


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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Philadelphia Inquirer  
July 3, 2003

## **CIA Defends Its Reports On Iraq**

*An internal study said the agency did a good job though evidence often wasn't up-to-date or precise.*

By Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - The CIA was justified in telling President Bush and top aides last fall that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was still seeking weapons of mass destruction, but the agency often lacked precise, up-to-date information about the threat that those weapons posed, an internal CIA review has found.

Former CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr, who is leading the study, said he found that the spy agency was “surprisingly consistent” in reporting during the year before the U.S. invasion of Iraq that Baghdad was trying to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

But Kerr, in a telephone interview, said the status and locations of those weapons programs were “harder to conclude.”

The report, while broadly backing the spy agency, is likely to provide ammunition to critics who say the White House exaggerated the Iraqi threat beyond what was known by U.S. intelligence agencies.

Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top officials rarely, if ever, mentioned uncertainties about the state of Hussein’s weapons programs or the quality of U.S. intelligence when making the case last year and this year for an invasion of Iraq.

The report on the internal CIA review, which has not been made public, was delivered to the CIA in draft form in mid-June.

Disclosure of the CIA findings comes as questions continue over the failure of U.S. troops to find unequivocal evidence of active weapons of mass destruction nearly three months after the fall of Hussein’s regime.

House and Senate committees are doing their own reviews to determine whether intelligence estimates were slanted under political pressure to dramatize the Iraqi threat and make the case for war.

Kerr, who emphasized that he thought the CIA did a good job on Iraq, said the CIA’s sourcing on the country’s weapons program in recent years was “less specific and detailed” than in earlier years. That was particularly true after U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, he said.

Kerr said it was reasonable to determine that Hussein was seeking banned weapons, in part because of reports of Iraqi agents trying to covertly acquire materials for such weapons.

The report rebuts allegations that the intelligence agency erred in concluding that Hussein was still seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

“It is unlikely that even the most critical review of [CIA] reporting would have led to a conclusion that WMD programs were not being pursued,” the draft report states, according to a senior intelligence official. The official spoke on condition of anonymity.

Kerr said agency intelligence reports included “appropriate caveats” when there was a lack of specific information.

“Their analysis was quite strong on the full range of problems... . As far as we could find, there weren’t many gaps.”

Kerr said his four-person team looked at all CIA reporting on Iraq, including its daily reports; daily briefings, especially for Bush; other special reports; and an October 2002 National Intelligence Assessment, or NIE, which is the combined judgment of all U.S. intelligence agencies.

An unclassified version of the NIE released by the CIA the same month concluded that Hussein’s regime “has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.”

In some ways, Kerr’s findings of uncertainty in the intelligence picture parallel a September 2002 report on Iraq’s chemical-weapons program from the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency.

The Defense Intelligence Agency concurred with other intelligence agencies that Hussein had an ongoing chemical-weapons program in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. But that agency’s report, disclosed in part last month, acknowledged significant questions about the state of the poison-gas program.

“There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has - or will - establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities,” it said.

Current and former U.S. intelligence officials have said the White House appears to have made a largely black-and-white case based on information that was piecemeal and far from clear-cut.

Kerr said the strongest indications of Hussein’s continuing interest in weapons of mass destruction came from earlier data, before the U.N. inspectors left. Many of the CIA’s conclusions were “based on knowledge acquired [before] then but salted with new information,” he said.

Greg Theilman, a former analyst in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, concurred.

Estimates of Hussein’s weapons potential were based largely “on information acquired in the early 1990s and then dribs and drabs afterward,” said Theilman, who has been critical of the way the administration interpreted Iraq intelligence.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/nation/6222945.htm>

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## **Anthrax Suspect Trained U.S. Team On Bioweapons**

### ***Hatfill Had Lost His Security Clearance***

By Marilyn W. Thompson, Washington Post Staff Writer

Months after Steven J. Hatfill came under FBI scrutiny in the anthrax investigation and lost his government security clearance, he played an important role in training U.S. intelligence agents and Special Forces for covert missions abroad to search for weapons of mass destruction and was involved in planning security at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, according to documents and interviews with government officials and Hatfill's associates.

Hatfill trained an elite team from the Defense Intelligence Agency on ways to search for biological weapons, worked on secret projects with the Army's Delta Force and sat in on at least one State Department meeting on embassy security in postwar Afghanistan, according to the sources and documents. He secured letters of commendation for his work from officials at the DIA, which gathers military intelligence, and the State Department, which was trying to add protections to safeguard U.S. diplomats.

The disclosure of Hatfill's work on secret bioweapons projects casts new light on the government's investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks, which killed five people and sickened 17 others. Hatfill, 49, has been labeled a "person of interest" in the anthrax case by Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, though the scientist and his supporters have strenuously denied that he had any involvement in the case.

Hatfill was among an exclusive group of biological weapons experts whose skills attracted the attention of the Pentagon, which needed instructors as it began to focus seriously on the hunt for bioweapons in Iraq, and the FBI, which was looking for people able to carry out the anthrax attacks. Hatfill's involvement with the Pentagon as the anthrax investigation intensified created tension between the FBI and the Defense Department, sources close to the investigation said.

Hatfill, who has not been charged, remains under 24-hour FBI surveillance. Pat Clawson, his friend and spokesman, said yesterday that he cannot discuss many aspects of Hatfill's government work because they are secret. But he said many agencies viewed Hatfill as a preeminent bioweapons expert.

"If the facts were known, most Americans would be deeply grateful to Dr. Hatfill for his service to our nation," he said. "Steve Hatfill knows nothing about the anthrax attacks. He is a loyal American and patriot who loves his country."

Hatfill, who once conducted research at the Army labs at Fort Detrick, Md., played an intimate role in U.S. preparations for the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, designing special equipment and countermeasures that U.S. teams could use in hostile situations. In one top-secret project, he even helped design a replica of the mobile biological weapons production laboratories that the Pentagon believed troops might encounter in Iraq. Hatfill's work on the mock mobile lab was first revealed in yesterday's editions of the New York Times.

In March 2002, as the FBI's interest in him intensified, Hatfill led a training session for the DIA's Chemical and Biological Intelligence Support Team at Camp Dawson, W.Va., DIA spokesman Don Black said. The agency was preparing small numbers of agents to be sent to Afghanistan to relieve agents in the field. It was also training them for possible deployment to Iraq and other nations suspected of having chemical and biological stockpiles.

DIA and CIA agents assigned to the weapons hunt work with the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which searched for weapons in Iraq in recent months.

To facilitate Hatfill's involvement in the training program, the DIA had to appeal to its training contractor, Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), to allow the bioweapons expert, who had been stripped of his security clearance, to participate, Black said.

A week before the session began, the SAIC had fired Hatfill amid mounting concern over the FBI's scrutiny of him. But after the DIA's request, the SAIC agreed to allow Hatfill to volunteer in the training program, a Hatfill associate said.

The DIA was so pleased by Hatfill's performance in the specialized training that division leader Esteban Rodriguez wrote a letter of commendation on his behalf to managers at the SAIC. In the letter, dated May 1, 2002, Rodriguez said that Hatfill "consistently displayed unsurpassed technical expertise, unique resourcefulness, total dedication and consummate professionalism. I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to this ultimate biological weapons expert."

Hatfill also secured a letter praising his work for the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service. That letter referred to a "counter-measures program" Hatfill developed for State Department personnel who might encounter biological weapons threats. In another effort with the State Department, Hatfill sat in on one meeting about embassy

security in the spring of 2002 but was not sent to Afghanistan on an official mission, said a spokesman for the Diplomatic Security Service.

Black said that “there is nothing to indicate that the FBI objected” to Hatfill’s role in the secret training course. FBI spokeswoman Debbie Weierman said the bureau would not comment on Hatfill’s work for government agencies. But other sources said the Pentagon’s insistence on using Hatfill as an instructor even as the FBI intensified its investigation of him angered and puzzled some agents on the case. In the summer of 2002, when it was ready for delivery to Fort Bragg, N.C., the FBI demanded to search the mock mobile laboratory for evidence that it could have been used to prepare the anthrax used in the mailings. The searches found nothing, sources familiar with the events said.

While instructing government agents, Hatfill also was undergoing his own specialized training to go to Iraq as a biological weapons inspector for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). A medical doctor who once conducted virology research at the U.S. Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Hatfill was on the U.N. inspection roster but was never deployed to participate in the weapons hunt.

As an employee of the SAIC, stationed in McLean and in Joppa, Md., Hatfill worked partly as a bioweapons and counterterrorism trainer who designed realistic scenarios that could be used to prepare troops, government inspectors and first responders for encounters with biological and chemical agents. A more sensitive part of his job was working with defense and intelligence agencies to design equipment and countermeasures that could be used in an encounter with weapons of mass destruction.

