


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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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New York Times

June 25, 2003

Rumsfeld Says All Reports Pointed To Iraq Arms

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, June 24 — Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, in an energetic endorsement of prewar intelligence on Iraq, said today that "virtually everyone" had agreed that Baghdad had "weapons of mass destruction programs."

Mr. Rumsfeld said Saddam Hussein's own behavior contradicted statements that Iraq had destroyed all stockpiles of biological or chemical weapons and had disbanded its development program in advance of the American-led invasion.

"If he had in fact disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperation with the U.N., yet he continued to lie and to obstruct the U.N. inspectors," Mr. Rumsfeld said during a Pentagon news briefing. In his opening statement and during the question-and-answer exchange, Mr. Rumsfeld strode directly into a growing public debate over whether the Bush administration had exaggerated the imminent threat of Iraq using unconventional weapons, or sharing them with terrorists, in making the case for war.

"The search for Iraq's W.M.D. continues," Mr. Rumsfeld said, using the initials for weapons of mass destruction. "We're still early in the process, and the task before us is sizable and complex. But we do know this: before the war, there was no debate about whether Iraq had unconventional weapons.

"Virtually everyone agreed they did — in Congress, in successive Democratic and Republican administrations, in the intelligence communities here in the United States, and also in foreign countries and at the U.N, even among those countries that did not favor military action in Iraq," he added.

Mr. Rumsfeld was pressed as to whether his description of Iraqi weapons "programs" — as opposed to a statement that Mr. Hussein had a ready stockpile of chemical or biological arms before the war — should be interpreted as a softening of the administration's position. He said that would be "reading too much" into his comments.

"In the 90's, Iraq admitted having 8,500 liters of anthrax and several tons of VX," he said. "Iraq admitted producing 6,500 chemical bombs containing an estimated 1,000 tons of chemical agents, none of which have ever been accounted for."

The defense secretary cited the administration's Democratic Party predecessor, President Bill Clinton, as having said that Mr. Hussein "possessed 5,000 gallons of botulin, 2,000 gallons of anthrax, and 177 Scud warheads and bombs filled with biological agents."

Although American and allied forces captured Baghdad about 10 weeks ago, and have had free rein of the country since, no conclusive evidence of unconventional weapons or a program to develop them has yet been uncovered.

But Mr. Rumsfeld said there had been insufficient time to pass judgment.

"I have reason — every reason — to believe that the intelligence that we were operating off was correct and that we will, in fact, find weapons or evidence of weapons programs that are conclusive," he said. "But that's just a matter of time."

Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also defended intelligence reports that the Iraqi military had been poised to use chemical or biological weapons against advancing allied forces.

"No, I don't think you can take that off the table," General Myers said during the news briefing. He added later:

"And that's why our forces, as they moved north, wore their chemical protective gear, and when missiles were fired, short-range missiles were fired by the Iraqis towards our forces, why they put on their masks and took all the appropriate precautions. It was exactly because we thought that that was a very high probability."

But General Myers added a cautionary note about use of intelligence.

"Intelligence doesn't necessarily mean something is true," General Myers said. "It's just — it's intelligence. You know, it's your best estimate of the situation. It doesn't mean it's a fact. I mean, that's not what intelligence is."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/international/worldspecial/25PENT.html>

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Washington Post

June 25, 2003

Pg. 16

Secretary Expects Arms To Be Found

Sen. Byrd Attacks Prewar Intelligence

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld responded to criticism from Democrats yesterday by saying he believed prewar intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was correct and that in time the United States would "find weapons or evidence of weapons programs that are conclusive."

"We're still early in the process, and the task before us is sizable and complex," Rumsfeld told reporters yesterday, "but we do know this: Before the war, there was no debate about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction programs." He repeated what President Bush and other administration officials have been saying the past two weeks,

that "virtually everyone agreed" Iraq had such programs, including past Democratic and Republican administrations, foreign intelligence agencies and even countries at the United Nations "that did not favor military action." On Capitol Hill, Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) delivered a harsh criticism of the administration, saying, "For the first time in our history, the United States has gone to war because of intelligence reports claiming that a country posed a threat to our nation."

Presenting a series of prewar statements delivered by President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Byrd said, "There is an abundance of clear and unmistakable evidence that the administration sought to portray Iraq as a direct and deadly threat to the American people." But, he continued, "There is a great difference between the hand-picked intelligence that was presented by the administration to Congress and the American people when compared against what we have actually discovered in Iraq."

He urged Bush to cooperate with congressional inquiries, saying there was the possibility that intelligence reports may have been "bent, stretched or massaged to make Iraq look like an imminent threat." That, he said, "played upon the well-founded fear of the American public about future acts of terrorism."

For example, he referred to a section of the Jan. 28 State of the Union address in which Bush said, "Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -- this time armed by Saddam Hussein." Byrd said, "The face of Osama bin Laden morphed into that of Saddam Hussein," which he described as "confusing al Qaeda and Iraq." Byrd asked whether the president wasn't "trying to scare our fellow citizens half to death about them."

Rumsfeld's request yesterday for the public to have patience because it had only been eight weeks since the end of major combat echoed remarks Monday night by retiring chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, who made a final appearance in that role before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Blix said that after his inspectors had been working in Iraq for only 14 weeks, Washington wanted to end the process. "Now the U.S. government wants the world to have patience," he said. Blix said he did not "exclude that they [U.S. teams] may find something," and added that he did not know all the intelligence the United States and Britain had since the only data he sought was about sites to be inspected and not how those sites were selected. He said he became skeptical of intelligence from the United States and other countries because none of the sites proved to have weapons of mass destruction. "There was a 100 percent certainty of the existence of weapons, but zero percent knowledge of where they were," he said.

At yesterday's Pentagon news conference, Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tried to explain such a situation. "Intelligence doesn't necessarily mean something is true," Myers said. "It's your best estimate of the situation. It doesn't mean it's a fact. I mean, that's not what intelligence is. It's not -- they're -- and so you make judgments." He added that his explanation doesn't mean "we're not going to find shells with residue in them and so forth? No, it doesn't mean that."

Blix said intelligence agencies had good information on Iraq's covert procurement of dual-use items that could be used to produce chemical or biological weapons or conventional weapons Baghdad was permitted to buy. He speculated it was "plausible" that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein "wanted to preserve a jump-start situation" where he could begin producing weapons after U.N. inspections ended.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28135-2003Jun24.html>

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Los Angeles Times

June 25, 2003

Report Cites Safety Of Military Vaccination Program

Many health workers remain skeptical about the need to join the U.S. drive against smallpox.

By Susannah Rosenblatt, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The large-scale smallpox vaccinations of U.S. military personnel were conducted so safely that President Bush's civilian vaccination effort should be able to proceed at a much faster rate than it has so far, a study published Tuesday found.

But representatives of some of the front-line health-care workers who are eligible for the government's voluntary vaccination program remained skeptical about participating.

Charles Idelson, spokesman for the 50,000-member California Nurses Assn., said there was no sign of a bioterrorist attack with the smallpox virus, from which the vaccination program is designed to protect the nation.

He said the vaccination program represented a "massive diversion of public resources for badly needed health care toward a program that has, to this date, been demonstrated to be totally unnecessary. Any of the adverse reactions that have occurred as a result of this immunization program have been too many."

The study of the nearly 500,000, mostly young military personnel who were ordered to be vaccinated from December to May found that only a handful experienced serious adverse side effects. None died, according to the study, which was published in the Journal of the American Medical Assn.

The study found 37 cases of mild to severe myopericarditis (an inflammation of the heart or its membrane) among the 450,293 vaccinated. It said all 37 individuals were expected to return to duty.

