


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



Air University

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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Chicago Tribune

October 10, 2002

Hussein Dots Iraq Landscape With Mosques

U.S. suspects sites hiding bioweapons

By E.A. Torriero, Tribune staff reporter

BAGHDAD -- Rising from the craters and dust of the bombed-out downtown airport is the enormous shell of what someday is to become one of the grandest mosques in Arabia, named after none other than Saddam Hussein.

Less than a mile away, on land where chic Iraqis once bet on horse races, the towers and gilded dome of another huge Muslim place of worship head toward completion.

Across Iraq, and under the watchful surveillance of U.S. satellites, Hussein's government and wealthy Islamic supporters are building dozens of mosques at a pace unseen in the Arab world for centuries, clerics here say.

"No one but Saddam Hussein has had the will, the vision or the drive to do such a thing," said Abdul Bhafour al-Kaisi, an imam at one of Baghdad's oldest mosques. "He is the symbol of belief for all Muslims."

Western suspicions are that the edifices could be more than they seem.

Mosques have been mentioned in intelligence briefings as potential storehouses for chemical weapons. Some of their sprawling grounds could contain sites for the stuff of biological warfare, the Bush administration fears, although it has offered scant proof.

During the Persian Gulf war, Iraq placed anti-aircraft guns and missiles near mosques to deter U.S. and coalition pilots from targeting them. U.S. and British pilots patrolling the no-fly zones over Iraq say that tactic remains in force today.

As the Pentagon this week unveiled aerial photos indicating possible Iraqi movements of chemicals and weapons in the country, Iraqis--from the highest levels to ordinary folks--scoffed at the suggestion that mosques are anything but places to pray for peace.

"These are all lies. There are no weapons or chemicals in religious sites," said Thair Ibrahim Al-Shammari, imam at a glittering mosque opened in April in suburban Baghdad to mark Hussein's birthday. Its name: Mother of All Battles Mosque.

"I personally supervised the religious construction of this mosque and I can say that what is underneath us is just the air conditioning unit," he said, sitting on the floor of the blue-domed mosque before afternoon prayers. "Let's just say we and the Americans have a great disparity as to what we think is the truth."

The truth, as it often is in Iraq, is elusive. Foreigners are not permitted to look into the structures and caverns of mosques. Also off-limits are the dozens of elaborate presidential guesthouses the United States suspects of storing biological and chemical agents.

Although Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, claims his family descends from the Prophet Muhammad, Hussein had long been a nominal believer. His ruling Baath Party is mostly secular. And during anti-government rebellions in 1991, Hussein's forces bombed a mosque where rebel Shiite Muslims were taking shelter in the holy city of Karbala, according to opposition leaders.

By 1994, however, with Western sanctions making life desperate for his people, Hussein started a campaign to encourage Iraqis to embrace religion.

By uniting Iraqis under the banner of Islam, Hussein figured that millions of neighboring Arabs would be more likely to side with him in a "holy war" against Israel and the West. And by constructing mosques that tower over this sprawling city, Hussein intended to show the world what he viewed as Iraq's spiritual and physical prowess.

"He wanted to make a statement that Iraq can set its mind to do things bigger and better than anyone else," said a senior Iraqi official. "He succeeded."

Iraqis, who live in the cradle of religious civilization, came back to mosques in droves in recent years, drawn by anti-American and pro-Palestinian rhetoric from imams they refer to as sheiks. Now Iraqis say they find strength and wisdom in mosques for a defense against a possible U.S. invasion.

"Saddam Hussein has raised public awareness through Islam and it has made us more willing to fight for him in the name of Allah," said government worker Adnan Muthir, one of the 3,500 people who pray daily at the Mother of All Battles Mosque.

Mostly, though, the gleaming mosques seem to praise Hussein.

Limestone arches, some 20 stories tall, that can be seen from throughout Baghdad signal the start of the Grand Saddam mosque, which is to be finished in 2015 and bears more resemblance to the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas than to a holy shrine. It will house a library, religious school and several prayer halls in a complex the size of a small university.

Hussein reportedly is obsessed with every detail of this mosque's construction. Foreign reporters are prohibited from getting closer than driving by on a highway, but examples of Hussein's elaborate taste can be found a few miles to the east at the Mother of All Battles Mosque.

Four of the towers topped with loudspeakers beckoning worshipers to daily prayers were built 43 yards high at Hussein's insistence to mark the "43 days of U.S. aggression" during the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Another tower is 37 yards high to commemorate 1937, the year Hussein was born.

In a museum that is off-limits to visiting journalists, 605 pages of text of the Koran reportedly are written in blood donated by Hussein. When U.S. spy planes look down on the mosque they see a lagoon shaped in the form of the Arab world with the mosque at the center.

Mosque leaders chuckle at suggestions from Western journalists that the towers resemble scud missiles used by Iraq during the gulf war.

"Of course, the Americans will bomb these mosques like they did in 1991," said Al-Shammari, when asked if he suspects U.S. intentions. "We don't even have one bullet here. But will anything we say stop them?"

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-0210100273oct10.story>

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Washington Times

October 11, 2002

Pg. 10

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Russian nuke exercise

Russian strategic nuclear forces are preparing to conduct a long-range aviation exercise that is expected to include aerial probes of U.S. air defenses, defense officials said.

The exercise begins next week and involves long-range bomber deployments to bases throughout Russia, including the bomber base of Anadyr in northeastern Siberia near the Bering Sea and the Tiksi air base in north-central Siberia on the Laptev Sea.

Tu-95 Bear H bombers, which carry air-launched nuclear cruise missiles, will be deployed. Tu-160 Blackjack bombers also are expected to take part in the war games.

The Russian bombers have flown close to the United States in past exercises, prompting the U.S. Air Force to scramble F-16 interceptor jets. Two Tu-95s flew within 37 miles of Alaska in April as part of spring war games.

Pentagon officials sought to play down the Russian exercises as routine. Other defense officials, however, said the maneuvers show the Russian military still regards the United States as its main enemy.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021011-8675332.htm>

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Chicago Tribune

October 10, 2002

Army Seeks To Expand Chemical, Biological Drills

But critics fear possible effects around Utah site

By Judith Graham, Tribune national correspondent

DENVER -- For 60 years, the U.S. military has tested its ability to withstand chemical or biological attacks at a desolate site in the Utah desert. Protective gear for troops, heavy equipment such as tanks and aircraft, and detection systems designed to signal an attack have all been run through intense simulations, sometimes using active chemical and biological agents.

Now, with a possible war with Iraq looming on the horizon, the military plans to more than double its testing at the 798,000-acre Dugway Proving Ground, 80 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, and to vastly expand its counterterrorism training activities at the site.

The plans are disclosed in a draft environmental impact statement issued by Dugway, which has received little attention in Utah or nationally. The statement indicates that the Army facility wants to expand biological defense testing from an average of 11 events a year to 26, and boost chemical defense testing from 30 events a year to 70. Counterterrorism training would go from two events to 58 events a year.

Almost no test details are provided, making the few advocates following Dugway's plans uneasy about risks to public health and the environment if biological or chemical materials were accidentally released. The environmental statement notes systems are in place to make sure that does not happen.

"In principle, there's an appropriate role for this kind of testing. But essentially what they're saying is we want blanket permission to double our mission without telling anyone what we really plan to do," said Steve Erickson, director of the Citizens Education Project, a non-profit organization based in Salt Lake City. "With their track record, that's spooky."

Information released Wednesday by the Department of Defense shows that during the Cold War, Dugway was involved in testing dangerous biological and chemical agents on military personnel in exercises on land and at sea. This seems to suggest that past tests were not confined to the isolated Utah setting, and posed more of a potential threat to human health than previously acknowledged.

The 28 reports were released by the Pentagon after a two-year investigation prompted by veterans who claimed they had been exposed to harmful substances during their participation in the exercises. As many as 5,500 men and women in the military may have been involved.

In a news release, the Defense Department said safety precautions had been taken to protect service personnel at the time and its investigators had not been able to link the tests with "adverse health consequences." But it said the inquiry would continue.

The chemical and biological exercises were overseen by the Deseret Test Center in Utah from 1962 to 1973; those tests occurred in the coastal waters off Hawaii, California and Puerto Rico, as well as on land in Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Utah and Canada. The center, headquartered at Ft. Douglas, Utah, was combined with Dugway in 1968 and the alliance lasted until 1973, according to materials supplied this week by Dugway's public affairs office.

Some not fully informed

The Pentagon acknowledged that some soldiers may not have been fully informed about the tests, which included use of the military's deadliest nerve agent, VX.

Also, thousands of civilians in Hawaii and Alaska probably were unaware of their exposure to relatively mild bacteria meant to simulate germ weapons, a Defense Department health official said.

"How are we supposed to trust an outfit that did this kind of thing but never told anyone?" Erickson asked.

Dugway spokeswoman Paula Nicholson declined to comment, referring all questions to Defense Department officials.

A year ago, when the anthrax attacks struck Florida, New York and Washington, it also emerged that Dugway had been producing a weapons-grade form of the Ames anthrax strain--the same strain investigators found in letters implicated in five deaths.

The Utah complex had been making the lethal anthrax for a decade, and included the only military lab in the United States known to produce the finely milled, powdered form discovered in the letters.

If weapons-grade anthrax had been produced secretly at Dugway, Erickson wondered, what other active biological and chemical agents were there and how well were they supervised?

"There should be much greater oversight" of activities at the testing facility, he said.

The environmental statement indicates active agents will be used in defense exercises, along with much less dangerous substances that simulate chemical or biological agents.

Up to 250 workers who served at Dugway during the Cold War claim to have been exposed to harmful substances, and believe they contracted serious illnesses, such as cancer and multiple sclerosis, from their work.

"They don't want us to know anything about what they do out there, and they never have," said Beverly White, a former Utah state legislator who is leading an effort to get compensation for the workers.

