


#267

17 June 2003

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



Air University

Air War College

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

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(Press Release)

June 12, 2003

Engineered Support gets Homeland Defense contract

Engineered Support Systems Inc. has received a homeland defense contract from the U.S. Army to develop a system that would be used in the event of a chemical or biological terrorist attack in the United States.

The initial development is valued at \$700,000 and will take place over a 12-month period. The contract will be managed by the Homeland Defense Chemical Biological Umbrella office at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. The Information Transfer Vehicle would be used to set up a centralized information link between first responders and various government and civilian agencies. It will host the necessary equipment to access the agencies' computer networks and provide wireless communications between the parties.

St. Louis-based Engineered Support Systems Inc. (Nasdaq: EASI) engineers and manufactures military electronics and support equipment.

<http://stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2003/06/09/daily51.html>

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Washington Times

June 16, 2003

Pg. 12

Retired General Confident Iraqi Weapons Will Be Found

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The general who planned the first air war against Iraq says once “total security” is established in the country, a U.S. inspection team will determine what happened to Iraq’s large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

“Absolutely, Iraq had WMDs,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen Buster Glosson, who was an adviser to the CIA in the 1990s. “The only question is what weapons or precursors did they ship out of the country or destroy immediately prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

President Bush largely justified the war in Iraq as the only way to rid Saddam Hussein of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons components. To date, the United States has discovered two mobile facilities used to produce germ agents — matching a prewar CIA intelligence report. But it has not found the weapons, spurring charges from some Democrats that the president sent troops into battle on false pretenses.

Gen. Glosson disagrees.

“We need to be patient, and the results will speak for themselves. Once total security is established in Iraq and the shadow of Saddam removed, the Iraqi people will provide the WMD information for the world to see,” he said.

“That will be a very humbling day for the rush-to-judgment naysayers.”

On other postwar issues, Gen. Glosson said Operation Iraq Freedom already has provided several lessons to guide commanders in the future.

Author of the Persian Gulf war book, “War with Iraq: Critical Lessons,” the retired general said in an interview that the just-completed war once again showed that commanders should allow air power and special operations forces to destroy enemy ground troops before soldiers and Marines engage in land combat.

It also demonstrated that attack helicopters cannot survive intense ground fire in extremely hostile battlefield environments. Also, it was a mistake to allow Iraq’s state-operated TV to stay on the air, enabling Saddam’s regime to communicate with the masses.

“Operation Iraq Freedom demonstrated that surprise, speed and precision are the three tenets of tactical operations for modern warfare,” Gen. Glosson said. “Air power with precision weapons can destroy a field army, but we can never forget only soldiers and Marines can occupy a country and control its populace.”

Gen. Glosson said this new twist to an old strategy worked in Iraqi Freedom because the ground commander, Army Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, and the air commander, Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, put a premium on joint operations.

“McKiernan paused after day six and asked Moseley to obliterate the Republican Guard between Najaf and Baghdad, and the results speak for themselves,” Gen. Glosson said. “Moseley directed fixed-wing fighters over Baghdad when many thought it unwise.”

Gen. Glosson, who since his retirement generally has stayed mum on commenting on military affairs, broke his silence before Operation Iraqi Freedom. In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Gen. Glosson, a former fighter pilot who flew combat missions in Vietnam, expressed fears that planners would not give air power enough time to destroy key ground targets.

“The criticism was valid at the time it was made,” Gen. Glosson said. “Prior to the war, I was very critical of the initial size of the ground force requested. Fortunately, Defense Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld’s leadership alleviated this concern.

“Also, I found it difficult to believe that the planning and strategy did not include early securing of the oil fields with soldiers and Marines, or obliterating the Republican Guards with precision air power and special forces, prior to ground engagements. However, McKiernan changed the plan during execution and he should get the credit for bold and decisive leadership.”

While a few retired generals appeared on network and cable news programs to criticize Gen. Tommy Franks’s plan in the war’s early stages, Gen. Glosson refused all requests to play “talking head” during the war.