There were many instances of rashes in the area where the vaccination was administered, and one case of encephalitis, an inflammation of the brain.

Bush launched a program in February aimed at inoculating 450,000 civilian health-care workers and another 10 million emergency personnel as a precaution against the possibility of a bioterrorist attack.

As of June 13, 37,608 civilian health-care workers had been inoculated, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Only a fraction of the eligible workers have volunteered to be vaccinated, and the comments of their representatives Tuesday suggested that the study of the military's experience would not have much effect.

Several hospitals and public health departments are proceeding carefully with the vaccinations, still wary of the rashes, encephalitis and heart problems linked with the disease.

"We've moved ahead slowly and safely and cautiously," said Tim Church, a communications representative with the Washington state Health Department. The department's secretary is Mary Selecky, the president of the Assn. of State and Territorial Health Officials.

Washington state has so far vaccinated 543 employees. "We certainly have felt that it would increase our level of preparedness," Church said. "We support the federal efforts."

Congress enacted legislation in April to guarantee compensation to civilians injured by the smallpox vaccine. Even that had little effect on the campaign.

The Los Angeles County Department of Health Services had aimed at vaccinating 10,000 employees; the current count is 238, according to Dr. Laurene Mascola, chief of the department's acute communicable disease control unit. Mascola said that although the smallpox vaccine "isn't the best vaccine in the world, we still need people vaccinated in the event of [a terrorist] event." She said the department had targeted its vaccination efforts on potential responders to a public health emergency.

"We are in agreement with the nation," she said. "But this study doesn't change feelings or our plans."

The military study was written by John Grabenstein of the Army Medical Command's Military Vaccine Agency and Dr. William Winkenwerder Jr., the assistant Defense secretary for health.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-pox25jun25,1,3041390.story?coll=la-headlines-nation>

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New York Times

June 25, 2003

Laboratories Set To Undergo Major Overhaul Of Security

By Associated Press

WASHINGTON, June 24 — Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham ordered a broad overhaul of security today at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories in response to security lapses that include missing computers, misuse of credit cards and reports of sleeping guards.

The order came after a Congressional report said security upgrades required by the heightened terrorist threat since Sept. 11, 2001, would not be fully put into effect and tested at the department's nuclear weapons facilities for two to five years.

In light of recent security breaches at the laboratories, Mr. Abraham said, "improved security must be aggressive and far-reaching."

He said he was directing the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees nuclear weapons programs, "to put in place any immediate changes" deemed necessary to prevent future problems.

All three of the major nuclear weapons laboratories — Sandia and Los Alamos in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore in California — have been afflicted by security embarrassments in recent months.

"Security is lax; our nuclear secrets are not safe," Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, said today at a hearing.

Mr. Grassley described a long list of security problems at the weapons laboratories, including lost keys to secure areas, guards found sleeping, stolen laptop computers and a case where two vials of plutonium oxide were missing for two years without being reported.

In another incident, a van was stolen from a secure area of the Sandia laboratory, driven through a fence and later found in a commercial parking lot. The incident was treated as "a routine auto theft," although no one knows what was inside the van. A classified computer was also missing from the same area, Mr. Grassley said.

Representative Christopher Shays, the Connecticut Republican who is the chairman of the House Government Reform subcommittee on security, said there was "lax management and stubborn cultural antipathy" at the research laboratories despite heightened concern about terrorists obtaining nuclear material since the Sept. 11 attacks.

But Linton Brooks, head of the nuclear security administration, said none of the recent incidents raised a national security concern except the incident involving the vials of plutonium. Mr. Brooks called that a "bookkeeping problem."

He announced that two retired admirals, both former commanders of the United States Strategic Command, would review aspects of the security situation at the weapons complexes, including the research laboratories and their manpower needs.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/national/25NUKE.html>

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Los Angeles Times

June 25, 2003

Pg. 1

In Montana, Terror War Hits Too Close To Home

Planned bioresearch lab would seek cures for deadly pathogens. Critics fear accident.

By Charles Piller, Times Staff Writer

HAMILTON, Mont. — In the shadow of the snow-capped Bitterroot Mountains, moon-suit-clad scientists will soon begin producing gallons of concentrated death.

Armed guards, a reinforced perimeter and biometric locks will protect a hermetically sealed laboratory — a "hot zone" designed to trap the deadliest microbes on Earth: Ebola and Lassa viruses that cause hemorrhagic fevers, and others that produce exotic scourges for which no vaccines or medicines exist.

The lab's goal is finding cures for these feared bioterrorism agents, but that is little consolation to residents at the Hamilton Senior Center across the street, diners at the Spice of Life cafe downtown, or boys scrimmaging on Hamilton Middle School's football field, a few blocks from the lab fence.

"We've got homes and children sleeping 50 meters away," said Jim Miller, a University of Montana research biologist and local resident. "They never consider the possibility that there could be a pathogen breach. It's like at Three Mile Island, saying that there could never be a release of radiation from a nuclear power plant."

The planned high-security lab is part of a federal movement to dot the country with at least six new bioterrorism research facilities designed to the most stringent level of pathogen containment, a standard known as "Biosafety Level 4."

Universities, research centers and some local officials are clamoring to join the building boom because of the hundreds of millions of dollars in research money that will flow their way.

But the plans have sparked a furious "not-in-my-back yard" movement, with residents mobilizing not against some mini-mall or landfill, but a key element of the federal research strategy against bioterrorism.

Residents have packed public hearings, questioning officials with angry suspicion. They have already blocked a Department of Homeland Security plan to upgrade its Plum Island Animal Disease Center off Long Island, N.Y., and have sued to scuttle a lab proposed by UC Davis, where more than 50 faculty members oppose the lab.

"The risk is low, but the outcome is total devastation," said Linda Perry, a Hamilton veterinarian, gesturing toward the verdant river valley. "If there is an accident, people here are going to lose everything."

John La Montagne, deputy director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, or NIAID, in Bethesda, Md., which operates Rocky Mountain Laboratories, where the new facility would be built, described local critics as intransigent NIMBY spoilers who don't understand level-4 precautions.

Sterilized waste from such labs is cleaner than what comes out of any home, he said. "Safety is a nonissue," he said. "These are highly safe facilities."

But for lab opponents, the dispute has long transcended seemingly endless debates over technical safety and costs versus benefits. The sealed facilities have become a troubling sign that the war on terrorism has intruded into once-routine lives, its shadow stretching into the farthest corners of America.

"In a naive way, I did think that I could move here and escape," said Cooper Neville, an artist who moved from New York to flee the nagging sense of modern doom — from terrorism to environmental disaster. "You can run, but you can't hide."

The town of Hamilton, population 3,700, lies in a sweeping river valley surrounded by mountains that soar to 10,000 feet. Driving south from Missoula, the landscape is dotted by ranches, the occasional seedy casino and several log-home builders. One of its biggest employers is Rocky Mountain Laboratories, which traces its roots to 1902, when scientists in a log cabin studied a mysterious disease, later named Rocky Mountain spotted fever.

Hamilton would seem suitably remote for studying the tools of bioterrorism — the kind of place lab opponents in other towns might suggest as an alternative to their own communities.

The nation has never had an enormous need for such advanced facilities. There are now four level-4 labs — the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, the Army's Ft. Detrick in Maryland, the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio and a facility at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda that currently uses only level-3 organisms.

The CDC will soon open a new level-4 lab, as will the University of Texas at Galveston. NIAID plans large-scale labs at Hamilton and Ft. Detrick. Boston University; the University of Illinois at Chicago; the New York State Department of Health in Rome, N.Y.; Oregon Health and Science University in Portland and UC Davis are vying to build two other labs.