"I'm concerned about the people who live here. I think we've just about had enough," she added.

In its draft statement, which has been circulating for comment in Utah, Dugway asserts the need for more tests and training "related to new enemy threats" and offers general examples of what these might entail.

"Testing would evaluate newly developed biological defense detection and protection equipment that is required to effectively prepare for potential terrorism incidents," reads one point under the biological defense testing section.

Mock city test planned

"Large-scale aircraft contamination control field testing" would "evaluate the way the military handles aircrew, passengers, and cargo in a chemically or biologically contaminated aircraft," another point notes.

Counterterrorism training scenarios could include constructing a mock city and simulating an attack for "urban chemical/biological incident training," according to the statement.

Since 1999, Dugway has been training weapons of mass destruction teams for the National Guard. Under expanded counterterrorism training, more emergency response teams would receive similar instruction.

One exercise would include firing a cruise missile into a building filled with containers of a chemical to see what would happen to the materials in such a scenario, the document said.

"Sometimes it's very difficult to delineate the differences between offensive and defensive purposes in biological and chemical weapons testing," said Erickson, the Salt Lake advocate.

Offensive testing is banned under biological and chemical weapons conventions signed by the United States.

If things go as planned, Dugway's environmental impact statement will become effective a little more than a year from now. Implementing the preferred option, which calls for expanded testing, will depend on Department of Defense funding, spokeswoman Nicholson noted.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0210100293oct10.story>

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National Journal
October 12, 2002

Worst Case: Iraqi War Goes Nuclear

By George C. Wilson

Israel's firing off a nuclear weapon in retaliation for Saddam Hussein's attacking it with a chemical or biological weapon looms as the No. 1 nightmare if the United States goes to war against Iraq, according to a wide spectrum of government and private arms specialists pondering the "what-if" scenarios.

The scenario would unfold this way: Saddam fires chemical and/or biological weapons at Israel. They inflict such heavy casualties that hard-line Israeli leader Ariel Sharon strikes back with a nuclear device as deadly as the one that incinerated Hiroshima during World War II. Arabs and Muslims, in angry response, attack Americans and their cities wherever and whenever they can, including launching suicide attacks similar to the ones being conducted by the Palestinians against Israel.

Four of these worst-case scenarios, including the Israeli one, have been discussed at high levels in the Bush administration, although behind closed doors. But the public is unlikely to hear much about them as President Bush strives to build support for attacking Iraq should United Nations inspectors fail to disarm Saddam's regime.

What follows are the views of nongovernment defense analysts on the possible—but not necessarily probable—worst-case consequences of the United States' invading Iraq. All four scenarios involve the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear bombs. Government officials, who declined to be identified, were also interviewed for this story. But their privately expressed concerns closely parallel those of the private defense analysts, who can speak more freely.

Any military operation involves risks. Before the first shot is fired, civilian policy leaders, generals, and admirals routinely explore worst-case scenarios. A widely stated criticism of U.S. leaders and the press is that before going to war in Vietnam, they failed to consider adequately the worst things that could go wrong. But at least a few people are thinking about them today.

1. Israel goes nuclear. Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, a defense think tank on the liberal side, says that two documents have made this scenario more plausible. In 1997, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 60, which authorizes the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate for an opponent's use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological ones. The classified version of President Bush's new nuclear-posture statement is said to permit the use of nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike against a likely attacker who possesses weapons of mass destruction. That reported change, coupled with the development of new "bunker-busting" nuclear bombs, which can hit underground caches of weapons, have made it easier for Israel to justify going nuclear against Iraq, according to Blair, who has analyzed nuclear issues intensively over the years and written several books on the subject.

President Bush and his team have "created a doctrine that says it is legitimate to respond to weapons of mass destruction by using nuclear weapons and using them pre-emptively, not just using them second," Blair said. "Israel could cite our own doctrine, line and verse, as a legitimate justification for unleashing its nuclear arsenal in response to even a threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq—to unleash it pre-emptively. In a way, we've even given Saddam that justification, too. Even Saddam could cite potential threats of the use of weapons of mass destruction against him."

Saddam, Blair added, could cite the new American-developed B-61 Mod 11 nuclear bunker-buster as "part of the arsenal of forces he is arrayed against." If Iraq should kill "tens of thousands" of Israelis with a weapon of mass destruction, Blair said, "all bets are off" on whether Sharon would unleash his nuclear weapons. "Israel and Sharon are increasingly loose cannons in the Middle Eastern conflict."

Joseph Cirincione, director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that the Arab world "would go nuts" if Israel dropped a nuke on Iraq. Such an attack would "expose the complete hypocrisy of the U.S. position: The Arabs can't have nuclear weapons, but the Israelis can." An Israeli nuclear attack could kill "tens of thousands of people," he added, and breed "a whole new generation of terrorists" who would be

"intent on striking back at Israel and the United States." The Carnegie Endowment has urged Bush to use U.N. inspectors backed by a multinational military force instead of attacking Iraq unilaterally.

Jack Spencer, defense policy analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation, agreed that a retaliatory response by Israel is the most likely way a war in Iraq could go nuclear, although he doubted this would happen. And he agreed that President Bush has changed American policy on the use of nuclear weapons, but he hailed the shift as a good thing.

"I do not think that the Israelis will respond to a chemical or biological attack with a nuclear weapon," Spencer said. "I don't know that they won't. If they got attacked—I'm not talking about a chemical attack where a thousand people die, but a devastating, unbelievable attack—then they might." An Iraqi attack that would trigger a nuclear response would have to be "so horrendous that people probably would not be able to question Israel's requirement and right to do so.

"While it's not a popular view in the mainstream media today and among many in the left," Spencer continued, "the fact of the matter is that Israel shows unbelievable restraint given what they face every day with this terrorism. I think any country in the world would react far stronger than Israel has."

Spencer applauded the development of new nuclear weapons such as the B-61 bunker-buster, because of the changed threat. "If we need new nuclear weapons, I don't have a problem with it because that's the way you decrease the likelihood that you have to use nuclear weapons or some other form of massive force."

Israel and nuclear weapons were also worrisome wild cards during America's first war with Iraq, in 1990-91.

Retired Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the U.S. field commander, wrote afterward that his biggest fear during the Gulf War was that Israel would respond to Saddam's firing of Scud missiles into Israeli cities by attacking Iraq.

Israel's entry into that war, Schwarzkopf and civilian leaders believed, would have broken up the coalition of nations put together so painstakingly by the first President Bush. Many of today's U.S. leaders share the same worry.

The possibility of using U.S. nukes to burn up Iraq's biological weapons was gingerly discussed by Schwarzkopf's team and by Gen. Colin L. Powell, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now secretary of State, according to an account in journalist Rick Atkinson's book, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*. Atkinson writes, "Some suggested that detonating a small nuclear warhead might be a legitimate employment of one weapon of mass destruction to negate another. Temperatures reaching at least 20,000 degrees Fahrenheit in three seconds were believed necessary to ensure that no spores survived an attack. 'We both know there's one sure way to get the temperature hot enough,' [Air Force Brig. Gen. Buster C.] Glosson remarked to Powell, alluding to thermonuclear explosions. 'Yeah,' the chairman replied, 'but we don't talk about that.' "

2. Saddam uses weapons of mass destruction against U.S. troops. Second in the lineup of worst-case scenarios is Saddam's decision to unleash chemical or biological weapons on American troops while they are massing to invade his country. In turn, the United States strikes back with tactical nukes, perhaps using one of the B-61 earth-penetrating bombs to destroy Saddam's remaining supply of biological and chemical weapons stored deep underground in Iraq. "How do you stop Saddam Hussein from using his weapons of mass destruction as the United States is assembling an invasion force?" asked Cirincione. "It's likely Saddam would strike before the United States is capable of mounting an invasion, by using chemical or biological weapons against both U.S. forces and Israel to try to provoke Israel into reacting.

"My fear is that Saddam has already smuggled out chemical and biological agents" and hidden them in the United States, Cirincione added. These weapons "are someplace else and will be used directly against American targets." The United States would then likely "feel provoked to use some of the tactical nuclear weapons. You would then have 1) chemical and biological agents used against Americans in America, with perhaps hundreds of thousands dead, and 2) the use of U.S. nuclear weapons—however small—on Arab soil, with Arab casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Once again, it would be the United States using nuclear weapons against people of color"—the first instance occurred at the end of World War II, when U.S. forces dropped nuclear bombs on the Japanese. Such a scenario would provoke a tremendous Arab backlash, Cirincione said.

3. The Pakistani government falls. In this scenario, Pakistani dissidents protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq by toppling Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf, who has been cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism. Or the Musharraf government falls after Israeli or U.S. forces use a nuclear weapon in retaliation for Saddam's use of chemical or biological weapons. The splintered Pakistani army loses control of the country's nuclear weapons in the resulting chaos, enabling Al Qaeda or other terrorists to get ahold of them. Both Blair and Cirincione raised this scenario as a possibility.

"If Musharraf falls, there isn't another national institution to take his place," Cirincione said. "The control of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and the scientists who know how to build nuclear weapons would be up for grabs."

Spencer, however, discounted this scenario. "I don't think that would happen," he said, "because I'm confident Israel is not going to shoot a nuke out of the blue." If Israel did suffer such a devastating attack that it felt compelled to retaliate with a nuclear weapon, "I don't think anything would happen" in the form of a damaging backlash in the Arab world. He noted that terrorists are already "stimulated to the ultimate extent to use violence."

4. Saddam strands U.S. forces. Under this "what-if," Saddam waits for U.S. invaders to get deep inside his country and then cuts their supply and escape routes, possibly by blowing up the entry port in Kuwait with perhaps a small nuclear weapon that the Iraqi dictator has secretly obtained and kept hidden.

