


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



*Air University*

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Washington Times  
June 10, 2003  
Pg. 1

## Iran Agrees Iraq Hid Arms

*Tehran official backs U.S. assertion of Saddam's arsenal*

By Stewart Stogel, The Washington Times

NEW YORK — An Iranian government official with ties to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Tehran sides with the Americans on one big issue — Saddam Hussein's weapons.

"Yes, we agree with the Americans. Our intelligence indicated that Iraq did possess weapons of mass destruction and was hiding them from the U.N.," the official said.

The official, from the top ranks of Iran's cleric-led government, asked to remain anonymous amid escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran.

He went on to say that the big question is, "What did the Iraqis do with these weapons?"

Although Tehran does not know where these weapons may be today, there is a strong suspicion that some may have filtered onto local black markets.

"We know other items, once under military control [such as broadcast transmission equipment], have found their way onto the black market," the official said.

"We have people coming to Tehran from Baghdad with catalogs of items [stolen from the Iraqi government] offering them for sale."

So far, the official said, no chemical, biological or related weapons have turned up.

His remarks come amid criticism of the Bush administration and the government of British Prime Minister Tony Blair for the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both governments cited Iraq's deadly weapons as a reason for going to war.

In Tehran yesterday, Iran said foreign pressure over its nuclear capabilities would backfire and harden Iran's position.

Since its rapid conquest of Iraq, Washington has tightened the screws on neighboring Iran, which it accuses of sheltering al Qaeda fugitives, backing terrorism and developing nuclear weapons.

"Excessive pressure on Iran would untie the hands of those who do not believe in dialogue," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. "Even those who favor constructive talks would not accept the language of force and threat."

The United States and European Union are divided over Iran. The EU favors a policy of encouraging embattled reformers around President Mohammed Khatami, while Washington argues this is a waste of time because he has no real power to effect change.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, in a report obtained by Reuters on Friday, accused Iran of not complying with safeguards to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and sent a team of inspectors to the country on Saturday.

Fresh from war in Iraq over banned weapons, the United States described the report as "deeply troubling."

Since the Iraq war, U.S. administration hawks have raised the specter of military action against Iran, but President Bush, who put Iran in an "axis of evil" with prewar Iraq and North Korea, has denied that he has plans to attack it.

Even so, many in Iran suspect that the Islamic Republic may be next on a U.S. hit list of regimes to be overthrown.

"We hope Iran's constructive cooperation with the agency and other countries makes the international community better aware of America's evil intentions," Mr. Asefi said.

"We are always alert about America's policies ... but we have no doubt the Americans won't be deluded into mistaking Iran for Iraq. Such a mistake would be irreparable," he said.

*This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030609-114511-9442r.htm>

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June 10, 2003

## Energy uses tech tools to protect radioactive shipments

By Molly M. Peterson, [National Journal's Technology Daily](#)

In response to the war on terrorism, the Energy Department's online tools and communications systems for

facilitating global and domestic shipments of radioactive materials have expanded over the past couple of years to protect those shipments from potential threats.

"These tools were originally deployed in order to ensure safe and compliant transportation [of radioactive materials]," Steven Hamp, a program manager with Energy's National Transportation Program (NTP), said during a homeland security conference sponsored by E-Gov.

"Now, there's much more emphasis on cost efficiency and security issues," he added. "These same tools that were originally deployed for one reason are now being expanded to address the more common [security] focus of today." One component of the Automated Transportation Management System, for example, helps Energy officials select the most responsible trucking firms for transporting radioactive materials. "You don't let just anybody transport this," Hamp said, noting that the application originally was designed as an accident-prevention tool. "We didn't want the carriers to have high accident rates."

But now the program includes background checks on all drivers, company histories and ownership, and other security measures. "There's a variety of criteria now that we've implemented ... and that information is accessible [online] at all of our shipping sites," he said.

He added that the satellite-based Transportation Tracking and Communications (TRANSCOM) system also is playing an increasing role in homeland security. That system enables officials to track, on a "near real-time basis," trucks, rails and barges that are toting radioactive materials and are equipped with global positioning systems, according to Hamp.

"There are about 450 trained users for this system across the country, both federal and state," Hamp said. "It's a very effective tool for knowing where a shipment is at any given time, and if there was an emergency, the communications aspect of this system allows a very quick interface with [state and local] first responders."

Hamp said that system, and several other NTP information and communications networks, increasingly are being used as counterterrorism measures.

Noting that Energy makes only about 4,600, or less than 1 percent, of the nation's 3 million annual shipments of radioactive material, Hamp said those tools also are available for use by other shippers.

"All the tools that we use are declassified," Hamp said, adding that many state agencies also use them. "They are open and available for others to review."

<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0603/061003td1.htm>

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**June 10, 2003**

## **Officials fear terrorist attack on U.S. food supply**

By Katherine McIntire Peters

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When members of the al Qaeda terrorist network abandoned their caves and safe houses in Afghanistan after being routed by U.S. troops in the months after the Sept. 11 attacks, they left behind many clues to their aspirations.

Besides the supplies and cell phones, ammunition and assorted weaponry one might expect to find with any modern paramilitary organization were thousands of documents and computer records. Among this mother lode of information were hundreds of pages of U.S. agricultural documents that had been translated into Arabic.

Al Qaeda's interest in American agriculture was more than academic, according to government officials. A significant part of the group's training manual is reportedly devoted to agricultural terrorism—the destruction of crops, livestock and food processing operations.

It shouldn't be surprising that a determined enemy like al Qaeda would consider ways to disrupt U.S. food supplies. The history of warfare is full of examples of burned crops, poisoned wells and slaughtered herds. Agriculture is an obvious target for terrorists: infecting plants or animals with deadly disease is easier, cheaper and less risky than infecting humans directly; the economic consequences of a widespread attack would be enormous; and the panic and fear such an attack might reap could lead to wide-scale social disruption.

Over the past 18 months, state and federal agencies have beefed up security and increased inspections of food and agricultural facilities across the country. But in an industry as complex and varied as agriculture, security is an elusive concept. From sprawling farms to feed lots, from state fairs to food processing plants, there are countless points at which terrorists could access the food supply system with relative ease. Defense Department officials are so concerned about the prospect of an attack that twice over the past several months, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's Strategic Policy Forum has conducted classified crisis simulation exercises for members of Congress and federal officials across government to plan potential responses to an incident.

The fact that the United States has not experienced a major agricultural or food-related disaster in recent memory is more a function of luck than design, says Peter Chalk, a policy analyst with RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “There is little real appreciation for either the threat or the potential consequences,” Chalk says. In an article for *RAND Review* last summer, Chalk wrote that the farming and food industries are highly vulnerable to both deliberate and accidental disruption for several reasons: The routine use of antibiotics and growth stimulants in animal diets has heightened the susceptibility of animals to disease; infectious animal diseases can spread rapidly across the country because of the highly concentrated nature of U.S. farming; and the huge number of food processing facilities—most of which have highly transient unscreened workforces, minimal security and inadequate procedures for recalling products—are ideal sites for the deliberate introduction of toxins into the food supply.

### **Critical Infrastructure**

According to the Agriculture Department, one out of eight Americans works in an occupation directly supported by food production, making the food and agricultural sector the nation’s largest employer. The farm sector alone, with agricultural exports exceeding \$50 billion a year, is the largest positive contributor to the U.S. trade balance. By any reasonable measure, agriculture is not just a vital component of the national economy, but of the global economy as well. Exports of American agricultural products account for 15 percent of all global agricultural exports. The United States in 1998 produced nearly half the world’s soybeans, more than 40 percent of its corn, 20 percent of its cotton, 12 percent of its wheat and 16 percent of its meat.

In a report issued by the National Defense University last March, Henry Parker, a researcher at USDA’s Agricultural Research Service, wrote that there are five potential targets of agricultural bioterrorism: field crops; farm animals; food items in the processing or distribution chain; market-ready foods at the wholesale or retail level; and agricultural facilities, including processing plants, storage facilities, wholesale and retail food outlets, elements of the transportation infrastructure, and research laboratories.

In the report, Parker said that “America is exceedingly vulnerable to agricultural bioterrorism. The reasons for the situation are numerous. To begin, there is limited appreciation for the economic and social importance of agriculture in the industrialized [world]. Abundant, affordable and safe food supplies are largely taken for granted. . . . It is hard for American citizens to imagine a world where the availability of food radically changes for the worse.”

Yet it’s not hard for terrorism analysts to imagine the impact of a major attack. RAND officials estimate that no major U.S. city has more than a seven-day supply of food. The consequences of a major attack on food sources, especially animals, would be felt almost immediately by consumers. Such an attack could easily spread fear and panic and quickly undermine public confidence in government.

According to Parker, the size and complexity of U.S. agribusiness makes it a tempting target, and the industry’s widespread vertical integration, where a single company controls much of the commodity production, processing and distribution system, makes it easier for pathogens to spread quickly over a wide area.

State and federal agencies have taken a number of steps to improve security. Twenty states have passed or are considering legislation related to agricultural terrorism, according to data compiled by the Council of State Governments, and many have hired more farm and food inspectors, developed guidelines or requirements for improving physical security at agricultural facilities, and are building more effective disease surveillance networks. At the federal level, responsibility for ensuring food safety is for the most part spread across three departments: At the Agriculture Department, the Food Safety and Inspection Service monitors meat and poultry products and plans for responding to outbreaks of food-borne illness, while a division of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is responsible for protecting agricultural crops and plants from disease. At the Department of Health and Human Services, the Food and Drug Administration is responsible for ensuring the safety of seafood, plant and dairy foods and beverages and other food products. The Homeland Security Department has taken over the inspection of food and agricultural products entering the United States, formerly a function of APHIS’ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection program. Close coordination among these various agencies and their state counterparts is vital to effectively securing the food supply.

Over the last 18 months, agencies have taken steps to boost their inspection and analysis capabilities. USDA has hired 20 new “import surveillance liaison” inspectors, who will reinspect imported meat and poultry products at various locations across the country. The agency is increasing the identification and diagnostic capacities at federal and state laboratories—a critical need, because responding quickly to an outbreak will be key to reducing the health and economic consequences of an attack. Also, as a result of the 2002 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, the Food and Drug Administration is tightening food safety regulations in several ways: requiring food processing facilities to register with the agency, mandating that companies provide advance notice of imported food shipments, and maintaining better records to make it easier to trace tainted food to its source.

All these steps are welcome, but terrorism experts say much more is needed. Chalk believes federal and state agencies remain woefully unprepared to respond to an agricultural or food-related disaster. He suggests giving a single federal agency the authority to standardize and rationalize food and agricultural safety procedures across a wide spectrum of jurisdictions: "Such an agency could help weave together the patchwork of largely uncoordinated food safety initiatives that currently exist in the United States."

### **Silent Prairie**

Many agricultural experts believe the greatest threat to U.S. agriculture would be the deliberate or accidental introduction of foot-and-mouth disease, the highly contagious viral disease that attacks cloven-footed animals, including cattle, swine, sheep, deer and elk. While humans cannot contract the disease from animals, its effect on animals is so swift and debilitating that milk and meat production could be severely cut nationwide. With thousands of animals being transported across state lines every day, an outbreak could spread within days, before animal health officials would even be able to provide a definitive diagnosis.

Even rumors of an outbreak can have economic consequences. At a Holstein market in Kansas one afternoon in March, a veterinarian discovered sores in the mouths of some of the cattle. He didn't believe the problem was foot-and-mouth disease, but following procedures, he notified the state animal health department. By 5 p.m., a state veterinarian, who had studied the devastating 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom, arrived at the market to test the animals. He also believed the problem was something other than foot-and-mouth disease. Nevertheless, the next morning, even before the appearance of news reports citing the discovery of a potential problem with the cattle, the national cattle futures market plummeted.

"There were six people who witnessed [the veterinarian inspecting the cattle] at the market," says Maj. Gen. Gregory Gardner, adjutant general and director of emergency management for the state of Kansas. "That's how powerful rumors can be." It turned out the cattle had eaten hay containing thorns, which caused the sores. According to Parker, more than 70 different strains of foot-and-mouth disease exist. It is the most infectious virus known, capable of spreading in wind-driven aerosol form more than 170 miles from its source. In Taiwan in March 1997, after the disease was confirmed in pigs there, it spread throughout the island within six weeks, forcing authorities to slaughter more than 8 million pigs and halt pork exports.

"The origin of the disease was reportedly traced to a single pig from Hong Kong, and China was suspected of deliberately introducing the disease into Taiwan," Parker wrote. "The disease is still affecting Taiwan, and the ultimate costs to that nation are estimated to be at least \$19 billion—\$4 billion to diagnose and eradicate the disease and another \$15 billion in indirect losses from trade embargoes. Was this an act of biowarfare or bioterrorism? The answer may never be known, but it is a plausible hypothesis that it indeed was."

No cases of foot-and-mouth disease have been diagnosed in the United States since 1929, but with more than 100 million head of cattle, 70 million pigs, 10 million sheep and more than 40 million wild cloven-footed animals, the country remains at great risk for the disease, Parker says, estimating that even a limited outbreak affecting no more than 10 farms could have a \$2 billion economic impact. Containing the disease to a small number of farms would be enormously difficult, he says.

Responding to an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease also would involve the coordinated efforts of thousands of local, state and federal officials, and likely require the deployment of National Guard troops—and perhaps even federal troops—to help enforce quarantines and help destroy infected animals.

