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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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Washington Times
November 13, 2003
Pg. 15

New Nuclear Talks Eyed For December

By Barry Schweid, Associated Press

Six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program are likely to resume in mid-December, a senior Bush administration official said yesterday.

An announcement is expected after Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi confers with North Korean leaders, the official said.

Mr. Wang met last week in Washington with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. An initial round of six-party talks was held in August.

The United States wants to completely dismantle North Korea's nuclear-weapons program, and China has called for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Wang had discussed future steps with North Korean officials before coming to Washington.

In late August, China convened a groundbreaking meeting involving the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia. The talks ended inconclusively.

The U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the North Korean nuclear-weapons program was probably further along than Iran's. But he also said both problems were of equal significance.

Asked when the talks might be resumed, the official said he was predicting mid-December, perhaps the second week. Although no dates were set, diplomatic activity is moving in that direction, he said.

Last week, the United States, South Korea, Japan and the European Union tentatively decided to suspend work at Kumho, a remote village on North Korea's northeast coast, where they have been building two light-water reactors to generate badly needed electricity for the impoverished state.

The countries say that halting the \$4.6 billion project is inevitable because North Korea has violated a 1994 agreement by secretly building nuclear weapons.

On Tuesday, North Korea said it would seize equipment for the two power plants until the United States pays a penalty for its decision to stop construction.

North Korea renewed its claim that the United States had first violated the 1994 agreement, in which two power-generating reactors were promised in return for a freezing of the North's Soviet-designed reactors, suspected of being used for weapons development.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20031112-095756-1339r.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

November 13, 2003

U.S. Questions U.N. Findings On Iran's Bid For Nuclear Arms

A Bush official says Tehran's covert efforts to acquire sensitive technology make sense only as part of a weapons program.

By Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — A U.N. inspectors' report that said no evidence had turned up that Iran has tried to develop nuclear weapons is "simply impossible to believe," the Bush administration's top arms control official said Wednesday.

In the administration's first official response to the harshly worded report, which was circulated this week among members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton noted that the inspectors had found evidence that Iran had conducted a secret nuclear program for 18 years, and that it had committed numerous breaches of its nuclear treaty obligations.

In a speech prepared for a dinner of the American Spectator, a conservative magazine, he disputed the IAEA's conclusion that "no evidence" has yet been found that the concealed activities were linked to a nuclear weapons program.

The administration believes that "the massive and covert Iranian effort to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities makes sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program," Bolton said.

"In what can only be an attempt to build a capacity to develop nuclear materials for nuclear weapons, Iran has enriched uranium with both centrifuges and lasers, and produced and reprocessed plutonium," he said. "It attempted to cover its tracks by repeatedly and over many years neglecting to report its activities, and in many instances providing false declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency."

The IAEA, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, is issuing its report as the international community considers whether to take action to prevent any Iranian effort to build arms. Next week, the IAEA board of governors is meeting to consider whether Tehran, which has continued to deny any intent to build nuclear weapons, should be held in violation of its nuclear treaty obligations.

The 30-page IAEA report harshly criticized Iran, saying that, over 18 years, the regime concealed from the United Nations both a centrifuge uranium-enrichment program and a laser enrichment program. It said Iran manufactured small amounts of enriched uranium and plutonium, a substance with virtually no civilian uses.

The report noted that the IAEA had so far found no evidence that Iran had sought to build nuclear weapons, as the Bush administration has asserted. But the IAEA intends to keep looking for such evidence, the report said, adding that it would be some time before the agency could conclude whether Iran's nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Bolton, however, said "the report's assertion [on nuclear arms] is simply impossible to believe." Despite Tehran's denial that it has any nuclear arms program, "the IAEA has amassed an enormous amount of evidence to the contrary that makes this assertion increasingly implausible," he said.

He accused Tehran of trying to falsely legitimize its pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities that would give it the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

According to Bolton, Iran wants to develop the capability for uranium mining and extraction, uranium conversion and enrichment, reactor fuel fabrication and heavy-water production, as well as acquire a heavy-water reactor well suited for reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium. It is also pursuing "management of spent fuel" — a euphemism for reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium," Bolton said.

He said that if Iran took all the steps sought by the IAEA, including full disclosure of nuclear activities and an agreement to allow unannounced inspections, such actions would "mark a major advance toward its integration into civilized society."

But if Iran continues to conceal its program and "lie to the IAEA, the international community must be prepared to declare Iran in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations," he said.

Such a declaration would put the issue before the U.N. Security Council and could lead to sanctions against Iran.

Bolton did not disclose what course the United States would recommend when the 35 members of the IAEA board meet in Vienna on Nov. 20.

He noted that Iran, which President Bush last year grouped with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq as part of an "axis of evil," also has "robust" biological and chemical weapons programs, as well as a missile development effort.

Iranian officials acknowledged this week that the country had failed to comply with all their treaty obligations, but they described the violations as minor and insisted that the IAEA report was proof that it was not developing nuclear weapons. Tehran is hoping that its new candor will persuade the international community not to take tough steps. Jack Straw, Britain's foreign secretary, took a milder tone this week in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corp., saying that the world "should be reacting calmly to the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency."

Although Iran had concealed its nuclear activities in the past, it was now cooperating with the agency, he noted. Straw is scheduled to meet today in Washington with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. The two are expected to discuss Iran's nuclear interests.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran13nov13001426,1,1081984.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

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London Times

November 13, 2003

Iran Admits Pakistan Gave Key Nuclear Help

By Bronwen Maddox, Foreign Editor, in Vienna

IRAN has told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it received crucial help from Pakistan with its controversial nuclear programme, according to those familiar with the negotiations.

Iran revealed the extensive foreign sources of help to the United Nations nuclear watchdog only in the past two weeks, *The Times* has learnt.

After a year of mounting international alarm that Iran's interest in nuclear power concealed an attempt to develop nuclear weapons, the regime has admitted that it has gone to great lengths over 18 years to hide its research.

Iran has now named Pakistan and several other countries as the source of components and advice used to make centrifuges to enrich uranium, the most controversial part of its research.

The atomic energy agency (IAEA) is now trying to confirm exactly when the assistance was given, and whether it was from scientists acting on their own or with the backing of their governments.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA Director-General, refers to the foreign contribution several times in the damning 23-page report on Iran's evasions, which he sent to the agency's board of governors on Monday.

But he does not name the countries or people involved and said yesterday that he would not be drawn on their identities until the agency had completed many more investigations.

Maleeha Lodhi, the Pakistani High Commissioner in London, said yesterday: "No country has been named in the report. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is a responsible nuclear power which has scrupulously observed its non-proliferation obligations."

