


#271

2 July 2003

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



Air University

Air War College

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

CONTENTS

[Who Lost The WMD?](#)

[British Minister Presses Iran To Allow Nuclear Inspections](#)

[FBI Ends Anthrax Probe Of Pond Near Frederick](#)

[Iraq's Real Weapons Threat](#)

[C.I.A. Said To Find North Korean Nuclear Advances](#)

[U.S. Releases Final Reports On Cold War Toxin Tests](#)

[Russia Presses Iran To Accept Scrutiny Of The Nuclear Sites](#)

[Britain Links Iran Trade To Nuclear Data](#)

[CIA Removes Photos Of Uranium Equipment](#)

[Bioterrorism Field Risky, So Firms Are Being cautious](#)

[Bioterrorism: Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen Federal Agencies' Abilities to Respond to Public](#)

[Health Emergencies](#) (GAO Report)

[Subject Of Anthrax Inquiry Tied To Anti-Germ Training](#)

[East Alabama Edgy: Disaster Plan](#)

[A U.N. Official To Visit Iran Over Nuclear Sites](#)

Time

July 7, 2003

Pg. 32

Who Lost The WMD?

As the weapons hunt intensifies, so does the finger pointing. A preview of the coming battle

By Massimo Calabresi and Timothy J. Burger

Meeting last month at a sweltering U.S. base outside Doha, Qatar, with his top Iraq commanders, President Bush skipped quickly past the niceties and went straight to his chief political obsession: Where are the weapons of mass destruction? Turning to his Baghdad proconsul, Paul Bremer, Bush asked, "Are you in charge of finding WMD?"

Bremer said no, he was not. Bush then put the same question to his military commander, General Tommy Franks. But Franks said it wasn't his job either. A little exasperated, Bush asked, So who is in charge of finding WMD? After aides conferred for a moment, someone volunteered the name of Stephen Cambone, a little-known deputy to Donald Rumsfeld, back in Washington. Pause. "Who?" Bush asked.

It seems as if just about everyone has questions these days about the missing WMD. Did U.S. intelligence officials—or their civilian bosses—overstate the evidence of weapons before the war? And if some intelligence officials expressed skepticism about WMD, who ignored them? For the past several weeks, the usually lockstep Bush Administration has done its best to maintain a unified front in the face of these queries. Whenever asked, Administration officials have replied that the weapons will turn up eventually. But as the search drags on through its third largely futile month, the blame game in Washington has gone into high gear. And as Bush's allies and enemies alike on Capitol Hill begin to pick apart some 19 volumes of prewar intelligence and examine them one document at a time, the cohesive Bush team is starting to come apart. "This is a cloud hanging over their credibility, their word," Republican Senate Intelligence Committee member Chuck Hagel told abc News. Here are key questions Congress wants answered:

What Was Cheney's Role?

Lawmakers who once saluted every Bush claim and command are beginning to express doubts. Two congressional panels are opening new rounds of investigations into the Administration's prewar claims about WMD. One of their immediate inquiries, sources tell Time, involves Vice President Dick Cheney's role in reviewing the intelligence before the bombing started. Cheney made repeated visits to the CIA in the prelude to the war, going over intelligence assessments with the analysts who produced them. Some Democrats say Cheney's visits may have amounted to pressure on the normally cautious agency. Cheney's defenders insist that his visits merely showed the importance of the issue and that an honest analyst wouldn't feel pressure to twist intelligence. The House intelligence committee (and possibly its Senate counterpart, sources say) plans to question the CIA analysts who briefed Cheney, and that could lead to calling Cheney's hard-line aides and perhaps the Veep himself to testify.

Is Powell Trying To Have It Both Ways?

Secretary of State Colin Powell, who staked his reputation on his February declaration at the U.N. about Saddam Hussein's arms program, is also feeling the heat. Powell's aides fanned out after that performance to say the Secretary had gone to the CIA and scrubbed every piece of intelligence to make certain it was solid. But since then, little of Powell's presentation has been proved by evidence on the ground, and last week his aides were on the defensive over a memo from the State Department's intelligence bureau that questioned whether two Iraqi trailers discovered in April were mobile bioweapons labs, as Powell has asserted. Questionable intelligence that made it into Powell's February speech leaves him particularly vulnerable. Expect a push by Democrats, and perhaps some Republicans, to seek Powell's testimony too.

Will Tenet Be Left Holding the Bag?

CIA Director George Tenet is faring a bit better. The House committee's top Democrat, Jane Harman, noted last week that "caveats and qualifiers" Tenet raised in prewar intelligence about Iraq's weapons were "rarely included" in Administration arguments for war. After the awkward Q&A in Doha, Bush put Tenet in charge of the WMD hunt. Tenet in turn hired a former U.N. weapons inspector, David Kay, to run the search, but Tenet and Kay have a lot of ground to make up fast. Tenet, sources say, recently conceded to the House panel that the CIA should have done more to warn that finding WMD could be a drawn-out process. Tenet got a reprieve last week when an Iraqi scientist who had hidden parts and documents for nuclear-weapons production in his backyard for 12 years came forward. Tenet's usually behind-the-scenes CIA suddenly became very public in trumpeting the importance of the discovery, if only to remind people how hard illicit weapons would be to find. But Tenet's hot zone isn't Baghdad; it's Capitol Hill. He canceled testimony before the Senate committee last week, citing a schedule conflict. If he doesn't find any weapons, he needs to find a way not to be blamed.

Bush officials believe that time and history are on their side. They argue that now that Saddam is gone, Americans don't care very much about finding WMD. They also say it is only a matter of time before more evidence of weapons materials and programs emerges. And when that occurs, they contend, all their opponents will look as silly as they did when they argued that the war was going badly in its second week. "The Dems are looking for an issue, but I think they're making a mistake," says a senior Administration official.

Democrats do sense a possibly potent campaign theme, but they run the risk of appearing to politicize a sensitive national-security issue as they try to prove the Administration has a credibility gap. But Democrats are not alone in feeling as though they may have been sandbagged on the evidence before the war began. Sources say g.o.p. Senate Intelligence Committee members Olympia Snowe and Hagel have privately questioned the Administration's handling of prewar intelligence. The Republican-held House voted last week to order the CIA to report back on "lessons learned" from the buildup to war in Iraq. The House and Senate intelligence-committee leaders have agreed

to coordinate their probes loosely to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. In a rare move, the House panel quietly voted on June 12 to grant all 435 Representatives access to the Iraq intelligence, although a Capitol Hill source said fewer than 10 members outside the committee had reviewed the material.

Administration officials have a further concern about where all these questions are leading. They fear that any problem with the prewar intelligence could undermine Bush's ability to continue his muscular campaign against terrorism overseas. The Administration has argued that to counter new kinds of threats posed by terrorists, rogue states and WMD, it has to be able to act pre-emptively. But pre-emption requires excellent intelligence, and the whole doctrine is undermined if the intelligence is wrong—or confected. "Intelligence takes on an even more important role than in the past because you can't wait until you see an enemy army massing anymore," says former Clinton Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg. But if WMD don't turn up and the Administration wants to act elsewhere, it may find that the enemy massing against it is public opinion at home.