The two classified agro-terrorism response exercises sponsored by the Defense Department, both called "Silent Prairie," involved the spread of foot-and-mouth disease at a time when the military was engaged in overseas missions. Air Force Col. Jim Haas, the exercise coordinator and an analyst at the National Defense University, says the exercise was designed to enlighten officials about the complex decisions they would have to make in the event of a major disease outbreak, as well as the "second- and third-order effects" on things such as agricultural exports and trade agreements.

The 40 participants in the most recent exercise in February, including several members of Congress, Defense's Rumsfeld, Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman and personnel from state and federal agencies, were not role-playing from a predetermined script, Haas says. "Everyone's expertise is what they walked in the door with. That's what makes these exercises especially valuable and informative."

### **'A Big Bull's-Eye'**

Foot-and-mouth is only one of many diseases that could have devastating consequences for the U.S. economy. An attack on crops would have even greater consequences, according to Parker.

Crops make up more than half the total value of American farm commodities and contribute more to exports, Parker wrote in his study. "More important," he noted, "crops comprise the major components of prepared feeds for livestock, poultry and farm-raised fish. Finally, deliberate contamination of processed foods by terrorists could have

devastating consequences, not only in terms of human health, but also because of economic impact and loss of consumer confidence in the safety of the nation's food supplies."

States are not waiting for the federal government to figure out solutions, but they're also realistic about their own ability to protect the food supply. A December report by the Council of State Governments' Midwestern Office found that risk management is critical. Only by focusing efforts on key vulnerabilities can officials hope to reduce the likelihood of an attack as well as the severity of damage. "Complete surveillance of U.S. agricultural holdings is not a realistic, cost-effective option. With more than 500,000 farms and 57,000 processors in the United States, and more than 350,000 acres of farmland in the Midwest alone, no inspection regime could fully guarantee safety and security," the report found.

Dr. Thomas McGinn, assistant state veterinarian at the North Carolina Department of Agriculture, told an agro-terrorism panel convened by the National Governors Association in February that people need to start thinking of animal health as part of public health. North Carolina, he says, is in the process of creating a multi-hazard threat database that links the two.

Displaying a U.S. map that shows the distribution of poultry and cloven-footed livestock across the country—a blur of dots that illustrates just how dispersed the agricultural animal population is—McGinn says, "This looks like a big bull's-eye to me."

"We have food safety. We've got to get ourselves to a place where we have food security as well," he says.

<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0603/061003kp1.htm>

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Philadelphia Inquirer  
June 10, 2003

## **In Iraq, Empty-Handed Arms Hunters Reassigned**

By Dafna Linzer, Associated Press

BAGHDAD - U.S. military units assigned to track down Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have run out of places to look and are getting time off or being assigned to other duties, even as pressure mounts on President Bush to explain why no banned arms have been found.

After nearly three months of fruitless searches, weapons hunters say they are waiting for a large team of Pentagon intelligence experts to take over the effort, relying more on leads from interviews and documents.

"It doesn't appear there are any more targets at this time," said Lt. Col. Keith Harrington, whose team has been cut by more than 30 percent. "We're hanging around with no missions in the foreseeable future."

Over the last week, his and several other teams have been taken off assignment completely. Rather than visit suspected weapons sites, they are brushing up on target practice and catching up on letters home.

Of the seven Site Survey Teams charged with carrying out the search, only two have assignments for the coming week - but not at suspected weapons sites.

Lt. Col. Ronald Haan, who runs Team 6, is using the time to run his troops through a training exercise.

"At least it's keeping the guys busy," he said.

The slowdown comes after checks of more than 230 sites - drawn from a master intelligence list compiled before the war - turned up none of the chemical or biological weapons the Bush administration said it went after Saddam Hussein to destroy.

Still, Bush insisted yesterday that Baghdad had a program to make weapons of mass destruction.

"Intelligence throughout the decade shows they had a weapons program," he said. "I am absolutely convinced that with time, we'll find out they did have a weapons program."

The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency said work would resume at a brisk pace once its 1,300-person Iraq Survey Group took over.

Ahead of the war, planners were so certain of the intelligence that the weapons teams were designed simply to secure chemical and biological weapons rather than investigate their whereabouts, as U.N. inspectors had done.

But without evidence of weapons, the CIA and other intelligence agencies have begun reviewing the accuracy of information they supplied to the administration before the March invasion of Iraq. Government inquiries are being set up in Washington, London and other countries to examine how possibly flawed intelligence might have influenced the decision for war.

"The smoking guns just weren't lying out in the open," said David Gai, spokesman for the Iraq Survey Group.

"There's a lot more detective work that needs to be done."



Led by Keith Dayton, a two-star general from Defense Intelligence, the Iraq Survey Group is settling into headquarters in Qatar rather than in Iraq. However, it will maintain a large presence of analysts and experts on the same palace grounds outside Baghdad where the weapons hunters are based.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/6051590.htm>

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New York Times

June 10, 2003

## North Korea Says It Seeks To Develop Nuclear Arms

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, June 9 — North Korea declared today for the first time that it was seeking to develop nuclear weapons so that it could reduce the size of a million-man army it can no longer afford.

The announcement came on the same day that several administration officials said the United States and its Asian allies were planning to track and inspect suspect sea shipments out of North Korea.

Administration officials said that those steps would stop short of a full embargo, but would amount to what one official called "selective interdiction." The effort is aimed at curbing the weapons exports of North Korea and cutting off its sources of cash, officials said. North Korea has shipped missiles to the Middle East, including Iran, and to Pakistan.

The administration was deliberately measured in its public response to the North today.

"This does not mean we are on our way to war," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said in Santiago, Chile, where he was attending a meeting of the Organization of American States, according to Reuters. "We are not."

"The president continues to believe that there is an opportunity for a diplomatic solution, a political solution, but it's a solution that must come in a multilateral forum," Mr. Powell said at a news conference.

While debate continues on holding a second round of talks with North Korea — the first was two months ago — the administration is stepping up the economic pressure on the government of Kim Jong Il.

Japan began the process, sending 1,900 "safety inspectors" and policemen to meet a North Korean ferry suspected for years as being the link that allowed North Koreans living in Japan to transfer money home. When it became clear that the ferry would be inspected regularly, the North suspended the service.

American officials say those inspections are just a beginning. They are encouraging allies to stop ships and inspect them for drugs, as Australia did a month ago. Whether the United States itself will attempt to interdict shipments is unclear.

The legality of stopping ships is open to question. A ship suspected of carrying illegal drugs, for example, may be searched.

The effort "will be focused on those activities which require no additional laws, no new international treaties, no going to the United Nations Security Council," a senior official said. "Look at the Japanese, who can't stop transfers of money on North Korean ships, but suddenly discovered they can do `safety inspections.'" Other techniques like that are under consideration.

The strategy, officials say, is to make no announcement of any new measures, to avoid any overt confrontation with the North. But the interdictions are intended to make clear, officials say, that the United States has had some success in organizing its Asian allies into a loose coalition to put more and more pressure on the North. The most important nation needed in that coalition is China, and so far there is no indication it is willing to seal off its border or cut off oil and other shipments.

There is no indication that the squeeze on the North is having much effect. A Congressional delegation that traveled there last week said officials boasted that they had nearly completed reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, which can make four or five weapons. The North was believed to have two nuclear weapons produced at least a decade ago, but with the ejection of international inspectors on New Year's Eve the opportunity to produce weapons has increased.

"What they are doing, though, is edging toward a declaration that they are now a nuclear weapons state," a senior official said. "And once they take that step, how do we respond?"

That is the subject of a continuing debate between Mr. Bush and his allies. Meetings with the leaders of South Korea and Japan have produced statements that the allies will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea. But the meaning of that is unclear.

The White House has said that it will rule out no options, even a military strike against the North's nuclear facilities. South Korean leaders have declared such a strike would be unthinkable, and have said they will neither plan for any military solution nor discuss one with allies.

In today's announcement, the North said it might have to develop a "nuclear deterrent." Its usual warning is that it will develop a "physical deterrent" against the United States.

Today also marked the first time North Korea linked its atomic weapons program to the goal of cutting its conventional military and saving money. Its huge army consumes most of the country's budget. But it also performs nonmilitary functions, including building housing.

"They introduced a new element into their logic today when they said they would also do this as a cost-saving measure," Mr. Powell said. "I'll have to reflect on that for a while," he added.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/10/international/asia/10KORE.html>

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Christian Science Monitor

June 10, 2003

## Russia Grows Wary Of Iran Nukes

*A 'worst-case scenario' says Iran could be capable of building nuclear weapons by 2006.*

By Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

MOSCOW – Even as a leaked report on Iran's nuclear program cites a string of safeguard "failures," Iran is enhancing its cooperation with UN inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and trying to mollify deepening concerns in Russia and the US that it harbors secret nuclear-weapons ambitions.

An IAEA team arrived in Iran Saturday to take samples to test Iran's stated policy of transparency. Revelations in the past year about swift Iranian progress in uranium enrichment and previously unknown advanced facilities are raising new questions among nuclear experts.

Russia is Iran's top nuclear business partner and the builder of a controversial \$1 billion reactor at Bushehr. But after years of defending Iran's nuclear program as peaceful, Russia appears to be undergoing an change in official thinking.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair set off a firestorm when he announced last week that Moscow had imposed new conditions on Iran. Russia would not send nuclear fuel to Iran unless the Islamic republic signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) additional protocol, a measure that would enable stringent IAEA inspections of undeclared sites.

### Technical leaps

Senior Russian and Iranian officials have since denied that any new condition exists.

They said instead that the two nations have only to hammer out details of an accord that requires Iran to return all spent fuel to Russia.

But Russia has been embarrassed and surprised by the scale of an undeclared gas centrifuge-enrichment plant at Natanz, 200 miles south of Tehran.

### Background:

A uranium-conversion facility is also coming on line at Isfahan, and Iran declared to the IAEA last month that it plans to build a heavy-water research reactor.

And in February, President Mohamed Khatami announced that Iran was developing its own uranium deposits at mines near Yazd, in the central part of the country.

"Russian officials have made a huge evolution in understanding the threat from Iran" and are making "progress toward the US position," says Anton Khlopkov, an Iran expert at the PIR Center in Moscow, a military-research institute that predicts a "worst-case scenario" of Iran building a nuclear weapon by 2006, in a report soon to be released.

"Not only US but Russian experts were really surprised by the information about these two sites and these two plants," Mr. Khlopkov says of the enrichment facilities. "Russia and the US should engage with European experts to find the source of such technologies ... maybe in North Korea or Pakistan."

The US has labeled Iran part of an "axis of evil," and is pushing for the 35-member board of the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the NPT when it meets in Vienna on June 16.

Addressing the issue Sunday during a special session of Iran's parliament, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi declared that it was strictly forbidden for Muslims to use any weapon of mass destruction.



"We have no nuclear weapons program and we have said this frankly and clearly so many times," Mr. Kharrazi said. "We have a security doctrine that is without nuclear weapons."

But a tough IAEA report drawn up for the Vienna meeting was widely leaked on Friday. It found that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations ... with respect to the reporting of nuclear material [imported from China in 1991]." The IAEA also noted that the failures were being "rectified" by Iran.

Though Iran dismissed the findings as out of date, headlines and speculation about Iran's nuclear intentions are cutting deeply, even with allies.

#### **A 'sophisticated' program**

For years, Russia stated that Iran was incapable of gas centrifuge enrichment. But during a February visit to the Natanz site - which Iran was not required to declare, according to the NPT, until 180 days before it planned to enrich uranium there - IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei found what he called a "sophisticated" program.

An article in the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by two American experts notes that Iran has joined an "exclusive club" of some 10 nations that can build such centrifuges.

Some 160 centrifuges were already operational, with parts in place for 1,000 more. Portions of the facility are being built deep underground. The complete project would include some 5,000 - enough, experts say, to create weapons-grade material for several nuclear weapons per year.

#### **'Iran clearly got caught'**

Iran has also declared that it has worked with uranium metal - a substance rarely used for peaceful purposes but critical for weapons components - raising red flags for experts.

The leaked IAEA report makes clear that unless Iran signs the additional protocol, its ability to "provide credible assurances" about "undeclared nuclear activities is limited."

"Iraq clearly got caught, so it revealed quite a few things," says David Albright, a nuclear expert and former IAEA inspector in Iraq, who is head of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington and an author of the Bulletin article.

"In total," he adds, "it looks like it was putting together a nuclear weapons program."

Still, Iran is not in breach of the NPT, Mr. Albright says, and most on the IAEA board "will want to give Iran more time, to see if they really are turning a corner, or just revealing what they have to."

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher on Friday said the IAEA report was "deeply troubling."

While Iranian officials have long denied nuclear-weapon ambitions, many declare their right to create such weapons, noting that they live in tough neighborhood in which Israel, Pakistan, and India all have the bomb.

Kharrazi on Sunday linked Iran's nuclear progress to national pride, calling it "the source of our power and every Iranian is proud of that."

Already, many Iranians embrace the idea of being a nuclear-armed regional power.

"The people of Iran actually believe that if we have a nuclear weapon, it is a good idea, because it is a deterrent ... and we would be treated much more politely by the rest of the world," says an Iranian observer contacted in Tehran, who asked not to be named. "Why shouldn't we have that?"

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0610/p06s01-woeu.html>

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Los Angeles Times

June 10, 2003

## **Al Qaeda Attack Highly Probable, U.S. Says**

By Times Wire Reports

There is a "high probability" that Al Qaeda will attempt an attack with a biological, chemical, radioactive or nuclear weapon in the next two years, the U.S. said in a report to a U.N. Security Council committee.

