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(Editor's Note: Full text and hyperlink for the statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) follows article.)

USA Today

October 6, 2003

Pg. 14

## **Both Sides In Weapons Debate Can Point To Inspector's Report**

*Findings prove threat, some say. Others say no such thing.*

By John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — Three months of searching for Iraqi weapons has done little to resolve the debate over President Bush's prewar explanations for invading Iraq.

An interim report by the U.S. inspection team headed by David Kay provides fodder for both the White House and its critics. To Bush, Kay's interim report shows that Saddam Hussein's regime had a secret biological weapons program and a secret plan to build long-range missiles. To his critics, the news is that no weapons have been found and that Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear programs were all but inactive.

The Bush administration went on an information offensive after the release last week of a declassified version of Kay's report to Congress. The effort was aided Sunday when Kay said on TV that news reports had missed key

findings by his 1,400-member Iraq Survey Group and that, knowing what he knows now, he still would have supported the invasion of Iraq.

On Friday, Bush quoted parts of the Kay report to reporters on the South Lawn of the White House. The passages focused on Iraq's interest in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons over two decades. That interest, the report said, was "elaborately shielded by security and deception operations."

"In other words," Bush said, "he's saying Saddam Hussein was a threat, a serious danger."

Not so, says Democratic Rep. Nancy Pelosi of California, the House minority leader. She says the Kay report makes clear that whatever was going on in Iraq, it did not amount to an imminent threat that required an invasion.

Michigan Sen. Carl Levin, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, wants an investigation into whether U.S. intelligence, or the way it was interpreted by officials in the Bush administration, was so far off that the United States went to war over an arsenal that does not appear to exist.

Although the investigation into Iraq's weapons programs has become politically charged, reaction to the Kay report was not entirely partisan.

Republican Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, emerged from a closed briefing with Kay last week saying he expected the alleged weapons to have been found by now. On the other hand, Democratic Sen. Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, a presidential candidate who supported the U.S.-led invasion, agreed with Kay that some of the Survey Group's important findings had received insufficient attention.

"A lot of the press coverage didn't sound like what Mr. Kay said, or what his report said," Lieberman said on *Fox News Sunday*. But, he added, "there is some evidence that the Bush administration exaggerated unnecessarily."

Vice President Cheney set the tone for the Bush administration's defense in a political speech Friday in Malvern, Pa. Cheney cited a long list of findings in the Kay report based on information provided by Iraqi officials, documents uncovered by investigators or visits to sites:

- \*A prison laboratory complex that may have been used in human testing of biological agents.

- \*Documents and equipment found in a scientist's home that could have been used in restarting a nuclear weapons program, and a secret network of labs that may have some connection to the development of biological weapons.

- \*Efforts to develop an engine for a cruise missile and attempts to purchase long-range rocket technology from North Korea.

"So there's no question in my mind but what Saddam was guilty of what we said he was guilty of, and that the action that the president ordered in Iraq was exactly the right thing to do," Cheney said.

Administration critics have their own talking points from the Kay report, among them:

- \*No actual chemical or biological weapons found and a nuclear program that Kay described as "rudimentary."

- \*No confirmation that two Iraqi mobile trailers were for making biological weapons, that intercepted shipments of aluminum tubes were intended for uranium enrichment to make nuclear weapons, or that Iraq attempted to buy uranium in Africa — all key justifications for the war by the Bush administration.

- \*A determination based on "multiple sources with varied access and reliability" that Iraq "did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled (chemical weapons) program after 1991."

Kay said investigators have some evidence of what they call "red-on-red deception," that is, Iraqi officials who told Saddam they were carrying out orders to develop weapons but didn't follow through.

The Bush administration is asking for \$600 million to complete the Kay investigation on top of the roughly \$300 million spent to date. The job is expected to take six to nine more months.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20031006/5562521s.htm>

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## STATEMENT BY DAVID KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP (ISG)

BEFORE THE

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, AND THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

October 2, 2003

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to discuss with the Committee the progress that the Iraq Survey Group has made in its initial three months of its investigation into Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that the Interim Progress Report, which has been made available to you, is a snapshot, in the context of an on-going investigation, of where we are after our first three months of work. The report does not represent a final reckoning of Iraq's WMD programs, nor are we at the point where we are prepared to close the file on any of these programs. While solid progress - I would say even remarkable progress considering the conditions that the ISG has had to work under - has been made in this initial period of operations, much remains to be done. We are still very much in the collection and analysis mode, still seeking the information and evidence that will allow us to confidently draw comprehensive conclusions to the actual objectives, scope, and dimensions of Iraq's WMD activities at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq's WMD programs spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The very scale of this program when coupled with the conditions in Iraq that have prevailed since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom dictate the speed at which we can move to a comprehensive understanding of Iraq's WMD activities.

We need to recall that in the 1991-2003 period the intelligence community and the UN/IAEA inspectors had to draw conclusions as to the status of Iraq's WMD program in the face of incomplete, and often false, data supplied by Iraq or data collected either by UN/IAEA inspectors operating within the severe constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions imposed or by national intelligence collection systems with their own inherent limitations. The result was that our understanding of the status of Iraq's WMD program was always bounded by large uncertainties and had to be heavily caveated. With the regime of Saddam Husayn at an end, ISG has the opportunity for the first time of drawing together all the evidence that can still be found in Iraq - much evidence is irretrievably lost - to reach definitive conclusions concerning the true state of Iraq's WMD program. It is far too early to reach any definitive conclusions and, in some areas, we may never reach that goal. The unique nature of this opportunity, however, requires that we take great care to ensure that the conclusions we draw reflect the truth to the maximum extent possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq.