William S. Lind, director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism and a military reformist who was a defense adviser to former Sen. Gary Hart, D-Colo., said the risks of invading Iraq outweigh the possible gains and therefore should not be attempted. "My worst-case scenario is that we go in through Kuwait so we have a single port of entry and a single line of communication and supply as we go down the Persian Gulf. We get well into Iraq with a small army, our line of communication is cut, and our Army is essentially stranded."

All of this helps explain why Secretary of State Powell has indicated he would settle for Saddam's disarming himself and staying in power, rather than invading Iraq to topple him.

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Salt Lake Tribune
October 10, 2002

Deseret Chemical Depot Safety Procedures Were Relaxed At Time Of Accident

By Dawn House, The Salt Lake Tribune

Despite a previous leak of a dangerous nerve agent, safety procedures were relaxed at the Deseret Chemical Depot in July when two workers were exposed to the chemical GB, says a U.S. Army report.

One of the two plant workers spread residual amounts of the nerve agent, also known as sarin, from his leather gloves onto his hair and respirator after an alarm prompted him to change his face mask to a safer, government-issued respirator.

The worker suffered disorientation, a headache, blurry vision, tightness in his chest and a runny nose, and his red blood cell count dropped -- all symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, says the report by the Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Only one of the men was clinically exposed, and both were cleared to return to work the next day, said Alaine Southworth, spokeswoman for the depot. No agents were released into the air.

The contractor, EG&G Defense Materials, had repaired a leaking valve on an incinerator in January, yet relaxed safety procedures July 15 when the two employees were exposed while working on the second incinerator, Army investigators said.

The Army also faulted EG&G for failing to document previous problems with faulty check valves and leaking pressure regulators when working on the first incinerator. The incinerators are identical.

The Maryland-based company declined comment, said spokesman Mark Mesesan. The firm and its subcontractor, Battell, employ about 700 workers at Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility, about 45 miles southwest of Salt Lake City.

The Army investigation cited a series of missteps and safety violations that left the two workers exposed. The men subsequently changed into clean coveralls, but neither medical personnel nor decontamination materials were brought to the scene.

Also, an inspection team later left the area without undergoing monitoring or decontamination procedures, said investigators.

The Army has ordered corrective action that includes educating all workers on safety procedures, improving communication among engineering, safety, operations and maintenance personnel, and implementing proper checks and balances to provide maximum worker protection.

For people concerned about ongoing safety issues at the depot, it may not be enough.

"The corrective language sounds great on paper, but we've been hearing that same thing from the Army for nearly a decade now, yet nothing has changed," said Jason Groenewold, director of Families Against Incinerator Risk in Salt Lake City. "The core problems with the incinerator still exist."

Last March, the plant had finished destroying more than 6,000 tons of GB and was retooling for a changeover to incinerate the more toxic VX agent when the incident occurred. The plant remains shut down but probably will reopen by December, after a number of corrective safety measures are complete, said Ted Ryba, deputy program manager at the depot.

The incinerator, which began operating in 1996, is scheduled to burn 1,300 tons of the agent VX. It next will destroy 6,100 tons of mustard gas before the plant is disassembled.

Small amounts of GB, which is essentially a powerful pesticide, can kill quickly by disrupting the central nervous system. VX is an oily nerve agent that sticks to the skin.

Mustard gas causes severe burning in the respiratory system and blistering to the skin.

An international treaty requires the United States to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by April 2007.

<http://www.sltrib.com/2002/oct/10102002/utah/5698.htm>

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San Jose Mercury News

October 10, 2002

Pg. 5

Work On Burrowing Bomb OK'd

Congressional Compromise Allows Livermore To Begin Weapon Design

By Dan Stober, Mercury News

Congressional leaders have reached a military budget compromise that will allow Livermore nuclear weapons designers to do preliminary work on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a hydrogen bomb intended to take out deeply buried targets.

An additional rationale for the bomb project is to provide the nuclear physicists and engineers a real-world task to engage their scientific interest, a decade after the end of U.S. nuclear testing. Critics complain that such projects amount to welfare for bomb workers and could lead to a new arms race.

The compromise between the Republican-controlled House and the Democrat-run Senate provides \$15 million for a feasibility study, but fences off the money until the Defense Department answers several questions about the weapon's purpose, its intended targets and the ability of conventional weapons to attack the same targets.

Support for the earth-penetrating weapons grew out of Air Force studies and was fed by Bush administration officials' interest in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Under the budget proposal, Livermore researchers would begin a feasibility study on strengthening the B-83 hydrogen bomb and mounting it inside a narrow, pointed case so that it can withstand a high-speed collision with the ground and a grinding trip through several dozen feet of rock, concrete and dirt before exploding.

Scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico would study similar modifications to the B-61 bomb. The "design contest" between the two labs is intended to generate enthusiasm among their workers, who have engaged in a spirited nuclear competition for five decades.

In a split along party lines, Republications in the House of Representatives approved funding for the project in the Pentagon budget. The Senate blocked funding and demanded the Pentagon answer a list of questions. A House-Senate conference committee recently reached the compromise, which remains unofficial until the entire military budget is approved and signed by the president.

During negotiations, Republicans cited the need for younger weapons scientists to gain experience on real weaponry, not just the virtual bombs of the labs' supercomputers, according to congressional sources. The Republicans cited a March report by a Pentagon advisory committee headed by former Lawrence Livermore director John Foster. "Only through work on advanced designs will it be possible to train the next generation of weapon designers and producers," the Foster committee concluded.

The Pentagon has cited several countries, including Iraq, Russia and North Korea as having deeply buried bunkers for military and political leaders, and possibly underground facilities for biological or chemical weapons. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator -- known as RNEP -- would not be ready for use for several years, providing a decision is made to send it to production.

"We should be asking ourselves why we want to design, refine and produce weapons of mass destruction," said Greg Mello, who heads the Los Alamos Study Group, an anti-nuclear group in New Mexico. "We cannot persuade other people to give up their weapons of mass destruction if we cannot live without our own."

<http://www.bayarea.com/mld/bayarea/news/nation/4251990.htm>

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Wall Street Journal
October 15, 2002

Iraq's Scuds Still Keep The Pentagon Guessing

High-Tech Gear May Foil Missiles' Use, But Nightmare Scenarios Haunt Officials

By Greg Jaffe, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON -- Over the past decade, the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars trying to solve its biggest failure in the Persian Gulf War: its inability to find and destroy Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles and launchers.

Pentagon officials say they have solved many, but not all, of those problems with better sensors, communications and precision munitions. Yet, as the Pentagon plans for a new Gulf War, the relatively primitive missiles remain one of its biggest concerns.

The Iraqi arsenal of Scuds is far smaller these days, probably just a few dozen missiles and about a dozen launchers, according to U.S. analysts. But Mr. Hussein still could do serious damage lobbing the missiles, which have a range of about 400 miles, at the capitals of Arab nations hosting U.S. troops and at U.S. bases in the region. The nightmare scenario is that Iraq will launch Scuds filled with chemical or biological weapons at Israel, hoping to provoke massive Israeli retaliation and to split whatever Arab coalition the U.S. has managed to put together for the war. Because both U.S. and Israeli antimissile systems, including the new Patriot-3, remain largely unproven, the Pentagon's best hope for stopping such attacks is to destroy the Scud launchers -- heavy trucks with missiles mounted on their backs. The biggest problem with Scuds is finding them and hitting them before the Iraqis can hide again. "With Scuds, you have got to pounce very, very quickly," says Rear Adm. Mark P. Fitzgerald, the Navy's director of air warfare.

During the Gulf War, Iraqi missile crews hid under bridges and in buildings during the day, scooting out of their hiding places and launching only after night fell and then rushing back into hiding. The process often took only 30 minutes. And despite an intense surveillance effort with special-operations commandos on the ground, spy planes and satellites, U.S. forces never managed to destroy a single mobile launcher during the entire war.

Reconnaissance and communications technology has improved significantly since. Today the Pentagon has unmanned surveillance planes such as the Global Hawk and the Predator that can hover over critical areas for as long as 24 hours, which should improve their chances in the cat-and-mouse game. "We have the ability to stare at a particular piece of ground instead of just taking snapshots of it," says retired Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn, a naval aviator.

Defense officials say a decade of enforcing the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, flying over the terrain and studying Iraqi tactics and road networks have given them a much better sense of where to look for the launchers. Scud-hunting still is a lot like looking for a needle in a haystack, says Air Force Brig. Gen. Dan Leaf, an expert on targeting, but the Pentagon has "cut down the size of that haystack." The hunting ground could be further narrowed if, as U.S. military analysts believe, Mr. Hussein decides to target most of his diminished arsenal at Israel. To reach Israel, his launchers would have to be deployed in western Iraq.

If mobile Scud launchers are located, better communications equipment will be able to get the information back to attack planes a lot faster -- down to just a matter of minutes, compared with at least an hour during the Gulf War. In Afghanistan, special-operations soldiers on the ground using hand-held satellite radios could pass coordinates for precision-guided bombs directly to attack planes circling the battlefield. A handful of Predator unmanned planes also were modified earlier this spring so they could transmit still photos of targets to strike aircraft. Previously, the Predator operator or the command center had to verbally relay a description to a pilot.

The Pentagon now has far better precision munitions. Laser-guided bombs were a novelty during the Gulf War and still couldn't be used in cloudy weather. Today, the Pentagon has far-more accurate laser-guided munitions, as well as very precise satellite-guided bombs that could be used in all weather.

Military planners say they need to be able to identify a Scud on its launcher and attack it with a precision weapon in less than 30 minutes to have a reasonable chance of getting it. Air Force officials say all these improvements mean they now could pull that off in less than 10 minutes.

Others with recent experience in Afghanistan warn that that estimate may be overly optimistic. Adm. Fitzgerald, who commanded a carrier battle group involved in the Afghan campaign, says it often took about 30 minutes from the moment of acquiring target data to pulling the trigger.