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030707-461781,00.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times
June 30, 2003

British Minister Presses Iran To Allow Nuclear Inspections

By Nazila Fathi

TEHRAN, June 29 — Britain's foreign secretary, Jack Straw, urged Iran today to sign "quickly and unconditionally" an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that would lead to more aggressive United Nations inspections of its nuclear sites.

Iran has come under increasing pressure since the International Atomic Energy Agency released a report earlier this month saying that Iran had secretly processed nuclear material.

So far, however, Iran has refused to sign the protocol, arguing that the country is seeking nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Speaking at a news conference at the outset of his fourth visit to Iran in less than two years, Mr. Straw said Iran's refusal to sign the protocol allowing surprise inspections was undermining international confidence and discouraging the lifting of trade sanctions.

"With my colleagues in Germany and in France we want to have closer trade cooperation with Iran, but we have to say that progress in trade cooperation depends on progress in issues of human rights and weapons of mass destruction," he said.

"If there is no signature, then confidence will not be improved and the international community will be profoundly reluctant to lift the sanctions," he added.

Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, responded that his country was willing to be more open about its nuclear activity but that first other countries would have to fulfill what he said were their obligations toward Iran. Iran has demanded other countries that have signed the nonproliferation treaty to assist Iran with its nuclear energy program. Mr. Kharrazi also objected to remarks by Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, supporting antigovernment demonstrations in Iran earlier this month. He said the police in Iran should be praised for the way they controlled what he called the "chaos."

On Friday, the country's prosecutor general, Ayatollah Abdolnabi Namazi, said that more than 4,000 protesters had been arrested, including 30 student leaders. He added that 40 percent of those arrested had since been released.

The protests, some of the largest since 1999, began in Tehran June 10 and spread to other cities before they were suppressed by knife- and club-wielding vigilantes close to hard-line clerics. Scores of demonstrators were injured. One protester was killed in the southern city of Shiraz.

Although the street demonstrations have simmered down, protests have continued in other forms. At Isfahan University, 200 miles south of Tehran, 17 students have been on a hunger strike for more than a week. Today, the former Friday prayer leader of Isfahan, Ayatollah Jalaledin Taheri, who resigned in protest against the government a year ago, visited the students in Isfahan today in a gesture of solidarity.

An imprisoned pro-democracy activist, Mohsen Sazegara, started a hunger strike two weeks ago after he was arrested with his son, Vahid. He has also refused to take his heart medication until Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, agrees to a referendum on his absolute power.

Four members of Parliament also began a two-day sit-in at Parliament on Saturday to protest the arrests of the students.

In a letter to President Mohammad Khatami last week, the students stated their disillusion with his reform movement and urged him to resign.

"Mr. President, if you are incapable of protecting our rights, if you cannot put an end to illegal arrests and kidnapping of students, please resign so that the student movement can confront the regime on its own," the statement said. "Then everyone will know what the end result of such confrontation will be."

Foreign Minister Kharrazi, addressing another subject that has raised tensions between Iraq and the West, denied today that his country was sheltering Al Qaeda operatives and said that Iran had arrested or returned "hundreds" of Al Qaeda members to their countries of origin.

"For security reasons, I cannot say publicly how many and who are among those arrested now," he said.

Last week, Al Arabiya, the satellite television network, reported that Ayman al-Zawahiri, a top leader of Al Qaeda, and Suleiman Abu Gaith, a spokesman for Al Qaeda, were among those arrested.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamidreza Assefi, denied today that the two men were among those arrested, but said that there were "a handful whose identity was still under investigation."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/30/international/middleeast/30IRAN.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Washington Post

June 29, 2003

Pg. C1

FBI Ends Anthrax Probe Of Pond Near Frederick

By Elizabeth Williamson and David Snyder, Washington Post Staff Writers

FBI agents searching a pond near Frederick for clues in the 2001 anthrax attacks finished their work and left the area yesterday after finding no additional physical evidence to immediately suggest any links to the case, law enforcement sources said.

Those sources said the FBI took soil samples from the bottom of the pond for testing. Investigators earlier this month diverted 1.45 million gallons of water from the pond and began sifting through mud for clues to the case that brought the prospect of bioterrorism into the average U.S. household.

Frederick Mayor Jennifer P. Dougherty said the FBI told her yesterday that "they found a bicycle, some logs and a street sign," leaving the items for workers to dispose of in a public landfill. She said it was unclear whether that was a complete list of what was found. Law enforcement officials said other items found in the pond included coins, fishing lures and a handgun, which was given to local authorities.

The FBI began draining the one-acre pond in the Frederick Municipal Forest, about eight miles from downtown Frederick, on June 9. Investigators were hoping to find clues that could lead to an arrest in the attacks, which killed five people and sickened 17 others who were infected by anthrax bacteria sent through the mail.

The pond is about eight miles from the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick, one of the nation's primary anthrax research centers. It is one of several ponds searched by divers in December and January after FBI officials had received a tip that a bioterrorism expert who formerly worked as a researcher at the institute once talked hypothetically about how he might dispose of contaminated materials in water. That researcher, Steven J. Hatfill, has been described by Attorney General John D. Ashcroft as a "person of interest" in the investigation. His apartment was next to Fort Detrick.

Hatfill has denied any involvement in the attacks.

In May, law enforcement sources said FBI investigators found laboratory equipment of interest to them in those earlier searches. Yesterday, all that remained at the pond was a plastic mesh fence the FBI erected around its perimeter.

The fence was "for safety reasons," Dougherty said, to keep people away from the spring-fed pond while it refills, a process that will take seven to 10 days.

Dougherty said the FBI told her yesterday that "they are done" at the pond. "They are leaving. I don't have any expectation that they'll be back in this area, in the watershed." However, she said, "They've given us no indication that they're out of Frederick County."

The latest operation in the forest was expected to end within a month and cost about \$250,000.

Staff writer Allan Lengel contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46064-2003Jun28.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Iraq's Real Weapons Threat

By Rolf Ekeus

THE HAGUE -- With no weapons of mass destruction as yet found in Iraq, the political criticism directed against President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair is mounting. Before the war, the two leaders publicly declared that the Iraqi regime had not only procured and produced such weapons but still retained them with the intention to use them. This was considered a good reason for a military operation against Iraq -- an outright *casus belli*.

A United Nations inspection team, before the war, and the U.S. military, after the war, have been searching Iraq and have not come up with anything that can remotely be called weapons of mass destruction. Is it now time to join the game of blaming Bush and Blair for an illegitimate or illegal war? Let us first consider some facts in a complicated picture.

Chemical weapons were used by Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-88). Arguably that use had a decisive effect on the outcome: It saved Iraq from being overwhelmed by a much larger Iranian army. Furthermore, Iraq made use of chemical bombs in air raids against the Kurdish civilian population in northern Iraq. Nerve gases, such as sarin, and mustard gas immediately and painfully killed many thousands of civilians. More than 100,000 later died or were crippled by the aftereffects.