We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.

Why are we having such difficulty in finding weapons or in reaching a confident conclusion that they do not exist or that they once existed but have been removed? Our search efforts are being hindered by six principal factors:

1. From birth all of Iraq's WMD activities were highly compartmentalized within a regime that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror and with deception and denial built into each program;
2. Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation related to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans-to-post conflict;
3. Post-OIF looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectable material and forensic evidence concerning Iraq's WMD program. As the report covers in detail, significant elements of this looting were carried out in a systematic and deliberate manner, with the clear aim of concealing pre-OIF activities of Saddam's regime;
4. Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pre/trans conflict period and may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them;
5. Any actual WMD weapons or material is likely to be small in relation to the total conventional armaments footprint and difficult to near impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for, in the quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two car garage;
6. The environment in Iraq remains far from permissive for our activities, with many Iraqis that we talk to reporting threats and overt acts of intimidation and our own personnel being the subject of threats and attacks. In September alone we have had three attacks on ISG facilities or teams: The ISG base in Irbil was bombed and four staff injured, two very seriously; a two person team had their vehicle blocked by gunmen and only escaped by firing back through their own windshield; and on Wednesday, 24 September, the ISG Headquarters in Baghdad again was subject to mortar attack.

What have we found and what have we not found in the first 3 months of our work?

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later:

- A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.
- A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
- Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.
- New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.
- Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
- A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.
- Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.
- Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
- Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment.

In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment efforts, we have been faced with a systematic sanitization of documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts to erase evidence - hard drives destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all traces of use - are ones of deliberate, rather than random, acts. For example,

- On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement of the main building contained an archive of documents situated on well-organized rows of metal shelving. The basement suffered no fire damage despite the total destruction of the upper floors from coalition air strikes. Upon arrival the exploitation team encountered small piles of ash where individual documents or binders of documents were intentionally destroyed. Computer hard drives had been deliberately destroyed. Computers would have had financial value to a random looter; their destruction, rather than removal for resale or reuse, indicates a targeted effort to prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their contents.
- All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have been clearly sanitized, including removal of much equipment, shredding and burning of documents, and even the removal of nameplates from office doors.
- Although much of the deliberate destruction and sanitization of documents and records probably occurred during the height of OIF combat operations, indications of significant continuing destruction efforts have been found after the end of major combat operations, including entry in May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party intelligence building in Baghdad and highly selective destruction of computer hard drives and data storage equipment along with the burning of a small number of specific binders that appear to have contained financial and intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site exploitation team at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the smoldering ashes from documents that was still warm to the touch.

I would now like to review our efforts in each of the major lines of enquiry that ISG has pursued during this initial phase of its work.

With regard to **biological warfare** activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.

Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. The IIS also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-applicable research. This was the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.

Discussions with Iraqi scientists uncovered agent R&D work that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents. Examples include: *B. Thurengiensis* (Bt) with *B. anthracis* (anthrax), and medicinal plants with ricin. In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists, confirmed that Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the simulatant Bt that would have been directly applicable to anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

A very large body of information has been developed through debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial of live *C. botulinum* Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced. This discovery - hidden in the home of a BW scientist - illustrates the point I made earlier about the difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons. The scientist who concealed the vials containing this agent has identified a large cache of agents that he was asked, but refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this second cache.

Additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substances, but progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.

We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of and intended use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq in April has yielded a number of explanations, including hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW production, but technical limitations would prevent any of these processes from being ideally suited to these trailers. That said, nothing we have discovered rules out their potential use in BW production.

We have made significant progress in identifying and locating individuals who were reportedly involved in a mobile program, and we are confident that we will be able to get an answer to the questions as to whether there was a mobile program and whether the trailers that have been discovered so far were part of such a program.

Let me turn now to **chemical weapons** (CW). In searching for retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons. For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort is enormous.

While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003. When Saddam had asked a senior military official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it would take six months for mustard. Another senior Iraqi

chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid-2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard and two years for Sarin.

We are starting to survey parts of Iraq's chemical industry to determine if suitable equipment and bulk chemicals were available for chemical weapons production. We have been struck that two senior Iraqi officials volunteered that if they had been ordered to resume CW production Iraq would have been willing to use stainless steel systems that would be disposed of after a few production runs, in place of corrosive-resistant equipment which they did not have.

We continue to follow leads on Iraq's acquisition of equipment and bulk precursors suitable for a CW program. Several possibilities have emerged and are now being exploited. One example involves a foreign company with offices in Baghdad, that imported in the past into Iraq dual-use equipment and maintained active contracts through 2002. Its Baghdad office was found looted in August 2003, but we are pursuing other locations and associates of the company.

Information obtained since OIF has identified several key areas in which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or undeclared activity since 1991, including research on a possible VX stabilizer, research and development for CW-capable munitions, and procurement/concealment of dual-use materials and equipment.

Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program after 1991. Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced - if not entirely destroyed - during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections. We are carefully examining dual-use, commercial chemical facilities to determine whether these were used or planned as alternative production sites.

