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Articles & Other Documents:

[Doctor: Pentagon Slow In Vaccine Death](#)

[Ex-Spy Fingers Russians On WMD](#)

[Two Studies Cite Confusion on Terrorism](#)

[Protecting Emergency Responders](#) (RAND Report)

[Suspected N. Korean Chemicals Worry U.S.](#)

[Tension High On Eve Of North Korea Talks](#)

[Air Force Assessment Before War Said Iraqi Drones Were Minor Threat](#)

[A Weapons Cache We'll Never See](#)

[China Wary Of Weapons Searches](#)

[N. Korea May Be Offered A Carrot](#)

[1966 Hydrogen-Bomb Mishap In Spain Detailed](#)

[Canada Arrests 19 As Security Threats](#)

[Divergent Issues Crowd Nuke Talks](#)

[Expert Says U.S. Should Consider Using Mininukes](#)

[Tool for bioterrorism?](#)

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

UPI.com

August 18, 2003

Doctor: Pentagon Slow In Vaccine Death

By Mark Benjamin, United Press International

WASHINGTON-- A civilian doctor who took care of an Illinois soldier before she died in April says the Pentagon should have treated her death as possibly due to vaccine side effects, but may be hesitating because of the impact on the military's controversial smallpox and anthrax vaccine programs.

The death of Rachael Lacy, 22, of Lynwood, Ill., has taken on added significance because she died without ever being deployed, but had pneumonia. The Army is investigating pneumonia cases in Iraq and Southwest Asia that have sickened more than 100 soldiers and killed two - but has excluded Lacy's case in its search for a cause because she died before arriving there.

"I do think her illness should be classified as a vaccine adverse event for smallpox vaccination," said Dr. Jeffrey Sartin, an infectious diseases doctor at the Gundersen Clinic in La Crosse, Wis., who was a member of the team that treated Lacy. "If she had been a civilian, the case would almost certainly have been reported as such."

"Some of us on the civilian side have worried that the interpretation of these cases would be colored by how it would reflect on the (vaccination) program," said Sartin.

The Pentagon's top vaccine expert told United Press International Monday that the Pentagon has not determined if Lacy's death should be reported as vaccine related.

"Rachael Lacy is still in the unexplained death program" at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said Col. John D. Grabenstein, deputy director for clinical operations at the Military Vaccine Agency.

Sartin, a former Air Force doctor, said the vaccines the Army gave her might have caused Lacy's death.

"What we know of her illness suggests a very robust immune system activation, which could have been caused by vaccinations," said Sartin. "The more doctors and scientists who are aware of this case and its details, the more likely we are to figure out what killed Rachael Lacy and to prevent it from happening to other persons."

Lacy died April 4 after what a doctor and her family said was heart and lung trouble, including pneumonia, which started soon after her March 2 vaccinations.

Lacy's June 3 death certificate says the immediate cause of death was "diffuse alveolar damage," or lung damage. It lists "lymphocytic pericarditis with eosinophils, post vaccination," as an underlying cause -- that means an inflammation of the thin layer of tissue that covers the outer surfaces of the heart. Under "contributing conditions," the certificate lists "lupus-like autoimmune disease (not otherwise specified); recent smallpox and anthrax vaccination."

Some doctors think a severe reaction to vaccines could look a lot like lupus.

Nearly four months after Lacy's death, top Pentagon medical officials said they had not seen any deaths linked to smallpox vaccinations.

At a July 25 press conference, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Dr. William Winkenwerder Jr. and Grabenstein announced a study of soldiers who received the vaccine between Dec. 13, 2002, and May 28, 2003.

Winkenwerder said the military had detected 37 cases of inflammation of the membrane covering the heart after smallpox vaccines, but those soldiers had lived.

"All of these individuals have recovered or they are recovering and we will continue to follow them," he said July 25. "Our experience demonstrates that on a large-scale the smallpox vaccination program can be conducted safely." Grabenstein said in a telephone interview that while Lacy also had the inflammation of the heart tissue, it might not have been the cause of her death.

"She had pericarditis, but it is not at all clear that the pericarditis was a key factor in her death," said Grabenstein. "It is a finding on her death certificate. Its final contribution has not been finally decided."

Winkenwerder and Grabenstein published their findings in the June 25 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association. "We attribute no deaths to smallpox vaccination to date," that study said.

Grabenstein said the study does recognize Lacy's death, which he said is listed as a fatal "neurologic event" where the "association to vaccination is unclear, given multiple possible causes." He cited privacy laws in declining to specify the neurological problem.

The Pentagon excluded Lacy's death, which was also preceded by pneumonia, from its investigation into possible causes of the mysterious pneumonia killing and sickening troops in Iraq and around southwest Asia.

The Pentagon announced Aug. 5 it was tracking at least 100 cases of pneumonia among soldiers deployed throughout Southwest Asia. Seventeen have needed respirators to breathe and at least two have died. The military says that whatever is causing the illness does not seem contagious and has all but ruled out chemical or biological warfare.

The Pentagon has not publicly mentioned vaccines as a possible culprit, but has noted the sandy, dusty conditions in Iraq.

Rachael Lacy suffered from pneumonia before she died, according to her father, Moses Lacy, and a doctor.

"My daughter's first symptoms were pneumonia," Lacy said in a telephone interview from his home in Lynwood, Ill. Moses Lacy blames vaccines for his daughter's death. "When you're autoimmune system shuts down, it can manifest itself in a number of different ways. Pneumonia seems to be a more common manifestation," Lacy said.

"My life was centered around my daughter," Moses said. "She was mine. She was like me."

Army Surgeon General spokeswoman Virginia Stephanakis said Lacy's death was not included in the pneumonia investigation because she got her shots prior to being deployed to the region, but never got there.

"She was never deployed to Iraq. It is a whole different issue," Stephanakis said.

Medical journals and some military medical officials have also cited possible cases of pneumonia linked to the anthrax vaccine, which Rachael Lacy also received.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Hamre told the House Military Personnel Subcommittee on Sept. 30, 1999, that there had been three reports of "serious illness" linked to the anthrax vaccine that had included "hypersensitivity pneumonia."

In an August 2002 article in the Cardiopulmonary and Critical Care Journal CHEST, three military doctors described the case of a 39-year-old "previously healthy man on active duty" who was diagnosed with "bronchiolitis obliterans with organizing pneumonia" that occurred "following anthrax vaccination." And a review by a government advisory committee in 2002 found one case of pneumonia "considered probably related to [anthrax] vaccination."

Last week, the parents of two soldiers wrote Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seeking an investigation into their sons' deaths after getting pneumonia while deployed in Iraq.

"We as a family are concerned that we are not being told the truth," say the similar Aug. 12 letters to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, facilitated by the National Gulf War Resource Center, a veterans' advocacy group. Grabenstein, the military vaccine expert, said vaccines are probably not to blame for the sicknesses. "In 200 years of vaccinations, no vaccine has ever been shown to cause pneumonia and there are multiple reasons to believe that the vaccines have no role."

<http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030818-060641-9420r>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

August 21, 2003

Pg. 17

Ex-Spy Fingers Russians On WMD

They aided Saddam in making them disappear

By Ion Mihai Pacepa

On March 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the U.S.-led "aggression" against Iraq as "unwarranted" and "unjustifiable." Three days later, Pravda said that an anonymous Russian "military expert" was predicting that the United States would fabricate finding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov immediately started plying the idea abroad, and it has taken hold around the world ever since.

