



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 305, 3 December 2003

Articles & Other Documents:

[Combating Terrorism: Improvements Needed in Southern Command's Antiterrorism Approach for In-Transit Forces at Seaports \(GAO Report\)](#)

[Smugglers Enticed by Dirty Bomb Components](#)

[Conviction underscores threat of nuclear theft](#)

[Official: Al-Qaeda Plans Something Big](#)

[Iran-Pakistan Atomic Link Seen](#)

[U.S., Allies Prepare Solution To N. Korea Nuclear Dispute](#)

[Iran Says It Won't Scrap Uranium Plans](#)

[Iraqi Physicists Overstated Bomb Course, Book Says](#)

[Run-Up To Talks On N. Korea Falters](#)

[National Guard To Take On More Homeland Defense Duties](#)

[Chem-Bio Defense Needs Common Standards](#)

[FBI Seeks To Delay Suit On Anthrax](#)

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

Combating Terrorism: Improvements Needed in Southern Command's Antiterrorism Approach for In-Transit Forces at Seaports.

GAO-04-80NI, October 31.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-80NI>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Smugglers Enticed by Dirty Bomb Components

Radioactive Materials Are Sought Worldwide

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

TBILISI, Georgia -- When police caught up with him on May 31, Tedo Makeria was headed toward Tbilisi's main rail station, his lethal cargo hidden in boxes lined with lead so thick his taxi sagged from the weight. The suspicious policeman who halted the cab had barely cracked the trunk when he noticed the boxes and the distinctive labels that warned, "Danger: Radiation."

More police arrived within minutes, and a Geiger counter was produced. As Makeria smoked nervously in the back seat, the officers flipped the instrument's "on" switch and watched the needle leap off the screen.

"At first we were just shocked," Maj. Leri Omiadze, the ranking officer at the scene, recalled later. "Then we all started backing away slowly."

Inside Makeria's boxes were two capsules of highly radioactive metals -- strontium and cesium -- of a type that terrorism experts say can be used in a dirty bomb, a device that spews radiation but does not trigger a nuclear explosion. A third container held a vial of brown liquid that Georgian police identified as the substance used in mustard gas, one of the earliest chemical weapons. Only later did police learn Makeria's role in the affair. He was a courier for criminals trading in components and materials for weapons of mass destruction.

In a scheme still not fully understood, the boxes were delivered to Makeria by another Georgian, a man with a history of drug offenses. Makeria's job was to carry the boxes by train from Tbilisi to Georgia's Adzharia province, a troubled enclave on the southwestern frontier of the country. From there, police believe, they were to be transported by other couriers across the border into Turkey or perhaps even Iran, for delivery to an expectant customer. The buyer's identity remains unknown.

What is certain is that the Georgians who sought to profit from selling components of a dirty bomb are far from unique.

There have been dozens of cases of trafficking in radiological materials over the past three years, along with what some weapons experts describe as a disturbing new trend. While most sellers of such materials traditionally have been amateurs -- opportunists and lone actors in search of easy profits -- authorities are now seeing a surge of interest among criminal groups. In a string of incidents that stretches from the Caucasus and Eastern Europe to West Africa and South America, gangs have stalked and stolen radiological devices to sell for profit or to use in crimes ranging from extortion to murder.

The new interest in radiological material by smugglers and criminal networks complicates an already difficult task confronting governments: how to stop terrorists from obtaining any of the tens of thousands of powerful radiological sources around the world that are currently in private hands or have simply been discarded. In Georgia and other unstable corners of the world, radioactive materials are turning up on black markets alongside more traditional contraband, such as drugs or Kalashnikov rifles.

They are a currency of the global gray zone, a dangerous mixture of failed states, porous borders and weak law enforcement, where the tools of terrorism are bought and sold.

Crude but Effective

The involvement of professional smugglers and criminals only increases the odds that some of the radiological materials will end up in the hands of terrorists, U.S. experts say. Already, the sheer volume of such materials in circulation has prompted scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to conclude, in a study released in September, that a dirty bomb "attack somewhere in the world is overdue."

So serious is the threat that both the Bush administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency have launched major initiatives within the past 18 months to find and lock up abandoned radiological material across the globe. At the Energy Department, Secretary Spencer Abraham has made preventing a dirty-bomb threat to a top priority, on a par with long-established programs to secure nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet Union.

A dirty bomb, or "radiological dispersion device" in the jargon of defense experts, is not a nuclear weapon but rather a crude device that uses conventional explosives or other means to spread radiation over a wide area. Compared to true nuclear weapons or even to biological or chemical weapons, they are technologically simple, and well within the grasp of international terrorist groups, nuclear experts say.

Documents seized from training camps in Afghanistan two years ago by U.S. forces showed that al Qaeda leaders there planned to build a dirty bomb and may have begun gathering materials for one. Iraq, which struggled in vain for a decade to master the complexities of a nuclear weapon, built and tested a dirty bomb in the 1980s before abandoning the program on the grounds that it was ineffective against military targets, according to U.N. weapons inspectors.

Such a bomb would likely unleash panic and trigger economic and social upheavals. Even a moderately sized dirty bomb exploded in a modern city could contaminate large swaths of real estate with radiation, rendering some areas uninhabitable for months or years.

Last year, the Federation of American Scientists conducted a computer simulation to determine the impact of exploding less than two ounces of cesium-137, about 3,500 curies, in the heart of Manhattan. (A curie is a unit used to measure radioactivity. Experts say that a device of only a few dozen curies could make an effective bomb.) In the simulation, fine cesium particles spread across an area covering 60 square blocks. Cleanup and relocation following the blast would take years to complete and cost tens of billions of dollars, the study found.

Whether the radiation from such a blast would cause deaths or injuries is a subject of renewed debate. A view long held by radiation experts was that the human toll would be minimal; any deaths and injuries would be those caused by the blast effects of the explosion itself.

Now scientists aren't so sure. A new analysis, drawn from medical studies of radiation accidents, sees a significant health threat in the clouds of radioactive dust thrown up by a dirty-bomb explosion. The diluted radioactivity in those dust clouds would probably be too weak to cause serious harm. But, according to a new National Defense University analysis expected to be released next month, people near the blast site could suffer serious internal injuries from highly radioactive particles that enter the body through the nose and mouth and lodge in sensitive tissues. The severity of the injuries would depend on the type of radioactive material used, how it is spread, and how quickly the victims can be treated.

