


#274

14 July 2003

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



Air University

Air War College

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

CONTENTS

[North Korea Has Reprocessed Nuclear Fuel Rods, South Says](#)
[Files Show A Stubborn North Korea](#)
[Kim Jong-Il's Appetites Are Ingredients Of Book](#)
[Eleven Countries Join Forces To Combat The Trade In Weapons Of Mass Destruction](#)
[Proliferation Security Initiative \(PSI\)](#)
[US Plans To Seize Suspects At Will](#)
[Briton, 18, Arrested For US Nuclear Computer Breach](#)
[North Is Said To Finish Reprocessing Spent Fuel](#)
[Investigations Of Chemicals Will Continue](#)
[Is The Nonproliferation Treaty In Tatters?](#)
[Uranium Theft Puts Britain On Alert](#)

Wall Street Journal
July 10, 2003

North Korea Has Reprocessed Nuclear Fuel Rods, South Says

By Gordon Fairclough and Hae Won Choi, Staff Reporters Of The Wall Street Journal

In a sign that North Korea may have raised the stakes again in a standoff with the U.S. and its allies over Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons program, South Korea's intelligence agency said it believes the North recently has reprocessed "a small number" of reactor fuel rods to obtain weapons-grade plutonium.

The National Intelligence Service told lawmakers in Seoul that it thinks North Korea has begun reprocessing some of the 8,000 fuel rods it has stored at a nuclear complex north of its capital, Pyongyang.

The announcement came two days after a summit at which the leaders of South Korea and China called for renewed talks with the North about its nuclear program. The spy agency also said Pyongyang has tested conventional explosives that could be used as triggers for nuclear weapons.

There have been past reports, not confirmed by Seoul, that Pyongyang has conducted dozens of such tests over the years. It couldn't be learned if the intelligence agency was referring to this past activity or talking about something new.

Pyongyang has asserted before that it has nearly finished reprocessing all the rods, something Western experts estimate would give it enough weapons-grade plutonium for five or six nuclear bombs, in addition to the one or two that U.S. intelligence believes have been produced already.

Some U.S. officials previously have voiced suspicions that the North was doing some reprocessing, at least at a low level. But neither the U.S. nor the South Korean governments have said they have definite proof of North Korean reprocessing.

A spokesman for Seoul's intelligence service declined to comment on how or why the agency had reached its new conclusion. A clear sign that reprocessing has started would be emissions of krypton gas, an element that can be detected by remote sensors. But officials in Washington said they were unaware that any gas had been detected, despite other signs of activity at the nuclear complex and the North's statements that it was reprocessing some rods. If Washington, Beijing and Tokyo share the South Korean agency's view, it could increase the pressure for action in the long-running confrontation over North Korea's nuclear-weapons programs. "This could speed up the timeline" for putting more pressure North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, said Victor Cha, a Korea expert at Georgetown University in Washington.

One official in the Bush administration predicted the South Korean intelligence agency's stance would "bring our allies and friends closer to the U.S. position" as Washington tries to put the squeeze on Pyongyang by choking off its hard-currency earnings from missile exports and from alleged drug sales and currency counterfeiting.

The official said John Bolton, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control, recently traveled to the Middle East to warn governments against purchasing missiles from Pyongyang. "We're ratcheting up the pressure," the official said.

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Christian Science Monitor

July 10, 2003

Pg. 1

Files Show A Stubborn North Korea

Communist bloc archives reveal that aid to North Korea gave its old allies little influence.

By Jasper Becker, Special to The Christian Science Monitor

BEIJING – New material emerging from secret archives opened in Moscow and Eastern bloc capitals is shedding light, mostly unfavorable, on the question of whether handing out aid to North Korea can buy any meaningful compliance.

A multinational group of scholars trawling through the Czech, Hungarian, Soviet, and East German archives is now producing the first clear picture of North Korea's relationship with its key allies.

"It shows how dependent North Korea has always been, and how extremely skillful it has always been at getting enough aid," says Kathryn Weathersby, who runs the Korea Initiative as part of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project in Washington.

"It also shows that over the decades, China and Russia gave a lot of aid but gained very limited leverage," she says.

The new findings come as a string of visitors from Washington are returning from meetings with President Kim Jong Il convinced that there is a deal out there waiting to be done.

The latest group, led by Rep. Curt Weldon (R) of Penn., proposed in late June giving Pyongyang up to \$5 billion a year in aid as part of a deal to end its suspected nuclear weapons program. Mr. Weldon also recommended that the US sign a one-year nonaggression pact with the North, recognize the communist nation, and establish a mission in Pyongyang.

The archives, which include telegrams and diplomatic reports, show that the aid-for-concessions formula has historically been an imbalanced equation.

