


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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## **The National Security Strategy of the United States of America**

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

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(Editor's Note: Press release for referenced report follows article.)

Washington Post

September 20, 2002

Pg. 27

## **Bioterror Targets May Be On Farms**

### ***Livestock, Crops Need Protection, Experts Say***

By Guy Gugliotta, Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks on its livestock and food crops and needs a national plan to identify threats, direct research, gather intelligence and respond to outbreaks, a committee of experts said yesterday.

A report by the National Academy of Sciences said that while agricultural bioterrorism was "highly unlikely to result in famine or malnutrition," it could have "major direct and indirect costs to the agricultural economy."

The report also cautioned that there could be "adverse health effects" caused by agents -- such as anthrax -- that can move from animals to humans, as well as "loss of public confidence in the food system . . . and widespread public concern and confusion."

The report, titled "Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism," was prepared over the past three years by the academy's National Research Council at the behest of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Parts of the original report dealing with specific case studies were put in a classified annex withheld from the published study.

"We thought about it all along -- whether we were giving anybody a recipe for how to mount an attack," said David R. Franz, a bioterrorism expert and NAS panelist who is vice president of the Southern Research Institute. "You always have to weigh your vulnerability against the need to educate people about what they're up against and to overcome their natural reticence."

Reticence, however, is no longer a problem, said Iowa State University veterinarian Harley W. Moon, chairman of the 12-member NAS panel.

"September 11 fixed that," Moon said. "People became so urgent that they went ahead on their own." But while "there's increased general awareness and agency interaction," he added, "we need a national response, as well."

In one sign of increased intensity over agricultural bioterrorism, the Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service early this week was able to enlist the help of veterinarians, hog farmers, state officials and veterinary labs across the country to watch for evidence of swine disease from genetically altered bacteria cultures stolen from a Michigan State University lab a week ago.

The genetically altered bacterium, *Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae*, can cause pneumonia, encephalitis and death in pigs but is not dangerous to humans and is hard to spread. "If you were going to pick a pathogen, this would not be high on the list," said Ron DeHaven, deputy administrator at APHIS.

Nevertheless, because of "the potential of it to be a bioterrorist event," DeHaven held a conference call to enlist help from stakeholders at all levels of the pig farming industry.

"If this had happened 13 or 14 months ago, we probably wouldn't have thought twice about it, but we have to assume the worst and be prepared," he said.

According to the NAS panel, preparation requires a national coordinating center. Panelist R. James Cook, a Washington State University plant pathologist, said the participants wanted to make the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention their model. The CDC is a research center and early warning system for outbreaks of human disease. "We don't know what will happen or whether there will even be bricks and mortar," Cook said. "We just need to be able to do what the CDC does -- get the information we need in real time."

The panel noted that the Agriculture Department already has a well-developed infrastructure to deal with plant pathogens and animal diseases that come into the country accidentally. These have included San Francisco's Mediterranean fruit flies, in the early 1980s, to Florida's citrus canker in the 1990s and today's mosquito-borne West Nile virus.

But the panel cautioned that deliberate infestation demanded a far more extensive menu of precautions, including stringent border monitoring, better overseas intelligence and research to develop resistant plant strains and assemble genetic libraries of likely "threat agents."

Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman noted in a statement that the department has several initiatives similar to those outlined in the report, including identifying a priority list of threat agents, allocating increased funds for bioterrorism research and strengthening its laboratories.

"Because of these aggressive efforts, our nation's food and agriculture infrastructure is stronger today than a year ago," she said. "However, threats remain, and we must work in a responsible and aggressive manner to continue strengthening these programs."

The NAS panel's Moon praised USDA for increasing funding to establish a network of diagnostic labs -- five for livestock and five for plants -- that could be called on to make quick assessments of dangerous pathogens even as they are discovered.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41505-2002Sep19.html>

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The National Academies

Date: Sept. 19, 2002

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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

## **Better Plan Needed to Protect U.S. Agriculture From Bioterror Attack**

WASHINGTON -- The United States is vulnerable to agricultural bioterrorism and needs a comprehensive plan to defend against it, says a new report from the National Academies' National Research Council. The United States cannot rapidly detect and identify many pests and pathogens and could not quickly respond to a large-scale attack, which would overwhelm existing laboratory and field resources.

"Biological agents that could be used to harm crops or livestock are widely available and pose a major threat to U.S. agriculture," said Harley W. Moon, chair of the committee that wrote the report, and professor of veterinary medicine, Iowa State University, Ames. "Part of the plan to defend against agricultural bioterrorism should be to enhance our basic understanding of the biology of pests and pathogens so we can develop new tools for surveillance and new ways to control an outbreak."

The committee began its study at the request of the U.S. Department of Agriculture prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Those acts and the subsequent anthrax attacks -- which showed that "bioterrorism is now a reality," as the report puts it -- heightened concerns about an attack on U.S. agriculture. The report says that while a bioterrorism attack on U.S. agriculture is highly unlikely to result in famine or malnutrition, it could harm people, disrupt the economy, and cause widespread public concern and confusion. The recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that arose naturally in the United Kingdom, for example, led to the destruction of millions of animals and cost billions of dollars.