"If the particles are in a respirable form, they can do considerable damage -- to the lungs, to the digestive system, to the immune system," said Peter Zimmerman, chairman of the panel that produced the study. "Overall, the effects could be much worse than many of us previously thought."

Guerrilla Smugglers

Dozens of smuggling routes for nuclear and radiological materials have been charted over the last decade, but since 1999 a clear favorite has emerged. Judging from cases reported to police, nuclear traffickers have discovered abundant opportunity in Europe's southeastern flank: the Black Sea and Caucasus states that have long served as a crossroads linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

Topping the list is Georgia, the former Soviet republic where huge crowds of demonstrators recently forced President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. The small nation of 5 million suffers from porous borders, official corruption and rampant smuggling, problems exacerbated by three ethnic rebellions -- in the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the north, and Adzharia in the south -- and regular incursions by guerrillas in the eastern region bordering Chechnya. In the conflict zones, trafficking in contraband has gone from a sideline trade to a thriving industry that supports tens of thousands of people, including, by some accounts, leaders of the rebel movements. "Today, it's smuggling that keeps the separatist movements alive," said Aleko Kupatadze, a black-market specialist at the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center in Tbilisi. "Many of the guerrillas are really professional criminals who sometimes even switch sides. The violence you see has less to do with ethnic conflict than with disagreements over how the spoils are divided."

Radioactive materials are now caught up in the illicit trade. Georgia has been a dumping ground for Soviet-era radioactive hardware and waste, some of it extraordinarily lethal. Abandoned radioactive devices are found regularly in Georgia's rugged hills, often after a villager turns up with severe radiation burns. Two years ago this month, three woodcutters in northern Georgia nearly died of radiation injuries after stumbling across a Soviet-built generator powered by strontium with a radioactivity level of 40,000 curies. Nine such devices have been found in Georgia since the mid-1990s, and as many as three more are feared to be still missing.

"We inherited chaos: Radiological equipment has turned up in garbage dumps, even in sewage," said Dato Bakradze, director of international security and conflict management for Georgia's National Security Council. The possibility that Georgian terrorists or separatists might obtain one of the devices, he said, poses a "direct physical danger to our own country."

Since the early 1990s, Georgian police have been intercepting radioactive flotsam from amateur sellers hoping to profit from their discoveries. Lately, the materials offered for sale have become more sophisticated, and so have the traffickers.

At least three times since 1999, officials have discovered kilogram-quantity caches of uranium in vehicles leaving or entering Georgia. In the most recent case, on June 26, just over a pound of uranium was seized at the Georgia-Armenia border by guards armed with U.S.-supplied radiation detectors, according to Georgian security officials. Tests to determine the origin and enrichment level of the uranium were carried out with the help of U.S. Energy Department officials. The agency has declined to release the results. Georgian officials say they believe the material originated in Russia and was being transported through Georgia for resale in Iran.

The smuggling incident uncovered on May 31 in Georgia's capital appears to have been bolder still. If the plan had unfolded as intended, the radioactive materials would have moved by public train through the heart of the country's most populous city, into the troubled Adzharia province, a center of ethnic clashes and long-simmering hostility toward Georgia's central government.

Makeria, 33, the taxi driver, has told police he knows almost nothing about the origins or destination of the deadly cargo. In fact, he may not have realized the contents were radioactive, despite warning labels written in English and Russian, said Tamaz Alania, chief of the criminal division of Georgia's Internal Affairs Ministry.

"It is at least possible that Makeria did not know," Alania said in an interview. "He seemed confused and nervous when we first questioned him. And when we explained what was in the boxes he became much more nervous." Makeria told police he picked up the unusually heavy green cartons from Giorgi Samkhakiuli, 29, an acquaintance of his father-in-law, who asked him to keep the boxes at his home in Adzharia until someone else came to pick them up. But Samkhakiuli, a man described by police as having a history of drug offenses, vanished after the smuggling plot was foiled. Investigators continue to pursue leads, but the search for others appears to have stalled. Police have learned that the larger of the two radiological elements, a capsule of powdery cesium, was manufactured in the Soviet Union in the 1970s for industrial use. While the cesium has lost more than half of its original potency, it still contains enough radioactivity to seriously injure or kill, investigators said. Police were baffled about the possible the origin of the mustard gas substance, which was still being analyzed.

Where and how the smuggled materials were to be used, police can only guess. But those responsible went out of their way to collect and package three radioactive materials with no known uses other than to terrorize or kill, said Malkhaz Salakaia, the investigations director at Georgia's Ministry of State Security.

"At this point we have to assume there are other people behind Samkhakiuli," Salakaia said. "And we cannot exclude that a criminal act was envisioned."

Iridium for Ransom

The radiological materials coveted by criminal groups are not found only in former Soviet states. Tens of thousands of powerful radioactive devices are currently in use across a wide range of industries, from medicine to metallurgy to mining. Some of them, because of their size, potency and availability, have become popular targets for thieves -- and a nightmare for counterterrorism experts.

One such device is known as a "well-logger," an instrument used by energy companies and geologists to search for underground oil fields. In well-logging, a powerful capsule of radioactive metal -- usually americium, iridium or strontium -- is lowered into a well shaft to probe for oil deposits, using beams of neutron and gamma radiation that penetrate dense rock. Then the radiation is measured to look for evidence of oil beneath the rocks. When not in use, the core is kept in a shielded canister the size of a small beer keg.

Well-loggers don't pack enormous amounts of radiation. But what they carry is dangerous.

"It's a neutron source," said Abel Gonzales, the radiation safety chief for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, referring to the type of deep-penetrating, tissue-destroying radiation emitted by well-loggers. If a dirty bomb is the objective, he said, "you could make something very nasty with that."

They also are easy to obtain. Tens of thousands of well-loggers are currently in use around the world, often in remote areas where they are liable to be stolen or lost.

One particularly worrisome criminal plot that recently came to light involved the theft of five iridium devices in Ecuador by a criminal gang that demanded -- and received -- thousands of dollars in payments for their return. It was the first known case of successful blackmail involving radiological material, and U.S. and U.N. experts fear the pattern could be repeated.