“There are only a finite number of tactical execution options for any military commander,” he said. “I believe it is irresponsible for retired general officers to second-guess or hypothesize about future tactical actions during a war. The time to voice differences of opinion is before or after the shooting — not during.”

In the end, a ground, air and sea force of about 230,000 ousted Saddam from power in four weeks.

“We won with minimum loss of life,” Gen. Glosson said. “Secretary Rumsfeld’s insistence that we maximize our technology advantage and use only the ground forces required for decisive victory was an example for future political leaders to emulate.”

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030616-012756-8104r.htm>

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London Sunday Telegraph

June 15, 2003

Iran Recruits Saddam’s Scientists To Build Long-Range Missile

By Philip Sherwell, in Baghdad

Iran is recruiting top Iraqi weapons scientists to join a dangerous brain drain from Baghdad as international concern grows about Teheran’s clandestine arms programme.

The pro-Iranian Badr Brigade, an Iraqi Islamic militia, is helping scientists to travel through tribal areas north east of Baghdad and across the border for meetings with senior military and regime figures in Teheran, The Telegraph has learnt.

The Iranian regime is particularly seeking Iraqi specialists in solid missile propellants, a technology in which Baghdad was strong but Teheran weak. Iran wants to switch from liquid to solid fuels to improve the performance of its long-range Shahab missiles, which may soon be able to reach Europe.

Last week Iran barred United Nations inspectors from taking samples from a suspect nuclear plant, heightening fears that the regime is secretly preparing to make enriched uranium, the crucial raw material for nuclear weapons.

Donald Rumsfeld, the American defence secretary, issued a warning that Iran was actively working to develop a bomb.

A senior Pentagon official who has just visited Baghdad privately confirmed that Iran headed a list of states - including Syria, Libya and possibly North Korea - which have approached some of Saddam Hussein’s leading missile experts. Senior employees of Iraq’s Military Industrialisation Commission (MIC), the body that ran Baghdad’s weapons programmes, have also told this newspaper that scientists are being recruited overseas.

There are particular fears over the intentions and whereabouts of Gen Mudh’her Sadeq Sabe’a, Saddam’s chief missiles expert, and the man behind the al-Samoud missile that was proscribed by UN inspectors for exceeding the permitted 92-mile range.

Gen Mudh’her, who shares the same Shia Muslim faith as Teheran’s ruling clerics, disappeared from Baghdad after the war. An Iraqi businessman with close links to the MIC said that the general was travelling between his home province of Diyala and Iran, under protection from the Badr Brigade. Former MIC associates predicted that several leading weapons scientists would take their expertise to Iran after falling victim to the clear-out of ruling Ba’ath Party officials ordered by the coalition.

“Do not be surprised when some of these people start turning up in Teheran,” Brig Marouf al-Chalabi, the former director-general of the MIC, told The Telegraph.

“If the Americans do not find work for MIC’s employees soon, and if they continue to rule out all of the Ba’athists, then many of our best scientists will leave. Some want to go to the West, but others will go to Iran.”

Brig al-Chalabi, who insisted that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme after 1991 during a lengthy interview last week, said that he did not know Gen Mudh’her’s specific plans.

He also gave a warning that files and computer disks looted from his Baghdad research facility could be sold abroad. The brigadier, who studied mechanical engineering in America and was honoured by Saddam for his work last year, said that he had previously been questioned extensively by UN inspectors, but had not been questioned by the Americans.

American officials confirmed that Iran and Syria are making lucrative financial offers to Iraqi scientists. One intelligence official said: “Some have gone, and others will go. We need to get a programme in place quickly to keep these people and their expertise in Iraq.”

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2003%2F06%2F15%2Fwmiss15.xml>

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U.S. News & World Report
June 23, 2003

Squeezing North Korea

Kim Jong Il wants a nuclear arsenal. Can he be stopped without a war?