Level-4 labs are an outgrowth of the two great terrors of modern biology — germ warfare and the advent of genetic engineering in the early 1970s, which opened the possibility of altered organisms with unknown risks.

A modern level-4 is a pristine isolation chamber — at once meticulously contained and yet unavoidably dirty and dangerous. About 20 liters of concentrated Ebola and other dangerous organisms — enough to infect every person on the planet — may be brewed for experiments to develop vaccines, said La Montagne. Multi-liter quantities also are used to infect animals with a fine mist of deadly germs when testing vaccines.

Researchers enter in heavy, rubberized suits tethered to dedicated air supplies. They need security clearance and follow the two-person rule — no one works alone. Negative air pressure keeps germs inside; exhaust air passes through ultra-fine filters that trap microbial particles. Scientists exit through a chemical shower before disrobing. Jim Orzechowski, chief executive of Smith Carter Architects & Engineers Inc. in Winnipeg, Canada, a top innovator in hot labs, said new labs are festooned with safety systems, and can withstand a small plane crash.

"We're getting as close to fail-safe as possible," Orzechowski said, adding: "As fail-safe as the space shuttle."

That analogy defines the rift between the labs and their neighbors: There will always remain some small chance of error. When it comes to Ebola, anthrax or other dangerous pathogens, a single mistake can lead to disaster.

Mary Wulff, a former Santa Ana police officer who has coordinated opposition to the Hamilton Lab, said: "What would make me happier than anything is never having to say, 'I told you so.'"

The debate has raged over wildly differing perceptions of unlikely, yet terrifying prospects.

There is no dispute that mistakes have been made in the past. Since the late 1960s, there have been about 75 laboratory infections involving organisms that require the highest containment — 10 fatal, according to the CDC. There have been no infections since 1980, and no one outside of a hot lab has ever been inadvertently infected. Ft. Detrick's aging laboratory sewer, a labyrinth of cast-iron pipes encased in concrete, has sprung numerous leaks. In 1997 the Army concluded that chemicals and "potentially infectious waste water" are leaching into the groundwater.

Orzechowski, designer of most of the new level-4 labs in the U.S., said that at the decades-old Ft. Detrick and CDC labs, walls are cracking and ventilation systems degrading — endangering researchers, although not the public. "You never get the straight stories," he said regarding comments from the facilities' operators. "None of those laboratories can meet their own requirements in terms of containment."

Opponents of new level-4 labs view recent accidents as precursors to a lethal epidemic.

In April 2002, anthrax spores were twice found outside secure areas at Ft. Detrick. The Army said no employees were sickened, but it has not disclosed the cause of the accident.

In December, at the Plum Island level-3 lab, then run by the Department of Agriculture, primary and backup power systems failed for three hours, shutting down ventilation and filtration. Lab staff members sealed secure areas with duct tape until power was restored. The incident occurred during a strike of maintenance employees, which featured charges of vandalism.

Such lapses are less dangerous than they sound, because outside a living host or controlled lab, most deadly microbes quickly die, experts say. The escape of infected animals or insects, accidental infection of a lab worker or the theft of lab samples pose a risk, but are considered far-fetched prospects, given tight security, authorities say.

But an incident in January at Texas Tech has troubled critics and sponsors alike. A researcher, Thomas Butler, falsely reported about 30 vials of plague bacteria missing. He later said the samples were accidentally destroyed.

Butler, whose motives remain unclear, was indicted by a federal grand jury and faces 15 charges, including lying to authorities and shipping microbes without permission to Tanzania.

Richard Ebright, a professor of microbiology at Rutgers University, said that adding many new ultra-secure labs will inevitably — and unnecessarily — enlarge such problems. The big three of bioterrorism are smallpox, anthrax and plague. By law, smallpox can only be studied at the CDC in Atlanta, he said. The others can be treated with antibiotics and don't require level-4 labs — although federal officials say that in some cases, large quantities of level-3 or even level-2 microbes, including anthrax, might be studied in secure labs for extra safety.

The new labs are required only for a few obscure viruses, such as those causing Ebola and Marburg fevers, which pose little or no U.S. public-health threat and are considered dubious weapons of bioterrorism, according to Ebright. Marshall Bloom, associate director of Rocky Mountain Laboratories, has heard all the arguments before, but says they pale against the threat that a bioterrorist attack could catch the country unprepared.

With more labs and researchers, he said, the United States could work faster to deal with what he considers a national emergency.

"It bothers me that people have had this feeling of entitlement," that they should be protected from facing the greater needs of society, he said.

Hamilton's mayor, Joseph Petrusaitis, said the town will also benefit if residents can overcome their fear. The prize is a piece of the \$6-billion federal plan, known as Project BioShield, to increase bio-defense research.

"This is the biomedical Silicon Valley of Montana," he said in an interview after his shift as a delivery man for the local laundry. "This would put Hamilton on the map."

Petrusaitis blamed the local rancor on "leftist" environmentalists. "It frustrated me that there was so much mistrust," he said. "I have a lot of love for the environment. But because of my faith in the saving grace of Jesus Christ, I think we should be good stewards of the environment, but we shouldn't worship the environment."

Such thoughts underscore how the debate has become as much about emotions as science.

Many residents are recoiling from the realization that the war on terrorism has followed them to one of the most remote recesses of the country.

"If you type [BSL-4] into the Internet, it comes up 'Rocky Mountain Lab,'" said Perry, the Hamilton veterinarian and a former researcher at the lab. "It's putting us on the map — and not a good map."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-sci-biolab25jun25235424.1.7287225.story?coll=la-headlines-nation>

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Washington Post

June 25, 2003

Pg. E1

Firm's Anthrax Drug Cleared For Human Tests

By Justin Gillis, Washington Post Staff Writer

A Rockville biotechnology company plans to announce today that it has received government permission to launch human tests of a drug designed to combat anthrax, the biowarfare agent that killed five people and terrified Congress in 2001.

Human Genome Sciences Inc. appears to be ahead of several competitors to develop such a compound. Its drug, Abthrax, could be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration for approval in months, presenting the Bush administration with a test of its stated commitment to buy anti-terrorism drugs if industry takes the trouble to develop them.

The drug is a synthetic antibody, a type of protein similar to antibodies produced by the immune system, that neutralizes the main toxin produced by the anthrax germ. Anthrax can already be treated with antibiotics, but drugs like the one Human Genome Sciences is developing might be useful as an adjunct to or replacement for antibiotics in several situations.

The drug is on an unusually fast path.

Anthrax is rare as a naturally occurring disease, and, because it's potentially fatal, humans can't ethically be exposed to it in tests. That means the only test available to show the new drug works is in animals. Human Genome Sciences said the drug has already passed that test, showing marked improvement in survival for animals that received the new drug and were exposed to anthrax spores.

The company has now received FDA permission to test the drug in people, but only to see if it can be administered safely. The test subjects won't be exposed to anthrax spores. The initial safety tests, in scores of healthy volunteers, are likely to go rapidly.

But William A. Haseltine, chairman and chief executive of Human Genome Sciences, said the company won't proceed to the more expensive final phases of safety testing unless it's clear the government is willing to buy the drug. "It has to make economic sense, or we will not proceed with it," he said.

Under new legislation, drugs like this may win FDA approval based only on animal studies of their effectiveness, coupled with human safety tests. That means the drugs may well enter national anti-terror stockpiles without doctors having a clear fix on how to use them.

Theory suggests that an anthrax antibody, like Abthrax, may be useful in several situations. If terrorists create an anthrax strain resistant to antibiotics, an antibody might be the only treatment for exposed people.

An anthrax vaccine is available, but it requires multiple shots over months. By contrast, an antibody injection would in theory confer instant immunity, so it might save the lives of soldiers or workers at risk of exposure to the germ who haven't already been immunized.