In a carefully planned, nighttime burglary Dec. 9, thieves broke into a storage shed in Quinde, in the coastal province of Esmeraldas, to steal the devices, which were owned by the firm Interinspec, according to accounts by investigators at the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency and Ecuador's Atomic Energy Commission. One of the thieves knew precisely where the instruments were kept and how much they were worth. He was a former employee who had been recently fired in a job dispute, Ecuadoran officials said.

Within days, the company received a ransom demand, and despite protests from government investigators, it decided to pay. Officials familiar with the case say the firm's top manager agreed to a price of \$1,000 for each of the five devices. "He thought this was the best way to take control of the five lost sources," said Marco Bravo Salvador, technical director of the Ecuadoran commission.

The thieves, however, returned only three of the well-loggers, apparently deciding to keep the other two. Meanwhile, the company lost a sixth source in January when it fell from a boat into Ecuador's Quinde River. A seventh device went missing when a work crew accidentally left it behind after finishing a project in a remote jungle location.

After a massive search involving hundreds of army troops, the sources lost in the jungle and river were recovered. The two others, presumably still in the hands of bandits, remain unaccounted for.

Another recent theft, viewed by U.S. and U.N. officials as especially grave, occurred in December when a large well-logger was stolen from a truck in Nigeria. The owner of the device was the Halliburton Co., based in Houston, which conducted its own search for several weeks before notifying the U.N. nuclear watchdog of the loss.

The device reportedly was stolen while being hauled through the oil-rich Niger Delta, between the cities of Warri and Port Harcourt. Initially, the truck driver told police that someone swiped the instrument from his vehicle after he stopped at a roadside motel for a nap. Later, investigators began to find discrepancies in the driver's story.

"The hotel story didn't check out," said one official involved in the investigation, who spoke on condition that his name not be used. "The suspicion now is that the driver took it," apparently as part of a plot involving accomplices. The thief was apparently knowledgeable about such well-loggers because, out of several devices on the truck, he singled out the most powerful one, the official said.

Months of searches using radiation detectors turned up no trace of the missing well-logger. Then, two months ago, investigators got a break. A well-logger discovered in a private scrap yard in September turned out to be the same one that was stolen nine months earlier. The scrap yard was in Germany, more than 3,200 miles away from the Niger Delta.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21879-2003Nov29.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Conviction underscores threat of nuclear theft

Russian fleet official stored, tried to sell radioactive material

By David Filipov, Globe Staff, 11/26/2003

MOSCOW -- Seeking to prevent potential terrorists from getting hold of radioactive materials, the United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars improving security at Russia's far-flung nuclear storage sites. But a criminal case that concluded in northern Russia this week showed how state-of-the-art security might not be enough to prevent nuclear theft.

A court in Murmansk on Monday convicted Alexander Tyulyakov, deputy director of the company that runs Russia's atomic icebreaker fleet, of possessing and attempting to sell radioactive substances. The first such case involving the senior management of a Russian nuclear facility, Tyulyakov's story raises the disturbing question of whether the people charged with safeguarding dangerous materials might be tempted to collaborate with terrorists. Police arrested Tyulyakov, 50, in August when he tried to sell a container of radioactive materials to undercover officers posing as buyers.

Investigators said he kept more than six pounds of radioactive materials, including enriched uranium, in his car, his garage, and a summer cottage.

Analysts say the Tyulyakov case illustrates how corruption and lax security procedures could make Russia's nuclear storage and reprocessing sites vulnerable to theft despite the US-funded effort to safeguard dangerous materials from potential terrorists.

"These upgrades are only as effective as the people who are responsible for them," said Charles Digges, a researcher for Bellona, a Norway-based environmental watchdog. "If the guy in charge wants to steal nuclear materials, he can easily do it."

Judge Sergei Alisov said Tyulyakov received an 18-month sentence. In a telephone interview, he said Russian laws passed in 1997, "before we had a serious problem with terrorism," prohibited him from meting out a harsher punishment.

"It is nonsense that a person is punished less for trying to sell radioactive materials than for illegal possession of a box of bullets," Alisov said.

In Russia, some 565 tons of uranium -- enough to make tens of thousands of nuclear weapons -- are in storage facilities that often lack sensors to detect when someone carries something out and cameras to monitor potentially corrupt employees, according to an October report by Matthew Bunn, a specialist on nuclear proliferation issues at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Although the United States is making progress in securing hazardous material sites around the world, terrorist groups are working faster than ever to infiltrate them, Bunn wrote. Insider thefts, the report said, "are among the hardest for any security system to prevent."

Atomflot, the state-run company where Tyulyakov worked, handles tons of weapons-grade uranium from refueling and maintaining the country's nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as reprocessed nuclear waste from decommissioned submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet. In the mid-1990s, Atomflot received one of the first US-funded comprehensive security upgrades in Russia, including a double-fence system with intrusion detectors and guard towers to protect the facility's perimeter.

"Even because material is secured, we have concerns about the people in charge," said Jon Wolfstahl of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., who worked on Russian nuclear security upgrades for the Department of Energy in the 1990s. "Even if it's locked up, it can still go walking."

The details of what exactly Tyulyakov had, and what he was trying to do with it, are murky. Investigators say they are trying to arrest accomplices and refuse to discuss details. The three-day trial was closed to reporters.

Officials close to the case said the container in Tyulyakov's car contained "yellowcake," nonenriched uranium that would be of little use to terrorists. But police and prosecutors said a search of Tyulyakov's home and summer cottage had turned up uranium-235, which could be used by terrorists to make a nuclear bomb or a "dirty bomb" -- a conventional explosive packed with radioactive materials that could contaminate a large area.

In court last week, Tyulyakov admitted possessing radioactive materials, but said he was trying to hand them over to specialists for research.

That did not convince the court, which saw videotape that police said showed Tyulyakov offering to sell the materials.

Nuclear specialists have known since the fall of the Soviet Union about the threat of insider theft at Russian nuclear facilities.

Wolfstahl described traveling to a facility in Russia that had received a US-funded upgrade. The director showed off the elaborate system. Then he showed how he could turn off detectors and other security equipment.

"He was not supposed to be able to do that," Wolfstahl said. "Comprehensive upgrades only work if they are plugged in."

Bunn said that the stabilization of the Russian economy in recent years has raised the reliability of Russian nuclear workers.

"We no longer have guards at nuclear facilities leaving their posts to forage in the forest for food," he said. "The desperation that could lead to temptations to steal nuclear material has been much reduced."

