


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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## Seoul Seeks Bush Accord On Diplomacy

By Fran Coombs, The Washington Times

SEOUL — President Roh Moo-hyun will urge President Bush to join him this week in a public promise to resolve growing tensions with North Korea by peaceful means, exempting the communist nation from the U.S. policy of "pre-empting" regimes that pursue weapons of mass destruction.

"The mere thought of a military conflict with North Korea is a calamity for us," Mr. Roh told The Washington Times in an interview here Friday prior to his first face-to-face meeting with Mr. Bush, which will take place this week.

"If possible, we think it is much more reasonable for us to induce North Korea to reform itself and to open up to the outside world," Mr. Roh said, citing a policy of social, political and economic engagement begun by his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung.

"Of course," Mr. Roh said bluntly, "alongside pursuing the engagement policy we are fully prepared and fully braced for a possible calamity."

Mr. Roh met with representatives of The Times for nearly an hour at the Blue House, the presidential mansion that overlooks downtown Seoul, marked by its arching blue-tile roof. Present for Mr. Roh's only extended American news interview before arriving in the United States were his national security adviser, Ra Jong-yil, and his foreign policy adviser, Ban Ki-moon.

Mr. Roh's meeting with President Bush at the White House, scheduled for Wednesday, follows admissions by North Korea that it has a small number of nuclear bombs, is assembling more, and may sell its nuclear weapons to other nations.

Despite repeated assertions by Mr. Bush and top U.S. officials that there are no plans to turn American military might against North Korea, the successful campaign in Iraq has prompted widespread speculation in South Korea that the hostile Stalinist regime in Pyongyang, cited by President Bush as a member of the "axis of evil," would be targeted for "regime change" by military force.

"There are some Koreans who are afraid that President Bush's peaceful resolution principles may change at any minute," said Mr. Roh. The president gave his answers in Korean, which were simultaneously translated to English by his official interpreter.

"So by agreeing at the summit on this peaceful resolution principle" to the crisis with North Korea, Mr. Roh said, he and Mr. Bush can calm the concerns of his countrymen.

In turn, Mr. Roh said he would reassure Americans that during his five-year term, which began in February, South Korea will remain a strong and reliable ally: "I think that many Americans do not know me well and some of them may have doubts about me, and I will try my best to resolve all these doubts about me during this visit.

"I fully understand the mood and the circumstances that gave rise to [the pre-emption] doctrine," Mr. Roh said, "I would like to discuss with President Bush that the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula may not be appropriate for applying this principle."

About half of South Korea's 46 million people live in or near Seoul, which is about 30 miles south of the world's most heavily fortified border and within range of an estimated 12,000 North Korean artillery pieces. U.S. officials fear that casualties in the first two weeks of a war could top 1 million, mostly civilians.

Mr. Roh said the policy of engagement with North Korea may not be the best option but that "other options are so severe and so harsh for us that we've tried to go down the path of engagement."

Mr. Roh's manner of speaking is considered by many diplomats here and in the United States to be refreshingly straightforward for a South Korean politician. But some key advisers worry that Mr. Roh, like Mr. Bush, often "jumps off script" to convey his opinions with candor unusual in foreign-policy discussions.

There have been complaints in South Korean newspapers that Mr. Roh's meeting with Mr. Bush is to last only 90 minutes — half of which will be taken up by translation — which critics say will not be long enough to air critical issues between the two countries.

Asked about assertions that some South Koreans fear the Bush doctrine more than the military threat of North Korea, Mr. Roh said: "Even if there is a very small portion of the Korean society which thinks that way, I don't think this will be accepted as a reasonable thought to the majority of the Korean people."

"Most people in Korea believe that [Mr. Bush's pre-emption doctrine] will be applied selectively, according to the situation."

Of the Pyongyang government, Mr. Roh said: "Their ultimate objective is hard to understand, and the ways and means, the diplomatic and political ways of North Korea, to achieve their objective are unacceptable."

He remains nevertheless convinced, he said, that North Korea is ready for peaceful change.

About 12,000 South Koreans, including major politicians, academics and journalists, visited the North last year, he said, "and most of them came back with the impression that North Korea wants change. They want to implement reforms and opening up, and they want to accept the market economy."

Of North Korean assertions during recent talks with the United States in Beijing that it has begun manufacturing weapons-grade plutonium at a nuclear facility north of the capital in Pyongyang, he said: "I think that we need to verify these facts more closely, because all these came out during the negotiations in Beijing and they may be bargaining chips for North Korea." Those talks, held by China, excluded both South Korea and Japan.

During three days of bilateral talks between South and North Korea in Pyongyang in late April, South Korea was unable to win a pledge from the North to end its nuclear programs. The two countries, however, did agree to move forward on reconciliation efforts and economic cooperation.

The Seoul newspaper Joong Ang Daily reported Saturday that South Korea eclipsed Japan in 2002 to become North Korea's No. 1 trading partner. Two-way trade totaled \$642 million last year, the newspaper reported, breaking it down as \$272 million in South Korean imports from the North, mostly food and textile goods, and \$370 million in exports to the North, primarily chemical goods and food.

The current crisis erupted in October, when the North admitted having a program to make uranium fuel for atomic bombs in violation of a 1994 agreement. The United States responded by cutting off shipments of fuel oil.

The North has since withdrawn from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, admitted having a small number of nuclear bombs and said it restarted a separate factory to make plutonium, which can also be used to make atomic bombs.

Despite the heated exchanges between North Korea and the United States in recent months, Mr. Roh said he found some encouragement from history — to the final burst of hostilities before the end of the Korean War.

"At the time of the armistice agreement in 1953, the battles were most bloody between the two parties right before the armistice agreement because those parties wanted to have the maximum benefit at the negotiations," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030512-60441550.htm>

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Washington Post

May 10, 2003

Pg. 1

## Seven Nuclear Sites Looted

### *Iraqi Scientific Files, Some Containers Missing*

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

BAGHDAD -- Seven nuclear facilities in Iraq have been damaged or effectively destroyed by the looting that began in the first days of April, when U.S. ground forces thrust into Baghdad, according to U.S. investigators and others with detailed knowledge of their work. The Bush administration fears that technical documents, sensitive equipment and possibly radiation sources have been scattered.

If so, there are potentially significant consequences for public health and the spread of materials to build a nuclear or radiological bomb. President Bush had said the war was fought to prevent the spread of "the world's most dangerous weapons."

It is still not clear what has been lost in the sacking of Iraq's nuclear establishment. But it is well documented that looters roamed unrestrained among stores of chemical elements and scientific files that would speed development, in the wrong hands, of a nuclear or radiological bomb. Many of the files, and some of the containers that held radioactive sources, are missing.

Previous reports have described damage at two of the facilities, the Tuwaitha Yellowcake Storage Facility and the adjacent Baghdad Nuclear Research Center. Now, the identity of three more damaged sites has been learned: the Ash Shaykhili Nuclear Facility, the Baghdad New Nuclear Design Center and the Tahadi Nuclear Establishment. All of them have attracted close scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency and from U.S. analysts who suspected that Iraq, despite IAEA inspections, was working to develop a bomb.

The identities of two other sites, also said to have been looted, could not be learned.

Army Lt. Col. Charles Allison, who led the U.S. survey team at Ash Shaykhili, said in an interview that its "warehouses were completely destroyed" by ransacking and fire. A Special Forces soldier, part of another team that

reached Ash Shaykhili before Allison, said "they were supposed to store all their enrichment processing machinery there, but it was all gone or badly burned."

Alarmed by similar reports about the two Tuwaitha-area sites, IAEA's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, sent a letter Monday pressing earlier demands that the United States grant the agency access to Iraq's nuclear sites. He has previously asserted that the IAEA has sole legal authority over the sites under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.N. resolutions. But an adviser to ElBaradei said late Thursday that "we have got no official reply" from the United States.

Ash Shaykhili, 10 miles southeast of Baghdad, was the legally designated repository of heavy equipment used in Iraq's former nuclear weapons program. Some of the equipment was destroyed when Israel bombed the Osirak reactor in 1981 and when the United States bombed a Russian research reactor there 10 years later. Other gear had been seized and rendered useless by IAEA inspectors between 1991 and 1998.

Subject to regular inspection by the nuclear watchdog agency, Ash Shaykhili held destroyed centrifuges once used to enrich uranium, disks and machinery used in an alternate enrichment process called electromagnetic isotope separation, key components of the bomb-damaged reactors, vacuum pumps and valves. Experts said it may have held small radiation sources, but not in significant quantities.

Allison's U.S. survey team sought evidence that the site concealed other, forbidden activities, particularly in an underground space that U.S. intelligence thought suspicious. But when Allison arrived on April 24, he found it "so looted that it was just basically warehouses with all kinds of crap all over the floor," he said. "If there was something there it's long since gone."