We have also acquired information related to Iraq's CW doctrine and Iraq's war plans for OIF, but we have not yet found evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Iraqi military units were prepared to use CW against Coalition forces. Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons program have thus far yielded little reliable information on post-1991 CW stocks and CW agent production, although we continue to receive and follow leads related to such stocks. We have multiple reports that Iraq retained CW munitions made prior to 1991, possibly including mustard - a long-lasting chemical agent - but we have to date been unable to locate any such munitions.

With regard to Iraq's **nuclear program**, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point. Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of sanctions. At least one senior Iraqi official believed that by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience with waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear program. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around 1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and increased its overall funding levels. This expansion may have been in initial preparation for renewed nuclear weapons research, although documentary evidence of this has not been found, and this is the subject of continuing investigation by ISG.

Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to nuclear weapons development. These initiatives did not in-and-of themselves constitute a resumption of the nuclear weapons program, but could have been useful in developing a weapons-relevant science base for the long-term. We do not yet have information indicating whether a higher government authority directed Sa'id to initiate this research and, regretfully, Dr. Sa'id was killed on April 8th during the fall of Baghdad when the car he was riding in attempted to run a Coalition roadblock.

Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. However, Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.

- According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). Some scientists from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG that they believed that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none of the scientists could produce official orders or plans to support their belief.

- In some cases, these groups performed work which could help preserve the science base and core skills that would be needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear weapons development.
- Several scientists - at the direction of senior Iraqi government officials - preserved documents and equipment from their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not reveal this to the UN/IAEA. One Iraqi scientist recently stated in an interview with ISG that it was a "common understanding" among the scientists that material was being preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.

The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the centrifuge program. We do not yet fully understand Iraqi intentions, and the evidence does not tie any activity directly to centrifuge research or development.

Exploitation of additional documents may shed light on the projects and program plans of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id. There may be more projects to be discovered in research placed at universities and private companies. Iraqi interest in reconstitution of a uranium enrichment program needs to be better understood through the analysis of procurement records and additional interviews.

With regard to **delivery systems**, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were initiated in late-2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid propellant missile, and it appears the work had progressed to a point to support initial prototype production of some parts and assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee, Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would take too long. For instance, the liquid-propellant missile project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002.

ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently seeking additional confirmation and details on this project. A second cooperative source has stated that the program actually began in 2001, but that it received added impetus in the run-up to OIF, and that missiles from this project were transferred to a facility north of Baghdad. This source also provided documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA-2s into surface-to-surface missiles.

ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and cooperative sources that indicate that proscribed-range solid-propellant missile design studies were initiated, or already underway, at the time when work on the clustered liquid-propellant missile designs began. The motor diameter was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500-mm Ababil-100. The range goals cited for this system vary from over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the payload mass.

A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002 deliberations on the long-range solid propellant project, provided ISG with a set of concept designs for a launcher designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length missile. The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was some way to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that these drawings would not have been requested until the missile progress was relatively advanced, normally beyond the design state. The drawing are in CAD format, with files dated 09/01/02.

While we have obtained enough information to make us confident that this design effort was underway, we are not yet confident which accounts of the timeline and project progress are accurate and are now seeking to better understand this program and its actual progress at the time of OIF.

One cooperative source has said that he suspected that the new large-diameter solid-propellant missile was intended to have a CW-filled warhead, but no detainee has admitted any actual knowledge of plans for unconventional warheads for any current or planned ballistic missile. The suspicion expressed by the one source about a CW warhead was based on his assessment of the unavailability of nuclear warheads and potential survivability problems

of biological warfare agent in ballistic missile warheads. This is an area of great interest and we are seeking additional information on warhead designs.

While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one high-level detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a small quantity of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001, although he subsequently recanted these claims, work continues to determine the truth. Two other sources contend that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel and oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating source claims that the al Tariq Factory was used to manufacture Scud oxidizer (IRFNA) from 1996 to 2001, and that nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of IRFNA was collected from a bleed port on the production equipment, was reserved, and then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its pre-Gulf War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of fear, multiple sources have stated, that the al Tariq Factory would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad without the ability to produce highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives and munitions. To date we have not discovered documentary or material evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued efforts are underway to clarify and confirm this information with additional Iraqi sources and to locate corroborating physical evidence. If we can confirm that the fuel was produced as late as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can only be used in Scud-variant missiles, we will have strong evidence that the missiles must have been retained until that date. This would, of course, be yet another example of a failure to declare prohibited activities to the UN.

Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained two UAV programs that were working in parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and one at al-Rashid Air Force Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development of smaller, more traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to the UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV-20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several Iraqi officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the system's range. The al-Rashid group was developing a competing line of UAVs. This program was never fully declared to the UN and is the subject of on-going work by ISG. Additional work is also focusing on the payloads and intended use for these UAVs. Surveillance and use as decoys are uses mentioned by some of those interviewed. Given Iraq's interest before the Gulf War in attempting to convert a MIG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents, attention is being paid to whether any of the newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a similar purpose. This remains an open question.

ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile programs. The first appears to have been successfully implemented, whereas the second had not yet reached maturity at the time of OIF.

The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense cruise missile. ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its original 100km to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr during OIF - one was shot down and one hit Kuwait.