Finally, a high proportion of people who develop anthrax symptoms die in spite of receiving antibiotics. The antibiotics attack the germ itself, but not a toxin that it releases into the blood. Drugs like Abthrax are specifically designed to attack the toxin, so they might, in theory, save the lives of people who are not responding well to standard anthrax treatment.

Exactly how well the drug would work may be answered only if there's another terrorist attack with anthrax, like the ones in 2001 that emptied congressional and media offices, killed several postal workers and others, and forced some 10,000 people, including members of Congress and their employees, onto antibiotic therapy as a preventive measure.

Because a drug like Abthrax would generally be useful only in an attack, there's likely to be no routine commercial market for it. Instead, the government has pledged to create a market for such drugs by stockpiling them if they meet certain criteria.

The nation already has large stockpiles of anti-terrorism drugs and supplies, but administrators at the Department of Health and Human Services have complained that they don't have the authority to make long-term purchase commitments that would create a stronger incentive for firms to undertake expensive research and development. President Bush has asked Congress to fix that by passing Project BioShield, which would commit some \$6 billion to anti-terror defenses over 10 years. The National Institutes of Health has said the Human Genome Sciences drug may serve as a test for whether Project BioShield can work.

The legislation has bogged down in Congress. Bush, speaking Monday to biotechnology executives in Washington, demanded again that Congress resolve the issues. "For the sake of our national security, . . . Congress must pass the BioShield legislation as soon as possible," Bush said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28254-2003Jun24.html>

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London Guardian

June 24, 2003

How Two Students Built An A-Bomb

It's one of the burning questions of the moment: how easy would it be for a country with no nuclear expertise to build an A-bomb? Forty years ago in a top-secret project, the US military set about finding out. Oliver Burkeman talks to the men who solved the nuclear puzzle in just 30 months

Dave Dobson's past is not a secret. Not technically, anyway - not since the relevant US government intelligence documents were declassified and placed in the vaults of the National Security Archive, in Washington DC. But Dobson, now 65, is a modest man, and once he had discovered his vocation - teaching physics at Beloit College, in Wisconsin - he felt no need to drop dark hints about his earlier life. You could have taken any number of classes at Beloit with Professor Dobson, until his recent retirement, without having any reason to know that in his mid-20s, working entirely as an amateur and equipped with little more than a notebook and a library card, he designed a nuclear bomb.

Today his experiences in 1964 - the year he was enlisted into a covert Pentagon operation known as the Nth Country Project - suddenly seem as terrifyingly relevant as ever. The question the project was designed to answer was a simple one: could a couple of non-experts, with brains but no access to classified research, crack the "nuclear secret"? In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, panic had seeped into the arms debate. Only Britain, America,

France and the Soviet Union had the bomb; the US military desperately hoped that if the instructions for building it could be kept secret, proliferation - to a fifth country, a sixth country, an "Nth country", hence the project's name - could be averted. Today, the fear is back: with al-Qaida resurgent, North Korea out of control, and nuclear rumours emanating from any number of "rogue states", we cling, at least, to the belief that not just anyone could figure out how to make an atom bomb. The trouble is that, 40 years ago, anyone did.

The quest to discover whether an amateur was up to the task presented the US Army with the profoundly bizarre challenge of trying to find people with exactly the right lack of qualifications, recalls Bob Selden, who eventually became the other half of the two-man project. (Another early participant, David Pipkorn, soon left.) Both men had physics PhDs - the hypothetical Nth country would have access to those, it was assumed - but they had no nuclear expertise, let alone access to secret research.

"It's a very strange story," says Selden, then a lowly 28-year-old soldier drafted into the army and wondering how to put his talents to use, when he received a message that Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb and the grumpy commanding figure in the US atomic programme, wanted to see him. "I went to DC and we spent an evening together. But he began to question me in great detail about the physics of making a nuclear weapon, and I didn't know anything. As the evening wore on, I knew less and less. I went away very, very discouraged. Two days later a call comes through: they want you to come to Livermore."

Livermore was the Livermore Radiation Laboratory, a fabled army facility in California, and the place where Dave Dobson, in a similarly surreal fashion, was initiated into the project. The institution's head offered him a job. The work would be "interesting", he promised, but he couldn't say more until Dobson had the required security clearance. And he couldn't get the clearance unless he accepted the job. He only learned afterwards what he was expected to do. "My first thought," he says today, with characteristic understatement, "was, 'Oh, my. That sounds like a bit of a challenge.'"

They would be working in a murky limbo between the world of military secrets and the public domain. They would have an office at Livermore, but no access to its warrens of restricted offices and corridors; they would be banned from consulting classified research but, on the other hand, anything they produced - diagrams in sketchbooks, notes on the backs of envelopes - would be automatically top secret. And since the bomb that they were designing wouldn't, of course, actually be built and detonated, they would have to follow an arcane, precisely choreographed ritual for having their work tested as they went along. They were to explain at length, on paper, what part of their developing design they wanted to test, and they would pass it, through an assigned lab worker, into Livermore's restricted world. Days later, the results would come back - though whether as the result of real tests or hypothetical calculations, they would never know.

"The goal of the participants should be to design an explosive with a militarily significant yield," read the "operating rules", unearthed by the nuclear historian Dan Stober in a recent study of the project published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences*. "A working context for the experiment might be that the participants have been asked to design a nuclear explosive which, if built in small numbers, would give a small nation a significant effect on their foreign relations."

Dobson's knowledge of nuclear bombs was rudimentary, to say the least. "I just had the idea that [to make a bomb] you had to quickly put a bunch of fissile material together somehow," he recalls. The two men were assigned to one of Livermore's less desirable office spaces, in a converted army barracks near the facility's perimeter. Bob Selden found a book on the Manhattan Project that culminated in America's development of the bomb. "It gave us a road map," Dobson says. "But we knew there would be important ideas they'd deliberately left out because they were secret. This was one of the things that produced a little bit of paranoia in us. Were we being led down the garden path?"

They faced one key decision, Dobson says: whether to design a gun-style bomb, like the one dropped on Hiroshima, that used a sawn-off howitzer to crash two pieces of fissile material together, or a more complex implosion bomb, like that dropped on Nagasaki. By now they were beginning to enjoy the challenge, so they went for the harder, more impressive option. "The gun device needed a large amount of material, and didn't make a very big bang," Dobson says. "The other one was more bang, less material."

Dobson and Selden had decided to assume that their fictional Nth Country had already obtained the requisite plutonium - a huge assumption, since it would be, almost certainly, the hardest part - but there was plenty more to consider. "Obtaining the fissile material is really the major problem - that drives the whole project," says Selden.

"But the process of designing the weapon - I'm always careful to point out that many people overstate how easy it is. You really have to do it right, and there are thousands of ways to do it wrong. You can't just guess."

As Stober's study noted, the two amateurs were ironically aided by information published as part of President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program, which spread word of the benefits of non-military nuclear power

around the world. And Atoms for Peace was only the most prominent example of a fad for everything nuclear that propelled a huge amount of technical detail into the public domain.

Eventually, towards the end of 1966, two and a half years after they began, they were finished. "We produced a short document that described precisely, in engineering terms, what we proposed to build and what materials were involved," says Selden. "The whole works, in great detail, so that this thing could have been made by Joe's Machine Shop downtown."

Agonisingly, though, at the moment they believed they had triumphed, Dobson and Selden were kept in the dark about whether they had succeeded. Instead, for two weeks, the army put them on the lecture circuit, touring them around the upper echelons of Washington, presenting them for cross-questioning at defence and scientific agencies. Their questioners, people with the highest levels of security clearance, were instructed not to ask questions that would reveal secret information. They fell into two camps, Selden says: "One had been holding on to the hope that designing a bomb would be very difficult. The other argued that it was essentially trivial - that a high-school science student could do it in their garage." If the two physics postdocs had pulled it off, their result, it seemed, would fall somewhere between the two - "a straightforward technical problem, but one that involves some rather sophisticated physics".