These reminders illustrate that Iraq's acquisition and use of chemical weapons were carried out in pursuit of two strategic goals, namely to halt Iran's possible expansion of its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf region and to suppress internal opposition. The war started by Iraq in 1980 was directed against its historical enemy, Iran. In strategic terms and over generations, Iraq/Mesopotamia had been positioned as a gatekeeper of the Arab nation against repeated Persian expansion westward, a threat that had become acute with the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. All the emirates and states in the gulf region, ruled by Arabs of traditionalist Sunni Muslim orientation, considered Persian nationalism and expansionism a constant problem, especially after Iran's Shiite revolution. For Saddam Hussein, the self-styled, self-promoted defender of the Arab nation, "the Iranian beasts," to quote Tariq Aziz in a conversation with me -- not the United States or Israel -- were the eternal enemy of Iraq. With its population of more than 64 million, Iran constituted a challenge that Iraq, with its 24 million inhabitants, could not match with conventional military means. By using chemical weapons to gas and kill the "human waves" of young, poorly protected Iranian attack forces, the Iraqi army repeatedly saved itself from being overwhelmed. And thus it became conventional wisdom, nourished by the Iraqi leadership, that only nonconventional weapons could guarantee that Iraq would prevail in an armed conflict with Iran.

Regarding biological weapons, the U.N. inspection team, UNSCOM, managed after four years of investigation to confirm the existence in Iraq of a major secret biological weapons program. This led in August 1995 to the defection from Iraq of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamal, director of Iraq's WMD programs. During UNSCOM's debriefings in Iraq after the defection, Iraqi biological weapons scientists, able to speak slightly more openly than normally, explained that their secret work mainly was on assignments to find means for warfare against the Iranians. Regarding the nuclear weapons projects, the Iraqi authorities defended their systematic violation of Iraq's obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the proposition that Iran, likewise a party to the treaty, was active in developing its own nuclear weapons. Iraq's obsession with Iran was illustrated by its air attack in 1983 on the Iranian nuclear reactors at Busher.

Even the quite remarkable missile developments in Iraq were related to Iran. Iraq succeeded in modifying and re-engineering many hundreds of the more than 800 Scud missiles bought from the Soviet Union -- increasing their range of 200-300 kilometers to 500-600 kilometers, sufficient to reach Tehran.

In sum, all four components of Iraq's prohibited and secret WMD program were motivated and inspired by its structural enmity and rivalry with Iran. Thus, during the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq did not use its readily available chemical weapons, stored in considerable quantities in southern Iraq, against the U.S.-led forces. The Iraqi leadership made clear to me that there would have been no military sense in using chemical weapons on such a fast-developing battlefield, where the enemy was highly mobile, well trained and well equipped for chemical warfare. In addition, the Iraqi willingness to use chemical weapons had been tempered by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's promise to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that such a contingency would change the U.S. war aim from the liberation of Kuwait to regime change in Iraq.

The fact that Iraq in the recent war did not counter the coalition forces, now even better trained and equipped than last time, with chemical weapons should not have come as a surprise. The chemical weapons, like the other WMD,

had been developed with another enemy in mind. But a big question remains about the puzzling absence of chemical weapons in Iraq. Detractors of Bush and Blair have tried to make political capital of the presumed discrepancy between the top-level assurances about Iraq's possession of chemical weapons (and other WMD) and the inability of invading forces to find such stocks. The criticism is a distortion and trivialization of a major threat to international peace and security.

During its war against Iran, Iraq found that chemical warfare agents, especially nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun and later VX, deteriorated after just a couple of weeks' storage in drums or in filled chemical warfare munitions. The reason was that the Iraqi chemists, lacking access to high-quality laboratory and production equipment, were unable to make the agents pure enough. (UNSCOM found in 1991 that the large quantities of nerve agents discovered in storage in Iraq had lost most of their lethal property and were not suitable for warfare.)

Thus the Iraqi policy after the Gulf War was to halt all production of warfare agents and to focus on design and engineering, with the purpose of activating production and shipping of warfare agents and munitions directly to the battlefield in the event of war. Many hundreds of chemical engineers and production and process engineers worked to develop nerve agents, especially VX, with the primary task being to stabilize the warfare agents in order to optimize a lasting lethal property. Such work could be blended into ordinary civilian production facilities and activities, e.g., for agricultural purposes, where batches of nerve agents could be produced during short interruptions of the production of ordinary chemicals.

This combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat -- its chemical weapon. The rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the important question of WMD in Iraq and exposed the American and British administrations to unjustified criticism.

The real chemical warfare threat from Iraq has had two components. One has been the capability to bring potent chemical agents to the battlefield to be used against a poorly equipped and poorly trained enemy. The other is the chance that Iraqi chemical weapons specialists would sign up with terrorist networks such as al Qaeda -- with which they are likely to have far more affinity than do the unemployed Russian scientists the United States worries about. In this context the remnants of Iraq's biological weapons program, and specifically its now-unemployed specialists, constitute a potential threat of much the same magnitude. While biological weapons are not easily adapted for battlefield use, they are potentially the more devastating as a means for massive terrorist onslaught on civilian targets.

As with chemical weapons, Iraq's policy on biological weapons was to develop and improve the quality of the warfare agents. It is possible that Iraq, in spite of its denials, retained some anthrax in storage. But it could be more problematic and dangerous if Iraq secretly maintained a research and development capability, as well as a production capability, run by the biologists involved in its earlier programs. Again, such a complete program would in itself constitute a more important biological weapon than some stored agents of doubtful quality.

It is understandable that the U.N. inspectors and even more, the military search teams, have had difficulty penetrating the sophisticated, well-rehearsed and protected WMD program in Iraq. The task was made infinitely more challenging by the fact that Iraq was, and indeed still is, a "republic of fear." Through my indirect contact with some senior Iraqi weapons scientists, I have been given to understand that the reign of terror is still in place.

Outsiders who have not dealt with Iraq cannot easily understand the extent to which the terror of the Hussein years has penetrated that unhappy nation. As long as Hussein and his sons are not apprehended or proven dead, few if any of those involved in the weapons program will provide information on their activities. The risk of terrible revenge against oneself or one's family is simply too great. The first point on a WMD agenda must be to create a safe environment free from the remnants of terror.

The chemical and biological warfare structures in Iraq constitute formidable international threats through potential links to international terrorism. Before the war these structures were also major threats against Iran and internally against Iraq's own Kurdish and Shiite populations, as well as Israel.

The Iraqi nuclear weapons projects lacked access to fissile material but were advanced with regard to weapon design. Here again, competition with Iran was a driving factor. Iran, as a major beneficiary of the fall of Hussein, has now been given an excellent opportunity to rethink its own nuclear weapons program and its other WMD activities.

The door is now open for diplomatic initiatives to remake the region into a WMD-free area and to shape a structure in the Persian Gulf of stability and security. Moreover, the defeat of the Hussein regime, a deadly opponent to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, has opened the door to a realistic and re-energized peace process in the Middle East.