The problem in Afghanistan wasn't the technology so much as the process, say officials involved in the campaign. In the early months of the campaign, worries about civilian casualties led senior commanders to demand that sensor data pass through either the air-operations headquarters in Saudi Arabia or in some cases through U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla., for target approval -- slowing the response time significantly. Saudi Arabia and Tampa is "where the clog starts to happen," says Adm. Fitzgerald.

The flood of data pouring in from hundreds of sensors further complicated the effort. Afghanistan was a relatively small war in terms of the number of strike aircraft and sensors circling the battlefield. Still pictures from battlefield sensors often piled up, say military officials involved in the campaign. Most military planners expect Iraq will be a far larger operation, with more sensors, strike planes and ground troops, making the challenge of managing the flood of data in a timely matter considerably more difficult.

Air Force officials say changes in the way information is routed could solve some of the problems. Sensors could immediately pass data about a potential target to both headquarters and an attack aircraft, so a pilot could get into position even as analysts and commanders weighed whether he should shoot. "Ideally, as soon as the sensor senses something, everyone begins to lean forward," Gen. Leaf says.

There may be other fixes on the horizon. New computer programs have been developed that can analyze how a vehicle is moving and determine whether it is a Scud launcher, as opposed to one of the hundreds of other vehicles on a battlefield. In computer simulations, the programs have been able to identify Scud launchers about 85% of the time. But the programs, which are just being introduced, haven't been tested in combat.

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Washington Post
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Pg. 13

Next Round Of U.N. Inspections Would Build On Previous Efforts

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

In September 1997, United Nations inspectors in Iraq were blocked when they tried to search a facility in one of the presidential areas that housed President Saddam Hussein's Special Security Organization, which handled the Iraqi leader's personal security and was involved in concealing Iraq's programs for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Nine months later, U.N. inspectors surprised officials at Iraq's Air Force headquarters and found a document detailing the use of "special weapons" during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The documents proved Baghdad had lied about the chemical weapons used in that war. Almost immediately, Iraq took the document from the U.N.'s chief inspector, an act that played a major role in the withdrawal in December 1998 of U.N. inspectors.

The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, is continuing his negotiations with the Iraqi government over resumed weapons inspections for the first time in four years, even as the U.N. Security Council debates whether to approve a new resolution proposed by the Bush administration that would give the inspectors a toughened mandate. But should the U.N. send its inspectors back, they will be guided, at least at the outset, by the experiences of the previous inspections regime.

Blix has told colleagues that it would be weeks or months before he could reliably report to the Security Council on Iraq's level of cooperation. During that time, monitoring and inspections would begin. Overall, Blix has said, he would need a year or two before it could be determined whether Baghdad was in compliance with U.N. resolutions. The inspectors will be permitted immediate access to sensitive sites without notice, Blix and Iraqi officials agreed in Vienna earlier this month. The sites would include military camps, such as Air Force headquarters, and "premises of security services" such as the Special Security Organization and the Special Republican Guard, another elite security unit.

U.N. and U.S. officials expect that Iraq will eventually permit unrestricted and unannounced inspections at the eight presidential sites that were given special status under a 1998 agreement negotiated by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. The initial push to search presidential sites was primarily to obtain documents related to Iraq's concealment of weapons of mass destruction and not for prohibited chemical, biological or nuclear materials, laboratories or their production facilities, according to former senior members of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the inspections organization disbanded in 1999.

"We did have a real reason to go there. It was to investigate their concealment system," said Charles Duelfer, deputy executive director of UNSCOM, who led the eventual search.

Other details of how the new inspections would be carried out have been obscured in the negotiations over the consequences of Iraq's possible noncooperation or violations. Also lost is the level of intrusiveness posed by inspections and monitoring of Iraq's dual-use facilities -- those that have nonmilitary operations but also could be used to create weapons of mass destruction.

Although inspections get almost all the attention, monitoring of facilities that could produce prohibited missiles and chemical, biological or nuclear components is also a major part of the U.N. inspection operation.

A permanent group of U.N. employees monitored a facility in Baghdad that contained computer and other analytical tools, including a complete if modest laboratory. Agreement has been reached to reestablish and refurbish that facility.

The monitoring system in the past, and the one contemplated in the future, would involve placing new, 24-hour television cameras in missile-building facilities to watch production lines to make certain the rockets built stay within the 150-kilometer range approved in the United Nations. All Iraqi missile tests would be attended by U.N. monitors, as in the past.

The Blix team has already identified more than 300 sites that involve use of either machinery or materials that could produce prohibited weapons, based on a review of past facilities and Iraq's purchases over the past four years.

The CIA report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, released last week, noted that screening by Blix's organization of Iraq's purchases under the U.N.-authorized oil-for-food program already has provided leads for facilities to be investigated.

Some purchases were designed to rehabilitate facilities that had been used for both industrial and weapons programs. President Bush in his speech on Iraq last week released photos showing new buildings at an Iraq facility identified in the past as home to that country's now-prohibited nuclear weapons program.

Plants apparently involved in commercial activities -- such as breweries, dairies, paint or oil producers -- that could be converted to produce chemical or biological weapons materials or components will have video coverage as well as sensors to gather air and dust residue. U.N. scientists in Baghdad will regularly go into the field and collect water, air and soil samples, and inspectors will conduct aerial surveillance from helicopters and U-2 planes.

The CIA report noted that although Iraq occasionally obstructed access to sensors and manipulated cameras, on the whole Baghdad "generally accommodated U.N. monitors at declared sites."

At U.N. headquarters in New York, intelligence will be collected from governments as well as defectors. Special inspection teams will examine specific buildings or sites for two or three weeks to look for parts of missiles or chemical or biological equipment that could be violations.

To frustrate interference, lists of inspectors entering Iraq will only be given to the Iraqi government one hour before arrival and the nationality of staff members will not be disclosed. In the Vienna talks, Iraq agreed to admit inspectors with only a U.N. certificate as identification. Inspectors will bring satellite phones and other communication equipment that may not be searched by Iraq.

Teams will be flown into Baghdad airport rather than to one 50 miles outside the city, and Blix's fleet of four or more helicopters will be stationed at an air base near Baghdad. The helicopters will be used for aerial photography and for quickly moving inspection teams to sites.

Another possible means to reduce the time between determining what needs to be inspected and reaching a site will be establishment of U.N. field offices in Basra and Mosul. When Blix raised the issue in Vienna, the Iraqis showed "a readiness to accept" such a move, Blix told the Security Council last week.

There remain what Blix has called "loose ends" that must be settled before he will send an advance team back to Iraq to prepare for inspectors, according to a source close to the U.N. operations.

One, considered vital by the United States, is the manner for interviewing Iraqi scientists and others familiar with Iraq's weapons programs. The draft U.S. resolution calls for taking such individuals out of Iraq, along with their families. In Vienna, Blix raised the issue and mentioned that UNSCOM felt interviewees were intimidated by Iraqi government observers who sat in on these meetings.

He proposed keeping government officials out of such interviews but did not put forward the U.S. position. The Iraqi response was that its government wanted an observer, a note-taker and a video of such meetings, and the matter was left open for future discussion.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25577-2002Oct14.html>

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Film Ties Germans To Iraqi Nuclear Program

By Charles J. Hanley, Associated Press

NEW YORK — A new investigative film traces the roots of the Iraq nuclear crisis to links between German industry and Baghdad's bomb builders, and questions the lenient sentence — probation — handed down to a German engineer for treason in aiding the project.

The documentary, "Stealing the Fire," also offers a rare close-up look at a "proliferator," the engineer Karl-Heinz Schaab, who emerges on film as a bland, gray, fastidious 68-year-old technician who protests that he is "too small to be turned into a scapegoat for the others."

The film, produced and directed by Oscar-winning documentarian John S. Friedman and Eric Nadler, premieres today at a New York theater.

Blueprints and other documents that Schaab and associates brought to Iraq in the late 1980s, along with Schaab's own hands-on skills, were a vital boost to Baghdad's development of gas centrifuges — machines whose ultra-fast spinning "enriches" uranium by separating U-235, the stuff of nuclear bombs, from non-fissionable U-238.

Much of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure subsequently was wrecked by American and allied bombing in the 1991 Gulf war.

More was destroyed during U.N. inspections inside Iraq in the 1990s. Baghdad officials deny they are working on atomic weapons today.

But reconnaissance photos released by the Bush administration, as it seeks support for a potential war against Iraq, indicate the Iraqis have been rebuilding sites previously used for nuclear development. A newly released U.S. intelligence report says they may have nuclear weapons by 2010.

"Stealing the Fire" looks at the source of these capabilities.

Iraq was failing with other enrichment technologies when German centrifuge specialists Bruno Stemmler and Walter Busse, recruited by a German company, H&H Metallform, came to Baghdad in 1988 and sold the Iraqis old designs for centrifuges.

The next year they brought Schaab, who provided components, technical reports and, most important, a stolen design for an advanced "supercritical" centrifuge.

The design, classified secret in Germany, was used in enriching nuclear-power fuel at the European government consortium Urenco, for which a Schaab-owned company worked as a subcontractor. The Iraqis paid \$62,000 for the key documents.

In an on-film interview, Schaab said that on his last Baghdad visit, in April 1990, he personally helped install Iraq's first test centrifuge. Bomb production would require thousands of such devices.

A German court on June 29, 1999, convicted Schaab of treason and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment and a \$32,000 fine, but then suspended the prison term because he had served 15 months in a Brazilian jail.

He had fled to Brazil in 1995 after U.N. inspectors uncovered documents in Iraq exposing the German connection. At Germany's request the next year, the Brazilians arrested the fugitive engineer, but freed him when a Brazilian court held that his crime was political and he could not be extradited.

In 1998, Schaab returned to Germany to be with his dying mother and to surrender to authorities, apparently assured his cooperation would win him leniency.