The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more ambitious effort to convert the HY-2 into a 1000km range land-attack cruise missile. The Jenin concept was presented to Saddam on 23 November 2001 and received what cooperative sources called an "unusually quick response" in little more than a week. The essence of the concept was to take an HY-2, strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a turbine engine from a Russian helicopter - the TV-2-117 or TV3-117 from a Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopter. To prevent discovery by the UN, Iraq halted engine development and testing and disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design criteria had been met.

In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permitted UN 150km, ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology. Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong) and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300km. The document quotes the North Koreans as understanding the limitations imposed by the UN, but being prepared "to cooperate with Iraq on the items it specified". At the time of OIF, these discussions had not led to any missiles being transferred to Iraq. A high level cooperating source has reported that in late 2002 at Saddam's behest a delegation of Iraqi officials was sent to meet with foreign export companies, including one that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested in buying an advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.

The ISG has also identified a large volume of material and testimony by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to illicitly procure parts and foreign assistance for its missile program. These include:



- Significant level of assistance from a foreign company and its network of affiliates in supplying and supporting the development of production capabilities for solid rocket propellant and dual-use chemicals.
- Entities from another foreign country were involved in supplying guidance and control systems for use in the Al-Fat'h (Ababil-100). The contract was incomplete by the time of OIF due to technical problems with the few systems delivered and a financial dispute.
- A group of foreign experts operating in a private capacity were helping to develop Iraq's liquid propellant ballistic missile RDT&E and production infrastructure. They worked in Baghdad for about three months in late 1998 and subsequently continued work on the project from abroad. An actual contract valued at \$10 million for machinery and equipment was signed in June 2001, initially for 18 months, but later extended. This cooperation continued right up until the war.
- A different group of foreign experts traveled to Iraq in 1999 to conduct a technical review that resulted in what became the Al Samoud 2 design, and a contract was signed in 2001 for the provision of rigs, fixtures and control equipment for the redesigned missile.
- Detainees and cooperative sources have described the role of a foreign expert in negotiations on the development of Iraq's liquid and solid propellant production infrastructure. This could have had applications in existing and planned longer range systems, although it is reported that nothing had actually been implemented before OIF.

Uncertainty remains about the full extent of foreign assistance to Iraq's planned expansion of its missile systems and work is continuing to gain a full resolution of this issue. However, there is little doubt from the evidence already gathered that there was substantial illegal procurement for all aspects of the missile programs.

I have covered a lot of ground today, much of it highly technical. Although we are resisting drawing conclusions in this first interim report, a number of things have become clearer already as a result of our investigation, among them:

1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.
2. In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn.
3. In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.

Let me conclude by returning to something I began with today. We face a unique but challenging opportunity in our efforts to unravel the exact status of Iraq's WMD program. The good news is that we do not have to rely for the first time in over a decade on

- the incomplete, and often false, data that Iraq supplied the UN/IAEA;
- data collected by UN inspectors operating with the severe constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions imposed;
- information supplied by defectors, some of whom certainly fabricated much that they supplied and perhaps were under the direct control of the IIS;
- data collected by national technical collections systems with their own limitations.

The bad news is that we have to do this under conditions that ensure that our work will take time and impose serious physical dangers on those who are asked to carry it out.

Why should we take the time and run the risk to ensure that our conclusions reflect the truth to the maximum extent that is possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq? For those of us that are carrying out this search, there are two reasons that drive us to want to complete this effort.

First, whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has always been, different from intelligence judgments that must be made under serious constraints of time, distance and information. It is, however, only by understanding precisely what those difference are that the quality of future intelligence and investment decisions concerning future intelligence systems can be improved. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is such a continuing threat to global society that learning those lessons has a high imperative.

Second, we have found people, technical information and illicit procurement networks that if allowed to flow to other countries and regions could accelerate global proliferation. Even in the area of actual weapons there is no doubt that Iraq had at one time chemical and biological weapons. Even if there were only a remote possibility that these pre-1991 weapons still exist, we have an obligation to American troops who are now there and the Iraqi population to ensure that none of these remain to be used against them in the ongoing insurgency activity.

Mr. Chairman and Members I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the initial results of the first 3 months of the activities of the Iraqi Survey Group. I am certain that I speak for Major General Keith Dayton, who commands the Iraqi Survey Group, when I say how proud we are of the men and women from across the Government and from our Coalition partners, Australia and the United Kingdom, who have gone to Iraq and are carrying out this important mission.

Thank you.

[http://www.cia.gov/cia/public\\_affairs/speeches/2003/david\\_kay\\_10022003.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html)

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USA Today  
October 6, 2003  
Pg. 1

## **Iraq Isn't Innocent, Inspector Urges**

*Many overlooking proof of illegal activity*

By John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — Chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay complained Sunday that initial reaction to his interim report on Iraqi weapons focused too much on the failure to find chemical or biological weapons and not enough on secret laboratories and rocket programs investigators have found.

Kay, who heads the 1,400-member Iraq Survey Group, went on three TV talk shows Sunday to rebut lawmakers and news reports that emphasized the failure to find weapons alleged by President Bush before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

Bush made the same argument to reporters Friday.

Kay said on CNN's *Late Edition*, "We have actually found quite a bit, although we have not yet found shiny, pointy things that I would call a weapon." Kay said his team found evidence of "a vast network of undeclared labs engaged in prohibited activity" related to biological and chemical weapons.

The comments were stronger than the language in a statement released by the CIA. It summarized Kay's testimony to House and Senate panels Thursday. In the statement, Kay said investigators were trying to determine "the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts" such as making biological weapons.