Another site known to have been damaged is the Baghdad New Nuclear Design Center. A prominent yellow building, the center housed the key personnel responsible for the crash program that nearly succeeded in building a nuclear bomb in 1991.

That program, known by the code name Petrochemical Three, or PC-3, demonstrated Iraqi mastery of three different nuclear enrichment technologies: fabrication of finely milled uranium or plutonium spheres for the core of a fission bomb and the makings of a sophisticated implosion device to detonate the weapon.

Many of the principal scientists and technicians of PC-3 moved to jobs at the new nuclear design center. They formed an umbrella organization for electrical, mechanical and chemical engineering research, all potentially useful for a nuclear weapon. But IAEA inspectors watched the work carefully, and an expert with detailed knowledge of the results said the agency "didn't find anything that indicated ongoing prohibited activities regarding nuclear weapons."

Last month U.S. Central Command sent the Pentagon's Direct Support Team to survey the site. Sources said they found it looted and collected little that would help resolve U.S. suspicions about what was being done there. They declined to detail the damage.

The third site that was badly damaged is the Tahadi Nuclear Establishment.

Jacques Baute, who heads the IAEA's Iraq Action Team, made that site his first stop when IAEA inspections resumed Nov. 27, according to press accounts. Tahadi was thought to be a potential location of renewed weapons activity because, like the Baghdad center, it employed some of Iraq's leading weapons scientists. Unlike the Baghdad center, it housed substantial dual-use equipment, capable of both permitted and prohibited work. Tahadi hosted magnetic research and development of high-voltage power supplies. Those can be used as components of a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade. An expert on Iraq's weapons program with close ties to the IAEA said in an interview that the site was "at the top of the list" of sites that might be involved in prohibited centrifuge work. The Bush administration accused Iraq of attempting to import specialized aluminum tubes for such a centrifuge cascade, but the IAEA said they were not suitable.

The administration sought evidence at Tahadi, but the Direct Support Team found little left.

At the Baghdad site and Tahadi, experts said there might have been small radiation sources to calibrate instruments, but nothing in quantity. At two other looted sites, Tuwaitha's Location C and the Baghdad Nuclear Research Center nearby, there were significant quantities of partially enriched uranium, cesium, strontium and cobalt. U.S. survey teams have been unable to say whether any of those radiation sources were stolen.

According to witnesses, Allison's survey team reached both of these sites on April 10, the same day that ElBaradei cited them as the two most important for U.S. forces to protect. But because of continuing debate within the Bush administration over whether to enter without IAEA inspectors present, Allison received a hasty order to withdraw. When Allison was told to evacuate all U.S. personnel, including troops providing security at the perimeter, he grew agitated, witnesses said.

"Whoever gave that order better check his retirement plan, because if we leave this place open somebody is going to lose their job," he told an officer at the ground forces operations center of Central Command, according to two witnesses. Allison confirmed the gist of the conversation.

Eventually Central Command relented and ordered a company of the 3rd Infantry Division to guard both Tuwaitha-area sites. But the twin complexes, about a square mile each and half a mile apart, were far too big for the force left in place. Soldiers posted there permitted Iraqi civilians who said they were employees to enter freely. Looting at both places continued last Saturday, when a Washington Post reporter spent four hours at the site.

Daoud Awad, who ran the electrical design department at Tuwaitha, said in a brief interview that he "saw with my own eyes people carrying the containers we used to put radioactive materials in." The containers slightly resemble jugs commonly used for milk, he said, "and they didn't know what was inside."

"I saw some papers on an experiment, and the people threw the papers on the floor and took the table," he said. "If they knew how valuable the papers were, they would have kept the papers, not the table."

"How could they leave a place like this without protection?" he asked. "It's not an ordinary place. It's too dangerous."

*Staff researcher Robert Thomason in Washington contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36985-2003May9.html>

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New York Times

May 12, 2003

## **Radioactive Material Found At A Test Site Near Baghdad**

By Judith Miller

BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 11 — An American team searching for unconventional weapons has uncovered what is thought to be the strongest source of radiation found so far in Iraq, at a long-abandoned test range near Amiriya, just west of the capital, nuclear experts and military officers said today.

The discovery of what is thought to be radioactive Cobalt-60 at the site on Friday, supplemented by new information from international nuclear monitoring experts, has shed no new light on whether Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. But it has reinforced concern about what should be done about nuclear material that American forces are finding at abandoned industrial and military sites throughout the country.

"We've never gone into a country and cleaned it of radiological material before," said Drew, the nuclear expert for the Army's Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha, who spoke on condition that he be identified only by his first name.

"At some point, there needs to be one location, or several, where truly dangerous material is collected and separated from other radioactive material and stored."

He said that, as far as he knew, neither his team nor the United States Central Command had a specific policy for handling radioactive material. Some of the material uncovered at former weapons sites in Iraq could be used to make "dirty bombs" designed to expose people to radiation, and some poses a health hazard to Iraqis and others exposed to it over time. Despite such threats, he said, nothing has been decided about what to do with the material.

On Friday, the team surveyed the site and found eight large mechanical poles that were connected to earth-covered, concrete bunkers on what appeared to be a test range. The team and its nuclear experts went to the site after receiving a report that allied military forces had found a large source of radiation in one of eight pits next to the poles.

According to the initial report, one of the pits was registering radiation levels more than 1,000 times normal background radiation levels. But when the team got to the site, it found relatively moderate levels of radiation at the base of each of the eight poles, along with signs in German warning about exposure to radiation.

Nuclear experts on the team could not explain the discrepancy between the initial report last week of a huge radiation source and what they found, except to say that such initial reports have often been in error.

There was no American security force when the inspection team members arrived at the sprawling test range, though they had been told there would be. The test range was apparently not on the list of more than 900 sites that Washington suspects Iraq may have been using to store or make illegal weapons. Because of that, team members had no information about the site when they arrived.

Team members were initially perplexed by the site, near Amiriya about 34 miles west of Baghdad, and what the Iraqis had been doing there. There did not appear to have been any nuclear-related activity on this stretch of desert for many years. But as the experts moved through the site, they noted that shallow trenches had recently been dug between the poles. Some thought that this may have been done to modify or improve the dilapidated facility. But Drew, the chief nuclear expert on the team, concluded that a more likely explanation was that looters had dug the trenches in order to get at valuable copper wiring.

Examining the poles, Drew and other nuclear experts from the Pentagon's Nuclear Disablement Team concluded that they were apparently designed to raise and lower a radioactive source and expose surrounding troops, equipment or objects to the radiation.

The team's initial speculation turned out to be close to what other experts had concluded. According to international nuclear experts, the Iraqis had used the site to expose troops to a simulated nuclear battlefield more than a decade ago.

The area itself is quite remote, which is fortunate given the size of the radiation source, believed to be Cobalt-60, which is commonly used in X-ray machinery, Drew said. He said that because the sources are well shielded in the concrete bunkers, they do not pose a hazard to the immediate area.

Nevertheless, the team recommended, as did the International Atomic Energy Agency when it surveyed the site, that the nuclear source in the area be secured, which has not happened yet.

Drew said he was not concerned that terrorists or elements of the deposed government might try to steal the material to make a crude nuclear bomb. He said exposure to the radioactive material itself would be lethal to anyone who tried to move or steal it. "It is a self-solving problem," he said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/12/international/worldspecial/12WEAP.html>

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Washington Post

May 11, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team To Leave Iraq**

### *Task Force Unable To Find Any Weapons*

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

BAGHDAD -- The group directing all known U.S. search efforts for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is winding down operations without finding proof that President Saddam Hussein kept clandestine stocks of outlawed arms, according to participants.

The 75th Exploitation Task Force, as the group is formally known, has been described from the start as the principal component of the U.S. plan to discover and display forbidden Iraqi weapons. The group's departure, expected next month, marks a milestone in frustration for a major declared objective of the war.

Leaders of Task Force 75's diverse staff -- biologists, chemists, arms treaty enforcers, nuclear operators, computer and document experts, and special forces troops -- arrived with high hopes of early success. They said they expected to find what Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described at the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5 -- hundreds of tons of biological and chemical agents, missiles and rockets to deliver the agents, and evidence of an ongoing program to build a nuclear bomb.

Scores of fruitless missions broke that confidence, many task force members said in interviews.

Army Col. Richard McPhee, who will close down the task force next month, said he took seriously U.S. intelligence warnings on the eve of war that Hussein had given "release authority" to subordinates in command of chemical weapons. "We didn't have all these people in [protective] suits" for nothing, he said. But if Iraq thought of using such weapons, "there had to have been something to use. And we haven't found it. . . . Books will be written on that in the intelligence community for a long time."