The report did not say where the Bush administration believes such an attack might be launched.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-briefs10.1jun10.1.1658121.story>

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Christian Science Monitor

June 10, 2003

# The Quest To Create A Futuristic Battle Suit, One Micron At A Time

*New institute in Boston, which develops defense technologies, reflects shift in the region's economy.*

By Abraham McLaughlin, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Deep inside the labyrinthine hallways of the world-renowned Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in a quiet laboratory with pristine linoleum floors, two students are hunched over a compressing machine the size of a small refrigerator.

Suddenly a loud pop pierces the air. Lauren Frick, an MIT senior, yelps, as small white shards spatter across her hand.

But it's hardly cause for concern. She and fellow researcher Benjamin Bruet are testing the strength of seashells.

Their aim: to help create a futuristic "battle suit" for America's soldiers that's as thin as a scuba diver's wet suit - but fit for a superhero. Among other things, it would be bulletproof and help soldiers leap 20-foot walls.

Their work is part of a unique new venture called the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology (ISN). It's a collaboration between the US Army, MIT, defense contractors, and the medical industry.

The institute represents a fusion of realms in a city that's a national hub for big ideas in a growing number of fields. And it reflects tectonic shifts in the region's economic character.

Amid growing military spending - especially on futuristic weapons - the center of gravity for the region's defense industry is shifting from building behemoths, like ships, to high-tech research. Meanwhile, the region's biotech sector is expanding. And medical complexes dominate the Northeast landscape more than ever.

The ISN is "a very different kind of collaboration," says Andre Mayer, president of the New England Economic Project. "It isn't entirely new for some of these players. But it's a new wave and a new kind of focus."

Collaboration between the military and Boston's mega-watt academic minds is nothing new. Researchers at MIT perfected radar for military use during World War II.

But nano-technology is a whole new world. It's the science of objects far smaller than the width of a human hair.

For instance, when Ms. Frick and Mr. Bruet use scanning-electron microscopes or atomic-force microscopes to look at the seashells, they see what looks like a wall of bricks. The "bricks" are five microns long and one micron tall. (A human hair is 80 microns wide.)

Nature, they explain, has taken relatively weak materials and created a structure - the brick wall - that is impressively tough. Using nano-construction techniques, the ISN will eventually try to mimic that structure with super-strong materials, thus creating a lightweight - and bulletproof - substance.

But first ISN researchers are testing the toughness of many natural materials - everything from antlers to armadillo shells to horse hoofs.

They even tried to get dinosaur plates from Norway - but couldn't get export permits. And Bruet convinced a paleontologist in Paris to give him a prehistoric armored fish from Senegal. Bruet hand-carried it back to Boston for testing.

"We're going to try to find nature's toughest material," says Frick, a material-science major.

And these researchers are not the only ones looking. When ISN is fully staffed, it will have some 35 faculty members; 80 graduate students; and specialists from Raytheon, the DuPont chemical company, two Boston hospitals, and others.

Together, they're working on a range of projects. One would create "exo-muscles" embedded in the battle suit.

These would give soldiers Spider-Man-like strength. But ISN Director Ned Thomas admits it's probably years from reality.

He tells of a recent show-and-tell session with an Army general. A nano-model - shaped like a human hand - was expanding and retracting. Scientists saw it as an impressive display of nano-mechanics. But, recalls Dr. Thomas, "The general said, 'Call me when it can crush rocks.'"

Even if scientists can create a nano-muscle, they will have to figure out how to enable it to work alongside real muscles.

Another project - which involves medical researchers - would include nano-sized bioweapons sensors. When the battle suit detected chemical weapons it would close up a system of "pores" that would keep toxins away from the soldier.

Indeed, the beauty of nano-tech, Thomas explains, is that it can include multiple functions all woven into a fabric as thin as a wet suit.

But, for now the ISN has more realistic aims. When Thomas interviewed soldiers at an Army training facility, he asked what improvements they most wanted. "They told us they wanted to waterproof everything - everything," he says.

They already lug up to 140 pounds of gear around the battlefield, he explains. When it gets wet, it's even heavier. So, one of ISN's short-term projects is a waterproof microcoating that could be applied to any material.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0610/p02s01-usgn.html>

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Washington Post

Monday, June 9, 2003; 6:55 PM

## **FBI Draining Pond in Anthrax Investigation**

*FBI's 'Forensic Searches' Seek Clothing and Equipment*

By David Snyder and Marilyn W. Thompson, Washington Post Staff Writers

The FBI today began an elaborate operation to drain a rural pond in the Frederick Municipal Forest, hoping to find evidence that might have been dumped there in the fall of 2001 after postal envelopes were stuffed with deadly anthrax bacteria.

In a brief press release, the FBI's Washington field office said that officials from the FBI and U.S. Postal Service are conducting "forensic searches" on the public land, including draining one of about a dozen man-made ponds in the 7,000-acre forest a few miles outside the Frederick city limits.

"These searches are related to the investigation of the origin of the anthrax-laced letters mailed in September and October 2001, which resulted in five deaths and 17 illnesses," the release said. "To facilitate the search activity, one pond will be drained."

The operation, expected to last several weeks and cost about \$250,000, follows the discovery last winter of a box and other equipment that authorities say could have been used by the anthrax perpetrator. Tests on the equipment have been inconclusive for the presence of anthrax, but FBI forensic experts continue to analyze the equipment for possible clues.

FBI divers went to the ponds last December and cut through ice to search for possible evidence after a tipster told investigators that Dr. Steven J. Hatfill had once hypothetically described how he might dispose of contaminated equipment. Hatfill has not been charged in the crimes. Attorney General John Ashcroft has described him as a "person of interest" in the case, and he remains under 24-hour FBI surveillance.

A former researcher at the U.S. Army military research lab at Fort Detrick, Hatfill once lived about eight miles from the ponds and has acknowledged through a spokesman that he had visited a "wooded area" in Frederick with the Boy Scouts but he does not remember this specific pond.

The divers' recoveries in the murky ponds buoyed the hopes of FBI officials, who have been looking for a break in the frustrating 18-month investigation. In numerous searches of homes, outbuildings and other structures, the FBI's anthrax team has found no evidence of how the letter-stuffing operation could have been carried out.

The anthrax letters included two addressed to Sens. Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), which contained a powder so highly refined that many believed it could have killed anyone handling it. This led the FBI to ponder the possibility that the perpetrator had moved the letter-stuffing operation to the ponds, using water as natural protection against the airborne bacteria.

The FBI's press release said that before the draining began, extensive environmental tests were conducted. The tests indicated that the draining would pose no threat to the public health or safety. Debbie Weierman, an FBI spokeswoman, declined to comment further.

Frederick city spokeswoman Nancy Poss said FBI officials would brief city officials this morning about the operation.

The pond in question, in the northeast corner of the forest, is one of about a dozen such ponds in the forest that were constructed decades ago as water sources in case fires broke out in the forest. The area is managed by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources. The FBI has coordinated its searches with DNR, the Maryland Department of the Environment and city officials.

*Staff writer Allan Lengel contributed to this report.*

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34060-2003Jun9.html?nav=hptop\\_tb](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34060-2003Jun9.html?nav=hptop_tb)

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# New Lab Assigned to Bioterror Fight

Richmond Facility Opens With Mandate to Back Up CDC in Case of Attack

By Michael D. Shear

Washington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, June 10, 2003; Page B01

RICHMOND, June 9 -- Virginia today became a key part of the nation's defense against bioterrorism and deadly epidemics, opening a \$60 million laboratory that state and federal officials said is rivaled in sophistication only by the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and a handful of military labs.

Known as "Biotech Six," the Richmond facility has eight sealed rooms for handling such deadly diseases as SARS, West Nile virus and tuberculosis -- more than any other state lab, according to Dee Pettit, the lab's lead scientist for bioterrorism. And within a year, plans call for the first "Biosafety Level 4" room in a state facility, capable of safely testing the most dangerous pathogens such as Ebola, hantavirus and smallpox.

In addition, the CDC has designated Virginia's Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services as one of five in the nation to handle round-the-clock testing in the event that a massive chemical attack by terrorists overwhelms the national labs in Atlanta.

"We can't always do everything ourselves," said Charles Schable, director of bioterrorism preparedness for the CDC's National Center for Infectious Diseases. "This will enhance the nation's capability to respond to a bioterror event."

Schable noted the emergence over the weekend of the monkeypox virus in the Midwest. A cousin of smallpox that is usually found only in Africa, monkeypox produces similar symptoms but is considered less dangerous.

"It's usually not a lethal agent," he said. "But what if it was something else? You need the capability to react very quickly."

Virginia officials formally opened the lab today in front of an audience of several hundred state lab directors, federal public health officials and terrorism experts. The lab's old building, where scientists labored with cramped facilities and aging equipment, will be torn down to make way for a parking garage.

The new glass and brick building is home to 151 scientists and researchers who will conduct more than 3 million tests each year. The 200,000-square-foot facility is also one of the most secure in the city, with 48 closed-circuit cameras and several layers of electronic card-key access that limit movement throughout the building.

Financed in part by federal anti-terrorism money made available after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the lab is part of a downtown biotechnology campus in Richmond that includes about 42 private labs, the state forensics facility and the state medical examiner's office.

"We have concerns about the potential attacks on our soil by those who employ biological or chemical agents to disrupt our community and economy," Virginia Gov. Mark R. Warner (D) said at the morning dedication. "This lab . . . is in many ways our first line of defense against the new threats and against traditional threats."

Local and national terrorism officials said the Virginia lab may play a key role in any future attacks against the seat of government in the Washington region.

"We find ourselves consistently in the bull's-eye of terrorist actions targeted against America," said George W. Foresman, who advises Warner on terrorism. "It becomes incumbent upon us . . . to make sure we have state labs that can handle the spillover."

In a chemical attack, officials said, scientists at the Virginia lab could perform testing to determine what the chemical is, how deadly it is, how far it has spread and what doctors can do to treat patients.

Using sophisticated analysis, the lab can detect tiny traces of chemicals in air, soil or even blood to map the attack's reach. And new equipment would allow scientists to detect and identify dozens of deadly chemicals, many of which are odorless and invisible.

Those facts can be critical, public health officials said. When Russian special forces last year used gas to end a standoff in a Moscow theater, more than 115 hostages died because doctors were kept in the dark about what chemical had been used.

Meanwhile, public health officials say they worry that SARS -- severe acute respiratory syndrome -- which has been mild in the United States, might reemerge in the fall. If that happens, the CDC and other national labs could be flooded with testing requests.

"If you started to have panic occur . . . you have all these people showing up" in hospital emergency rooms, said Shelley A. Hearne, executive director of the Trust for America's Health, a nonprofit health care organization. "They are thinking they have SARS. It's probably just the flu."

Hearne's group last week issued a report critical of the nation's public health labs. The report said the labs are "dangerously unprepared" for a chemical attack.

Even with its new building, Virginia is not immune from some of those criticisms.

With the state in the midst of a budget crisis, the lab has been forced to hold 20 of its 220 jobs vacant in recent months so officials can use the money to pay other operating expenses, lab Director James L. Pearson said. Many scientists who worked in the old lab building stayed only a few years, then sought higher-paying jobs at a private company.

Money problems have also delayed completion of the lab's Level 4 testing facility, where scientists could eventually handle deadly germs in sealed cases. The state still needs about \$1.7 million.

"It will happen," Pearson vowed, "but it isn't here today."

In ordinary times, the Virginia lab will focus on testing of water, air and soil samples. Scientists will continue to examine the blood of every newborn in the state for genetic disorders and will test consumer products, including condoms and lottery scratch-off tickets.

But a key role, in the post-Sept. 11 world, will be terrorism.

"We're all asking the same question," Pearson said. "How do we handle these unknowns?"

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36856-2003Jun9.html>

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Washington Post

June 11, 2003

Pg. 31

## **Chalabi Defends Intelligence On Arms**

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, June 10 -- Ahmed Chalabi, a former Iraqi exile who fed the United States intelligence on Iraq's banned arms program that helped justify the U.S.-led war, today dismissed charges that he exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons.

Chalabi, 58, the leader of the Pentagon-backed Iraqi National Congress, insisted that U.S. authorities would find the former Iraqi government's hidden weapons once they locate Hussein. Chalabi maintained that Hussein is still alive and directing attacks against U.S. soldiers.

Chalabi, a former banker and Iraqi opposition leader, traveled to the United States this week to persuade Washington to quickly establish an Iraqi-led provisional government. He said that Iraqi defectors he introduced to U.S. intelligence officials helped uncover the first important arms discoveries in Iraq: mobile laboratories that the White House says were built to produce biological weapons.

"We gave very accurate information, and we produced people who we handed over to the United States who told them very significant things," Chalabi said today during a question-and-answer session with "NBC Nightly News" anchor Tom Brokaw at the New York office of the Council on Foreign Relations. "The only tangible things they have found are the mobile labs, which our defectors talked about."

The role of Chalabi and other former Iraqi exiles in helping to build the U.S. case for war has been scrutinized recently in Washington, particularly since U.S. inspectors have not provided substantial evidence of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Even the use of mobile labs, which President Bush maintained constitutes proof that Iraq was engaged in a banned program, has reportedly prompted heated internal dissent among some U.S. intelligence analysts, who question whether the labs were being used to produce biological weapons.

Chalabi is a longtime favorite of Pentagon hawks, and he traveled on a U.S. military transport plane with the U.S.-trained 700-member Iraqi Free Forces to southern Iraq during the war.