Given the importance of this report to homeland defense, the National Academies took the unusual step of briefing the Office of Homeland Security and USDA earlier this year on the report's preliminary findings and conclusions. The report also was submitted to USDA and the Office of Homeland Security for a classification review. Because the government has been aware of the report's main recommendations for several months, it is possible that authorities have already taken some steps to act on them.

At its own discretion, the National Academies decided to remove certain detailed and specific information from the report. An appendix of the material that was removed is not for distribution to the general public.

"We are convinced that this report will increase our security by helping to inform and assist the nation in improving its awareness, capabilities, and plans to defend against threats of agricultural bioterrorism," wrote the presidents of the National Academies in a foreword to the report.

Although USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has several emergency plans for dealing with the unintentional introduction of plant and animal pests and pathogens, the committee could not find, as of last spring,

any publicly available in-depth national plan to defend against the intentional introduction of biological agents in an act of terror. The committee also said that significant gaps exist in U.S. knowledge about foreign pests and pathogens.

A comprehensive plan to counter agricultural bioterrorism should define the role each federal and state agency will play in preventing and responding to an attack and how they will cooperate with one another, the report says. The agencies involved also should develop a consensus list of biological agents that could potentially be used in an attack. The agencies should further agree to a shorter list of agents -- representative of various types of agents and the plant or animal species they would target -- for which preparations can be made. Developing countermeasures for this subset of agents would be valuable to officials and front-line personnel in the event of an attack, even if the agent ultimately confronted does not happen to be on the short list.

In addition, credible spokespeople are needed and potential attack scenarios should be developed for training purposes. The report recommends building upon USDA's current emergency plans for coping with unintentional introduction of pests and pathogens, but emphasizes that the new plan must be designed specifically for terrorist threats.

As part of the plan, the United States needs to create a network of laboratories to coordinate the detection of bioterror agents in the event of an attack. USDA appears to have budgeted for such a network in the next fiscal year, the committee said. A nationwide agricultural bioterrorism communication system, modeled after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's "Health Alert Network," also is necessary. And new technologies are needed to aid in the early detection of bioterror agents, especially genetically engineered ones. Early detection is key to stopping the spread of an agricultural bioterror attack.

The report was already in final stages of preparation when President Bush called for transferring the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to the proposed Department of Homeland Security, so the committee did not analyze the significance of such a move.

The study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The National Research Council is the principal operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. It is a private, nonprofit institution that provides science and technology advice under a congressional charter. A committee roster follows.

Printed copies of [Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism](#) are available for purchase from the [National Academy Press](#) Web site or by calling (202) 334-3313 or 1-800-624-6242. Reporters may obtain a copy from the Office of News and Public Information (contacts listed above).

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<http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309085454?OpenDocument>

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Washington Post  
September 20, 2002  
Pg. 21

## **Hussein Denies U.S. Weapons Allegations**

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 19 -- Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared today that his country "is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons" and urged the United Nations to resist the Bush administration's campaign to obtain U.N. backing for a military strike against his government.

In a message read before the U.N. General Assembly by Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, Hussein cast his country as a victim of U.S. aggression and alleged the United States had "fabricated" charges that Baghdad has been secretly building an arsenal of banned weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi president also charged that Washington's military ambitions were aimed at defending Israel's interests in the Middle East and acquiring control of Iraq's oil fields.

Hussein's message mixed continued defiance of the United States with softer language rebutting charges that he was a threat to peace. Coming three days after Iraq invited U.N. weapons inspectors back into the country, it represented an escalation in the Iraqi leader's efforts to thwart the administration's plans even as it sought to limit the scope of any new inspections regime.

The speech was received with warm applause from the delegates in the General Assembly chamber, although the U.S. delegation remained impassive as Sabri ended his remarks.

"I hereby declare before you that Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons," the Iraqi foreign minister said, reading from Hussein's message to the world body. "The U.S. administration wants to destroy Iraq in order to control the Middle East oil. In targeting Iraq, the United States administration is acting on behalf of Zionism, which has been killing the heroic people of Palestine, destroying their property, murdering their children and seeking to impose their domination on the whole world."

The Iraqi remarks came as the United States, backed by Britain, stepped up pressure on the Security Council to approve tough action against Baghdad. The United States is seeking Security Council support for a resolution authorizing military action against Baghdad if it refuses to grant unfettered access to U.N. weapons inspectors and is

informing council members that if they do not act, the administration believes it has the authority to move against Iraq unilaterally under the U.N. Charter.

In Washington, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the speech "presented nothing new and was more of the same."

"The speech is an attempt to lure the world down the same dead-end road that the world has traveled before and, in that, it represents a disappointing failure by Iraq," Fleischer said.

Many countries, particularly Russia, China and most of the Arab world, continued to press the United Nations to give Iraq another chance to prove it has dismantled its weapons program and destroyed its weapons stockpiles. "We welcome Iraq's decision," said Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia. "This is a step toward detente in the region. Tunisia supports the Arab position, which is against any strike against an Arab state."

In his message, Hussein accused President Bush of presenting the American public and the United Nations "with the utmost distortions" relating to Iraq's weapons program and by insinuating that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.

He warned that if the Bush administration succeeded in toppling his government, other countries would be subject to U.S. domination. "God forbid, it would dictate on you what each country needs for its economic development, what quantities of oil it is allowed to buy, and what prices," he said.