Finally, after a valedictory presentation at Livermore attended by a grumpy General Edward Teller, they were pulled aside by a senior researcher, Jim Frank. "Jim said, 'I bet you guys want to know how it turned out,'" Dobson recalls. "We said yes. And he told us that if it had been constructed, it would have made a pretty impressive bang." How impressive, they wanted to know. "On the same order of magnitude as Hiroshima," Frank replied.

"It's kind of a depressing thing to know, that it could be that easy," Dobson says. "On the other hand, it's far better to know the truth." And the truth today, he is certain, is that terrorists - with a bit of luck and, crucially, access to the right materials - could easily build a nuclear bomb. "Back in the 50s, there were two schools of thought - that the ideas could be kept secret, and that the material could be locked up. Now? Well, hopefully the materials can still be locked up, but we all have our doubts about that." Obtaining sufficiently enriched fissile material could be difficult but, when it comes to creating the bomb, "It turns out it's not overwhelmingly difficult. There are some subtleties that are not trivial ... but an awful lot has been published. If you were a grad student today, and you reviewed the literature, a lot of pieces would fall into place."

It was, relatively speaking, easy - so easy that both Selden and Dobson seem to have emerged from the Nth Country Experiment deeply troubled by their own capacities. Selden stayed in the military, on a career that sent him from Livermore to the army's other major research base, at Los Alamos, and is still a member of the US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; he has been closely involved in planning how the US might respond to a nuclear terrorist incident. Dobson, meanwhile, felt so uncomfortable that he left the sector entirely. "It was one thing to work on a project which was hopefully going to illuminate the decision makers so they could see that weapons were easily designed," he says. "It was a rather different thing to go in and say, 'OK, for example, let's make a thermonuclear device that's only four inches in diameter.' That's an acceleration of the arms race, and I didn't really want to do that."

Einstein was famously said to have commented that if he had only known that his theories would lead to the development of the atom bomb, he would have been a locksmith. Dave Dobson, having designed one, got a job as a teacher.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,983646,00.html>

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Washington Times

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Pg. 1

Bush Warns Iran To Keep No-Nukes Vow

IAEA report cites failure to aid inspectors

By Joseph Curl, The Washington Times

President Bush yesterday warned Iran that it had better keep its promise not to develop nuclear weapons, "and if they don't, we'll deal with that when they don't."

A new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) outlines Iran's failure to provide access for agency inspectors that the president said is unacceptable.

"Iran must comply. I mean, the free world expects Iran to comply. Just leave it at that. ... We believe they will when the free world comes together," Mr. Bush said after a White House meeting with European Union leaders.

The United States and Europe, which were at odds over how to handle Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, yesterday agreed that Iran must be confronted over its pledge to allow more open inspections of its nuclear projects. Both agree that Iran could be using their atomic energy program as a cover to develop nuclear weapons.

"America and the EU agree that Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA," Mr. Bush said. "We agree that Iran must sign and comply with an additional protocol giving the IAEA new tools to investigate clandestine nuclear weapons activities.

"Iran has pledged not to develop nuclear weapons, and the entire international community must hold that regime to its commitments," he said.

At an East Room press conference, Romano Prodi, president of the European Commission, said European leaders understand the threat posed by an Iran with nuclear weapons and therefore back the United States in calling on Tehran to allow IAEA inspectors free access.

"We push that they accept all the inspections, even ... planned inspections because we have to be sure that doesn't constitute a danger to future peace. We have to be absolutely sure," Mr. Prodi said.

In Tehran, the defense minister accused the United States of pressuring Iran over its nuclear program to cover up for its failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the state news agency Islamic Republic (IRNA) reported yesterday.

"The U.S. approach to Iran is one of threats and seeking concessions, in other words forcing Iran to accept its unlawful demands," Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani told the agency. "The reason why the U.S. is pressuring the IAEA ... is to escape from its claims on the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that it has not found."

He said that failure has led to U.S. accusations that Iran's clerical leadership is meddling in Iraq, helping al Qaeda fugitives and seeking a nuclear arsenal.

"Everyone knows that al Qaeda was started by the U.S., that most of its top leaders were trained by the U.S., and that they received U.S. financial and logistical support," he said.

Holding their first meeting since the war in Iraq, Mr. Bush, Mr. Prodi and Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis, whose country holds the EU presidency, made efforts to move past ugly disagreements.

"Many people have said that Europe is too old," said Mr. Prodi, a reference to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld calling antiwar allies part of "old Europe." Added Mr. Prodi: "Maybe, but the old age helps us to understand our strengths and our weakness."

With a wry smile, Mr. Bush replied, "You're looking pretty young these days."

Said Mr. Simitis: "The United States and the European Union cannot possibly have and share on foreign policy or trade interests in all areas the same opinions. There will be issues and times where we will differ.

"But friendship presupposes that we will have to agree to differ, to accept to differ. And friendship presupposes that we must be disciplined and manage our differences. We should always act on the basis that what unites us will always outweigh any issue that divides us," he said.

To illustrate that point, the leaders yesterday announced a new agreement to curb funding to terrorism organizations and hasten extradition of terrorists. The pact, signed by Attorney General John Ashcroft and Greek Minister of Justice Philippos Petsalnikos, broadens the number of crimes that extradition will apply to and authorizes such things as joint investigative teams, video testimony in court cases and sharing information on suspect bank accounts. "These treaties focus not on our differences, but on our common values," Mr. Ashcroft said at the Justice Department.

The leaders brushed over another issue separating them — genetically modified food. A 1998 European moratorium bans the import of genetically modified foods because many European consumers fear health risks.

Mr. Bush used a trip to France earlier this month to urge Europe to change its policy, arguing that it is worsening famine in Africa by discouraging African nations from investing in biotechnology.

But the U.S.-European relationship is once again strong enough that Mr. Bush could joke about the issue with the leaders, said White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer.

He said the president ended yesterday's morning meetings by telling EU leaders, "'Let's go eat some genetically modified food for lunch.' He said it with a big smile and everybody laughed," Mr. Fleischer said.

It wasn't true, though. They dined on freshwater prawns, fruitwood-smoked Kobe beef tenderloin, pencil Asparagus and potato hash.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030625-115341-7125r.htm>

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Iraqi Scientist Turns Over Nuclear Plans, Parts

Former Head of Uranium Enrichment Program Had Buried Material in Yard After 1991 Gulf War

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

A former Iraqi nuclear scientist has given U.S. intelligence officials a new lead in their search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction: a trove of blueprints and parts he says were buried 12 years ago for use in the event that Saddam Hussein resumed his quest for a nuclear bomb, a nuclear research group and Bush administration officials said yesterday.

Mahdi Obeidi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program in the late 1980s and early 1990s, turned over the documents to U.S. officials in Baghdad voluntarily and is now assisting the investigation of Iraq's former weapons program, according to officials of the Institute for Science and International Security, a nonprofit research group that advised the scientist in his decision to surrender the materials to the U.S. government.

Obeidi supplied U.S. officials with several components of a gas centrifuge, a machine used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, along with design plans for the machines, the institute's assistant director, Corey Hinderstein, said yesterday. The scientist, who contacted the group in late April, said he buried the materials in his yard in 1991 under orders from Hussein's son, Qusay.

"If the order was given, these documents and materials could be used to restart the program," Hinderstein said. She added: "Obeidi did not receive that order."