Army Col. Robert Smith, who leads the site assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said task force leaders no longer "think we're going to find chemical rounds sitting next to a gun." He added, "That's what we came here for, but we're past that."

Motivated and accomplished in their fields, task force members found themselves lacking vital tools. They consistently found targets identified by Washington to be inaccurate, looted and burned, or both. Leaders and members of five of the task force's eight teams, and some senior officers guiding them, said the weapons hunters were going through the motions now to "check the blocks" on a prewar list.

U.S. Central Command began the war with a list of 19 top weapons sites. Only two remain to be searched. Another list enumerated 68 top "non-WMD sites," without known links to special weapons but judged to have the potential to offer clues. Of those, the tally at midweek showed 45 surveyed without success.

Task Force 75's experience, and its impending dissolution after seven weeks in action, square poorly with assertions in Washington that the search has barely begun.

In his declaration of victory aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, President Bush said, "We've begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons, and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated."

Stephen A. Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, told reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday that U.S. forces had surveyed only 70 of the roughly 600 potential weapons facilities on the "integrated master site list" prepared by U.S. intelligence agencies before the war.

But here on the front lines of the search, the focus is on a smaller number of high-priority sites, and the results are uniformly disappointing, participants said.

"Why are we doing any planned targets?" Army Chief Warrant Officer Richard L. Gonzales, leader of Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha, said in disgust to a colleague during last Sunday's nightly report of weapons sites and survey results. "Answer me that. We know they're empty."

Survey teams have combed laboratories and munitions plants, bunkers and distilleries, bakeries and vaccine factories, file cabinets and holes in the ground where tipsters advised them to dig. Most of the assignments came with classified "target folders" describing U.S. intelligence leads. Others, known as the "ad hocs," came to the task force's attention by way of plausible human sources on the ground.

The hunt will continue under a new Iraq Survey Group, which the Bush administration has said is a larger team. But the organizers are drawing down their weapons staffs for lack of work, and adding expertise for other missions. Interviews and documents describing the transition from Task Force 75 to the new group show that site survey teams, the advance scouts of the arms search, will reduce from six to two their complement of experts in missile technology and biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. A little-known nuclear special operations group from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, called the Direct Support Team, has already sent home a third of its original complement, and plans to cut the remaining team by half.

"We thought we would be much more gainfully employed, or intensively employed, than we were," said Navy Cmdr. David Beckett, who directs special nuclear programs for the team.

State-of-the-art biological and chemical labs, shrunk to fit standard cargo containers, came equipped with enough supplies to run thousands of tests using DNA fingerprinting and mass spectrometry. They have been called upon no more than a few dozen times, none with a confirmed hit. The labs' director, who asked not to be identified, said some of his scientists were also going home.

Even the sharpest skeptics do not rule out that the hunt may eventually find evidence of banned weapons. The most significant unknown is what U.S. interrogators are learning from senior Iraqi scientists, military industrial managers and Iraqi government leaders now in custody. If the nonconventional arms exist, some of them ought to know. Publicly, the Bush administration has declined to discuss what the captured Iraqis are saying. In private, U.S. officials provide conflicting reports, with some hinting at important disclosures. Cambone also said U.S. forces have seized "troves of documents" and are "surveying them, triaging them" for clues.

At former presidential palaces in the Baghdad area, where Task Force 75 will soon hand control to the Iraq Survey Group, leaders and team members refer to the covert operators as "secret squirrels." If they are making important progress, it has not led to "actionable" targets, according to McPhee and other task force members.

McPhee, an artillery brigade commander from Oklahoma who was assigned to the task force five months ago, reflected on the weapons hunt as the sun set outside his improvised sleeping quarters, a cot and mosquito net set down in the wreckage of a marble palace annex. He smoked a cigar, but without the peace of mind he said the evening ritual usually brings.

"My unit has not found chemical weapons," he said. "That's a fact. And I'm 47 years old, having a birthday in one of Saddam Hussein's palaces on a lake in the middle of Baghdad. It's surreal. The whole thing is surreal."

"Am I convinced that what we did in this fight was viable? I tell you from the bottom of my heart: We stopped Saddam Hussein in his WMD programs," he said, using the abbreviation for weapons of mass destruction. "Do I know where they are? I wish I did . . . but we will find them. Or not. I don't know. I'm being honest here."

Later in the conversation, he flung the unfinished cigar into the lake with somewhat more force than required. Team members explain their disappointing results, in part, as a consequence of a slow advance. Cautious ground commanders sometimes held weapons hunters away from the front, they said, and the task force had no helicopters of its own.

"My personal feeling is we waited too long and stayed too far back," said Christopher Kowal, an expert in computer forensics who worked for Mobile Exploitation Team Charlie until last week.

### **'The Bear Wasn't There'**

But two other factors -- erroneous intelligence and poor site security -- dealt the severest blows to the hunt, according to leaders and team members at every level.

Some information known in Washington, such as inventories of nuclear sites under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, did not reach the teams assigned to visit them. But what the U.S. government did not know mattered more than what it did know. Intelligence agencies had a far less accurate picture of Iraq's weapons program than participants believed at the outset of their search, they recalled.

"We came to bear country, we came loaded for bear and we found out the bear wasn't here," said a Defense Intelligence Agency officer here who asked not to be identified by name. "The indications and warnings were there. The assessments were solid."

"Okay, that paradigm didn't exist," he added. "The question before was, where are Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons? What is the question now? That is what we are trying to sort out."

One thing analysts must reconsider, he said, is: "What was the nature of the threat?"

By far the greatest impediment to the weapons hunt, participants said, was widespread looting of Iraq's government and industrial facilities. At nearly every top-tier "sensitive site" the searchers reached, intruders had sacked and burned the evidence that weapons hunters had counted on sifting. As recently as last Tuesday, nearly a month after Hussein's fall from power, soldiers under the Army's V Corps command had secured only 44 of the 85 top potential weapons sites in the Baghdad area and 153 of the 372 considered most important to rebuilding Iraq's government and economy.

McPhee saw early in the war that the looters were stripping his targets before he could check them. He cut the planning cycle for new missions -- the time between first notice and launch -- from 96 to 24 hours. "What we found," he said, was that "as the maneuver units hit a target they had to move on, even 24 hours was too slow. By the time we got there, a lot of things were gone."

Short and powerfully built, McPhee has spent his adult life as a combat officer. He calls his soldiers "bubbas" and worries about their mail. "It ain't good" that suspect sites are unprotected, he said, but he refused to criticize fighting units who left evidence unguarded.

"You've got two corps commanders being told, 'Get to Baghdad,' and, oh, by the way, 'When you run across sensitive sites, you have to secure them,'" he said. "Do you secure all those sites, or do you get to Baghdad? You've got limited force structure and you've got 20 missions."

A low point came when looters destroyed what was meant to be McPhee's headquarters in the Iraqi capital. The 101st Airborne Division had used the complex, a munitions factory called the Al Qadisiyah State Establishment, before rolling north to Mosul. When a reporter came calling, looking for Task Force 75, looters were busily stripping it clean. They later set it ablaze.

#### **An Altered Mission**

The search teams arrived in Iraq "looking for the smoking gun," Smith said, and now the mission is more diffuse -- general intelligence-gathering on subjects ranging from crimes against humanity and prisoners of war to Hussein's links with terrorists.

At the peak of the effort, all four mobile exploitation teams were devoted nearly full time to weapons of mass destruction. By late last month, two of the four had turned to other questions. This week, MET Alpha, Gonzales's team, also left the hunt, at least temporarily. It parted with its chemical and biological experts, added linguists and document exploiters and recast itself as an intelligence team. It will search for weapons if leads turn up, but lately it has focused on Iraqi covert operations abroad and the theft of Jewish antiquities.

The stymied hunt baffles search team leaders. To a person, those interviewed during a weeklong visit to the task force said they believed in the mission and the Bush administration accusations that prompted it.

Yet "smoking gun" is now a term of dark irony here. Maj. Kenneth Deal, executive officer of one site survey team, called out the words in mock triumph when he found a page of Arabic text at a former Baath Party recreation center last week. It was torn from a translated edition of A.J.P. Taylor's history, "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe." At a "battle update brief" last week, amid confusion over the whereabouts of a British laboratory in transit from Talil Air Base, McPhee deadpanned to his staff: "I haven't a clue where the WMD is, but we can find this lab."

Among the sites already visited from Central Command's top 19 are an underground facility at North Tikrit Hospital, an unconventional training camp at Salman Pak, Samarra East Airport, the headquarters of the Military Industrialization Commission, the Baghdad Research Complex, a storage site for surface-to-surface missiles in Taji, the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, a munitions assembly plant in Iskandariyah and an underground bunker at the Abu Ghurayb Palace.