One of Hatfill’s most intriguing projects at the SAIC was his design of the mock mobile lab, which was assembled for training of the Delta Force, a commando unit of the U.S. Special Forces based at Fort Bragg. The nonfunctional lab was built on an 18-wheel trailer and fitted with a fermenter and other specialized equipment.

Hatfill planned the equipment, designed the interior layout and stored construction materials in a warehouse before building began, said a source who has seen the vehicle.

In its investigation, the FBI has traced all of the materials ordered for the lab by Hatfill and others at the SAIC, the source said.

The trailer, known at the SAIC as the “can,” was under construction in late 2001 at a shop in Frederick, where Hatfill once lived in an apartment near Fort Detrick.

The FBI recently completed a search of a one-acre pond in that area, where it had previously found equipment that some investigators believe could have been used to prepare the letters containing the anthrax bacteria.

Col. Bill Darley, a spokesman for the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, said that Hatfill also designed a fixed or “static” nonfunctional bioweapons lab for use in training Special Forces in an unspecified location in the western United States.

Darley said he could not discuss details of how these labs have been used in training. The programs, he said, are at the heart of the “dark tactics, techniques and procedures” used to prepare troops for missions abroad.

*Staff writer Tom Jackman contributed to this report.*

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New York Times  
July 3, 2003

## **Delay By U.N. On Rebuking North Korea Is Urged**

By Felicity Barringer with David E. Sanger

UNITED NATIONS, July 2 — China and Russia sought today to delay a Security Council condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear arms program, a day after a top North Korean general said any sanctions or blockades initiated by the United States would be considered a “complete breach” of the truce that ended hostilities on the peninsula 50 years ago.

The letter added that if the United States took such actions, the North Korean army would “immediately take strong and merciless retaliatory measures” and promised that “horrible disasters” would befall the South Korean population.

The July 1 letter from “the chief of the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People’s Army,” contrasted sharply in tone though not in overall content from a letter the Korean foreign minister, Paek Nam Sun, sent the Security Council last week.

The harsh follow-up this week to the original letter led some diplomats to wonder if there was an internal North Korean dispute over what mix of conciliatory language and threats should be used with the United Nations and the United States.

“The meaning is not clear, because we don’t know if the army is speaking for Kim Jong Il,” one senior Asian diplomat said, referring to the North Korean leader. “But it is unusual to have the Army communicating with the United Nations.”

While some Asian diplomats here played down the threats in the letter as typical bombast, it was reminiscent of warnings from Pyongyang in 1994 about how it would react to sanctions — warnings that led President Clinton to prepare for the possibility of war on the peninsula.

As the Security Council discussed the issue here, State Department officials as well as representatives of the National Security Council and the Pentagon were meeting with China’s deputy foreign minister, Wang Yi, in Washington, to discuss North Korea and other regional issues.

Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesman, said today, “We’ve discussed with him issues of nonproliferation, issues of North Korea, issues of South Asia.” He added, “He’s reiterated Chinese support for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and further explored with us the cooperation that we have with China to bring North Korea’s nuclear programs to an end.”

In Washington, a senior diplomat said China was continuing to press the United States to negotiate directly with North Korea. At a three-way meeting in Beijing in April, the North said it was speeding ahead in its effort to reprocess spent fuel rods into plutonium, which can be used as fuel for nuclear weapons. But those officials hinted that Pyongyang might be willing to trade its nuclear program, or part of it, for aid and security guarantees.

President Bush has insisted that he would not give in to “blackmail.” He has said talks must include South Korea and Japan. The Korean issue came up today in talks with Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin.

At the United Nations, diplomats made it clear that, regardless of the Korean letters, the United States, Britain and France believe that a Security Council discussion and statement are needed, in part because so little progress has been made in the last three months’ worth of diplomatic overtures from China, Japan and South Korea.

As one Council diplomat put it today, “The Chinese have been saying: ‘The time isn’t right’ “ for a Security Council statement, arguing that more time is needed for pressure by China, Japan and South Korea. The diplomat added, “The U.S., France and the U.K. are saying there is no contradiction between the two efforts; they can be complementary.”

Asked about the import of the belligerent North Korean letter, the diplomat said, “Their pronouncements, you need a psychiatrist to analyze.”

If the North Koreans sound more threatening, the diplomat added, “is that because they are more threatening or because they feel more threatened? It’s very hard to analyze.”

Another Council diplomat who attended the meeting of the permanent five Council members said, “The Americans, British and French are all in favor of a statement” from the Security Council condemning North Korean violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. “The idea,” that diplomat said, would be to be “firm about all the violations, at the same time is supporting backing the diplomatic approach.”

China’s deputy permanent representative, Zhang Yishan, said after the meeting that he believed there should be more talks outside the framework of the United Nations, among North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China and the United States.

The Russian deputy permanent representative, Gennadi M. Gatilov, said it was “premature” to consider a Security Council statement.

The United States deputy ambassador, James B. Cunningham, had no comment as he left the meeting.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/03/international/asia/03KORE.html>

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Los Angeles Times

July 3, 2003

## **Iran Sets Its Sights On More Reactors**

*Regime seeks Russian help building additional nuclear plants. Moscow defends such dealings.*

By David Holley, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW — Iran wants Russia to help it build more nuclear power plants in addition to the country’s controversial first reactor now nearing completion, Iranian atomic energy chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh said here Wednesday.

“We have plans for building, besides the Bushehr nuclear power plant, several others having a total capacity of 6,000 megawatts, and we are inviting Russia to take this opportunity,” Aghazadeh said in an interview with the Russian news agency Itar-Tass.

Although Iran’s hopes to build additional power plants are not new, the positive tone of Aghazadeh’s comments was significant because it implies that Russia might agree to cooperate despite fierce objections from Washington, which fears that Tehran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Working under an \$800-million contract, Russia has helped Iran build a 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor, which is nearly completed, in the western port of Bushehr. Iran may also seek to build a second reactor at that site.

Iran has come under mounting international pressure in recent weeks — not just from Washington but also from the European Union and the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency — to accept tougher inspections of its nuclear sites.

Iran has expressed willingness in principle to sign additional safeguard protocols, but only if other countries commit themselves to assisting it with civilian nuclear technology.

The fear in Washington and some other capitals is that Iran’s nuclear power program in combination with secret weapons research could give the Islamic nation the knowledge and materials to build nuclear bombs.

A senior Bush administration official said in Moscow this year that one of Washington’s top priorities is to be sure that Russia doesn’t agree to help build any additional power plants besides the Bushehr reactor. He implied that stopping the Bushehr project is impossible, but that Washington did not expect Moscow to agree to any new deals. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, speaking Wednesday at a news conference, defended his country’s nuclear dealings with Iran.

“Many criticize us, saying that Russia is supplying nuclear military know-how to Iran, and demand on these grounds that the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant be stopped,” he said. “I would like to say officially that there is no cooperation between Russia and Iran other than that on the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology. We call this kind of politics unfair competition, when we are accused of something and are forced out of Iran.”

In recent months, Moscow has been pressing Iran to sign additional safeguard agreements with the IAEA, saying it would benefit the country by proving that Tehran has purely peaceful intent in its nuclear program. That pressure has been seen as helpful by Washington.

Russian President Vladimir V. Putin has also said his nation opposes development of nuclear weapons by Iran.

President Bush told reporters in Washington on Wednesday that in a 15-minute telephone conversation with Putin that was focused largely on Iran and North Korea, “I thanked him for keeping the pressure on the Iranian government to dismantle any notions they might have of building a nuclear weapon.”

Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, is due to visit Iran next week to discuss concerns about Tehran’s nuclear program and the issue of additional safeguards.

A stricter safeguards agreement between Iran and the IAEA, however, could pave the way for greater Russian-Iranian cooperation.

Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir B. Rushailo, when he received Aghazadeh earlier this week, declared that as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran “has the right to receive international assistance in developing its nuclear power industry.”

Article IV of the treaty states that signatories “undertake to facilitate” the exchange of equipment and scientific information “for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

“Parties to the treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of nonnuclear-weapon states party to the treaty,” it continues.

Iran contends that Washington is seeking to ignore this part of the treaty.

Article I of the treaty says that signatories possessing nuclear weapons will not assist “nonnuclear-weapon states” to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear arms.

“In theory, Articles I and IV do not contradict each other,” said Ivan Safranchuk, director of the Moscow branch of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. “But in practice everything looks totally messed up and confused. It is extremely difficult to tell the difference. Where is that fine line that separates proliferation from development of civilian nuclear energy? How is this to be judged?”