In an interview with *The Times* yesterday Dr ElBaradei said that Iran's success at hiding its nuclear programme for nearly two decades had been an "eye-opener" for the IAEA. Sanctions had slowed down Iran's attempts, but in the end had failed, he said.

Iran, as a signatory of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is entitled to explore nuclear power for peaceful purposes provided that it is monitored by the IAEA.

However, despite years of supervision, the agency became suspicious only in the summer of 2002 that the programme was far more ambitious, sophisticated and older than Iran had admitted.

Dr ElBaradei said that Iran's systematic covering-up of its programme for years "is by itself a serious matter".

Iran now had all the knowledge it needed to enrich uranium, Dr ElBaradei said, and had little need of more foreign help. But its enrichment plants were still far from complete and it would take the country "probably a few years" to finish. The most controversial site, at Natanz, "is an empty structure", he said.

Enrichment of uranium has been the focus of international concerns because, although it is permitted under the NPT as part of a civil nuclear programme, it takes a country to within a whisker of the ability to make nuclear weapons.

"The NPT gives you a very thin margin of security," Dr ElBaradei said. "Once you have the capability (to enrich uranium), you are not far (from being able to make weapons)."

His report spells out the omissions and outright lies in Iran's past account of its programme to the IAEA. But "in the last five weeks (Tehran has shown) a complete change of heart", he says.

Iran now admits conducting secret experiments to test its centrifuges with uranium gas, in breach of IAEA rules.

That contradicts its account this summer that some of this gas was "missing" and must have evaporated through leaky valves. It has also used lasers, over a 12-year period.

Iran told the IAEA last month that it had scrapped centrifuges from the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and so inspectors could not see them. Now it has admitted that it moved them elsewhere and finally allowed inspectors to see them on October 30.

Dr ElBaradei's report, packed with examples of Iran's brinkmanship, says that in the past three months Iran has admitted eight serious breaches of the rules.

It concludes: "It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations" under its agreement with the IAEA.

However, the Director-General has pointedly not used the words "non-compliance" about Iran's behaviour, which would almost compel the governors to refer it to the UN Security Council.

Instead, he emphasises that the disclosures and pledges are "a positive development", that IAEA analysts need time to weigh them up and that he will report to the governors again in March.

"We should not tolerate breaches, whether small or large," he told *The Times*, "but we should (also) focus . . . on the new chapter, and on the complexity of the task facing the IAEA." This measured tone is likely to strip some of the significance from the board of governors' meeting on November 20.

His deliberate impartiality is also likely to disappoint the United States, which had hoped that next Thursday's meeting would agree on a tough stance against Iran.

There were signs of tension yesterday between Washington and Jack Straw over the appropriate response to Dr ElBaradei's conclusions. The Foreign Secretary has favoured dialogue with Tehran, rather than a showdown in the UN. To Dr ElBaradei, the dispute with Iran illustrates the wider problems at the heart of the non-proliferation treaty. "What I'd like to see is an addition to the NPT," he said, where countries would agree to pool the most sensitive technologies, such as enrichment, rather than doing it all for themselves.

That would have to apply to the five nuclear weapons countries that are the permanent members of the Security Council — Britain, the US, France, Russia and China, who "cannot continue to put the screws on the rest of the world" while offering no concessions. In its current form, as an uneasy bargain between states with nuclear weapons and those without them, the treaty "is not sustainable", he concludes.

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Jerusalem Post
November 13, 2003

Iran Will Have Nukes In A Year -- Mofaz

By Janine Zacharia

Iran will have nuclear capability in one year, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Wednesday.

His prediction came as both the International Atomic Energy Agency and former chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said they found no evidence Iran is using its civilian nuclear program as cover to produce a bomb.

"We believe Iran can reach the point of no return in one year from now," said Mofaz, who met later with Secretary of State Colin Powell and is to meet Thursday with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.

"From my perspective, the way that the US [is] leading the effort to prevent this nuclear power in the hands of an extreme regime with long-range missiles has started to bear fruit. It's necessary to continue with this effort," he said. The US would like to see the issue referred to the UN Security Council, where sanctions could be placed on Iran. Blix told Reuters in a Wednesday interview that he does not believe the civilian nuclear reactors being constructed by Iran are a danger. A report by the IAEA, which has yet to be released, reportedly says the group found no evidence of a secret arms bid.

Mofaz warned Syria that Israel could again strike inside its territory, as it did last month when it attacked a Palestinian terrorist training camp near Damascus in retaliation for a suicide bombing, if President Bashar Assad does not halt the activities of groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad there.

"Syria is continuing to support and to back terror activities against the State of Israel. Syria should know that they will pay a price for backing terrorism and for continuing to harbor and finance terror against the free world," he said. Mofaz also described Assad's leadership as "strange," but did not elaborate.

Mofaz held out the prospect of dialogue with the new Palestinian Authority government headed by Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala). But he said he was deeply skeptical that Qurei would be able to combat terrorist groups with Chairman Yasser Arafat retaining control of the security forces.

"Our goal is to bring back the Palestinians to the negotiating table. But first they should fight against terrorism and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure," he said.

"We will speak with Abu Ala. To be honest with you, I'm worried about the way he's going to control the security groups. Knowing the structure, Arafat is going to control the security groups. It will make it very difficult to move forward if he will be the man to give the order and the direction to the security groups. However we will judge the Abu Ala government first and foremost by the results."

Of a possible cease-fire with Hamas or Islamic Jihad, he said: "We will not be a part of any cease-fire with Palestinian terrorist groups. We will speak to Abu Ala. But achieving an agreement or cease-fire between the Abu Ala government and the Palestinian terror groups, it is their problem. I mean the Palestinian problem."

He said prospects for a political settlement with the Palestinians in the near future are bleak and that instead the sides should work toward achieving another interim agreement.

"It will be very difficult from the situation that we are facing today to reach in a month or a few years a permanent agreement, and I believe that we have to go through some interim agreement that will rebuild the trust between the two sides, will give us a proper sense of security for the people of Israel, and give hope to the Palestinian people," he said.

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Inside The Pentagon

November 13, 2003

Pg. 11

McHale: DOD To Choose States To Host New Civil Support Teams

Paul McHale, assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense, will make recommendations "within the next month" on where the Pentagon should establish a dozen new Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, he told Inside the Pentagon last week.

McHale is working closely with Congress and the National Guard Bureau -- each WMD-CST consists of Air and Army National Guard personnel -- before offering his decision to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The fiscal year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into law Oct. 1, provided \$88 million to fund the 12 teams, each consisting of 22 service members. The teams respond to incidents involving chemical, biological or radiological weapons (ITP, Oct. 9, p3).