The light sentence he received raised questions, however, among nonproliferation specialists. American physicist David Albright, who was on the U.N. inspection team, suggested that the German government wanted to minimize public perception of Schaab's crime.

"I think they wanted the Schaab story to disappear.

The film suggests that some people want Schaab himself to disappear. His attorneys told the filmmakers that Brazilian authorities had warned them that foreign secret services wanted to kill or kidnap their client, and suggested that the closely timed deaths of associates Mr. Stemmler and Mr. Busse in the early 1990s might not have been natural, as reported.

"Stealing the Fire" leaves such questions unexplored, but it firmly establishes that German companies have supplied technology usable in Baghdad's plans.

One high-ranking defector from Iraq's nuclear program said Germany was an "open field" for Iraqi ambitions in the 1980s, particularly for purchases from such companies as chemical giant Degussa.

A top Degussa executive retorted that "by the German laws, there were no illegal deliveries" during this pre-Gulf war period.

German export controls, widely regarded as too lax, were toughened after the Gulf war. German industry was not alone, however, in helping develop Iraqi capabilities. From 1985 to 1990, the U.S. Commerce Department, for example, licensed \$1.5 billion in sales to Iraq of American technology with potential military uses.

Schaab "of course did it for the money," said his attorney, Michael Rietz. But the centrifuge specialist — described by wife, Brigitta, as "very quiet, very well-behaved; he doesn't smoke, he doesn't drink" — insisted he was focused as much on the technological challenge, and not on illegality and international repercussions.

"I stumbled naively into this thing," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20021015-90292292.htm>

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New York Times

October 12, 2002

Pg. 1

Pentagon Plans Smallpox Shots For Up To 500,000

By Judith Miller and Eric Schmitt

With the Bush administration moving closer to military action against Iraq, the Pentagon is expected to begin vaccinating up to half a million troops against smallpox as soon as the vaccine is licensed in mid-November, military and administration officials said today.

The officials said that leading military and civilian advisers to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, as well as his top medical experts, had recommended that the troops be inoculated.

The officials, familiar with the prolonged debate over whether to vaccinate against the disease — and if so, whom — said Mr. Rumsfeld had not yet approved the recommendation. But barring objections from the White House, they said, that approval is all but assured. Soldiers would then be receiving vaccine that would not yet be available to most civilians, because of concerns about potential side effects.

Of the 1.4 million service members on active duty, 350,000 to 500,000 could be immunized under the Pentagon's plan, officials said. Most would be in units that might eventually be deployed to the Middle East, though others would be inoculated as well.

"If you're talking about potentially sending troops to areas where they could be exposed to smallpox," one senior military official said, "aren't you negligent if you don't give them every possible protection?"

Vice President Dick Cheney, who was secretary of defense during the Persian Gulf war of 1991, has been a strong advocate of vaccinating the troops, administration officials say.

Like Mr. Cheney, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top civilian officials at the Pentagon, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, an influential proponent of a change of government in Iraq, strongly favor vaccinating soldiers deployed to the Middle East even before any case of smallpox is detected, Pentagon aides said today.

In the past week, Secretary Rumsfeld has also directed aides to help allies, including those in the Middle East, acquire the vaccine and so protect themselves against smallpox attack, a senior military official said.

Public health officials said recently that the Pentagon had already asked the Department of Health and Human Services, the keeper of American vaccine stockpiles, to set aside one million doses for United States military use. Should the Pentagon go ahead with the vaccination program, members of the military could be in the vanguard of mass smallpox inoculation. Government health officials disclosed last week that they favored offering the smallpox vaccine to the public even if there has been no bioterror attack, but not until as many as 10 million health workers are immunized and a vaccine is licensed for general use. They said this would probably not occur before 2004.

The White House is expected to announce soon whether civilians are to be vaccinated. Officials said the decision had been difficult for President Bush, given the probability that some people would die of the vaccine's side effects. The Defense Department recommendation favoring immediate vaccination of soldiers who might be deployed to or near the Middle East caps a yearlong policy review by the Pentagon.

The review has focused on assessing the probability that American soldiers might be exposed to the virus that causes smallpox, a disease that was declared eradicated more than 20 years ago. Historically, smallpox was one of mankind's deadliest scourges, killing one-third of those it infected.

The Defense Department declined to comment today on the status of its protracted review. But in interviews this week, Pentagon officials and others said military scientists had recommended that soldiers be vaccinated against smallpox regardless of what Mr. Bush ultimately decides is appropriate for civilians.

Much of the reasoning at the Defense Department has dealt with the presumption that Iraq has secretly kept strains of the virus that it could use in a confrontation with the United States.

There are only two official repositories of the virus: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in Atlanta, and the Vector laboratory in Novosibirsk, Russia. But intelligence analysts maintain that about a dozen countries may be secretly harboring it, among them Iraq.

Those opposed to vaccinating soldiers before an actual case of smallpox is discovered have argued that there is no conclusive proof that Iraq has the virus or, even if so, is willing to use it in a bioterror or military attack.

Those who favor immunization have argued that while scientific data show that vaccinations given within four days of exposure to the virus can prevent the disease, there are no readily deployable detectors that can reliably signal the presence of the virus in an attack on a battlefield or in a terrorist strike.

Scientists said the decision was difficult because the vaccine itself has been known to cause life-threatening complications for 15 people of every one million who are being vaccinated for the first time.

Neither troops nor public health workers and other "first responders" will be inoculated until the Food and Drug Administration fully licenses the vaccine.

Public health officials say the F.D.A. is now expected to license the first million doses by the end of the first or second week of November, and another million doses by the end of the month.

"No official in the Pentagon or the civilian sector is going to approve immunization prior to the detection of a case of smallpox unless the vaccine is fully licensed," a senior administration official said.

Although the vaccine was given to millions of people throughout the world prior to 1972, it has not been administered to civilians since the World Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated in 1980.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/12/national/12SMAL.html>

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National Journal
October 12, 2002

Saddam: 'Vindictive, Totalitarian Terrorist'

By Lee Michael Katz

Robert Gallucci, the dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, plans a teach-in to educate his students on U.S. policy toward Iraq. But Gallucci's knowledge of Iraq is not just academic. He was the founding deputy executive chairman of the U.N. weapons inspection commission.

The career diplomat later dealt with weapons of mass destruction as assistant secretary of State for political-military affairs and as U.S. special envoy. Lee Michael Katz, who has covered the Iraqi weapons issue since 1991, interviewed Gallucci on October 4 and 8. The following edited excerpts reflect Gallucci's assessment that Saddam Hussein's Iraq poses chilling dangers.

NJ: Given your experience in dealing with Iraq, what should the ground rules be for the U.N. inspections?

Gallucci: Iraq is not a normal place. Yet discussions of the ground rules sometimes appear to me otherworldly. They don't take account of seven years of inspections in which the Iraqis lied repeatedly about their holdings in chemical, biological, nuclear weapons capabilities, and/or missiles; did what they could to obstruct inspections; and showed absolutely no remorse.

This is not an inspection in Canada. One cannot allow sanctuaries, or allow advance notice, and still expect to find things people want to hide. It's common sense. Yet we have colleagues in the Security Council, and in Paris and Moscow, who would settle for an inspections regime obviously inadequate to deal with a determined cheater.

We can expect this president to fulfill his responsibility to defend the citizens of the United States. That's not unreasonable and was the message of his speech on Monday.

NJ: So you're backing President Bush's ultimatum of military action if inspections in Iraq don't satisfy the United States?

Gallucci: Weapons of mass destruction alone, in the hands of Iraq, do not necessarily imply an imperative to invade. But having been attacked on September 11, we need to be sure a regime such as Saddam's does not transfer weapons to a group such as Al Qaeda. I'm looking for, in the American tradition, some way of dealing with these threats short of military force. One can design an inspections regime that would give us pretty high confidence.

If the Security Council won't impose it or Saddam won't accept it, how comfortable are you with leaving to chance whether Iraq transfers those weapons to Al Qaeda? Does that mean we have to act tomorrow morning? No. But I think we can conclude that under the circumstances, we will not tolerate that risk to the American people.

Saddam should have to accept this resolution immediately or be subject to the certainty, at some point, of military action to separate him from his weapons.

NJ: Actually, Iraq declared recently that Western reports of its weapons program are overblown. What's your response?

Gallucci: It's all lies. It's a pack of lies. It's a big pack of lies.

NJ: You were part of a Carnegie Endowment group suggesting that military forces accompany inspectors, an idea the administration has embraced. How would that work?

Gallucci: You don't want to have a repeat of those cases in which a guy in a white shirt stands in front of the gate on which there's a padlock, and tells a team of 30 U.N. inspectors in little blue hats and armbands that they can't come in today. The inspectors haven't any way of pushing the man aside and cutting the padlock off. That's not what the United Nations does.

A military special-operations unit could provide security for the U.N. team and also allow access where there's only minimal resistance. You would force the Iraqis, if they wished to protect a site, to have a more substantial military presence--which would then provide a much clearer trigger for the use of force.

NJ: If there was deception during those seven years of inspections in Iraq, what makes you think that inspections can succeed this time around?

Gallucci: The Iraqis know a lot about how to deceive and harass inspectors, and about how to undermine the political basis for inspections. They learned a lot in those seven years. But inspectors, too, learned a lot about what works and what does not work against the Iraqis

Remember, we did not have seven years of failure. What we had was enormous success initially in finding lots of things the Iraqis didn't want us to find. We took apart their nuclear weapons program. We didn't kill their weapons scientists, obviously, so they're there to regenerate the program. We uncovered their biological weapons program. We destroyed incredible quantities of chemical weapons, many of their ballistic missiles. A lot of destruction went on.

But there was the watering-down of the inspections regime. There was a lack of support within the Security Council for threatening hostilities in the event of Iraqi resistance.