Safranchuk said he believes Russia’s goal is “to make any misuse impossible” instead of ending nuclear cooperation with Iran.

He also said the invitation from Aghazadeh, who heads Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, for Russian deal-making does not mean Moscow will agree to any new contracts.

There is probably a “tacit understanding” that “Washington shuts its eyes as Moscow finishes the Bushehr nuclear power plant project in return for Moscow’s renunciation of all other projects that could follow,” he said.

Rushailo's comments about Iran's right to acquire nuclear technology should be seen primarily as an effort to defend the Bushehr project, according to Safranchuk.

"No question, the Kremlin does have concerns about Iran and its nuclear program," Safranchuk said.

"But these concerns cannot and should not be voiced out loud, in a straightforward manner, for it would immediately leave Bushehr open to political attacks."

Talk of possible future nuclear deals with Iran "is a psychological trick," Safranchuk added. "Russian authorities believe that if they start talking about future contracts, everybody will take Bushehr for granted."

*Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-irannukes3jul03.1.3096634.story>

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USA Today

July 7, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Bush Pushes For Next Generation Of Nukes**

*The administration hopes to develop a new generation of bunker-busting weapons and to resume atomic testing.*

By Tom Squitieri, USA Today

MERCURY, Nev. — If the Bush administration succeeds in its determined but little-noticed push to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons, this sun-baked desert flatland 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas could once again reverberate with the ground-shaking thumps of nuclear explosions that used to be common here.

The nuclear-weapons test areas are now a wasteland that is home mostly to lizards and coyotes. Throughout the Nevada Test Site, the ground is strewn with mangled buildings and pockmarked with craters, the ghostly evidence of the 928 nuclear tests the government conducted here from 1951 to 1992.

A concrete tower designed to hold the bomb for what would have been the 929th test still looms over the desert floor.

But "Icecap," the test of a bomb 10 times the size of the one that devastated the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945, was halted when the first President Bush placed a moratorium on U.S. nuclear tests in October 1992. The voluntary test ban came two years after Russia stopped its nuclear tests.

In the 11 years since, the United States has worked to halt the spread of nuclear weapons around the world and has often touted its own self-imposed restraint as a model for other nations.

But the Bush administration has now taken a decidedly different approach, one that has touched off a passionate debate in Washington. Last year the White House released, to little publicity, the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review.

That policy paper embraces the use of nuclear weapons in a first strike and on the battlefield; it also says a return to nuclear testing may soon be necessary. It was coupled with a request for \$70 million to study and develop new types of nuclear weapons and to shorten the time it would take to test them.

Last November, months before the invasion of Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld casually told reporters during a flight to Chile that military strategists were examining ways to neutralize Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. Among options studied were bunker-busting bombs that might have nuclear payloads.

Bunker-busters are heavy, missile-like bombs with hardened noses that penetrate the ground before exploding. No nuclear bunker-busters were employed in Iraq, although their use was considered there and in Afghanistan.

But the matter-of-fact way in which Rumsfeld suggested their possible role was a rare public sign of a growing effort by the administration to end the decade-long ban on developing and testing new nuclear bombs.

The main reason offered by the Pentagon is that "rogue" nations such as North Korea, Iran and Libya have gone deep, building elaborate bunkers hundreds of feet underground where their leaders and weapons could ride out an attack by the biggest conventional weapons U.S. forces could throw at them. U.S. officials also theorize that the vaporizing blast of a nuclear bomb might be the only way to safely destroy an enemy's chemical or biological weapons.

The Pentagon says developing new nuclear weapons makes sense in a dangerous world. "Without having the ability to hold those targets at risk, we essentially provide sanctuary," J.D. Crouch, an assistant secretary of Defense, told reporters earlier this year.

But others argue that moving toward a new generation of nuclear weapons, instead of improving conventional and non-nuclear ways to attack deep targets or chemical weapons sites, is fraught with danger.

"They are opening the door to a new era of a global nuclear arms competition," says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. "As we try to turn the tide of nuclear proliferation,

the last thing we should suggest is that nuclear weapons have a role in the battlefield, and these weapons are battlefield weapons. This is a serious step in the wrong direction.”

Kimball and others say research would eventually lead to testing. If Congress approves the White House requests, the first live tests of any new nuclear weapon could come as early as 2005.

Since 1992, weapons have been tested only in non-nuclear experiments 963 feet below the ground at the test site and in computer simulations here and in labs. Congress has mostly gone along with the new approach and has green-lighted most of the Bush administration proposals. This spring, the House of Representatives and the Senate agreed to spend \$15.5 million to develop a nuclear bunker-buster called the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.” They also agreed to spend money to make changes to the Nevada Test Site, shortening to as little as 18-24 months the time it would take to resume nuclear tests. (It would take 24-36 months now.)

Congress is hung up on just one element of the Bush plan: a ban on researching and developing a nuclear bomb with a payload of 5 kilotons or less. (A kiloton is equivalent to the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT.) The Senate voted to end the ban, while the House voted to keep it; the two sides are expected to settle their differences in a House-Senate conference committee by August.

**‘10, 9, 8, 7 ...’**

In the peak days of nuclear testing, more than 11,000 people worked here at the test site, an area larger than Rhode Island. It was a bustling place with a movie theater, newspaper, social activities, souvenir earrings in the shape of mushroom clouds and a clear sense of mission underscored by its own peculiar brand of humor. When protesters occasionally slipped through security and hid on the grounds to try to stop a test, officials would flush them out by turning on the PA system and faking a countdown — “10, 9, 8, 7. . .” — until the terrified trespassers jumped up and waved their arms to be hustled away.

Now the test ranges look like historical snapshots that have faded under the blistering Nevada sun. Lizards skitter about the debris that survived the numerous nuclear blasts. Coyotes give hard stares to the rare human interloper who interrupts their scavenging. Just over a hill is “Area 51,” the ultra-secret Air Force test site that spawned rumors of strange new weapons and UFO visits.

Go north, and the land becomes a moonscape where craters large and small pinpoint the locations of dozens of underground tests. Turn south, and the road leads to “Doom City,” where twisted steel girders, a shattered bank vault and the skeletal remains of buildings, cars and airplanes are testimony to the savage power of nuclear blasts.

“In the past, you could take (a nuclear weapon) off the shelf, take it to the Nevada Test Site and detonate it to see what you needed to see,” says Kevin Rohrer, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which maintains the U.S. nuclear arsenal. “Now we have to do it with computers, and that doesn’t tell you how the (nuclear) material ages, what physical properties have changed, what all you need to know.”

The United States has signed three treaties to limit nuclear weapons testing: the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban treaty, which prohibited aboveground and underwater nuclear tests; the 1974 Threshold Treaty, which limited tests to less than 15 kilotons; and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban, which was to halt all testing. The Senate never ratified the 1996 treaty. But like other nations, the United States abides by treaties it has signed, even if they have not been ratified.

### **Bunkers and bugs**

During his trip to Chile last fall, Rumsfeld questioned the reliability of aging and long-untested U.S. nuclear stockpiles. He suggested that the military might need to resume testing weapons to ensure they would work if deployed.

“If you are asking me (if I am going) to go to the president and recommend re-initiating nuclear testing, the answer is, no, I am not. Could I someday? Yes, I could, if they came to me and said, ‘I’m worried about the reliability and safety and our weapons,’” Rumsfeld said then.

Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says nuclear weapons could be crucial tools for destroying chemical and biological weapons stocks without causing wider harm.

“In terms of anthrax, it’s said that gamma rays can ... destroy the anthrax spores, which is something we need to look at,” Myers told reporters at the Pentagon on May 20. “And in chemical weapons, of course, the heat (of a nuclear blast) can destroy the chemical compounds and make them not develop that plume that conventional weapons might do, that would then drift and perhaps bring others in harm’s way.”

Military planners also see nuclear bombs as vital for destroying deep bunkers, which they say have become rogue nations’ tool of choice for putting their weapons beyond the reach of the world’s mightiest military force. At the top of the bunker list is North Korea, according to an official at the Defense Intelligence Agency who asked not to be named. The North Koreans have developed advanced tunneling equipment and improved building materials that allow them to dig deeper, more quickly and more stealthily. They can make their bunkers stronger and put them in places where U.S. surveillance now has a tougher time finding them.

Neutralizing such bunkers is getting more difficult, according to a congressional agency.



“Special operations forces or precision-guided conventional bombs might *defeat* buried structures by attacking power supplies, ventilation systems and exits. The only way to *destroy* them is with a strong shock wave that travels through the ground,” the Congressional Research Service said in a report in January.