There are 32 teams now certified nationwide, with two in California. The FY-03 Defense Authorization Act approved the creation of an additional 23 teams. The 12 teams McHale recommends to Rumsfeld will make up nearly half that number. They are to be positioned in every U.S. state and territory.

A state's population density turned out to be the major criteria for selecting the 12 states to receive WMD-CSTs, the same criteria that was used to position the existing 32 teams, McHale said. The Pentagon factored in elements such as defense industrial base sites, critical Defense Department infrastructure and "historical sites of national importance" -- as well as conference report language in the FY-04 Defense Appropriations Act, which urges "special attention should be paid to ports and coastal areas," McHale said.

A number of lawmakers called McHale's office or sent correspondence about the criteria for selection. McHale also met with a half dozen representatives and senators "to directly discuss that issue," he said.

McHale outlined the selection criteria in a letter his office has sent to 11 lawmakers since August, including Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT).

"Congress has also directed the secretary of defense to develop a plan detailing the schedule and budget requirements for manning, training and equipping the new teams as rapidly as possible," McHale writes. The letter goes on to state the selection criteria and assures each lawmaker that his state "will be given full and equal consideration" as DOD finalizes its plan to establish new WMD-CSTs.

"The purpose of that correspondence was to emphasize that population alone would not be the basis for selection," McHale said. "But in a preliminary review, population density captures all of the other criteria as well."

McHale said his office initially had thought it might find "states with unique vulnerabilities . . . along the margins" and without the largest population densities, but did not.

McHale's background as a Democratic congressman from eastern Pennsylvania between 1993 and 1999 was key to his selection for the Pentagon job, considering the level of interaction and communication defense officials anticipated he would have with Congress, sources said.

Meanwhile, McHale said he hopes Congress provides more funding for FY-05 to stand up the remaining 11 teams. Additional funds are needed to pay for Air and Army National Guard personnel, equipment and operating costs for the teams, as well as training certification for troops prepared to identify nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological threats. WMD-CSTs undergo 15 months of individual and unit training prior to certification.

The teams have been present at major events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. They also have been activated for several disasters, including a search for highly toxic rocket fuel following the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia earlier this year.

Even if all the authorized teams receive funding next year, some analysts would like to see more teams established overall.

In an October 2002 report titled "America Still Unprepared -- America Still in Danger," a task force headed by former Sens. Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren Rudman (R-NH) urged the Defense Department to establish a total of 66 teams, with multiple units deployed in larger states (ITP, Oct. 31, 2002, p9).

-- **Jeremy Feiler**

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Washington Times
November 14, 2003
Pg. 1

N. Korea Offers To Give Up Nukes

Seeks security guarantee, aid

By John Zarocostas, The Washington Times

GENEVA — North Korean diplomats said yesterday the nation was willing to give up its nuclear deterrent, stop testing and exporting missiles and permit annual inspections as part of a grand bargain with its four neighbors and the United States.

In exchange, the diplomats said, the North expected written security guarantees and compensation for economic losses suffered by a decision to halt construction of two South Korean-made nuclear power plants in the North.

In addition, the envoys said the United States must pledge not to hinder the economic development of the North, particularly its dealings with Japan and South Korea.

Two diplomats, in a rare, wide-ranging interview, reiterated Pyongyang's position that it might be prepared to consider President Bush's proposal for written guarantees on security "positively" if they were linked to simultaneous diplomatic actions demanded by the communist regime.

The envoys said there is so far no confirmation of the date, but the six-way talks involving the United States, Russia, China the two Koreas and Japan are expected to continue, and they underscored that Pyongyang "agreed in principle to the next round of talks."

Until now, North Korea has been adamant it wants a nonaggression pact with the United States, which President Bush and his administration have refused.

On Oct. 22, Mr. Bush said "a treaty is not going to happen, but there are other ways to effect, on paper, what I have said publicly: We have no intention of invading. Obviously, any guarantee would be conditional, on Kim Jong-il doing what he hopefully will say he'll do, which is get rid of his nuclear weapons program."

A few days later, Pyongyang signaled its willingness to consider a written guarantee instead of a formal treaty.

When asked whether Pyongyang was still insistent on a North Korea-U.S. nonaggression pact, or could live with an accord signed by the six parties, one of the envoys, Kim Yong-ho, said yesterday:

"If Mr. Bush's proposal on written guarantees of security is based on the principle of simultaneous action which was proposed by the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], we can consider positively about that."

The envoy said there is a need for simultaneous action between North Korea and the United States because, as he put it, "between the U.S. and the DPRK there is no confidence or mutual trust, so we cannot do first, and the U.S. cannot do first, so we do simultaneously."

Pressed on what he meant by simultaneously, Mr. Kim said "first guarantee the security, and second do not hinder the economic development of my country."

Kim Song-sol, the other senior North Korean diplomat, added that during the first round of six-way talks in Beijing in April, Pyongyang had proposed a nonaggression treaty, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two, and the guarantee of the realization of economic collaboration between its neighbors South Korea and Japan. The envoy added that the North's demands also include compensation for the electricity loss and to complete construction of the two light water reactors.

As part of the bargain in exchange, Kim Song-sol said, Pyongyang would "not manufacture nuclear weapons, allow annual inspections, dissolve the nuclear facilities, and suspend the testing of missiles or the missile export or such kind of things."

Turning to other issues, the diplomats also urged other governments "including the U.S., to push Japan to respond positively" to a proposal by Pyongyang for bilateral talks to discuss reparations for war crimes and other serious human rights violations inflicted by the Japanese military and imperial government during World War II and the period of occupation and colonial rule of Korea.

"Japan should respond positively in any way. It is a very critical issue to solve before the normalization of the relations between the two countries ... therefore the Japanese government should come to the table, as we proposed," Kim Song-sol said.

"We cannot explore any possibilities if Japan refuses the proposal," said Kim Yong-ho.

The envoys stressed that new evidence disclosing 420,000 victims forcibly drafted during the Japanese occupation has renewed calls for action on the past crimes.

This included about 200 women and girls who were sexually abused by the Japanese forces, and many more who were victims of torture or used as guinea pigs for experiments.

"Over 1 million [Koreans] were massacred by the Japanese and also 8.4 million Korean adults and youth forcefully drafted, kidnapped by the Japanese military and government and used as forced labor.

The last round of North Korea-Japan normalization talks were held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in October 2002, just one month after the historic visit to Pyongyang by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

The North says the addition of security preconditions by Japan linked to the nuclear issue and missile posturing led to the breakdown of talks.

However, for Japan the North Korean nuclear threat was a top security issue that had to be addressed in the talks.