As a former Romanian spy chief who used to take orders from the Soviet KGB, it is perfectly obvious to me that Russia is behind the evanescence of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. After all, Russia helped Saddam get his hands on them in the first place. The Soviet Union and all its bloc states always had a standard operating procedure for deep sixing weapons of mass destruction — in Romanian it was codenamed "Sarindar, meaning "emergency exit." Implemented it in Libya. It was for ridding Third World despots of all trace of their chemical weapons if the Western imperialists ever got near them. We wanted to make sure they would never be traced back to us, and we also wanted to frustrate the West by not giving them anything they could make propaganda with.

All chemical weapons were to be immediately burned or buried deep at sea. Technological documentation, however, would be preserved in microfiche buried in waterproof containers for future reconstruction. Chemical weapons, especially those produced in Third World countries, which lack sophisticated production facilities, often do not retain lethal properties after a few months on the shelf and are routinely dumped anyway. And all chemical weapons plants had a civilian cover making detection difficult, regardless of the circumstances.

The plan included an elaborate propaganda routine. Anyone accusing Moammar Gadhafi of possessing chemical weapons would be ridiculed. Lies, all lies! Come to Libya and see! Our Western left-wing organizations, like the World Peace Council, existed for sole purpose of spreading the propaganda we gave them. These very same groups bray the exact same themes to this day. We always relied on their expertise at organizing large street demonstrations in Western Europe over America's war-mongering whenever we wanted to distract world attention from the crimes of the vicious regimes we sponsored.

Iraq, in my view, had its own "Sarindar" plan in effect direct from Moscow. It certainly had one in the past. Nicolae Ceausescu told me so, and he heard it from Leonid Brezhnev. KGB chairman Yury Andropov, and later, Gen. Yevgeny Primakov, told me so too. In the late 1970s, Gen. Primakov ran Saddam's weapons programs. After that, as you may recall, he was promoted to head of the Soviet foreign intelligence service in 1990, to Russia's minister of foreign affairs in 1996, and in 1998, to prime minister. What you may not know is that Primakov hates Israel and has always championed Arab radicalism. He was a personal friend of Saddam's and has repeatedly visited Baghdad after 1991, quietly helping Saddam play his game of hide-and-seek.

The Soviet bloc not only sold Saddam its WMDs, but it showed them how to make them "disappear." Russia is still at it. Primakov was in Baghdad from December until a couple of days before the war, along with a team of Russian military experts led by two of Russia's topnotch "retired" generals, Vladislav Achalov, a former deputy defense minister, and Igor Maltsev, a former air defense chief of staff. They were all there receiving honorary medals from the Iraqi defense minister. They clearly were not there to give Saddam military advice for the upcoming war—

Saddam's Katyusha launchers were of World War II vintage, and his T-72 tanks, BMP-1 fighting vehicles and MiG fighter planes were all obviously useless against America. "I did not fly to Baghdad to drink coffee," was what Gen. Achalov told the media afterward. They were there orchestrating Iraq's "Sarindar" plan.

The U.S. military in fact, has already found the only thing that would have been allowed to survive under the classic Soviet "Sarindar" plan to liquidate weapons arsenals in the event of defeat in war — the technological documents showing how to reproduce weapons stocks in just a few weeks.

Such a plan has undoubtedly been in place since August 1995 — when Saddam's son-in-law, Gen. Hussein Kamel, who ran Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological programs for 10 years, defected to Jordan. That August, UNSCOM and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors searched a chicken farm owned by Kamel's family and found more than one hundred metal trunks and boxes containing documentation dealing with all categories of weapons, including nuclear. Caught red-handed, Iraq at last admitted to its "extensive biological warfare program, including weaponization," issued a "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure Report" and turned over documents about the nerve agent VX and nuclear weapons.

Saddam then lured Gen. Kamel back, pretending to pardon his defection. Three days later, Kamel and over 40 relatives, including women and children, were murdered, in what the official Iraqi press described as a "spontaneous administration of tribal justice." After sending that message to his cowed, miserable people, Saddam then made a show of cooperation with U.N. inspection, since Kamel had just compromised all his programs anyway. In November 1995, he issued a second "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" as to his supposedly non-existent missile programs. That very same month, Jordan intercepted a large shipment of high-grade missile components destined for Iraq. UNSCOM soon fished similar missile components out of the Tigris River, again refuting Saddam's spluttering denials. In June 1996, Saddam slammed the door shut to UNSCOM's inspection of any "concealment mechanisms." On Aug. 5, 1998, halted cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA completely, and they withdrew on Dec. 16, 1998. Saddam had another four years to develop and hide his weapons of mass destruction without any annoying, prying eyes. U.N. Security Council resolutions 1115, (June 21, 1997), 1137 (Nov. 12, 1997), and 1194 (Sept. 9, 1998) were issued condemning Iraq—ineffectual words that had no effect. In 2002, under the pressure of a huge U.S. military buildup by a new U.S. administration, Saddam made yet another "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure," which was found to contain "false statements" and to constitute another "material breach" of U.N. and IAEA inspection and of paragraphs eight to 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

It was just a few days after this last "Disclosure," after a decade of intervening with the U.N. and the rest of the world on Iraq's behalf, that Gen. Primakov and his team of military experts landed in Baghdad — even though, with 200,000 U.S. troops at the border, war was imminent, and Moscow could no longer save Saddam Hussein. Gen. Primakov was undoubtedly cleaning up the loose ends of the "Sarindar" plan and assuring Saddam that Moscow would rebuild his weapons of mass destruction after the storm subsided for a good price.

Mr. Putin likes to take shots at America and wants to reassert Russia in world affairs. Why would he not take advantage of this opportunity? As minister of foreign affairs and prime minister, Gen. Primakov has authored the "multipolarity" strategy of counterbalancing American leadership by elevating Russia to great-power status in Eurasia. Between Feb. 9-12, Mr. Putin visited Germany and France to propose a three-power tactical alignment against the United States to advocate further inspections rather than war. On Feb. 21, the Russian Duma appealed to the German and French parliaments to join them on March 4-7 in Baghdad, for "preventing U.S. military aggression against Iraq." Crowds of European leftists, steeped for generations in left-wing propaganda straight out of Moscow, continue to find the line appealing.

Mr. Putin's tactics have worked. The United States won a brilliant military victory, demolishing a dictatorship without destroying the country, but it has begun losing the peace. While American troops unveiled the mass graves of Saddam's victims, anti-American forces in Western Europe and elsewhere, spewed out vitriolic attacks, accusing Washington of greed for oil and not of really caring about weapons of mass destruction, or exaggerating their risks, as if weapons of mass destruction were really nothing very much to worry about after all.

It is worth remembering that Andrei Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, chose to live in a Soviet gulag instead of continuing to develop the power of death. "I wanted to alert the world," Sakharov explained in 1968, "to the grave perils threatening the human race thermonuclear extinction, ecological catastrophe, famine." Even Igor Kurchatov, the KGB academician who headed the Soviet nuclear program from 1943 until his death in 1960, expressed deep qualms of conscience about helping to create weapons of mass destruction. "The rate of growth of atomic explosives is such," he warned in an article written together with several other Soviet nuclear scientists not long before he died, "that in just a few years the stockpile will be large enough to create conditions under which the existence of life on earth will be impossible."

The Cold War was fought over the reluctance to use weapons of mass destruction, yet now this logic is something only senior citizens seem to recall. Today, even lunatic regimes like that in North Korea not only possess weapons of mass destruction, but openly offer to sell them to anyone with cash, including terrorists and their state sponsors. Is

anyone paying any attention? Being inured to proliferation, however, does not reduce its danger. On the contrary, it increases it.

Ion Mihai Pacepa, a Romanian, is the highest-ranking intelligence officer ever to have defected from the former Soviet bloc.

<http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20030820-081256-6822r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced RAND document follows article.)

Two Studies Cite Confusion on Terrorism

By PHILIP SHENON

WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 — Two private studies released this week have found that police officers, firefighters, public school safety officers and other emergency response workers believe that nearly two years after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, they are unprepared if terrorists strike again.