### **The fallout problem**

But some military experts argue that while underground bunkers are a legitimate concern, nuclear bunker-busters are not the answer.

“Even if there were a worldwide trend toward deeply buried bunkers, which is doubtful, alternative means exist for disabling the devices stored there,” says Loren Thompson, a military analyst with The Lexington Institute, an Arlington, Va., public policy group. “These include conventional penetrating warheads with higher yields, microwave weapons that shut down bunker electronic systems and various special forces.”

The limitations of physics mean even the best-designed bunker-busters can burrow only 30 to 50 feet before exploding. The explosion triggers shock waves that travel down toward buried targets and destroy them.

Critics say that means nuclear bunker-busters wouldn’t be able to burrow deep enough before exploding to contain the fallout they would create. Sidney Drell, a Stanford University physicist, determined that destroying a target dug 1,000 feet into rock would require a nuclear weapon with a yield of 100 kilotons — more than six times that of the Hiroshima bomb. The explosion of a nuclear bomb that big would launch enormous amounts of radioactive debris into the air and contaminate a huge area.

To contain fallout for a one-kiloton bomb, the warhead would have to penetrate an estimated 220 feet underground, many times the depth achievable by any current earth-penetrator warhead. The challenge scientists face is to find some way to get the bomb deep enough so that the explosion harms only what’s underground — not people on the surface.

Critics say the evidence against battlefield use of nuclear weapons is spread all over the Nevada Test Site. Most notable is Sedan Crater, 1,280 feet across and 320 feet deep. It is the largest crater at the test site, the result of a 104-kiloton device that was exploded 635 feet underground in 1962.

The idea was to see whether nuclear weapons could be used for such peaceful purposes as creating new harbors. The blast threw 12 million tons of radioactive earth 290 feet into the air, where it became airborne fallout. That was the end of the idea of digging harbors with nuclear bombs.

Skeptics of the Bush program — and the ability of the new weapons to perform as advertised — say they hope the debate over the weapons has not started too late.

“The public does not focus very much on national security and foreign policy,” says John Isaacs, president of Council for a Livable World, a Washington, D.C.-based nuclear arms public policy group. “The administration has prevailed by telling Congress this is only research, not developing or testing or building. The next battles (in Congress) may not be as easy.”

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030707/5301538s.htm>

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Washington Post

July 6, 2003

Pg. 13

## **Ex-Envoy: Nuclear Report Ignored**

### ***Iraqi Purchases Were Doubted by CIA***

By Richard Leiby and Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writers

Joseph C. Wilson, the retired United States ambassador whose CIA-directed mission to Niger in early 2002 helped debunk claims that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium there for nuclear weapons, has said for the first time publicly that U.S. and British officials ignored his findings and exaggerated the public case for invading Iraq.

Wilson, whose 23-year career included senior positions in Africa and Iraq, where he was acting ambassador in 1991, said the false allegations that Iraq was trying to buy uranium oxide from Niger about three years ago were used by President Bush and senior administration officials as a central piece of evidence to support their assertions that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.

“It really comes down to the administration misrepresenting the facts on an issue that was a fundamental justification for going to war,” Wilson said yesterday. “It begs the question, what else are they lying about?”

The Niger story—one piece of the administration’s larger argument that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat—was not debunked until shortly before the war began, when the United Nations’ chief nuclear inspector told the Security Council the documents were forgeries. The White House has acknowledged that some

documents were bogus, but a spokesman has said there was “a larger body of evidence suggesting Iraq attempted to purchase uranium in Africa,” indicating it may have involved a country other than Niger. For the past year, Wilson has spoken out against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but until he was interviewed by The Post and wrote an op-ed article published in today’s New York Times, he had never disclosed his key role in the Niger controversy.

The CIA turned to Wilson in February 2002 because of his extensive experience with intelligence and his relationship with senior officials in Niger.

Wilson’s account of his eight-day mission to Niger, including a statement he was told Vice President Cheney’s staff was interested in the truth of the allegations, has not been contradicted by administration officials, but they have played down his importance and denied his accusations.

A senior administration official said yesterday that Wilson’s mission originated within the CIA’s clandestine service after Cheney aides raised questions during a briefing. “It was not orchestrated by the vice president,” the official said. He added that it was reported in a routine way, did not mention Wilson’s name and did not say anything about forgeries.

Wilson has been interviewed recently by the House and Senate intelligence committees, which are expected to focus on who in the National Security Council and the vice president’s office had access to a CIA cable, sent March 9, 2002, that did not name Wilson but said Niger officials had denied the allegations.

Wilson said he went to Niger skeptical, knowing that the structure of the uranium industry—controlled by a consortium of French, Spanish, German and Japanese firms—made it highly unlikely that anyone would officially deal with Iraq because of U.N. sanctions. Wilson never saw the disputed documents but talked with officials whose signatures would have been required and concluded the allegations were almost certainly false. Back in Washington, he briefed CIA officers but did not draft his own report.

In September 2002, the story of Iraq purchasing uranium in Africa made its way into a published British dossier on Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction that got wide coverage. Wilson was perplexed.

“‘[I]t was unfathomable to me that this information would not have been shared’ with the British, he said.

In late September, CIA Director George J. Tenet and top aides made two presentations in closed session on Capitol Hill. They said there was information that Iraq had attempted to buy uranium but that there was some doubt the information was credible. But on Dec. 19, 2002, a State Department fact sheet listed attempts to purchase uranium, specifically from Niger, as an item omitted from Iraq’s supposedly full disclosure of its weapons of mass destruction program.

Bush, in his State of the Union speech on Jan. 23, declared that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

After Bush’s speech, Wilson said he contacted the State Department, noted that the Niger story had been debunked and said, “You might want to make sure the facts are straight.”

In early February, the CIA received a translation of the Niger documents and in early March, copies of the documents, which it turned over to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

After IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei announced they were bogus, Wilson read a March 8 front-page story in The Washington Post that quoted an unidentified U.S. official as saying, “We fell for it.”

The quote provided “a wake-up call . . . that somebody was not being candid about this Niger business,” he said.

Interviewed that day on CNN, Wilson said: “I think it’s safe to say that the U.S. government should have or did know that this report was a fake before Dr. ElBaradei mentioned it in his report at the U.N. yesterday.”

In June, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that top administration officials were unaware of the faked documents at the time of the State of the Union. “Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery.”

But Wilson said he considers that “inconceivable.” Based on his experience at the NSC, Wilson does not believe his report would have been buried. Having been told the vice president’s office was interested, he said, “If you are senior enough to ask this question, you are well above the bowels of the bureaucracy. You are in that circle.”

Last week, Wilson said of Hussein: “I’m glad the tyrant is gone.” But he does not believe the war was ever about eliminating Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. It was, he said, a political push to “redraw the map of the Middle East.”

While his family prepared for a Fourth of July dinner, he proudly showed a reporter photos of himself with Bush’s parents. On a den wall was a framed cable to him in Baghdad, from the first President Bush, dated Nov. 20, 1990: “What you are doing day in and day out under the most trying conditions is truly inspiring,” the cable states. “Keep fighting the good fight. You and your stalwart colleagues are always in our thoughts and prayers.”

Wilson observed: "I guess he didn't realize that one of these days I would carry that fight against his son's administration."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13536-2003Jul5.html>

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Jane's Defence Weekly

July 9, 2003

## Iran Successfully Tests Shahab 3

By Alon Ben-David, JDW Correspondent, Tel Aviv

Iran successfully tested its Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) to a range of 1,300km at the beginning of July, regional intelligence sources have told Jane's Defence Weekly.

This was the eighth test in the Shahab 3 programme, and the first to successfully achieve that range (*JDW* 18 September 2002). The intelligence sources claim that Iran already has an unspecified number of operational Shahab 3 MRBMs with a range of 1,000km.

Based on the North Korean No Dong-1, the Shahab 3 is reportedly capable of carrying an 800kg warhead. While Iran has attained self-sufficiency in the manufacture of Shahab 3, Israeli intelligence sources told *JDW* that the missile tested last week was powered by a North Korean liquid-fuel engine. The latest test, from Iran's missile-testing range near the northern city of Semnan, southeast of Tehran to a target in the west, achieved the desired range, following a series of failed attempts. US surveillance satellites picked up and tracked the test. The 16m-long, single-stage Shahab 3 is believed to have an accuracy of 3,000m circular error of probability.

Israeli intelligence sources told *JDW* that "Shahab 3 is now capable of hitting any target in Israel, even if launched further from Iran's western border". Israel Defence Force Chief of Staff Lt Gen Moshe Ya'alon is scheduled to discuss the progress of the Iranian nuclear and missile programme during a visit to Washington, DC, later this month. Israeli intelligence sources claim that Shahab technologies are being transferred to Libya. Tel Aviv is concerned that these missiles could reach Israel.