Hussein reiterated Iraq's invitation to U.N. weapons inspectors or any other foreign politicians or scientists, saying that Baghdad is "ready to cooperate with the Security Council" on arranging new inspections, which were suspended in 1998 after repeated intransigence by the Iraqi government. But he added that Iraq and the United Nations would have to strike "a balanced formula" for inspections that would "reassure Iraq with regard to its security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and its right to choosing its own way with out interference."

He also demanded that the United Nations lift sanctions on Iraq and force Israel to abide by Security Council resolutions calling for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including Israel's nuclear weapons program.

U.S. officials are concerned that Iraq intends to block inspections of a broad range of national security sites in Iraq, citing agreements with the United Nations that require the inspectors to follow a cumbersome set of procedures that can delay access to such sites for days.

Testifying before the House International Relations Committee today, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said the Iraqi remarks demonstrated Hussein "is already walking away" from promises to unconditionally allow arms inspectors to return.

The United States and Britain are seeking to tighten the inspections regime by negotiating ironclad assurances that U.N. inspectors would be granted unfettered access at a moment's notice to any location in Iraq. They have insisted that the U.N.'s chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, be given new instructions on how to carry out tough inspections in Iraq.

Blix has said he is obliged to honor a 1995 agreement between U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Iraq that requires foreign diplomats be flown to Baghdad to accompany U.N. inspectors hunting for weapons at "presidential sites," a series of palaces and other national security institutions that the Iraqi government insists are off-limits. "This administration is not going to live with these arrangements," said one council diplomat. "Blix must be allowed to visit any site at any time and nothing is off limits."

Blix provided the Security Council today with a detailed time line for renewed inspections that he will present to the Iraqi government during talks in Vienna at the end of the month. He said that the first team of U.N. inspectors could arrive in Baghdad on Oct. 15, and that it would take at least 120 days before he could inform the council precisely which Iraqi weapons systems need to be dismantled. It would be months more before the United Nations could determine whether Iraq is fully cooperating.

John D. Negroponte, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, asked Blix to shorten the timetable, accelerating the period before the United Nations can test Iraq's willingness to disarm.

He also provided the council with key elements the United States wants in a new Security Council resolution. They include a condemnation of Iraq's violations of past Security Council resolutions, a detailed list of obligations Iraq must fulfill, a clear deadline for Iraqi compliance, and a warning that Iraq's failure to comply will not be tolerated.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41742-2002Sep19.html>

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# New U.N. Inspectors In Iraq Would Face Old Restrictions

By David S. Cloud, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

As the United Nations considers whether to send weapons inspectors back into Iraq, a major issue is whether they can do their job effectively.

The last time inspectors went into Iraq, it didn't go well. The question now is whether new inspectors will be tied down by past restrictions the U.N. has accepted or by renewed Iraqi intransigence. Here is a look what happened before and the potential problems ahead:

## **Q: What powers did inspectors have originally?**

A: In theory, they were quite broad. In a resolution passed after the 1991 Gulf War, the Security Council created the U.N. Special Commission -- UNSCOM -- authorizing it to carry out "immediate on-site inspections" of weapons sites disclosed by Baghdad and "any additional locations."

The resolution, which passed April 3, 1991, gave Iraq 15 days to provide a detailed accounting of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapon stockpiles, as well as its missiles with ranges of more than 150 kilometers. Iraq had 45 days to "unconditionally accept the destruction" of its weapons stockpiles after inspections began. The International Atomic Energy Agency had responsibility for nuclear sites. But when UNSCOM started work that June, Baghdad stonewalled.

## **Q: How did UNSCOM respond?**

A: It put together an aggressive strategy of surprise inspections and intelligence-gathering to ferret out where Iraq was hiding weapons materials. UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus arranged for a U.S. spy plane to take surveillance photos.

## **Q: Did UNSCOM's approach work?**

A: Despite Iraqi evasions, UNSCOM uncovered and destroyed large quantities of chemical agents and production facilities. But when Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, defected in 1995, he revealed new details about Iraq's weapons programs. As UNSCOM stepped up its work, Iraq began denying or delaying inspectors' access to "sensitive sites."

Mr. Ekeus negotiated an agreement in June 1996 under which Iraq committed to provide immediate access to any site in return for a pledge that the U.N. would respect Iraqi sovereignty. Mr. Ekeus appeared to have given away little, but his implicit concession that some Iraqi sites were different created problems for UNSCOM. Baghdad began violating the agreement almost immediately, and the following year declared off limits Mr. Hussein's presidential palaces, which are large compounds around the country that include more than 1,000 buildings and cover hundreds of acres.

## **Q: Didn't the Security Council back up the inspectors?**

A: Not very effectively. The Security Council passed resolutions from 1996 to 1998 citing Iraqi violations of earlier resolutions and demanded that inspectors be given unrestricted access. But there was little support on the Security Council for using force to make Baghdad comply.

In February 1998, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan negotiated special procedures for inspecting eight so-called presidential sites. The deal included giving Iraq advance notice of about a week when UNSCOM wanted access to these sites. Although inspectors eventually were admitted to all the sites, Iraq later stopped cooperating again. Fed up, the U.S. and Britain carried out air strikes, and inspectors haven't been back since.

## **Q: If the new inspectors go back in now, how will it be different?**

A: Because of a series of deadlines in a 1999 resolution setting up a new inspection organization, U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, inspectors are under time pressure to complete work quickly and declare whether Iraq is providing full details of its weapons activities.