Soviet experts built over 60 industrial plants in North Korea and kept it supplied with large quantities of weapons, oil, and grain. The East Germans and others also built industrial plants, trained North Koreans, and brought high-ranking North Koreans to Eastern Europe for medical treatment.

"[North Korea] was totally reliant on outside help. Even in the 1980s they could not produce enough clothing for themselves," said Bernd Schäfer of the German Historical Institute in Washington. After the Soviet Union's demise ended the supply of aid from Moscow and its allies, North Korea has been set on trying to make up for the loss by extracting aid from its erstwhile enemies - the United States, South Korea, and Japan. According to Balazs Szalontai, a Hungarian scholar who is studying the Hungarian diplomatic archives, there are clear parallels to be drawn.

"There is a long-term pattern. They are playing the same game they played with the USSR and China," he says. "They set out to get the technology they needed but gave little back in return. Even the manufactured goods they shipped in payment were almost worthless, with the Soviets insisting they could not accept such museum pieces," Mr. Szalontai says.

The Koreans systematically harassed the Soviet and East Europeans living in North Korea. But Moscow swallowed this and Pyongyang's blatant opposition to many of its foreign policy goals.

Instead, the Soviets made concessions to stop the North from joining the Chinese camp when Moscow and Beijing were bitter rivals for the leadership of the Communist bloc.

Reports filed by diplomats stationed in Pyongyang show how the North Koreans managed to frustrate most efforts by the Soviets or the Chinese to control and influence Kim Il Sung's behavior, both his economic policies and his attempts to start a second Korean conflict.

"It is also clear they did not trust their East European allies or the Soviets and told them as little as possible," Szalontai says.

From the mid-1950s, the North Korean government prevented the Soviets, Chinese, and others from direct contacts with citizens, including those who had returned from studying abroad.

The Soviets fell out with the North Koreans in mid-1955 when the Soviets warned them against seizing half the grain harvest by brute force during the collectivization of farming. As predicted, it led to famine and forced Kim Il Sung to go to Moscow and plead for food aid. In response, the Soviets gave aid and the agricultural policies were changed.

"Whenever they had to be, they made some superficial reforms to please their donors and get assistance," Szalontai says.

As would happen time and again, the adjustment was only temporary; Pyongyang resumed its old practices of extorting grain from peasants only a few years after having gotten the aid it wanted.

The Soviets also constantly reminded the Koreans that they would not support them if they mounted an offensive action so the North tried to provoke the South into initiating hostilities.

It is also now clear from the archives that North Korea's commando raid to assassinate President Park Chung Hee at the South Korean presidential residence in January 1968 was designed to trigger an uprising or a military coup, found Mr. Schäfer.

The aggressive policy was reversed under Chinese pressure when in 1972, President Richard Nixon paid his visit to China. At the same time, the North opened the first direct talks with the South leading to family exchanges and other contracts.

"There is a direct link between the two. China put pressure on the North," says Schäfer.

Afterwards, North Korean policy soon swung back to open hostility.

Similarly, Chinese influence proved fleeting when it was revealed that North Korea continued its nuclear weapons program despite agreeing to a halt in the Agreed Framework, brokered with the help of Beijing in 1994.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0710/p01s03-woap.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Washington Times

July 10, 2003

Pg. 1

Kim Jong-II's Appetites Are Ingredients Of Book

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

Kim Jong-il, the secretive head of North Korea's Stalinist regime, has a 10,000-bottle wine cellar, favors Mazda RX-7s and tuna sushi, and once sent his wife and children on an unannounced vacation to Tokyo Disneyland, according to the man who served as his personal chef for more than a decade.

Kenji Fujimoto is the pseudonym for the Japanese chef who was recruited by Mr. Kim to come to Pyongyang in the early 1980s, becoming the exclusive sushi chef to the North's "Dear Leader" in 1988.

Revelations from his memoir, "Kim Jong-il's Chef," have produced banner headlines in South Korean and Japanese newspapers since the book came out late last month.

In one of the book's racier scenes, Mr. Fujimoto describes a banquet in "a rural city" where the president suddenly ordered the dancing women hired as entertainment to strip.

The women, known as the "Group for Pleasure," were a frequent presence at Mr. Kim's banquets, where Japanese marching songs were often played.

The author depicts Mr. Kim as smart but hot-tempered, feasting on imported cuisine and cognac even as ordinary North Koreans faced famine and deprivation.

"His banquets often started at midnight and lasted until morning," Mr. Fujimoto said in an interview with Japan's Shukan Post. "As far as I knew, the longest banquet lasted for four days.

"All executives invited to the long banquets were not allowed to sleep until Kim Jong-il went to bed. It was torture for them."

There are some substantive revelations in the memoir, including Mr. Kim's reported admission that he had hoped to use a diplomatic opening in the waning days of the Clinton administration — capped by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000 — to "bypass" South Korea and Japan and cut a deal directly with the United States.