The Bush administration and its critics are fighting over how to interpret the report. Critics say it proves that Bush exaggerated his claims about the Iraqi threat.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking to reporters Friday, asked rhetorically whether "vials of botulism should constitute a weapon of mass destruction." He was referring to "reference strains" of botulinum that an Iraqi scientist kept in his home refrigerator from 1993 until he handed them over to U.S. investigators. The material in the vials could be used to make biological agents.

Kay also cited two Iraqi officials who said Iraq was equipped to produce fuel for Scud missiles long after it claimed to have none of the missiles. And he said people have overlooked that Iraq conducted research on agents "applicable" to making biological weapons, including Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever. In a conference call with reporters Friday, Kay disclosed that Iraq had paid North Korea \$10 million as a first installment on components for long-range missiles. In 2002, though, North Korea said it couldn't deliver because the United States was watching closely for illegal trade with Iraq.

On ABC's *This Week with George Stephanopoulos*, Kay was shown video of Bush saying last September that Iraq "possesses biological and chemical weapons." Kay said, "We have not found specific evidence that would indicate that." Shown a postwar statement by Bush that two trailers were Iraqi weapons labs, Kay said, "We ... don't know what they were for."

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20031006/5562463s.htm>

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USA Today  
October 6, 2003  
Pg. 23

## What Happened To Looted Iraqi Nuclear Material?

By Brett Wagner

The release Thursday of chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay's report detailing America's six-month search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has rekindled the debate over whether anyone will ever uncover that country's alleged stockpiles of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

A great irony, however, seems to have gotten lost in that debate: As a direct result of President Bush's decision to invade Iraq without sufficient forces to secure and protect its nuclear research and storage facilities from rampant looting, enough radioactive material to build scores of dirty bombs now is missing and may be on its way to the international black market.

It didn't have to turn out this way. In the weeks before the invasion, the U.S. military repeatedly warned the White House that its war plans did not include sufficient ground forces, air and naval operations and logistical support to guarantee a successful mission. Those warnings were discounted — even mocked — by administration officials who professed to know more about war fighting than the war fighters themselves.

### **Undermanned**

But the war fighters were right. Military commanders weren't given enough manpower and logistical support to secure all of the known nuclear sites, let alone all of the suspected ones.

It wasn't until seven of Iraq's main nuclear facilities were extensively looted that the true magnitude of the administration's strategic blunder came into focus.

The White House knew all along, for example, that enormous quantities of dangerous nuclear materials were at the Tuwaitha nuclear storage facility near Baghdad, sealed and accounted for by the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency. Soon after the war began, the IAEA warned the White House that it should strive to secure the facility quickly. When word of looting at the site began to leak out through the international media, the IAEA again warned the White House.

The looting, however, went on for more than two weeks before the U.S. took any action. When the site was finally secured and U.S. authorities permitted a brief inspection by IAEA officials, the inspectors were inexplicably forbidden to check the status of highly radioactive materials that could be used in dirty bombs. Many of these materials are now unaccounted for. What the inspectors were allowed to verify is how much uranium is now missing: at least 22 pounds.

Other looted nuclear sites include the Baghdad Nuclear Research Center, where significant quantities of partially enriched uranium, cesium, strontium and cobalt were stored. U.S. survey teams have not been able to determine how many of those materials are missing.

### **Small amount, huge effect**

It takes only a small amount of such materials to arm a dirty bomb. The 22 pounds of missing uranium, for example, could arm a device that could shut down Capitol Hill or the New York Stock Exchange for weeks, if not months.

Properly built and encased with radioactive materials, a dirty bomb can kill thousands and render large areas uninhabitable for months or years. While their destructive capacity pales in comparison to that of actual nuclear bombs, a dirty bomb's capacity to inflict terror should never be underestimated.

Should an organization such as al-Qaeda acquire a dirty bomb, it is unlikely authorities could keep it out of the U.S. or prevent it from being detonated. Under such circumstances, a terrorist group would not even actually need to

possess a second device; it would merely just have to say one was planted in a U.S. city. Imagine what the outbound highways would look like or the overall effect on our economy, our security, our civil rights, our way of life. Several terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, have shown interest in acquiring the radioactive materials necessary to transform an ordinary bundle of explosives into a weapon of mass terror. The blueprints and other components are commonly available. And now, thanks to sloppy war planning by the White House, the only missing component — radioactive materials — may be readily available, too.

Sort of takes the "pre-emptive" out of pre-emptive war, doesn't it?

*Brett Wagner is president of the California Center for Strategic Studies and a professor at the U.S. Naval War College.*

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20031006/5562486s.htm>

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Washington Post

October 4, 2003

Pg. 2

## Measure Would Alter Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

### *Energy Bill Provision Backed by Two Firms Would Ease Constraints on Exports of Bomb-Grade Uranium*

By R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post Staff Writer

A provision written into the pending omnibus energy bill at the behest of two nuclear companies would overturn a decade-old U.S. policy of discouraging worldwide trade in bomb-grade uranium by eliminating constraints on U.S. exports of the material to five countries for medical isotope production, current and former U.S. officials say.