This is enough to justify the international military intervention undertaken by the United States and Britain. To accept the alternative -- letting Hussein remain in power with his chemical and biological weapons capability --

would have been to tolerate a continuing destabilizing arms race in the gulf, including future nuclearization of the region, threats to the world's energy supplies, leakage of WMD technology and expertise to terrorist networks, systematic sabotage of efforts to create and sustain a process of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the continued terrorizing of the Iraqi people.

The writer was executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997. A former Swedish ambassador to the United States, he is now chairman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43468-2003Jun27.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

July 1, 2003

Pg. 1

C.I.A. Said To Find North Korean Nuclear Advances

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, June 30 — American intelligence officials now believe that North Korea is developing the technology to make nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop the country's growing arsenal of missiles, potentially putting Tokyo and American troops based in Japan at risk, according to officials who have received the intelligence reports.

In the assessment — which they have shared with Japan, South Korea and other allies in recent weeks — officials at the Central Intelligence Agency said American satellites had identified an advanced nuclear testing site in an area called Youngdoktong. At the site, equipment has been set up to test conventional explosives that, when detonated, could compress a plutonium core and set off a compact nuclear explosion.

Some intelligence officials say they believe that the existence of the testing range is evidence that North Korea intends to manufacture much more sophisticated weapons that would be light enough to put onto its growing arsenal of medium- and long-range missiles.

Previously, American officials had said they were uncertain whether North Korea had received enough outside technical help to even attempt the precision steps required to detonate such a "miniaturized" nuclear warhead.

The new testing capability does not mean North Korea can actually build a small weapon, but it suggests that the North Koreans are moving to combine their two most advanced weapons projects: nuclear technology and missile technology. The new intelligence reports suggest that they could develop such a weapon in less than a year, but some officials warn that that assessment represents what one called "a best guess rather than a solid estimate."

For months, Washington has been trying to convince Asian nations, especially South Korea and China, that the North Korean threat is so urgent that it requires a unified diplomatic front to force the country to give up its weapons. The new intelligence, officials who have seen it say, apparently is being marshaled to support the administration's argument.

According to officials who have been briefed on the American reports, conventional explosions simulating a nuclear detonation have been set off at the testing site, which is near North Korea's main nuclear complex. North Korea has never tested a nuclear weapon, though the C.I.A. long ago estimated that it manufactured two crude devices in the late 1980's or early 1990's.

North Korea, unlike Iraq, has made no secret of its plan to develop nuclear weapons. Now, administration officials say they fear that the North is on the verge of producing five or six new weapons, some of which might be miniaturized.

"This would give them the range they never had before, and the chance to spread their threat far beyond South Korea," said a senior Asian official, noting that about 60,000 American troops are based in Japan.

The new intelligence estimates provided to Asian allies, however, left it unclear how quickly the North could produce the small warheads. The worst-case estimate, officials say, is less than a year.

American satellites have watched North Korean nuclear activity intently since late last year, when the North evicted international inspectors. The inspectors had guarded a collection of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, which can be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium.

In January, the North restarted its reprocessing equipment, which had been mothballed under a 1994 agreement with the Clinton administration. But according to American officials, it now appears that North Korean engineers ran into technical problems in restarting the program.

While intelligence officials have reached no consensus, they told allies last week that in the worst case, only a few hundred of the 8,000 rods had been converted into plutonium. It would take 1,000 to 1,500 rods to make enough plutonium for a weapon, experts say.

"What we are told is that it would take perhaps six months after that to produce a miniaturized warhead and put it into one of the missiles," said a senior official familiar with the intelligence. "But after Iraq, who knows how good those estimates are?"

After the claims made about prohibited weapons in Iraq, which have not been found so far, skepticism about the quality of American intelligence is widespread. And in the case of North Korea, as in Iraq, the immediacy of the threat depends on whose analysis seems most compelling.

So far, American intelligence has picked up almost no sign of the telltale krypton gas that is released into the atmosphere when nuclear fuel rods are converted into weapons-grade plutonium. That has led some analysts to argue that the North may be further from producing a weapon than feared a few months ago.

But others note that trucks were seen carrying the rods from their storage area months ago, and it is unclear where they are or whether the United States is sniffing for the krypton gas in the right place.

"We don't believe that the main reprocessing facility has been very active," a senior administration official said in a recent interview. "But could there be a second reprocessor? No one knows for sure."

Without question, though, North Korea's abilities greatly outstrip anything Iraq had in the last decade, and the North's program is probably several years ahead of Iran's.

President Bush and South Korea's president, Roh Moo Hyun, declared in mid-May that their two nations "will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea." But it is unclear whether they interpret the meaning of that phrase the same way.

Mr. Bush has said he wants a diplomatic solution to the problem, but would not foreclose any option, including military options. Mr. Roh has said any pre-emptive strike against the North's nuclear facilities could prove disastrous.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/international/asia/01KORE.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times
July 1, 2003

U.S. Releases Final Reports On Cold War Toxin Tests

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, June 30 — The Pentagon made public today a final set of reports on a cold war program that tested the vulnerability of American forces to unconventional attack, having identified 5,842 people who may have been exposed to chemical or biological agents.

The end of the inquiry was criticized on Capitol Hill and by a leading veterans' organization, whose leaders said they remained unconvinced that all the tests had been documented and all those potentially exposed had been identified. The 10 test reports declassified today offered none of the revelations of earlier Pentagon releases on the test program, in which deadly substances like VX and sarin had been sprayed on sailors, ships and even on American soil.

One new fact was the disclosure that military personnel used a substance called Betapropiolactone to decontaminate naval vessels, structures and clothing. Studies of mice, rats, hamsters and guinea pigs now indicate that it may cause cancer, the Pentagon said, although the findings are not definitive.

Under the testing program, which was known as Project 112 and Project SHAD (for shipboard hazard and defense), the military conducted 50 exercises out of 134 that had been planned, the Pentagon said. The names of those known to have participated in the tests have been provided to the Department of Veterans Affairs, because they may be eligible for benefits if medical problems or disabilities can be linked to exposure.

"This release concludes a significant effort on the part of many people in the Department of Defense to ensure important information was made available to service members and the Department of Veterans Affairs," William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said. "That effort reflects our individual and collective commitment to veterans and their families."

But seven members of Congress wrote to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on Thursday stating that while they "appreciate the determination to declassify information concerning known tests," any decision by the Pentagon to "discontinue its investigation would be premature and would put thousands of veterans at further risk."

An author of the letter, Representative Mike Thompson, a California Democrat, said today: "There are still a lot of unanswered questions, and a lot of new information is still coming out. I think we do need a hearing, or at a minimum a briefing by the Department of Defense, to ask some of these questions, in particular why they think it is necessary to shut this down."

