern."

"Israel is open to the Americans to learn from the experience," said the official. "It would be conceivable to learn from a country that has had that experience."

[http://www.nti.org/d\\_newswire/issues/newswires/2002\\_10\\_24.html#8](http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_10_24.html#8)

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## **U.S. Seeks 'Common Strategy' on North Korea at APEC**

Wed Oct 23, 7:22 PM ET

*By Steve Holland*

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Bush ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) will seek a common strategy for dealing with North Korea ([news](#) - [web sites](#))'s nuclear weapons program in talks with Asian leaders this weekend without pushing immediately for ways to punish Pyongyang, a top Bush aide said on Wednesday.

"We don't want to get ahead of ourselves in taking measures until we have decided how we are going to structure diplomacy about this," national security adviser Condoleezza Rice ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) told reporters.

The U.S. push for a diplomatic solution for the North Korean challenge differs sharply from Washington's threats of military force against Iraq.

Rice defended the separate approaches, saying the chances for a diplomatic outcome are better on the Korean Peninsula because of North Korea's desire for help in alleviating deep economic problems, pressure from neighbors and the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea ([news](#) - [web sites](#)).

"We've always said we're not going to have a cookie-cutter approach to our foreign policy problems, and North Korea provides an opportunity we believe for potentially a diplomatic solution," she said.

Bush is to meet Chinese President Jiang Zemin ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) on Friday at his central Texas ranch then travel to Los Cabos, Mexico, on Saturday for a summit of the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) group.

North Korea's admission last week that it has a nuclear weapons program in violation of a 1994 agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons has presented a challenge to the APEC summit, which traditionally is supposed to focus on trade and economic issues but invariably gets derailed by political crises.

Bush will have a joint session with Japanese Prime Minister Junihiko Koizumi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung ([news](#) - [web sites](#)), a meeting primarily to focus on North Korea.

The United States, Japan and South Korea were partners to the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea established to control its nuclear program, which U.S. officials believe has spawned one or two nuclear bombs.

There has been no move by the parties involved to cut off fuel oil shipments to North Korea established as part of the 1994 agreement. Nor will Bush discuss specific sanctions.

"First things first. I think we need to consult. We need to see what common strategies we can employ to try and get the North Koreans to live up to their international obligations, to recognize that they cannot on the one hand say that they want to enter... the international community, its economic benefits, its trade benefits, and on the other hand brandish an illegal nuclear weapons program," Rice said.

Bush's meeting with Jiang, who is on a farewell visit to the United States, will be his third. Bush wants a "candid and constructive" discussion on a variety of topics, including North Korea, Iraq, cooperation in the war on terrorism, trade, human rights and religious freedom, said Rice.

Jiang, 76, plans to step down as head of China's Communist Party next month and end his term as president in March. There has been speculation -- never denied -- that Jiang could refuse to step down from one or more of his posts.

"I can't second guess or I don't really have a sense of what will happen in the Chinese succession, but we obviously stand ready to work with Chinese leaders as they emerge," Rice said.

Other U.S. officials said there is a consensus among U.S. policymakers that a leadership transition in China is coming up.

In Mexico, Bush will discuss the aftermath of the deadly Bali bombing with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, have a meeting with Mexican President Vicente Fox ([news](#) - [web sites](#)), and a working lunch with Russian President Vladimir Putin ([news](#) - [web sites](#)).

[http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=584&ncid=584&e=8&u=/nm/20021023/pl\\_nm/apec\\_bush\\_dc](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=584&ncid=584&e=8&u=/nm/20021023/pl_nm/apec_bush_dc)

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## U.S.: \$10B If Russia Stops Iran Aid

Wed Oct 23, 11:38 PM ET

By BARRY SCHWEID, AP Diplomatic Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration is holding out the incentive of a \$10 billion project for Russia if it would stop helping Iran develop potent missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

The potentially lucrative deal involves storage of radioactive material from around the world.

"If the Russians end their sensitive cooperation with Iran, we have indicated we would be prepared to favorably consider such transfer arrangements potentially worth over \$10 billion to Moscow," the State Department said.

A tradeoff could resolve one of the most difficult issues in an overall good relationship between President Bush ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) and Russian President Vladimir Putin ([news](#) - [web sites](#)).

They will meet this weekend in Mexico at a conference of leaders of Asian and Pacific nations.

Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton was sent to Moscow in advance of the meeting to discuss U.S. concerns about Russia's assistance to Iran.

Bolton has talked to top Russian officials about the problem several times in the past without apparent results.

Specifically, the administration wants Russia to halt construction of a light-water nuclear reactor at the Iranian coastal city of Bushehr.

Russia has denied consistently it is helping Iran develop nuclear weapons or its missiles program.

"The U.S. position is clear," the State Department said. "A weapons of mass destruction-armed Iran would be a major threat to Russia as well as to the United States and our friends and allies in the region."

Hinting that Bush will take the issue up with Putin, the statement said, "We will continue to intensively work this issue closely at senior levels with Russia."

An end to aiding Iran would benefit the U.S.-Russian relationship and help Russia "economically, politically and strategically far more than any short-term gain from sensitive transfers to Iran," the statement said.

The United States controls whether spent fuel from reactors in other countries can be transferred to Russia for storage because it originally provided the fresh fuel to the countries.

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, who met with Bolton in Moscow, said afterward on Ekho Moskv radio that "Russia is not providing any weapons technologies and is not even negotiating such projects with Iran."

Also on Wednesday, Bush signed into law the Russian Democracy Act, which authorizes — but does not actually provide — U.S. foreign aid to Russia for "the promotion of democracy, rule of law, international exchanges, human rights, economic reforms, administration of justice and the development of a free and independent media in Russia." Rep. Tom Lantos, D-Calif., who sponsored the legislation, said it would help Russia as it transitions to a democratic society and adopts a free market economy.

[http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=536&ncid=536&e=7&u=/ap/20021024/ap\\_on\\_go\\_pr\\_wh/us\\_russia](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=536&ncid=536&e=7&u=/ap/20021024/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_russia)

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