The North Korean leader also is depicted as having long had a fascination with nuclear weapons, telling the author that "without nuclear weapons, we will be attacked."

The book also described what might have been an accident at a North Korean nuclear facility in 1995. Mr. Kim is described as having shown no emotion when an aide informed him that workers at a nuclear facility had taken sick, apparently from a radiation leak.

And Mr. Kim, who succeeded his father, Kim Il-sung, as supreme leader in 1994, is said in the book to favor his third and youngest son, Kim Jung-woon, as the third-generation leader in the communist dynasty.

Western speculation has focused on the middle son, Kim Jung-chul, as being groomed by his father for the top slot. Kim Jung-chul is said to have support within North Korea's powerful military.

But the personal details and high living behind the walls of Mr. Kim's presidential retreats have garnered the most attention.

With his high pompadour and reputed taste for blonde movie starlets, the North Korean leader has long been a magnet for speculation about his personal life.

He had not ventured much beyond the secretive North's borders when he took power, and has made only tightly controlled diplomatic forays to Beijing and Moscow as leader.

Mr. Fujimoto began as a personal chef, but soon found himself invited to accompany his boss on several official and unofficial outings, including water skiing and hunting.

The book confirms Western intelligence reports that Mr. Kim was hurt badly in a 1992 horseback riding accident. He refused to take painkillers after the accident, saying that he "did not want to become a drug addict."

In the Shukan Post interview, the chef detailed the nude dancing party, saying that the Group for Pleasure women at first "hesitated, but they had no power to resist."

"They all took off their clothes and danced. Then [Mr. Kim] ordered his men, including me, to dance with them. He said, 'You can dance with them, but if you touch them, you will be arrested as thieves.'"

Mr. Kim is portrayed as a confident, even arrogant executive who relies on a personal computer to keep tabs on affairs of state. He can be abrupt with underlings, and once threw a stainless steel napkin box at Chang Sung-taek, a senior party official and the president's brother-in-law.

The president of impoverished North Korea also is shown as having a taste for rich fare.

He developed an appetite for gourmet shark fin soup three or four times a week, sampled the most exotic sushis, and imported high-quality food ingredients from across Asia and Europe. His wine cellar contained a variety of French vintages, as well as sake, and such whiskey brands as Johnnie Walker Swing and Hennessy's XO.

Getting too close to the leader posed its own dangers. While Mr. Fujimoto enjoyed many privileges as a confidant of Mr. Kim, the chef found himself under suspicion by the regime when he was detained for two years in Japan during a visit in 1996.

When he finally returned to the North, Mr. Kim confided that he had intended to "order my people to kill you in Japan," only to be talked out of it by his Japanese-born second wife, Ko Yong-hi.

The chef traveled again to Japan in April 2001, telling his boss that he needed to buy sea urchins. He never returned to North Korea.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030709-115039-4157r.htm>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

(Editor's Note: See Chairman's Statement, Proliferation Security Initiative, following article.)
London Financial Times
July 11, 2003
Pg. 11

Eleven Countries Join Forces To Combat The Trade In Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Eleven countries yesterday agreed to share intelligence and start military training exercises as part of stepped up efforts to intercept ships and aircraft involved in the illegal trading of weapons of mass destruction, writes Anna Fifield in Sydney.

After a two-day Proliferation Security Initiative meeting in Brisbane, the countries at the Australian-chaired meeting said they had agreed to move quickly on direct, practical measures to stop trafficking in WMD and missiles.

"Participants agreed on the importance of building a broad and effective partnership of countries prepared to play a part in disrupting and stopping the trafficking in WMD, missiles and related items," said Paul O'Sullivan, Australia's foreign affairs deputy secretary and meeting chairman. "As the PSI moves forward, they aim to involve all countries that have the will and ability to take action to address this menace."

In Madrid last month the countries - Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and United States - decided measures were needed to stop the flow of WMD and missiles. Although the Brisbane meeting addressed general concerns about proliferation, a statement referred to recent concerns about North Korea and Iran. Mr O'Sullivan said the 11 countries' military and police services would take part in air, ground and maritime interception training exercises as soon as September.

The training exercises are most likely to be held in the Pacific and Indian oceans and the Mediterranean. They would also establish an intelligence sharing network ahead of the next PSI meeting in early September.

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Brisbane Meeting, 9-10 July 2003

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

The participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July reiterated their strong political support for the initiative, and underscored that the PSI is a global initiative with global reach. They agreed to move quickly on direct, practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles and related items.

This was the second meeting of the eleven PSI countries. The first meeting was in Madrid on 12 June. Participants are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US.

The Madrid meeting was unanimous on the need to take active measures to stop the flow of WMD, missiles and related items to and from proliferators. This reflected the international alarm at the growing trade in WMD, missiles and related items, including the risk that these might fall into the hands of terrorists.