Rick Weidman, director of government relations for the Vietnam Veterans of America, said his organization had been contacted by retired military personnel who provided information that suggested additional tests were conducted and that other military units were involved beyond those described in the Pentagon reports.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/national/01TOXI.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

July 1, 2003

Russia Presses Iran To Accept Scrutiny Of The Nuclear Sites

By Sabrina Tavernise

MOSCOW, June 30 — Russia today received Iran's chief nuclear official, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, to discuss details of the two countries' cooperation on nuclear power. There is growing concern in other countries that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

Mr. Aghazadeh met with the Russian foreign minister, Igor S. Ivanov, and with the atomic energy minister, Aleksandr Rumyantsev. The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had pressed Iran to sign an international protocol that would allow more aggressive United Nations inspections of its nuclear sites.

A state-owned company in Russia began building a \$1 billion nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran, in the late 1990's. It is expected to begin operating on a test basis by next year.

Officials from the United States and Britain suspect that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, possibly by using the fuel that will be provided by Russia for use at Bushehr. Those concerns seemed to be confirmed this month, when the International Atomic Energy Agency said Iran had secretly processed nuclear material.

Other countries have urged Iran to sign an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that would lead to more aggressive United Nations inspections of its nuclear sites, but Tehran has refused, saying that its program is peaceful.

It was not immediately clear how Mr. Aghazadeh responded to the Russian request for more openness. He said only that work between the two countries was "transparent and in the framework of international law," according to Russia's state news agency, RIA-Novosti.

Still, Russia does not seem willing to abandon the project at Bushehr if Iran refuses to sign. The project employs more than 1,000 Russian experts in Iran, according to Nikolai Shingaryov, head of the Russian Atomic Ministry Information Department, and provides work for several large Russian companies.

In meetings today, Mr. Ivanov "confirmed Russia's pledge to honor its obligations" in Bushehr, the Foreign Ministry said.

However, Mr. Shingaryov said Russia would not ship any fuel before receiving a guarantee from Iran that it would return the spent fuel.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/international/europe/01RUSS.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

July 1, 2003

Britain Links Iran Trade To Nuclear Data

Economic sanctions could also be lifted if Tehran allows a closer look at its facilities. Response focuses on 'technical problems.'

By Azadeh Moaveni, Times Staff Writer

TEHRAN — Britain's foreign secretary urged Iran Monday to cooperate with the international community and allow more thorough inspections of its nuclear facilities to dispel suspicions that they could be used to develop nuclear weapons.

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, speaking at a news conference during his brief visit, said Iran must "unconditionally and quickly" sign an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that would permit unfettered inspections of its nuclear sites.

Straw, meeting with President Mohammad Khatami and other Iranian officials, tied to the signing of such a protocol the fate of a European Union trade pact, as well as the end of economic sanctions.

"If there is no signature, confidence will not be improved and the international community will be profoundly reluctant to lift the sanctions," he said.

Iran's leaders did not agree during Straw's visit to sign the protocol. Instead, Hassan Rowhani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, told Straw that Iran would invite the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to return to Iran to clear up "technical problems" over international inspections, according to the official Iranian news agency.

Washington has alleged Iran's civilian energy program is a cover for an effort to produce nuclear weapons. The discovery of several previously undisclosed nuclear facilities last summer has fueled that suspicion and helped Washington to press its concerns on Europe and Russia.

After an IAEA team visited some of those sites, it reported in June that Iran had imported and processed nuclear material without notifying the commission.

The Bush administration has said that it considers a nuclear-armed Iran unacceptable, and that the IAEA's ability to monitor nuclear activities is compromised by Iran's unwillingness to sign the additional protocol.

Iran, despite growing criticism from the international community, has remained officially reluctant to permit full inspections. It also contends that the West is ignoring a portion of the nonproliferation treaty that grants signatories the right to pursue atomic energy for civilian purposes and obliges nuclear states to assist them in doing so.

Senior officials here say that they already allow adequate inspections of the country's nuclear program. But they appear ready to use the protocol as a bargaining chip for concessions on trade and other issues.

"When Iran takes new steps to be transparent, it naturally expects others to take positive steps as well," said Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister.

Iranian officials told Straw that Iran would consider signing the protocol only if other countries committed to assisting Iran with civilian nuclear technology. Tehran is worried that as the United States, Europe and, increasingly, Russia, line up in opposition to its extensive nuclear program, the country will be left with costly facilities that sit idle without the technicians and fuel that must be imported.

Despite holding vast reserves of oil and natural gas, Iran insists it needs nuclear power to supply homes with energy, so that it can reserve its oil for export. Gholamreza Aghazadeh of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization met with Russian officials Monday in Moscow. Russia has been pressing Tehran to agree to full inspections, saying they could prove the intent of Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful.

Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear program is critical, because Russia has helped Iran construct a nearly completed 1,000-megawatt, light-water reactor in the western port of Bushehr and has considered additional nuclear power projects.

In recent months, Russian officials have begun to back away from their previous position that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

"The positions of Russia and the United States on the issue are much closer than they seem," Russian President Vladimir V. Putin said at a news conference in early June. "We need no convincing that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be prevented."

Russia's increasing willingness to view Iran's nuclear ambitions more critically helped the British foreign secretary intensify the pressure on Tehran.

Straw's visit comes at a strained moment in Britain's relations with Iran.

Though President Bush has branded Iran part of an "axis of evil," Britain has long advocated a policy of "constructive engagement" as the most effective means of encouraging the Islamic Republic to moderate its politics. That approach has seen limited measurable success with Tehran's support for anti-Israel terrorist groups and opposition to the Middle East peace process persisting unaltered.

On Iraq, Straw struck a more conciliatory note than the U.S. over the possibility of Iranian meddling. The occupation authority in Baghdad recently warned Iran against conspiring to undermine it.

Straw alluded to anxieties over "possible future actions" but said that, for now, Britain was "satisfied with the degree of cooperation received from Iran" inside Iraq.

Times staff writer David Holley in Moscow contributed to this report.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran1jul01235624,1,439264.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Washington Post
July 1, 2003
Pg. 8

CIA Removes Photos Of Uranium Equipment

By Reuters

The CIA abruptly removed from its Web site photos that showed key uranium-enriching equipment found hidden in Iraq because they revealed secrets that countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons might find helpful, analysts said yesterday.

The CIA on Thursday had posted on its Web site a statement and six photos of centrifuge parts that had been hidden for 12 years under a rosebush in the garden of an Iraqi scientist, Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi.

The spy agency touted the discovery of the parts as an illustration of the difficulty of uncovering evidence of Iraq's alleged programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, the rationale cited by President Bush in going to war. No biological or chemical weapons have been found, nor any evidence that Baghdad had restarted a nuclear weapons program, leading to charges that Bush and ally Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain exaggerated the threat posed by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

The CIA statement about Shukur Ubaydi, who was head of Iraq's pre-1991 uranium enrichment program and turned over the centrifuge documents and components, remained on its Web site. But the photos had vanished yesterday.

"We just took them down. They were up there for a few days and didn't need to be up any more," CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said, refusing to comment further.

The photos, which can still be found on other Web sites, showed the centrifuge parts and engineering drawings of a centrifuge, which is used to enrich uranium. Some of the photos showed dimensions, which would be very sensitive material, analysts said.