The larger of the studies, prepared for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and made public today by the Rand Corporation, found that police officers and firefighters agreed that "they do not know what they need to be protected against, what form of protection is appropriate and where to look for such protection."

The report, which surveyed 190 emergency workers in 40 cities and towns in the nation, said a "majority of emergency responders feel vastly underprepared and underprotected for the consequences of chemical, biological or radiological terrorist attacks."

The second study, prepared for the National Association of School Resource Officers, which represents security officials who work in schools, cited a poll this summer that found that more than 90 percent of its surveyed members said they believed that schools were a "soft target" for terrorists and that 76 percent said they thought their schools were inadequately protected.

The studies mirror the results of other recent studies and offer support to Bush administration critics who say that Washington has done too little to help state and local officials deal with terrorist threats and that billions of dollars in promised federal counterterrorism assistance have been slow to arrive.

The Department of Homeland Security, which oversees federal counterterrorism assistance to state and local governments, said the studies pointed out a concern shared by the administration.

"We share the desire of the first responders to get better prepared and to get the best equipment possible, and that is why we have provided approximately \$4 billion this year to further that goal," Gordon Johndroe, a department spokesman, said.

Public school safety officers "should lead the charge within the education community to get school districts to implement emergency plans," Mr. Johndroe added.

The Rand study, which was requested by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, part of the disease control centers, found that there was widespread confusion among police officers, firefighters and other emergency workers about the proper response to terrorist attacks, especially if they involved chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

"Such uncertainty frustrates efforts to design a protection program and acquire the necessary technology," the study said.

The report found that the emergency workers interviewed were unsure how well the protective clothing and other equipment for hazardous materials now provided to them would function in the event of a terrorist attack with a chemical or biological agent.

Much of the available hazardous materials protection "is neither designed nor certified for this new role of terrorism response," the report said, noting that much of the hazardous material equipment used by government emergency-response teams was designed for response to industrial accidents, not terrorism.

An author of the report, Demosthenes J. Peterson, a political scientist at Rand, said in an interview that the report was not intended as criticism of federal counterterrorism programs.

But he said that the study made it clear that emergency response workers "feel exposed against these new threats from terrorists" and that they needed help urgently to plan for the possibility of terrorist attack.

The school safety study, based on a June and July survey of more than 700 school safety officials, said the results suggested that there had been "no significant changes in emergency preparedness and training to deal with emergency situations" despite warnings of new terrorist attacks since 9/11.

On the survey, 51 percent of the respondents reported that their schools did not have specific, formal guidelines to follow when there was a change in the national color-coded threat alert level; 71 percent reported that teachers and administrators in their schools had not received special training on how to respond to a terrorist attack.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/21/national/21HOME.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Protecting Emergency Responders, Volume 2:

Community Views of Safety and Health Risks and Personal Protection Needs

<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1646/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Suspected N. Korean Chemicals Worry U.S.

By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA

The Associated Press

Saturday, August 23, 2003; 3:57 PM

SEOUL, South Korea - The United States wants to talk to North Korea not only about nuclear bombs, but the communist nation's entire arsenal: suspected stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, missiles that can reach all of South Korea and Japan and massive conventional forces massed near the border.

If U.S. negotiators bring up all these issues at talks in Beijing this week, the meetings are likely to become contentious quickly. An impoverished nation with few friends, North Korea relies on its military might as one of its few means of political leverage, and it suspects U.S. talk of disarmament is a scheme to undermine its ability to defend itself.

The Aug. 27-29 talks, featuring the United States, the two Koreas, China, Russia and Japan, will focus on resolving a standoff that erupted in October over North Korea's suspected development of nuclear weapons. A diplomatic solution could take years.

But the enduring question of North Korea's threat to stability in northeast Asia - a menace that dates to its 1950 invasion of South Korea, triggering the Korean War - could remain even if the nuclear confrontation dissipates.

The North's test-firing of a Taepodong-1 rocket over Japan and into the Pacific in 1998 highlighted its military ambitions and penchant for provocation. The North said it was an attempt to insert a satellite into orbit.

Many analysts believe North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was chastened by the U.S.-led war in Iraq and the ouster of Saddam Hussein, and recognizes that a head-on military confrontation with the United States could amount to a suicidal act.

But Washington, which says North Korea is the world's main proliferator of missiles and engages in drug trafficking and other illegal activities to raise cash, fears North Korea could deal with terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction.

"Postponing the elimination of Kim Jong Il's nuclear weapons program will only allow him time to amass even more nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to develop even longer range missiles," John Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, said in a speech in Seoul last month.

Foremost among the concerns of Washington and its allies are:

- North Korea's nuclear activities. North Korea is suspected of having a covert uranium-based nuclear program and has resumed operations at plutonium-based facilities that some experts say could yield several bombs within months.

U.S. officials say they believe the North already has one or two nuclear bombs. South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan also said Wednesday that the North "is believed to possess enough material to build one or two nuclear weapons." However, there are doubts about its ability to mount such weapons on warheads.

- The North's arsenal of up to 700 missiles and its sales of missile technology and components to clients like Iran and Yemen. North Nodong missiles can hit targets as far as 810 miles away. U.S. defense experts believe North Korea is working on a long-range missile that could deliver a payload of several hundred pounds as far as Alaska or Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the continental United States.

The administration of former President Clinton held talks with North Korea on curbing its missile development, but no agreement was reached.

- A chemical warfare program that includes the ability "to indigenously produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents as well as a variety of different filled munitions systems," according to the Federation of American Scientists, a research group based in Washington.

- North Korea also is believed to have pursued a biological weapons program since the 1960s.

- The huge number of North Korean troops and weapons arrayed close to the Demilitarized Zone, a buffer area between the two Koreas. In the early hours of a conflict, North Korea could rain thousands of rounds of artillery on Seoul, the South Korean capital, only 40 miles south of the border.

With more than 1 million soldiers, North Korea has one of the largest armies in the world. However, the country is short of food and fuel, and many of its weapons are antiquated. Its air force, for example, has as many as 1,600 planes, but most are based on old Russian and Chinese designs from the 1950s and 1960s. North Korea does not manufacture airplanes.

Still, North Korea often showcases its military at politically sensitive times. In March, four communist fighter jets intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance plane off the North's east coast. The fighters illuminated the U.S. plane with targeting radar, but there was no hostile fire.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36635-2003Aug23.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Philadelphia Inquirer

August 25, 2003

Pg. 1

Tension High On Eve Of North Korea Talks

By Michael Dorgan and Warren P. Strobel, Knight Ridder News Service

BEIJING - Amid high tensions and low expectations, representatives of six nations will gather in China's capital Wednesday for three days of talks aimed at easing the nuclear standoff with North Korea.

The outcome is uncertain, but the stakes are clear. While much of the world recently has focused on Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, North Korea has emerged as one of the most dangerous diplomatic challenges facing President Bush and other world leaders.

"The North Korean nuclear threat is about as real and serious a threat as we could have anywhere in either the region or the world," Australian Prime Minister John Howard noted during a visit to Beijing last week.

North Korea is believed to already have at least one or two nuclear weapons, and has reactivated facilities that may soon provide it with more. Even without those weapons, it has the conventional military capability of devastating South Korea and destabilizing Northeast Asia.

Not wanting anyone to forget that, North Korea's government-controlled media last week issued a warning that the country was "ready for both dialogue and war."

Kenneth Lieberthal, the National Security Council's senior director for Asia during the Clinton administration, recently told reporters in Beijing that when the United States contemplated a military strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities in 1994, the Pentagon calculated that South Korea would suffer at least 500,000 casualties - and maybe many more - if war broke out.