By Thomas Omestad

The numbers give pause to even the hardest hard-liners: In the first hour of a war, North Korea could rain between 300,000 and 500,000 artillery shells onto metro Seoul and other points in South Korea, a deadly opener to a conflict whose scope would dwarf that of the Iraq war. With more than 13,000 artillery pieces concealed in thousands of tunnels—not to mention missiles, chemical weapons and more than 1 million soldiers—North Korea is, clearly, no Iraq. “North Korea’s military is a much tougher nut to crack and potentially a much greater threat,” warns former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Defense specialists express confidence that the United States and South Korea would prevail in a conflict. But the human cost would be so horrendous that avoiding war is as much an imperative as blocking Pyongyang’s drive for nuclear weapons. This fact weighs heavily on Bush administration officials as they consider how to prod the North to abandon its nuclear ambitions. U.S. officials tout progress in bringing South Korea, Japan, and even China closer to President Bush’s position: only multiparty talks with Pyongyang and no rewards for coming back into compliance with its past no-nukes agreements.

Yet with Kim Jong Il’s regime defiant—last week publicly vowing to field a “nuclear deterrent”—the Bush administration wants to pressure the North by draining money from its already thin wallet. But there is a problem: Pyongyang warns that sanctions would be “tantamount to war.” Some South Korean officials believe that threat—and U.S. officials don’t know how hard they can press. “Let’s face it,” shrugs a senior State Department official, “North Korea is bizarre.”

Without announcing a shift in policy, the administration is quietly putting one in place. The aim is to cut off the regime’s revenue from sales of missiles, heroin, methamphetamines, and cigarettes, as well as from counterfeit U.S. dollars. The hope is to cripple funding for the North’s unconventional weapons programs—and pinch the communist elite—without hurting most of the country’s 22 million impoverished people.

How aggressively to ply the new course is being debated. Some officials at the Pentagon and elsewhere want to interdict ships on the high seas, a de facto blockade that as yet lacks support in international law. Prodding neighboring countries to deny North Korean airplanes overflight rights is also being discussed. The North, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said recently, “is teetering on the edge of economic collapse. That, I believe, is a major point of leverage.”

Crackdown. For now, a less-confrontational pattern is emerging: the rigorous enforcement of existing laws. Australia in April seized \$48 million worth of heroin on a North Korean freighter. Japan last week readied 1,900 inspectors to meet a North Korean ferry believed to be a conduit for cash and high-tech goods, prompting Pyongyang to suspend the ship’s trips. South Korea seized methamphetamines allegedly originating at a North Korean port. And even faraway Poland ordered North Korean diplomats in Warsaw to stop illegally subletting embassy space.

U.S. diplomats believe these actions show that they are winning converts to the view that Kim’s coterie constitutes “a mafia regime unlike any other on Earth,” as one says. “North Korea is not a sovereign country. It’s a military gang. . . . They understand horse heads in their beds.” The Bush administration, *U.S. News* has learned, is looking for a legal basis for governments to intercept counterfeit currency transported in North Korean diplomatic pouches, normally off-limits to inspection because of diplomatic immunity.

The evolving policy also aims to prevent North Korea from exporting nuclear material to other countries or terrorist groups. But that poses significant technical hurdles: It may be necessary to pull alongside or even board a suspect ship at sea to reliably detect fissile material.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials face conflicting intelligence reports about whether the North has actually reprocessed the 8,000 fuel rods at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, which could yield enough bomb-grade plutonium for five or so weapons. The North told a visiting congressional delegation two weeks ago that it has done so—and that it already possesses nuclear weapons. Some U.S. officials, though, say the North has encountered technical problems in reprocessing and, in the past, may also have had trouble fashioning the fissile material into a functioning bomb or two. Chinese and Russian specialists suspect that the North is bluffing; Japanese officials say they cannot confirm

any reprocessing. If they do, a senior official in Tokyo tells *U.S. News*, Japan will be willing to follow the United States into the “next stage,” including sanctions. “We’re walking a tightrope,” he says.