We in the United States, and anybody that wants serious inspections, do not wish to see that inspections regime regenerated. A weak inspections regime is worse than no regime. It gives to some a false sense of confidence; to others a cover under which these programs can be pursued.

NJ: Part of the debate over going to war with Iraq is that a threatened Saddam could unleash chemical and biological weapons against U.S. troops. Do you think he would?

Gallucci: In that circumstance, I don't believe we should have any confidence Iraq would exercise restraint out of fear of American retaliation or some humanitarian concern. The worst can be quite bad. I don't believe Iraq has nuclear weapons to use. I do believe with some high confidence that it has both chemical and biological weapons to use.... It's a particular threat for Israel.

NJ: So basically, you're saying that Saddam would quite possibly use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. troops and Israel?

Gallucci: We have to expect that to be one of the consequences of an invasion aimed at regime change. Since Saddam has used chemical weapons not only in the war against Iran, but also against his own people, these are for Saddam clearly usable weapons. For a humanitarian, there might still be a reason not to use weapons of mass destruction in order to spare his people the pain and suffering of an American retaliation. But I don't believe anyone would put the label "humanitarian" around the neck of Saddam Hussein. "Vindictive, totalitarian terrorist," maybe, but not "humanitarian."

NJ: What weapons of mass destruction do you believe are in Saddam Hussein's arsenal?

Gallucci: Chemical weapons--you could expect mustard [gas], sarin, and VX. In biological weapons, you could expect toxins, botulinum toxin, bacteriological agents. You could expect anthrax and ricin.

Our concern is that they've gone beyond toxins and bacteriological agents to viral agents. They had smallpox naturally occurring in the '70s in Iraq, and they may have taken that advantage to preserve this viral agent. I think by now everyone knows that as bad as anthrax is--and it can be very bad, indeed--with viral agents, by virtue of their capability to move from person to person, the casualties can be quite a bit larger. But we don't know of their work in viral agents.

We can also worry about whether Iraq has done any of the type of research we believe has been done in the former Soviet Union: in engineering viruses to put together agents that spread very quickly, like smallpox, with agents that are more deadly, like viral hemorrhagic fevers. I'm talking about what we don't know that we might worry about.

NJ: When you say "viral hemorrhagic fevers," you're talking about the Ebola virus?

Gallucci: Marburg and Ebola. Marburg is just about as deadly as Ebola, just about as ugly and disgusting. It is like Ebola. But instead of smallpox, which is about 30 percent deadly, hemorrhagic fevers are close to 90 percent deadly.

NJ: Do you think that Saddam had a hand in the anthrax that popped up in the United States?

Gallucci: I think Iraq would be very conservative in attacking the United States with a weapon of mass destruction, for fear of the consequences. I say that, but I worry that the risk propensity of Saddam is hard for us to fathom. As a colleague of mine once said, "He's calculating, but he's not very good at it."

NJ: Could Saddam deliver a radiological "dirty bomb" in the United States?

Gallucci: It's very important to draw a bright line between radiological weapons and nuclear weapons as we understand it, which is producing an explosive force by fission. A radiological weapon is a conventional bomb that is encased in or accompanied by radioactive material that is hazardous to our health.

But what you must please understand is that if a radiological weapon went off in downtown Washington on K Street, it is much more likely that any casualties would occur as a result of the blast from the conventional explosive, rather than from the radiation that would be spread about.

I don't know any serious analyst who believes Iraq has a nuclear weapon right now. However, the bad part of this is, Iraq is known to have already done the development work for a nuclear explosive device, produced designs, and has put itself in the position of being able to produce a nuclear weapon relatively quickly--perhaps a month to a year--if it could get its hands on fissile material.

NJ: Britain issued a comprehensive, but not unexpected, document detailing Saddam's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Why is the drumbeat of war so loud right now? Is there a threat the public doesn't know about?

Gallucci: If you can read the British white paper and not worry about the threat, there is nothing in the file cabinets at the CIA or anyplace else that would worry you. You are not a candidate for invasion advocacy.

It seems to me, you conclude the threat is serious now and growing. It comes principally from our concern over the transfer of this capability to an entity we cannot deter, such as Al Qaeda. I, for one, having lived through the 11th of September in Washington, don't wish to rely on the lighting of candles as a method of dealing with that threat.

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The Specter of a New and Deadlier Smallpox

By RICHARD PRESTON

PRINCETON, N.J.

Smallpox, or variola virus, is considered by many doctors to be the pathogen most dangerous to the human species. The virus was eradicated as a natural disease 25 years ago, and is now stored legally at only two sites: in a freezer at the Atlanta headquarters of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and at a Russian government laboratory in Siberia. Research on the virus is being conducted at both sites, but is tightly restricted by the World Health Organization. In 1972, the United States stopped giving routine vaccinations for the virus.

Now fears about smallpox have returned, with the possibility that this biological agent will be used as a weapon in terrorism or war. A number of countries, including Iraq, Iran and North Korea, are suspected by United States intelligence agencies of keeping clandestine stocks of smallpox for use as a weapon.

The United States government has begun a crash effort to create a national stockpile of vaccine for use in a smallpox emergency, at a cost of around \$1 billion. Though the vaccine is being made with modern methods, it is designed to work against the natural form of the smallpox virus. This vaccine was developed in 1796. Would it work against a 21st-century biologically engineered smallpox? Probably not. And given rapid advances in molecular biology, genetic engineering of the smallpox virus is now feasible, not by amateurs or terrorist groups but by professional scientists in countries that have biowarfare programs.

In early 2001, a group of researchers in Australia surprised and scared pox virus experts when they reported that they'd put the interleukin-4 gene, the gene that controls immune responses, into the mousepox virus and found that it made mousepox into a killer virus in naturally immune mice and deadly even to some vaccinated mice. (Mousepox is related to smallpox but can't infect people.)

If this particular gene made mousepox vaccine-resistant, then there is the frightening possibility that the gene could be added to the smallpox virus, making it vaccine-resistant — a super variola. The interleukin-4 gene is one of the most commonly studied genes. Thousands of scientific papers have been written about it and it can be readily purchased on the Internet by scientists. (The gene typically comes as a pinch of dried bacteria in a small brown glass bottle.)

Few people realize how straightforward it is to put a gene into a virus. Genetic engineering of viruses, for peaceful research, has become routine and standardized. The cost of supplies for creating a strain of engineered virus for an experiment can be less than \$1,000, and it can be done on a laboratory countertop that's three feet long.

Pox viruses are among the easiest viruses to engineer in the lab because they readily accept foreign genes. The first engineering of a pox virus was done more than 20 years ago. There is little doubt that Iraqi biologists know how to do it. Smallpox could probably be genetically engineered in a couple of rooms in a small facility with relatively simple safety precautions, and it might be very hard for inspectors to find it or prove what was going on. A nation that has clandestine stocks of smallpox might thereby be able to make a strain that would do an end run around the American stockpile of the vaccine, with severe consequences.

Recently Mark Buller, a pox virus researcher at the St. Louis University School of Medicine, began experiments with mousepox to try to answer the question of whether, in fact, the interleukin-4 gene really would turn natural smallpox into a superpox. His team is trying to develop a vaccine strategy that could work against such a virus. That research is ongoing and will take time.

The biologist community has reacted with troubled anxiety to the idea of genetically engineered bioweapons. The Australian scientists who worked on the mousepox virus wanted to alert scientists about how easy it might be to engineer a supervirus. Even so, many scientists prefer not to talk about how such research might be used, while others believe that no nation is likely to make a super smallpox because such a weapon would be uncontrollable and devastating for the world. Perhaps.

This logic of restraint, however, did not persuade Edward Teller and Andrei Sakharov, the distinguished American and Russian physicists who independently invented the hydrogen bomb, to stop their research. They sincerely believed it was the right thing for their countries, and they were attracted to the technical challenge. When something can be done in science, in the end it is almost always done.

Weapons are often simpler to make than peaceful technologies: a cannon is less complicated than a clock; a nuclear bomb is a simpler device than a nuclear power plant. Biologists are now in much the same position as physicists were during the late 1930's, when it was becoming apparent to some of them that, whether they liked it or not, they were learning that the forces of nature could be directed into a giant bomb — and that someone could really try to make it. The question now is whether scientists and policymakers can fully recognize that recent advances in molecular biology are making possible the creation of frightening new weapons — and whether they will be prepared to offer protection to ordinary citizens if or when such weapons become a reality.

Richard Preston is the author, most recently, of "The Demon in the Freezer: A True Story."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/14/opinion/14PRES.html>

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Security of replacement workers at disease lab questioned

By FRANK ELTMAN, ASSOCIATED PRESS

GARDEN CITY, N.Y. (AP) - A strike by maintenance workers at a sensitive government laboratory enters its third month this weekend, and a U.S. senator is raising concern that replacement workers may pose a security risk.

Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., demanded the parties reach a settlement to end the walkout at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which studies highly contagious illnesses like foot-and-mouth disease.

"I've called on the U.S. Department of Agriculture to facilitate a resolution so that the security and safety of Plum Island does not depend on temporary workers," Clinton said in a statement Friday.

She wrote to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman last month claiming some workers hired as replacements for strikers may not have received proper background checks or drug screenings. She said the island "stores many agents that could be used in bioterrorism if they fell into the wrong hands."

A one-time Army base, the 850-acre island off eastern Long Island is the only testing and diagnosis center for dangerous animal diseases in the United States. No testing on human diseases is performed.

Workers walked out Aug. 13 after rejecting an offer from LB&B Associates Inc. of Baltimore, which operates the center on a government contract. The two sides met last week with a federal mediator; another session was scheduled Tuesday.

LB&B's 76 Plum Island workers provide support services including the operation, maintenance and repair of the power plant, buildings and grounds, waste disposal and a marine fleet.