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Los Angeles Times

November 14, 2003

Pg. 1

Column One

N. Korea's Ace In The Hole

The secretive nation is said to have thousands of underground facilities. They help keep weapons sites out of view -- and the U.S. military's reach.

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — Like so many worker ants, the North Korean soldiers spent their days underground in a vast labyrinth of tunnels.

Their daily commute involved walking down four steep flights of stairs, then passing through a corridor that went nearly 800 yards into a mountain. They carried tightly sealed cartons, believed to contain raw materials for North Korea's secret weapons programs. Some days, especially if they were being punished, they were assigned simply to dig more tunnels.

K., a North Korean in his 30s, was recruited at age 17 into an elite military unit working for the agency responsible for weapons production. He took an oath to work underground for the rest of his career and was assigned to a cave in remote Musan County in North Hamgyong province, about 15 miles from the Chinese border.

"This is how we hide from our enemies. Everything in North Korea is underground," said K., who described the cave on condition that he be quoted using only his first initial and that certain identifying details be kept vague. North Korea is riddled with caves like the one in which K. worked. Under its paranoid regime, virtually everything of military significance is manufactured underground, whether it's buttons for soldiers' uniforms or enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. A South Korean intelligence source estimates North Korea has several hundred large underground factories and more than 10,000 smaller facilities. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., the author of three books on the North Korean military, puts the total number between 11,000 and 14,000.

Whatever the count, there are enough underground facilities that a popular joke has the country eventually collapsing not from the failure of its communist economic system but from so much burrowing in the dirt.

"The place is like Swiss cheese, there are so many holes," said John Pike, a defense analyst with GlobalSecurity.org, a consulting firm in Alexandria, Va.

North Korea's relentless tunneling has had a profound effect on the U.S. debate over how to respond to its drive to build nuclear weapons. It makes the option of preemptive military action far less viable, because so much of the nuclear program is underground and out of reach.

Even if the Pentagon were to develop nuclear "bunker-busters" — relatively small bombs that penetrate the surface before exploding — the United States would be hard-pressed to use them successfully without knowing which of the thousands of bunkers scattered throughout the country were the correct targets.

The North Koreans began tunneling after the 1950-53 Korean War, when U.S. bombing destroyed most of their industrial base and infrastructure. North Korea's founder, the late Kim Il Sung, is believed to have been so awed by American air power that he directed key industrial facilities to be built underground.

"The entire nation must be made into a fortress," Kim wrote in 1963. "We must dig ourselves into the ground to protect ourselves." North Korea's mountainous topography, inhospitable for agriculture and transportation, proved to be singularly well suited to the nation becoming what Bermudez calls the "most heavily fortified country in the world."

The nation of 22 million people created the fifth-largest army in the world, with the mountains providing natural cover for its military infrastructure.

"We would dig horizontally into the mountains rather than going straight down because we didn't have good technology for waterproofing and we didn't want to run into the water table," said Lim Young Sun, a North Korean defector who worked from 1980 to 1993 in a construction bureau assigned to build underground facilities.

Lim said the North Koreans used mostly Japanese tunneling techniques, although more modern equipment was later imported from Europe.

In the countryside, small entryways can be seen dug into the sides of many hills, covered with slabs of concrete. "As you travel around and look around, you see that what looked like a regular hill is actually a bunker. It takes a while for your eyes to adjust and to make the mental shift, but after a while, you realize that all of North Korea is an underground facility," said Peter Hayes, who has traveled several times to North Korea and is executive director of the Nautilus Institute, a Berkeley think tank.

Above the demilitarized zone that divides the Korean peninsula, the North Koreans have put an estimated 13,000 heavy artillery pieces into mountain bunkers. The doors face north — the artillery is positioned to quickly slide in and out on rails — so that South Korean and U.S. troops stationed south of the DMZ can't reach them.

North Korean tunneling activity hasn't stopped at the border. Over the years, four infiltration channels have been discovered in South Korean territory. Based on defector testimony, South Korean investigators believe that as many as 20 more may still be hidden beneath the earth.

The subway system in Pyongyang doubles as a bomb shelter. Some stations in the capital are believed to be as deep as 100 yards underground, with secret tunnels designed to transport the leadership in an emergency.

One tunnel is said to lead north to Pyongyang's international airport, which is believed to have a runway that is largely underground so that an aircraft would not be exposed to hostile fire until the moment its wheels leave the ground. Predictably, official maps of Pyongyang do not show the location of subway stations, and with the exception of two showcase stations, the system is off-limits to foreigners.

Because so much happens below the surface, the North Koreans are able to conceal their military infrastructure from the prying eyes of surveillance satellites and aerial reconnaissance. But people and vehicles going in and out of the tunnels can be surveyed, as can utility lines.

When a new facility is built, its size can be estimated by the debris, or tailings, excavated in the process. Exactly what happens inside those installations remains shrouded in mystery, however, making North Korea a far bigger challenge from an intelligence standpoint than Iraq.

"North Korea is the longest-running failure in the history of American intelligence," said Donald P. Gregg, who served as both CIA station chief and U.S. ambassador in Seoul. He cited the difficulty of recruiting reliable spies inside the country and the many underground facilities. "It is simply a much harder place to gather intelligence than Iraq or Iran ever was."

For example, confusion reigns on the question of whether North Korea has, as it claims, extracted plutonium from 8,000 nuclear-reactor fuel rods and, if so, where the reprocessing has taken place — the critical step in producing the fissile material that is the heart of a nuclear bomb.

Until recently, it was assumed that the only possible location was at Yongbyon, a sprawling compound 55 miles north of Pyongyang that has a building six stories high and the length of two football fields designed expressly for plutonium extraction.

United Nations weapons inspectors were expelled from the premises at the end of last year. Now it appears that this imposing building, clearly visible in satellite imagery, might be a decoy. The actual reprocessing could have taken place at undiscovered locations underground.

"I'd be prepared to suggest that Yongbyon is a decoy," said Pike of GlobalSecurity.org. "They don't really need a building the size of several football fields. They could use several buildings the size of tennis courts. Could they hide those? Absolutely. The North Koreans are very annoying that way. What they are trying to hide is small, and they have plenty of places to hide it."

There's even more confusion about the North's production of highly enriched uranium, also used in nuclear warheads. The process requires centrifuges, small devices that are even easier to conceal than the technology used in processing plutonium. The North Koreans asserted in October 2002 that they had a secret uranium program, but U.S. and South Korean intelligence have been unable to determine where.

"Uranium does not give you the same punch for the pound as plutonium, but it has the advantage that it is almost impossible to detect, and you can easily hide it underground," said one U.S. military intelligence official, who requested anonymity.