"These documents would be incredibly useful to countries like Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security and a former weapons inspector.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54274-2003Jun30.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

San Jose Mercury News
June 29, 2003

Bioterrorism Field Risky, So Firms Are Being cautious

By Heather Fleming Phillips, Mercury News Washington Bureau

A blueprint for battling terrorism is taking shape in the nation's capital. But this time, instead of focusing on the nation's airports and borders, this war will be fought in the laboratories of cutting-edge biotech companies in the Bay Area and across the country.

The weapons in this conflict aren't bombs or guns, but rather microscopic agents -- anthrax, smallpox and the plague -- that can ravage a community within hours.

Nearly two years after anthrax-laden letters killed five people and wreaked havoc on the nation's postal system, the United States still is ill-prepared to handle biological or chemical attacks. But the White House and Congress are working to quickly make a change. President Bush has proposed a \$6 billion plan to develop biomedical countermeasures over 10 years, and Congress is expected to pass a modified version of the proposal within the next few months.

The initiative could provide a sorely needed infusion of cash to an industry that's struggling to climb out of a three-year slump. While the first six months of this year have seen biotech stocks climb nearly 50 percent, the industry's market capitalization is still 35 percent below its lofty highs from 2000, according to Burrill & Company, a San Francisco-based biotech venture capital firm.

"This is a moonshot for the industry," said Steve Burrill, chief executive of Burrill & Company. "The impact of bioterrorism is enormously positive for this industry."

But biotech companies aren't lining up to get a piece of the government pie. Instead they're eyeing it warily, skeptical that the so-called "Project BioShield" will set out the kinds of incentives and protections they need to develop vaccines and drugs that will protect against the most deadly of diseases.

"The government doesn't have a good model there that would say why we should be putting our very valuable resources in this area," said Robert Chess, chairman of San Carlos-based Nektar Therapeutics, which is working on an inhaled insulin product. "They need to do a lot more work to make it lucrative."

Biotech is an inherently risky business, where only a handful of the many drugs being researched ever make it to market. But after tens of millions of dollars spent in research and decades worth of grueling lab work and clinical tests, at the end of the road is the prospect of making a fortune off the next big breakthrough.

For vaccines and drugs to combat smallpox, anthrax, botulism and the plague, the same doesn't necessarily hold true. The U.S. government will be the only customer -- at least for now. So companies seeking to dip their toe in the bioterrorism field are looking for some guarantees that the government will pony up the cash when the product is ready.

The government already has handed out a number of contracts to companies to develop a new anthrax vaccine and treatment for infected humans. But companies that have agreed to do the research and development are doing so with a big risk -- they have no guarantee the government will purchase the finished product.

And another pressing question for the industry is: Who will bear the liability cost of developing these new bioterrorism countermeasures? Many of the products can't be tested on humans because of the deadly consequences if they don't work.

If there are side effects, a company could face multimillion-dollar lawsuits, driving it into bankruptcy.

"Even the threat of a lawsuit can put us out of business," said Una Ryan, CEO of Avant Immunotherapeutics in Needham, Mass., speaking on a panel at the BIO 2003 conference in Washington this week.

Avant has a contract with the National Institutes of Health to develop an oral vaccine against anthrax and the plague. Project BioShield in its current form doesn't have a provision guaranteeing liability protection.

The industry also is concerned about changes made to the project in Congress. A House committee stripped out language that would have guaranteed Project BioShield continuous funding, without going through the annual appropriations process that many other government programs face. That means that even though a multiyear project to develop a drug or vaccine is under way, it could get caught up in the annual political struggle in Congress over where to spend the government's money.

Meanwhile, many biotech companies are carefully watching Brisbane-based VaxGen and others who have dabbled in government bioterrorism contracts to see how their experiences play out.

VaxGen won a \$16.1 million contract with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to develop a new anthrax vaccine and create a plan to manufacture a stockpile of 25 million doses.

Like many government contracts, VaxGen's deal follows a "cost-plus" formula, which means all its costs are covered, plus it earns a modest profit of less than 10 percent.

That model guarantees that the company isn't losing money on the deal, but it's not yielding the kind of 25 percent return that venture capitalists usually look to reap when funding biotech projects.

The contract only goes as far as phase I clinical trials. VaxGen has to bid again to win the phase II contract, and then again to actually produce the 25 million-dose stockpile.

But VaxGen CEO Lance Gordon is optimistic that the contract will yield long-term benefits and profits for the company. "Neither VaxGen nor any other biotech company would have incentives to go into servicing one of these (contracts) for the benefit of research support," he said.

Rather, he's hoping for a trickle-down effect. He expects to first win with the government stockpiling contract. Even though that profit also will be modest, from there it could lead to more lucrative agreements with state and city governments, foreign entities, and other private groups.

"I wish there were great guarantees in business. But unfortunately, such guarantees don't generally exist," Gordon said. But VaxGen would never have tread this dangerous territory if it didn't believe it had a high probability of success, he said.

For Anacor Pharmaceuticals, an early-stage biotech company in Palo Alto, working with the government was a natural fit. It won a \$22.6 million contract with the Defense Department to develop an antibiotic for anthrax.

There's nothing in the contract to say the government will purchase the product in the end, but that works for them. "We get paid to do the research. All the work we're doing is work we'd be doing anyway to develop commercial antibiotics," Anacor CEO David Perry said.

<http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/business/6196374.htm>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Bioterrorism: Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen Federal Agencies' Abilities to Respond to Public Health Emergencies.

GAO-03-139, May 30.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-139>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

July 2, 2003

Pg. 1

Subject Of Anthrax Inquiry Tied To Anti-Germ Training

By William J. Broad, David Johnston and Judith Miller

Three years ago, the United States began a secret project to train Special Operations units to detect and disarm mobile germ factories of the sort that Iraq and some other countries were suspected of building, according to administration officials and experts in germ weaponry.

The heart of the effort, these officials said, was a covert plan to construct a mobile germ plant, real in all its parts but never actually "plugged in" to make weapons. In the months before the war against Iraq, American commandos trained on this factory.

The tale of the mobile unit provides a glimpse into one of the most secretive of military and intelligence worlds, that of germ warfare defense. But here, two stories intersect. The first involves this previously unknown aspect of the Iraq war. The second involves the investigation into who sent letters containing anthrax that killed five people in the United States in late 2001.

Officials familiar with the secret project say that to design an American version of a mobile germ unit, the government turned to Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, then a rising star in the world of biological defense but more recently publicly identified by the Justice Department as "a person of interest" in the anthrax investigation.

It was unclear why investigators focused on Dr. Hatfill. Officials now say a major reason he came under suspicion was his work on the mobile unit.

Dr. Hatfill has been subjected to greater scrutiny than anyone else in the anthrax investigation, but the government has brought no charges. He has repeatedly denied any role in the attacks and has said he knows nothing about anthrax production.