LB&B chief operating officer Ed Brandon said Friday he did not want to negotiate in the media, but a company spokesman previously described the walkout as "a pretty classic case of an economic strike."

The dispute is over wages and benefits, retroactive pay and whether replacement workers should remain on the payroll once a settlement is reached.

Gerard Devine, a spokesman for Local 30, International Union of Operating Engineers, said LB&B was "being completely unreasonable. I think they do not want to settle the contract and I think they have the backing of the USDA."

He said LB&B wants 32 replacement workers kept on staff as part of any settlement. "Some of the replacement workers haven't even started working there yet," he said. "How can you call them replacement workers?"

Sandy Miller-Hays, a spokeswoman for the USDA's Agricultural Research Service, said the USDA had no role in the negotiations and that the strike has had little effect on operations.

Since the walkout, there have been two ferryboat accidents involving a replacement worker. LB&B maintains the ferry operator was experienced and qualified.

An FBI spokesman said the agency investigated a suspicious drop in water pressure at the laboratory in August, and that any potential hazard had been contained.

Clinton noted in her letter to Veneman that a van taken by replacement workers on Sept. 8 with the permission of Plum Island officials was never returned.

"This is a red flag that security at the island can easily be breached," she said.

Plum Island became a USDA research center in the early 1950s after flare-ups of foot-and-mouth disease in Mexico and Canada. The disease was officially eradicated in the United States in 1929. It remains common in other parts of the world.

<http://newsobserver.com/24hour/science/story/574833p-4497203c.html>

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From the Los Angeles Times

Inside the Mind of a Dictator

Profile: Experts say Hussein is ruthless but afraid, cunning but error-prone. And he's eerily unpredictable.

By SONNI EFRON and SEBASTIAN ROTELLA

Times Staff Writers

Published October 12, 2002

WASHINGTON -- Saddam Hussein rules by fear, but he is also ruled by his fears.

The Iraqi president spends ever more time in the many bunkers beneath his ornate palaces. He rarely sleeps more than one night in the same place. He receives visitors only after they have been thoroughly searched and had their hands disinfected in up to three liquids. He uses food tasters, and special teams test everything the president might touch: bed linens, toiletries, clothes, ink.

Each day, meals are prepared for him at palaces around Iraq, so no one can know where he will dine. He gives televised speeches from more than a dozen identical conference rooms, so no one can know where he is. He even employs surgically enhanced presidential doubles, so no one can know who he is.

"He's afraid all the time," said Ahmed Samarra, a former lieutenant colonel in Hussein's security force. "He likes to escape. He likes to hide. He likes to be underground, in bunkers. He only sleeps two or three hours ... and he is always armed."

This portrait, painted by Iraqi defectors, weapons inspectors, scholars, current and former U.S. intelligence officials and other experts in the United States, Europe and Israel, makes Hussein sound like a madman. Yet the experts place him in the ranks of sane but ruthless dictators who have ruled by terror, political cunning and personality cults.

As the United States prepares to go to war with Hussein for the second time in nearly 12 years, military and political analysts are mining these glimpses of his personality for clues to his likely diplomatic and military moves: Can Hussein be made to give up his weapons of mass destruction in exchange for his survival? Would he unleash a chemical or biological holocaust on invading U.S. troops? If he knew that he was about to be deposed, would he attempt to annihilate Israel or unleash a terrorist attack on America with weapons of mass destruction?

The problem is that experts disagree on the answers. In fact, Hussein's mind-set is the subject of a high-stakes debate in the Bush administration, especially after a CIA letter this week asserted that Hussein is unlikely to use his lethal arsenal against the U.S. unless he comes under military attack.

Hussein, 65, is one of the most secretive, heavily guarded leaders in the world. Despite years of study--and during his 23-year rule Hussein has been studied as much as any leader since Josef Stalin--he remains an enigma to the West.

The Times based this story on a spectrum of sources--from former U.S. security officials and Iraqi opposition leaders to Middle Eastern writers and European academics. Some favor toppling Hussein, while others have deep misgivings about past and present U.S. policy toward Iraq. The diverse experts concurred on many facts about the Iraqi ruler; they differed over to what lengths he would go to resist attempts to disarm his regime.

Some defectors and political observers say Hussein is the consummate survivor who would do anything to stay in power, including give up weapons of mass destruction. These people insist that he is not suicidal and will back off, at least temporarily, if he can do so without humiliation or displays of weakness that would leave him prey to internal enemies.

Others take the view that Hussein has a messianic complex fueled by his survival of coups, assassination attempts and the wrath of U.S. presidents, and may choose to go out in a blaze. He is convinced that his divine mission is to restore the oppressed Arab world to its former glory, some observers say, and may sacrifice his life to secure his legacy.

Most analysts regard Hussein as essentially a thug who sees the world in the stark terms of the professional gunman he once was. They predict that he will resort to massive violence to defeat the Bush administration's efforts to bring about a "regime change" in Baghdad. Hussein is most dangerous when he is cornered, they say. If "regime change" means a bullet to the brain, the Iraqi president is not likely to go quietly.

"He would like to try to survive, but I believe he knows that if we come back this time, we're not going to let him off the way we did" in previous confrontations, said former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, a hard-liner on Iraq. "I think he would like to be remembered as someone who has wreaked maximum destruction on what [Osama] bin Laden calls the Crusaders and the Jews. He will definitely try to wreak maximum destruction."

Those who have made a career of watching Hussein say he is a study in contradictions, at once clever and prone to miscalculation. He claims that he can look into people's eyes and know whether they will betray him before they know it themselves. He plants provocateurs to ensnare potential traitors. And he has a talent for dividing his enemies, as shown by the current dispute in the United Nations over how to deal with him.

"He is not impulsive, only acts after judicious consideration and can be extremely patient," said Jerrold Post, a former CIA psychiatrist and now director of the political psychology program at George Washington University who has studied Hussein for years. "Indeed, he uses time as a weapon."

Yet, Hussein is dangerously isolated and apt to make catastrophic mistakes in foreign affairs. His invasion of Kuwait in 1990 resulted from a fundamental misreading of signals from the United States and the West, experts say. In the subsequent battle with an overwhelming international force, he let domestic political considerations trump the seemingly rational course of withdrawing from Kuwait because he judged that he could not afford the loss of face at home.

Hussein studied law at the University of Cairo and in Baghdad, but he has rarely traveled outside the Middle East. Although he watches Al Jazeera, the Arab satellite news station, and even CNN, analysts say he often gets limited and distorted information.

"No one in his inner circle really understands the workings of the outside world," said Remy Leveau, a former French envoy in the Middle East and professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris. "The few who might understand the world are afraid to tell him the truth. He is the classic primitive dictator."

Iron Rule Resembles

That of Stalin

The Iraqi leader sees himself on par with Stalin--whom he admires--as well as China's Mao Tse-tung and former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. According to the biography "Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge," by Said Aburish, a Kurdish leader visited Hussein in his palace soon after the Iraqi seized power in 1979. The new president had just awakened and wore a bathrobe when he welcomed the visitor, Mahmoud Othman.

There was a military cot in the office, indicating that Hussein had slept there after putting in a typical 17-hour day. Next to the bed, Othman saw 12 pairs of expensive shoes--the indulgence of a man who had gone barefoot as a peasant boy.

"And the rest of the office was nothing but a small library full of books about one man, Stalin," Othman said. "One could say he went to bed with the Russian dictator."

Like Stalin, Hussein has used violence to maintain his grip on power. He has executed underlings who dared to disagree with him, sometimes shooting the offender on the spot, according to U.S. officials and defectors. He has also allegedly given pistols to aides and ordered them to shoot, thus making them his accomplices.

But death is not necessarily the punishment that those who serve Hussein fear most. The Iraqi regime is notorious for forcing suspected turncoats to watch videotapes of their wives being raped and their children tortured, according to numerous defector accounts.

"Nobody can look in his eyes," said Samarrai, who defected in 1998. "You feel he could shatter you.... One year he killed three guards ... because they tried to steal some of his shoes."

There are, nonetheless, a few stories of Hussein showing kindness to people who had treated him well. In one, he saved a Jewish Iraqi from the torture chamber, according to biographer Aburish, because the man had tipped him generously when Hussein had sold him cigarettes on the streets as a child.

By most accounts, Hussein keeps his own counsel and has not consulted aides about some of his most vital foreign policy moves. The solitary decisions were his worst, made "when the leader felt omnipotent and invincible, while at the same time his pride was hurt, and he believed that he and Iraq were being wronged," wrote Amatzia Baram of the University of Haifa, one of Israel's leading Hussein watchers.

"When his advisors feel that the leader's mind is made up, they agree with him," Baram wrote. "They prefer to go down with the ship eventually rather than be tossed overboard immediately."

Among a handful of close advisors, Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz can speak with relative frankness, said Iyad Allawi, leader of the Iraqi National Accord, or INA, a London-based opposition group. But even Aziz avoids upsetting his president, Allawi said.

Hussein's isolation has increased since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as he has suffered betrayals from his most trusted circles: his family, his clan and his army.

In 1995, after a shootout with Hussein's eldest son, Uday, two of Hussein's sons-in-law defected to Jordan and spilled secrets about Iraqi weapons programs. They were persuaded to return--and immediately were killed.

Altogether, Hussein has had 53 of his relatives killed, according to Mustafa Alani, an Iraq expert at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense, a think tank in London.

Hussein's army reportedly has been demoralized by the country's failure to win the Iran-Iraq war and by the crushing defeat in the Gulf War. There have been at least four coup attempts since 1990, according to Baram. Some of those executed belonged to the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard, the units that are supposed to be the best trained and most loyal.

This time, the Iraqi regime has threatened its own military commanders with chemical attacks if they attempt an uprising, according to Allawi, whose organization has frequent secret contact with Iraqi officials.