Under Australian chairmanship, the Brisbane meeting built on the results from the Madrid meeting and moved forward in translating the collective political commitment of PSI members into practical measures.

The Brisbane meeting focused on defining actions necessary to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the air or on land. Participants emphasised their willingness to take robust and creative steps now to prevent trafficking in such items, while reiterating that actions taken would be consistent with existing domestic and international legal frameworks.

The Brisbane meeting made good progress in considering interdiction modalities, particularly in the information sharing and operational arenas. Participants emphasised that effective information sharing is vital to interdiction, and agreed to strengthen and improve capabilities for the exchange of information and analysis between participants as a basis for cooperative action to impede WMD and missile trade. Participants acknowledged that although interdiction efforts have been under way for some time, there is a need to further develop and enhance the capabilities of PSI nations to conduct actual air, ground and maritime interdiction operations in partnership against WMD and delivery systems. To that end, they agreed in principle to the concept of a series of interdiction training exercises, utilising both military and civilian assets as appropriate, and that such exercises should take place as soon as practicable.

Participants agreed on the importance of building a broad and effective partnership of countries prepared to play a part in disrupting and stopping the trafficking in WMD, missiles and related items. They agreed effective implementation of the PSI will require the active involvement of countries around the world. As the PSI moves forward, they aim to involve all countries that have the will and ability to take action to address this menace. It also will be crucial to involve countries that are key flag, coastal or transit states, and others that are used by proliferators in their WMD and missile trafficking efforts.

Participants underlined that the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials and equipment is a serious threat to national, regional and global security. Participants expressed concern that WMD and missiles are increasingly being acquired by states of concern which reject international standards against the acquisition, use and proliferation of such weapons.

PSI participants considered the question of states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. They referred to the relevant statements of the G-8 Evian summit on 1-3 June and the EU-US Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 25 June which addressed countries of proliferation concern and non-state actors with particular reference to North Korea and Iran.

The Brisbane meeting strongly supported the strengthening of the existing framework of national laws and export controls, multilateral treaties and other tools which remain the international community's main means for preventing the spread of WMD and missiles. They emphasised that the increasingly aggressive and sophisticated efforts by proliferators to circumvent or thwart existing non-proliferation norms, and to profit from the trade of WMD and missiles or related items, requires new and stronger enforcement action by law-abiding nations. The PSI was therefore welcomed as a necessary and innovative approach to the problem of countries which cheat on their international obligations, refuse to join existing regimes or do not follow international norms, and for non-state actors seeking to acquire WMD.

Participants acknowledged that the PSI is a fast-track initiative that will require continued interaction among experts and policy makers in the days and weeks ahead, and agreed to a next high-level meeting in early September.

See also:

Speech at the PSI, [Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Greatest Threat to International Security](#) from the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hon Alexander Downer, 9 July 2003

Transcript: [Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting outcomes](#), Paul O'Sullivan, DFAT Dep Sec, 10 July <http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/psi/index.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

London Times

July 11, 2003

US Plans To Seize Suspects At Will

By Michael Evans, Defence Editor

AMERICA appeared to be at loggerheads with Britain and other allies yesterday after it declared that it had the authority to intercept any suspect ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace.

"We are prepared to undertake interdictions right now and, if that opportunity arises, if we had actionable intelligence and it was appropriate, we would do it now," John Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said.

He was speaking after a meeting in Brisbane of the new Proliferation Security Initiative, whose 11 members include Britain. Under present laws it is only legal for nations to stop and search foreign ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction within their 12-mile territorial limit.

British diplomatic sources were taken aback by Mr Bolton's interpretation. A Foreign Office spokesman said: "All 11 participants agreed that any action that might be taken would have to be consistent with international law."

However, Mr Bolton, a Washington hawk, said that the countries had reached an agreement that in itself authorised the US to take action on the high seas and in international airspace. "There is broad agreement within the group that we have that authority," he said.

The Brisbane meeting, which agreed to hold military exercises to train for interceptions, was also attended by Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

The US initiative was launched after an attempt to stop Scud missiles being shipped from North Korea to Yemen failed for legal reasons. Mr Bolton said the US might seek a UN Security Council resolution to add further weight to the action.

The International Maritime Organisation said the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was being reviewed. The US had proposed a new power to board ships on the high seas. It was "pretty contentious".

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-6047-741887.00.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

London Times

July 11, 2003

Briton, 18, Arrested For US Nuclear Computer Breach

By Steve Bird

A BRITISH teenager has been arrested for allegedly hacking into computers at the department responsible for the safety of America's nuclear arsenal.

The security breach emerged after music and video files were placed on 17 computers in Botavia, Illinois, at laboratories run by the Department of Energy. The 18-year-old from Woodford Green, Essex, allegedly enabled other internet users to access the department's computer system to download the files.