Concomitant to the development of Shahab 3, the sources claim that Iran is continuing to work on the development of the 2,000km-range Shahab 4, based on Russian SS-4 MRBM technology, and even a 5,000km-range Shahab 5.

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Moscow Times

July 7, 2003

Pg. 4

## Putin On Iran

WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Vladimir Putin volunteered fresh assurances about Iran's nuclear program during a telephone conversation with President George W. Bush, a senior U.S. official said.

The official said late last week that Putin told Bush he was very concerned about Iran's program and that Russia would not provide fuel for the Iranian reactor until Russian officials were certain Iran was not developing nuclear weapons.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Putin's assurances contributed to a growing notion within the Bush administration that Russia was ready to help in stemming the spread of nuclear technology.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/07/07/031.html>

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Congressional Quarterly Weekly

July 5, 2003

Pg. 1700

## 'Privatization' Of Iraq's Weapons A Growing Postwar Concern

By Helen Fessenden, CQ Staff

As Congress pushes ahead with its review of prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the question of the weapons' whereabouts has taken on new urgency among some lawmakers. According to several congressional leaders on intelligence and homeland security issues, the failure to find the weapons could be explained by a terrifying scenario: Either before the war or during the anarchy and looting that followed, Saddam Hussein may have spirited the banned materials out of Iraq or sold them to third parties, including terrorist groups.

Politically, this theory is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it could provide lawmakers — both Republicans and Democrats who voted for the war — with more time by deflecting the argument that the weapons threat was overblown before the fighting began. But if this theory gains credence, it would seriously undermine the prewar contention of the Bush administration and its supporters in Congress that conquering Iraq would make the United States safer.

Indeed, it would reinforce the argument made before the war by some terrorism experts, including those who worked in the Clinton administration, that invading Iraq could result in dangers even greater than the one posed by Saddam, including the dispersal of his weapons.

Already, some Democrats are using this latest theory on the whereabouts of Iraq's weapons to intensify their demands for a full investigation into prewar intelligence and to criticize the military's postwar failure to safeguard known Iraqi nuclear weapons research sites.

### **New Warnings**

Some Republicans have responded by scaling back expectations for the teams that are still scouring Iraq for evidence of the weapons. Pat Roberts of Kansas, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, says that now those teams are focusing on finding evidence of weapons programs rather than existing weapons, mostly in documents and interviews with Iraqi scientists.

"That will lead to the final puzzle to prove without a doubt [Saddam] had the weapons of mass destruction," Roberts said July 3, after returning from a visit to Iraq.

But he added: "The most important thing is, where is it now?"

Jane Harman of California, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee and a supporter of the war, tried to answer that question on the House floor June 25.

Saddam, Harman said, had most likely "buried or dispersed the [weapons of mass destruction]. . . . Some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S. and British troops."

On the same day that Harman made her remarks, Christopher Cox — the California Republican who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee — also underscored that fear.

"We know that Saddam had 8,500 liters of anthrax, but there's no evidence inside Iraq that he destroyed it," Cox warned. "My most ominous concern is that there's no evidence of [its] destruction in the country."

The possibility of the "privatization" of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction by rogue elements willing to sell to terrorist groups has started to affect legislation as well.

On June 26, the House Homeland Security Committee met to approve a bill (HR 2122) that would authorize, among other things, \$5.6 billion for President Bush's Project Bioshield, a 10-year initiative to develop and stockpile vaccines and medications against biological, chemical and radiological attacks.

Framing Project Bioshield as a reaction to proliferation concerns, the committee's ranking Democrat, Jim Turner of Texas, cautioned that "despite our belief that Iraq possessed significant stockpiles of such weapons, we have to date found none, leading to the very real possibility that those weapons may be in the hands of our terrorist enemies."

The CIA is also expected to take a look at the missing weapons mystery. The House intelligence authorization bill (HR 2417), which the House passed 410-9 on June 27, includes a provision requiring that the CIA conduct its own review of the intelligence lessons learned from the war with Iraq.

Although the bill's report called the CIA review "consistent with previous after-action studies undertaken following past conflicts," it adds that the current task for the intelligence community "is to try to figure out who has the [weapons of mass destruction] and how they got there."

Even among those lawmakers who believe that the ouster of Saddam made the United States more secure, some are starting to express concerns more openly about the ramifications of the weapons' disappearance.

"There is now less of a chance that the United States will be attacked with Saddam Hussein gone, but it is disconcerting that we can't pinpoint his weapons," said John E. Sweeney, a New York Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee.

Added Jennifer Dunn, a Washington state Republican who also sits on the Homeland Security panel: "I definitely think that there is a genuine risk. . . . The feeling in Congress now is that there is more of a concern now."

### **Privatized Weapons**

Those in Congress who opposed the Iraq war resolution (PL 107-243) deployed a variety of arguments against invading Iraq. But the fear that the proscribed weapons would fall into the wrong hands as a consequence of the war was not frequently cited last fall. (*2002 CQ Weekly*, p. 2671)

Instead, anti-war lawmakers mostly criticized the notion of pre-emption as a national security doctrine, the risk of American diplomatic isolation at the United Nations, and the question of whether Iraq posed a truly imminent danger to the United States.

Among some terrorism and intelligence experts, however, the “privatization” scenario posed a very real threat last fall — and still does today.

One was Daniel Benjamin, who served on the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton as a counterterrorism official. He warned in *The Washington Post* last October that a U.S. occupation of Iraq could backfire in two serious ways.

Benjamin wrote that a U.S. occupation of Iraq could provide a magnet for fundamentalist Islamic militants intent on exacting revenge on the United States. But even more worrisome was the prospect that the weapons material would be “liberated by colonels, security service operatives and soon-to-be unemployed scientists” eager to sell, during and after the war’s chaos.

Today, Benjamin says, the privatization of Iraq’s weapons remains “a real possibility,” especially in the case of biological weapons and nuclear waste material that could produce a “dirty bomb” — a crude device that uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive waste across a wide area.

“If you assume that Saddam Hussein was not in production mode but wanted to reconstitute his stockpile when he was out from under the inspections, he probably kept small amounts of biological weapons and the things needed to produce them,” said Benjamin, now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“It’s possible that he hid them somewhere and they’ve now made their way into untrustworthy hands,” he warned. Touching on the “dirty bomb” threat, Benjamin pointed to the postwar looting of the al Tuwaitha nuclear research facility outside Baghdad as another area of grave concern.

“The looting at Tuwaitha leaves ample room for terrorists to get their hands on radioactive material,” Benjamin explained. “It would be tempting for former Iraqi Secret Service types, who know their future isn’t appealing, to make as much money as they can by selling that material.”

In a June 16 letter to Bush, 16 House Democrats also broached the “dirty bomb” scenario.

Citing the deliberate steps that U.S. forces took to secure Iraqi oil fields, the letter asked why “similar precautions were not taken with respect to nuclear facilities.”

Separately, 23 House Democrats introduced a bill (HR 2625) June 26 that would establish an independent commission to investigate how U.S. intelligence was used before the war. Among the group’s concerns, according to Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., is that weapons of mass destruction “are now in the hands of al Qaeda, Baathist separatist groups, other terrorist groups, or in Syria.”

The House Intelligence Committee is conducting its own review into the matter, but some Democrats have said they want more committees to be involved and more open hearings held.

### **Mission Impossible**

Whether some stockpiles may have indeed been looted during and after the war, most terrorism analysts discount the possibility that Saddam could have shipped his proscribed weapons or their precursor materials out of Iraq undetected.

“It seems implausible that large quantities could have been spirited away without leaving some trace,” said Gregory F. Treverton, senior analyst at the RAND Corporation and former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the first Clinton administration.

“There wasn’t enough coherence in the regime to do such a thing ahead of the war. Even if it was done in a chaotic way, it would have left some traces,” he explained, adding that the privatization scenario remains “a legitimate fear,” especially regarding biological agents.

Richard A. Clarke, a former White House adviser on counterterrorism and intelligence who served under Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush, also discounts the possibility of a massive illegal weapons transfer before the war, even if some material did fall into the hands of rogue parties.

“It would have been hard to secretly move the large amounts of anthrax and sarin that the United Nations described. Besides, some of that material has a limited shelf life,” he explained. “The toxicity falls over time.

“But small amounts, or small amounts of precursor materials, may well have been smuggled out,” he said.

Clarke thinks that “the notion that it all went to Syria or to terrorists doesn’t answer the question.” The Syria option was first raised by Israel, which has an interest in getting the United States to focus on Damascus’ unconventional weapons programs.