But Tyulyakov did not appear to be a desperate man. He had an expensive car and a luxurious cottage. Digges said someone in Tyulyakov's position would not have had to sneak into a nuclear facility to steal materials.

"It would be easy for him to coordinate with people who were unloading nuclear fuel from icebreakers," he said.

"He would be the guy to have the magic pen to be able to divert this or that shipment to wherever he wanted."

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2003/11/26/conviction_underscores_threat_of_nuclear_theft/

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

USA Today

November 28, 2003

Pg. 3

Official: Al-Qaeda Plans Something Big

Terrorists reportedly plotting 'catastrophic attack' to top 9/11

By Kevin Johnson, USA Today

WASHINGTON — A top counterterrorism official says al-Qaeda operatives dropped plans this year for several small attacks in the USA to focus on plotting a "more spectacular" assault comparable to the Sept. 11 attacks.

The U.S. counterterrorism official, who has access to all intelligence on the terrorist group, told USA TODAY this week that officials have no specific evidence to indicate how or when al-Qaeda might try to launch a massive strike on U.S. soil.

But, the official said, interviews with al-Qaeda detainees, intercepts of communications from suspected operatives and other sources have yielded evidence that Osama bin Laden's network still has a command structure and a determination to launch an attack that might rival the suicide hijackings.

About 3,000 people were killed in the Sept. 11 attacks.

"It's clear that al-Qaeda wants to strike here" and that it continues to seek opportunities for "a catastrophic attack," said the official, who asked not to be identified.

Recent intelligence reports indicate that al-Qaeda remains fascinated by the idea of using aircraft as missiles, despite the additional security at U.S. airports since the 9/11 attacks, the official said.

U.S. analysts still say explosives typically used in more limited assaults, including vehicle bombs in suicide attacks, remain al-Qaeda's most likely weapon here.

But intelligence reports suggest that some of the network's operatives think that an attack using chemical or biological weapons could be a way to top the 9/11 attacks, the official said.

Such weapons can be difficult to use, but al-Qaeda has sought them for years.

It's unclear whether the group has access to chemical or biological weapons. But those weapons represent a more likely concern than nuclear arms, U.S. analysts say.

The latest intelligence on al-Qaeda's possible intentions comes at a time of heightened tension about terrorism here and around the world.

A series of deadly bombings of synagogues and British interests in Turkey has led some U.S. analysts to suggest al-Qaeda is starting a new wave of attacks.

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security told law enforcement agencies last week to be particularly mindful of security around cargo jets and chemical plants. U.S. officials, however, have not said they plan to raise the nation's color-coded threat level. It is at code yellow (meaning there is an "elevated" risk of an attack), the midpoint on a five-level scale.

It isn't clear whether more aggressive efforts by U.S. agents during the past two years — including their increased authority to do wiretaps and other types of surveillance — contributed to al-Qaeda's apparent shift in strategy here this year.

It also is unclear who is directing al-Qaeda's strategy.

Bin Laden is said to be hiding along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. And analysts suspect it is difficult for him to plot strategy while being hunted.

The United States and its allies have captured or killed hundreds of al-Qaeda operatives overseas since 9/11, including many in the terror network's highest ranks.

Much of the talk among U.S. analysts regarding al-Qaeda's capabilities has focused on the potential for terrorists to attack targets abroad.

But U.S. law enforcement officials say they are learning more about the group's presence here.

The officials say there are only a few people in the USA who could be classified as suspected al-Qaeda operatives capable of carrying out an attack. That raises the possibility that any big strike would have to be conducted by terrorists entering the country.

The counterterrorism official said the government is conducting more than 1,000 terror-related investigations in the USA. Nearly all of them involve people suspected of raising funds or recruiting for al-Qaeda or Middle Eastern terror groups.

Other suspects are classified as "unwitting facilitators" whom operatives are using to obtain fraudulent documents or other materials.

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

November 28, 2003

Pg. 1

Iran-Pakistan Atomic Link Seen

Both nations deny technology assistance. The U.N.'s watchdog agency is investigating.

By Douglas Frantz, Times Staff Writer

ISTANBUL, Turkey — The United Nations nuclear watchdog agency is investigating potential links between the atomic programs of Iran and Pakistan after discovering that the secret Iranian uranium-enrichment program used technology identical to Pakistani plans, diplomats said.

Tehran acknowledged to the International Atomic Energy Agency that its centrifuge enrichment program was based on designs by a European firm, Urenco. Diplomats said the designs were the same Urenco-based technology used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear bomb in the 1990s.

Centrifuges are used to process uranium into fuel for reactors or fissile material for bombs. The purification process is complex, and perfecting the machines, which spin at twice the speed of sound, can take years.

The most recent IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program said Tehran started research in 1985 and got the centrifuge designs "from a foreign intermediary in 1987." Iran has told the agency that they came from a middleman whose identity remains a mystery.

The United States has accused Iran of using a civilian program to conceal efforts to develop an atomic bomb. IAEA inspections in recent months have uncovered numerous instances in which Iran concealed nuclear activities that could have played a role in developing an atomic bomb.

Iran has maintained that its nuclear program exists solely to generate electricity. This month, Tehran agreed to provide the IAEA with a full disclosure of its program's history and accept tougher IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

On Wednesday, the IAEA governing board in Vienna condemned Iran for its long cover-up of sensitive nuclear research and warned that any future violation of its nonproliferation obligations could result in sanctions.

The board stopped short of referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions, as the Bush administration initially wanted.

A Western diplomat said in a telephone interview Thursday that the U.S. believed that Iran was still hiding activities and that the matter eventually would go to the U.N.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the IAEA, said a new report on Iran would be ready for the agency's board in mid-February. He said the agency's inspectors had "a lot of work to do before we can conclude that Iran's program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."

Diplomats said discovering the origins of the Iranian uranium enrichment process was one of the key areas under investigation by the IAEA as it attempted to reconstruct 18 years of hidden activities.

A diplomat said that the IAEA had not determined whether the centrifuge plans had come directly from Pakistan or were obtained or stolen from a Pakistani nuclear laboratory by the middleman.

Urenco is a British, Dutch and German consortium and a world leader in centrifuge design and operation. The company denied supplying centrifuge technology or blueprints to Iran.