The breach of security is an embarrassment to the department, which attaches great importance on "cybersecurity". It is responsible for guaranteeing the safety of nuclear weapons and providing nuclear power plants for the Navy. Once an attack was detected at the department's Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, a centre specialising in particle physics, the system was shut down and a criminal investigation launched. An FBI special agent was despatched to London when Britain was found to be the source.

Officers from the Metropolitan Police's computer crime unit arrested the teenager at his home on Wednesday.

A spokeswoman for the Office of Inspector-General at the Department of Energy refused to say what was on the files placed on the computers.

A spokeswoman for the laboratories insisted that there had been no threat to security. The "cluster" of computers, which used an old form of security access codes, was shut down within two weeks of the security breach, she said. It held no secret files.

"The hacker or hackers were taking advantage of our big volume of disc space to store their files," she said. "It normally takes an hour to back up our system. But suddenly we noticed it asking about eight hours, so we knew something was up."

The teenager, who has not been named, has been bailed to return to a North London police station in mid-August pending examination of computers seized from his home.

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

International Herald Tribune

July 14, 2003

North Is Said To Finish Reprocessing Spent Fuel

By Don Kirk

SEOUL - North Korea has reported that it has reprocessed all its spent nuclear fuel rods, restarted a small experimental reactor and is working on two much bigger reactors, a South Korean report said Sunday.

Chang Sung Min, a former member of the South Korean National Assembly, said that a high-level American official had quoted North Korean diplomats as having said that the North had finished reprocessing its 8,000 spent fuel rods by the end of last month, according to Yonhap, the semiofficial South Korean news agency.

Reprocessed fuel can be converted into nuclear weapons. Chang said that North Korea's two top representatives at the United Nations told of the reprocessing last Tuesday in a meeting in New York with Jack Pritchard, the U.S. envoy assigned to the North Korean issue, and David Straub, director of the Korean desk at the State Department, Yonhap reported.

Chang, a member of South Korea's governing Millennium Democratic Party, reportedly was briefed in Washington. In the conversation, according to Yonhap, the North Koreans said that scientists and engineers at the Yongbyon complex near the capital, Pyongyang, had restarted a five-megawatt experimental reactor from which it is possible to extract the plutonium for nuclear warheads.

At the same time, the report said, the North said it had resumed work on two large reactors, one with a capacity of 200 megawatts, the other 50 megawatts.

All work at the Yongbyon complex was frozen under terms of the 1994 Geneva framework agreement, which fell apart last autumn after the North acknowledged the existence of an entirely separate program for developing nuclear warheads from enriched uranium.

South Korean officials refused to comment Sunday on the report or on another report, by Kyodo news agency in Japan, that said U.S. analysts had taken air samples over the Yongbyon complex that showed a substance known as krypton 85, a byproduct of reprocessing.

Although the report of krypton 85 indicated the North Koreans were indeed working on the spent fuel rods, analysts and officials have been uncertain as to whether their reports of going ahead with reprocessing were true or just part of the negotiating process, or both.

North Korea has demanded bilateral talks with the United States on halting its program while spurning multilateral talks that would include South Korea, Japan, China and possibly Russia.

North Korean negotiators refused last weekend to agree on a place for South Korea in talks on nuclear weapons but left open the possibility of a face-saving way out of the impasse.

Hopes for the multilateral talks were raised just slightly after a debate between North and South Korean cabinet members that resulted Saturday in a six-point communiqué that began with the two sides agreeing to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully through talks.

The two sides, the communiqué added, would work together for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korean officials promptly said they saw the bright side of what some reports called the failure of the negotiators to come to terms on the multilateral talks to which North Korea has said it will never consent. The North's position is that it will negotiate only with the United States on its nuclear weapons program.

Shin Eon Sang, a spokesman for the South's delegation, told South Korean reporters there was an inference that the North Koreans saw the necessity for multilateral talks even if were not authorized to include the term in the agreement.

The agreement seemed to indicate the North's desire for improving relations with the South despite the nuclear issue. Negotiators also agreed on another round of reunions of families separated by the Korean War at the Mount Kumkang resort in North Korea during the Korean thanksgiving holidays in September and on more talks on North-South economic cooperation in August.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/102685.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

July 12, 2003

Investigations Of Chemicals Will Continue

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, July 11 — The Pentagon has assured Congress that it will not shut down its inquiry into a cold war program that tested the vulnerability of American forces to chemical or biological attack, officials said today. Seven members of Congress had written to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on June 26 arguing that any decision by the Pentagon to "discontinue its investigation would be premature and would put thousands of veterans at further risk." Veterans groups also complained to the Pentagon.

Late last month, the Pentagon declassified a final set of reports on the test program, which ran from 1961 to 1970, after having identified 5,842 people who may have been exposed to chemical or biological agents.