The bunker, toured several days later by a reporter, withstood the palace's destruction by at least two satellite-guided bombs. The bombs left six-foot holes in the reinforced concrete palace roof, driving the steel reinforcing rods downward in a pattern that resembled tentacles. The subsequent detonation turned great marble rooms into rubble. But the bunker, tunneled deep below a ground-floor kitchen, remained unscathed. The tunnel dropped straight down and then leveled to horizontal, forming corridors that extend most of the breadth of the palace. Richly decorated living quarters were arranged along a series of L-shaped bends, each protected by three angled blast doors. The doors weighed perhaps a ton.



In a climate-control room, chemical weapons filters and carbon dioxide scrubbers protected the air and an overpressure blast valve stood ready to vent the lethal shock waves of an explosion. And a decontamination shower stood under an alarm panel designed to flash the message "Gas-Gaz."

"Is it evidence of weapons of mass destruction?" asked Deal. "No. It's probably evidence of paranoia."

"I don't think we'll find anything," said Army Capt. Tom Baird, one of two deputy operations officers under McPhee. "What I see is a lot of stuff destroyed." The Defense Intelligence Agency officer, describing a "sort of a lull period" in the search, said that whatever may have been at the target sites is now "dispersed to the wind."

All last week, McPhee drilled his staff on speeding the transition. The Iraq Survey Group should have all the help it needs, he said, to take control of the hunt. He is determined, subordinates said, to set the stage for success after he departs. And he does not want to leave his soldiers behind if their successors can be trained in time.

"I see them as Aladdin's carpet," McPhee told his staff. "Ticket home."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40212-2003May10.html>

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New York Times

May 11, 2003

## **Trailer Is A Mobile Lab Capable Of Turning Out Bioweapons, A Team Says**

By Judith Miller

BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 10 — A team of experts searching for evidence of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq has concluded that a trailer found near Mosul in northern Iraq in April is a mobile biological weapons laboratory, the three team members said today.

Describing their four-day examination of the lab for the first time and on the condition of anonymity, the members of the Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team-Charlie, or Team Charlie, said they had based their conclusion on a thorough examination of the gray-green trailer, with the help of British experts and a few American soldiers.

The members acknowledged that some experts were still uncertain whether the trailer was intended to produce biological agents. But they said they were persuaded that it was a mobile lab for biological production.

The team leader said that the lab contained equipment that could be used to make vaccines, drugs and other peaceful pathogens, as well as deadly germs for weapons, and that Iraq had therefore been obliged to disclose possession of such equipment to international inspectors before the war.

"The failure to disclose such equipment is a clear violation of United Nations sanctions and an indication of ill intent," said the team leader, a 20-year veteran of Special Operations forces and explosive ordnance work and a nuclear weapons expert.

He contended that this could be construed as the kind of "smoking gun" that his team was charged with finding to substantiate the Bush administration's allegations that Iraq was making biological and chemical weapons.

Other American experts say they believe that teams hunting for biological and chemical weapons may now have located parts of three mobile labs, military and civilian officials said today.

Those experts said that in addition to the Mosul trailer and another one found recently in northern Iraq, a smaller trailer was discovered last week by American forces near Baghdad. They said the smaller trailer, like the one near Mosul, had been taken to Baghdad International Airport for further examination.

The experts also said they believed that based on intelligence information, there might be as many as eight mobile labs in Iraq, adding that the locations of the other five have not yet been determined.

Some members of another team of weapons experts and intelligence officials arrived in Baghdad today to survey the labs at the airport and gather additional information about their operation and purpose. Pentagon officials sent the team to check the initial test results, and if they find they are accurate, to help assemble an ironclad technical case that would counter alternative, peaceful explanations for the trailers.

Some scientists say the trailers could have been used for peaceful purposes, like biopesticide production, but none of them have seen the labs or talked to the experts who reject such contentions. All three Team Charlie members said they were certain that future tests would confirm that the trailer was evidence of a weapons program.

The team also said they had found a substance in the lab's fermenting machine, which they declined to identify.

Officials in Washington, reached by telephone, said they believed that the team had found growth media that might

have been used to culture germs. More lab tests on the samples are being conducted in the United States and Britain, which assisted Team Charlie in its examination, officials said.

The team also found that the lab had been cleaned with a "caustic agent" — ammonia or bleach.

"We never expected to find positive samples" of pathogens, the team's biological specialist said. "But to prove that the lab could make biological agents, you don't need to find such agents."

The members of the team work for the Defense Intelligence Agency as part the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which has been responsible for the search for unconventional weapons. Team members said their investigation showed that the lab was partly assembled under the noses of international inspectors. A new inspection agency, known as the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission, returned to Iraq late last year after its predecessor agency was forced to leave the country in 1998. The agency conducted inspections in Iraq with many restrictions until just before the war.

The team's chemical expert, a 34-year-old former marine, said the team had found identification plates on equipment inside the trailer that "had dates from 2000 to 2002."

While most of the equipment in the lab was Iraqi in origin, some of it was from "foreign sources," the team leader said, describing it as "generic equipment that could have been easily ordered from several different places." The team declined to identify the countries that had supplied such equipment.

The members said another indication that the lab was part of a biological weapons program was an information plate found on a major piece of equipment from the Al Nasser Company, an Iraqi concern that had helped design and equip a major biological weapons plant destroyed after the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

The biological specialist said the equipment he took apart would support the production of peaceful germs, as well as those for weapons. But he said the presence of equipment to contain the emission of gasses from the trailer — known informally as scrubbers — indicated that the two to four people who may have operated the lab, including a driver, did not want traces of what they were making to be detectable.

"You don't need that kind of system if you're making a vaccine," he said. "You don't make baby formula on the road in a mobile van."

The team did not find any protective clothing or biocontainment system to safeguard the scientists or technicians who worked inside the trailer from exposure to deadly germs. But the team leader said he was not surprised by the absence of such equipment, which is standard in Western labs.

"We've already seen what a low regard for human life this regime had," the leader said.

He said the team had tried to eliminate other possible explanations for the lab. First, they discounted the possibility that the lab was intended to be a decoy. They also dismissed the possibility that it was a nuclear reactor on wheels, or that it held any other nuclear-related equipment. Also discounted was the theory that the lab was intended to produce missile fuel, propellant or explosives. The equipment was not appropriate for those functions, they said. Finally, they considered the possibility that the lab was intended for chemical production.

"There are still some experts who think that," the team leader said. "And while we haven't totally ruled it out, the lack of glass, stainless steel, Teflon and other material that can withstand the corrosive effects of chemicals suggests that the purpose was bio."

The team said the only major piece of equipment that was made of stainless steel was the lab's fermenter. They said that much of the craftsmanship in the lab was crude, but that the equipment — a fermenter, a system to bring in fresh water to and eliminate contaminated water from the trailer, and a water cooling system based on what appeared to be a jerry-built air conditioning unit — was capable of making considerable amounts of pathogens in a relatively short time.

"It was a Rube Goldberg system, but it clearly would have worked," the team leader said. "And they continued making improvements to it."

The lab was mobile, the team concluded, despite the fact that there were no shock absorbers between the tires' rubber and the lab floor.

The team said the configuration of the trailer and the equipment inside it was similar in many respects to the lab described in detail by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in his speech to the United Nations in February.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/international/worldspecial/11WEAP.html>

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New York Times  
May 12, 2003

# Lessons From Iraq Include How To Scare North Korean Leader

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, May 11 — American intelligence officials have concluded that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, went into seclusion during the final buildup to the war in Iraq because he feared that he too might be the target of attack. That judgment has led the Pentagon to consider new ways to hold him and his inner circle at risk as a way of bolstering deterrence on the peninsula, officials say.

Mr. Kim vanished from public view for 50 days starting in mid-February, a time when the Pentagon also moved bombers into the Korean area of operations. Now, the military's ability to mount precision attacks on leadership targets in Iraq is being examined to see how it might apply in a tense standoff with North Korea, perhaps influencing North Korea's behavior without ever firing a shot.

A senior Defense Department official said that lessons from the attacks against Saddam Hussein of Iraq, including short-notice air strikes on suspected hideouts in the opening and closing days of the war, are shaping discussions of how best to re-arrange the American military presence in South Korea and nearby in the Pacific.

The goal would be to assemble in the Korean region the same kind of detailed intelligence on high-priority targets — including the location of the adversary's leadership — and the ability to strike almost instantaneously with precision weapons should the need arise.