Currently, the U.S. government can export such uranium only to isotope manufacturers moving toward the eventual use of another type of uranium that poses no risk of nuclear proliferation. The provision, inserted into a compromise version of the Energy Policy Act of 2003 without congressional hearings, would free two manufacturing firms, based in Canada and Missouri, to keep receiving U.S. bomb-grade uranium indefinitely.

Isotopes are used in medical diagnoses around the world, and the global manufacturing process annually requires enough bomb-grade uranium to make a handful of weapons. None of the material has ever been reported stolen, but Washington has spent millions of dollars to develop production methods that use a different type of uranium.

The provision is typical of the many special-interest benefits inserted into the energy bill with little public attention or debate, but it is unusual because of its national security implications. The bill is now in the final stage of House-Senate negotiations, with final action expected this month.

Representatives of eight nuclear policy and arms control groups, two former commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a member of the Defense Policy Board have criticized the provision in a letter to Congress. Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), who sponsored the 1992 law that would be overturned, said in an interview that "it would be a giant step backwards" and that "it is amazing we would do this in the post-9/11 world." The companies concerned have said the provision is needed to ensure that manufacturing is not halted for costly and uncertain retooling. But Schumer said the provision is designed "so that a few companies can make money." It is one reason "more and more people say this bill is not worth it," Schumer said, adding that he and others are considering a filibuster to block it.

President Bush has repeatedly described nuclear nonproliferation as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy, but the Energy Department did not reply to requests for comment. Nils J. Diaz, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided a tepid endorsement in August, saying the provision "could be beneficial" to ensuring a steady supply of isotopes.

Congressional aides said the provision was placed in the bill at the request of Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.) and Rep. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) after an extensive lobbying effort by the manufacturers, St. Louis-based Mallinckrodt Inc. and Ottawa-based MDS Nordion. The companies account for about 60 percent of the global supply of isotopes used in medical imaging and cancer treatment.

"Current law may soon force cancer patients to pay much more for, and may even interrupt supply of, nuclear medicines," said a memorandum circulated by Bond.

The firms have long sought an exemption from a requirement to develop new production techniques, with U.S. government help, that use low-enriched uranium -- an action U.S. officials say will initially cost each firm millions of dollars but could lead to lower operating costs. Under current law, companies moving steadily toward that goal are entitled to continue receiving highly enriched uranium (HEU) from U.S. defense program stockpiles, guarding against a sudden cutoff of supply.

The U.S. assistance program is part of a larger effort to constrain the movement and storage of HEU outside U.S. borders. Under Washington's pressure, dozens of nuclear reactors that required HEU fuel have already been converted or shut, reducing global shipments by an estimated 3,000 kilograms, or enough for 120 crude bombs. The use of alternative fuel to make medical isotopes has been tested extensively in Indonesia, Australia and Argentina, prompting the Argonne National Laboratory, a research arm of the Energy Department, to declare earlier this year that no technical obstacles to its wider use remained.

MDS Nordion since 1996 has been constructing an Ontario production plant that would use only HEU, according to Grant Malkoske, the company's vice president for engineering and technology. He said the company is studying alternatives but remains unconvinced that the plant can be "converted economically" to low-enriched uranium. "This isn't a proliferation issue; it's a health care issue," Malkoske said, explaining that the new provision would give the company "clarity" about its ability to keep making isotopes with HEU.

U.S. officials said privately that the company has reason to be concerned about its eligibility for future exports. Argonne officials earlier this year complained to the Energy Department that the company had demonstrated minimal interest in retooling, and said that it had curtailed the required scientific cooperation as it sought the exemption.

The company promised in a diplomatic note that it would convert its process, but it seemed to have "bailed out" a year ago, a State Department official said. "It's just an expense they don't want to bear," said an Argonne official, who asked not to be identified.

Mallinckrodt, for its part, said it is worried about the feasibility and cost of converting its plant in the Netherlands to low-enriched uranium. Under the new provision, U.S. HEU exports would be permitted not only to the Netherlands, but also to Canada, Belgium, France and Germany.

In pursuing their exemption, the two companies enlisted the support of an industry trade group, the Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals. The council's Washington-based lobbyists, the Alpine Group, helped enlist two other trade groups, the Society of Nuclear Medicine and the American College of Radiology, which orchestrated a letter-writing campaign aimed at Congress, according to an official at one of the groups.

"This is a classic example of the industry looking at their financial bottom line and pitting it against the security bottom line," said Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment's nonproliferation project and a former Energy Department official. "Nordion always hated this . . . [but] we told them it's not a commercial matter, it's a security matter."

He and other experts said that while shipments of bomb-grade material to Canada pose few risks, the exemption would encourage other nations -- such as Argentina, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea and Egypt -- to use bomb-grade material in future isotope production. "I'm worried about the terrorist threat everywhere. If we make an exception for Canada, then Russia can make an exception in Vietnam or Germany," Wolfsthal said.

Burr and Bond have received campaign donations from supporters of the provision. Their aides said the funds had no bearing on their sponsorship.

Burr, who was directly lobbied by radiologists at Wake Forest University's medical school in his district, has received campaign donations of more than \$30,000 from doctors or officials there since 1997, according to Senate records and a database compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics. He has also received \$11,000 in contributions from the Radiation Advocacy Council, an arm of the American College of Radiology, since 1999. Bond has received \$28,850 in campaign contributions from the Mallinckrodt's political action committee since 1989, while Burr has received \$3,000 from the company's committee since 1997. The committee has donated \$162,500 to congressional candidates since 1997, including \$11,000 to members who are now on the House-Senate conference committee that will decide the energy bill's shape.