All the uncertainty is stoking criticism by former policymakers, who argue that Bush has failed to draw a clear “red line” on reprocessing—meaning a military strike on Yongbyon if the North starts accumulating bomb-grade plutonium. “These issues were sufficiently dangerous that we were willing to risk nuclear war,” recalls former Defense Secretary William Perry, who ran the Pentagon during the last nuclear crisis with the North in 1993-94. Then, the Clinton administration readied plans to destroy Yongbyon if negotiations failed. This time, the White House says it has no intention of hitting the complex but adds that “all options” remain open. Indeed, Pentagon adviser Richard Perle suggested last week that a unilateral “surgical strike,” similar to Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, can’t be ruled out.

That sort of talk rattles Pyongyang—and Seoul, where suspicions abound that administration hawks are quietly nursing strike plans. A top official there recently cautioned that the North was already “very paranoid” about an attack. Without a return to talks, that paranoia is unlikely to get a rest.

<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/030623/usnews/23korea.htm>

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Time

June 23, 2003

Pg. 23

Notebook

Spook On The Spot

After weeks of pressure to explain what it knew about the alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq before launching the war there, the Bush Administration has placed the issue in CIA Director George Tenet’s lap. Administration officials have been subtly pointing the finger in his direction, saying all their knowledge of Iraq’s weapons programs came from Tenet’s agency. That apparently didn’t apply to a British intelligence report, cited by President Bush in his State of the Union speech, that claimed Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from an unnamed nation later identified as Niger. The report has since been discredited, having been based on forged documents. The CIA had, in fact, looked into the report in February 2002 and found it dubious. At first the White House claimed that the CIA, if it had had any reservations about the intelligence, had not communicated them. Then, after other U.S. officials revealed that the CIA had sent a cable to the White House in March 2002 that cast doubt on the Niger report, Bush aides insisted the warning was too vague to raise red flags.

Now Bush has put Tenet in the hot seat, placing him in charge of the hunt for the WMD. Tenet announced last week that he was bringing in former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay as his adviser in the search. Sources tell Time that Kay will be in overall charge of the operation of 1,300 soldiers and civilians, which was previously overseen by the Pentagon, and will report directly to Tenet.

All this responsibility may or may not be what Tenet is seeking. On July 11 he will become the third longest-serving CIA director, and sources tell Time he had been mulling retirement before the weapons controversy. The new assignment offers him a chance to go out either as a hero—or a scapegoat. “The spin is that somebody’s got to be in charge so that it’s being done in an organized fashion,” says an intelligence official. “The more cynical view is that they have handed the whole bag of s___ to him.”

By Timothy J. Burger and James Carney

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030623-458730,00.html>

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New York Times

June 14, 2003

Police In Thailand Seize Radioactive Material

By Philip Shenon

WASHINGTON, June 13 — Authorities in Thailand, acting on information from American investigators, seized a large amount of radioactive material from a Thai man, breaking up a plot to sell it to terrorists. He was peddling it for use in so-called dirty bombs, according to American law enforcement officials.

American officials said the seized material — which Thai authorities said was cesium-137, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear power plants commonly found in medical equipment — was believed to have originated in Russian stockpiles and been taken to Thailand via Laos. It could easily have been used in terrorist weapons, the officials added.

Law enforcement officials and terrorism experts said they were alarmed that so much of the material — as much as 66 pounds, according to initial reports — was apparently available for sale on the black market. Even a “dirty” bomb with only a few grams of cesium would be deadly, the experts said. It is particularly troubling that the material turned up in Thailand, which Al Qaeda has long used as a hub in Southeast Asia, they said.

Earlier this week, three men suspected of being Muslim terrorists were arrested in southern Thailand and accused of plotting to blow up embassies in Bangkok, the capital, and in Thai tourist resorts.

“This enforcement action represents an outstanding example of international cooperation in disrupting the proliferation of radiological material,” said Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, whose department was responsible for the American end of the cesium investigation.

The man arrested today, Narong Penanam, 44, of Thailand’s Surin Province, was taken into custody in the parking lot of a Bangkok hotel. American officials said that his accomplices were still being sought by the Thai police, but that he had no known ties to terrorist groups.