"Truly, if I'm Kim Jong Il, I wake up tomorrow morning and I'm thinking, 'Have the Americans arrayed themselves on the peninsula now, post-Iraq, the way they arrayed themselves in Iraq, rather than the way they were pre-Iraq?' " the senior Defense Department official said.

"And the idea is to make the North Koreans realize that we are arrayed, we are deployed, we are committed in Korea with the types of resources and types of capabilities that we brought to Iraq," he added. "And we think that doing that will make our deterrence there much more credible and much stronger."

No changes in American forces deployed to the region have been decided yet, the official cautioned, and the process could take two or three years or more.

Advancements in military technology may even allow increased deterrence with fewer American troops on South Korean soil, just as the American military fought this year in Iraq with a smaller force than it used in the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

"We are committed to bringing the same improvements in military war-fighting capability to Korea that we brought to Iraq this time," the senior Defense Department official said.

South Korea's new president, Roh Moo Hyun, arrived in the United States today, at a time when the two nations have been discussing a number of changes in their military relationship, from the structure of the United States-South Korean command framework and the proximity of American forces to major South Korean cities to, eventually perhaps, significant decreases in American forces in South Korea.

In the nearer term, the senior Defense Department official said, potential changes could lead to increased intelligence and reconnaissance deployed in or near South Korea so that they could surge to the front. With those increased surveillance capabilities, "whatever forces we have there are exponentially much more effective, because you can use precision targeting much more aggressively and much more quickly," the official said.

While American intelligence officials concede that it is impossible to know for certain what motivated the North Korean leader's unusual and lengthy seclusion, a consensus has emerged that it most likely was his fear of an attack, according to administration, military and intelligence officials.

Mr. Kim vanished after he welcomed a Russian delegation on Feb. 12, and reappeared only on April 3, choosing a ceremony at a military surgeons' school for his highly symbolic return to public view, according to American intelligence officials.

This was a remarkably long absence from public life, especially since state-run North Korean news organizations normally track Mr. Kim's activities on a daily basis, intelligence officials said.

"There was widespread speculation, both in South Korea and in the U.S., that Kim Jong Il was very concerned that he might be next," said a senior American intelligence official. "There is a good chance that there was some concern on his side, and he decided to lay low."

Mr. Kim's departure from public view coincided with the final stages of the American military build-up to war with Iraq.

During that same period, 24 long-range B-1 and B-52 bombers moved from bases in the United States to Guam, within easier striking distance of North Korea, to strengthen American power in the region as large numbers of troops and weapons normally assigned to the Pacific rotated toward Iraq.

Equally significant in that period was the arrival of several F-117 Stealth fighters in South Korea from American bases for a combined military exercise.

Those fighters, which American military officials confirm have remained in South Korea even though the exercise is over, are designed for quick strikes against targets ringed by heavy air defenses. They are the same kind of radar-evading aircraft that opened the war with Iraq by attacking a command bunker in Baghdad on a mission intended to kill Mr. Hussein and his sons. "Clearly our willingness to attack leadership targets from the get-go has probably made Kim a lot more apprehensive," said one senior administration official.

Pentagon officials said that Mr. Kim's military carefully studied American war-fighting techniques in the 1991 gulf war, and "we saw adjustments in the way they did things after that, especially in the areas of camouflage and concealment," according to one Defense Department official. "I suspect they are doing that again."

Mr. Kim's decision to stay out of public view "may be one of those adjustments," the official added.

Since re-emerging, Mr. Kim has mostly visited military units, including a naval weapons factory late last week, according to American intelligence officials.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/12/international/asia/12PENT.html>

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New York Times  
May 10, 2003

## Senate Panel Votes To Lift Ban On Small Nuclear Arms

By James C. Dao

WASHINGTON, May 9 — A sharply divided Senate Armed Services Committee voted today to repeal a 10-year-old ban on the development of small nuclear weapons, asserting that the United States must begin looking at new ways of deterring terrorist groups and so-called rogue nuclear powers like North Korea.

The Bush administration, which requested the repeal, said it had no plans to develop a new low-yield nuclear weapon. But it contends that the existing prohibition has had a chilling effect on weapons research at a time when the United States is trying to reconfigure its military to address post-Soviet threats.

The measure goes before the full Senate in two weeks, where opponents, mainly Democrats, have vowed to fight it. The House Armed Services Committee is scheduled to take up the proposal on Tuesday.

"We have tried for 50-plus years to make these weapons unthinkable," said Senator Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island. "And now we're talking about giving them a tactical application. It's a dangerous departure."

Proponents, mainly Republicans, argue that low-yield warheads could be used to incinerate chemical or biological weapons installations without scattering deadly agents into the atmosphere.

"Without committing to deployment, research on low-yield nuclear weapons is a prudent step to safeguard America from emerging threats and enemies who go deeper and deeper underground," said Senator John Warner, a Republican from Virginia who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

But senior administration officials have also argued that new nuclear weapons may be needed to deter emerging nuclear powers like North Korea and Iran. They contend that large warheads may have lost their deterrent value for the paradoxical reason that they are so destructive that world leaders no longer believe the United States would use them against small countries.

Low-yield weapons might prove more effective in containing smaller nuclear powers precisely because they are less devastating — and therefore theoretically more usable, the officials argue.

"We need to make sure our weapons will in fact be seen by other countries as a deterrent," Linton Brooks, the acting administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration, said in an interview. "One element of that is usability. If nobody believes there is any circumstance where you will use the weapon, it is not a deterrent."

Arms control advocates and many Democrats contend improvements in laser and satellite guidance systems have made conventional weapons nearly as destructive as small nuclear weapons. They argue that lifting the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons will only undermine America's ability to prevent the spread of such weapons to other countries.

"This just undermines our whole argument," said Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee. "We're driving recklessly down a road that we're telling other people not to walk down." Democrats agreed their fight will be uphill, given the Republicans' two-seat advantage in the Senate and the fact that two Democrats on the Armed Services Committee — Ben Nelson of Nebraska and Evan Bayh of Indiana — voted for the repeal.

The repeal of the 1993 ban was approved as part of the national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2004 that the committee sent to the full Senate today.

The bill calls for spending \$400.5 billion on military programs, including a 3.7 percent across-the-board raise raise for all servicemen, \$6.6 billion for new warships and \$4.4 billion for development of the Joint Strike Fighter.

The 1993 ban was known as the Spratt-Furse Amendment after its original Democratic sponsors — Representative John Spratt of South Carolina and former Representative Elizabeth Furse of Oregon. It prohibited any research and development that could lead to the production a low-yield nuclear weapon.

The law defined a low-yield weapon as having the explosive force of less than five kilotons of TNT. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was about 15 kilotons.

The defense authorization bill included two other measures opposed by arms control advocates: \$15 million to continue a feasibility study of a nuclear weapon capable of penetrating deep into the earth, and \$25 million to cut in half the time needed to prepare for an underground nuclear test, from 36 months to 18 months.

Senior administration officials said the earth-penetrating weapon would involve developing a hardened casing for existing nuclear weapons to enable them to crash through thick rock and concrete. Democrats have said they would support developing the casing for conventional weapons, but do not want it used for nuclear warheads.

The administration says it has no plans to restart underground nuclear testing, but wants to speed up the time needed to conduct a test in case of a national emergency.

Underlying the willingness of many Republicans to repeal the ban on developing low-yield weapons is the belief that existing arms control measures, consisting of treaties and inspection programs, are failing.

"Experience has shown that nonproliferation treaties really don't have any affect on countries like North Korea, India and Pakistan," said Senator Wayne Allard, a Republican from Colorado.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/10/international/worldspecial2/10NUKE.html>

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St. Louis Post-Dispatch

May 10, 2003

Pg. 6

## **Colonel Is Confident U.S. Military Disrupted Iraqi Weapons Program**

*But no chemical or biological arms have turned up, and expectations shift from discovering the weapons to confirming a capability to make them.*

By Associated Press

The commander of the American weapons hunters in Iraq says he's certain the U.S. invasion has ended a program that would have let Iraq make chemical and biological weapons.

But the teams of hunters have found no such weapons thus far, says the commander, Col. Richard R. McPhee.

In fact, members of McPhee's team and U.S. defense officials say that banned arms may never be found in Iraq.

This marks a shift in expectations to confirming an Iraqi capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, rather than actually finding them. Before the war, U.S. leaders said they knew such weapons existed in Iraq, and that war was necessary to root them out.

McPhee said in an interview, "There's no doubt in my mind that what we have stopped here in Iraq is a WMD program that was being run, that was capable of producing chemical weapons, biological weapons." Asked for the evidence, he cited "the expertise and knowledge of the people, the scientists, dual-use capability facilities."

The recent U.N. inspectors never declared they had uncovered a program designed to produce weapons of mass destruction.