The Alpine Group has been paid \$1.9 million since 1997 by the Council for Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals. A partner there who worked on the account, James D. Massie, personally donated \$88,942 to members of Congress in the past four and a half years. With his wife, Camille, he gave \$1,000 to Burr this year. Another Alpine Group partner who worked on the account, Richard White, has contributed \$1,704 to Burr since 2001. He and Massie declined to comment.

*Staff researchers Karl Evanzz and Margaret Smith contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41776-2003Oct3.html>

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Washington Post

October 4, 2003

Pg. 16

## **N. Korean Report Spurs Debate On Credibility**

By Anthony Faiola, Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, Oct. 3 -- One day after North Korea said it had reprocessed spent fuel rods into a cache of plutonium for building atomic bombs, it outlined further details of its weapons program, saying the process was finished as long as four months ago and a new technology was used to enhance the power of the plutonium.

The statements today came as Asian and U.S. diplomats and defense experts continued to debate the credibility of North Korea's assertion Thursday that it had reprocessed 8,000 fuel rods, sealed and guarded by international observers until late last year, for building a nuclear arsenal. North Korea observers in South Korea and Japan expressed cautious skepticism. North Korea's history of bluffing, they said, made its assertions hard to believe. But the difficulty in verifying the claims either way also made it impossible to dismiss them entirely.

"It is early to judge whether or not such a North Korean move is a threat to elicit concessions from the United States or a sophisticated tactic to admit [the North's] possession of nuclear arms," South Korea's leading newspaper, Joong-ang Ilbo, said in an editorial.

North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency said today that the reprocessing was completed in June, and added that the nuclear complex at Yongbyon, about 55 miles north of Pyongyang, the capital, was "still operating on a normal footing." Analysts have said the reprocessing of North Korea's 8,000 rods could yield enough plutonium to make about a half-dozen bombs.

North Korea also said today that its nuclear deterrent is strictly for "peaceful purposes."

At the United Nations on Thursday, North Korea's vice foreign minister, Choe Su Hon, said North Korea possessed a nuclear deterrent and would continue to strengthen it. He later met with veteran U.N. diplomat Maurice Strong, who said Choe had said North Korea "is still committed to abandoning its nuclear weapons program" and "to subjecting itself to internationally agreed inspection and verification procedures."

The North Koreans also praised their scientists for switching to a new technology that made it possible to enhance the capability of its plutonium, but they did not elaborate on whether that meant Pyongyang could build more or stronger bombs. It simply said the new process had allowed it to boost its "nuclear deterrent."

"But the truth is that there is still no real evidence that this is anything more than a bluff," said Motoaki Kamiura, a Tokyo-based defense analyst and North Korea expert. "At the same time, among the only ways for them to prove it would be to test a bomb, but I think even they realize that would cut off all their options for a diplomatic solution."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41780-2003Oct3.html>

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New York Times

October 4, 2003

## **Pakistan Tests Missile Able To Hit Sites In India**

By Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 3 — Pakistan fired a surface-to-surface, nuclear-capable rocket on Friday in its first test in months, but it denied that the launch had anything to do with stalled peace talks with India.

The army announced the early morning launch of the short-range Hatf-3 Ghaznavi missile and promised a series of tests in coming days. The missile can carry conventional and nonconventional weapons, and its range of 180 miles would enable it to hit targets in India.

An army spokesman declined to say where exactly the test was conducted. Defense Minister George Fernandes of India told the Press Trust of India, "It has to be seen whether the missile is their own or provided by North Korea or China."

The comments were an allusion to charges, denied by Pakistan, that it had exchanged nuclear and other weapons technology with North Korea. China is Pakistan's main supplier of military hardware, but the Hatf-3 is made in Pakistan.

The test was the first by Pakistan since March 26, when it fired a short-range missile shortly after India announced a similar launch.

A few weeks later, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India raised hopes with a surprise call for peace with Pakistan, saying he was extending a "hand of friendship" to his bitter rival.

Pakistan had refrained from any missile tests since then, while the two countries resumed diplomatic ties and restored bus connections.

But last week at the United Nations General Assembly, India and Pakistan engaged in their most bitter public sparring in years.

A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman, Muhammad Masood Khan, denied Friday that there was any link between the most recent test and the failing peace movement.



"The timings of the tests reflect Pakistan's determination not to engage in a tit-for-tat syndrome to other tests in the region," he said. "Pakistan will maintain the pace of its own missile development program and conduct tests as per its technical needs."

The two countries have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir, which is split between them.

They nearly came to blows again in 2002, each rushing troops to the border before international mediation brought them back from the brink.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/04/international/asia/04STAN.html>

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## **FDA OKs Antidote for 'Dirty Bomb' Attack**

The Associated Press

Thursday, October 2, 2003; 10:10 PM

WASHINGTON - A German company won U.S. approval Thursday of a "dirty bomb" attack antidote - a compound long used as the artist's pigment Prussian blue.

The Food and Drug Administration had called in January for drug companies to seek permission to manufacture pill forms of Prussian blue, considered for decades a treatment for exposure to certain forms of radioactive cesium and thallium. But until now, national stockpiles of Prussian blue pills have been limited, and bought from overseas.

The FDA's action Thursday clears a German company to sell its version here, with the brand name Radiogardase, potentially making it easier to stockpile more in case of a terrorist attack.