“The bulk of the missing weapons were either hidden or destroyed, or a combination of the two,” he concluded.

## **The Search for Intelligence**

For many in Congress, the debate over the accuracy of prewar intelligence on the Iraqi threat is now part of a larger discussion over how good the intelligence is on developing threats, such as those that could grow out of Iraq's missing weapons.

"We're concerned about the lack of good intelligence on this issue. Where are these weapons? Where do we stand on bioterrorism?" asked Rep. Karen McCarthy of Missouri, ranking Democrat on the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism.

"We do not have the intelligence we need, and not having it heightens our concern about rogue actors in Iraq," she said.

Meanwhile, both the House and Senate Intelligence committees continue to conduct their reviews on the performance of U.S. intelligence before the Iraq war behind closed doors. (*CQ Weekly*, p. 1564)

Some members, such as Harman, already have brought up troubling scenarios on the whereabouts of Iraq's weapons. And if the House Intelligence Committee conducts its first open hearing on the missing weapons issue later in July, as Harman has said it will, it could provide a forum for more members to openly express their concerns on the topic.

Referring to the possibility of Iraq's weapons falling into the wrong hands, Olympia J. Snowe, R-Maine, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said "there is a higher probability of thinking on the issue" on the panel.

"But I don't know if it is seen as more probable than other scenarios," she cautioned.

"The main idea is that we now have a greater commitment to find the truth. If [privatization] did occur, it opens the door to all kinds of potentially threatening scenarios," she added. "We certainly don't want the materials to fall into the wrong hands, in different countries."

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Washington Times

July 4, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Senators See Proof Of Arms Program**

### ***Iraq visit gives GOP optimism***

By Stephen Dinan, The Washington Times

Senior Republican senators returning from Iraq yesterday said U.S. officials there showed them proof of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs, and the lawmakers expect the information to be made public soon.

"In my judgment, any fair-minded, objective individual upon learning of that information, which I'm sure in the future will be divulged, will clearly come to the conclusion that these weapons did exist, that they were in the hands of those who could use them and, thank God, they weren't used," said Sen. John W. Warner, Virginia Republican. However, Mr. Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the information was "of the highest classification, which we cannot divulge."

He and seven other senators — a bipartisan group of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Select Committee on Intelligence — briefed reporters at the Capitol after returning from a three-day, fact-finding mission to Iraq.

The senators visited with U.S. military forces, Iraqi civilians, and U.S. and Iraqi officials involved in trying to rebuild the country's political system and infrastructure. They paid visits to the Kurdish north, Sunni center and Shi'ite south.

Sen. Pat Roberts, Kansas Republican and chairman of the intelligence committee, said he is optimistic that U.S. forces will find Saddam's banned programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

"We are finding volumes of documentation, and it takes us time to go through it. That has led us to a couple of what I would call breakthrough pieces of information that I hope in the near future will be very positive news," Mr. Roberts said.

"Now the focus is on people information and document exploitation. That will lead to the final puzzle to prove without a doubt he had the WMD," he said.

After the briefing, Mr. Roberts told reporters, "I'd be a little careful were I overly critical of the lack of finding any WMD — you may end up with WMD and some egg on your face."

President Bush declared victory in Iraq two months ago. Since then, specialists have been combing the country for evidence of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and trying to determine what happened to the programs known to exist from the early 1990s.

But as confident as the two Republicans were of finding evidence, some of the Democrats said they didn't reach the same conclusion.

"There is troubling evidence of exaggeration and stretching on the part of the intelligence community relative to the presence in Iraq, right before the war, of weapons of mass destruction," said Sen. Carl Levin, Michigan Democrat. "That was the immediate reason that was given," Mr. Levin said. "And the accuracy and objectivity of that intelligence is under review in a number of places, as it should be."

He said the question of whether Saddam had a weapons program — the new focus for the investigative team — is different from the question of whether Iraq had weapons at its disposal.

But Sen. Mark Dayton, Minnesota Democrat, was skeptical about the worth of the search for Saddam's weapons. "I think this hunt for the weapons of mass destruction, like the hunt for Red October, is a huge red herring that's distracting resources and personnel in Iraq for what should be under way, which is to win this engagement," he said. Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia Democrat, said one key to determining the fate of the programs is to capture Saddam or to prove to the Iraqi people he is dead. That would allow those with information about the programs to come forward without fear of retribution.

"There is a shadow over that country — far more so than I thought when I went there — of the lack of the proven death of Saddam Hussein and his two sons," Mr. Rockefeller said.

Senators from both parties said lifting that uncertainty surrounding Saddam's fate will aid the search for weapons, as well as help the coalition rebuild the country and quell resistance.

"There's a pervasive climate of fear that is impeding the recovery, particularly in central and southern Iraq," said Sen. Susan Collins, Maine Republican. "There is a fear that he will return, that he will come back. And that fear prevents us from making progress as rapidly as we otherwise would, and that fear emboldens those who would attack our troops."

Senators said they do not believe the attacks, which have killed 25 U.S. soldiers since Mr. Bush's declared end of major combat, are part of a coordinated effort.

"I don't think in the judgment of the intelligence community and the military that this is a really fine-tuned organization by any means," Mr. Roberts said. "It's very loose-knit. But the word is, it could come to that if, in fact, we don't make progress in the next 100 days to six months."

Mr. Rockefeller described chilling leaflets explaining how to kill a U.S. soldier by pointing out the most vulnerable areas.

The senators said they were impressed by how well the military was handling what promised to be a difficult job for a long time to come.

Sen. Jack Reed, Rhode Island Democrat, said that even in the mostly Kurdish northern part of Iraq, which is considered the most stable, more than 2,300 individual ammunition supply points remain to be secured.

"It just gives you an indication of the proliferation of small arms and conventional weapons throughout Iraq," he said.

Still, several senators said they also detected a rising national sentiment of unity.

Miss Collins said the fear that Iraq would split into three nations after the war proved unfounded.

Mr. Roberts noted a symphony concert last week that closed with the old Iraqi national anthem, "My Nation," which Saddam didn't like and was played rarely in his 35-year rule.

"All of the Iraqis, which was a packed house, stood up, cheered, and there wasn't a dry eye in the place. The key issue is resolve: We can do this thing, we can do it well, and I think we are doing it well," Mr. Roberts said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030703-114718-9620r.htm>

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Armed Forces Journal

July 2003

Pg. 18

## Should U.S. Create Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons?

*Views from both sides of the issue*

*Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, is a leading proponent of resuming low-yield nuclear weapons research in the United States. Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., was among the leaders in the fight against resuming such research, fearing a new nuclear arms race. Both lawmakers recently shared their views with AFJ in written responses to questions posed to them by Congressional Editor William Matthews.*

**After giving up low-yield nuclear weapons years ago, should the United States develop new ones now?**

Thornberry: We should take a fresh look at all our options because the world has changed - a lot. Weapons which may have made sense during the Cold War and which may have been an effective deterrent against the Soviet Union may not make sense or be an effective deterrent to rogue states or terrorist groups. Whether we like it or not, a strong, credible nuclear deterrent will remain central to our national security, and we should continually explore whether our current weapons are as strong and as credible a deterrent as possible.

Tauscher: I feel strongly that the United States does not need to develop new nuclear weapons, low-yield or otherwise. Our existing nuclear stockpile is the safest, most reliable deterrent in the world. And, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, conventional weapons can do the job. There is no scientific, military or strategic reason to go nuclear at this time - and every reason not to.

**Would developing new nuclear weapons undermine the United States' ability to convince other countries not to acquire nuclear arsenals?**

Tauscher: Absolutely. By calling for the development of new and more usable nuclear weapons, the United States is starting a new arms race. We are beginning to see the effect.

Since the Bush administration came in to office, it has been trying to repeal the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons - those under 5 kilotons. In May, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the Russian military is developing new types of strategic weapons. While he did not say "nuclear," his meaning was clear and appeared to be a direct response to the administration's aggressive pursuit of new nuclear weapons.

Developing new nuclear weapons also undermines decades of American efforts to prevent non-nuclear states from getting nuclear weapons. It suggests that nuclear weapons are necessary tools to achieve political objectives.

Just look at the difference between how the United States dealt with non-nuclear Iraq and nuclear North Korea - military action versus diplomacy. It sends the message to non-nuclear states and terrorist organizations that the way to negotiate with the United States is to get a nuclear weapon.

Thornberry: Since 1945, the United States has discouraged other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons while, at the same time, maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent ourselves. We must continue to do both.