There is a short list of suspected sites for the uranium program, among them underground facilities at Yongjori, about 12 miles from the Chinese border in Yanggang province, and in Chagang province, also in the north. The facility in Chagang, known as Hagap, has been known to U.S. intelligence since 1996 and suspected of being variously a reprocessing facility, a high-explosives test site or even an underground nuclear reactor. But Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea military analyst for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif., says more recent information suggests that it is merely a vast underground archive for the ruling Korean Workers' Party. The North Koreans help maintain the extreme secrecy of the underground facilities by keeping personnel virtually locked inside. This is particularly true for facilities that are used for weapons of mass destruction.

"Once you go in, you don't go out," said K., the North Korean who worked at the Musan County facility until, through a combination of bribery, guile and family connections, he escaped in 1996. "I volunteered for this, but then I came to realize that it was like a big prison and we were slaves."

K. was assigned to work for the 2nd Economic Committee of the National Defense Commission, which despite its innocuously bureaucratic name is the organization believed to be responsible for producing weapons of mass destruction. He said he was selected for the elite unit because his father also was in the military and his family was considered loyal to the regime.

At the time he was sworn in, he took an oath promising to work there until age 60. In nine years, he left only once — handing over a bribe so he could visit his family at home. Others could see relatives only at a reception area outside the facility, where visits were supervised.

Had he remained, K. said, he would have been expected to find a wife among the women assigned to his unit and to raise a family within the compound, which had schools, canteens and other facilities to keep employees relatively content for life. Most of the staff facilities were within the compound but above ground, and visible. K. said male recruits generally married after 10 years of military service, while women became eligible for marriage at age 24. So complete was the secrecy that even employees inside had little idea of what was being produced.

"Some people said it was for chemical weapons. But everything was wrapped tightly with zinc so that we never really knew what was inside," K. said. "We weren't supposed to ask questions. We weren't supposed to wander around."

K.'s account is corroborated by the testimony of other defectors, who speak of secret military sites where the staff is virtually imprisoned.

"In these places, people have a lot of privileges. There is no problem with food and there are good schools, but they are like concentration camps too. You live in secrecy under constant suspicion," defector Lim said. "This is what happens if you volunteer for the chemical, nuclear or missile units."

The North Koreans' talent for concealment complicates efforts to forge a diplomatic solution to the current nuclear standoff. On Oct. 19, President Bush announced in Bangkok, Thailand, where he was attending a summit of Asian-

Pacific leaders, that he would consider giving North Korea a written guarantee that the United States won't attack if Pyongyang verifiably and irreversibly dismantled its nuclear program. But how is complete verification possible when so much is hidden underground?

"Unless you are prepared to invade and occupy the whole country, you might never be able to find what you're looking for," said Pinkston of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

There is a precedent for inspecting North Korea's underground facilities that could be taken as a cautionary tale. In 1999, the United States demanded access to an excavation site called Kumchangri that was so large, it could accommodate an underground reactor and reprocessing plant. North Korea demanded \$300 million in return — which it received in the form of 600,000 tons of food aid from the United States and South Korea.

The team that conducted the inspection found the facility surrounded by thousands of North Korean soldiers, some doing kung fu exercises, others manning machine-gun nests at the entrance to the tunnel, according to Joel S. Wit, who headed the inspection team for the State Department.

"It was a little bit surreal," Wit said. "It looked like the set of a World War II movie."

What the inspectors did not find, however, was any evidence of nuclear weapons production despite a thorough scouring of the premises and sophisticated air and soil sampling. They left joking bitterly that the underground complex might be used instead as a mushroom farm or vast wine cellar for the private stock of North Korean leaders.

"We provided that food aid for nothing," said a South Korean security official, who asked not to be named. "We were all duped by the North Koreans."

<http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-underground14nov14,1,3225005.story>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced report follows article.)

Washington Times

November 14, 2003

Pg. 5

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

Iran nuclear program

The CIA has released new information regarding Iran's nuclear program. The agency in its semiannual report to Congress stated that Iran is developing both a uranium and plutonium program for its bombs.

"The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," said the report, known as the 721 Report based on the legislation requiring it.

The Iranians have insisted that their uranium enrichment is for making fuel for the Russian-made reactors at Bushehr and other sites. "We remain concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate fuel-cycle activities," the report said.

It is the first official U.S. government report identifying Iran's nuclear arms research.

"Iran appears to be embarking on acquiring nuclear weapons material via both acquisition paths — highly enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium," the report said.

The agency said a major problem is the uranium centrifuges that were discovered at Natanz. Such equipment can spin uranium gas into fuel for bombs, the report said.

The plutonium project is part of heavy water reactor research "that we believe could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons," the report said. "We also suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from foreign suppliers to support its overall nuclear weapons program."

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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003

... Acquisition by Country

As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern. . . .

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/jan_jun2003.pdf

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Birmingham (AL) News

November 14, 2003

Rocket Fuel Fire Shuts Burner At Incinerator

By Katherine Bouma, News staff writer

A small fire inside the rocket furnace at the Anniston chemical weapons incinerator forced the Army to shut down the burner Thursday, officials said.

While a blade was cutting a rocket into pieces Thursday afternoon, flammable propellant flared and ignited a rocket piece, according to the Army.

The M-55 rockets being destroyed are drained of liquid sarin before processing, but the flammable propellant remains during the process.

The explosive material from the rocket had not yet entered the chute and there was no explosion, said Donovan Mager, a spokesman for Westinghouse Anniston, the company that operates the incinerator.

The fire took place in a room built with 24-inch concrete and steel walls and designed to withstand an explosion. Fire dampers immediately closed the room off so that the fire burned itself out within moments, according to an Army statement.

The Army is conducting trial burns to determine whether it is meeting federal and state environmental standards at the incinerator. However, the rocket furnace was not conducting a trial burn when it was forced to shut down Thursday. It was processing rockets to drain them of enough liquid sarin for a test at the liquid incinerator.

The liquid incinerator is expected to test as scheduled today, Mager said. He said the rocket furnace had minor damage and was expected to be back in service today.

Also this week, the contractor hired to operate the laboratory at the incinerator fired a lab technician blamed for accidentally setting off an alarm at the facility and then refusing to admit his mistake for three days.

The 23-year-old, who has not been identified, tested the wrong air monitor with a diluted sarin nerve gas, officials said. He was not dismissed for the mistake, but for trying to cover it up, Army officials said.

The alarm forced the laboratory building to be evacuated early Friday morning.

The incinerator was built to destroy more than 660,000 Cold War-era chemical weapons.