Radioactive cesium and thallium are commonly used, at low doses, in medical treatment and diagnosis. But high levels can be deadly, and they are among the materials that officials worry might be used in a "dirty bomb" - a device that isn't nuclear but that uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material.

The FDA evaluated reports of Prussian blue's use after some accidental radioactive exposures. The mineral compound bound to the radioactive chemicals in the gut to speed the body's elimination of them.

Side effects include constipation and upset stomach.

Radiogardase is made by HEYL Chemisch-pharmazeutische Fabrik GmbH & Co. of Berlin.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37177-2003Oct2.html>

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## **Ft. Detrick Celebrates 60 Years, New Role**

Facility a Leader In Bioterror Fight

*By David Snyder*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sunday, October 5, 2003; Page C07

Fort Detrick, the once-shadowy Army installation that produced anthrax and other deadly agents for weapons during the Cold War, marked its 60th anniversary yesterday with a day-long program celebrating a new image: defender of the homeland against biological terrorist attacks.

"Just as we did in World War II and the Cold War, the United States has turned to Fort Detrick," said U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.), the keynote speaker at a two-hour ceremony for Detrick workers and veterans. "The United States today is threatened by chemical and biological terrorism. . . . We know what you're doing here, and you should know how grateful your nation is."

Founded in intense secrecy in April 1943 as Camp Detrick, the Army installation was charged with developing weapons to match the growing stockpiles of biological and chemical arms in production by Japan and Germany. The 1,200-acre compound in Frederick was at the center of the nation's biological weapons program until 1969, when President Richard M. Nixon decommissioned offensive biological weapons research. Recently, however, Congress approved \$100 million to build a new lab at Fort Detrick to study deadly pathogens. The lab is part of a larger effort to bolster the nation's defenses against biological attack.

"For many years at Fort Detrick, you've had a glorious history, but what I see for you also is a glorious future, because the talent you have here is something that can and should be used in a variety of venues, not the least important of which is in the biodefense of our nation," said Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, who also spoke at the ceremony at Mount St. Mary's College in Emmitsburg, about 15 miles north of Fort Detrick.

Anthrax was once brewed by the gallon in Building 470, which for years was the tallest building in Frederick County. But decades ago, Detrick shed its role as a producer of biological agents. The symbol of that role, Building 470, has been vacant for years and is being dismantled.

After the nation's biological weapons program ended, the installation fell from national attention but has grown as a research hub for 36 federal agencies, including the National Cancer Institute. Anthrax, Ebola and other deadly bugs are still researched in Detrick labs, but government officials say the microorganisms are kept only in small quantities, for research into vaccines and treatments.

The anthrax mailings in fall 2001 brought the attention back to Detrick, which became a major focus of the FBI's investigation into those attacks. News organizations from around the world have descended on Frederick to chronicle the FBI's searches of the apartment of Steven J. Hatfill, a former Detrick researcher whom Attorney General John D. Ashcroft named as a "person of interest" in the anthrax investigation.

Detrick researchers tested the envelopes laced with anthrax spores that were sent to the offices of U.S. Sen. Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and others. Former Detrick scientists have become regulars at lectures and on news programs about biological weapons.

With the increased attention to Detrick has come greater awareness of its role in researching biological weapons. During yesterday's celebration, prominent figures from the world of politics and science converged on bucolic Emmitsburg to pay homage to the research conducted at Detrick, including the development of many of the vaccines against biological agents that U.S. soldiers took before combat in Iraq.

Yesterday's ceremony was part of a broader celebration of Detrick's 60th year, which included a weekend-long series of events commemorating Operation Whitecoat. The once-secret Army program, which used human volunteers to test a wide range of potentially deadly pathogens, began in 1954 and lasted 19 years.

Some members of Congress, including U.S. Rep Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-Md.), are lobbying for even more facilities at Detrick. Researchers there "were important before, but they're doubly important today," Bartlett said yesterday. "If you knew of the potential for biological warfare, you'd have trouble sleeping."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45391-2003Oct4.html>

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Washington Post

October 7, 2003

Pg. 5

## **Weapons Lab Security Lax, DOE Whistleblower Charges**

By Associated Press

NEW YORK, Oct. 6 -- Security at the nation's nuclear weapons labs is so lax that the facilities have repeatedly failed drills in which mock terrorists captured radioactive material and escaped, according to an article in Vanity Fair magazine.

"Some of the facilities would fail year after year," said Rich Levernier, who spent six years running war games for the U.S. government. "In more than 50 percent of our tests at the Los Alamos facility, we got in, captured the plutonium, got out again, and in some cases didn't fire a shot, because we didn't encounter any guards."

These failures occurred despite security forces at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and other nuclear facilities knowing the dates of the drills months in advance, according to the article.

Anson Franklin, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, an arm of the Department of Energy that oversees nuclear weapons security, said Monday that DOE has increased security funding by more than 50 percent to protect against terrorist attacks.

"Allegations of a 50 percent failure rate in security tests are simply untrue," Franklin said.

The report also says Levernier, a 22-year DOE veteran, was stripped of his security clearance in 2001 after raising security concerns. Levernier has filed a whistleblower lawsuit.

Franklin denied that allegation. "We do not punish federal employees who are doing their jobs by pointing out potential weaknesses in safety and security," he said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53447-2003Oct6.html>

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