Pakistan repeatedly has denied providing any nuclear assistance to Iran and criticized as "anti-Muslim" articles suggesting it had aided Iran. Tehran also has denied cooperating with Pakistan.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the primary developer of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, worked at the Urenco enrichment plant in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s. After returning to Pakistan, he was accused of stealing centrifuge plans from the facility.

Two former Iranian diplomats told the Los Angeles Times last summer that Khan made several trips to Iran, beginning in 1987, to help with Iran's nuclear program. One of them, Ali Akbar Omid Mehr, said Khan was given a villa on the Caspian Sea in return for his assistance.

On a trip to South Korea this month, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said a reported visit by Khan to Iran was connected with attempts to purchase short-range missiles, not nuclear technology sales.

The Iranian centrifuge program is at the top of the IAEA inquiry list because traces of weapons-grade uranium were found in two locations where the machines had been assembled and tested.

One of the locations was the massive underground enrichment plant being constructed near Natanz in central Iran.

Diplomats said IAEA inspectors spotted the similarity to the Urenco designs when they visited the plant.

The centrifuges at Natanz appeared to have been modified to produce enriched uranium more efficiently than the original design, said diplomats familiar with the inspection.

Traces of weapons-grade uranium also were discovered at Kalaye Electric Co. Tehran reluctantly acknowledged having performed extensive tests on purifying uranium with centrifuges at the Kalaye plant, once identified as a watch factory.

The machinery had been removed and extensive construction had been done by the time inspectors visited the site, but they found the enriched-uranium particles through tests.

Iran had long maintained that its centrifuge program was indigenous.

Confronted with the IAEA discoveries, Iranian officials said some components were contaminated with enriched uranium when they were purchased outside the country through middlemen.

The inquiry into the origins of the centrifuge designs is only one aspect of a widespread investigation by the IAEA of what turned out to be a surprisingly broad nuclear program in Iran.

The IAEA report this month said Iran had been conducting research using exotic laser technology to enrich uranium for 12 years before disclosing the program this fall. Some of the laser technology appears to have come from Russia and some of it may have European origins, diplomats familiar with the inquiry said.

The agency's report said Iran established a pilot plant for laser enrichment three years ago and shut it down and disassembled the machinery in May.

<http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-iaea28nov28.1.4380078.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

November 28, 2003

U.S., Allies Prepare Solution To N. Korea Nuclear Dispute

Atomic efforts would end with a guarantee of no invasion. Talks are planned for next month.

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — The United States and its allies are writing a detailed draft document of what they hope will be a comprehensive agreement under which North Korea would dismantle its nuclear program in return for guarantees that it is not about to be invaded, according to reports out of South Korea and Japan.

South Korea's deputy foreign minister, Lee Soo Hyuck, confirmed Thursday that a written document was being prepared with the hope it could be fine-tuned and presented to North Korea by mid-December. Other officials have said that six-party talks are tentatively planned for Dec. 17-19 in Beijing.

Reports in the Japanese media described several intriguing aspects of what would be a multinational approach that would involve North Korea's largest neighbors as well as the world's declared nuclear powers.

The parties to the talks — the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia — would offer North Korea a written security guarantee that it is not a target for invasion. The actual dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program would be overseen by another international team of experts from the nuclear bomb-possessing countries — the United States, China, Russia, Britain and France.

Moon Chung In, a South Korean academic and occasional foreign policy advisor, said the idea was loosely modeled after an agreement signed with Ukraine in the mid-1990s under which the former Soviet republic eliminated its nuclear weapons in return for recognition of its independence and territory.

"The Ukrainian model contains a lot of the same elements that North Korea has been asked for from the United States. Although the North Koreans are calling for a bilateral treaty with the United States, this would be a multilateral guarantee," Moon said.

The last round of six-party talks held in August in Beijing ended in disappointment. The North Koreans, supported to some extent by the Chinese, were critical of the United States for failing to put on the table a specific proposal for ending the nuclear crisis.

Lee, the South Korean deputy foreign minister, said Thursday that there must be a "documented outcome" to the next round of talks.

He said the draft had been agreed on by the United States, South Korea and Japan and would be presented to the Chinese for their approval.

Japan's Kyodo News Service and the leading daily newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, reported further details of the proposal.

In addition to North Korea's elimination of nuclear weapons, the admission of international inspectors into the country and the issuing of a five-party security guarantee to North Korea, the proposal would call for an agreement to resolve outstanding issues such as the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korea and the testing of long-range missiles.

There would also be a pledge by all parties to avoid moves that would aggravate tensions in the region.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-koreas28nov28,1,7964655.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Philadelphia Inquirer

November 30, 2003

Iran Says It Won't Scrap Uranium Plans

By Paul Hughes, Reuters

TEHRAN, Iran - Iran has no intention of scrapping its disputed uranium-enrichment program, which it needs to provide fuel for at least one of eight nuclear reactors it plans to build, a top Iranian official said yesterday.

In the face of concerted international pressure, Iran agreed last month to allow inspections of its nuclear sites and suspend enrichment of uranium, which can be used to make fuel for nuclear reactors or bomb-grade material.

"Our uranium-enrichment program has been suspended voluntarily, temporarily, to build trust," Hassan Rowhani, secretary-general of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said at a news conference.

"The issue of ending uranium enrichment is not in question and never has been, nor will be," said Rowhani, Iran's key negotiator with European Union nations over the nuclear issue.

At a board meeting last week of the U.N. nuclear agency, Rowhani said that Iran would punish countries that backed U.S. efforts to take Iran's nuclear record to the U.N. Security Council.

Rowhani said countries that supported the U.S. call would be barred from lucrative contracts for energy and development projects in Iran.

The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency on Wednesday condemned Iran's 18-year secrecy about sensitive nuclear research, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, and said further serious breaches of nonproliferation obligations would not be tolerated.

Rowhani said Iran had nothing to fear from tougher inspections of its nuclear facilities, and would do everything it could to help the IAEA give Iran a clean bill of health in its next report, due in February.

"Whatever search, inspection or visit they want to do they can do, because they will come to the conclusion that Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful," he said.

Rowhani said the scale of Iran's nuclear-energy plans dictated its efforts to produce its own fuel, including enriched uranium.