<http://www.al.com/search/index.ssf?/base/news/1068805082121730.xml?birminghamnews?nstate>

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Washington Times

November 14, 2003

Pg. 19

Opposition Sold Uranium To Al Qaeda

LYON, France — A representative of al Qaeda bought enriched uranium capable of being used in a so-called dirty bomb from the Congolese opposition in 2000, according to sworn testimony quoted in a French newspaper yesterday.

An unnamed former soldier from the Democratic Republic of Congo has told investigators looking into the murders of two Congolese opposition figures in France in December 2000 that he had attended a meeting earlier that year at which the uranium was sold, the Lyon-based Le Progres reported.

The man "described a meeting which took place on March 3 in [the German city of] Hamburg between some Congolese men and an Egyptian by the name of Ibrahim Abdul," the newspaper said.

It quoted the man as saying, "I realized it was al Qaeda."

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New York Times on the Web
November 14, 2003

U.S. Has No Evidence Iraq Hid Banned Arms In Syria

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration said on Friday it had no evidence that any of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction had been hidden in neighboring Syria.

In an interview with WTVT-TV in Tampa, Florida, White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice defended prewar intelligence on Iraq that Washington used to justify the invasion. Despite U.S. assertions that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological arms, none has been found.

"The American people can be certain that we went to war on solid information, on information that had been gathered over 12 years, on a history of use of weapons of mass destruction, and that we are finding confirmation that this was somebody who hid his activities from the United Nations and intended to continue those programs," Rice said.

A U.S. team hunting for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was investigating multiple reports from Iraqis that banned weapons or weapons-related substances were moved across borders into Syria, Iran, and Jordan.

"I've seen reports, as everyone has," Rice said. But she added: "We don't have any evidence at this point that that's what happened."

Washington has accused Damascus of turning a blind eye to militants crossing into Iraq.

Syria has long been on the State Department's list of states that support terrorism, and Washington accuses it of seeking weapons of mass destruction.

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Washington Times
November 15, 2003
Pg. 6

U.S. Wants Offer Discussed At Korea Talks

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

The United States has taken note of a sweeping new proposal from North Korea to end East Asia's nuclear standoff, but remains focused on a second round of multilateral talks in Beijing as the best way to address the issue, the State Department said yesterday.

In a rare interview, two senior North Korean diplomats told The Washington Times in Geneva Thursday that Pyongyang was prepared to give up its nuclear deterrent, stop testing and exporting missiles and allow international inspectors back into the country in exchange for economic reparations and a written security pledge from Washington.

The North Korean envoys, Kim Yong-ho and Kim Song-sol, also said the United States must agree not to hinder the economic development of the North, particularly its ties with South Korea and Japan.

"We have seen the report and are examining efforts already under way for another round of six-party talks," a senior State Department official said yesterday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

A first round of the talks, involving the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, Russia and China, broke up in Beijing in August with little tangible progress. Chinese officials have been pushing for a second round, which could come as early as mid-December.

"We hope to discuss whether North Korea is prepared to completely, verifiably and irreversibly end its nuclear program and related issues" in any new round of talks, the U.S. official said.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, the lead U.S. diplomat at the August talks, travels to Japan, China and South Korea beginning tomorrow to discuss the next diplomatic steps.

State Department officials said that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bangguo planned to travel to North Korea to confirm the dates.

"It's close to a done deal that there will be talks, but ... the dotted line hasn't been signed," a second State Department official said.

The Bush administration says that Pyongyang admitted violating a 1994 deal with the Clinton administration to freeze its clandestine nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic aid and the construction of two civilian nuclear power plants.

The North has insisted on new aid and a formal non-aggression pact with the United States as the price for ending its nuclear program.

North Korea abruptly eased its traditionally bellicose rhetoric earlier this month, showing new openness to renewed negotiations.

The program outlined by the two North Korean diplomats in Geneva was the most extensive to date.

The envoys said Pyongyang would insist on simultaneous actions by all parties as part of the bargain. The North would also seek compensation for the electric power lost with the halt of construction at the two nuclear plants. U.S. officials said the timing of any agreement was less important than achieving a definitive end to the North's nuclear programs, which have sent shock waves across the region.

Former President Clinton told an audience in Seoul during a visit to South Korea yesterday that the Bush administration should agree to the non-aggression pact if it cleared the way for a deal with North Korea.

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Washington Post

November 16, 2003

Pg. 20

CIA Finds No Evidence Hussein Sought To Arm Terrorists

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA's search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has found no evidence that former president Saddam Hussein tried to transfer chemical or biological technology or weapons to terrorists, according to a military and intelligence expert.

Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided new details about the weapons search and Iraqi insurgency in a report released Friday. It was based on briefings over the past two weeks in Iraq from David Kay, the CIA representative who is directing the search for unconventional weapons in Iraq; L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. civil administrator there; and military officials.

"No evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction or weapons to terrorists," Cordesman wrote of Kay's briefing. "Only possibility was Saddam's Fedayeen [his son's irregular terrorist force] and talk only."

One of the concerns the Bush administration cited early last year to justify the need to invade Iraq was that Hussein would provide chemical or biological agents or weapons to al Qaeda or other terrorists. Despite the disclosure that U.S. and British intelligence officials assessed that Hussein would use or distribute such weapons only if he were attacked and faced defeat, administration spokesmen have continued to defend that position.

Last Thursday, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith defended the administration's prewar position at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The idea that we didn't have specific proof that he was planning to give a biological agent to a terrorist group," he said, "doesn't really lead you to anything, because you wouldn't expect to have that information even if it were true. And our intelligence is just not at the point where if Saddam had that intention that we would necessarily know it."

Yesterday, allegations of new evidence of connections between Iraq and al Qaeda contained in a classified annex attached to Feith's Oct. 27 letter to leaders of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were published in the Weekly Standard. Feith had been asked to support his July 10 closed-door testimony about such connections. The classified annex summarized raw intelligence reports but did not analyze them or address their accuracy, according to a senior administration official familiar with the matter.

During the recent Baghdad briefing, Cordesman noted that Kay said Iraq "did order nuclear equipment from 1999 on, but no evidence [has turned up] of [a] new major facility to use it."

Although there was no evidence of chemical weapons production, Kay said he had located biological work "under cover of new agricultural facility" that showed "advances in developing dry storable powder forms of botulinum toxin," Cordesman wrote.