A top operations officer for McPhee's 75th Exploitation Task Force said Friday that he would be surprised if the team failed to find the infrastructure and program for "demand production of biological weapons" - in other words, not production, but a capacity to produce quickly on demand.

As for finding actual weapons, the operations officer said it might turn out that no weapons of mass destruction will be found.

Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, made a similar point at a Pentagon briefing Tuesday.

When asked whether banned weapons would ever be found, he said, "I think we're going to find that they had a weapons of mass destruction program. Now, how it was configured and how they intended to use it is part of the hard work that they're going through right now."

After a month's field operations from Kuwait, McPhee's task force has moved into one of Saddam Hussein's palace complexes outside Baghdad. The unit began work with a list of 900 Iraqi sites where inspectors might look for evidence of banned weapons work, led by 90 high-priority sites. Of those priority sites, 75 have been examined thus far, McPhee said Thursday, with nothing of major significance reported.

A top operations officer said a large percentage of the U.S.-surveyed sites had been inspected by the U.N. agency that resumed inspections for banned weapons programs last November and suspended them in March. Such Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological facilities had also undergone eight years of earlier U.N. inspections in the 1990s. The U.N. teams tagged, sometimes sealed or planned to monitor dual-use equipment found at the sites - equipment that might be intended for civilian use but potentially useful for weapons-making.

The 75th XTF has reported one find of potentially major significance - a truck trailer some specialists suspect was designed as a mobile production plant for biological weapons.

The Washington Post reported in today's edition that looters had damaged or all but destroyed seven nuclear facilities in Iraq. The Post said U.S. officials feared that technical documents, sensitive equipment and possibly radioactive material had been scattered.

If so, there could be potentially dangerous consequences for public health - and for the struggle to keep radioactive material out of terrorists' hands, the Post said.

Previous reports have described damage at two of the facilities, the Tuwaitha Yellowcake Storage Facility and the adjacent Baghdad Nuclear Research Center. Now, the Post said, the identity of three of the five other damaged sites has been learned: the Ash Shaykhili Nuclear Facility, the Baghdad New Nuclear Design Center and the Tahadi Nuclear Establishment.

<http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/news/A44616EB3FB3AE1286256D22000EF016?OpenDocument&highlight=2%2CColonel%2Cis%2CConfident%2CU.S.%2CMilitary%2CDisrupted%2CIraqi%2CWeapons%2CProgram&headline=Colonel+is+confident+U.S.+military+disrupted+Iraqi+weapons+program>

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London Sunday Telegraph

May 11, 2003

## **Villagers Suffer Radiation Sickness After Looting Nuclear Power Plants**

By Inigo Gilmore, in Baghdad

Doctors fear that hundreds of Iraqis may be suffering from radiation poisoning, following the widespread looting of the country's nuclear facilities.

Seven nuclear facilities have been damaged or effectively destroyed by ransackers since the end of the war.

Technical documents, sensitive equipment and barrels containing radioactive material are believed to have been stolen.

Many residents in villages close to the huge Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility, about seven miles south of Baghdad, were showing signs of radiation illness last week, including rashes, acute vomiting and severe nosebleeds.

As Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed last month villagers began looting barrels of the uranium oxide, known as "yellowcake", from the site, which they then emptied to use to store water, milk and yoghurt.

In Al Riyadh village, about a mile from the site, 13-year-old El Tifat Nasser fell ill after her brothers visited the facility on a dozen occasions and returned with barrels. "She is bleeding twice a day through her nose and she is very sick," said her mother, Sabieha Nasser, 48. "We are very worried."

Local hospitals have seen an influx of patients complaining of similar symptoms. "A lot of people seem to be affected," said one doctor. "It is deeply worrying."

Villagers said Iraqi officials arrived recently with Geiger counters. One said the men had measured areas where locals had emptied the contents of stolen barrels. "The Geiger counters were screaming," he said, adding that the officials had then instructed them to cover the areas in concrete.

The failure to secure the nuclear sites has fuelled criticism of American forces in Iraq. It is known that at the Tuwaitha facility there were significant quantities of partially enriched uranium, caesium, strontium and cobalt. Besides Tuwaitha and the adjacent Baghdad Nuclear Research Centre, the Ash Shaykhili Nuclear Facility, the Baghdad New Nuclear Design Centre and the Tahadi Nuclear Establishment have all been looted.

It is not yet clear what has been lost in the ransackings. There was unrestrained looting among chemical stores and scientific files that some experts believe could, in the wrong hands, allow the manufacture of a "dirty bomb". Many of the files, and some of the containers that held radioactive material, are missing.

All of the facilities have attracted close scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency and from United States experts who claimed that Iraq, despite IAEA inspections, was working to develop nuclear weapons. The warehouses at Ash Shaykhili have been destroyed by ransacking and fire and the enrichment processing equipment is either missing or burnt.

Alarmed by the reports, the IAEA's director-general, Mohamed El Baradei, last week sent a letter to reiterate earlier demands that the US grant the agency access to Iraq's nuclear sites, but so far there has been no response. Mohammed Zaidan, the former chief agricultural engineer at Tuwaitha, said he had visited the nuclear site with Dr Hamid Al Bahli, a nuclear scientist, on April 7 when American troops were approaching from the south. The soldiers, he said, assured the men they would secure Tuwaitha, but two weeks later they returned to find there were no American soldiers, only hundreds of people looting the facility and dogs rolling around in the contaminated uranium oxide.

"The soldiers had promised us they would secure the site but they did not and we wonder why," he said. "Perhaps it was because they always knew there were no real weapons there, despite all their claims. But, nevertheless, these materials represent a major health hazard and before long we may start to see people developing cancer and deformed babies because they did not stop the looting."

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2003%2F05%2F11%2Fwirq111.xml>

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Los Angeles Times  
May 11, 2003

## **After A Disappointing Start, U.S. Retools Weapons Search**

By Bob Drogin, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Few Americans are watching the search for stashes of deadly germs, poison gases and other illicit weapons in postwar Iraq as closely as retired biologist William Capers Patrick III.

After all, during the Cold War, Patrick helped construct the same kind of mobile bioweapons labs for the Pentagon that the Bush administration insists Saddam Hussein built. He even used his trucks to produce some of the same lethal pathogens, including anthrax.

"We got all our equipment into a standard trailer, an 18-wheeler," said Patrick, 77, disclosing the U.S. effort for the first time. "They make very good units. You can produce your agent as you move along. The Soviets did the same thing."

Patrick's wheeled labs — as well as other labs hidden on ships at sea — were ordered destroyed along with deadly microbes such as tularemia, Q fever and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus after President Nixon disbanded the secret germ warfare program in 1969.

Whether Hussein also grew microbes in trucks is still unclear. The Pentagon announced Wednesday that it may have found a biowarfare lab in a tractor-trailer that was seized by Kurdish fighters at a roadblock April 19 in northern Iraq. Weeks of tests are planned.

The truck's discovery has excited senior Bush administration officials, and it's no wonder.

Amid growing skepticism about the central White House rationale for invading Iraq, officials are eagerly awaiting any evidence to prove U.S. charges that Hussein's regime secretly produced hundreds of tons of biological and chemical agents.

"The events of the past few weeks have a lot of us in the community worried about the quality of intelligence that informs major policy decisions," said Steven M. Block, a biophysicist at Stanford University and member of a high-level Pentagon advisory panel. "We have people in custody. We have the ability to interrogate anyone we want. You'd think by now one person would come forward with one good lead. With each passing day, it becomes a greater embarrassment."

The seizure of the suspected mobile lab gave the Pentagon the impetus for another unveiling. Facing complaints that the secrecy-shrouded weapons hunt has been poorly planned, unevenly executed and beset by bureaucratic turf wars, senior defense officials publicly defended and described the operation for the first time. They also spelled out plans for a significantly expanded effort.

Among the disclosures: Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, will take charge of the effort when he flies to U.S. Central Command headquarters in Qatar on May 20. Dayton ultimately

will lead about 2,000 scientists, interrogators, intelligence analysts, former U.N. weapons inspectors and others for a variety of missions in Iraq, including the weapons hunt.

"There seems to be no sense of urgency about this, which is confusing to me," said George A. Lopez, director of policy studies at Notre Dame University's Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and chairman of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. "We're losing evidence, we're losing opportunity."

But Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of Defense for intelligence, insisted at a news briefing that the Pentagon had a "comprehensive" approach aimed at "unraveling the puzzle that is the weapons of mass destruction program."

Each morning, he said, weapons and intelligence experts share notes and select priorities at the Central Command operations center outside Baghdad. Specialists then are dispatched to scour suspect sites, to interview Iraqis familiar with the program or to translate and analyze weapons-related procurement and technical documents and computer data.