Earlier this month, they said, the man gave undercover Thai police officers a metal box containing at least several pounds of what he said was weapons-grade uranium as a sample of what he could provide them later in larger quantities.

An analysis of the material by the Thai Atomic Energy Commission indicated it was not uranium but cesium-137, which experts say could be easily used by terrorist groups to make dirty bombs, in which radioactive material is wrapped around conventional explosives. Police officials in Thailand said the man had expected \$240,000 for the material.

Cesium-137 is the most common radioactive form of the metal cesium. It is commonly used in radiation treatment of cancer and in a variety of gauges in the construction and drilling industries.

In Washington, the Department of Homeland Security, which became responsible for the investigation after the department took over the Customs Service this year, said today that the inquiry began last October, when customs investigators based in Bangkok received information about the possible sale of weapons-grade uranium. Such material could be used in fission weapons capable of destroying entire cities.

In an announcement of today’s developments, the department said that the American agents “immediately began working with the Royal Thai Police and the U.S. Embassy on an investigation into this matter” and that they set up undercover meetings with suspects in the case. Earlier this month, American officials said, the key suspect provided the undercover Thai police with the metal container as a sample of what was available.

After testing showed the material was radioactive cesium, American officials said, the Thai police moved today to make the arrest. A statement from the Thai Royal Police in Bangkok today said that Mr. Narong had told them that the metal box with the cesium had been brought to Thailand from Russia, and that it had been stored for a time in neighboring Laos.

Nuclear experts said they would not be surprised if the material came from Russia or other parts of the former Soviet Union, which have been the source of much of the radioactive material seized on the black market in recent years.

The experts said they were startled by reports of the amount of cesium found in Thailand.

“Pounds? Most studies of dirty bombs start off describing weapons with an ounce of cesium,” said Joseph Cirincione, director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “Cesium-137 is serious stuff, highly radioactive. You put it alongside 10 pounds or more of dynamite, and you’ve got a really dangerous terror weapon. It might not kill many people, but it would terrify a city.”

Charles D. Ferguson, a physicist at the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said the investigation in Thailand was “very significant — cesium-137 has been high up in my list of radioactive isolates to be concerned about for dirty bombs.”

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/14/international/asia/14NUKE.html>

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USA Today
June 17, 2003
Pg. 1

Weak Spy Network Hurt Hunt For Arms

CIA tried to rebuild year before Iraq war

By John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — Slightly more than a year before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the CIA launched a major effort to rebuild its network of Iraqi agents, which had been badly depleted by repeated purges, according to congressional and Bush administration officials with knowledge of the effort.

Despite the commitment of substantial resources, however, the CIA had only modest success in reconstituting its organization inside Iraq. By the end of 2002, Iraqis working for the CIA had begun providing helpful information about Iraq's conventional weapons and other matters relating to the looming U.S. invasion. But the agents had provided no incontrovertible evidence of chemical or biological weapons, the officials said.

The difficulty the CIA had keeping its Iraqi agents alive underscores the challenges U.S. intelligence faced in locating the banned weapons U.S. officials claimed Iraq had. The failure to find those weapons has raised doubts about how much U.S. intelligence really knew about them before the U.S. forces invaded Iraq — and whether the administration was candid about possible weaknesses in its information.

U.S. spy satellites could detect tanks, artillery and other conventional weapons. But finding chemical or biological weapons was much more dependent on spies or defecting scientists, who could point the way to microbes or lethal chemicals that might have been undetectable by virtually any other means.

The CIA's intense effort to rebuild its spy network in Iraq came after it had been almost eliminated by Saddam Hussein's security forces, according to three U.S. intelligence officials. All the officials who gave information for this story spoke on condition of anonymity. All have routine access to classified information and are familiar with the CIA's struggles inside Iraq.

CIA officials outlined a plan to rebuild a base of sources inside Saddam's regime in a series of classified briefings to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in late 2001 and early 2002, a congressional aide said. A major focus was to collect information on Saddam's alleged weapons of mass destruction programs, but the CIA also sought information that would help the Pentagon plan an invasion. A Bush administration official confirmed this account. The effort came after at least four years of little intelligence from Iraqi sources within Saddam's regime. The gap in collection was the result, in part, of the difficulty of penetrating a closed and brutal regime and of the CIA's near total focus after Sept. 11, 2001, on the al-Qaeda terror group.