Once they begin, inspectors have 60 days to give Iraq a set of "clearly defined and precise" tasks to complete to prove it is disarming. If UNMOVIC decides Iraq is cooperating after four months, the Security Council can vote on suspending sanctions on Iraq for 120-day periods.

## **Q: What's the problem with this arrangement?**

A: Although the U.S. spearheaded the 1999 resolution, the Bush administration now fears it leaves Mr. Hussein in the driver's seat. Before the inspectors go in, the Bush administration wants a U.N. resolution passed that declares Iraq already in "material breach" of past resolutions and lays out unequivocal benchmarks Baghdad would have to meet quickly to show it is serious about disarming.

U.S. officials doubt Mr. Hussein would comply, paving the way for military action. But Security Council members Russia, China and France are reluctant to support this approach so far.

If inspectors return without tough new marching orders, Mr. Blix will have to decide whether to abide by Mr.

Annan's deal limiting inspectors' access to presidential sites. Mr. Blix has said that he may feel compelled to honor



the agreements, since it was negotiated by the secretary general. If the deal stands, it may hamper the new inspectors' ability to search anywhere for remaining Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

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USA Today  
September 20, 2002  
Pg. 6

## Inspections Could Take Months

By Barbara Slavin, USA Today

Restarting weapons inspection in Iraq and gauging whether leader Saddam Hussein has chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs could take many months. That's much longer than the weeks the Bush administration wants before determining whether to use military force to destroy any weapons programs and depose Saddam. Some key questions and answers:

### **Q. Why so long?**

A. First, the headquarters and equipment that inspectors left behind four years ago when they exited the country on the eve of U.S. and British bombing raids are in a shambles and will have to be almost completely reassembled. Second, Iraq is roughly the size of California, and a relatively small team of United Nations inspectors will have to travel to and thoroughly scrutinize hundreds of sites.

### **Q. What are the first steps the inspectors must take?**

A. If the U.N. Security Council approves, an advance team will go to Iraq next month. They will begin by examining the Baghdad building used by inspectors in the past to organize their work and analyze findings. A U.N. official says visitors to the site in 1999 found dirt and pigeon droppings covering computers and laboratory equipment. Members of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) say they will also have to procure new equipment, including helicopters, jeeps, computers, sensors for chemical and biological agents, cameras, protective clothing for inspectors, radios, walkie-talkies, satellite phones and laboratory equipment. Inspectors will also have to revisit about 750 sites regularly monitored in the past. These include weapons plants and factories that have dual military/civilian uses, such as breweries that could also be used to produce biological weapons.

UNMOVIC has about 30 inspectors based in New York and another 220 on call around the world, a spokesman says. It could take weeks to mobilize and deploy personnel.

### **Q. Are the Iraqis likely to cooperate?**

A. U.N. officials are hopeful, but Bush administration officials doubt Iraq will ever come clean about weapons programs banned after the Gulf War in 1991. Though the Iraqis have promised to allow inspectors back without conditions, they have not promised the "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" called for in resolution after resolution.

In testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday, Secretary of State Colin Powell recounted a series of clashes between UNMOVIC's predecessor, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), and Iraqi officials. In 1991, Iraqi personnel fired warning shots at inspectors to keep them away from suspicious vehicles, Powell said. Iraqis also held inspectors at an inspection site for four days when they refused to give up a set of documents.

UNSCOM veterans recall numerous times when the Iraqis removed material from the back of suspect sites as inspectors were coming in the front door. On July 18, 1998, Iraqis literally ripped from the hands of an inspector a document that detailed chemical weapons Iraq used against its neighbor, Iran, during their war in 1980-88. The document showed Iraq had dropped fewer bombs than it claimed and thus retained more chemical weapons than it had declared.

### **Q. What other obstacles are inspectors likely to face?**

A. Even if Iraqis do not repeat those ploys, it will be difficult to achieve the access inspectors need to determine whether weapons and weapons-making programs exist. For example, Charles Duelfer, the deputy head of UNSCOM, notes it will be almost impossible to visit suspect sites without tipping off the Iraqis. In the past, he says, it was necessary to give notice when inspectors flew around the country to prevent their planes from being targeted by Iraqi air defenses that try to shoot down U.S. and British planes patrolling no-fly zones in the north and south of the Iraq.

There is also the problem of interviewing the 300-400 Iraqi scientists known to have worked on weapons in the past. Duelfer says they will be unable to speak freely if Iraqi "minders" are present. He suggests that foreign safe haven be offered to important scientists and their families. "The people are the key," he says. "We know all the key engineers and scientists. They should be asked to account for their activities from 1998 until today."

**Q. What is the timetable for UNMOVIC to report to the Security Council?**

A. Under old guidelines, inspectors have 60 days after returning to Iraq to prepare a "work program" listing "key remaining disarmament tasks." If inspectors eventually report that Iraq has "cooperated in all respects," for a period of 120 days, sanctions that deprive Iraq of control over its oil revenue are supposed to be lifted. These guidelines are likely to be changed, U.S. officials say.