Despite assertions by Bush administration officials before the war that Iraq was rebuilding a nuclear program, U.S. officials have so far found no evidence that Hussein had reconstituted the advanced nuclear weapons program he developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s. That program, which included the construction of several facilities for enriching uranium, was dismantled in the early 1990s by coalition forces and by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

Still, the discovery of buried blueprints and centrifuge parts earlier this month appeared to confirm suspicions that Hussein was prepared to resume his quest for prohibited weapons in the future, perhaps after the lifting of sanctions against Iraq.

CNN and NBC first reported yesterday the discovery of the blueprints and parts.

Gas centrifuges are fast-spinning machines used to process uranium into fissile material needed for nuclear weapons. Producing enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon would require the use of hundreds of centrifuges working constantly for up to a year.

Hinderstein said the blueprints provided by Obeidi would have saved Iraq considerable time if Hussein had decided to restart his nuclear program.

"They would not have to start from scratch," she said. "Iraq would still have been years from making a weapon. But they would have saved themselves time, on the order of years."

In an interview with CNN broadcast yesterday, Obeidi said he decided to turn the materials over to U.S. officials in part to encourage other Iraqi scientists to cooperate.

"I have very important things at my disposal that I have been ordered to have, to keep, and I've kept them," Obeidi said in the interview. "And I don't want this to proliferate, because of the potential consequences, if it falls in the hands of tyrants, in the hands of dictators or of terrorists."

A senior administration official said the parts and about two feet of documents were turned over to the CIA this month. He said U.S. officials consider this a "significant development" that demonstrates the challenge of uncovering Iraq's weapons and programs. "We can't dig up every garden in the country," he said.

He confirmed that the Iraqi scientist said the material was hidden after the Persian Gulf War but before inspectors arrived. The idea was to give Iraq "a leg up and save millions of dollars" if the nuclear weapons program were ever reconstituted.

Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33828-2003Jun25.html>

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Weapons Reports Called Lacking

Military nominee says U.S. intelligence on Iraq was 'perplexingly incomplete.'

By John Hendren, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — U.S. intelligence on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction was "perplexingly incomplete," Gen. John P. Abizaid, President Bush's nominee to head the U.S. Central Command, told a Senate committee Wednesday.

"Intelligence was the most accurate that I've ever seen on the tactical level, probably the best I've ever seen on the operational level, and perplexingly incomplete on the strategic level with regard to weapons of mass destruction," Abizaid told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Abizaid's comments during confirmation hearings came as the Bush administration faces greater scrutiny from Congress on the decision to go to war. Lawmakers are questioning experts behind closed doors and poring over documents to determine whether the administration exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein or pressured intelligence analysts to skew their reports. In Britain, a parliamentary inquiry is examining whether Prime Minister Tony Blair's government did the same.

Both governments have denied any wrongdoing.

As U.S. and allied forces prepared to invade Iraq, Abizaid told senators, he asked his staff at the U.S. Central Command's temporary headquarters in Qatar, "Is there anybody around this table who believes we will not find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?" No one said no, he recalled.

And as U.S. forces moved north toward Baghdad, "I thought as we crossed what we termed the red line that we would overrun artillery units that had chemical warheads," the general said.

Abizaid, who was second in command to Gen. Tommy Franks during the war, said he could not explain why banned weapons had not been found despite nearly 1,000 visits to suspect sites.

"It is perplexing to me, Senator, that we have not found weapons of mass destruction, when the evidence was so pervasive that it would exist," he said. "I can't offer a reasonable explanation I don't know, and I think that we won't know for a while."

Both the British government and the Bush administration argued before the war that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and a program to develop nuclear weapons and that these posed such an immediate threat to its neighbors and the United States that war was necessary to disarm the country.

U.S. officials have scaled back those claims in recent weeks and now increasingly argue that Hussein's regime instead planned to reconstitute its unconventional arms programs if U.N. sanctions were lifted.

Evidence for that argument was strengthened Wednesday when the CIA confirmed a CNN report that a former Iraqi nuclear scientist, Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, had led intelligence officials to a cache of nuclear-related components and a 2-foot stack of documents he buried in 1991 under a rosebush at his Baghdad home.

The materials were from Iraq's vast but unsuccessful nuclear weapons programs of the 1980s. The cache had been hidden illegally from International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, who were responsible for dismantling Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons infrastructure after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraq's nuclear weapons effort was in effect destroyed by 1998, according to the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency.

Ubaydi said the buried components were "part of a secret high-level plan to reconstitute the nuclear weapons program once sanctions ended," a U.S. intelligence official in Washington said.

"This is significant, but it doesn't prove Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program," the official said. "But their existence validates our long-standing view that Iraq had hidden nuclear technology."

The official said the components appeared to be from a sub-critical gas centrifuge machine, a highly technical system used to enrich uranium as fuel for nuclear weapons. He said the documents included blueprints, reports and technical diagrams that "related to centrifuge design, construction and operation."

The official said Ubaydi has left Iraq and is cooperating with U.S. intelligence, but he is not in U.S. custody.

At the congressional proceeding, Abizaid's remarks fueled increasing criticism from Democrats over the administration's justification for going to war.

"I've never believed the assertions about nuclear capability. I've never believed the assertions about the capability of being able to disseminate, in ways that would kill large numbers of American people or any other citizens, those chemical weapons they had. I never saw any evidence of this massive biological capability that we were told or implied that they had," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "I believe they hyped that, and I believe they hyped that for a specific reason: to create a sense of urgency."

Pressed by reporters about Abizaid's statements, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said that "what the administration has said is exactly what the best analysts in the intelligence agencies have reported for a considerable

period of time, and that is that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons and the means to produce them and we stand by it."

Abizaid, who is of Lebanese descent and speaks several languages, including Arabic, is a West Point graduate from Coleville, Calif., and a veteran infantryman who served as Franks' deputy throughout the war. He has served in a series of field commands. In 1983, he led a Ranger rifle company during the invasion of Grenada. Abizaid served with U.N. forces in Lebanon and oversaw relief operations in northern Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War. He also served as commander of West Point and as director of the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As the Bush administration defends its rationale for invading Iraq, it also faces increasing criticism over persistent postwar security problems, troop levels and the costs of military occupation and reconstruction.

Abizaid said the 145,000-strong U.S. force in Iraq appeared sufficient and would probably "come down" once the current campaign against Iraqi guerrilla fighters ends. But "for the foreseeable future, we will require a large number of troops for Iraq," he said, adding that he expects an estimated 30,000 troops from other nations to supplement coalition forces in Iraq between now and September.

"There are a lot of people in the Middle East that believe that our weakness is our inability to stay the course, and they believe that two casualties today, two casualties tomorrow, four the next day will eventually drive us out," Abizaid said. "And it is a belief that they hold firmly, and we need to be just as firm that we can't be driven out." The general said capturing Hussein would improve security.

"It's very important to confirm or deny whether Saddam Hussein is alive or dead. It's important because the fear factor is high. It's important because he was a brutal dictator that killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. And it's important for the Iraqi people to come to closure with this nightmare that he imposed on them."

Abizaid said attacks on U.S. troops are carried out by Baath Party loyalists, Islamic militants from other nations and common criminals. He said the military is responding aggressively to the attacks.

"Every terrorist that we find and kill in the Middle East is one less that'll find his way to the United States to kill us here," Abizaid said. "So we need to bring the war to them."

Biden and Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, predict that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq for at least five years, and on Wednesday they called for Bush to allow troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to join the American-led force now in the country.

"NATO in Iraq is imperative," Lugar told reporters.

"We need to quickly patch up the relationships within NATO and take all offers of help in Iraq as quickly as possible," he said.