"This is not Iraq," he said.

Lieberthal noted that North Korea's military leaders were "masters of concealment" who had hollowed out entire mountains to hide and protect their weapons, putting the outcome of surgical strikes in doubt.

Still, he and many others maintain that the United States cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea, in part because the regime of Kim Jong Il would have no moral restraints against selling nuclear materials to terrorists or states hostile to America.

Going into the talks, the Bush administration is sticking by its long-standing refusal to offer North Korea rewards for not abiding by past nuclear agreements.

The first U.S. goal is to get North Korea "to commit to the complete, verifiable and irreversible ending of its nuclear arms program," a senior State Department official said in Washington last week.

The official, briefing reporters on condition that he not be identified, said Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, who will lead the U.S. delegation, will not offer North Korea any sweeteners, at least up front.

"We are certainly not coming in with inducements to resume activity that had been previously committed," he said, referring to North Korea's 1994 pledge to terminate its nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. officials say that pledge was broken when North Korea secretly developed a uranium enrichment program that it admitted to last October.

When the United States cut off fuel shipments to North Korea in response, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, expelled U.N. weapons inspectors and reactivated its shuttered Yongbyon nuclear facility. North Korea has since claimed to have completed reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods, enough to yield plutonium for five or six nuclear bombs, experts say. It probably already had extracted enough plutonium for one or two bombs before the facility was closed by the 1994 agreement, according to the CIA.

While the United States will not offer any up-front inducements, it will make clear that aid and other help will be forthcoming if North Korea abandons its nuclear ambitions, the senior State Department official said.

Joining the United States and North Korea at the bargaining table will be China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Each has its own stakes in the confrontation, and some - particularly South Korea - are more willing to offer the North a deal.

No one sees a quick end to the crisis, and some worry that the Bush administration may not have the patience to sit through long months, or years, of negotiations.

Washington's patience will be especially tested if North Korea does not agree to some kind of verifiable freeze of its nuclear programs while negotiations proceed.

Even the Chinese, who have pushed hard for dialogue and a peaceful resolution, worry that North Korea may drag out the talks while feverishly building nuclear bombs to create a stronger deterrent against a U.S. attack, according to Professor Shi Yinhong, a North Korea expert at Beijing's People's University.

"If it becomes a protracted crisis, then North Korea will have time to build a substantial nuclear arsenal, which will increase the danger of war," Shi said in an interview.

North Korea agreed to freeze its programs during the lengthy talks leading to the 1994 agreement. But it has given no indications it is willing to do so for the upcoming talks, at least in a verifiable way.

North Korea's official media have said repeatedly in recent days that no inspections are possible before the United States agrees to a nonaggression treaty and normalizes relations.

The United States has been firm in its insistence that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons programs in a verifiable way as a precondition to negotiations about aid, normalizing relations and other matters.

Kelly will listen to the expected demands for security guarantees but will not agree to a formal nonaggression pact, said the senior State Department official.

As for normalizing relations with the bankrupt and isolated Stalinist regime, he said that "is certainly one possibility" somewhere down the road.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/6610693.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Baltimore Sun
August 25, 2003

Air Force Assessment Before War Said Iraqi Drones Were Minor Threat

U.S. arms experts in Iraq came to same conclusion

By Associated Press

Huddled over a fleet of abandoned Iraqi drones, U.S. weapons experts in Baghdad came to one conclusion: Despite Bush administration assertions, these unmanned aerial vehicles were not designed to dispense biological or chemical weapons.

The evidence gathered this summer matched the views of Air Force intelligence analysts, who argued before the war in an assessment of Iraq that the remotely piloted planes were unarmed reconnaissance drones.

In building its case for war, senior Bush administration officials had said Iraq's drones were intended to deliver unconventional weapons. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell raised the prospect that the pilotless aircraft could sneak into the United States to carry out poison attacks on American cities.

The Bush administration based its view on a CIA finding that Iraq had renewed development of unmanned aerial vehicles - UAVs - capable of such attacks. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency supported the conclusion.

While the hunt for suspected weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them continues, intelligence and defense officials said the CIA and DIA stand by their prewar assertions about Iraqi drone capabilities, some of which Powell highlighted in his presentation Feb. 5 to the United Nations Security Council.

But the Air Force, which controls most of the U.S. military's UAV fleet, did not agree with that assessment from the beginning. Analysts at the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency said the Air Force view was widely accepted within their ranks.

Instead, the analysts believed that the drones posed no threat to Iraq's neighbors or the United States, said officials in Washington and scientists involved in the weapons hunt in Iraq.

The official Air Force intelligence dissent is noted in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons programs, parts of which were declassified last month as the Bush administration tried to defend its case for war.

"We didn't see there was a very large chance they [the drones] would be used to attack the continental United States," said Bob Boyd, director of the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency. "We didn't see them as a big threat to the homeland."

Boyd said there was little evidence to associate Iraq's UAVs with the country's suspected biological weapons program. Facilities weren't in the same location, and the programs didn't use the same people.

Instead, the Air Force believed that Iraq's UAVs were for reconnaissance, as are most American drones. Intelligence data suggested that the drones were not large enough to carry much more than a camera and a video recorder, Boyd said.

Postwar evidence uncovered last month in Iraq supports those assessments, according to two U.S. government scientists assigned to the weapons hunt.

"We just looked at the UAVs and said, 'There's nothing here. There's no room to put anything in here,'" one scientist said.

The U.S. scientists - weapons experts who spoke on condition of anonymity - reached their conclusions after studying the aircraft and interviewing Iraqi missile experts, system designers and Gen. Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, the Iraqi head of the military facility where the UAVs were designed.

While the weapons hunters cannot be sure they've recovered all of Iraq's UAVs, the evidence so far, coupled with the interviews, has led them to believe that the drones were not designed to carry unconventional weapons. Iraqis involved in the program have insisted that the drones were used for reconnaissance.

Some UAVs were kept north of Baghdad. Weapons hunters found some drones in better shape than others, with the most important finds at a facility in the capital, the U.S. scientists said. Weapons hunters hauled them back to their base on the outskirts of Baghdad International Airport, where the parts were analyzed.

The unproven U.S. assertion about Iraq's UAV programs is one among many.

American weapons hunters, like their U.N. counterparts, have found no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq.

The lack of success in uncovering unconventional weapons, after U.S. and British warnings that Iraq posed an immediate danger, has led critics to suggest that the Bush administration exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.drones25aug25.0.1127095.story?coll=bal-nationworld-headlines>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

August 25, 2003

A Weapons Cache We'll Never See

By Scott Ritter

DELMAR, N.Y. — Some 1,500 American investigators are scouring the Iraqi countryside for evidence of weapons of mass destruction that has so far eluded them. Known as the Iraq Survey Group and operating under the supervision of a former United Nations weapons inspector, David Kay, they are searching mostly for documents that will help them assemble a clear, if somewhat circumstantial, case that Iraq had or intended to have programs to produce prohibited weapons.

It is a daunting task. And according to many Iraqi scientists and officials I have spoken to, it is not being done very well.

A logical starting place for such a mission is in the Jadariya district of downtown Baghdad, adjacent to the campus of Baghdad University: the complex that housed the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate. The directorate was the government agency responsible for coordinating all aspects of the United Nations inspection teams' missions. It was also supposed to monitor Iraq's industrial infrastructure and ensure compliance with the Security Council resolutions regarding disarmament, verification and export-import controls.

As such, the directorate was the repository for every Iraqi government record relating to its weapons programs, as well as to the activities at dozens of industrial sites in Iraq that were "dual-use" — used to manufacture permitted items but capable of being modified to manufacture proscribed material.