[http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-09-19-inspect-qa\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-09-19-inspect-qa_x.htm)

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Business Week  
SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

## A U.S. Gift to Iraq: Deadly Viruses

**A 1995 letter from the Centers for Disease Control lists all the biological materials sent to Saddam's scientists for 10 years**

As the West Nile Virus spreads nationwide, some congressional leaders are asking whether the mosquito-borne illness could be linked to terrorism or to Iraq's bioweapons program. If so, a more troubling question may be whether Iraq's weapons efforts were unwittingly helped by U.S. scientists.

In a [previously unreleased letter](#) obtained by *BusinessWeek*, the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention admitted that the CDC supplied Iraqi scientists with nearly two dozen viral and bacterial samples in the 1980s, including the plague, West Nile, and dengue fever. The letter, written in 1995 by then-CDC director David Satcher, was in response to a congressional inquiry.

The CDC was abiding by World Health Organization guidelines that encouraged the free exchange of biological samples among medical researchers--before Congress imposed tighter controls on biological exports in 1995, says Thomas Monath, who headed the CDC lab where the viruses came from during the period in which they were handed over. "It was a very innocent request, which we were obligated to fulfill," recalls Monath. Plus, in the 1980s, Iraq and the U.S. were allies.

Scientists say the West Nile strain that so far has killed 46 people in the U.S. is not the same strain provided to Iraq, and they find it unlikely that it could have mutated. They also question whether terrorists would even try to develop West Nile as a weapon when more virulent viruses are available.

Still, some observers believe there should have been more prudence. "We were freely exchanging pathogenic materials with a country that we knew had an active biological warfare program," says James Tuite, a former Senate investigator who helped publicize Gulf War Syndrome. "The consequences should have been foreseen."

*By Dean Foust and John Carey*

[http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2002/nf20020920\\_3025.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2002/nf20020920_3025.htm)

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New York Times  
September 20, 2002

## Experts Say Nuclear Plants Can Survive Jetliner Crash

By Matthew L. Wald

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — Seeking to counter assertions that the nation's nuclear plants are vulnerable to attacks like the one on the World Trade Center, 19 prominent nuclear experts have concluded that a reactor containment building could easily withstand the force of a jetliner crash.

But the federal laboratory that conducted a major test cited by the experts says its experiment was not meant to demonstrate anything about reactors' structural soundness.

The 19 experts, many of them retired, work or worked at universities or companies that build or operate reactors. In an article on Friday in the journal Science, they dismiss fears voiced by opponents of nuclear power that the nation's reactors are vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

"We read that airplanes can fly through the reinforced, steel-lined 1.5-meter-thick concrete walls surrounding a nuclear reactor," the article says, "and inevitably cause a meltdown resulting in 'tens of thousands of deaths' and 'make a huge area uninhabitable for centuries,' to quote some recent stories." But, they add, "no airplane regardless of size, can fly through such a wall."

The article says the scenario "was actually tested in 1988 by mounting an unmanned plane on rails and 'flying' it at 215 meters per second (about 480 m.p.h.) into a test wall." The engines penetrated only about two inches and the fuselage even less, according to the article.

But the relevance of the test, conducted at Sandia National Laboratories, has long been in dispute. People who opposed nuclear power before Sept. 11 pointed out that the test wall moved several feet; the movement reduced the damage by absorbing some of the force of impact.

At Sandia, a spokesman, John German, said the point of the test was to move the wall, as a way to measure the impact forces. The test was sponsored by the Muto Institute of Structural Mechanics Inc., of Tokyo, as a preliminary step in building a computer model of such impacts, but the Japanese decided not to sponsor the next step, Mr. German said.

Asked if it showed that a plane could not penetrate a dome, he said, "We've been trying like heck to shoot down this rumor."

Mr. German said: "That test was designed to measure the impact force of a fighter jet. But the wall was not being tested. No structure was being tested."

The nuclear experts contend that the test makes their point nevertheless. The opponents of nuclear power have argued that the plane in the Sandia test, an F-4 Phantom, weighs far less than a jumbo jet.

But James Muckerheide, a nuclear engineer who is the co-director of the Center for Nuclear Technology and Society at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, on whose work the authors relied, said in an e-mail response to a reporter's question that penetrating a reactor containment building would take far more than an airliner. Compared with the F-4, Mr. Muckerheide said, "a large passenger aircraft is a slow, empty, tin can."

"The mass of the aircraft can put a heavy compression load on the containment structure," he said, "but it has negligible penetrating ability."

The containment building can withstand huge compression loads, he argued. The fact that the block in the Sandia test moved had a trivial effect, Mr. Muckerheide said.

Whether a containment building is the soft spot of a nuclear plant is also not clear. Most of the radioactivity in a power plant is in the spent fuel pool, which, critics note, is usually in a building that is far less sturdy.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is conducting an engineering analysis of the vulnerability of power plants to aircraft attack, Sue Gagner, an agency spokeswoman, said. "If warranted by the ongoing detailed analysis, we will consider changes," Ms. Gagner said.

Articles in Science, like those in many scientific journals, are reviewed before publication by experts not connected with the authors. But the magazine's editor in chief, Donald Kennedy, said that if there was a difference between the authors and the group that performed the experiment, "they're going to thrash it out in our letters column, and we'll let them do it."

The magazine is published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/national/20NUKE.html>

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Stratfor.com  
September 17, 2002

## **Rumsfeld Indicates Nuclear Status Key To Pre-Emption Policy**

Summary -- During a press briefing Sept. 16, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said North Korea has nuclear weapons. His comment, made while answering why Washington is not considering a pre-emptive strike on North Korea, suggests the U.S. military will attack a country to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons but will not

attack if it already has such arms. This distinction may encourage countries like Iraq to do just what Washington fears most: demonstrate a credible nuclear threat to avoid being attacked.