But he has criticized the U.S. military for not anticipating the extent of chaos after the fall of Hussein's government. He said he had repeatedly pleaded with U.S. officials to train a force of Iraqi military police to "go in with the American force" and halt the "looting" and the "acts of disorder."

He also said the United States failed to aggressively identify and interrogate Iraqi scientists with knowledge of the weapons programs, and has not met its obligations to promote the establishment of a provisional government run by Iraqis.

The main purpose of Chalabi's trip to the United States is to convey displeasure over the decision by L. Paul Bremer III, head of the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq, to put off plans to organize a national conference to choose an Iraqi transitional government. Instead, he plans to appoint an advisory board of 20 to 30 Iraqis.

"The United States should not pick and choose Iraqi leaders," Chalabi said. "There should be a provisional government very quickly."

Chalabi, who boasted that his network of Iraqi sources had helped U.S. forces capture 15 of the 55 most-wanted senior Iraqi leaders, appeared to be maneuvering for a role in Iraqi politics. He suggested that his network could help find Iraq's banned weapons and Hussein.

Chalabi said that Hussein, controlling \$1.3 billion stolen from the Iraqi Central Bank, has "put a price on American soldiers. He will pay a bounty for every American soldier killed in Iraq."

Chalabi said that the capture of Hussein and his younger son, Qusay, could still hold the key to discovering Iraq's banned weapons: "The weapons and Saddam are one and the same thing."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41936-2003Jun10.html>

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Philadelphia Inquirer

June 11, 2003

## **Tehran Says It Is Complying With Nuclear Pact, Faults U.S.**

By Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Knight Ridder News Service

TEHRAN, Iran - The head of Iran's atomic-energy program said yesterday that his nation would not agree to spot inspections of its nuclear sites until the "poisonous atmosphere" created by U.S. claims that Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program was eliminated.

Gholam Reza Aghazadeh insisted that Iran was not concealing any of its facilities from the U.N. agency that is monitoring Iran's burgeoning nuclear-power program. Aghazadeh said Iran cooperated with international inspectors who are in the country this week.

"Everything they've asked for... we've done" under the provisions of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that Iran has agreed to, Aghazadeh told reporters.

A Western diplomat in Vienna, where the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency - the International Atomic Energy Agency - is based, said that international inspectors were being denied access to a Tehran electric company they wanted to examine. Inspectors want to test centrifuges to determine whether any nuclear material may have been used there. Centrifuges are needed to produce enriched uranium, which can be made into nuclear weapons.

If the centrifuges were used, it would be a significant violation of the nuclear treaty, the diplomat said. Failure to notify the agency of the test of the centrifuges would be far worse than the black eye Iran recently received from a leaked IAEA report that accused it of failing to disclose 3,960 pounds of uranium imported from China in 1991. Iranian officials have never denied testing uranium material in centrifuges, although they insist they have never violated any agreement with the international agency, including one requiring Iran to notify it 180 days before any material that could be used in bombs arrives at its nuclear sites.

Iran told the agency its testing at the Kalaye Electric Co. in Tehran was simulated and employed no nuclear material, according to the diplomat.

The IAEA wants Iran to agree to additional parts of the Nonproliferation Treaty that would allow nuclear inspections with little notice.

According to the report, which IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei will discuss with his board of governors Monday, Iran is cooperating with reviews of its nuclear program but failed to fully account for its uranium, how it was processed, and where it was stored.

Aghazadeh's briefing yesterday was the latest in a flurry of news conferences that Iranian officials have called in recent weeks to refute Washington's growing criticism of Iran's nuclear activities.

Aghazadeh challenged the United States to show evidence to back up its accusations that his country was secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons.

"First clear up your embarrassment in Iraq before being embarrassed again over your accusations against Iran," he said, referring to the Bush administration's failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Iranian officials vehemently deny developing nuclear weapons, saying that it is strictly against their Shiite Muslim faith.

The inspectors will wrap up their visit to Iran as early as today before returning to Vienna.

The White House is pressing ElBaradei to find Iran in violation of the treaty, which would allow the U.N. Security Council to become involved and possibly impose sanctions on Iran.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/6059095.htm>

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New York Times on the Web  
June 11, 2003

## **Report: Iran Nuke Experts Visited N.Korea This Year**

TOKYO (Reuters) - Iranian experts on nuclear issues secretly visited North Korea this year, possibly to ask North Korean officials for advice on how to handle international inspectors, a Japanese newspaper said on Wednesday. The Iranian experts made three visits to North Korea between March and May, the conservative Sankei Shimbun said, quoting what it described as "a Korean peninsula source," who was not named.

The visits "may have been intended to ask North Korea for know-how on how to act when accepting inspectors," Sankei quoted the source as saying. "Cooperation on nuclear development may also have been discussed," the source added.

Two Iranian experts stayed in North Korea for several days in March for talks with North Korean officials in charge of nuclear development, Sankei said. One expert visited in April and two experts visited in May, the newspaper added.

Sankei said North Korea may receive, or may already have received, funds from Iran, both of which have been branded as part of an "axis of evil" by President Bush along with pre-war Iraq.

Washington has accused Iran of violating the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Tehran has signed, by using undeclared nuclear material to test a uranium enrichment system.

Iran says its nuclear ambitions are limited to producing electricity and it has allowed inspectors from the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to visit several of its nuclear facilities.

On Tuesday it denied having any hidden nuclear facilities that should have been declared to U.N. inspectors, following a critical U.N. report of Tehran's nuclear program which Washington called "deeply troubling."

North Korea said on Monday it wanted nuclear weapons so it could cut its huge conventional forces and divert funds into its economy, in Pyongyang's most explicit public acknowledgment to date that it was seeking to build nuclear weapons.

The United States said last October that Pyongyang had admitted to having a covert program to enrich uranium for nuclear arms. North Korea has since expelled U.N. nuclear inspectors and pulled out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

<http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-korea-north-iran.html>

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USA Today  
June 11, 2003  
Pg. 1B

## **Nuclear Plants Near Airports May Be At Risk**

*Spent-fuel pools might not be as protected as needed*

By Gary Stoller, USA Today

The nuclear industry beefed up security on the ground at power plants throughout the country after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. But the plants today remain as vulnerable to a hit from a plane using a nearby small airport as they were then.

A USA TODAY analysis shows that thousands of airports are within 60 miles of plants; 52 are within five miles. Yet, aircraft based at many of these airports are largely unguarded and could reach a nuclear site within minutes.

Nuclear power companies say their plants, designed to withstand earthquakes and natural disasters, are well protected and wouldn't release radiation if struck by an aircraft. Even a jet crash wouldn't cause major damage, although it could affect the ability to generate electricity, they say.

But some scientists, safety experts and lawmakers say the real threat is the ever-increasing stockpile of used fuel stored in less-protected pools at the plants.

The worry about a plane crashing at a nuclear power site was heightened after hijacked jets were used in the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Since then, various government agencies have sounded warnings that planes controlled by terrorists might pose a threat to the plants: The FBI alerted local law enforcement agencies last month to the possibility of terrorists using an aircraft to strike a plant; the government earlier this year urged small plane owners to look for and report suspicious activities; and in late February, the Federal Aviation Administration instructed pilots to "avoid the airspace above or in proximity to all nuclear power plants."

But Congress and the accountable federal agencies, facing high-cost solutions and political pressure, have done little to address the threat. The nuclear industry considers it an airport security issue. Aviation interests are opposed to restrictions that might limit access to the skies.

After Sept. 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission began a study of what could happen if an aircraft strikes a power plant. The study hasn't been completed. It has "the highest priority," but science "does take time," says Alan Madison, a security chief at the NRC.

The NRC says it relies on airport security to protect against anyone commandeering a plane and using it for a deliberate attack on a nuclear plant. Although security at major airports was beefed up after Sept. 11, there is little or no security at many of the 18,000 "general aviation" airports that handle smaller planes.

"What would prevent some terrorist or criminal from taking a Learjet from a small airport?" asks security consultant Jalal Haidar, senior vice president of Virginia-based Aerospace Services International. "They have no security measures. They're a loophole in the overall aviation security system."

Using government data, USA TODAY and Pennsylvania-based CAP Index, a risk-forecasting and mapping company, looked at the proximity of airports to the nation's operating nuclear power plants at 65 sites in 31 states. The analysis shows:

\*More than 6,200 airports and heliports are within 60 miles of the nuclear plants. Among them are 83 airports that have regular jet flights, including Chicago's O'Hare, the nation's busiest, and Boston's Logan and New Jersey's Newark, two airports from which terrorists hijacked planes on Sept. 11. But most of the 6,200 aren't bound by federal regulations designed to make larger airports more secure. About 1,200 are public; most of the rest are operated privately for companies, hospitals and local governments.

\*Every nuclear plant is within 19 miles of at least one public airport. Two hundred public airports are within 20 miles of a plant.

According to USA TODAY's analysis, the nuclear plant closest to a public airport is Wolf Creek, operating since June 1985 in Lebo, Kan. It is 1.4 miles from Burlington, Kan.'s Coffey County Airport, which handles about 55 flights daily and is home base for 28 single-engine and two multi-engine planes.

Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island, site of a 1979 nuclear accident, is the plant closest to an airport with scheduled commercial flights. Harrisburg International Airport is slightly more than three miles from the plant, handles about 200 flights daily, mostly airlines' multi-engine jets and commuter planes. Lancaster Airport, a busy private-plane facility with more than 300 flights each day, is 22 miles away.

Nuclear power companies say the numbers are meaningless. Most planes at airports near power plants are small, without the weight or speed to cause a crash that would release radiation into the atmosphere, they say. The concrete surrounding each nuclear reactor gives sufficient protection, and a crash elsewhere on a power plant site wouldn't lead to an environmental disaster, they say.

But given the proximity of the airports, including many of the USA's largest, to nuclear plants, some safety experts raise questions about the chance not only of terrorism but of an accidental crash, because most accidents happen at or near an airport.

An October 2000 NRC study calculated that the chances of an airplane damaging a spent-fuel pool, considered more vulnerable than the reactor itself, are between one in 17 million and one in 100 billion. As a comparison, a person's chance of being killed in a plane crash is one in 4.6 million.

The chances of a plane accidentally crashing into a pool are "at the far end of possibilities and low probability," says the NRC's Madison.

But the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, an arm of the NRC, has signaled its concern about the proximity of planes and nuclear facilities. In March, the board said it couldn't approve a license for a proposed nuclear waste facility in Utah, which would be built by utility companies, because it would be under an airway used by F-16 pilots during training flights from Hill Air Force Base, north of Salt Lake City. The NRC's technical staff disagrees with the board's decision, and utility companies have petitioned NRC commissioners to reverse it.

Jan Beyea, a nuclear physicist who agrees with the NRC's mathematical calculations for a conventional plane crash, says the odds "completely go out the window" in the case of terrorism. "After Sept. 11, the odds are much greater," he says. "There's also probably a whole number of events that could occur that we haven't thought about."

In a recent report for the 380,000-member Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, former Energy Department employee Robert Jefferson says common sense indicates that power plants' proximity to airports "does not increase their exposure to terrorist threats." He also says a small plane crash into any part of a power plant wouldn't produce enough damage to cause a radiation release.

### **Biggest worry**

Still, Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., who has been sounding alarms about the situation since Sept. 11, says that without a new NRC report or scientific proof, he's concerned about any aircraft, small or large, striking a power plant. "Is it a

fixed-wing aircraft, a helicopter or a shoulder-fired weapon that can cause a nuclear accident? I don't know," he says. "Until we get information from somebody, I can only throw up red flags."

Of particular concern are the spent-fuel pools, used to cool nuclear fuel that once powered the reactors. The pools' roofs are either corrugated metal or concrete less thick than the shells surrounding the reactors. That makes them vulnerable, critics say.

Three Mile Island is the only plant required to have features protecting vital areas from a 200,000-pound jet crash, the NRC says. But safety watchdogs say the plant's auxiliary buildings lack extra protection. Exelon, which owns the plant, says its reactor is designed to immediately shut down in such an emergency.

Marc Feigenblatt, an airline pilot who flew fighter jets, says hitting a spent-fuel pool is possible. "It's more difficult than a World Trade Center target but not beyond the capabilities of any commercial airline pilot. It's also not beyond the capabilities of a Sept. 11 terrorist with some degree of training in a commercial aircraft."

Power companies say a December study they commissioned — which they say can't be released because of security considerations — showed that a crash into a spent-fuel pool wall could crush and crack it but not enough to cause a radioactive release into the environment.

### **Costs a concern**

Providing better protection for the plants will be neither cheap nor quick. The U.S. government has invested billions of dollars and created an agency to make the country's large commercial airports secure. But at small airports, operators and private pilots say they can't afford the costs of providing more security.

Some security critics have suggested stationing guards with anti-aircraft guns at nuclear plants. But in Senate testimony last year, NRC Chairman Richard Meserve, who left the agency in March, said he's against the idea because, among other things, "the use of such weaponry could lead to significant collateral damage to plant workers and members of the public."

Nuclear safety experts agree that the most pressing need is to protect the used fuel. Many advocate removing it from the pools and putting it into concrete casks. If an aircraft crashed into the casks and radiation was released, the amount would be far less than would be released from a pool, they say.

Operators at 33 of the 103 operating plants have transferred a small amount of used fuel to casks. But it would cost up to \$7 billion to transfer about 35,000 tons from all the pools and take about a decade, according to a January study by eight scientists and nuclear experts.