In a statement today, a senior Pentagon health official said that while its active search of Defense Department records had been completed, officials would continue the inquiry if new information surfaced.

"We remain committed to further investigating any new information regarding these tests," Ellen Embrey, deputy assistant secretary of defense for force health protection and readiness, said.

That promise to keep the inquiry open, even in a passive status, was deemed a victory by members of Congress who had urged the Pentagon to declassify the reports.

Representative Mike Thompson, Democrat of California, said in a statement that the Pentagon also promised Congress that it would "continue responding to veterans who contact the department believing they may have been exposed to potentially harmful agents."

Mr. Thompson, an author of the letter to Mr. Rumsfeld, also said: "Many service members in our armed forces unknowingly participated in these tests. It is our duty to provide them with every piece of available information so they may be properly treated for health problems they may have developed as a result of this."

Pentagon officials said that under the testing program, known as Project 112 and Project SHAD, for shipboard hazard and defense, the military conducted 50 exercises of 134 that had been planned. Some of those tests included spraying deadly substances, including VX and sarin, on military personnel, ships and even on American soil.

Veterans may be eligible for benefits if medical problems or disabilities can be linked to exposure during the tests. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/12/national/12CHEM.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

National Journal
July 12, 2003
Pg. 2268

Is The Nonproliferation Treaty In Tatters?

By Gregg Sangillo

On February 11, CIA Director George Tenet had some disturbing things to tell the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. He described a "continued weakening of the international nonproliferation consensus" and said the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the 1970 cornerstone of nuclear arms control, was getting "battered." Then he added a little zinger: "The domino theory of the 21st century may well be nuclear."

Tenet isn't the only one in the Bush administration worried about nuclear proliferation. The assertion that Iraq had restarted its nuclear weapons program -- and the possibility that Saddam Hussein could give a bomb to a terrorist group -- was one of President Bush's primary justifications for the war in Iraq. Indeed, in his October 7, 2002, speech in Cincinnati, which laid out the president's case for a "pre-emptive" war against Iraq, Bush quoted President Kennedy and likened the crisis with Baghdad to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud," Bush said. His concern about terrorists with nuclear weapons also animates Bush's tougher line with the other two members of his axis of evil: Iran and North Korea.

Experts on both the left and the right are increasingly agreeing with Bush and Tenet that nuclear proliferation is again a great danger. And although they approach it from different angles, the two sides are also saying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has, over time, been weakened. The Left tends to blame Bush and the nuclear-armed states for falling short of treaty obligations. The Right, on the other hand, tends to blame what it sees as inherent weaknesses in the treaty, and the way that rogue states have manipulated it. Both sides agree, however, that the compact needs to be strengthened.

The basic bargain in the NPT was straightforward. The five nations that had manufactured and exploded nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 -- China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union (now Russia), and the United States -- were allowed to keep their nuclear weapons, for the time being. All non-nuclear states that were party to the treaty pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, and in return they were promised access to nuclear energy and research for peaceful purposes. The five nuclear weapon states, meanwhile, promised to "pursue negotiations in good faith" under Article VI to eliminate their own nuclear arsenals over time and pledged not to help non-nuclear states develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

Whether the Bush administration is fulfilling its obligations under Article VI is a source of much debate in the disarmament community. Both the Senate and House versions of the 2004 defense authorization bills, at the request of the Pentagon, would repeal a 10-year ban on research into low-yield nuclear weapons. The companion bills would also authorize \$15 million to study something called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a high-yield bunker-buster. Moreover, the Energy Department is planning to reduce to 18 months, from 24-36 months, the lead time between receiving an order to resume nuclear testing and actually beginning testing. (No nuclear weapons have been tested in this country since 1992.) Research into the new weapons, says Arms Control Association Executive Director Daryl Kimball, is "definitely contrary to the purpose and the spirit of the treaty."

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, not surprisingly, doesn't see it that way. He sees a world where nuclear proliferation is already a fact. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in May, Rumsfeld said, "The idea that our studying a ... nuclear deep-earth penetrator is going to contribute to proliferation, I think, ignores the fact that the world is proliferating.... It is happening without any studies by us."

Furthermore, the Bush administration argues that it has done more for arms control than any other recent presidency, pointing to the Moscow Treaty signed by the U.S. and Russia in May 2002, which calls for reducing by about two-thirds (down to 1,700-2,200 bombs for each side) the number of nuclear warheads the two countries have deployed and are ready to use. But the Moscow Treaty has disappointed many disarmament advocates, and others have called

it an outright sham. The two-thirds reduction in deployed strategic nuclear warheads does not have to occur until December 31, 2012, well after the Bush presidency will have ended, and the same day the entire treaty expires. Furthermore, the warheads do not have to be destroyed under the treaty, merely pulled off of their readiness status. Nor does the treaty include an enforcement mechanism or verification procedures. Critics say the United States would never sign such a voluntary and unverifiable agreement with, say, Iran or North Korea. All of this, say the administration's detractors, violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the NPT treaty.