Analysis -- U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked Sept. 16 during a press briefing to explain why Iraq, which is developing weapons of mass destruction, is a potential target of a U.S. pre-emptive strike while the two other members of the "axis of evil" -- North Korea and Iran -- are not. Rumsfeld's answer was not entirely clear, but one notable comment he made was that North Korea "has nuclear weapons."

This was quite a remark in and of itself. Washington has wavered continually on North Korea's nuclear capabilities, alternating between warning that Pyongyang is capable of producing one or two crude nuclear weapons and saying the country already possesses one or two nuclear devices. Rumsfeld apparently has laid the debate to rest, stating clearly that Pyongyang does have nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

What is just as interesting is the idea that North Korea, a nuclear state and, according to Rumsfeld, "one of the world's worst proliferators" of ballistic missiles and missile technology, is not a potential target of U.S. strikes, yet Iraq is despite the fact that it has no missiles capable of threatening the mainland United States and has yet to develop or obtain nuclear weapons. If pushed to the wall, North Korea potentially could launch a nuclear strike at U.S. troop concentrations in neighboring countries or even at the United States itself. Iraq, however, can do no such thing.

In essence, Washington will not pre-emptively strike North Korea because it is already a nuclear state, but Iraq is fair game because it is vital to prevent it from becoming a nuclear state. The message this sends could be counterproductive for Washington. Basically, if a country wants to avoid becoming the target of a pre-emptive U.S. attack, it must demonstrate a credible threat of already possessing nuclear weapons.

So if al Qaeda or Iraq or any other nation or non-state actor wants to keep the U.S. military at bay, it must be seen as already having nuclear weapons and the means to deploy them. In a way, news out of Ukraine Sept. 17 that there are still 200 Soviet-era nuclear warheads unaccounted for in the country could play into Iraq's or al Qaeda's hands.

While this disclosure by a Ukrainian Communist Party leader appears largely related to a political crisis going on in the country, the idea that there are 200 nuclear warheads floating around raises the specter that anyone -- al Qaeda and Iraq included -- could be holding these now.

On the one hand, this may heighten Washington's sense of urgency in striking Iraq before it gains such weapons. On the other hand, if Washington believes Baghdad already has nukes, it may have to rethink its entire policy on Iraq.

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Washington Post  
September 22, 2002  
Pg. 15

## **Study: Military System Can Detect Epidemics**

A new U.S. military health surveillance network caught an outbreak of diarrhea at a Marine facility before doctors were aware of it and could detect bioterror attacks and natural epidemics, one of the organizers said.

The network is small but has been expanded since last year's Sept. 11 attacks. It could serve as the basis for a nationwide early warning system, according to Maj. Michael Lewis, an Army physician.

The system, called Essence, tracks reports of symptoms and the diagnoses made by military doctors. It recently added information from two large civilian health maintenance organizations.

"We believe that this surveillance system can provide early detection of disease outbreaks such as influenza and possibly intentional acts," Lewis and colleagues wrote in a study to be published in the October issue of the American Journal of Preventive Medicine.

Early detection would help health officials focus limited resources and contain outbreaks, according to the researchers from the Department of Defense Global Emerging Infections System and the Walter Reed Army Institute in Washington.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49801-2002Sep21.html>

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Los Angeles Times  
September 21, 2002  
Pg. 11

## **Army Delays Burning Weapons, Citing Environmental Concerns**

By Associated Press

ANNISTON, Ala. -- The Army has postponed plans to begin burning Cold War-era chemical weapons at its new incinerator next month, citing new objections from state environmental officials.

The Army's spokesman for the project, Mike Abrams, said burning would likely begin after Jan. 1.

The Army had planned to begin destroying 2,254 tons of deadly Cold War-era weapons at the Anniston Army Depot in late October.

But the state Department of Environmental Management asked for a delay Sept. 12, complaining that Army laboratory burn tests were not done according to procedures approved by the agency.

Abrams said the tests will be redone to meet state guidelines.

The announcement Friday came hours after the Birmingham News reported that Army officials exchanged e-mails outlining a plan to deflect criticism of the incinerator by embarrassing local officials over their stand on emergency response training.

But Abrams said the newspaper's report did not influence the timing of the announcement.

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Birmingham (AL) News  
September 21, 2002

## **Incinerator Scheme Unauthorized, Army Says**

By Mary Orndorff, News Washington correspondent

WASHINGTON -- A strategy by Pentagon employees to discredit Alabama officials in their dispute over the chemical weapons incinerator in Anniston does not reflect the true intentions of their Army bosses, a spokesman said Friday.

But the man Calhoun County leaders say they can no longer work with because of the scheme revealed Thursday in a series of internal e-mails remains on the job.

"The suggested motivations and tactics detailed in the e-mails do not reflect the intent of the leadership of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment," an Army spokesman said in a written statement. "Mr. (Larry) Skelly remains in his current assignment."

The Calhoun County Commission wants Skelly, who wrote that he wanted to improve the Army's image by shifting blame for the unfinished emergency plan to Alabama, to be dismissed or reassigned. The strategy is proof that the Army has been deceitful in its dealings over how best to protect the citizens living near the incinerator, the commissioners said Friday.