So far, he said, the teams have searched about 110 Iraqi sites — 70 from a master list of 580 prepared before the war by U.S. intelligence and 40 resulting from leads from Iraqis or documents gathered since the war.

The hunt has several layers. Initial assessments of suspect sites are done by seven military teams, including four that arrived in Iraq in mid-April. The teams have six members each and carry radiation dose-meters and other portable chemical and biological detection gear.

If suspicious materials are found, two "mobile exploitation teams" with more sophisticated equipment are called in to run more thorough scientific tests. Samples also are sent to two military labs in the U.S., as well as what Cambone called a "non-U.S. laboratory," which he declined to identify, for independent analysis.

If illicit weapons or production facilities are found, two private defense contractors hired by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency will have primary responsibility for destroying them. Raytheon Co. and KBR, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney's former employer, Halliburton Co., will each send 60 people to Iraq this month as the first phase of the weapons elimination effort, according to a senior defense official.

In addition to finding weapons, the officials said, they aim to compile a "cradle-to-grave" portrait of the ousted regime's reputed programs to design, build and deploy weapons of mass destruction. So far, they said, the evidence is fragmentary and mostly comes from documents and interrogation of relatively junior Iraqi technicians.

The failure to find clear proof so far has sparked a bitter debate over the intelligence repeatedly cited by President Bush and his aides before the war. When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell laid out the U.S. case against Iraq to the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, he insisted the evidence was indisputable. "What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence," he said.

A U.S. military official involved in the hunt acknowledged that he is disappointed as well. "The assumption was a lot of stuff would be found by now," he said.

Nancy W. Gallagher, a former State Department arms control specialist now at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, said she fears the administration "vastly overstated" the evidence it had. "I presume they were trying to make the strongest case they could without revealing sources and methods," she said. "But now we're seeing that their best intelligence wasn't necessarily very good."

U.N. weapons inspectors, who returned to Iraq in November and searched more than 500 sites before being withdrawn on the eve of the war, tend to agree. They chased numerous CIA tips about suspected weapons caches and other evidence based on defector accounts, satellite photos, intercepted conversations and other intelligence. None panned out.

"I acted on almost a dozen intelligence tips," said one former inspector, who asked not to be identified. "Sometimes it was amazingly specific. You know, 'Go into the basement, there's a door marked 4, go in there, then there's a long corridor, then you'll find a room filled with equipment.' Except there never was."

In some cases, U.N. teams determined that what the CIA insisted were decontamination vehicles — a telltale sign that chemical or biological production was underway nearby — were firetrucks or other emergency vehicles.

U.N. teams searching vaccine plants and other biological facilities also looked for evidence of mobile labs, according to Rocco Casagrande, who ran the U.N.'s bio-analysis lab in Baghdad and who went on more than 50 U.N. searches before the inspectors were withdrawn.

"Almost every place we went, we looked for signs of truck repair or heavy equipment manufacture, two activities that don't normally go together" with normal biological work, said Casagrande. "We never found it."

It's possible that Hussein built mobile weapons labs but never used them. One Iraqi defector said Hussein built production facilities for the future, not to produce stockpiles of bioagents that could quickly degrade or be discovered.

It's also possible that the labs were more benign. During the early 1970s, Iraq used mobile labs to produce a common pesticide called *Bacillus thuringiensis* "out in the cotton fields, as these cultures had a very short shelf life" according to Dr. Martin Hugh-Jones, a Louisiana State University scientist.



Patrick, who headed the "product development division" of the Pentagon's biowarfare program in the 1950s and '60s, said he isn't surprised that no proof of an illegal-weapons program has yet been found. He noted that it took four years of intensive investigations after the 1991 Persian Gulf War before he and other U.N. inspectors uncovered Hussein's vast germ warfare program in 1995.

Patrick said America's mobile labs were built as backup facilities that could be hidden if Soviet missiles destroyed the main U.S. germ facilities. Iraqi defectors have said Hussein had a similar goal for his mobile labs.

"If you want to have a surreptitious BW [biological warfare] program, I can't think of a better way than to use a trailer," Patrick said.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-war-wmd11may11235422,1,1294667.story>

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Washington Times

May 12, 2003

Pg. 16

## Iran Seen Ready To Develop Nuclear Arms

By John Zarocostas, Special To The Washington Times

GENEVA — Heightened global security concerns over the reputed pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran, the standoff between North Korea and the United States and the threat of nuclear terrorism dominated an international meeting here aimed at strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On Thursday, President Bush voiced concern that "the Iranians may be developing a nuclear program."

Similarly, John S. Wolf, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, told the U.N.-sponsored NPT forum that Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the 188-member NPT accord.

Under the NPT, which came into force in March 1970, signatory states renounce the option of ever acquiring such weapons and agree to an international safeguard regime.

In return, nuclear weapons powers have agreed to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

"Iran has been conducting an alarming clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe only make sense as part of a nuclear-weapons program," Mr. Wolf told the forum in Geneva. "Iran is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq."

But on Friday, Amir Zamnina, director-general for international political affairs in Iran's Foreign Ministry, told delegates that "Iran has renounced the nuclear option for many reasons." And, he added, "we consider the use of nuclear weapon to be inhuman, immoral, illegal."

"We do not have anything to hide," Mr. Zamnina said, and argued that the American charges regarding Iran illustrate a double standard on the nuclear issue.

"Compare the U.S. approach to Israel as a proven and established proliferator with its approach to Iran as a country that the U.S. suspects may have not fully complied with its NPT obligations," he said.

Besides North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT on April 10, other nonsignatories include India, Pakistan and Israel — all countries known or believed to have nuclear weapons.

Malaysia, speaking on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement member states that are parties to the NPT, and other countries including China, renewed calls for the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The Non-Aligned Movement also said Israel should accede to the NPT, promptly put "all its nuclear facilities" under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, permit international inspections and agree to the need to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

A number of industrialized and developing countries also criticized the Bush administration and the other NPT nuclear-weapons states — Britain, China, France, and Russia — for not doing enough on the disarmament front.

New Zealand's minister of disarmament, Marian Hobbs, speaking on behalf of "the new agenda group" — Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden — said: "We believe that the responsibility of the NWS [nuclear-weapons states] to lead by example is greater than ever."

With regard to North Korea, Mr. Wolf of the State Department said: "If NPT withdrawal and threats to acquire nuclear weapons become the currency of international bargaining, our world will be in chaos."

Beijing's ambassador, Hu Xiaodi, said: "China holds that the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula should be maintained, [and] that the legitimate security concerns of [North Korea] should be addressed."

A major review of the NPT is planned in 2005.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030512-90.htm>

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Time

May 19, 2003

Pg. 22

**Notebook**

## **Al-Qaeda's Nuclear Contact?**

By Tim Burger and Tim McGirk

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the No. 3 leader of al-Qaeda, who was captured in Pakistan on March 1, has been questioned extensively about his relationship with Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers. But his U.S. interrogators have also grilled him about another figure of much concern to Washington: Abdul Qadeer Khan, the maverick Pakistani scientist who has been called the father of the Islamic Bomb. U.S. intelligence, according to one official, has information that the al-Qaeda man and the nuclear scientist had connections with the same safe-house operator and may have crossed paths. They were "reported to be at the same place at approximately the same time," the official said. Under questioning, according to the source, Mohammed denied seeing Khan and downplayed any usefulness Khan may have had to al-Qaeda. Khan declined repeated requests from TIME to comment on the accusations.

The CIA believes that Khan had a key role in helping North Korea develop at least one or two nuclear devices, a senior official tells TIME. Under pressure from the U.S., the Pakistani government two years ago stripped Khan of his position in the nuclear and military establishment and barred him from traveling abroad without official permission. Within Pakistan, Khan is always accompanied by two military officers, Pakistani officials say. But Washington fears that he may still have enough freedom to be able to shop Pakistan's nuclear secrets to other clients. Says a Washington official: "He moves around very freely and has everything he needs inside his head, if not his briefcase."

-- *By Tim Burger and Tim McGirk*

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030519-450968,00.html>

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Washington Times

May 12, 2003

Pg. B1

## **Pond Intrigues Anthrax Probers**

By S.A. Miller, The Washington Times

FREDERICK — Mayor Jennifer P. Dougherty confirmed yesterday that the FBI is considering draining a pond in Frederick Municipal Forest to search for evidence related to the 2001 anthrax attacks.

"They have probably found something that tickles their interest, which is why they keep coming back," Miss Dougherty told The Washington Times.

The plan stems from a new FBI theory reported over the weekend by The Washington Post about how the person behind the attacks could have packed the deadly spores into envelopes without being infected or leaving traces in homes, buildings or on open land.