If the nuclear weapon states are unwilling to reduce their arsenals further, why should non-nuclear states fulfill their own obligations under the NPT, critics ask. But Paul Leventhal, founding president of the Nuclear Control Institute, says it is legitimate to reverse the question, too: "I would pose the opposite question.... Can we expect the weapon states to disarm if the world is proliferating?" Leventhal views the Bush administration's research into new nuclear weapons to be an unfortunate response to continuing proliferation and the failure of the NPT, which he says is "in shambles."

Leventhal says arms-controllers have for too long been obsessed with the obligations of the nuclear states under Article VI, while ignoring flawed interpretations of Article IV, which allows non-nuclear states to have nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Under Article IV, a country can legally import nuclear material, such as uranium, for power and research applications. Civilian plutonium, which is produced as a byproduct of the fission of uranium fuel in nuclear power reactors, is not directly usable in weapons so long as it remains embedded in highly radioactive spent fuel. But once a state begins chemically separating plutonium from the spent fuel (known as reprocessing -- something the North Koreans have been threatening to do in recent months), the plutonium can then be used for nuclear weapons.

As Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, testified at the June 4 hearing before the House International Relations Committee: "Iran acquired most of its nuclear capabilities covertly, and yet, was able to do so, for the most part, without violating the NPT."

Some argue that by letting the North Koreans of the world gain access to plutonium before it is reprocessed, you are essentially giving them a leg up on a weapons program. And even if a state signed the NPT, as North Korea and Iran did, once they have a chunk of spent fuel and know how to reprocess it and build a bomb, they have to give only 90 days' notice before withdrawing from the treaty and becoming a nuclear power.

"I think the problem that we've discovered is that a country can develop nuclear weapons, possibly even in significant numbers, and reach the brink of deploying them, while still being a member of the nonproliferation treaty in good standing," says Danielle Pletka, an American Enterprise Institute expert on weapons proliferation. "That's a problem we're going to have to face up to -- the limitations of the treaty. And the tools it provides to confront the problem are clearly inadequate."

Compounding the proliferation problem is that more separated plutonium resides in civilian nuclear programs than in all the world's nuclear weapons. And most of that separated plutonium is in Europe and Japan, which rely heavily on nuclear power to produce electricity. Japanese utilities have had contacts with European companies to reprocess spent fuel and soon plan to open a large reprocessing plant of their own designed to separate about eight tons of plutonium a year. Leventhal argues that under the NPT, plutonium is unlawful anywhere in the absence of a legitimate need, but the treaty has never been interpreted that way because of objections from plutonium producers in Europe and Japan.

Every arms control expert agrees that stronger enforcement is needed. The International Atomic Energy Agency is supposed to detect when a non-nuclear weapon state has diverted significant quantities of weapons-usable material to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA must in turn report this to the U.N. Security Council. Yet the on-site inspections and audits of nuclear facilities and materials (known as safeguards) can be of limited effectiveness, say many experts, if a country is a determined bomb-maker.

IAEA safeguards have traditionally been more of an accounting system, verifying that a state has declared the type and quantities of nuclear material accurately. In 1992, after discovering Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA ruled that it could hold "special inspections" at undeclared facilities, although they were never effectively carried out. Since 1997, the agency has been promoting something called an Additional Protocol to the NPT, which enables it to inspect undeclared nuclear facilities and materials more thoroughly. At this point, however, the Additional Protocol is only voluntary, and the IAEA, the United States, and Europe have failed to persuade Iran to accept.

Another continuing weakness in the NPT is that not everyone signed on to it. India, Israel, and Pakistan never signed the treaty, and they all have nuclear weapons. Worse, the consequences for staying outside the NPT appear to have been negligible. Although Presidents Kennedy and Johnson came down hard on Israel in the 1960s for its nuclear weapons program, subsequent presidents have not, and today Israel has no stronger supporter than the United States. India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998, and President Clinton quickly imposed sanctions on both

countries in response. But the sanctions were temporary, and President Bush just promised a large package of new aid for Pakistan because of its help in the war on terrorism. Relations between the U.S. and India, meanwhile, have never been closer.

Jon Wolfsthal, an arms control expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that the failure of the nonsignatories to pay a price sends a dangerous message to NPT members. "It undermines the benefits of the treaty," he said. "Right now the main benefits of the treaty are that if you agree not to gather weapons, you can get nuclear reactors, nuclear facilities, nuclear safety, and so forth. Well, if India can get that anyway from Russia or from other countries, then people will legitimately ask, 'Well, so why do I bother' " with the treaty?"