The fuel transfer also presents risks. A cask that is dropped, an NRC staff study concluded, could "catastrophically damage the pool."

Not all the fuel could be put into casks. Reactors keep producing more, and used fuel must cool for years before it can be transferred. Some experts say it would be safer in dry storage racks than in pools.

For decades, environmental concerns and scientific studies have derailed the federal government's promise to build a waste-disposal site for used fuel. But last July, President Bush signed a bill to develop Nevada's Yucca Mountain site, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, as an underground repository. The Energy Department is expected to submit a licensing application by the end of next year. Then the NRC, an agency within the DOE, must decide whether to approve it.

The proposed site is projected to open in the next decade. The cost, originally estimated at \$6.3 billion, is now about \$8.4 billion.

In late 2001, the NRC said its new study will include a detailed analysis of the consequences of a plane crash into a spent-fuel pool, as well as a "top-to-bottom" evaluation of "all aspects of the agency's safeguards and physical security programs."

Memos about classified information sent by the NRC to the CIA and the Office of Homeland Security show that the agency has at least looked at the potential of large commercial planes hitting nuclear facilities and the ability of plants to withstand plane crashes.

"We've increased security in general since Sept. 11, but we haven't been able to get into specifics," says NRC spokeswoman Beth Hayden. "We don't want to give our hand away."

Nuclear power companies say the public has nothing to worry about because their plants are well protected. "The nuclear power industry is confident that nuclear plant structures that house reactor fuel can withstand aircraft impacts, even though they were not specifically designed for such impacts," the companies said in their December report.

Such confidence infuriates Reid, who has introduced legislation with Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., to create a federal force to assess the design, operation and protection of nuclear facilities and develop a plan for each plant. "For their own protection, they should be joining in on this," he says.

"There's a lot of blame to go around. Our pants aren't all the way down on this issue, but they're pretty close."

*Contributing: Barbara Hansen*

[http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2003-06-10-nuclear\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2003-06-10-nuclear_x.htm)

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Moscow Times  
June 11, 2003  
Pg. 3

## Stockpile Destruction

MOSCOW (AP) -- The commission responsible for overseeing the destruction of Russia's vast chemical weapons arsenal has requested that funding for the effort to be increased threefold this year to speed the work, the Interfax-Military News Agency reported Tuesday.

Russia committed itself in 1997 to destroying the stockpile within 10 years. But the Kremlin says it lacks the funds to complete the program on time.

Sergei Kiriyyenko, the chairman of the oversight commission, said its members had backed a request to the government for tripled funding, Interfax reported. The government set aside 5 billion rubles (\$161 million) for the effort in this year's budget.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/06/11/031.html>

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Washington Post  
June 12, 2003  
Pg. 1

## CIA Did Not Share Doubt On Iraq Data

### *Bush Used Report Of Uranium Bid*

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

A key component of President Bush's claim in his State of the Union address last January that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program -- its alleged attempt to buy uranium in Niger -- was disputed by a CIA-directed mission to the central African nation in early 2002, according to senior administration officials and a former government official. But the CIA did not pass on the detailed results of its investigation to the White House or other government agencies, the officials said.

The CIA's failure to share what it knew, which has not been disclosed previously, was one of a number of steps in the Bush administration that helped keep the uranium story alive until the eve of the war in Iraq, when the United Nations' chief nuclear inspector told the Security Council that the claim was based on fabricated evidence.

A senior intelligence official said the CIA's action was the result of "extremely sloppy" handling of a central piece of evidence in the administration's case against then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But, the official added, "It is only one fact and not the reason we went to war. There was a lot more."

However, a senior CIA analyst said the case "is indicative of larger problems" involving the handling of intelligence about Iraq's alleged chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and its links to al Qaeda, which the administration cited as justification for war. "Information not consistent with the administration agenda was discarded and information that was [consistent] was not seriously scrutinized," the analyst said.

As the controversy over Iraq intelligence has expanded with the failure so far of U.S. teams in Iraq to uncover proscribed weapons, intelligence officials have accused senior administration policymakers of pressuring the CIA or exaggerating intelligence information to make the case for war. The story involving the CIA's uranium-purchase probe, however, suggests that the agency also was shaping intelligence on Iraq to meet the administration's policy goals.

Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), former chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and a candidate for president, yesterday described the case as "part of the agency's standard operating procedure when it wants to advance the information that supported their [the administration's] position and bury that which didn't."

Armed with information purportedly showing that Iraqi officials had been seeking to buy uranium in Niger one or two years earlier, the CIA in early February 2002 dispatched a retired U.S. ambassador to the country to investigate the claims, according to the senior U.S. officials and the former government official, who is familiar with the event. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity and on condition that the name of the former ambassador not be disclosed.

During his trip, the CIA's envoy spoke with the president of Niger and other Niger officials mentioned as being involved in the Iraqi effort, some of whose signatures purportedly appeared on the documents. After returning to the United States, the envoy reported to the CIA that the uranium-purchase story was false, the sources said. Among the envoy's conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because the "dates were wrong and the names were wrong," the former U.S. government official said.

However, the CIA did not include details of the former ambassador's report and his identity as the source, which would have added to the credibility of his findings, in its intelligence reports that were shared with other government agencies. Instead, the CIA only said that Niger government officials had denied the attempted deal had taken place, a senior administration said.

"This gent made a visit to the region and chatted up his friends," a senior intelligence official said, describing the agency's view of the mission. "He relayed back to us that they said it was not true and that he believed them."

Thirteen months later, on March 8, Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, informed the U.N. Security Council that after careful scrutiny of the Niger documents, his agency had reached the same conclusion as the CIA's envoy. ElBaradei deemed the documents "not authentic," an assessment that U.S. officials did not dispute.

Knowledgeable sources familiar with the forgery investigation have described the faked evidence as a series of letters between Iraqi agents and officials in Niger. The documents had been sought by U.N. inspectors since September 2002 and they were delivered by the United States and Britain last February.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a panel of nongovernment experts that is reviewing the handling of Iraq intelligence, is planning to study the Niger story and how it made its way into Bush's State of the Union address on Jan. 28. In making the case that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program, Bush declared that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

That same month, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice also mentioned Iraq's alleged attempts to buy uranium, and the story made its way into a State Department "fact sheet" as well.

Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the Government Reform Committee and a leading administration critic, wrote the president June 2 asking why Bush had included the Niger case as part of the evidence he cited against Iraq. "Given what the CIA knew at the time, the implication you intended -- that there was credible evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa -- was simply false," Waxman said.

The CIA's decision to send an emissary to Niger was triggered by questions raised by an aide to Vice President Cheney during an agency briefing on intelligence circulating about the purported Iraqi efforts to acquire the uranium, according to the senior officials. Cheney's staff was not told at the time that its concerns had been the impetus for a CIA mission and did not learn it occurred or its specific results.

Cheney and his staff continued to get intelligence on the matter, but the vice president, unlike other senior administration officials, never mentioned it in a public speech. He and his staff did not learn of its role in spurring the mission until it was disclosed by New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof on May 6, according to an administration official.

When the British government published an intelligence document on Iraq in September 2002 claiming that Baghdad had "sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa," the former ambassador called the CIA officers who sent him to Niger and was told they were looking into new information about the claim, sources said. The former envoy later called the CIA and State Department after Bush's State of the Union speech and was told "not to worry," according to one U.S. official.

Later it was disclosed that the United States and Britain were basing their reports on common information that originated with forged documents provided originally by Italian intelligence officials.

CIA Director George J. Tenet, on Sept. 24, 2002, cited the Niger evidence in a closed-door briefing to the Senate intelligence committee on a national intelligence estimate of Iraq's weapons programs, sources said. Although Tenet told the panel that some questions had been raised about the evidence, he did not mention that the agency had sent an envoy to Niger and that the former ambassador had concluded that the claims were false.

The Niger evidence was not included in Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Feb. 5 address to the Security Council in which he disclosed some intelligence on Iraq's alleged weapons programs and links to al Qaeda because it was considered inaccurate, sources said.

Even so, the Voice of America on Feb. 20 broadcast a story that said: "U.S. officials tell VOA [that] Iraq and Niger signed an agreement in the summer of 2000 to resume shipments for an additional 500 tons of yellow cake," a reference to the uranium. The VOA, which is financed by the government but has an official policy of editorial independence, went on to say that there was no evidence such shipments had taken place.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46957-2003Jun11.html>

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New York Times  
June 12, 2003

## **U.S. Expands Plan for Cargo Inspections at Foreign Ports**

By Philip Shenon

WASHINGTON, June 11 — The Bush administration has decided to place teams of American inspectors at major seaports in Muslim nations and other smaller, strategically located foreign ports to prevent terrorists from using cargo containers to smuggle chemical, biological or nuclear weapons into the United States, senior administration officials said.

The inspectors, they said, will be provided with radiation monitors, chemical detectors and other equipment to inspect "high risk" metal cargo containers before they are placed on ships bound for the United States.

The move is the second phase in a government program begun shortly after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, to station American customs inspectors overseas to work side by side with their foreign counterparts in searching for unconventional weapons. The first phase focused on 20 large container ports in Europe and Asia, none of them in countries with predominantly Muslim populations.

Officials said the Department of Homeland Security planned to place teams of inspectors that would remain indefinitely in Dubai, the Persian Gulf emirate that is a crucial transshipment point for containerized cargo in the Arab world; Malaysia; Turkey and other Muslim nations. Al Qaeda is believed to have a sizable presence in both Dubai and Malaysia.

Intelligence agencies report that Al Qaeda has repeatedly used cargo ships to move conventional weapons and explosives, including the explosives used in the 1998 bombings of two American Embassies in East Africa.

Human cargo is also a concern. In October 2001, only weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, the authorities in an Italian seaport discovered an Egyptian man suspected of Qaeda membership hiding in a shipping container bound for Halifax, Nova Scotia; airport maps and security passes were also found in the container, which he had outfitted with a bed and bathroom. The man disappeared while on bail.

Robert C. Bonner, the commissioner of customs and border protection in the Homeland Security Department, said the expansion of the program reflected a continuing concern that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups would try to place chemical, biological or nuclear weapons into some of the more than six million containers that arrive in the United States from overseas each year.

"I'm not prophesying anything," Mr. Bonner said in an interview. "But I do have concern that we need to have this security system in place as fast as we possibly can." He said "the system of containerized shipping was vulnerable to terrorist exploitation."

"And you don't have to take my word for it," he added. "Every national security expert I've heard has come to the same conclusion."

The issue of cargo security has become increasingly contentious on Capitol Hill. Many prominent lawmakers from coastal states have accused the administration of failing to provide the money to safeguard ports from terrorist attacks and to prevent terrorists from using cargo ships to transport weapons.

Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, who will announce many of the details of the expanded inspection program in a visit Thursday to Port Elizabeth, N.J., said that "identifying and dealing with high-risk containers at the earliest possible point protects the entire international supply chain and all of the world's major seaports."

He said the posting of customs inspectors abroad, a 17-month-old program known as the Container Security Initiative, had "emerged as a formidable tool for protecting us from the threat of terrorism."

In the first phase of the program, the Customs Service, which has since been merged into the Homeland Security Department, opened negotiations with foreign governments representing the world's 20 largest cargo ports, as measured by shipments to the United States, to permit American inspectors to be stationed permanently in those ports.

Administration officials said teams of American inspectors would be at work at almost all of those large ports — a list that includes Antwerp, Genoa, Hamburg, Hong Kong, Rotterdam, Shanghai, Singapore, Tokyo and Yokohama — by the end of the year.

Mr. Ridge signed an agreement today with the prime minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, who is visiting Washington, to allow American inspectors to work the giant Thai port of Laem Chabang, which is No. 20 on the list.



But while those 20 foreign ports represent almost two-thirds of the containerized cargo bound for the United States, officials said there was mounting worry that Al Qaeda might try to make use of cargo containers passing through other, smaller ports, especially in Muslim nations where the terrorist group has a strong following.

In the new phase of the program, Mr. Bonner said, the Bush administration would place teams in an additional 20 to 25 foreign seaports, with the ports to be chosen on the basis of both cargo volume and their strategic location in nations or regions where terrorism is believed to be a special threat.

"We will be expanding to important parts of the Islamic world," he said. "We will be looking more strategically."

Administration officials said that the Malaysian government had already agreed to join the program, and that negotiations would begin soon in earnest with both Dubai and Turkey, which are also expected to sign on quickly. The Department of Homeland Security has already placed 130 inspectors overseas as part of the first phase of the program, with another 170 in training to join them. Department officials said more than \$100 million had already been committed to setting up the program.

Mr. Bonner said foreign governments were eager to allow the American inspectors into their ports, if only because it meant that cargo shipped from their ports would face no special delays for inspection when it arrived in the United States. Governments that refuse to join the program would risk having their cargo shipments held up on arrival in this country.

Foreign governments that agree to join the program are required to provide the American inspectors with high-level detection equipment, including radiation monitors that would be used to detect nuclear devices or the components of radioactive weapons.

Mr. Bonner said that while the United States had no intention of buying detection equipment for use in foreign seaports, the administration had asked the World Bank to consider how to help foreign governments raise the money for it.

Under the program, the American teams are expected to carry out inspections of a small sample of cargo containers that raise suspicion — because their shippers are unknown, because their contents are in question or for some other reason. Each team is expected to have about five members.