The first of the reactors, each of which will have a 1,000-megawatt capacity, is being built with Russian help near the southwestern port city of Bushehr and should be completed by the end of next year, he said.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/nation/7379630.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times
December 1, 2003
Pg. 3

Iraqi Physicists Overstated Bomb Course, Book Says

By Associated Press

Iraqi scientists never revived their long-dead nuclear bomb program and lied to Saddam Hussein about how much progress they were making before U.S.-led attacks shut the operation down for good in 1991, Iraqi physicists say. Before that first Persian Gulf war, the chief of the weapons program resorted to "blatant exaggeration" in telling the then president of Iraq how much bomb material was being produced, key scientist Imad Khadduri writes in a new book.

Other leading physicists said in interviews in Baghdad that the hope for an Iraqi atomic bomb was never realistic. "It was all like building sand castles," said Abdel Mehdi Talib, Baghdad University's dean of sciences.

Seven months after a U.S.-British invasion toppled Saddam's Ba'ath Party government, Iraqi scientists have grown more vocal in countering Bush administration assertions that Baghdad had "reconstituted" nuclear weapons development.

At best, Mr. Khadduri writes, it would have taken Iraq several years to build a nuclear weapon if the 1991 war and subsequent inspections had not intervened.

His self-published "Iraq's Nuclear Mirage," a chronicle of years of secret weapons work and of a final escape into exile, is part of this senior scientist's emergence from a low profile in Canada — intended to refute what he calls a "massive deception" in Washington that led the United States into war.

Months of searching by hundreds of U.S. experts have turned up no trace of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in Iraq. Before the war, inspectors from the United Nations also had found none. No Iraqi scientists have confirmed that the programs were revived in recent years.

Bush administration officials nonetheless speak of a threat from such weapons — of Baghdad's "robust plans" for them, in Vice President Dick Cheney's words — in defending the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March. They offer no hard evidence, however.

A former bomb designer is dismissive of the U.S. contentions.

"There was no point in trying to revive this program. There was no material, no equipment, no scientists," Sabah Abdul Noor said in a recent interview at Baghdad's Technology University.

"Scientists were scattered and under the eyes of inspectors, totally scattered. To do a project, you have to be together."

Mr. Khadduri writes that when he transferred top-secret documents of bomb program chief Jafar Dhia Jafar to an optical disc in 1991, he found the "blatant exaggeration" in a 1990 report to Saddam.

With its clever wording, Mr. Khadduri said in a telephone interview from Toronto, "one could easily have been convinced we had produced a couple of kilograms of enriched uranium instead of a couple of grams" — that is, about 4 pounds of bomb material instead of a fraction of an ounce.

A bomb would have required about 40 pounds of highly enriched uranium.

In a 1997 summary, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog said there were no indications that the Iraqis had produced more than a few grams of such material. It also said there were "no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031201-123719-9484r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post
December 3, 2003
Pg. 24

Run-Up To Talks On N. Korea Falters

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

Efforts to resume six-nation talks on rolling back North Korea's nuclear program have hit a snag, U.S. and Asian officials said yesterday, apparently delaying a planned mid-December meeting until sometime next year.

The Chinese government, which will host the talks in Beijing, has proposed the other nations agree in advance to the text of a final statement that would outline the parameters of the negotiations and offer the prospect of a regular

dialogue to resolve the North Korean crisis. The first round of talks, held in August, ended in acrimony between North Korea and the United States, and the Chinese are eager to portray the next meeting as a success. But little progress has been made in writing a statement that would meet the approval of all sides, forcing a likely delay in the talks, officials said yesterday. U.S. officials met with a senior Chinese official in Washington on Monday to discuss the Chinese proposed language, and further talks are planned with Japanese and South Korean officials this week to discuss their ideas for the proposed statement.

U.S. officials do not oppose the Chinese effort, but they are still debating what they would like to see in the statement. Then the North Koreans must agree to whatever language is proposed. Russia is also a participant in the six-nation talks.

Officially, the State Department said it is hopeful the talks could still take place this month. But several officials said time was rapidly running out.

A key issue, officials said, is the desire by the United States and its allies to obtain a commitment from North Korea that it will dismantle its nuclear programs. But in exchange the North Koreans want security assurances and economic aid, and the United States and other countries hope to keep that section of the statement more general. Pyongyang also has demanded compensation for the recent decision by the United States and its allies to suspend a \$4.6 billion light-water reactor project designed to ease North Korea's energy problems. North Korea has insisted that any concessions by Washington and U.S. allies be extended simultaneously with the ending of its nuclear programs, a concept the Bush administration has rejected.

North Korea, in a public statement using an abbreviation for the country's full name, declared on Monday, "The U.S. demand that the DPRK drop 'the nuclear program first' means that the DPRK should lay down arms and work for the U.S. as a servant. The DPRK can never accept it. It would rather die than having peace in exchange for slavery." The North Korea statement said its "blueprint of a package solution is simple, clear-cut and fair. It is the DPRK's stand that both sides should lay down arms at the same time and co-exist in peace."

In a speech yesterday, Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said the United States was "prepared to provide a written document on security assurances to Pyongyang with other participants in the talks."

But he said "such assurances can only be provided, however, in the context of agreement and implementation of an effective verification regime" that would ensure North Korea does not restart its nuclear programs.

U.S. officials have not decided at what point security assurances would be offered to North Korea, which is why administration officials frequently say the guarantees would be offered "in the context" of a verification agreement. U.S. officials have also not decided on how tough a verification program to demand from North Korea.

"For the United States, irreversibility is a paramount goal," Bolton said, adding that "we are determined that bad behavior on the part of North Korea will not be rewarded."

In the same speech, Bolton also warned that the Bush administration will press to take any evidence of further violations of Iran's nuclear obligations to the U.N. Security Council. The International Atomic Energy Agency last month strongly deplored Iran's clandestine, 18-year effort to build a nuclear program, but declined to bring it to the Security Council unless more violations were uncovered.

"For our part, the United States will continue its efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran, from whatever source, and will monitor the situation there with great care," Bolton said, in a warning to countries such as Pakistan, China and Russia that are suspected of aiding Iran's program.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28758-2003Dec2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

GovExec.com

December 2, 2003

National Guard To Take On More Homeland Defense Duties

By Chris Strohm

The National Guard will play a greater role in protecting critical infrastructure in the United States from terrorist attacks, the Defense Department's assistant secretary for homeland defense said Tuesday.