Dr. Hatfill, people close to him say, is proud of his work on the mobile unit and says it demonstrates his desire to assist the government in biodefense, even though investigators tried to use his work against him. In any case, investigators found no evidence suggesting that the plant ever made anthrax, his friends, government experts and investigators all agree.

The secret trainer is similar to the mobile units that the Bush administration has accused Iraq of building to produce biological weapons. Neither its existence nor Dr. Hatfill's work on it has previously been disclosed publicly. Pat Clawson, Dr. Hatfill's spokesman and friend, said Dr. Hatfill would not comment on any secret project or any role that he might have played. Mr. Clawson also declined comment.

Dr. Hatfill helped develop the mobile plant while working for Science Applications International Corporation, a leading contractor for the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, the officials and the experts said.

They said the unit was set up last fall at Fort Bragg, N.C., to help Delta Force, the Army's elite Special Operations unit, learn what to look for in Iraq and how to react if it found dangerous mobile gear.

Several people familiar with the Delta Force trailer, including senior counterterrorism officials, said it was intended solely for training. They emphasized that its components were not connected and that it could not have made lethal germs.

Even after the F.B.I. began investigating Dr. Hatfill, the Pentagon continued to draw on his expertise. But tensions arose between the Justice Department and the Defense Department over their access to the mobile unit, the weapons experts said.

The trainer's equipment includes a fermenter, a centrifuge and a mill for grinding clumps of anthrax into the best size for penetrating human lungs, these experts said.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, suspecting that components from the Delta trainer might have been used to make the anthrax mailed in late 2001, examined the unit, officials and experts said. But investigators found no spores or other evidence linking it to the crime, they said.

The mobile unit is part of the government's secretive effort to develop germ defenses.

Critics say such biodefense projects often test the limits of the 1975 global ban on germ weapons, which the United States championed.

But the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the anthrax letters only weeks later prompted the Bush administration to greatly expand the number of such clandestine projects.

Elisa D. Harris, a Clinton administration arms control official now at the University of Maryland, said developing a mobile germ trainer would not violate the treaty. But she questioned the wisdom of it.

"It will raise concerns in other capitals," Dr. Harris said, "in part because the United States has fought tooth and nail to prevent the international community from strengthening the germ treaty."

Senior Pentagon officials declined to discuss the mobile unit. An administration official said the Pentagon had reviewed the unit to ensure legal compliance with the germ treaty.

The American mobile unit was not a first. About 50 years ago, when the United States made germ weapons, scientists drew up plans for mobile units that could produce enough anthrax to kill almost everyone in a large city, said William C. Patrick III, a former head of product development at Fort Detrick, Md., then the military's center for developing germ weapons. The goal, Mr. Patrick said in an interview, was to create a reserve in case an enemy destroyed the nation's germ factories, in Arkansas and Maryland at the time.

Over the decades, other countries, including Iraq, have also sought such mobile gear.

After Iraq lost the 1991 Persian Gulf war and agreed to destroy its unconventional arms, Iraqi officials told United Nations inspectors that Baghdad had once considered making mobile germ plants. A United Nations official said that inspectors "kept that in the back of their minds" while looking for evidence of mobile germ plants. They found none.

In the fall of 1997, Dr. Hatfill, a medical doctor, entered the world of germ defense by taking a job at Fort Detrick, where he studied protections against deadly viruses like Ebola. In late 1998, he began working at Science Applications, a company based in San Diego that has offices in the Virginia suburbs of Washington. Among other things, it helps the government develop defenses against germ weapons.

At Science Applications in Virginia, because of an increase in anthrax hoaxes, Dr. Hatfill helped commission a paper from Mr. Patrick to assess the risks of spores sent through the mail. The February 1999 paper compared the probable physical characteristics of anthrax that could be produced by amateurs with the known traits of American weapon-grade anthrax; it said nothing about anthrax production.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and other senior American officials have said that in late 1999 a defecting Iraqi chemical engineer told American officials he had supervised operations at a mobile germ unit, and that Baghdad was making a fleet of them.

By 2000, the United States appears to have concluded that the rumored Iraqi mobile plants were probably real.

At his job, Dr. Hatfill took on the mobile trainer project with enthusiasm, colleagues recalled. At times, one said, he asserted that he was its instigator.

Military officials said that the effort was financed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that works to counter biological, radiological and chemical weapons.

Experts said that Science Applications assigned the project to Dr. Hatfill and Dr. Joseph F. Soukup, a vice president for biomedical science, who helped commission the 1999 anthrax report.

Science Applications declined to discuss the project or Dr. Hatfill's involvement. "It's highly classified," Ron Zollars, a company spokesman, said. Dr. Soukup did not return phone calls.

To learn about mobile production, Dr. Hatfill again called on Mr. Patrick and his encyclopedic knowledge, said experts familiar with their work. Mr. Patrick, who also declined to comment, described the old American plans in detail, these experts said.

The collaboration, experts said, produced a novel design that demonstrated a number of ways to multiply viruses and bacteria, including the use of fermentation, chicken eggs and tissue culture. It was not meant to replicate Iraqi or American designs but instead to illustrate a range of mobile biological threats.

In 2000, Dr. Hatfill began gathering parts for the mobile unit, an expert said. Another quoted Dr. Hatfill as saying he had bought parts for the Delta trailer long before its construction and stored them in a warehouse.

"It's all the ordering of equipment that in hindsight looks suspicious," said a third expert, who is familiar with the secret federal projects that Dr. Hatfill worked on.

The trainer's construction began in September 2001, one expert said. Dr. Hatfill supervised it at A.F.W. Fabrication, a metalworking plant on the outskirts of Frederick, Md. The shop was a mile from Dr. Hatfill's apartment outside Fort Detrick's main gate.

Although Dr. Hatfill seemed fully engaged in biodefense work, his world began unraveling. That summer, the C.I.A. had rejected his application for a high-level intelligence clearance after he failed a polygraph test, associates and officials said. Then, in September 2001, the anthrax attacks began and Dr. Hatfill soon found himself under scrutiny. Science Applications fired him in March 2002. The secret Delta trailer, a person close to Dr. Hatfill said, was then half built.

Mr. Zollars of Science Applications said Dr. Hatfill did no further work for the company and received no further pay. Experts familiar with Dr. Hatfill said he continued to work on the germ trainer. "He was doing it on his own, using his own money," one recalled.

Later, as the Delta trailer was being hauled to Fort Bragg, F.B.I. agents and experts pulled it over and thoroughly checked it for anthrax and other deadly germs.

"The F.B.I. wanted to confiscate it," one expert recalled.

After tense discussions, the Pentagon kept the Delta trailer, which was set up at Fort Bragg last fall in preparation for the war with Iraq. Experts said many troops used it in training sessions run at times by Dr. Hatfill and at other times by Mr. Patrick.

"This is a sensitive thing," Col. Bill Darley, spokesman for the United States Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., said of the mobile unit in an interview. He declined to disclose details, other than to say it was used exclusively for training.

"We are not growing anthrax or botulinum toxin," Colonel Darley said. "None of this equipment is functional. It looks like — it is — the real stuff, but it's nonfunctional."