For 12 years the Iraqis collected and collated this data. If we inspectors had a question about a contract signed between country A and Iraqi factory B, the directorate could produce it at short notice. The 12,500 page "full, final and complete declaration" provided by Iraq to the United Nations in the fall of 2002 was compiled using this archive. And the directorate's holdings went well beyond paperwork: every interview conducted by the United Nations inspectors with Iraqi scientists throughout the 1990's was videotaped and available for review.

Of course, all this material was put together by officials and scientists who were obedient, either out of loyalty or fear, to the former regime, and it was done in a way intended to prove that Iraq was complying with the United Nations resolutions (something that has not been proved false in the five months since the American-led invasion). Still, even if one was to discount the entire archive as simply a collection of Iraqi falsifications, it would still be a sound foundation on which the Iraq Survey Group could have started investigations. After all, some of my most fruitful efforts as a United Nations inspector were initiated using false claims by the Iraqi government as the starting point.

And it seems that after the coalition troops moved into Baghdad, the records were all there for the taking. According to several senior directorate officials I have spoken to since the war — one a brigadier general who had been a high-ranking administrator at the complex — the entire archive had been consolidated into metal containers before the war and stored at the directorate's Jadariyah headquarters for protection.

Yet these eyewitnesses have provided me with a troubling tale. On April 8, they say, the buildings were occupied by soldiers from the Army's Third Infantry Division. For two weeks, the Iraqi scientists and administrators showed up for work but, according to several I have spoken to, no one from the coalition interviewed them or tried to take control of the archive.

Rather, these staff members have told me, after occupying the facility for two weeks, the American soldiers simply withdrew. Soon after, looters entered the facility and ransacked it. Overnight, every computer was stolen, disks and video records were destroyed, and the carefully organized documents were ripped from their binders and either burned or scattered about. According to the former brigadier general, who went back to the building after the mob had gone, some Iraqi scientists did their best to recover and reconstitute what they could, but for the vast majority of the archive the damage was irreversible.

Obviously, I am relying on the word of former directorate officials, but these are people I knew well in my days as an inspector, and none would seem to have anything to gain by lying today. In any case, the looting of the building, if not the previous presence of American troops, has been well documented by Western news reports.

Why was this allowed to happen? I am as puzzled as the Iraqis. Given the high priority the Bush administration placed on discovering evidence of weapons of mass destruction, it seems only logical that seizing the directorate archive would have been a top priority for the coalition forces — at least as important as the Iraqi Oil Ministry or the National Museum. And it seems highly unlikely that coalition leaders didn't know what the archive contained. I was one of many international inspectors who led investigations of the facility — and the data we produced was used by the American government as part of its case that Saddam Hussein was hiding prohibited programs.

Today, with the tremendous controversy over the administration's pre-war assertions, it is impossible to overstate the importance of the archive that produced Iraq's 12,500 pages of claims — none of which have yet been shown to be false — that comprise the most detailed record of Iraq's weapons programs.

Next month the Iraq Survey Group will give a formal briefing to American and British officials on the status of its investigations. President Bush has already hinted that the group will make a case that it has found evidence of prohibited weapons programs and of efforts to hide them from international inspectors. Such a case may have merit, but without being able to compare and contrast it to the Iraqi version of events, I'm not sure how convincing it will be to the American public, or to the rest of the world.

Scott Ritter is a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq and author of "Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/25/opinion/25RITT.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

August 23, 2003

Pg. 19

China Wary Of Weapons Searches

Official: Country Won't Be Transit Point for N. Korean Arms

By John Pomfret, Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIJING, Aug. 22 -- North Korea will not be allowed to use China as a back door to evade international sanctions designed to prevent it from exporting weapons of mass destruction, a senior Chinese arms control official said today. However, the official said, China had serious reservations about a U.S.-led plan, called the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which a group of 11 countries has agreed to stop and search planes and ships suspected of carrying banned weapons or missile technology. North Korea and Iran were named as countries of particular concern.

"China is fully opposed to proliferation," said Liu Jieyi, director of the arms control and disarmament department at the Foreign Ministry, in an interview. But, he added, China was concerned that the way the group will carry out interdiction activities and the quality of intelligence that it might use "could make a bad situation worse."

Liu's comments came five days before a critical six-nation gathering in Beijing. China, Russia, the United States, Japan and South Korea will meet with North Korea and try to persuade it to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. If the talks fail, U.S. officials have said they are ready to launch an international effort aimed at halting North Korea's sales of weapons technology and other controlled items.

Most analysts agree that if a naval blockade is set up around North Korea, it will attempt to move its weapons and weapons technology through China to third countries. China was North Korea's main ally in the Korean War, but Beijing has not supported North Korea's latest program to build a nuclear device.

Liu said China had enacted a series of laws designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, referring to North Korea, said "we do not make exceptions." However, he said his government was uncomfortable with the Proliferation Security Initiative because, in addition to other things, the techniques that might be used to board ships and inspect cargo could prompt a military confrontation. North Korea has warned that it would view any such behavior as an act of war. Liu said that China was also concerned about whether the intelligence used to search ships would be faulty.

"In China," he said, "we have a saying: You should not shoot a mosquito with a cannon. The collateral damage could be worse and you may miss the mosquito."

Liu also said that China's government was investigating several cases of Chinese companies trying to export weapons-related technology.

"There are cases under investigation or in the midst of legal proceedings," he said. "Those found to have violated laws and regulations will be punished, and we are looking at serious punishments." He said that in other cases, the government had levied fines or administrative sanctions on Chinese companies caught violating new rules controlling the export of weapons of mass destruction and related technology.

"China is a big country. To reach all the companies in the shortest period of time is a challenging task," Liu said. "I cannot say it's been all problem-free, but we're devoting a lot of energy and time to this."

"The enforcement of the laws and regulations is strict," he said.

Bush administration officials disagree. Chinese companies, they say, continue to trade in dual use-technology that can be used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Over the last two years, the United States has sanctioned more than a dozen Chinese companies, including such industrial giants as Norinco, a large military-backed firm, for allegedly trading in weapons technology, mostly with Iran.

Liu said China was disappointed with the Bush administration's recent moves to sanction Chinese companies, saying the U.S. policy was not "conducive to the non-proliferation efforts that the Chinese government is engaged in."

Specifically, he noted, U.S. policy did not seem based on Chinese violations of any international or bilateral agreements. "The Americans never gave us any information about what the Chinese firms allegedly did wrong," he said. "So it's impossible for us to investigate."

As a result, he said, China has concluded that the United States is sanctioning Chinese companies simply because it wants them to stop doing business with Iran.

"We feel these sanctions are not about export controls or proliferation," he said. "They are about the political relationship between the United States and Iran. The Chinese companies are simply the victim of a hostile relationship between the U.S. and Iran."

Under pressure from the United States, China has enacted a series of laws and regulations to control its weapons exports. It has joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and another treaty which bans chemical weapons. It has also agreed to most of the provisions of the Missile Control Technology Regime and other international agreements designed to stem the flood of weapons of mass destruction.

Liu declined to say how many cases Chinese officials were investigating, or what products were involved. He also said that the government has rejected export applications for products because of proliferation concerns. And in several cases, he said, investigators were able to stop "some of these transactions even prior to a formal application being submitted," again because of proliferation concerns.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34407-2003Aug22.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times
August 23, 2003

N. Korea May Be Offered A Carrot

The U.S. says it might not block other nations from offering the regime disarmament incentives when nuclear talks begin next week.

By Sonni Efron, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration might not object if other nations offer incentives to North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, a senior State Department official said Friday.

The remarks, an apparent overture to South Korea, came as the United States prepared to join officials from Japan, South Korea, Russia, China and North Korea in Beijing on Wednesday for six-party talks aimed at persuading North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

The United States tried but apparently failed to produce a joint U.S.-Japanese-South Korean position to present at the three-day session. Wary of the U.S. strategy of using military and economic pressure on North Korea to force it to disarm, South Korea has been taking a softer line toward its neighbor.