Military studies of potential domestic terrorist attacks have determined that the National Guard should not only protect the defense industrial base but also critical infrastructure that has previously been defended by civilian law enforcement agencies, said Paul McHale, who became Defense's head of homeland defense almost a year ago.

"I would anticipate that with recurring frequency National Guard forces, under the command of a state governor, will be deployed to defend critical infrastructure in the country," McHale said during the Defense Manufacturing Conference in Washington.

McHale called the new responsibility an "emerging mission requirement" for the National Guard, and said the Pentagon will increase the number of weapons of mass destruction civil support teams in the Guard from 32 to 55 by

next year. The teams are designed to work with first responders to detect and react to the use of chemical or biological agents or other weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil. Ten teams were certified in 2000 and 22 others have been added since then. Each team has 22 members and is outfitted with detection equipment, mobile laboratories and command posts.

The military is responsible for protecting the U.S. defense industrial base, such as military bases and labs. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the military provided support for domestic law enforcement agencies and organizations. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military from conducting domestic law enforcement operations, but exceptions to the law have allowed Defense to take on extra responsibilities in supporting homeland security efforts. McHale said ongoing studies reveal that civilian law enforcement agencies may not have the firepower and capabilities to handle all potential attacks. In the future, the National Guard will be the lead organization that coordinates military and civilian responses to terrorist threats and attacks against some critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, McHale said.

"The need for the deployment of a heavy weapons capability to defeat a threat is becoming more apparent," he said. McHale said the Pentagon reviewed the Posse Comitatus Act and determined that it would not be a violation to deploy the National Guard to protect critical infrastructure in some circumstances. He said he expects more presidential directives in the future to expand the military's homeland defense role.

McHale added that Marine and Army active and reserve forces are ready to respond to domestic terrorist threats at a moment's notice. "The forces are immediately available and for the most part have been drawn from the active component."

He said the role of the National Guard has been brought under "careful and strategic review" and, from now on, will be responsible for "robust and critically important homeland defense missions."

McHale also said he believes, based on recent meetings with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, that a "significant and growing" portion of the annual Defense budget will be directed toward homeland defense activities.

<http://govexec.com/dailyfed/1203/120203c1.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

National Defense
December 2003

Chem-Bio Defense Needs Common Standards

By Geoff S. Fein

Chemical and biological defense equipment is improving, but still is suffering from the lack of technical standards across industry and government agencies. The Defense Department and the Department of Homeland Security are working closely in this arena, but their efforts are hampered by the diversity of technologies offered in the marketplace, said Army Brig. Gen. Stephen Reeves, Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense. Reeves is the first JPEO-CBD. The office was established last April.

Companies are focused on selling their technology, rather than combining forces and pushing the most promising concepts, Reeves told National Defense.

"Military acquisition favors competition. However, once a clear technology winner is identified, funds are focused on expanding that capability," said Reeves. "COTS [commercial-off-the-shelf] companies rarely collaborate for the good of technology and meeting the requirement."

That's not a sound business model, he added.

Military standards for detectors also will differ from their civilian counterparts, and they should, said Reeves.

"However, they should not be significantly different," he said.

COTS devices are intended for less severe environments and are designed to protect workers according to standards set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOHS).

While military systems are designed to protect a population between the ages of 18 and 45 that is in good health, civilian systems must be able to protect the young and old alike, he said.

"The requirements to detect, identify and quantify are the same. However, the actual agent, the concentration levels and the rate of detection will be different," said Reeves. "In addition, there are, and should be, areas of overlap. The systems need to be small, simple to operate, cost effective and reliable over prolonged periods of time."

For military systems, technical standards are shaped by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, which ensures 'jointness' from the start, he said. At the same time, COTS technologies suffer from the lack of standardized test protocols and methodologies, said Reeves.

"For example, similar devices are tested in different environments using different methods, timetables and agent concentrations resulting in different measurements and suitability criteria," said Reeves.

Technologies that appear promising often are “too large, require lots of power, require several personnel, are typically not ruggedized and are logistically burdensome in a military environment,” he said. “Many COTS are not focused on reducing the need for support; therefore, the items come with high consumable rates, training requirements and/or contractor logistics support requirements.”

COTS systems that are upgraded to meet military requirements sometimes become prone to false alarms, said Reeves.

For example, some pesticides closely resemble Anthrax. A detector could signal an alert, even though the agent is benign.

“The challenge is not the lack of desire to set standards, but the underlying science required to set standards,” he said. “In some cases, it is science that we don’t have. It’s science we need to go back and work, in both our commercial and government laboratory systems, to ensure we really understand what the standard is that’s required for any given piece of equipment.”

Reliability and false-alarm rates are issues of concern, he said. There were relatively few false alarms with the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA) deployed with units in Kuwait and Iraq during the war. But when a unit did issue a false alert, it often was due to detecting exhaust fumes from vehicles, Reeves said.

“We tested those things very thoroughly against 80 common battlefield interferents. Did we get some false alarms on the ACADA? Yes, but nothing like what we saw with the old M8 alarm,” said Reeves. “The [M8] was false-alarming to the point that people just ignored it. It became essentially non-functional.”

According to a Marine Corps report on Gulf War Syndrome, the Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (M8) “is highly sensitive to chemical agent vapor. It is also sensitive to a wide variety of interferents, including smoke, engine exhaust, burning fuel and even aftershave.

“Before the ground campaign began, M8s generated false alarms at a rate that caused many Marine units (for which the M8 was not a normal equipment item) to leave them behind or turned off for the attack into Kuwait. The M8, therefore, contributed little to the Marines’ chemical warning capability—particularly the capability to detect nerve agents in the air. (The 11th Marines, however, reported no symptoms of nerve agent exposure),” said the report. Quality control is absolutely essential on detectors, because “there are so many things you can cross-react to,” said Reeves.

Training is critical to help personnel know what they are dealing with, he noted. “None of these systems are perfect. You really need somebody who understands what the potential unintended consequences are of using that system.” Chemical agent detectors, such as ACADA, will give a rapid alert, within nine seconds or less, said Reeves. “That’s critical, because chemical agents tend to kill you pretty quick.”

With biological agents, it’s a different story. Because it can be days or weeks before the effects of a biological attack take hold, it is easier to treat victims.