At the news conference on Thursday, Mr. Ridge is also expected to announce the distribution of \$170 million in federal grants to strengthen port security around the country, most of it directed to state and local governments, and \$30 million for research and development on cargo security.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/12/international/middleeast/12HOME.html>

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New York Times

June 12, 2003

## **Rumsfeld Says Iran Is Developing Nuclear Arms Under Guise Of Civilian Program**

By Richard Bernstein

GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, Germany, June 11 — Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warned today about Iran's nuclear activities and called on the Atlantic alliance to find new ways of combating "the nexus of terror and weapons of mass destruction," which he called the biggest threat facing the countries of both "old" and "new" Europe.

Speaking in this resort town in the Bavarian Alps, Mr. Rumsfeld struck a mostly conciliatory tone, shaking hands warmly with the German defense minister, Peter Struck, who was here to greet him.

"Like a family, sometimes we don't agree on everything and sometimes we have debates, but when we are threatened or challenged, we need to come together, as we did after Sept. 11," Mr. Rumsfeld said.

One such threat, Mr. Rumsfeld said to a group of students before his formal remarks, is Iran's development of nuclear weapons, which Washington says Tehran is doing under the guise of a civilian nuclear program. "The intelligence community in the United States and around the world currently assess that Iran does not have nuclear weapons," he said. "The assessment is that they do have a very active program and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time."

In Washington, a senior United States official said the administration had asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer the issue of Iran's suspected nuclear arms program to the United Nations Security Council at a board meeting on Monday. He cited a "devastating" report by the agency that he said was "consistent with our theory, our belief, that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program."

The agency's report found, among other things, that Iran had failed to declare the existence of facilities, including a heavy water research reactor, that could enable it to produce nuclear weapons.

In his remarks, Mr. Rumsfeld exhibited some of his customary combativeness, continuing to draw a distinction between the "old" Europe, particularly France and Germany, and the "new," made up mostly of former Soviet bloc countries. He made it clear that the countries of "new" Europe understand what he called "the new threat" better than some of countries of "old" Europe.

"The distinction between old and new in Europe today is not really of a matter of age or size or even geography," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "It is a matter of attitude, of the vision that countries bring to the trans-Atlantic relationship.

"It is no surprise that many of the nations with fresh memories of tyranny and occupation have been among those most willing to face the new threats, and contribute to dealing with them," he said. "This attitude is why, a decade after the cold war ended, NATO has now invited 10 new allies to join the Atlantic alliance. They are bringing new vision and new vitality to our old alliance.

"Let me be clear: those countries have not been invited as junior partners, allowed to join the grown-ups' table so long as they sit quietly," Mr. Rumsfeld continued. "No, they have been invited to lead."

Mr. Rumsfeld is on a four-stop tour that began in Portugal and is due to end at a NATO meeting in Brussels on Thursday. It will be the first since the end of the Iraq war. He stopped for a few hours in Germany to attend the 10th-anniversary celebrations of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, a joint institution of the German and American military establishments, which holds seminars and classes for government officials from former Communist countries in Europe and Asia.

The site, now a complex of stately cream-colored stucco buildings, was first used by the United States in 1945 as a prisoner-of-war camp for officers. Later it was used to train American officers in Russian and Soviet studies, while a part of it was the headquarters for a mountain division of the German Army.

The meeting here, attended by ministers of defense from several former Communist countries, including Albania, Azerbaijan, Slovenia and Ukraine, was not for a major policy address by Mr. Rumsfeld. Still, the presence of so many senior officials from the former Soviet bloc seemed to underscore the American enthusiasm for countries like Poland and Romania, as opposed to Germany and France, which opposed the war in Iraq.

The text of Mr. Rumsfeld's speech, given to reporters only minutes before the ceremonies began, made reference to countries that want to "define themselves by their opposition to the United States" — an unmistakable reference to France — but Mr. Rumsfeld omitted the reference in his actual remarks.

While Mr. Rumsfeld praised first Poland, for its military involvement in Iraq, and then Romania, for sending an infantry battalion to Afghanistan, he did not mention the fact that Germany, though opposed to the war in Iraq, also has troops in Afghanistan and supported the United States in the Kosovo war.

In a brief statement made during a photo session after his speech, Mr. Rumsfeld did express condolences to Germany for the four German soldiers killed in a suicide bomb attack in Afghanistan over the weekend.

Overall, the atmosphere was far more cordial on this trip than on Mr. Rumsfeld's last visit to Germany, for a security conference in Munich, where a direct verbal confrontation on Iraq took place between Mr. Rumsfeld and the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer.

Mr. Rumsfeld, in his speech today, cited as the greatest of the "new dangers" facing the world the growing arsenals of rogue states, the trade among them in materials related to weapons of mass destruction and their connection with terrorist networks.

"If our free nations do not come to grips with the proliferation problem," Mr. Rumsfeld said, "it is possible that not so many years from now, when we gather for the 20th anniversary of this center, we could be living in a world with as many as twice the number of nuclear powers — and a number of those new nuclear powers being terrorist states."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/12/international/middleeast/12RUMS.html>

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New York Times

June 12, 2003

## **U.S. Asks Ex-U.N. Inspector To Advise On Arms Search**

By James Risen

WASHINGTON, June 11 — Apparently in a sign of dissatisfaction with the progress on the search for illegal weapons in Iraq, the Bush administration is turning to a former top United Nations weapons inspector to provide advice on how to more effectively focus the hunt, officials said today.

David Kay, who led three arms inspection missions as the United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, has been named a special adviser to the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, providing provide expertise on the best methods for scouring Iraq for illicit arms, the C.I.A. announced today. The surprise appointment of a former United Nations weapons expert follows a period in which the Bush administration frequently criticized the agency's inspection process as insufficient to penetrate Iraq's program of "denial and deception."

The decision to have Mr. Kay report directly to Mr. Tenet, while search teams on the ground will be reporting to the Pentagon, will give the C.I.A. a higher profile in a hunt that has been dominated by the Pentagon. Comments by senior officials tonight indicate concern that the move will be viewed as a turf battle between the Pentagon and C.I.A.

Mr. Kay, 63, will work closely with the newly organized Iraq Survey Group, a Pentagon team that is taking over the physical search for evidence of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Administration officials said that Mr. Kay would not manage the Iraq Survey Group, which is to remain under military control.

In a statement issued today, the C.I.A. said that Mr. Kay would be based in Iraq and would be "in charge of refining the overall approach for the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Defense's Iraq Survey Group will provide direct support to the special adviser."

One senior administration official said the decision was an effort to coordinate the work in Iraq of all the U.S. government agencies with expertise on unconventional weapons.

"This is about bringing all of the resources of the United States to bear on a challenging and important task," said the administration official.

The 1,400-member Iraq Survey Group would give "direct support" to Mr. Kay, one administration official said.

The relationship, one official said, is not unlike that of L. Paul Bremer III, the senior American civilian administrator in Iraq, who sets policy and guides strategy but relies on troops of the military's Central Command to carry out those plans. Mr. Bremer reports to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, as does Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the Central Command's top general.

Officials said tonight that the exact relationship between Mr. Kay and the survey group's commander was still being worked out. The work of Maj. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, the Army officer in charge of the Iraq Survey Group, is just now getting under way, officials said.

"David Kay's experience and background make him the ideal person for this new role," Mr. Tenet said in a statement, referring to Mr. Kay's "understanding of the history of the Iraqi programs."

At the same time, the political battle over the Bush administration's handling of prewar intelligence on Iraq began to intensify on Capitol Hill today. Republican Congressional leaders said they would oppose Democratic efforts to begin a full-scale public investigation of the Bush administration's handling of pre-war intelligence on Iraq, forcing Democratic lawmakers to debate among themselves just how aggressively to push for a wider inquiry.

The chairmen of the Senate intelligence and armed services committees, along with the chairman of the House intelligence panel, jointly told reporters that, as part of their normal Congressional oversight process, they believe that they can adequately examine the intelligence indicating Iraq has ties to terrorism and has made efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. They said they do not believe that there is a need for a broader investigation.

"Let me point out the joint inquiry by an independent staff into the 9/11 tragedy strongly criticized intelligence officials for not connecting the dots and for being risk-averse; for failing to put together a picture that seemed all too obvious after the fact," said Senator Pat Roberts, the Kansas Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"Now there seems to be a campaign afoot by some to criticize the intelligence community and the president for connecting the dots, for putting together a picture that seemed all too obvious before the fact," he said.

The vice chairman of the Senate intelligence panel, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, a Democrat of West Virginia, said that "closed hearings and review of documents presented by the administration are not sufficient. We need to be able to request additional intelligence documents; interview intelligence community and administration officials past and present; hold closed and open hearings; and prepare a final public report on lessons learned."

Democrats have tried to seize on the failure of the United States to find actual chemical and biological weapons and evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program since the war ended and believe public Congressional hearings would give the issue political momentum.

In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair has faced increasing heat over the failure to find weapons and mounting questions over whether the intelligence information on Iraq's programs was exaggerated to create support for the war.

In recent days, President Bush and senior administration officials have denied similar charges. On Monday, the president said he was "absolutely convinced" that the United States would find proof of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons.

Other Democrats criticized the administration's handling of intelligence, as well as the Republican reluctance to conduct a full-scale investigation. Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, said that "regardless of whether weapons of mass destruction are found in Iraq or not, the issue of whether U.S. intelligence was shaded or embellished is critically important."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/12/international/worldspecial/12WEAP.html>

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Washington Times

June 12, 2003

Pg. 22

## **Iraqi Group Aided CIA Intelligence**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The head of the Iraqi National Congress, a group of exiles that opposed Saddam Hussein, said yesterday that his organization helped three Iraqi defectors provide intelligence to the CIA on Iraq's weapons programs.

INC chief Ahmed Chalabi also said his group had no connection to British intelligence and to bogus reports the British received saying Iraq purchased uranium from Niger.

"We provided exactly three people to the U.S. who we thought could provide information about the weapons programs," Mr. Chalabi said during a lunch meeting with reporters and editors of The Washington Times.

The INC first located an Iraqi engineer, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, who met U.S. intelligence officials in Bangkok.

At the Dec. 17, 2001, meeting, the CIA took Mr. Haideri into the U.S. defector-relocation program. "And we have not seen him since," Mr. Chalabi said. "They liked him so much, they put him in the witness-protection program."

The defector has since provided information to the CIA, but he did not have "operational information" about Iraq's weapons programs.

Mr. Haideri gave the INC data on the country's weapons-storage facilities, Mr. Chalabi said. The defector was an expert on concrete-injection techniques used in building water- and radiation-proof facilities, both above and below ground, as part of the Iraqi defense complex, Mr. Chalabi said.

A second defector identified by Mr. Chalabi as Mohammed Harith met with U.S. intelligence in Amman, Jordan, and provided details on Iraq's mobile biological-weapons vans.

Two of the vans were discovered in Iraq by Kurdish forces and coalition troops in late April and early last month.

The CIA concluded in a report made public last month that the vans are "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological-weapons program."

The third Iraqi provided was a young physicist who worked on isotope separation, but who was not accepted by U.S. intelligence debriefers, he said.

"They talked to him briefly and they didn't want to talk to him any more and told us about that," Mr. Chalabi said.

"That is it. That is the extent of our intelligence provided by the INC to the United States' government on weapons of mass destruction."

Mr. Chalabi said his group provided no information or documents to the British government on any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

"We don't talk to the British in any intelligence capacity," he said.

Critics have accused the INC of providing falsified documents showing that Iraqi agents tried to buy uranium ore from Niger in 1999.

The false information turned up in U.S. and British intelligence reports and in President Bush's State of the Union speech in January. Mr. Bush said at the time that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

Asked about the debate on Iraq's banned arms programs, Mr. Chalabi said U.S. intelligence is derived from many sources and is vetted and corroborated.

"From our point of view, [U.S. intelligence agencies] made a determination themselves from their intelligence about the weapons programs, and press reports that have been blown up about the INC providing exaggerated information about the weapons of mass destruction, I believe, is basically blame-shifting," Mr. Chalabi said.

Critics of the INC are using the group as "a nice target" to deflect criticism of intelligence agencies, he said.

"The questions that should be asked about the weapons of mass destruction intelligence now is, what are the procedures that are being followed to find the weapons?" Mr. Chalabi said. Asked if any banned weapons of mass destruction will be discovered in the coming months, he said the arms will be uncovered if the search effort is conducted properly.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030611-113033-6956r.htm>

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Los Angeles Times  
June 12, 2003

## **U.S. To Ask Nuclear Agency To Rebuke Iran Over Activities**

By Sonni Efron, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The United States will ask the International Atomic Energy Agency to denounce Iran's nuclear programs and to insist that Tehran address unanswered questions about its activities, a senior State Department official said Wednesday.

However, the Bush administration is not pushing the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council, as was recently done with North Korea, the official said.

Instead, the United States hopes that what the official called a "devastating" IAEA report on Iran's nuclear research will convince other countries that Iran is working on a clandestine nuclear weapons program — and pressure Tehran to stop.

The IAEA's board of governors is scheduled to meet Monday to discuss a report by director Mohamed ElBaradei that Iran had secretly imported and processed uranium and had built facilities to refine and store it. The report, leaked last week, concluded that Iran had "failed to meet its obligations" to report nuclear material but did not declare Tehran in violation of the nonproliferation treaty.

The report was based on ElBaradei's visit to Iran in February, during which he was not permitted to visit a centrifuge workshop to verify whether uranium had been refined there. Another IAEA task force is now in Iran to inspect that facility, and the team's findings are expected to be presented at the Monday meeting.