"It would be nice if we had a relationship where we were totally honest with each other," Commissioner Eli Henderson said.

Commissioners also insisted that Congress call a hearing on the status of the chemical demilitarization program, including the incomplete and unsettled emergency response plan in Calhoun County.

U.S. Rep. Bob Riley, R-Ashland, on Friday scheduled a meeting next week with Mario Fiori, the assistant secretary of the Army for installations and environment. It was Skelly and another assistant in Fiori's office who wrote of their desire to lure Alabama officials into appearing to obstruct progress on the work in Anniston.

"Instead of devising a public relations strategy to harm the public image of state and local officials, the Army should be concentrating instead on working with the relevant leaders to develop solutions to the many outstanding problems," Riley wrote.

The employees, who mentioned in the e-mails that they were acting with Fiori's knowledge, said they would "challenge" Alabama to accelerate the schedule for emergency response training exercises and then publicize the state's refusal. One message likens the tactic to throwing down a gauntlet.

"Dr. Fiori wishes to take the offensive in Alabama and become proactive rather than reactive to the negative media coverage the last year," according to a Sept. 3 e-mail, one of several provided Thursday to The News. The plan would have included issuing news releases to make it seem it was local agencies, not federal, hampering work.

**Preparedness plans:**

The Army said Friday it would continue to work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency to plan more response exercises in communities around the incinerator.

"The Army has as its highest priority in the chemical demilitarization program the goal of providing maximum protection to the public, the environment and the workforce," the statement said.

The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program requires a combined effort of several agencies to educate residents near the Anniston Army Depot on what to do if there is a leak and provide them the necessary gear. For years, those agencies have disagreed about the details of that plan's effectiveness and cost. State and county emergency response officials have declined to participate in some of the training exercises recently because they do not have the equipment they've been promised.

The result is that the Calhoun County Commission, Gov. Don Siegelman, U.S. Sen. Richard Shelby and others believe the incinerator should not be allowed to start until their remaining safety demands are met.

Some 2,254 tons of deadly gases, nerve agents and explosives will be destroyed in the Army's Anniston incinerator. About 7 percent of the nation's chemical weapons stockpile is stored in earthen bunkers at the depot, a potential hazard to the community because of leaks.

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Washington Post  
September 23, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **Smallpox Vaccine Guidelines Readied**

### ***Emergency Plan To Cover All of U.S.***

By Ceci Connolly, Washington Post Staff Writer

Federal health officials will issue detailed guidelines today for vaccinating the entire U.S. population against smallpox within five days of an outbreak of the dreaded disease.

Intended as a blueprint for state and local health officials nationwide, the unprecedented move reveals a growing belief within the Bush administration that even one case of smallpox anywhere in the Western Hemisphere would signify a terrorist assault and should therefore trigger a far more massive response than officials had previously suggested, said two experts involved in the planning.

The manual being sent to health commissioners in the 50 states and the District of Columbia offers advice on how to operate mass vaccination clinics -- from logistical issues such as parking to the medical challenge of treating severe side effects. It offers suggestions on utilizing the National Guard, recruiting translators, building intricate data systems and contending with extreme weather conditions.

For now, the Bush administration does not anticipate inoculating the nation's 288 million residents -- partly because the threat of an attack is unknown and partly because the vaccine can cause severe, sometimes fatal, side effects.

The vaccination plan would be activated only if an outbreak of the deadly disease occurred, an event administration officials characterize as unlikely but not impossible.

"This is a very detailed, thoughtful recipe for response" to a bioterror incident, said Michael Osterholm, a public health expert at the University of Minnesota who is advising the federal government. Using the template, states and cities should be able to devise plans "for vaccinating the largest amount of people in the shortest time possible," he said.

Smallpox has not been seen in the United States for decades, and the disease was declared eradicated worldwide in 1980. Still, it is perhaps the most feared biological weapon because it is contagious, often incurable and can kill at least one-third of its victims. Since routine vaccination was halted in this country in 1971, there is little immunity left in the population and little expertise in dealing with the disease or vaccine.

Only the United States and Russia are known to possess stocks of the virus, but security experts fear a hostile nation such as Iraq may have acquired a cache of the virus. Vice President Cheney has contended the risk of attack may necessitate inoculating every American as a protective measure.

"One of the real concerns about Saddam Hussein, as well, is his biological weapons capability," he said recently on NBC's "Meet the Press." "The fact that he may, at some point, try to use smallpox, anthrax, plague, some other kind of biological agent against other nations, possibly including even the United States."

Ten months ago, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson signed a \$428 million contract to buy a dose of vaccine for every American. Production is under way, and the United States already has stockpiled nearly 100 million doses.

Federal experts since have been working furiously on two tracks: a vaccination program for the emergency medical workers most likely to see an initial case of smallpox, and a mass vaccination plan if an attack occurs, said Julie L. Gerberding, director of the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

"We have to be able to do both," she said in a recent interview.

Pre-vaccination, as it is known in public health, would be targeted to medical personnel, who could respond to an attack knowing they are protected. Plans are underway to begin vaccinating tens of thousands of "first responders," perhaps by the end of this year.