“The challenge with bio detection is that you do have to take some time to make sure that what you really have is a bio agent that is a threat,” said Reeves. “Making sure [that] what you are detecting is something you are going to warn people about is the trick.”

In the future, “we’ve got to get to the point where these sensors are transparent and it’s the information that’s apparent,” he said.

Meanwhile, military and industry developers have done a good job improving existing technologies, said Reeves. One example is the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Detection System (JBAIDS). It is the first device of this type to receive Food and Drug Administration approval.

“As we looked around and got ready for procurement, we discovered there were more than 20 companies out there developing something similar,” said Reeves.

Instead of putting JBAIDS through years of research and development and FDA approvals, the military turned to industry for help. The Army brought manufacturers to Dugway Proving Ground, in Utah, and told them what the service needed, said Reeves.

The effort cut the R&D process down to three years. “In the meantime, we will be able to buy an immediately available off-the-shelf system to do the identification and we will do in parallel the FDA approval for the diagnostic part,” he said. “It has really shortened the process even more.”

Another Army-industry partnership is helping to develop systems that will detect chemical and biological agents from greater distances. Although the Army has a good grasp on chemical detection, biological agents are a bit more complex, said Reeves.

“Industry is working with us right now on biological stand-off detectors. [They are] helping us look at novel approaches—how do we combine technologies, for example,” he said.

One contractor pointed out that radar could be used to detect man-made clouds. That is leading to the idea of using radar instead of expensive standoff devices to detect chemical agent dispersion, Reeves said.

The widespread use of radar by civilian organizations, such as the National Weather Service, airports and television stations, makes it an ideal system, said Reeves.

“In the longer term, where we are really going to go, is to look at how we optimize the number of systems we have out there,” said Reeves. “Both our academic institutions, as well as industry, will help us out with that.”

For example, hyperspectral imagery—looking across the entire spectrum—could be mounted into tanks and ground systems that are currently using thermal imaging, he said.

“If you have a hyperspectral viewer, you have the ability to leverage that thermal piece that you need for targeting or vehicle recognition, but you can use other parts of the spectrum to identify chemical or biological agents out there, all in one viewer,” said Reeves.

The Army also is looking to industry for help with decontamination systems and solutions.

“We’ve got some very old [decontamination] systems out there,” said Reeves.

In October 2002, the Army submitted an urgent operational need for a lightweight decontamination system to support current deployments, said Reeves. The Army requested a COTS system that weighed less than 500 pounds, was diesel-fueled, able to dispense standard and non-standard decontaminants, pump water at specific adjustable water pressures and specific adjustable temperatures, provide a field showering capability, and be skid-mounted, he said.

For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army procured the Karcher Multi Purpose Decontamination System (MPDS), developed in Germany. It not only met all the service’s requirements, but at \$12,000, the COTS system costs \$3,000 less per unit than the M22 (an “off-the-shelf” automatic chemical agent alarm system capable of detecting and identifying standard blister and nerve agents).

Decontamination Equipment

The Department of Defense is taking steps to address the need for a decontamination capability. The Chemical Biological Defense Program (CDBP) currently is modernizing its family of decontamination systems, said Reeves.

“The upgrades will focus on a common platform, reduced logistical footprint, increased mission payload, an environmentally benign decontaminant and a full spectrum applicator,” said Reeves. Decontamination solutions today are too corrosive and damage the equipment.

“With some of the new options we have, like DF 200, we just need to fully understand how that operates and make sure we have the tactics, techniques and procedures that go with that,” he said.

DF 200, developed at Sandia National Laboratories, rapidly neutralizes chemical and biological warfare agents.

It shows promise as an environmentally, and relatively non-corrosive, alternative, added Reeves.

The military also needs to look at wide area decontamination. Of particular concern is the effect of decontaminants on airplanes, said Reeves.

“[You] want to make sure that what you are going to spray on them isn’t going to do any damage to control surfaces or cockpit vision,” he said.

There is also a need for portable detectors, said Reeves. Although the Fox reconnaissance armored vehicle (a mobile laboratory that uses the MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer to rapidly analyze air and ground samples for chemical agents) has the capability to detect toxic industrial chemicals, Reeves said it’s not needed in every situation.

Reeves’ new office brings together multiple service projects and nine different milestone decision authorities.

Reeves is responsible for research, development, acquisition, fielding and life-cycle support of chemical and biological equipment and medical countermeasures.

He oversees seven joint programs: contamination avoidance, individual protection, collective protection, decontamination systems, installation protection, medical systems and information systems. Reeves, in turn, reports to the Army acquisition executive and the Defense Department acquisition executive.

The JPEO, he said, must provide an “acquisition environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and innovation.”

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Philadelphia Inquirer

December 3, 2003

FBI Seeks To Delay Suit On Anthrax

By Curt Anderson, Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Disclosure of what the FBI knows about the deadly 2001 anthrax attacks could enable terrorists to engineer biological weapons to escape detection, the FBI says in documents filed in response to a lawsuit by a scientist labeled a "person of interest" in the case.

Citing the criminal inquiry and national-security concerns, the Justice Department is trying to persuade a federal judge to delay the lawsuit filed by Stephen J. Hatfill, who contends the government invaded his privacy and ruined his reputation by leaking information to the media implicating him in the attacks.

Hatfill has denied any role in the attacks. His lawsuit seeks to clear his name and recover unspecified monetary damages.

Richard L. Lambert, the FBI inspector in charge of what is being called the "Amerithrax" investigation, says in a court document that Hatfill's lawsuit could jeopardize the probe and expose national secrets related to U.S. bioweapons defense measures.

"In the hands of those hostile to the U.S.," Lambert said, "this valuable intelligence could aid state sponsors of terrorism or terrorist organizations in their efforts to genetically engineer or alter their anthrax bioweapons to 'spooft' or escape detection."

Hatfill was labeled a "person of interest" in the probe in August 2002 by Attorney General John Ashcroft. Hatfill says in his lawsuit that FBI agents have had him under surveillance around the clock.

Surveillance has dropped off in recent weeks, according to one person close to Hatfill and two federal law-enforcement officials who spoke on condition of anonymity. The officials, however, cautioned against drawing the conclusion that Hatfill no longer was of interest to investigators.

Lambert said in the court document that Hatfill's suit could force the FBI to divulge its interest in specific individuals. No individual was identified.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/7399154.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)