It is an interesting line of argument to say that we make the world safer when we put unilateral restrictions on ourselves, and that if we would just set a good example by not researching other types of nuclear weapons, then countries like Iran and North Korea and even Russia, which has openly admitted it is developing new, smaller weapons, would be so impressed by our restraint that they would abandon their efforts. We have heard that line of argument before, and I would suggest that history has proven it wrong time and time again. For example, in the 1980s, President Reagan ignored the nuclear-freeze advocates and refused to back down on deploying theater-range missiles in Europe. Because the United States operated and negotiated from a position of strength, all the midrange weapons eventually were removed from Europe.

We really need to take a longer-term, strategic view of our nuclear policy. The greatest threat to world peace is not American strength. Peace comes when America is strong, and America is strongest when it has more options to defend itself. The House-passed version of the 2004 defense authorization bill gives us the ability to at least start exploring these options.

**Underground bunkers are tough targets. Some scientists contend even nuclear weapons can't penetrate deeply enough to destroy them without causing massive above-ground destruction and contamination. Can this problem be solved?**

Thornberry: Simply put, we do not know for certain the answer to this question, which is the very reason we need to study the issue and determine whether nuclear weapons can hold these and other targets at risk.

Tauscher: The best way to deal with underground bunkers is to use intelligence and conventional weapons. Even the most powerful nuclear weapons cannot destroy bunkers past a certain depth, and there is virtually no limit on how deep rogue regimes can tunnel.

Respected scientists and defense experts have called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapon "a crock" (Christopher Paine, Natural Resources Defense Council), and low-yield bunker busters "a physical myth" (Dr. Sidney Drell, National Nuclear Security Administration advisory committee).

On top of that, military commanders do not want these weapons. They would be a nightmare to guard in the theater, and no one wants to put American troops near radioactive fallout. If a bunker is filled with chemical or biological agents, it makes sense to keep them underground rather than spread them in a mushroom cloud of our own making.

**Some opponents argue that, since low-yield nuclear weapons cause less destruction than the current weapons, their use is more probable. Can low-yield weapons still serve as a deterrent? Or do their low yields make nuclear war more likely?**

Tauscher: Any "benefits" of a low-yield nuclear weapon are negated by the likelihood of its use. Lifting the current ban on weapons under 5 kilotons changes the entire concept of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons would no longer



be deterrents, but tactical weapons designed for use on the battlefield. Moreover, American development of these weapons will spur other countries to do the same.

Thornberry: The key question is whether our existing weapons present a credible deterrent to the kinds of threats we face today and are likely to face in the future. Some believe that our massive, Soviet-oriented weapons are not credible now because it is clear that they are so big and destructive that we would never use them. Having the credibility of our deterrent in doubt increases the dangers to us and the rest of the world. No president would ever take lightly a decision to use any kind of nuclear weapon. At the same time, we have to look at the whole range of options and determine what mix of weapons will provide us with the most effective deterrent and keep us most secure.

**Without research under way, is the United States in danger of losing nuclear expertise as older nuclear scientists retire?**

Thornberry: It's true that the work force is getting older and that we are getting further and further away from the group of scientists who actually experienced a live, end-to-end nuclear test. However, all the nuclear labs are performing important research in the nuclear area and have programs to attract new talent to this important mission. Much of today's research focuses on testing the weapons we now have to make sure they are safe and reliable as they age well past their design life. But another reason we would like to explore other weapons design research is to make sure we maintain a group of folks who know how to do it.

Tauscher: One of the challenges our nuclear labs face is ensuring that we maintain a high level of scientific expertise without resorting to designing new weapons or live testing. I believe our labs are up to the challenge.

Politicians who want new nuclear weapons built often muddy the waters with the seemingly innocuous issue of "allowing scientists to think." The truth is that Congress is responsible for drawing parameters when the result of the research would be dangerous. For example, the United States has had a policy not to develop chemical and biological weapons for years.

**Some argue that the ability to destroy what you're aiming at with precision-guided conventional weapons has made nuclear weapons obsolete. What do nuclear weapons offer that PGMs can't?**

Tauscher: Tremendous damage. Detonated in an urban area, even with minimal wind, a nuclear earth penetrator would kill tens of thousands of people.

I offered an amendment that would have put the \$21 million for new nuclear weapons in the defense authorization bill into improving our conventional capability to defeat hard and deeply buried targets, which the Pentagon is pursuing. It lost by one vote in the House Armed Services Committee in a partisan debate that did little justice to the dramatic change to our nation's nuclear policy.

Thornberry: That is one of the questions we need to research. Can a nuclear weapon be more effective against deeply buried targets or against a store of biological agents? We should find out. As much as we would wish that nuclear weapons never were invented, they are here, and they are here to stay with many countries and terrorist groups trying to get them. Perhaps the most important function nuclear weapons perform has been to prevent others from using them. If we continue to maintain a strong and credible deterrent, I believe it will improve our chances for never again using a nuclear weapon and for never having one used against us.

**Is there any role for nuclear weapons in the war against terrorism?**

Thornberry: Our nuclear deterrent is essential to our national security. But for this deterrent to be effective, it must be viewed as credible. Because the threat posed by terrorist groups is radically different from the threat we faced in the Cold War, we must make sure our deterrent is updated to reflect these changes. This is one of the reasons why we should study the feasibility of using nuclear weapons to destroy hardened underground targets and other terrorist-related sites.

Tauscher: After the Manhattan Project, the world changed. Unfortunately, I cannot imagine a world in which nuclear weapons will not play a role. I believe Americans should have a healthy debate about the role we want nuclear weapons to play in our national defense - strategic deterrent or offensive use.

Today we live in an asymmetrical threat environment in which stateless terrorists turned airplanes into weapons of mass destruction. That doesn't mean we need more nuclear weapons; it means we need better intelligence. I also don't believe that using nuclear weapons in Afghanistan would have made America's military victory more decisive or helped the Afghan people to rebuild their country and rid it of terrorists.

America was in a similar position a half century ago. President Eisenhower's advisers wanted new kinds of nuclear weapons they said would allow the United States to fight a winnable nuclear war. Eisenhower rejected the idea, saying, "You can't have this kind of war. There just aren't enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets."

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## **CIA Shifts On North Korean Nukes**

*Now sees rods processed for weapons*

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The CIA has revised an earlier intelligence estimate and now believes North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear-fuel rods into plutonium for weapons, U.S. officials said.

Reprocessing the 8,000 stored nuclear fuel rods would be a key indicator that Pyongyang has abandoned past commitments to freeze its nuclear-arms program.

A review of intelligence on the nuclear-rod reprocessing began in April after North Korea's representative to nuclear talks with the United States and China in Beijing stated that the reprocessing was nearly finished.

The CIA review included re-examining intelligence that showed North Korea had imported plutonium secretly from Russia or a former Soviet republic during the 1990s. It could not be learned whether that intelligence was confirmed. A senior U.S. official familiar with the review said the new estimate states that "some" reprocessing could be under way.

"If it is, we don't believe it is anywhere near completed," the official said.

A senior Asian diplomat also said new intelligence reports indicate that the fuel reprocessing is under way, although not completed.

In April, the CIA reported that North Korea was not separating the fuel, although trucks that could move the rods to a reprocessing facility had been seen at the storage facility at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

No reprocessing, however, had been detected before Li Gun, the North Korean negotiator at the Beijing talks last April, stated that it was nearly finished.

Mr. Li also told Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in an aside during the talks that North Korea planned to export nuclear weapons or add to its existing nuclear arsenal. U.S. officials view the statement as a threat and say Pyongyang will not blackmail the United States.

The United States wants to expand any new talks to include representatives of South Korea and Japan.

The fuel rods were taken from a 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and stored in canisters in a fuel pond that had been sealed by the International Atomic Energy Agency according to the terms of a 1994 agreement between North Korea and the United States to freeze Pyongyang's nuclear program in exchange for economic and energy aid.

The storage program was completed in April 2000.

North Korea announced last year that it had a secret program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. It then expelled international inspectors who had been monitoring the nuclear weapons freeze and restarted the small 5-megawatt reactor.

The communist government is believed to have enough plutonium for two or three nuclear devices. The plutonium in the fuel rods would give Pyongyang enough for five or six more weapons.

Reprocessing takes place at a large facility where the rods are chopped up and dissolved in nitric acid. The material is then treated with a mixture of tributyl phosphate and kerosene in several steps, and a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium is produced.

In December, U.S. intelligence agencies detected North Korea's purchase from a Chinese company of 20 tons of tributyl phosphate — one of the first indicators that the North Koreans were preparing to reprocess the spent fuel rods.