Friends said Dr. Hatfill was deeply committed to following through on the project because it was for the Special Forces, in which he had tried to serve while in the Army at Fort Bragg. "I had given my word," one friend quoted him as saying. "I wasn't about to break it."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/02/national/02GERM.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Atlanta Journal and Constitution

July 1, 2003

Pg. 1

East Alabama Edgy: Disaster Plan

Controlled Burn: Army's Destruction Of Poison Gas Is Expected To Be Safe, But Precautions Are elaborate.

By Charles Seabrook

Anniston, Ala. -- The government has provided 80-year-old Elzora Saunders with a protective hood, an indoor air filter and a kit to keep outside air from getting into her home.

Still, she's uneasy. "I hope I'll never need them," she said. "But if I do, I hope I'll remember what I'm supposed to do with them."

The items are supposed to protect her if something goes wrong with the Army's plan to destroy deadly nerve and blister weapons at the nearby Anniston Army Depot.

Nearly 2,300 tons of the chemicals -- some of the most lethal substances ever concocted by man -- are stored at Anniston. After more than two years of delays, the Army has told Congress that it plans to start burning the weapons this month in a specially built \$900 million incinerator at the depot.

Pending lawsuits could postpone the incineration process once more. But the Army's firmness on a July start has people in the Anniston area saying that it might be a go this time.

Calhoun County emergency management officials are operating on that assumption.

Preparing for an accident at the plant, they have devised intricate evacuation routes and are distributing to local residents thousands of protective hoods, air filters and shelter kits -- purchased with \$7 million from the Army.

The hoods function like gas masks but are larger and simpler to use. The filters are intended to purify air in a sealed-off room. The shelter kits contain scissors and duct tape to seal the rooms.

Emergency management officials have divided the hilly region surrounding the depot into zones depending on their vulnerability to an accidental release.

About 22,500 men, women and children living within 6 miles of the incinerator are getting hoods. Residents within 9 miles of the depot, the average distance a chemical vapor could travel in one hour, are receiving filters and kits. Households beyond that ring, up to about 30 miles from the depot, are receiving only the kits.

So far, about half the people eligible for the items had picked them up at a distribution center at the former Fort McClellan Army base in Anniston. Each person must sit through a session on how to use the hoods.

"They're coming through in a steady flow," training director John Reutter said. "Our busiest time, though, is on Sunday when people come by after church."

Schools within a 12-mile radius of the depot are slated to be overpressurized to prevent noxious vapors from flowing in, but that work has not been completed.

Residents, schools, businesses and others will be warned by wailing sirens and emergency radio and TV broadcasts if there is a release from the incinerator.

Army officials said that is not likely to happen. Redundant safety measures make it improbable that any noxious vapor will ever escape the plant, they said.

"There is nothing that can happen at the incinerator that would necessitate anyone using a hood or mask," said Mike Abrams, spokesman for the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. "Our biggest concern at the incinerator is dwarfed by things that could happen to the agents in storage."

The Army worries that terrorists could strike the heavily fortified storage site, but it is more concerned about the potential for disastrous leaks. "It's a gamble keeping these weapons in storage," Abrams said.

The liquid sarin, VX and mustard agents -- contained in rockets, projectiles, land mines, mortars and other munitions -- have been stored in earth-and-concrete igloos at the depot for more than 40 years.

The military brewed more than 32,000 tons of nerve and blister agents during the 1940s through the 1960s. The stockpile was maintained only as a deterrent, military officials say, because the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of chemical weapons in war. The protocol did not prohibit production of the weapons.

But under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, all nations must destroy their chemical arsenals by 2007. Russia and the United States are the only known chemical weapons superpowers, although U.S. forces are searching for such weapons in Iraq.

The military has destroyed more than one-fourth of the U.S. arsenal, but it acknowledges that it won't meet the deadline for getting rid of the whole stockpile. The Anniston incineration alone will take at least seven years and cost about \$2 billion.

The Army says numerous test runs at the incinerator were successful and showed that it can be operated safely with small risk to the community. "To ensure safety, we plan to start very slowly," said Timothy Garrett, the Army's project manager.

First, the Army plans to begin destroying rockets filled with nerve agents. It will process the chemicals at night and on weekends, and will provide 24 hours notice of burns.

The seven mayors in Calhoun County have signed a resolution urging the Army to go ahead with the incineration. The resolution was directed at other government officials and activist groups that have delayed startup of the incinerator.

Still, there's a chance that incineration could be delayed for several more weeks or even months. Alabama Gov. Bob Riley said he will agree to firing up the incinerator as long as a few final safety measures -- including improvements in the notification system and extra help for special-needs residents -- are met.

Without Riley's approval, the incinerator is unlikely to get a necessary state permit to operate.

His predecessor, Gov. Don Siegelman, sued last year to block the opening of the incinerator.

The lawsuit was withdrawn after the Army provided the funds to buy the hoods and other household protective equipment.

Still pending are two federal lawsuits by activist groups. One contends the military should scrap incineration and neutralize the weapons chemically. The other claims minorities will be unfairly endangered by the incinerator because it is located in an area that is disproportionately black.

Judges considering the lawsuits have not indicated when they will rule.

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

July 2, 2003

A U.N. Official To Visit Iran Over Nuclear Sites

By Nazila Fathi

TEHRAN, July 1 — With Iran coming under mounting pressure to open up its nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Iranian authorities announced today that Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Egyptian who heads the United Nations agency, would visit on July 9, his second trip to Iran this year.

Last month, the United Nations agency released a report showing that Iran had secretly processed nuclear material. Iran has so far refused to sign an additional protocol, which would allow the agency's inspectors to visit nuclear sites without prior announcement and take samples. Iran has demanded international assistance for its nuclear projects in exchange for signing the protocol.

Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, urged Iran during a two-day visit this week to sign the protocol "immediately and unconditionally" and warned that trade ties with the European Union could be jeopardized if Iran refused to open its sites to more intrusive inspection.

Dr. ElBaradei's plan to visit Iran came after Iran's secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, invited him for talks "to remove technical problems."

A senior diplomat in Tehran said: "I do not think this means Iran is moving to sign the protocol. It is a confirmation that Iran wants to work with the agency."

Khalil Mousavi, spokesman for Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said Dr. ElBaradei would stay for one day but an accompanying team might stay to visit nuclear facilities, Reuters reported.

Japan today postponed finalization of a \$2 billion deal to develop what is believed to be Iran's largest oilfield, known as Azadegan. Japan's chief cabinet secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, explained that Japan took into account international concerns about Iran's nuclear activity, The Associated Press reported.

Russia has helped Iran complete a nuclear power plant in the southern city of Bushehr. Iran independently built two other nuclear sites for processing uranium.

Despite pressure from the United States, Russia has refused to abandon the project. But during a visit to Moscow today by Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, Iran's chief nuclear official, Russian officials urged Tehran to sign the protocol in order to clear the way for nuclear fuel export to Iran.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/02/international/middleeast/02IRAN.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)