During his Nov. 1-12 trip, Cordesman visited Baghdad, Babel, Tikrit and Kirkuk, where he met combat commanders and staff in high-threat areas. Reporting on his briefing by Bremer, Cordesman said 95 percent of the threat came from former Hussein loyalists while most foreign terrorists, who entered Iraq before the war, arrived from Syria, with some from Saudi Arabia and only "a few from Iran." Bremer "felt Syrian intelligence knows [of the volunteers] but is not proactive in encouraging [them]." He also said there was "no way to seal borders with Syria, Saudi [Arabia] and Iran. Too manpower intensive."

Bremer said Hussein loyalists "still have lots of money to buy attacks [because] at least \$1 billion still unaccounted for." He also said the Syrians had admitted "some \$3 billion more of Iraqi money [is] in Syria."

The Coalition Joint Task Force briefers noted that the Iraq Governing Council felt "the U.S. is too soft in attacking hostile targets, arrests and use of force," while the U.S. side "feels restraint is the key to winning hearts and minds." Hussein, according to the briefers, "is cut off, isolated, moving constantly, [and has] no real role in control." They told Cordesman that the "problem is ex-generals and colonels with no other future -- not former top officials." They

also said Hussein "made officers read 'Black Hawk Down' [Mark Bowden's book about the fatal downing of U.S. helicopters in Somalia a decade ago] to try to convince them U.S. would have to leave if major casualties." They said there will be attacks "until the day U.S. leaves" and "cannot ever get intelligence up to point where [they can] stop all attacks."

During his visit to the Polish-led international division, south of Baghdad where the Shiites predominate, Cordesman said there were 34 attacks before a Pole was killed Nov. 6. The force there considers the holy cities "stable" but notes that Shiite leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, Iraq's top Shiite cleric, "protect themselves with their own militias with CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] approval. This has its advantages, but it means they cannot be given effective coalition protection," he wrote.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46460-2003Nov15.html>

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Washington Times

November 17, 2003

Pg. 16

Iraqi Missile Scientist In Iran

Fled to border after invasion

By Dafna Linzer, Associated Press

The Iraqi scientist who headed Saddam Hussein's long-range missile program has fled to neighboring Iran, a country identified as a state sponsor of terrorism with a successful missile program and nuclear ambitions, U.S. officers involved in the weapons hunt say.

Modher Sadeq-Saba al-Tamimi's departure comes as top weapons makers from Saddam's deposed regime find themselves eight months out of work but with skills that could be valuable to militaries or terrorist organizations in neighboring countries. U.S. officials have said some are already in Syria and Jordan.

U.N. inspectors spoke with Mr. Modher in Baghdad a week before the U.S.-led war began March 19. Two U.S. weapons investigators say they believe he crossed the Iraq-Iran border on foot at least two months after U.S. forces took Baghdad.

Mr. Modher is not on the list of the 52 most-wanted Iraqis whose faces grace a deck of playing cards, but U.S. officials have been eager to talk to scientists who may know anything about Saddam's efforts to develop proscribed weapons.

Mr. Modher's activities in Iran are unknown and may explain why his disappearance hasn't been disclosed publicly. The CIA declined to discuss its efforts with Iraqi scientists or identify individuals.

Thought to be in his mid-50s, the Czech-educated scientist specialized in missile engines. He met numerous times with U.N. inspectors during the 1990s and earlier this year when he argued that the al Samoud missile system under his command wasn't in violation of a U.N. range limit.

The inspectors determined otherwise when tests showed it could fly more than 93 miles. They quickly began destroying the Iraqi stock, much to his frustration.

"Dr. Modher was declared by Iraq to have been one of the principal figures in their missile programs," said Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for the U.N. inspectors.

In the late 1980s, Mr. Modher headed up the Iraqi military's Project 1728, part of an effort to produce engines for longer-range missiles.

He was the protege and favored colleague of Iraqi Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel, Saddam's right-hand man and son-in-law who briefly defected to Jordan in 1995. There, Gen. Kamel told U.N. inspectors during interrogations about his work and Mr. Modher's efforts to build a missile powerful enough to strike most major European cities.

According to the interrogation transcripts, Gen. Kamel said Mr. Modher and a nuclear physicist named Mahdi Obeidi both took work and documents from their offices. U.N. inspectors investigated the claim but found nothing. In July, Mr. Obeidi gave the CIA a stack of papers and a piece of equipment that had been buried in his back yard for 12 years. In return, he has become the only Iraqi scientist allowed to move to the United States since the beginning of the U.S. occupation.

Other than Mr. Obeidi, who is living along the East Coast with his family, another scientist known to have left the country is Jaffar al-Jaffer, who founded Iraq's nuclear program in the 1980s. He is in the United Arab Emirates, where U.S. troops are stationed, and has been questioned by U.S. and British intelligence officials.

Mr. Modher traveled to Germany in 1987 to buy high-tech equipment through H&H Metalform, a company whose senior officers were tried later in Germany and found guilty of violating the country's export-control laws, U.N. inspectors said.

The equipment enabled Iraq to make components for Scud missiles similar to the ones they fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf war.

When that conflict ended, Iraq faced U.N. sanctions forbidding it from purchasing any new weapons-making equipment.

But four years later, Mr. Modher was caught by U.N. inspectors when he inquired about Russian-made gyroscopes from a Palestinian middleman. At the time, Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister, told U.N. inspectors that Mr. Modher had acted on his own and would be punished for breaking sanctions.

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Miami Herald
November 15, 2003

Government Previews Bioterrorism Sensors

The government said devices that continuously analyze cities' air could save tens of thousands of lives.

By Ted Bridis, Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The Homeland Security Department offered a look Friday at its \$60 million sensor network to detect bioterrorism threats in 31 cities.

The government said the devices, which continuously analyze cities' air, could save tens of thousands of lives in the earliest days after a wide-scale attack. Neighborhoods covered in these 31 cities represent roughly half of the U.S. population.

Called "Biowatch," the project represents one of the Bush administration's most aggressive efforts to protect Americans from terrorists who might spread deadly biological pathogens, including anthrax, smallpox and plague. The network of nearly 500 sensors nationwide has never raised a false alarm, said Dr. Parney Albright, an assistant secretary for Homeland Security.

Albright and others declined to say which cities are covered, but local authorities have acknowledged the devices are in Washington, New York, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, San Diego and Boston.

The Bush administration recently expanded Biowatch from 20 to 31 cities, increasing its cost by more than \$20 million annually. Congress hasn't formally approved the extra spending, but Albright said the request for more money wasn't related to the department's decision to organize a demonstration of Biowatch for reporters.

The agency has privately admonished city officials for disclosing too many details about Biowatch.

The sensor network isn't immune from critics, who say Biowatch can't detect small releases that could sicken hundreds or thousands, doesn't monitor attacks indoors and lets too many hours pass between a possible attack and testing of air samples.