Reports that Pakistan helped North Korea with its nuclear program, experts say, prove that no nation can be placed outside the treaty if it is to work. Some experts believe that North Korea's announced withdrawal from the treaty in January may pose the greatest threat yet to the NPT. Aside from setting a bad example to non-nuclear weapons states, it could set off a ripple effect throughout East Asia if North Korea took its threatened next step and built more weapons (intelligence agencies say North Korea may already have two nuclear weapons). "I would guess that South Korea won't be too far behind, and then Japan would be in a real quandary," says George Bunn, a consulting professor at Stanford University and one of the negotiators of the NPT. Japan already has stocks of separated plutonium, and observers believe that it could go nuclear in a matter of months, if not weeks. China would then think it had to build up its arsenal. This in turn could affect India, which would then alert Pakistan.

Though it is under strain, the NPT can still be an effective framework for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, most experts say. Many point out that President Kennedy expressed fears in the early 1960s that the world could be facing 15 to 20 nuclear weapons states by 1975. This of course did not happen -- partly because of the NPT. And many arms control experts add that Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa (which had actually produced weapons) all had active nuclear weapons programs and gave them up to join the NPT. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons deployed in their territories. And at least 18 other countries have the technological base to develop weapons, but have so far remained party to the treaty and have not done so.

With regard to Article VI, the road ahead is still uncertain. Zia Mian, a lecturer of public and international affairs at Princeton University, says that recent actions by the nuclear weapon states are nothing new. The NPT, even if not always honored, continues to have value because most of the world's countries don't want to acquire, or to let their neighbors acquire, nuclear weapons. "The cumulative violations have been so egregious now that the only thing that at one level keeps the treaty in place is the sense that the vast majority of countries that have signed up as non-nuclear weapon states are still committed to getting rid of nuclear weapons," he said.

In addition, the NPT and other arms control agreements have forced, or allowed, the nuclear states to reduce their arsenals since the treaty went into effect in 1970. Russia now has some 20,000 nuclear warheads, down from its peak of 45,000 in 1986. The United States has 10,700 warheads; its apex in 1973 was 28,449. France's arsenal has dropped from 540 in 1992 to 348 today. Great Britain has 185 warheads, down from a peak of 350 in the 1975-1981 period. China is the closest to its peak level, with 410 warheads (just 25 fewer than in 1994).

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, who many believe is only a lukewarm supporter of arms control, suggested that the NPT is just one piece of the puzzle that must be solved in order to halt nuclear proliferation. In June 4 testimony before the House International Relations Committee, he said that although the NPT and other treaties are "useful, and we support them and support them strongly in the administration, they are not sufficient in and of themselves."

For Bolton and Rumsfeld and other conservative activists in the Bush administration, the ins and outs of the NPT are secondary. For them, it's not about Russia or China or the stable nuclear states and their warheads. They say it's about President Bush's idea of the mushroom cloud -- the one that could one day explode on U.S. soil were a link ever allowed to be forged between a rogue nuclear state and a terrorist group. "Let's talk about what makes you wake up in the middle of the night," says Pletka. "Osama bin Laden buying a nuclear weapon from Kim Jong Il is a matter of extraordinary urgency.... And if you're incapable of prioritizing and you get stuck in bureaucratic-think, then we are going to be facing a number of rogue regimes with nuclear weapons, and it will be a whole different day."

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

London Sunday Times
July 13, 2003

Uranium Theft Puts Britain On Alert

By David Leppard

Police have issued a national alert after 30lb of depleted uranium was stolen in a raid on a radioactive waste processing firm in Essex, *writes David Leppard*.

Senior intelligence officials have played down the security implications of the theft but nuclear experts say that if such a large quantity of uranium got into the wrong hands it could be used to make a terrorist "dirty bomb".

The alert was sent to all police forces in England and Wales last Monday after a van containing the uranium was stolen from the firm's depot on an industrial estate in Purfleet. The vehicle had been left unlocked and the keys were in the ignition.

It is believed to be the first time that depleted uranium has been stolen in Britain.

Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist branch and Special Branch officers have been briefed on the theft. Special Branch officers say it was captured by CCTV cameras.

Essex police said the uranium "would be radioactive if ignited".

Dr Frank Barnaby, a nuclear physicist, said it could cause chemical and radiological damage if particles were inhaled. He said terrorists might want to use the material in a dirty bomb.

He said: "If you exploded such a device in Oxford Street the police would be under pressure to evacuate a wide area. The uranium would spread all over and people would get it on their clothes and take it home with them."

Depleted uranium is mildly radioactive in its solid form but only becomes a real danger when it is involved in a fire or explosion. Then it can cause damage to the liver, kidneys and lungs. It is a heavy substance, nearly twice as dense as lead, and is commonly used on the tips of artillery shells to penetrate heavy armour.

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-523-743567,00.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)