Beginning in 2002, after the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, the CIA gradually developed some sources in Iraq who passed on reports about suspected Iraqi biological, chemical and nuclear programs, according to a senior intelligence official.

But establishing spies within a regime as closed as Saddam's takes time. And by late last year, U.S. intelligence hadn't managed to develop a network that could find banned weapons or production facilities U.S. officials were sure existed. While the CIA disclosed its difficulties to congressional overseers, it did not make the problem public before the war.

Only now are intelligence and congressional officials willing to discuss some of the weaknesses in the prewar effort to gather information on Iraq's suspected weapons.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030617/5247958s.htm>

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New York Times

June 17, 2003

Iran Is Urged To Sign Pact Giving Power To Inspectors

By Felicity Barringer

UNITED NATIONS, June 16 — With Iran facing growing pressure to be more forthcoming about its nuclear program, the United Nations top nuclear weapons inspector, the Russian foreign minister and a group of European Union ministers today urged it to sign a protocol that would give inspectors the right to conduct more intrusive examinations of its facilities.

The calls came after the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is meeting in Vienna, formally reviewed a recent report that gave new details about Iranian plans for a heavy water research reactor, which could be used in the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons.

The State Department responded to the developments by calling on the board of the I.A.E.A. to formally urge Iran to "answer all outstanding questions about that program" and to sign the protocol, which was added to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Reuters news agency reported today that Iran's Atomic Energy Organization had said that Tehran might be willing to sign the protocol, but reiterated that it wanted access to Western nuclear technology in return. "We have not yet decided about signing the Additional Protocol, but we are studying it with a positive view," Khalil Mousavi, the organization's spokesman, told Reuters.

The Iranian nuclear program has been the subject of heightened international concern since the I.A.E.A. report was distributed 10 days ago. Since then, Iranian officials have turned down the request of inspectors to take "environmental samples" at the Kalaye Electric Company. Intelligence agencies and exile groups have alleged that the plant was used to test Iran's centrifuge apparatus — another technology associated with nuclear weapons. Both the European Union, Iran's main trading partner, and Russia, whose engineers are helping Iran build a civilian nuclear power plant at Bushehr, called on Tehran to provide the necessary cooperation.

A statement of the Council of the European Union ministers issued in Luxembourg said that "while the council recognizes Iran's right to develop a nuclear program for civilian purposes, the nature of some aspects of this program raises serious concern." It also emphasized "the need for Iran to answer timely, fully and adequately all questions raised regarding its nuclear program."

The Russian foreign minister, Igor S. Ivanov, visiting New Delhi, said, "We hope that Iran will sign the additional I.A.E.A. protocol, which will allow the extension of the provision of the I.A.E.A. over all nuclear facilities in the territory of the country."

In a speech to the Vienna meeting of the nuclear agency's 35-member governing board, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general, called on Iran "to permit us to take environmental samples" at one suspect site and to allow inspectors greater access "to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities." The agency's report had concluded, in part, that Iran had not met its obligations in terms of "the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."

But the report also indicated that the very disclosures of the previously concealed activity and plans might be a sign of a new attitude.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/17/international/middleeast/17IRAN.html>

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Korea Times

June 17, 2003

Iranian Aircraft Frequent Pyongyang

By Kim Ki-tae, Staff Reporter

Iranian cargo aircrafts have visited Pyongyang around six times since April, a significant increase from previous reports of one or two visits per year.

According to sources in the South Korean Ministry of Defense, Iran dispatched the aircrafts to Sunan Airport more often than at any other time during prior months, raising suspicions about possible arms trade going on between the two nations. They are the other two members of U.S. President George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" along with Iraq before the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime.

According to a local daily, South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies suspect the aircrafts of carrying North Korea-made missiles to the Middle Eastern nation.