"Of the six parties, South Korea is probably the closest [in negotiating strategy] to North Korea," said Georgetown University professor Victor D. Cha, calling Seoul's position "very worrisome."

"Whether they'll even be on the same page as the other two allies, the U.S. and Japan, is a big question," Cha said.

A second State Department official said that although South Korea might have more joint endeavors with North Korea than any other nation, Pyongyang is getting only a tiny portion of the economic help that it could expect from South Korea if it abandoned its nuclear program.

The U.S. wants North Korea to commit to the "complete, verifiable and irreversible ending of its nuclear arms program." Doing so could open the door to "a very new kind of relationship" with the U.S. and other countries, the official said, including a possible normalization of relations, which have been frozen since the Korean War ended in a truce in 1953.

North Korea acknowledged having a secret uranium enrichment program last October, withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, announced that it had nuclear weapons — and that it intended to make more.

The Bush administration has insisted that it will not give North Korea incentives to stop doing what it promised not to do in the first place. Both officials reiterated Friday that the U.S. is still determined not to offer incentives.

Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, who is leading the U.S. delegation, is "not going with some package of rewards," one official said.

North Korea has vowed not to give up what it claims is a necessary nuclear deterrent unless the United States drops its "hostile stance" toward Kim Jong Il's regime and forswears any nuclear threat to Pyongyang. In a statement carried by the official news agency this week, it argued that "the Iraq war proved that consenting to disarmament through inspection does not help prevent a war but sparks it."

President Bush has verbally pledged not to attack North Korea, but Pyongyang wants an official nonaggression pact, which Washington has ruled out.

North Korea has also demanded that the U.S. not hinder its economic development and that it normalize relations — all as an apparent precondition to submitting its nuclear facilities to inspection.

Allowing a third country to sweeten any deal with North Korea before disarmament is completed could help break this diplomatic impasse.

The Bush administration would find some kinds of inducements troubling, but others could be seen as positive, the first State Department official told reporters, adding: "What's an inducement is in the eye of the beholder."

"We're not telling the South Koreans to stop family exchanges or not to connect the railways [between South and North Korea] if those things contribute to the possibility of change in North Korea," said the second official. "But we're certainly not encouraging anyone to undertake new projects or benefits that would give the North Koreans solace in their discomfort."

U.S. officials lowered expectations for the talks, saying it would be a positive step if the negotiations at least produced an agreement to meet again.

Analysts were even more pessimistic. Some said North Korea would never agree to give up its nuclear arsenal.

Others said the Bush administration's hard-line stance and well-publicized antipathy toward Kim would doom any deal.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor23aug23,1,5945714.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

August 24, 2003

1966 Hydrogen-Bomb Mishap In Spain Detailed

Four nuclear weapons fell on a populated area after planes collided. Incident is explored in photo exhibition.

By Daniel Woolls, Associated Press

PALOMARES, Spain — In a sunny corner of the world where nothing much ever happened, a fruit wholesaler named Martin Moreno climbed atop a leaking American H-bomb and tried to pry loose a souvenir. Oblivious to the danger from radiation, he poked a screwdriver into a crack, working in vain to secure his prize. "I've never regretted that nor have I been afraid," Moreno, an engaging, healthy-looking man of 68, said in recounting that morning in the winter of 1966.

His bird's-eye view of those 1.5 megatons of destructive power — Hiroshima 75 times over — didn't last long. American troops and Spanish police soon swarmed around the 10-foot-long bomb and carted it off. It was one of four hydrogen bombs that had plummeted from a B-52 that had collided with a refueling plane.

Nuclear bombs had been involved in previous plane crashes, but this was the first — and only — known case of such weapons being lost in a populated area.

Most people in Palomares, a sleepy farming hamlet on Spain's southeast tip, never saw the bombs, one of which ended up in the Mediterranean. Nor did they get a peek inside the tent city thrown up to house the 800 Americans who searched for the bombs and cleaned up the radioactive mess.

But now the camp and much of Spain's worst nuclear scare are on display for the first time in this country at a photo exhibition based on 16-mm film footage from the National Archives in Washington.

In 1966, Spain lived under the thumb of Gen. Francisco Franco, and about the only image most Spaniards remember from the disaster is a chirpy newsreel in which Information Minister Manuel Fraga and U.S. Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke took a swim at a Palomares beach to show that it was safe to go back in the water.

In the exhibition, however, photos show charred wreckage of the crashed B-52 and tanker, soldiers hauling thousands of barrels of contaminated soil onto ships bound for a nuclear cemetery, doctors sticking swabs up noses to check for radiation exposure, and frogmen and mini-submersibles looking for the bomb that fell into the sea and eluded recovery for 75 days.

The exhibition, "Operation Broken Arrow: Nuclear Accident in Palomares," opened in May in the provincial capital, Almeria, and will make a tour of Spain.

It is the work of Spanish film producer Antonio Sanchez Picon and photographer Jose Herrera. They culled 60 frames from 36 reels of movie film — 700,000 frames altogether — at the National Archives. Herrera has researched the Palomares incident for nearly 20 years.

The Cold War was in full swing in 1966, and U.S. policy was to keep nuclear-armed warplanes in the air constantly near the Soviet border. Under an accord with Franco, U.S. B-52s had permission to fly over Spain and rendezvous in Spanish airspace with KC-135 tankers.

On the morning of Jan. 17, 1966, a routine refueling operation turned disastrous. It is believed that the B-52 flew too fast as it approached the tanker from below. The planes collided, killing seven of 11 crew members and raining 100 tons of flaming wreckage over 15 square miles.

And the four H-bombs tumbled from the B-52.

While one bomb splashed into the sea, the other three hit the ground. None exploded — layers of safeguards made that virtually impossible — but seven pounds of plutonium 239 were released when two bomb detonators did go off. The three bombs on the ground were found in the first 24 hours.

The villagers of Palomares — population 600 then, 1,400 today — went days without knowing that they were at ground zero of an unprecedented nuclear accident.

"H-bomb, butane gas canister, what difference would it have made?" said Mayor Juan Jose Perez. "This is a rural area. What did people know about bombs?"

But some caught on when doctors speaking a strange language came around asking for urine samples and waving gadgets that ticked.

Crops were dug up and burned — a mistake, it turns out, that only served to disperse radioactive particles.

Contaminated soil was scooped up with tractors.

The mayor says Palomares today has the same cancer rate as the rest of Spain, although the government still tests people at random, and late last year it warned against construction where the two semi-detonated bombs fell.

At the time of the crash, the danger of contamination was largely overshadowed by the frantic search for the bomb lurking on the seabed, an operation using 34 ships, 2,200 sailors, 130 frogmen and four mini-submersibles.

A Spanish fisherman had come forward quickly to say he'd seen something fall that looked like a bomb, but experts ignored him. Instead, they focused on four possible trajectories calculated by a supercomputer, but for weeks found only airplane pieces.

Media worldwide expressed stupefaction. Newsweek ribbed the Pentagon: "Where, oh where has our H-bomb gone? Oh where, oh where can it be?"

The fisherman, Francisco Simo, was summoned back. He sent searchers in the right direction, having memorized the impact spot using visual triangulation, a mariner's trick used since the time of the Phoenicians. A two-man sub, the Alvin, finally found it in 2,162 feet of water.

But the nightmare was not over. The sub surfaced to recharge its batteries and went back down for the bomb, but it was gone. The crew discovered that it had tumbled 400 feet down an undersea slope. Several attempts to grab the bomb with mechanical arms failed. It rolled farther down the hill and when Alvin finally secured it, the weapon lay near a 5,000-foot-deep abyss.