There have been no plans to make the vaccine available to the public in the absence of any cases. But officials have been debating what would be the best response to an outbreak. Last winter, the CDC released a blueprint for containing a smallpox outbreak based on the "ring vaccination" strategy used during the campaign to eradicate the disease. Ring vaccination involves starting with the people closest to an exposure and working out in concentric circles.

There is growing recognition, however, that although that approach worked well for a naturally occurring outbreak during a time when air travel was rare, it would be no match for a terrorist with the ability to release the virus in several locations simultaneously, said Jerome M. Hauer, acting assistant secretary for HHS's Public Health Emergency Preparedness.

"You begin with ring vaccination, but in a big outbreak obviously mass vaccination would be part of the plan," he said. Federal officials are requiring states to develop plans for vaccination within five days, he said, because it is widely believed that even if a person has been exposed to the virus, a vaccine given in that time frame will provide immunity.

Administration officials refused to release the manual until state health commissioners receive it. But in interviews with The Washington Post, several described the scenario for responding to a smallpox attack.

At the first hint of a smallpox case, the CDC in Atlanta would begin dispatching emergency teams to the area to confirm the outbreak and begin vaccination.

Yet the suspicion that terrorists would strike more than one location "would require us to be in many, many places simultaneously," one federal planner said. "That would completely deplete our assets."

Instead of sending its staff to every corner of the country, the CDC plans to ship the vaccine and let states handle inoculation, Osterholm said. The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, he said, "can be at any hamlet in this country in 12 hours." Officials have not said how much it would cost or how it would be paid for.

HHS has received assurance that even if air traffic were halted, as it was immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, planes transporting vaccine would have clearance. Vaccine would be delivered in waves much the way a grocery store receives its weekly shipment of milk in batches.

The manual, which is almost 100 pages, was developed in consultation with local health officers, medical societies, the military and businesses such as UPS and Federal Express that have logistical expertise, said an adviser to Thompson. Much of its contents were based on previous large-scale vaccination programs, such as the 1995 meningitis outbreak in Mankato, Minn., in which 26,000 people were inoculated in four days.

Each state must determine where vaccination clinics would be located, who would staff them, how to counsel people on the potential risks of vaccination and most importantly, how to move hundreds of thousands of people through the process calmly and quickly. Some communities might select large shopping malls or sports arenas because of parking availability; metropolitan centers might rely on buses and subways to bring people to clinics.

Every state will need provisions for everything from inclement weather to the person who faints at the sight of a needle, Osterholm said. "Are you going to have a line stretching 2 1/2 blocks in the snow or blistering heat?" he said, describing one challenge.

The guidelines urge states to address the need for bathrooms, transportation, a media strategy and a medical questionnaire, as well as how to separate and treat any potential smallpox cases. They also include sample consent forms if states must administer an unlicensed vaccine. Two administration sources said they hope the vaccine soon will be re-licensed.

Although bioterrorism is a new challenge, large vaccination campaigns are not, Osterholm said. "The public health system delivers vaccine to our nation's children every day, overcoming language, transportation and financial hurdles," he noted.

Aside from an assumption that some health care workers will be vaccinated before an attack, the document does not resolve enormous questions surrounding that issue.

Last month, Thompson sent recommendations to the White House on how many people should be inoculated in advance. Although a CDC advisory panel has recommended vaccinating about 20,000 medical personnel, several administration sources said President Bush is weighing a proposal on the order of 500,000 people.

"Until a decision is made on pre-vaccination," Hauer said, "our efforts continue to focus on bioterrorism detection and response."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52992-2002Sep22.html>

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## **CDC welcomes rise in bioterrorism scares**

By RANDOLPH E. SCHMID, ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON (AP) - An increase in the number of false alarms reporting possible anthrax or smallpox over the past year shows local health departments are on guard for bioterrorism, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said Thursday.

"We love these false alarms because they tell us the system is working," Dr. Julie Gerberding told an American Medical Association science writers conference.

While she didn't give details on the number of such calls, Gerberding said requests from state and local health departments for assistance in evaluating a disease are up sharply since last year's anthrax attacks.

"It gives us confidence that if there is a first case of smallpox" it will be found and reported rapidly, she said.

Gerberding said that, unlike before the terrorist attacks, reports now come from all parts of the country and from small rural health departments as well as those in large urban areas.

During the past year, she said, her Atlanta-based agency has distributed \$918 million to state and local health departments and "substantial progress" has been made on the local level.

The funds are for such things as building better laboratories and detection systems and improving surveillance that might indicate a covert attack.

"All preparedness is really local," she stressed. The CDC can provide support, resources and supplies, but doesn't tell local officials how to respond to an emergency.

CDC has also increased the national drug stockpile so that materials and staff can be sent anywhere needed quickly. Gerberding said vaccines, antibiotics and emergency medical devices can be delivered anywhere in the United States within 12 hours.

She acknowledged that the CDC had problems in communicating with the public last fall and said that is being corrected.

For example, she said, the agency's publication *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* will be adding a new section, called MMWR Dispatches, which can be sent out instantly with new information rather than being published only in the weekly issue.

<http://newsobserver.com/24hour/science/story/542138p-4286180c.html>

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## **The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention**

Proceedings of an Expert Workshop Held on May 29-31, 2002, in Washington D.C.

Jonathan B. Tucker, Editor

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

<http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/cbwnp/pubs/cwc02.pdf>

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