Times staff writer Bob Drogin in Washington contributed to this report.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-abizaid26jun26.1.3935947.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

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Washington Post

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Pg. VA1

New Graduate Course At GMU To Focus On Biodefense

By Michele Clock, Washington Post Staff Writer

During the Cold War, he helped to transform anthrax, smallpox and Ebola into deadly weapons for the Soviet Union. After defecting to the United States, he told his secrets to Congress and the CIA.

Now, Ken Alibek is using his knowledge to train a new generation of experts to defend society from the estimated 80 pathogens emerging and in existence worldwide today -- including some he helped to create as a deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program.

This fall, Alibek and Charles Bailey, former commander of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, will lead a new graduate program in biodefense at George Mason University's Prince William campus.

University officials are touting the program as the first of its kind in the world.

The program will operate out of GMU's National Center for Biodefense, established in February 2002. At that time, GMU appointed Alibek and Bailey co-directors of the center, and each began teaching courses and workshops in biodefense. Previously, students would study microbiology, for example, and take a biodefense class or two. George Mason's graduate program is the first of its kind to offer a degree in the subject.

The university will spend an estimated \$1 million to get the program running, said Larry Czarda, vice president of operations for GMU's Prince William campus. School officials said they expected as many as 85 master's, doctorate and certificate-bound students at that time.

"This is ambitious, but we know how to do this," Alibek said. "We understand this is absolutely essential work because for the first time, we understand the biological weapons threat. We understand it's a very grim threat." Alibek spent 15 years working for Biopreparat, the Soviet state pharmaceutical agency whose primary function was to develop and produce weapons made from the most dangerous viruses, toxins and bacteria. Then known as Kanatjan Alibekov, he was first deputy chief from 1988 until 1992, when he defected.

GMU President Alan G. Merten said the program fits into the university's long-term goal of boosting its science offerings. University officials said they hoped the program would enhance GMU's reputation in biosciences and public policy.

The graduate program also gives the university greater access to federal funding, Merten said. The center received a \$1.4 million grant from the Defense Department to support its research on non-vaccine-based approaches to fighting pathogens. Officials said the center has received grants from the department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Institutes of Health. More is likely on the way, Merten said.

"We're having a lot of good discussions with federal government and the corporate sector," he said.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the anthrax attacks of the following months, education experts said that many universities have incorporated biodefense-related material into their curriculums.

Because it is the first university to develop an entire academic program of this kind, GMU is unique, said David Heyman, a senior fellow and director of science and security initiatives at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies. "But . . . a lot of other universities are starting up things like this. You will see more and more of these programs. Part of it is there is an academic need, and part of it is there's money out there."

Although there are other biodefense centers at U.S. universities, most focus on research, not on academics, said Vikas Chandhoke, the center's director of general administration. Most also focus on either the public policy or the medical side of the issue, not both, he said.

GMU students will learn to analyze the threats posed by biological weapons, and each will focus on one of four subspecialties -- medical defense, engineering defense and countermeasures, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism and law enforcement.

"It's our idea to [give] these people . . . absolutely in-depth knowledge of this field," Alibek said. "We don't want these people to have tunnel vision," he said.

Alibek and other officials said they believe that ultimately, this crop of experts will make society safer.

"The ultimate objective of any defensive work, especially in the field of biological terrorism, is to save as many possible lives," Alibek said. "That's why this program is focused on preparing a new generation of highly proficient biodefense experts who would be able to research new directions . . . and new methodologies for treatment of various infections. . . . You have no well-prepared people if you don't have well-prepared experts."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17919-2003Jun20.html>

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Washington Times

June 27, 2003

Pg. 1

Rice Tells Europe To Follow The Lead Of U.S. On Nukes

Seeks backing to avoid new strikes

By Nicholas Kravev, The Washington Times

The Bush administration yesterday urged its European allies not to "put a check" on American power but to stand firmly with the United States in its effort to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction and other modern ills.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice warned the Europeans that only a united front in pressuring rogue states like Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear ambitions would help to avoid military confrontation.

"We don't ever want to have to deal with the proliferation issue again the way we dealt with Iraq," Miss Rice said at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "If you don't want a made-in-America solution, then let's find out how to resolve the North Korean case and the Iranian case."

Addressing an audience that has often expressed distaste for the administration's policy of pre-emption, she offered assurances that Europe has nothing to fear from a "unipolar" world, in which the United States is the only superpower.

"Why would anyone who shares the values of freedom seek to put a check on those values?" Miss Rice asked, adding that Europe and democracies around the globe should follow Washington's lead instead of trying to balance it with competing policies. A text of the speech was released by the White House.

She dismissed a vision of "multipolarity" advanced by French President Jacques Chirac and others, calling it "a theory of rivalry, of competing interests," which "only the enemies of freedom would cheer."

"We have tried this before," she said. "It led to the Great War, which cascaded into the Good War, which gave way to the Cold War. Today, this theory of rivalry threatens to divert us from meeting the great tasks before us."

Mr. Chirac spoke about multipolarity during the Iraq debate earlier this year when France tried to prevent the United States from going to war. He threatened to block any resolution at the United Nations authorizing the use of force, causing Washington to invade Iraq with only British and limited Australian help.

Apparently concerned about U.S. dominance, Paris insists that all major decisions affecting international order be taken by the U.N. Security Council, where it has a veto.

At the annual summit this month of the Group of Eight — the world's leading industrial nations and Russia — in the French town of Evian, Mr. Chirac invited leaders from a dozen developing and other nonmember states, in a symbolic demonstration of his multipolar vision.

Even before September 11, the Bush administration was often accused abroad of being unilateral and allergic to multinational treaties, ignoring the views of other countries and bullying them into obliging the superpower.

But Miss Rice said the United States should not be feared and opposed just because of its unparalleled might. She argued that other nations can put their mark on history by joining forces with Washington to battle terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other post-Cold War security threats.

"Power in the service of freedom is to be welcomed, and powers that share a commitment to freedom can and must make common cause against freedom's enemies," she said. "This is not a description of a unipolar world."

Quoting the administration's National Security Strategy, Mr. Bush's adviser said: "There is little lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of allies and friends."

As an example of an effort that requires extensive international cooperation, Miss Rice pointed to the recent White House Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims at seizing weapons shipments on the high seas and in the air. The effort, whose targets are North Korea, Iran and other hostile states, has been joined by 10 allied nations.

"I don't think we can speculate about where an interdiction initiative should lead, but it's extremely important that countries like North Korea recognize that if they are going to flaunt their international obligations, there will be a cost for it," Miss Rice said.

"The North Koreans have to be stopped and the world has to stop them. How far it will go, I think none of us can predict."

As for Iran, which Washington has accused of developing a nuclear weapons program, she called again for a united effort to make that country accept tougher inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"The United States cannot face up to this alone," Miss Rice said. "This is something the international community must do."

She joined the chorus of U.S. and European officials who have been insisting that, however deep the divisions over the war in Iraq might have been, the two sides of the Atlantic are still united by a "confluence of common interests and common values."

But in a challenge to those who think the Bush administration has sacrificed too many civil liberties in its effort to protect the homeland after September 11, Miss Rice said: "We have learned the hard way that our values and our security cannot be separated."

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030627-120954-7952r.htm>

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New York Times
June 27, 2003

Iraqi Says Hussein Planned To Revive The Nuclear Program Dismantled In 1991

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, June 26 — The White House said today that an Iraqi scientist who led American forces to blueprints and prototype equipment for enriching uranium claimed Saddam Hussein had intended to revive his nuclear program as soon as the United Nations lifted sanctions against Iraq.

The scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, said he had been ordered in 1991 to bury the plans and equipment for gas centrifuges under the garden of his house in Baghdad. Today the International Atomic Energy Agency said the fact that the stash remained untouched was evidence that Iraq had not resumed its nuclear program since inspections began after the Persian Gulf War.

In the aftermath of the 1991 war, American officials and the nuclear agency determined that Mr. Hussein had been far closer to producing a bomb — perhaps as close as six months — than the agency or American intelligence had estimated. The many centrifuges that Mr. Hussein was constructing were dismantled, and the parts shipped out of the country.

Dr. Obeidi had headed the uranium-enrichment program prior to 1991, and was one of the scientists American officials most wanted to interview.

But while the nuclear agency said the discovery under Dr. Obeidi's rose garden was evidence of successful arms control, the White House took a distinctly different view. It said the information that Dr. Obeidi volunteered — after he denied any knowledge of surviving equipment during an interview by arms inspectors last year — was evidence that President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were correct in saying that Mr. Hussein had never given up hope of building nuclear weapons.

Mr. Cheney stated on "Meet the Press" in March that Iraq "has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."

Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said today of Iraq's nuclear program: "Nobody said it was operative. We expressed concerns about the development of a nuclear program, but nobody ever maintained that Iraq had nuclear weapons."

Mr. Fleischer said that the components in a barrel under Dr. Obeidi's rose garden were only one piece of the Iraqi program, and that others would inevitably be found. "It's certainly not the only garden in Iraq," he said. "We hope this will lead other scientists to step forward."

Administration officials familiar with what Dr. Obeidi uncovered for the Central Intelligence Agency said he had come forward in May.

"We not making any claims about what we have," one senior administration official said today. "My understanding is that these are the blueprints and the critical components."

Dr. Obeidi has been taken out of Iraq to prevent reprisals against him, officials said. He told CNN that there may be three or more other sets of similar parts, hidden by other scientists. But administration officials said no other scientists had come forward.

Mr. Fleischer described the equipment as "a template for what would have been needed to rebuild their centrifuge enrichment program." He said the plan, according to Dr. Obeidi, was to dig them up after sanctions were lifted, when it would be easier for Iraq to obtain the high-tech materials it would need to restart its weapons program. "What was under the garden would have saved them several years and million of dollars in reconstituting their work," the senior official said today.

But that is different from saying that Mr. Hussein was any closer to a nuclear weapon. To enrich uranium — a process that North Korea and Iran have well under way, according to American intelligence officials — Mr. Hussein would have needed hundreds or thousands of precisely machined centrifuges, arrayed together.

If working perfectly, such a "cascade" could produce enough material in a year or so to produce a bomb.

That program was well under way in 1991, American and international intelligence sources reported. And the administration contends that in recent years, Mr. Hussein's government sought to obtain uranium yellowcake from Africa to provide the raw material for bomb production, and aluminum tubes that would be part of the centrifuges. The reports about the yellowcake have been widely challenged. And prior to the invasion of Iraq this year, the administration and the United Nations inspectors differed on the importance of the aluminium tubes, with the nuclear agency declaring that the tubes were not designed for nuclear use.

Separately today, the White House and State Department both reiterated their support for a C.I.A. view that trailers found in Iraq were for biological weapons, despite the disclosure of a classified memorandum from the State Department's intelligence branch that has described that conclusion as premature.

"Our view, and the secretary's view, U.S. government view, is that these are mobile biological weapons laboratories," the State Department spokesman, Richard A. Boucher, said. But Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat, wrote a letter to the C.I.A. director, George Tenet, asking for further explanation.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/27/international/worldspecial/27WEAP.html>

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The Politics Of Mass Destruction

By Richard Spertzel

Even as evidence is uncovered that Saddam Hussein was planning to revive his nuclear-weapons program at the earliest possible date, politicians and pundits alike lament the failure of coalition forces to find a "smoking gun." Despite the recent discovery of plans and parts for a uranium-enrichment centrifuge, some presidential candidates have accused the Bush administration of lying about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to justify the war with Iraq. Such assertions ignore all that has been learned and has transpired during the last 12-plus years. As I've said time and again, expecting any inspection regime to find a massive cache of WMDs is a lesson in self-delusion. Such folly can only bring cheer to those who opposed the war in the first place and to those who simply oppose the Bush administration.

Recall that during the first Gulf War, Iraq stored its biological agent-filled munitions in pits dug in the sand or in abandoned railroad tunnels. Such sites are not easily found. Good intelligence emanating from those Iraqi personnel responsible for the deployment, protection and control of such storage sites will be required. Indeed, it was an Iraqi scientist who this week led coalition forces to the site where the uranium-enrichment equipment was buried. But many WMD personnel were part of the Special Security Organization under Saddam's younger son, Qusay. The information is not likely to be obtained easily.

Some pundits question, if Iraq had WMDs, why did they not use them? Iraq learned from the first Gulf War that coalition forces headed by the U.S. could advance very rapidly. Iraq also indicated in testimony to the U.N. Special Commission, or Unsc, that biological weapons would have little effect in stopping an advancing military force. Rather, their interest was to use biological weapons to intimidate their neighbors and cause them to "see things Iraq's way." Thus its failure to use biological WMDs should not be a surprise to anyone. The failure to use chemical WMDs is also not surprising considering the apparent confusion within the Iraqi command structure during the race to Baghdad.

Then, why have such weapons not been found? The answer may lie in the training and experience of the inspectors. The initial team looking for WMDs in Iraq was more reminiscent of site exploiters than inspectors. True, if they found a bomb or missile warhead, they were capable of further exploitation of the find to determine its contents. But they apparently did not have testing instruments capable of detecting trace-amounts of biological-weapons agents. The next iteration of the coalition inspectors was supposed to have a number of inspectors that had extensive experience in Iraq and has been so misrepresented in the media. I was asked in February to propose a list of Unsc experienced biological inspectors (a so-called A team) that had multiple inspection trips to Iraq. These were to be from the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. In March, after the concept was approved, I was asked to contact those on my list to assure they were willing and able to devote the time. All but one agreed to the deployment. None of the individuals on that list ever made it to Iraq.

A few weeks ago David Albright, writing in the Washington Post, stated that he had been contacted by several Iraqi nuclear scientists who asserted that they were afraid to talk to the coalition inspectors because of the way they were being treated by the inspectors -- interrogation, threats, etc., rather than with any degree of respect. The interviewing of Iraqi scientists is where extensive experience would have been most valuable. One doesn't need to like what was done or the individual scientist to treat them with respect. Experienced inspectors knew this. Furthermore, experienced inspectors knew what, when, and how to pursue a subject that is unlikely to occur to a neophyte. There is nothing that the U.S. could threaten the Iraqi scientists with that could approach what they've endured these past 30 to 40 years. A scientist I remain in contact with had been imprisoned by Iraq for 17 months in the 1990s. In early March this year, with tensions building, he was again arrested for fear he would disclose information Iraq did not want disclosed.

It is encouraging that the third and current iteration under the CIA is headed by David Kay, which may account for the recent breakthrough in uncovering the uranium-enrichment plans. In regard to other WMDs, Iraq imported or retained over the last several years key pieces of equipment that could not readily be carried off by looters. If located, extensive intrusive sampling with the right test system might tell wonders about Iraq's biological-weapons programs.

Let there be no doubt, Iraq retained an active biological-weapons program. Unsc had adequate evidence of such. In 1998, presented with the evidence, the leading biological-weapons experts from the U.S., U.K., Russia, France, Sweden, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Ukraine, Romania and Canada all agreed with the Unsc findings and observations. Incredibly, U.S. and British politicians with little or no knowledge of biological weapons and biological warfare are choosing to believe otherwise.

Mr. Spertzel was head of the biological-weapons section of Unsc from 1994-99.

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