"If they hadn't got it then, they might never have," Perez said.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-adfg-nightmare24aug24,1,3815234.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

August 23, 2003

Pg. 20

Canada Arrests 19 As Security Threats

By DeNeen L. Brown, Washington Post Foreign Service

TORONTO, Aug. 22 -- Canadian officials arrested 19 men last week who investigators say had followed "a pattern of suspicious behavior," including one man who had taken flying lessons over a nuclear power plant, officials said today.

Giovanna Gatti, a spokeswoman for the Citizenship and Immigration Department, said the men were arrested Aug. 14 in the Toronto area and face allegations of violating Canada's Immigration Act. The men were being held as possible threats to national security, officials said.

According to a document filed Tuesday at a detention hearing, one of the men was enrolled in a flight school and was trying to qualify as a multi-engine commercial pilot. "His flight path for training purposes flies over the Pickering Nuclear Power Plant," according to the document. Flight instructors described him as an "unmotivated student," according to the document. "The average time frame for qualification is approximately one year, the target has been training in Canada for almost three years."

The document said two of the men raised suspicions when police found them outside the gates of the nuclear plant at 4:15 a.m. "on a cool, damp morning in April 2002." The men "requested that they be allowed to enter the perimeter in order to go for a walk on the beach," the document said.

The document alleges that the men under investigation have associates who "have access to nuclear gauges," which contain a small amount of radioactive material that can be used to make "dirty bombs." An associate who lived with one of the suspects worked for the Global Relief Foundation, which the United Nations has said supports terrorist groups, including al Qaeda. Two apartments where some of the men in the group lived had unexplained fires, the record said.

The investigation found that the men generally lived in sparsely filled apartments with only mattresses on the floor and a computer. "One cluster left an apartment during the night and discarded all their belongings: mattresses, clothing and computer shells, apparently taking only the computer hard drive upon vacating an apartment."

The investigation, called Project Thread, began in February when an immigration officer became suspicious when she could not confirm that a student applying for permanent residency was enrolled at the Ottawa Business College.

"In fact, the visa officer could not even confirm the existence of the school," the document said. The officer became more concerned when the man produced a bank statement with a balance of more than \$40,000 but "had no identifiable source of income." Investigators concluded that the school was not legitimate, but was a place where foreign students could buy acceptance letters, transcripts and diplomas without attending classes. Officials seized 400 student files and letters "issued to accommodate the students' travel to and from the United States."

"Investigators began to see an alarming trend with respect to the foreign students," the document said. Officials identified 31 students who had misrepresented themselves to obtain permits to study in Canada, which led to the arrest of the 19 men. Officials also said that all but one person in the group had connections to the Punjab province of Pakistan, which "is noted for Sunni extremism."

Mohammed Syed, an attorney representing two of the men, called the evidence weak and discriminatory. "The only reason these individuals were arrested and are being detained is based on the fact they are Muslim in origin and have Muslim-sounding names," Syed said. He said both of his clients were in their thirties; one has applied for refugee status, and the other is a student whose student visa had expired.

A hearing has been set for next week to decide whether the detentions are warranted.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34586-2003Aug22.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Divergent Issues Crowd Nuke Talks

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

The United States and its allies face divergent agendas as they prepare for the opening of three days of talks with North Korea tomorrow over Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons program.

Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, the lead U.S. negotiator, and top envoys from South Korea, Japan and Russia arrived in the Chinese capital yesterday.

China and North Korea also will be seated around the six-sided table at the exclusive Diaoyutai state guesthouse in Beijing in a format that presented its own diplomatic challenges.

North Korea consistently had rejected multilateral talks on its nuclear programs, insisting on direct one-on-one talks with Washington.

The first and third day of the talks this week will follow the multilateral format favored by Washington, but time has been set aside Thursday for informal bilateral meetings in which U.S. and North Korean delegates could talk.

"Obviously, when you are in a room and holding talks with six parties, there are opportunities to raise issues with any of your interlocutors across the table or across the room," said State Department spokesman Philip Reeker.

Mr. Kelly's arrival in Beijing yesterday came about 10 months after Pyongyang acknowledged having a nuclear program, in direct violation of pledges made to the Clinton administration under a 1994 deal.

"We'll be getting going on Wednesday morning, and we're looking forward to a direct and fair exchange of views," said Mr. Kelly, the department's point man on East Asian and Pacific affairs.

In a related development, Reuters news agency reported that Charles "Jack" Pritchard, the U.S. special envoy to North Korea, had resigned.

Mr. Pritchard advocated engaging the North in negotiations in an administration deeply divided on the issue. A holdover from the Clinton administration, he was viewed as an adversary by some hard-liners in the Bush administration, who have resisted talks with Pyongyang.

The State Department denied that Mr. Pritchard's resignation, submitted Friday, was policy-related.

Meanwhile, Russian envoy Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov and South Korean negotiator Lee Soohyuck played down hopes of any early breakthrough in the talks, saying it would be progress enough just to begin multilateral discussions on the nuclear standoff that has unnerved the region.

"These talks are the beginning of a long negotiating process," Mr. Lee said.

Bush administration officials hope the talks will focus pressure on North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to abandon efforts to manufacture and possibly export nuclear weapons, and to allow international inspectors back into the secretive communist state.

The North has sent out conflicting signals about the talks, but has demanded a formal non-aggression pact from the United States. The North needs extensive humanitarian and development aid to boost its collapsing economy.

While the United States has taken a tough line, South Korea and China are deeply worried about a rapid collapse of the North Korean regime, which could create economic chaos and a regional refugee crisis.

Japan also has said it will raise the issue of its nationals kidnapped by North Korean intelligence agents in the 1970s and 1980s to train as spies.

Sharon Behn contributed to this article, which is based in part on wire-service reports.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030825-112352-7838r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Expert Says U.S. Should Consider Using Mininukes

By Keith Rogers, Review-Journal

Standing in an empty hall that next year will display Cold War artifacts from the heyday of atomic testing, Troy Wade pondered the need for research into a new generation of nuclear bombs called "mininukes."

These low-yield bombs, known in nuclear weapons circles as "robust earth penetrators," would be small enough to deliver to fortified targets deep underground. They'd also be powerful enough to do the job that conventional, bunker-buster bombs can't do: generate enough energy and heat to crumble rock-hard command facilities or render missiles or stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons useless with minimal damage on the surface.

"The whole issue of war fighting has changed," said Wade, a longtime Las Vegas, former Energy Department defense chief and veteran nuclear weapons expert. His resume dates to the days of atmospheric nuclear tests and the shift to below-ground detonations at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s.

"We've moved from superpower-to-superpower, where the goals were mutually assured destruction, to dealing now with rogue states," Wade, 69, said during an interview last week in the building on Desert Research Institute's Flamingo Road campus that will house the Atomic Testing Museum.

The targets today are not population centers but rather military facilities and command locations.

"Instead of destroying a city, you want to destroy a single building or a single factory or a single structure, and you want to do it in a way that minimizes damage to civilians and makes occupation much simpler, safer and easier," he said.

That, in essence, was a key part of the discussion that took place earlier this month during a closed-door meeting of 150 scientists, administration officials, arms experts and Pentagon planners at Offutt Air Force Base south of Omaha, Neb.

The meeting was spawned from the brainstorming that took place a year ago during the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review. The purpose of that review "was to look at the perceived needs of the military in nuclear weapons over the next couple decades," said Wade, who since his retirement in 1989 has acted as an adviser to both the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Defense on nuclear weapons matters.

Wade would neither confirm nor deny that he attended the meeting at the Offutt base's Strategic Air Command but spoke of his knowledge about it.