"Unless it's a major atmospheric release of large quantities of material, I do not think it would be hard at all for Biowatch to miss an attack," said Calvin Chue, a research scientist at Johns Hopkins University.

The government's experts say the project is relatively cheap by Washington standards -- roughly \$60 million each year -- and could save tens of thousands of lives by helping determine who should receive antibiotics after an attack, even before symptoms appear. But they also acknowledge some criticisms.

"It won't save everyone," Albright said. "By the time we get the hit confirmed, the people who are going to be contaminated have already been contaminated."

The government's goal is to reduce the hours between an attack and treatment.

"If we can get into that time lag, we can take bioterror agents off the table," Albright said.

<http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/7268173.htm>

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Washington Times
November 16, 2003

Official Warns U.S. Against Nuke Censure

VIENNA, Austria — Iran's chief delegate to the U.N. atomic agency said yesterday the United States will fail in its attempt to take his country before the Security Council to face possible sanctions for suspect nuclear activities.

Ali Akbar Salehi told the Associated Press that any Security Council involvement "could lead to consequences that none of us would like to witness."

Diplomats fear harsh actions against Tehran could backfire, leading it to renege on promises of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and again draw the curtain on Iran's nuclear agenda.

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Washington Post
November 16, 2003
Pg. 28

Radioactive Material Seized In Czech Sting Operation

By Karel Janicek, Associated Press

PRAGUE, Nov. 15 -- Undercover Czech police officers arrested two Slovaks who tried to sell them nearly seven pounds of radioactive material in a sting operation, police said Saturday.

The potential uses of the substance remained unclear pending an investigation, and experts disagreed on whether it could be used to make a so-called dirty bomb.

Police seized the suspects Friday in the Voronez Hotel in Brno, 125 miles southeast of Prague, Blanka Kosinova, a police spokeswoman, said in a statement. The men were arrested as they counted the \$700,000 they believed they had received for the sale.

Pavel Pittermann, a spokesman for the Czech nuclear safety office, said the first tests of four parcels containing the substance detected traces of thorium and uranium. While cautioning against jumping to conclusions, he said those two components could be used in a dirty bomb.

Later, Dana Drabova, the head of Pittermann's agency, told Czech Radio that the material probably came from somewhere in the former Soviet bloc but that she doubted it had direct weapons applications.

Still, there is concern that terrorists might try to use smuggled radioactive material to build and detonate a dirty bomb, which would use conventional explosives to spread radioactivity over a wide area. Such a bomb would typically be packed with strontium, cesium or some other highly radioactive isotope used in medicine and industry. No device of this type has been used anywhere, but the al Qaeda terrorist network is reported to have been interested in building such a weapon.

Pittermann said the contents of the parcels would be thoroughly checked at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez, just north of Prague, and that results could be available by the middle of the next week.

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency said it was reviewing the seizure.

The two suspects, from the eastern Slovak town of Presov, face up to 15 years in prison if convicted of illegal production and possession of radioactive material and a highly dangerous substance.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46630-2003Nov15.html>

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(Editor's Note: Although the article below is not WMD related, it does show how people react during a disease outbreak.)

Sat Nov 15, 2:08 AM ET

Pa. Panicking Over Hepatitis a Outbreak

By CHARLES SHEEHAN, Associated Press Writer

PITTSBURGH - The nation's biggest known outbreak of hepatitis A is causing such a panic that people are lining up by the thousands for antibody shots and no longer eating out.

A third person died Friday and nearly 500 others who ate at a Chi-Chi's Mexican restaurant have fallen ill in the outbreak that has prompted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) to send assistance.

Health investigators are focusing on whether contaminated produce — perhaps scallions — caused the outbreak at the restaurant in the Beaver Valley Mall, about 25 miles northwest of Pittsburgh.

"We're very concerned. It's very serious and we've sent a team of people out there to assist," said CDC spokesman David Daigle.

Health officials Friday met with worried shoppers at the mall to try to squelch rumors that the virus was spreading out of control to other restaurants in the region. State Rep. Mike Veon attended a news conference at the mall and ate a sandwich he bought there.

Officials at the mall said sales at the food court were off by as much as 40 percent and sales throughout the mall were down up to 25 percent.

"I won't go to Chi-Chi's again," Barbara Barrickman said as she shopped at the mall. "I know that's unfair, but that's just how I feel."

At least 490 people have been sickened in the outbreak — believed to be the largest on record in the United States, Daigle said.

The Chi-Chi's has been shut down and the restaurant chain removed scallions from kitchens at all its 100 locations, said Bill Zavertrnik, chief operating officer of the Louisville, Ky.-based company.

In September, about 280 people in Georgia and Tennessee were infected with hepatitis A from contaminated scallions, or green onions, including 210 people who ate at restaurants in the Atlanta area. The infections were linked to 12 restaurants — none of them Chi-Chi's.

"We've taken the action to remove them based on our abundance of caution with regard to green onions," Zavertrnik said. "There's no definitive information that green onions played a role. However, we don't know. Authorities are looking at them."

If the source of the outbreak was food shipped into the restaurant, there is a chance that tainted food could have been sent to other places as well, state Health Secretary Calvin Johnson said.

Between 125,000 to 200,000 people each year contract hepatitis A, an infection that attacks the liver. It can be spread by an infected person who does not wash his hands before handling food or utensils. It can also be spread on uncooked foods, such as salads.

Symptoms include fever, nausea, diarrhea, jaundice, fatigue, abdominal pain and loss of appetite. Hepatitis A usually clears up in about two months, but patients can get antibody shots that greatly reduce the chances of contracting the disease if given within 14 days after exposure.

About 8,500 people have received the shots at a gymnasium near the restaurant and at surrounding health centers since the cases began appearing at the start of the month.

Health officials initially suspected Chi-Chi's employees who had failed to wash their hands were the source of the infection. Investigators are now focusing on food, but have not ruled anything out.

Infectious-disease experts say finding the source could be challenging because hepatitis A has a long incubation period, meaning the virus could spread to many places before it is detected. Pennsylvania health officials began warning the public Nov. 3.

The most recent victim, John Spratt, 46, of Aliquippa, died Friday from complications of hepatitis A, according to the Allegheny County Coroner. It was the second death in three days connected to the outbreak.

Dineen Wiczorek, 52, died in a Cleveland hospital Wednesday while awaiting a liver transplant, said her daughter, Darleen Trunzo. Jeff Cook, 38, died on Nov. 7 of liver failure in a Pittsburgh hospital.

All three ate at the Chi-Chi's in October, according to family members.

Eleven restaurant employees have been diagnosed with hepatitis A.

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20031115/ap_on_he_me/hepatitis_outbreak_17

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