More paranoid than ever, Hussein moves every night with a security force of about 3,600 guards, including antitank and anti-aircraft personnel and a field hospital, according to Iraqi defectors. He even has three identical trucks equipped with bedrooms, former United Nations weapons inspector Scott Ritter said.

"For the secular-minded Saddam, security consciousness is the equivalent of religious fervor," wrote the CIA's Regis W. Matlak in an unclassified article.

Hussein's recent public statements indicate an awareness that his power could be weakening, according to Abbas Al-Jabani, who was once an architect of the regime's propaganda programs. He said Hussein has taken to the airwaves proclaiming the Iraqi people to be partners in his struggle to keep the Zionists and the Americans from destroying Iraq.

The Iraqi leader is convinced of the moral weakness of the West, its inability to accept mass casualties and its fundamental inferiority to Arab civilization, experts say. Hussein seized Western hostages as "human shields" in 1990 because he calculated that the U.S. would be too squeamish to blow up targets to which its citizens were strapped.

Now some think that he is betting on the West's fear of mass casualties from biological or chemical strikes.

High-ranking defectors insist that Hussein believes his deadly arsenal kept him from losing the Iran-Iraq war and enabled him to survive the Gulf War.

"He's not grateful to us for backing off in '91," said Woolsey, the former CIA director. "He believes it was his resolution and his possession of chemical and bacteriological weapons that did it. And he sees these as his only real trump cards."

That outlook makes Hussein inherently hostile to disarmament, the stated aim of the international community in this confrontation.

"He cannot comply fully with the kind of demilitarization that the U.S. is looking for because his weapons of mass destruction are the be-all and end-all of this regime--what he is all about," said Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi defector affiliated with Harvard University who wrote a book about Iraqi politics titled "Republic of Fear."

Moreover, if it is true that part of Iraq's chemical and biological arsenal is stashed inside Hussein's palaces, his obsession with his personal safety is likely to interfere with inspections.

Senior Iraqi officials have told foreign diplomats that Hussein will never allow unfettered access to his palaces because he believes that the weapons inspectors will send his coordinates to U.S. missile launchers or even plant special devices to kill him slowly with radioactive rays.

But not everyone who knows Iraq well thinks that Hussein will fight to the death; they predict that he would relinquish his weapons if he were faced with annihilation.

"He'd quite cheerfully give up whatever weapons he has to avoid being killed," said Nathaniel Kern, an Arabist and president of Foreign Reports Inc., a Washington-based consulting firm. In the end, Kern predicted, "he will let in the weapons inspectors unless he thinks he will be killed anyway."

Hussein's manipulation of the U.N. inspection programs shows a talent for diplomatic bait-and-switch. He is patient, shameless about reversing course if expedient, and uninhibited about lying, experts say. In the last two weeks, he has helped to divide the United States and Britain from the rest of the U.N. Security Council.

"The man will do everything diplomatically to avoid war," said Alani, the London academic. "He has reached the

conclusion that war is coming. He's resigned to it. But he's hoping something will happen to divert the attention of the Americans. Possibly another 9/11, a major terrorist attack. Or a scandal that will shake the credibility of the Bush administration. That's why he's playing for time."

During the Gulf War, Hussein was shocked that neighboring Arab countries sided with the West and provided the bases from which to attack him. He has since moved to improve his regional position. Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia remain hostile, but tensions with Iran and Turkey are somewhat reduced.

Hussein has cleverly co-opted Syria since the death of his old Baathist rival, Hafez Assad. Assad's son and successor, Bashar, now benefits from a deal by which Syria buys about 150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day at half the world market price, Kern said. The deal skirts U.N. sanctions by allowing the Syrians to export more of their own oil, while Iraq gets revenues it can spend without the fetters of the U.N. "oil-for-food" program. U.S. and Israeli officials worry that the money has gone straight to Hussein's weapons program.

In another gambit aimed at Muslims at home and abroad, Hussein has burnished his Islamic credentials. Although his Baathist ideology is socialist and secular, Hussein has built gargantuan mosques and has put up billboards around Baghdad showing himself kneeling on a prayer mat.

Not only has he wrapped himself in the Islamic flag, but he also had the words "Allahu akbar" (God is great) emblazoned across the flag of Iraq in his own handwriting, Woolsey said.

One of Hussein's mosques is said to house a museum that displays a copy of the Koran--605 pages--purportedly written with 36 liters of Hussein's blood. Whether or not the ink flowed from his own veins, the holy book is testament to Hussein's determination to portray himself as devout.

Still Confident

of Global Support

The West has interpreted Hussein's moves to mean that if the U.N. does not lift its economic embargo against Iraq, he might push the secular nation into the Muslim fundamentalist camp.

According to defectors, Hussein believes that the Arab street will rise up in solidarity with him against the West. Years of playing cat and mouse with weapons inspectors and fending off the effects of sanctions and punitive bombing raids have won Hussein some Arab admirers, but perhaps not as many as he believes.

"He thinks the world will be on his side," said French analyst Leveau. "He misreads the extent of his support."

If words give way to war and Hussein sees that he cannot win, many predict that he will repeat a long-standing pattern of lashing out at other targets.

In early 1991, as his armies were forced to retreat from Kuwait and bombs rained down on Baghdad, Hussein ordered the Kuwaiti oil fields set ablaze and sent oil pouring into the Persian Gulf. Some analysts worry that this time, a cornered or defeated Hussein could torch his own oil fields, the world's second-largest, in order to keep them out of the hands of American occupiers.

Hussein ordered the failed assassination attempt on former President George Bush in 1993 and arranged the killings of his own sons-in-law in 1996 to punish them for their defection. If thwarted this time, the most likely targets of his wrath are believed to be some of those who have suffered before: Iraqis and Israel.

After the Gulf War, U.S. forces found documents showing that missiles tipped with chemical or biological warheads had been deployed to Iraqi field commanders with authorization to fire if Baghdad was out of contact or destroyed, according to Judith Yaphe, a former intelligence analyst now at National Defense University in Washington.

Debate continues about why the missiles were never fired. It is generally thought that Hussein was deterred by a U.S. warning to Iraq's foreign minister that any use of nonconventional weapons would seal Iraq's destruction. But a

former weapons inspector who asked not to be named said it would be a mistake to assume that deterrence worked in 1991.

"We have no idea" why the weapons were never fired, the official said. The U.S. does not know whether an order was issued and never got through, whether the missiles failed to fire, or whether field commanders, who had been told they would be treated as war criminals if they used chemical weapons, might have balked.

When he fired nearly 40 Scud missiles at Israel during the 1991 war, Hussein's goal was to draw the Israelis into the conflict and break Arab backing of the international coalition against Iraq. Israel refrained from responding at the urging of the United States.

This time, however, Hussein knows that the Bush administration's policy is "regime change." This greatly increases the risk that he would unleash biological and chemical weapons on his own people, U.S. troops, Israel or even a Western city, some experts say. They fear the doomsday scenario: an all-out attack on the Iraqi leader provoking exactly the nightmare that it was intended to avert.

"Why expect Saddam to go gently when he has nothing left to lose?" said Richard K. Betts, director of the Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University. "We have given Saddam all the warning time he needs to concoct retaliation, since the Bush administration has made a coming war the most telegraphed punch in military history."

In the CIA letter this week, the director of the agency disclosed its assessment that if the U.S. attacked the Iraqi leader, "Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a [weapons of mass destruction] attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him."

Hussein's means of delivering weapons of mass destruction are limited, according to a recent British intelligence report that estimated his arsenal has been reduced to no more than 20 long-range missiles. But he could instead use a small plane or send commandos or terrorists to disperse a lethal biological agent in a city.

Retired Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark said military planners could not neutralize the threat of a nonconventional attack on U.S. troops, but there are ways to minimize the effects.

"There are no guarantees on biological weapons. One of my worst fears is that Saddam Hussein will use biological weapons against his own [Shiite] population in the south in order to create a humanitarian disaster that would impede our efforts," Clark said.

Former CIA director Woolsey's worst fear: a biological attack on the U.S. or Israel that could be difficult to thwart or even detect quickly. In addition to anthrax and VX, Iraq has weaponized aflatoxin, whose main effect is to cause liver cancer in children, he noted.

"Infected individuals in the case of communicable diseases, or model airplanes that can fly long distances, or Piper Cubs that can spray like crop dusting, there are all sorts of unconventional ways to deliver" a bacteriological weapon, Woolsey said.

Clark said the security precautions already being taken, combined with an alert citizenry, offer the best defense.

In recent years, the United States had grown "somewhat complacent" about Hussein's propensity for a terrorist attack, said Ellen Laipson, a Middle East scholar and former CIA analyst. "What is a great unknown, however, is whether Saddam has already planted any sleepers in the United States."

Whatever Hussein's intent, skeptics doubt that he could pull off such an ambitious and horrific plan. Alani, the London-based Iraq scholar, called the idea of a suitcase attack with a biological weapon on New York or Tel Aviv "fantasy." He and others argue that Hussein's power is brittle and that his authority would fade quickly in an all-out invasion.

"He will do his best to inflict damage before he goes down, but I don't think his orders will be carried out," Alani

said. "Apart from the people who are going to die with him. That is a small group. For a major operation like a biological attack you have to have people on the ground. One thing is to issue an order. The crucial thing is whether your order will be obeyed."

But analysts say that the international community will have to demonstrate sufficient resolve to topple Hussein if doubters among his subordinates are going to disobey orders to use weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. government says it will warn field commanders against any use of chemical and biological weapons, and Iraqi opposition leaders say they are reaching out to Iraqi commanders and diplomats with the same message.

"He may be ready to go down to the last bullet," Laipson said, "but you have to hope the team around him will make a different calculation."

Efron reported from Washington and Rotella from London and Paris. Times staff writers Bob Drogin and Robin Wright in Washington contributed to this report.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/la-fg-saddam12oct12.story>

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