The State Department official said the meeting would be very important "in highlighting to the Iranians that they have a lot of explaining to do. We are convinced, as are a number of others, that the Iranians have a nuclear weapons program they are seeking to conceal."

Tehran reacted angrily when Washington hailed the IAEA report as supporting its longtime claim that Iran is working on nuclear weapons. The head of Iran's atomic energy agency held a news conference Tuesday to demand that Washington provide proof to support its accusations — and took a swipe at the U.S. failure to find banned weapons in Iraq.

"I want to tell the Americans that this report contains nothing that can be used as a pretext against the Islamic Republic," Gholamreza Aghazadeh was quoted by Agence France-Presse as saying. "But first clear up your embarrassment in Iraq before being embarrassed again over your accusations against Iran."

On Wednesday, the State Department official said the report contained abundant evidence of a "very extensive, sophisticated" nuclear weapons program.

Among other evidence, the report found that Iran had produced uranium metal, the official said. "Other than a few sophisticated reactors [of a type Iran is not capable of producing], the only use for uranium metal is to fabricate warheads," the official said.

The official also branded as "ludicrous" Iran's claim that it is pursuing a civilian nuclear power program to augment its dwindling petroleum resources. According to U.S. Energy Department statistics, Iran has enough oil and gas at current production levels to last "a couple of hundred years," he said.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-usiran12jun12,1,6273397.story>

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Los Angeles Times  
June 12, 2003

# 11 Nations To Discuss Blocking Shipments Of Weapons Materials

*U.S.-led talks in Madrid seek ways to stop such trade by 'rogue' countries or terrorists.*

By Sonni Efron and Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON — Officials from the United States and 10 other countries will meet in Madrid today to discuss how they can use or change international law to prevent shipments of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems.

The meeting is the Bush administration's attempt to create a multilateral setting — outside the United Nations — to explore ways to stop such countries as Iran and North Korea from importing or exporting nuclear materiel, ballistic missiles or other such weapons technologies.

President Bush has repeatedly asserted the U.S. right to act, with other nations if possible but alone if necessary, to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of "rogue" states and terrorists. But he has had trouble persuading other nations to sign up for enforcement duty.

The Madrid meeting is a first, informal gathering of "a small group of like-minded countries" interested in expanding international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as part of the "Proliferation Security Initiative" proposed by Bush in a May 31 speech in Krakow, Poland, a senior State Department official said Wednesday.

Mid-level officials from the U.S., Britain, Italy, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands and host Spain will attend the seven-hour meeting, according to Ramon Santos, political counselor at the Spanish Embassy in Washington.

The U.S. hopes that the meeting will improve intelligence-sharing to intercept weapons and nuclear materiel, the State Department official said.

Among the questions to be discussed is whether new international legal authority is required to prevent transfers of weapons that are not banned under international law, diplomats said.

"We're still working on whether there needs to be some change to international law to facilitate these types of interdictions, to stop illicit trade," Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told Australian radio Wednesday. Downer said there was no talk "at this stage of imposing a blockade on North Korea," but Australia, he said, is discussing with the United States and Japan possible changes in international law that would make it easier to stop vessels suspected of carrying illicit goods.

But another source familiar with the Bush administration's thinking on North Korea said, "They are tightening the noose without calling it sanctions."

The effort was spurred by the case of the Sosan, a North Korean ship that was discovered carrying a cargo of Scud missiles to Yemen in December.

At the request of the United States, Spanish authorities boarded the ship and determined that its cargo was indeed weapons, not cement, as the captain claimed. But the North Korean short-range missiles are not banned under international law. When the Yemeni government said it had ordered the weapons, the Spanish had no choice but to let the ship continue on its way.

North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, declared that it has nuclear weapons and threatened to export them if the Bush administration does not address its security concerns. Washington also accuses Iran of pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program, and is attempting to rally other nations, including Russia and China, to pressure Tehran to stop.

The United States would like to pressure both North Korea and Iran — and try to keep the world's most dangerous weapons from spreading even faster around the globe — by intercepting objectionable cargo. Such a move is seen as an alternative to imposing economic sanctions.

But without careful legal basis, seizing ships or airplanes could be deemed an act of war.

At the first discussion, the official said, "we want to talk about our mutual understanding of the rules of the road, what the permissible bases for interdiction are."

For example, international maritime law allows nations to board suspect ships with the permission of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing, or to board stateless ships flying without a flag, he said.

"One thing we're going to explore is whether those authorities need to be supplemented," the official said.

A major problem for those who wish to bottle up the nuclear genie is that there is nothing illegal about nations who are not signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty shipping nuclear material to each other, said Jon B.

Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.



One approach to making such transfers illegal is to pass a U.N. Security Council resolution "authorizing states to board and inspect any vessel or vehicle if there is reason to believe they are carrying weapons of mass destruction," nuclear nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski argued in the latest issue of Arms Control Today.

After its bruising in the Security Council over the Iraq invasion, however, the Bush administration seems to be taking a more gradual approach to expanding the interpretation of international law to ban transfers of weapons of mass destruction and building up a common understanding that such interceptions are permitted, Wolfsthal said. "The fact that the U.S. is willing to explore the legal basis for this is better than simply saying: 'We have the right to do this under self-defense, and we don't need to cooperate or get anyone's opinion,'" Wolfsthal said.

Sanctions or a blockade on North Korea have been ruled out for now because they are opposed by its immediate neighbors China, South Korea and Russia. Proponents of the policy that some are calling "selective interdiction" believe that it will be far more palatable to the international community if it involves enforcement of existing laws. *Efron reported from Washington and Demick from Seoul. Times staff writer Mark Magnier in Tokyo contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor12jun12,1,2008965.story>

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USA Today  
June 12, 2003  
Pg. 12

## **Perle: U.S. Can't Rule Out N. Korea Strike**

The United States should be prepared to destroy North Korea's nuclear reactor if necessary to keep Pyongyang from trafficking in nuclear weapons, an influential member of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's advisory panel said. Richard Perle, an architect of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, said, "I think we must assume that if they had a nuclear weapon, and if al-Qaeda wished to purchase a nuclear weapon, it's a deal that could be done." He said the United States can't let the communist country acquire nuclear weapons. He didn't address U.S. intelligence assessments that North Korea already has nuclear weapons.

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Washington Post  
June 13, 2003  
Pg. 1

## **Covert Unit Hunted For Iraqi Arms**

*Amid Raids and Rescue, Task Force 20 Failed To Pinpoint Weapons*

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

A covert Army Special Forces unit, operating in Iraq since before the war began in March, has played a dominant but ultimately unsuccessful role in the Bush administration's stymied hunt for weapons of mass destruction, according to military and intelligence sources in Baghdad and Washington.

Task Force 20, whose existence and mission are classified, is drawn from the elite Army special mission units known popularly as Delta Force. It sent a stream of initially promising reports to a limited circle of planners and policymakers in Washington pointing to the possibility of weapons finds. The reports helped feed the optimism expressed by President Bush and his senior national security advisers that proscribed weapons would be found. Thus far, military and intelligence sources said, the expectations are unfulfilled.

Even skeptics of Task Force 20's progress in the weapons hunt speak admiringly of the team's exploits on its other assignments, in which its role was concealed. The team captured Palestinian guerrilla leader Mohammed Abbas in Baghdad in mid-April and the Iraqi scientists nicknamed Mrs. Anthrax and Dr. Germ; it fought a bloody battle behind Iraqi lines to prevent a catastrophic release of floodwaters from the Haditha Dam; and it retrieved Pfc. Jessica Lynch, an Army prisoner of war, from a hospital in Nasiriyah.

Task Force 20's principal assignment is to "seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction," according to a Special Operations mission statement. To that end it staged raids ahead of the U.S. and British ground advance to seize suspected caches of nonconventional arms, gathered hundreds of weapons samples and captured as many as half of the "high value" weapons scientists and Baath Party leaders now in U.S. custody. Its

role in the search for illicit arms, military and intelligence sources said, turned out to be far more important than that of the search teams operating in the open.

Yet Task Force 20 has come no closer than its widely publicized counterpart, the 75th Exploitation Task Force, to the Bush administration's declared objective. Sources with firsthand knowledge of its mission and personnel, and others with access to its reports, said the team has found no working nonconventional munitions, long-range missiles or missile parts, bulk stores of chemical or biological warfare agents or enrichment technology for the core of a nuclear weapon. The administration cited all those components specifically as part of Iraq's concealed arsenal. The arms were forbidden to Iraq under U.N. Security Council mandate, and President Bush used them as his primary argument for war.

The Defense Department has not made public Task Force 20's preliminary findings, which include a cache of land mines that U.S. analysts believed to be designed for dispersal of liquid contents. The mines were an unexpected discovery made more than 24 hours before the war began on March 20. A "direct action" team from Task Force 20 swept into a military base in Iraq's western desert, near Qaim, to preempt the firing of chemical-armed Scud missiles that U.S. intelligence suspected of being at the site. The team killed the Iraqi garrison guards but found no missiles. It found the mines in a bunker nearby.

Subsequent testing, at the Navy's Biological Defense Research Directorate in Silver Spring and at an undisclosed overseas laboratory, persuaded some U.S. government analysts that the mines once held botulinum toxin, according to two sources who spoke on condition of anonymity. But mines are not considered offensive weapons, and these had deteriorated so much that identification of their contents might be disputed, the sources said. United Nations inspectors reported in 1999 that Iraq had considered biological land mines but had no mines "suitable for filling with liquid BW agents."

"There's extreme caution of judgment," said one military official conversant with the discovery. "They don't have at this juncture great confidence that anything they have found constitutes a smoking gun."

Until very recently, the principal focus of the U.S. Central Command, which directs the search for illegal weapons, was a methodical survey of the 87 top-priority facilities identified in the "integrated master site list" maintained at the Defense Intelligence Agency. More than 900 specialists and tens of millions of dollars of detection and laboratory equipment were devoted to the survey, and its leaders said publicly that they expected to find large caches of chemical and perhaps other weapons at the sites. That effort, a high ranking national security official said Wednesday, was "a waste of time."

The Defense Department's new public emphasis is on "people, not buildings," as one officer put it. Some officials said previously that Iraqis would have to lead the United States to the concealed weapons. But it is now clear, from an examination of Task Force 20's work, that the Defense Department and intelligence agencies have already put that strategy to the test for 100 days.

It is possible, as some administration officials assert, that "exploitation" of files and captured Iraqis -- the intelligence term for using one lead to generate another -- may have brought the search to the brink of major results. "People who say there are no weapons are going to be quite embarrassed within weeks or months, when the material comes out," the high-ranking official said. He said that "there are things we are finding that are in train," under preparation for public disclosure, but he declined to elaborate.

But many of those most knowledgeable about Task Force 20's work, some of whom observed it at close quarters, said there is no sign of decisive evidence in the information gathered to date. They said most of Task Force 20's successes -- seizing files, wanted scientists and potentially "hot samples" of lethal substances -- came early in the war.

Intelligence specialists at the team's Baghdad airport headquarters, where many of the most important Iraqi prisoners are held, are interrogating leaders of the former Iraqi weapons program in cooperation with the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. But the highest-ranking Iraqi weaponeers -- including Rihab Rashid Taha, known in the west as Dr. Germ, and Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, a Texas-trained microbiologist dubbed Mrs. Anthrax -- have disclosed almost nothing.

"Most of the very senior people, the [deck of 55] cards people, are saying very little," said a career national security official who is in a position to give an authoritative assessment. "What they are saying is largely BS -- 'I was not very close to Saddam,' 'I don't know anything about WMD.' It's all very orchestrated."

Though the weapons hunt was Task Force 20's primary assignment, some of its greatest successes came in the three additional missions for which it was organized.

One was "direct action" against time-sensitive targets in enemy-held territory. Among the disaster scenarios envisioned by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the Central Command chief, before the war was the prospect that Iraqi forces might destroy the Haditha Dam, which holds vast floodwaters on the Euphrates River 130 miles northwest of Baghdad. Its demolition would likely have killed a great many Iraqi civilians, "caused an ecological catastrophe and

flooded the Euphrates plain, which was a primary approach to Baghdad" for the 3rd Infantry Division, a knowledgeable officer said.

Task Force 20, including a detachment from the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment, took the dam intact after three to four days of intense combat beginning April 2. It found no evidence that the Iraqis in fact attempted to blow up the dam.

Task Force 20 was also assigned to capture or kill "high-value targets," the U.S. military's euphemism for high-ranking wanted Iraqis. Some, such as Taha and Ammash, played important roles in the weapons program, and others, including Abbas, were sought for unrelated reasons. The team's third mission was prisoner rescue, and it led the mission to retrieve Lynch from her Iraqi hospital bed on April 2.

In its weapons hunting assignment, the special mission unit at the core of Task Force 20 had many advantages over the Defense Department's more public search teams. The teams operating openly lacked reliable communications gear, Arabic linguists, on-call helicopters and personnel with experience in Iraq. They often visited sites without knowing the extensive histories of U.N. inspections there. One team leader did not recognize Iraq's second-largest nuclear waste storage facility.

"We do not have the capability to fight for intelligence," the leader of one search team said. "We do not have the capability to fight for materiel. We do not have the capability to take people for questioning against their will. There are other units in the armed services that do that."

Task Force 20 employs the best-trained combat forces in the U.S. military. It can launch a mission with less than an hour's notice and communicate securely from anywhere in Iraq. It is equipped with the most advanced detection technology, including DNA identification of pathogens. Its biological and chemical laboratories, from the Theater Army Medical Laboratory, fit inside a collapsible tent that could be transported on the back of a Humvee. And it has full-time access to stealthy helicopters -- MH-60 Pave Hawks, MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft, and AH/MH-6 Little Bird gunships -- that enabled it to move covertly and defend itself.