It claimed the North might switch to air shipments because one of its ships transporting missiles was intercepted on its way to Yemen in December. Intelligence suspect the payload was likely disassembled Rodong missiles, the same type that were sold to Pakistan in 1998.

Meanwhile, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) yesterday said it was examining the case. "At present, we can neither confirm nor deny the report. We are only conducting a probe on it," an NIS official said.

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16 Jun 2003 15:19:09 GMT

Georgia finds dirty bomb material in taxi

TBILISI, June 16 (Reuters) - Georgian authorities have found highly radioactive material that could be used in a "dirty" bomb and a container of lethal Mustard Gas in a taxi in the capital Tbilisi, police said on Monday.

Police searched the taxi on May 31 and found two metal boxes stuffed with radioactive by-products of nuclear fission, Cesium-137 and Strontium-90. One container, inscribed in Russian and English, weighed at least 80 kg (170 lb).

A separate container had Mustard Gas, or Yperite, an odourless chemical used in World War One and which can be lethal in small quantities.

"The most likely version is that the containers were intended to be transported on to Turkey and to be resold," police spokesman Givi Mgebrishvili told a news conference.

Mgebrishvili said police found the material during a routine raid in a Tbilisi suburb.

The taxi driver was unaware of his dangerous cargo and has been released. Two suspects are in police custody, accused of trying to take the material to the former Soviet state's Adzhara autonomous republic on the border with Turkey.

"A dirty bomb could be easily made from these substances," said Leri Meskhi, a nuclear expert at Tbilisi University. In March, the United Nations nuclear watchdog called for stricter international security measures to keep radioactive material out of the hands of terrorists, who could use it to wreak havoc with dirty bombs.

A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives with radioactive material. It may not cause more casualties than a conventional blast, but the threat of radioactive contamination could create widespread panic.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, nuclear materials once under Moscow's control have turned up in many of its former republics and beyond.

In one of the most serious incidents, three men were arrested at Munich airport in Germany in 1994 carrying 363 grams (12 ounces) of Russian weapons-grade plutonium.

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/AN1660939.htm>

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Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening.

GAO-03-638, May 16.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638>

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New DHS and USDA Partnership for Plum Island Animal Disease Center Boosts Nation's Agroterrorism Defense

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) today announced a partnership agreement to transfer management of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. This agreement provides an added layer of protection to our nation's agricultural system while also meeting the mandates set out by the Homeland Security Act.

"We look forward to working closely with our USDA colleagues on a focused research and development program and management plan that will help us prevent, respond to, and recover from agroterrorism attacks," said Dr. Charles McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and Technology. "Our commitment to making a safer and more secure environment for our nation and our agricultural community is a top priority."

Under the agreement, DHS and USDA have launched a joint management program to oversee a four-month transition period. DHS has named Marc Hollander, Deputy Director of Facilities and Infrastructure for the Office of Research and Development, as Acting Center Director. Hollander expects to meet with community and business leaders and citizens throughout his tenure at Plum Island, with meetings to begin this month.

USDA will continue to perform agricultural animal health research and foreign animal disease diagnostics programs at Plum Island. "Plum Island will remain a key part of the U.S. animal health research and diagnostic infrastructure, which is vital to protect the nation's livestock and poultry from introductions of foreign animal diseases," said Dr. Joseph Jen, USDA's Under Secretary for Research, Education and Economics.

Plum Island researchers will lend their expertise to the Department's biological countermeasures efforts, which will include the prevention, detection, and response to high-consequence threats to U.S. agriculture, such as foot-and-mouth disease. Plum Island is the only place in the United States where foot-and-mouth disease is currently studied.

"Plum Island is a unique laboratory where scientists can safely and securely study foreign animal diseases," said Dr. Maureen McCarthy, Acting Director of the DHS Office of Research and Development. "Plum Island will remain an important national asset in which veterinary and animal disease research scientists from both DHS and USDA will work to protect the health of livestock."

For more information on the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, go to www.ars.usda.gov/plum.

<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=936>

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