"It's a well-known fact that in many countries around the world, defense facilities and command facilities are in deeply buried, underground locations and this nation is struggling with a better way to defeat those deeply buried targets," he said. "There is a very logical interest in discussing whether or not a small nuclear weapon might be part of the answer."

The United States has one type of nuclear weapon in its arsenal for use against underground targets: the B61 Mod 11 earth penetrator. That weapon, designed for delivery by a B-2 bomber, was altered in 1999, according to globalsecurity.org, a defense and intelligence policy organization based near Washington, D.C.

The B61 has been modified many times to improve its performance since it was stockpiled in 1968. It was developed and put in the stockpile without full-scale nuclear tests, the organization's Web site says.

Wade said, however, that some defense planners believe there's a need for a lower-yield weapon that will go deeper than the B61.

"It's not a mininuke like we're talking about here," he said, noting that the envisioned yield from such a weapon would be on the order of factors of 10 less yield than that of a B61.

The idea behind a mininuke is that the energetic punch could reach greater depths if the bomb is smaller, yet many times more powerful than a conventional bunker-buster.

"If you can penetrate to a great depth before you detonate either a conventional or nuclear weapon, you can get the shock waves down where they would damage the various facilities with minimum effect on the surface," he said.

There would always be a risk of surface contamination, "but you just have to minimize it as much as you could through tailored effects. The risk isn't zero," Wade said.

Over the next "couple years," Wade said, "I think you're going to see a complete review of the current stockpile and a detailed review of the need for any new design."

Among the challenges, he said, is assuring that the United States can come up with a way to defeat any target, for example, such as an underground plutonium production facility or deeply buried command bunker that North Korea could build.

The threat became more of a reality on June 9, when North Korea officials said they intend to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent. That announcement came six months after North Korea took steps to restart its nuclear facilities and asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove its cameras from the Yongbyon facility.

"A lot of the facilities in North Korea are underground and we have to be assured that we would hold those facilities at risk," Wade said.

"Maybe it's a submarine-launched (nuclear-tipped missile) or maybe it's an earth penetrator. You have to convince them that you can come and get them and only then do you achieve deterrence," he said.

Developing a new generation of warheads raises the question about resuming full-scale nuclear weapons tests that were put on hold indefinitely in 1992, launching a new era for the nation's nuclear proving grounds, the sprawling Nevada Test Site, 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas.

As a result, the United States has relied on a science-based, stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the weapons in the enduring stockpile are safe and reliable to maintain deterrence.

Though other independent experts and at least one Bush administration official have said the chances of resuming nuclear tests are slim in light of current world politics, in Wade's opinion putting an earth penetrator design through the rigors of a full-scale test might be in order.

"There are physicists who will tell you that it's not necessary to test. But I believe if you're going to have one opportunity on one target, you're going to have to do everything you can to know it will work," he said. "And the best way to ensure it will work is through a test."

http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2003/Aug-25-Mon-2003/news/22013053.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

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Tool for bioterrorism?

Scientist warns: Lax regulation of sludge could be fatal flaw

The U.S. government tracks smallpox, anthrax, ebola and many other pathogens that bioterrorists might employ against the American people. The government also monitors the production of powerful bacteria-related toxins, including botulinum toxin, a chemical used in minute quantities in botox shots.

The government doesn't, however, monitor another potential tool of terrorists -- sewage sludge. That's a mistake, according to microbiologist David L. Lewis.

Why? Because, Lewis warns, terrorists will look for lax security. They will look for biological agents that aren't being monitored and for new ways to unleash them on the American public.

Lewis' belief that sludge could be used to commit bioterrorism might strike many Americans as outlandish. But the events of 9/11 once seemed improbable, and Lewis makes a convincing case that sludge -- a byproduct of sewage treatment -- could be plausibly employed by bioterrorists against unsuspecting Americans.

"The troubling thing about land application of sewage sludge is that all these opportunities are there in a package deal," Lewis told a Herald-Tribune editorial writer in a recent interview. "Someone could formulate a weapon and have it transported and delivered with no one paying attention at all. It presents an opportunity to use chemicals and pathogens where no one is monitoring them, and they don't need a rental truck or crop duster to deliver them. Everything's handled for them by the city and the company hauling and spreading the contaminated sludge."

Step-by-step scenario

Much of Lewis' recent work has focused on the unintentional impacts of sludge disposal on human health and the environment. But Lewis provided us with a hypothetical yet plausible, step-by-step scenario of how a bioterrorist could use sludge to intentionally harm Americans:

1. A bioterrorist gets a job at a waste-water treatment plant.
2. He mixes a lot of nickel into a load of sewage sludge on its way to a field (nickel breaks down the human immune system).
3. The terrorist adds either staph bacteria highly resistant to antibiotics or relies on staph bacteria already present in sludge.
4. The sludge cocktail is spread on a field and covered with lime.
5. The mixture dries up, the wind blows, and the "weapon" is carried downwind.
6. People, their immune systems weakened by the nickel, develop skin infections.

Lewis detailed a variation on that theme: A terrorist adds a bacterial toxin to sludge which, when combined with the salmonella or E. coli bacteria already in the waste, causes people downwind from a dump site to suffer gastrointestinal problems.

The wind would be useful in states with dry climates. In Florida, Lewis says, a bioterrorist could contaminate water by adding thallium -- a metal extraordinarily toxic at low levels -- to a load of farm-bound sludge. The Environmental Protection Agency doesn't require waste-water plants to monitor thallium.

Terrorists need not kill a lot of people to inflict fear. Because sewage sludge is produced in large volume in urban areas and disposed of at the nearest farms, golf courses and public parks willing to take it, news reports about an attack could cause anyone who lives near sludge-fertilized fields and grounds to panic.

The U.S. government should heed Lewis' advice and develop prevention, response and cleanup plans based on assessments of where sewage sludge would most likely be used to deliver a biological weapon.

Early warnings

In June 2002, Lewis sent a memo stating his warnings to Dr. Rosemarie Russo, his supervisor at an EPA research laboratory in Athens, Ga. She had asked the laboratory's scientists to recommend how the agency might help in the war on terrorism.

In a deposition given in a Labor Department hearing early this year, Russo testified that Lewis' memo -- along with

his consistently "excellent and superb" work as an EPA microbiologist -- caused her to believe that Lewis could be a primary player in the agency's new antiterror mission.

Lewis' focus on the tools that bioterrorists could use predates America's 9/11- sparked awareness of terrorism. Lewis authored a 1999 article in the journal Nature in which he said sewage sludge can make pesticides more toxic.

Months later, to Lewis' surprise, he received an e-mail from a scientist in Syria who wanted to know more about the subject. Lewis, who did not respond to the e-mail, contacted Russo and a Georgia congressman.

EPA administrators should have assigned Lewis to a prominent homeland-security role. Instead, they forced him to retire on May 28 of this year.

A week earlier, Republican Sens. Charles Grassley of Iowa and James Inhofe of Oklahoma wrote a letter to EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman. They said Lewis had "contributed greatly to improving the quality of science" in the EPA. She was asked to "carefully consider" the decision to make him retire. The senators said they were "concerned about the impact Dr. Lewis' termination might have on the obligation of the EPA to fully support the nation's homeland security efforts."

We agree with Grassley, who responded with this statement when we contacted his office and asked about the forced retirement: "Dr. Lewis is another example of an all too common practice by federal agencies. Instead of listening to constructive criticism by patriotic employees like Dr. Lewis and other whistleblowers, they quickly close ranks and shut out anyone who is not willing to go along and get along."

For the good of the nation, the Department of Labor should order the EPA to put Lewis back to work.

This is the seventh editorial in the "Waste Land" series, which began on Sunday.

Tomorrow: Whistleblowers at risk.

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)