Robert Alvarez, a former Energy Department adviser, wrote in the current issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that the North Koreans could take the fuel rods to a cave or other hidden location to conduct the reprocessing.

"Work in this kind of makeshift environment would be even more dangerous and definitely more time-consuming — it would involve handling much smaller batches of rods than the reprocessing plant and using 'hot cells' to extract the tiny fraction of plutonium in the spent reactor fuel," Mr. Alvarez stated.

The North Koreans will need anywhere from "several months" to more than a year to produce the plutonium, he stated.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told Congress on April 30 that North Korean officials told the United States that they had reprocessed all the fuel rods in storage.

"We can't establish that as a matter of fact with our intelligence community, but they said they did it. That is their assertion. That is their position," Mr. Powell said.

On Wednesday, according to reports, China and Russia delayed U.N. Security Council action on a U.S.-sought condemnation of the North Korean nuclear-weapons program.

The administration also is pushing South Korea to stop helping to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea — one provision of the 1994 Agreed Framework aimed at halting the North Korean nuclear program. Asked about the reactor-building effort yesterday, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said: “This is obviously a subject of continuing discussions.”

North Korea has said it would consider any imposition of sanctions as a declaration of war, and South Korea is resisting U.S. pressure to halt the new reactors.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030703-114656-2535r.htm>

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New York Times  
July 6, 2003

## **Report Calls U.S. Agencies Understaffed For Bioterror**

By David Johnston

WASHINGTON, July 5 — The government is likely to be overwhelmed in the event of a bioterrorism attack because of serious shortages in skilled medical and scientific personnel, according to a study by a public service advocacy group.

“Perhaps more than any other terrorist threat, bioterrorism will place huge burdens on small pools of medical, scientific and technical expertise,” the study concluded. “These organizations are already exhibiting hairline cracks — some would say fractures — that may presage disaster.”

The study, which focused on five federal biodefense agencies, will be made public on Tuesday. It was prepared by the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit group founded in 2001 that seeks to attract more qualified people to government service.

The study found that the anthrax mailings in 2001, which killed five people, created confusion and heavily burdened the federal agencies that responded to the incident.

The attacks forced employees at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to work around the clock and to sleep in their laboratories as they performed tests on tens of thousands of specimens.

The study suggested that a larger attack involving infectious diseases would probably be overwhelming.

A planning exercise in 2001 called Dark Winter, which involved the simulated release of smallpox virus, showed that crucial public health decisions had to be made in the early stages of such an event, but the study said policy makers “were generally unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist attacks.”

Billions of dollars have been allocated for so-called first responders like police officers, firefighters, ambulance and hospital workers, and National Guard units to improve their training for emergencies involving chemical, biological and nuclear attacks.

But the study found that far fewer resources have been sought by the federal government for medical and scientific experts.

“We have uncovered a serious underinvestment in the human side of addressing the bioterrorism threat,” Max Stier, president and chief executive of the partnership, said in an interview.

“Each of the five agencies plays a central role in responding to the bioterrorism threat,” he said. “The resources they have are stretched too thin.”

The group recommended that the government undertake a campaign including the recruitment of biodefense experts trained in fields like genetics, infectious disease medicine, bacteriology, microbiology, pharmacology, epidemiology and the physics of aerosol attacks.

The study said the federal agencies that faced serious staffing issues were the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the Food and Drug Administration, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the Food Safety and Inspection Service.

Representatives of several agencies that have jurisdiction over counterterrorism programs — the Homeland Security Department, the Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health and the disease control centers — declined to comment on the study’s findings.

The study found that there were far too few people in the government with the skills needed to respond effectively to a bioterror attack.

“Based on our interviews with officials from these agencies and other areas of biodefense research,” the study said, “we found that the federal employees responsible for our defenses against bioterrorist attacks constitute a ‘civilian thin blue line’ that is retreating both in terms of capacity and expertise.”

The study, based on interviews with senior agency officials and a review of technical literature on the subject, cited several specific problems. It found that biodefense agencies struggled to hire employees with adequate scientific and medical expertise, and concluded that the need for highly trained personnel would increase, while the supply of such talent is likely to decline.

At the same time, these agencies were found to be losing some of their most talented employees because of government pay systems geared less to outstanding performance than to longevity in service.

Moreover, the agencies are likely to face “significant and unavoidable hurdles” in maintaining staffing levels because half of the employees in critical jobs are eligible to retire in the next five years, the study found.

Even efforts to fix the problems are likely to run into difficulty. The study cited the “byzantine hiring process” used by the federal government, which it said had already left some agencies without employees with the appropriate skills to respond to a bioterror attack.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/national/06BIOT.html>

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Newsweek

July 14, 2003

**Periscope**

## **Scientists: Mass Exodus?**

Just as the administration approved the first efforts in a decade to develop new nuclear weapons—earth-penetrating nukes to entomb underground WMD facilities—it’s triggered a potential exodus of America’s top nuclear-weapons designers.

For 60 years, Los Alamos—the nation’s premier nuclear-weapons lab—has been run by the University of California, which set up scientists with mouthwatering pensions. Those age 60, with 30 years of service, can retire on three-quarter salary; UC investments have been so profitable that nobody has had to contribute to the scheme for more than a decade. But those days may be over. After a series of management and security lapses, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham decreed the UC contract would go out to rival bids. Their pensions in danger, many of Los Alamos’s weapons designers are threatening to walk, with no experienced design cadre to take their place. The National Nuclear Security Administration assured staffers their pensions will be protected whoever wins the contract. One strong contender, Battelle Lab, falls in the district of Rep. David Hobson, chair of the key House Appropriations Subcommittee. “I don’t want to call [the UC pensions] lavish,” Hobson says, “but [they’re] certainly far above what the rest of us enjoy.”

— *John Barry*

<http://www.msnbc.com/news/934831.asp?0dm=s15Dk>

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Washington Times

July 4, 2003

Pg. 16

**Sweden**

## **Blix To Head Panel On Weapons**

STOCKHOLM - Hans Blix, who stepped down as U.N. weapons inspector this week, will head a planned international commission on weapons of mass destruction, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh said yesterday.

The commission, which is an initiative of the Swedish government, is expected to report its findings in 2005.

Mr. Blix, a Swede, formally ended Monday, days after his 75th birthday, a three-year quest for Iraq’s chemical, biological and ballistic missiles as head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030703-120733-6670r.htm>

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Korea Herald

July 5, 2003

# **‘Kim Jong-Il Admitted Having Nukes’**

By Lee Joo-hee

A top North Korean defector testified yesterday that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told him in 1996 that the North manufactured nuclear weapons.

“I heard from Kim Jong-il and officials in charge of (nuclear development) like Jun Byung-ho that we made nuclear weapons,” Hwang Jang-yop said in a parliamentary forum on North Korean defectors and human rights.

Jun is a secretary on the powerful Central Committee at the North’s ruling Workers’ Party and is one of the trusted aides of Chairman Kim Jong-il of the National Defense Commission, Seoul officials said.

Hwang also claimed that North Korea planned to conduct an underground nuclear test in 1991 or 1992, and concluded a contract with Pakistan to develop uranium enrichment technology to make atomic bombs in 1996. He did not disclose whether the North actually tested them or not.

It is the first time that Hwang, a North Korean Workers’ Party secretary, has participated in an open debate forum since he defected to South Korea in 1997.

Hwang’s testimony came at a time when the United States is stepping up its diplomatic pressure on the North to end its suspected nuclear weapons program.

He said he has no idea about how many nuclear weapons the North has made. “But I believe Kim Jong-il will never be able to use it because he knows his regime will collapse once the weapons are utilized.”

Hwang also said the “dictatorial Kim Jong-il regime” should be eliminated because there is little chance that he would lead the country to reform and openness.

But the defector expressed opposition to the use of military force to topple the Pyongyang government, saying he cannot agree on the idea because it will bring about war on the peninsula.

Hwang also said the North’s de facto No. 2 man after Kim Jong-il is Chang Song-taek, the husband of Kim’s younger sister, Kyung-hee. Chang is the chief vice director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party.

Since having defected to the South, Hwang has harshly criticized Kim Jong-il and the North Korean leadership, claiming that they were oppressing and starving their people.

His outspoken criticism embarrassed the former South Korean government, which attempted to work together with the Pyongyang regime for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.

A group of U.S. Congressmen has been pushing for a visit by Hwang, 78, to Washington. The South Korean government indicated it will allow his visit as the U.S. State Department promised to guarantee his safety during the U.S. visit.

[http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/archives/result\\_contents.asp?id=200307050087&query=top%20North%20Korean%20defector](http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/archives/result_contents.asp?id=200307050087&query=top%20North%20Korean%20defector)

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