Task Force 20 was able to reach most of its early target sites before they could be stripped by Iraqi insiders or looters from the general population. Because of that, the team took many more potentially "hot samples" than the openly operating search units. It has shipped hundreds of samples to Army and Navy laboratories in Maryland, one senior officer said, including about 90 this month. Knowledgeable sources said that none of the samples has produced a definitive hit.

Site survey teams attached to conventional military units, which most often found their targets looted and burned, occasionally learned to their chagrin that mysterious U.S. forces had already been there. Col. Richard McPhee and his subordinates at the conventional headquarters took to calling them "secret squirrels." In one case, Task Force 20 was still working when a survey team arrived. Its leader, who did not provide details of his unit or mission, ordered the survey team to leave.

"They were all in uniform, but some were obviously civilians -- long hair, guts on them, some old guys," said a regular Army officer who was present. "There was no attempt at deconfliction at all," he added, using the military term for avoidance of duplicate effort.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52505-2003Jun12.html>

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Washington Post

June 13, 2003

Pg. 16

## **CIA Says It Cabled Key Data To White House**

*But Officials Say Document Lacked Conclusion on Iraqi Uranium Deal*

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA, facing criticism for its failure to pass on a key piece of information that put in doubt Iraq's purported attempts to buy uranium from Niger, said yesterday it sent a cable to the White House and other government agencies in March 2002 that said the claim had been denied by officials from the central African country.

But Bush administration officials acknowledged that the 11/2-page document did not include the conclusion of a former U.S. ambassador dispatched by the CIA to Niger the month before that documents outlining a transfer of uranium to Baghdad were not authentic. The CIA cable attributed the Niger officials' denials to an anonymous source, but failed to mention the name of the former ambassador, who was a recognized expert in Africa, or that it had sent him to Niger.

The purported Iraqi effort to buy uranium oxide was used by President Bush and senior administration officials as a central piece of evidence to support their assertion that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. The CIA's failure to pass on the details of what it knew helped keep the uranium-purchase story alive until shortly before the war in Iraq began, when the United Nations' chief nuclear inspector told the Security Council that the documents were forgeries.

An administration official said yesterday that the CIA report was only one of many such cables received by the White House each day. The official said that other information received after March 2002 supported claims that Iraq was actively attempting to buy uranium. Because of the anonymous nature of the source cited in the CIA report, it was not considered unusual or very important and not passed on to Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, or other senior White House officials.

Rice, in defending Bush's decision to claim that Iraq was attempting to buy uranium in Africa in his State of the Union speech on Jan. 28, said she was unaware that there were doubts about the information. "Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency," Rice said on NBC's "Meet the Press" on Sunday, "but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery."

A White House spokesman said yesterday, "We have acknowledged that some documents detailing a transaction between Iraq and Niger were forged and we no longer give them credence. They were, however, only once piece of evidence in a larger body of evidence suggesting Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Africa."

The official added that in his speech the president talked about purchases from Africa and did not specifically mention Niger, adding that Bush's comments were "based on a multiple of other sources."

Senior intelligence officials said the CIA on several occasions after March 2002 told administration policymakers about its doubts about claims Iraq was seeking uranium. When the State Department on Dec. 19, 2002, posted a reference to Iraq not supplying details on its uranium purchases, the CIA raised an objection, "but it came too late" to prevent its publication, the senior intelligence official said.

The agency did get a reference to the alleged sales removed from a speech made to the Security Council by U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte and kept it out of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's presentation to the council on Feb. 5 that outlined the administration's case that Iraq had covert weapons programs, the official said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52813-2003Jun12.html>

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Christian Science Monitor  
June 13, 2003

## **On N. Korea, Diplomatic Clock Runs Down**

*During recent flurry of talks, Pyongyang may be moving ahead on nuclear plans.*

By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – With North Korea making new noises about its nuclear-weapons ambitions, concerns are growing that a crucial window for heading off expansion of the world's nuclear club is closing.

The US wraps up meetings with Japanese and South Korean officials in Honolulu Friday that are expected to end with a call for prompt multilateral talks with the North Koreans.

Despite North Korea's declaration this week that it seeks to build nuclear arms as a less expensive deterrent, prospects for more meetings bringing the US and North Korea to the same table have improved, US officials say.

They point to headway made when President Bush met recently with Chinese leader Hu Jintao in Europe and to signs the North is opening to US demands that talks include regional powers. The North Korea issue is also expected to figure, if primarily in the margins, in meetings at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) annual conference. Secretary of State Colin Powell will attend the conference beginning Monday in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

But the flurry of words over North Korea comes during weeks that Pyongyang may be using to proceed with activities that end up producing nuclear bombs, some intelligence officials and nonproliferation experts warn. While the US has been focused on Iraq and the Middle East, they add, it may have left one member of the "axis of evil" trio to become a nuclear power.

"We may look back and see that a nuclear-armed North Korea was the price of the Iraq war," says Steven Miller, director of the international security program at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass. "A North Korea with nuclear weapons will be a much greater international security threat and a much tougher nut to crack. The time to deal with that is now."

**Irreversible determination?**

For some experts, North Korea's latest justification for developing a nuclear arsenal - as a cheap alternative to maintaining an army of 1.1 million soldiers - is particularly troubling because they see it signaling an irreversible determination to go nuclear. "What this tells me is that they're beginning to make what they consider is an effective case to the world of why their course of action is justifiable," says Robert Einhorn, a former State Department official. "They're putting the best face on their pursuit of a nuclear capability."

The US believes North Korea already has one or two bombs, but their quality and reliability remain a mystery.

There has been speculation that the North could produce perhaps a half-dozen bombs within several months.

Such developments would establish North Korea as a member of the nuclear club and potentially allow it to act on its threat to export nuclear materials. "They're making plainer every day their intention not just to acquire, but to retain nuclear status," says Mr. Einhorn, now a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

The US approach appears for now to be to act with regional powers to address the North's weapons-exporting potential, while giving Pyongyang time to adjust to the idea of multilateral talks. Such talks, if the US has its way, would expand Beijing-hosted talks in April so that Seoul and Tokyo are included as well.

But giving a country with an erratic ruler and known proliferation ambitions more time is not perceived as wise by everyone. "Even if we don't know exactly what North Korea's nuclear status is, the relaxed attitude of the Bush administration is hard to understand," says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Mr. Cirincione says he sees a continuing divide in the administration over how the "North Korea conundrum" should be addressed. But he says the lack of an easy or obvious response should not rule out closer US attention.

"My preference would be that while the administration debates internally how it would like to solve the North Korea problem in the long term, it would still be pressing an all-out effort to stop the short-term turning of plutonium into bombs."

#### **Progress of short-term efforts**

The US has stepped up efforts to interdict the North's exports of weapons materials, and is beginning to get cooperation - so far from Japan and Australia. But that cooperation does not openly include China, Pyongyang's strongest economic supporter.

"The real issue is what the Chinese will be willing to do to coerce North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions," says Harvard's Dr. Miller. "The Chinese have not been willing to do Washington's dirty work, and frankly why should they be? They don't want a nuclear-armed Pyongyang any more than Washington does," he adds, "but other than that, their concerns are different. They don't want a collapsing regime on their border that would send waves of desperate refugees" into China.

North Korea may have indeed decided to go nuclear at any cost. But CSIS's Einhorn says the US still must "test" whether the North is willing to "reverse course" by putting some "reasonable offers" on the table. Then if Pyongyang rebuffs all offers - as Einhorn suspects it might - the US will be in a stronger position to get its reluctant friends in the region to pressure the North.

"The problem is that China and South Korea don't think the US has yet made a reasonable proposal" to the North. "Doing so," he says, "may be the only way to get their cooperation in interdicting the kinds of cargoes we want to stop."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0613/p02s02-woap.html>

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Los Angeles Times  
June 13, 2003

## **Japan Shrugs Off N. Korean Threats Over Inspections**

*Tokyo says a crackdown on vessels is needed to prevent shipment of consumer goods that could be converted to military hardware.*

By Mark Magnier, Times Staff Writer

TOKYO — Japan on Thursday brushed off threats by Pyongyang that it would torpedo relations between the two countries unless Tokyo eased up on maritime restrictions against North Korean vessels.

"We have conducted such inspections in line with our law," Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda told reporters, adding that he hoped North Korea would judge Japan's newly tightened inspection procedures against the communist state in a "reasonable and cool-headed manner."

North Korea suspended the only ferry service to Japan this week in response to the tough talk from Tokyo on ship inspections. Japanese officials say the crackdown is needed in part to prevent shipment of consumer goods that could be converted to military hardware. These include everything from high-end Japanese golf clubs — extracted titanium carbon fibers are used in missile housings — to off-the-shelf global positioning system hardware capable of steering missiles; to electronic fish finders that can be converted to sonar devices.

Even the lenses of store surveillance cameras can find a second life as submarine periscopes, experts said, and something as mundane as high-quality shampoo can be filtered for its triethanolamine and used in making chemical weapons.

"Any time they order huge amounts of anything, or buy expensive things, that should make us suspicious," said Shigeharu Aoyama, director of Japan's Independent Institute, a think tank based in Tokyo. "There are a lot of difficult judgment calls."

While many of these items are widely available around the world, Japan's close geographic proximity, the ferry service between the two nations and a sizable population in Japan with ancestral ties to North Korea means that Japan is Pyongyang's shopping center of choice.

Japan — which has various export-control laws and protocols in place, including a version of the 1991 U.S. "catch-all" Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative it passed in 2002 — has neither the inclination nor the time to block shampoo shipments. But it does have more authority to stop some sophisticated dual-use items.

Exports of more than two Sony PlayStation 2 video game players, for instance, are subject to Japanese export licenses, given their potential use in missile guidance systems. Also subject to review are airtight beer fermentation tanks of over 100 liters, given their potential use in incubating large quantities of biological hazards.

Japan's trade ministry said that it turned down a request from several Japanese-based trading companies who had sought permission between December and March to export 30-ton tractor-trailers to North Korea. North Korea is woefully short of large vehicles capable of transporting mid-range ballistic missiles.

In reality, however, analysts say it's a pretty leaky barrier. "It's impossible to stop everything," said Hideya Kurata, a professor of nuclear security at Tokyo's Kyorin University. "A lot of this is just a big performance by the Japanese government."

Other seemingly everyday items in an advanced economy that officials here say they're worried about include freeze-drying equipment used by instant-food manufacturers, which might have a second life in biochemical weapons production, and hydrogen fluoride, which could be of use in processing uranium.

"We all know suspicious goods are being sent to North Korea, and we try and check thoroughly whenever necessary," said Satoshi Shimono, an official with the Osaka customs office. "We have a list of export control items, but the list is secret, so no one can know exactly what we're looking for. But it can be a difficult task given that even used aluminum tire rims can supposedly be extracted to form parts of warheads."

Toshio Miyatsuka, an expert on North Korea at Yamanashi Gakuin University, said Pyongyang also scoops up used tires for fuel and old refrigerators containing chlorofluorocarbons, which it extracts to wash computer chips. And it fills ships returning to North Korea with huge numbers of used bicycles, he added, that it buys cheaply from local governments via intermediaries after they're abandoned outside rail stations. Once back in North Korea, the ball bearings are extracted for military use, Miyatsuka said.

Last month, a North Korean defector testified before U.S. Congress that 90% of the components used in Pyongyang's missile program came through the now suspended ferry service. Japanese were further jarred when a North Korean spy ship recently salvaged from the seabed off Japan turned up brimming with Japanese technology. But Wednesday at the Japan seaport of Maizuru, where a North Korean vessel was briefly detained for safety infractions, a local official said it was business as usual.

"I heard [Japanese Transport Minister Chikage Ogi] declare we were going to tighten up the system, but we haven't heard anything from our bosses about it," said Masami Nakamori, an official with the Maizuru safety inspection bureau. "We're just doing ordinary port patrols, nothing more."

In its commentary following Japan's announcement, Pyongyang slammed Japan for suggesting that its ferry was transporting spies and nuclear and missile-related parts. "This damages the great authority and image of our homeland," the state news agency said.

Meanwhile, on Thursday, Japanese police arrested five executives of Tokyo-based Seishin Enterprises on charges of illegally exporting sophisticated jet mills to Iran. The machinery can be used to help make solid rocket fuel for missiles.

*Hisako Ueno in The Times' Tokyo Bureau contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-japan13jun13,1,7393211.story>

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Washington Post  
June 13, 2003  
Pg. 25

## **Japan Arrests Five In Iran Missile Case**

TOKYO, June 12 -- Japanese police today arrested five officials of a Tokyo company and charged them with illegally selling Iran machinery that can help manufacture solid rocket fuel, a key element in making long-range ballistic missiles.

The firm, Seishin Enterprise Co., allegedly sold the same machinery to North Korea in 1994, but the statute of limitations for that transaction has expired.

The arrests come as Japan tries to clamp down on the flow of technology and equipment to weapons programs in North Korea and other countries.

The company officials, including the president, Haruhiko Ueda, were charged with export law violations for sending sophisticated grinding mills to Iran in 1999 and 2000.

The equipment can grind the elements of solid rocket fuel into a usable fine powder propellant.

Iran has said it has successfully developed a long-range missile using solid rocket fuel.

-- Doug Struck

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52878-2003Jun12.html>

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