The theory is based on evidence recovered from the pond this winter, according to anonymous sources close to the investigation cited by the newspaper. FBI spokeswoman Debra Weierman declined to comment yesterday on the story or on searches conducted at a series of ponds in the forest.

The attacks nearly 19 months ago killed five persons and sickened 13 others.

The pond findings offer physical evidence in a case that so far has been built almost exclusively on circumstantial clues, the newspaper quoted sources as saying.

Two sources familiar with the items recovered from one of the ponds described a clear box, with holes that could accommodate gloves to protect the user during work. So-called glove boxes are commonly used to handle dangerous pathogens. Vials wrapped in plastic also were recovered.

For protection against airborne bacteria that might be released, a person could put envelopes and secured anthrax powder into the box, then wade into shallow water and submerge it to put the bacteria into the envelopes

underwater, some involved in the case believe, the newspaper reported. Afterward, the envelopes could have been sealed inside plastic bags to be removed from the underwater chamber.

Miss Dougherty said yesterday that about six weeks ago FBI agents raised the possibility of draining the spring-fed pond that is roughly an acre in size and 10 feet deep. "Obviously, they want to find other evidence," she said. "And they think that, as I recall, they want to find other things being hidden by the muck."

She said FBI divers began searching the pond in December and January. The search was aided by scientists from the Army's nearby germ warfare lab, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

Some investigators said the water theory is the result of the FBI's interest in Steven Hatfill, a physician and bioterrorism specialist who formerly worked as a researcher at USAMRIID.

Attorney General John Ashcroft has described Mr. Hatfill as "a person of interest" in the investigation. Mr. Hatfill formerly lived in an apartment outside Fort Detrick's main gate, about eight miles from the ponds.

*This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

<http://www.washtimes.com/metro/20030512-63667978.htm>

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Washington Post

May 11, 2003

Pg. 1

## **New Find Reignites Anthrax Probe**

### ***Evidence From Pond May Indicate Killer's Method***

By Marilyn W. Thompson, Washington Post Staff Writer

The FBI has developed a new theory on a central mystery of the 2001 anthrax attacks after finding evidence in a Frederick, Md., pond that may suggest how an ingenious criminal could have packed deadly anthrax spores into envelopes without killing or sickening himself, according to sources close to the investigation.

A piece of equipment and other evidence recovered this winter from ice-covered ponds in Frederick Municipal Forest have reinvigorated the 18-month-old case, leading officials to explore a novel theory with shades of science fiction. Some involved in the case believe that the killer may have waded into shallow water to delicately manipulate anthrax bacteria into envelopes, working within a partly submerged airtight chamber. When finished, the killer could have easily hidden the evidence by simply dumping contaminated equipment and clothing into the pond.

Publicly, the FBI has said nothing about material that divers recovered during the elaborate search missions in December and January, which involved cutting through thick ice atop about a dozen spring-fed ponds on the city-owned parkland. Debra Weierman, media coordinator for the FBI's Washington Field Office, which supervises the case, declined to comment on the findings or on any law enforcement theories about how the crimes might have been carried out.

But sources close to the case said the discoveries were so compelling that the FBI now plans to drain one of the ponds in another search for sunken evidence. The FBI has notified the city of Frederick and the Maryland Department of Natural Resources that it will begin the operation by June 1 and expects to pump thousands of gallons of water from a single pond into the others and a nearby reservoir. Additional agents have been assigned to the case, code-named Amerithrax.

Two sources familiar with the items recovered from the pond described a clear box, with holes that could accommodate gloves to protect the user as he worked. Also recovered were vials wrapped in plastic.

Not everyone involved in the case subscribes to the theory. Some believe that the killer could have completed the task on land and simply dumped materials into the pond to avoid detection.

These investigators contend that the water theory is the result of the FBI's interest in one subject, Steven J. Hatfill, a medical doctor and bioterrorism expert who formerly worked as a researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Frederick. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft has described Hatfill as "a person of interest" in the investigation.

Hatfill has a varied background in science and medicine that includes research for NASA and exploration in Antarctica. On a résumé he sent several years ago to federal agencies, Hatfill, a former member of the Rhodesian special forces who received medical training in South Africa, lists a postgraduate diploma in diving and underwater medicine from a South African naval training institute.

Hatfill's attorney, Thomas Connolly, called the water theory "far-fetched" and said Hatfill had nothing to do with the anthrax crimes.

The evidence found in the pond has buoyed the FBI's hopes for resolution of the baffling case, which claimed five lives, sickened 13 other people and exposed thousands more to the lethal bacteria. The attacks involved a series of letters mailed in pre-stamped envelopes to media outlets in Florida and New York and to the offices of Sens. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.). While en route, the letters passed through various post offices and postal distribution centers along the East Coast and left a trail of contamination.

The five people who died from inhalation anthrax included two postal workers at the Brentwood postal facility in Washington, a Florida photojournalist, a New York hospital worker and a 94-year-old woman in Connecticut.

Entering the water to manipulate virulent anthrax bacteria would provide some degree of natural protection from finely ground spores, which disperse in the air and can live for decades in the soil. But expert opinions vary on whether spores from contaminated equipment could later be found in a natural body of water.

Several scientists suggested that the spores would likely disperse and be difficult to trace, but they said it would be wise to test sediment at the bottom of the pond for the possible presence of hardy microbes.

The FBI's theory could explain why, after numerous searches of homes, buildings and open land, investigators have failed to locate any sign of anthrax contamination. It would suggest that the criminal had experience doing complicated manual tasks in water and was highly skilled in the use of small laboratory tools to work within an airtight glove box or bag.

Some FBI officials involved in the case have theorized that the killer could have put both dry envelopes and secured anthrax powder into an airtight, waterproof chamber, sealed it shut, then stood in the water while filling the envelopes. When finished, the envelopes could be secured inside layers of zip-lock plastic bags and removed from the protective chamber.

The most commonly used devices for handling dangerous pathogens are known as glove boxes or bags. They feature polyurethane gloves built into the chambers. Scientists usually wear additional layers of gloves for added protection. The devices come in all sizes and range in price from simple models that cost less than \$150 to custom-designed varieties that are priced at \$10,000 or more. The Justice Department secured the sales records of major U.S. glove box and bag manufacturers soon after the anthrax attacks occurred.

The FBI has come under criticism for the pace of the investigation, which has involved dozens of agents and cutting-edge laboratory analysis.

The pond findings, the sources said, offer the first possible physical evidence in a case that, thus far, has been built almost exclusively on circumstantial clues considered too tenuous to lead to criminal charges.

But the case still has significant weaknesses, the sources said. A major problem is that the FBI has found no evidence linking anyone to the actual mailing of the letters. The two most deadly letters, to Daschle and Leahy, are believed to have been mailed from a highly visible mailbox in the village of Princeton, N.J., just across the street from the Princeton University campus. The box, which tested positive for anthrax, was removed from its concrete footings in August 2002 and shipped to Army labs for testing.

The water theory has increased investigators' interest in Hatfill, who formerly lived in an apartment outside Fort Detrick's main gate that is about eight miles from the ponds.

Based on a tip, FBI teams rushed to seal off the municipal forest in late December and sent divers into the ponds, which were created decades ago to provide water in case of forest fires. The FBI said at the time that it was looking for equipment that might have been used in the crimes. Since then, a team of FBI agents has returned occasionally to the site.

The pond searches represented another flurry of activity in an investigation that had appeared stalled.

Soon after the anthrax letters surfaced, the FBI released a psychological profile of the likely suspect, describing a disgruntled, middle-aged white male with scientific training and some experience working in government research labs. Agents scrambled to interview a short list of people who fit the profile, then seemed to focus on Hatfill. After Ashcroft called Hatfill a "person of interest" in the probe, Hatfill held two news conferences to adamantly proclaim his innocence.

He remains under round-the-clock FBI surveillance, and his attorney, Connolly, said he has refused recent approaches from the FBI. Connolly said Hatfill cannot find a job because of the unjustified FBI scrutiny.

Connolly said it would not be unusual for the FBI to find scientific equipment discarded in waters around Frederick, which is home to many research labs and biotech companies. He suggested that equipment dredged from the pond could have been discarded by a drug dealer operating a methamphetamine lab.

The FBI also has questioned Hatfill's associates about a device he used in much of his recent research. Hatfill had federal backing for projects using the "rotary cell culture system," a small device developed by NASA researchers to rapidly culture cells. It is marketed by Synthecon, a small Texas company.

While at USAMRIID between 1997 and 1999, Hatfill had the backing of a federal health agency for a project in which he sought to use the culturing device to develop a "Universal Pathogen System." He hoped to grow pathogens

that had proved difficult to culture, including possibly the smallpox virus, according to his proposal. Hatfill said the project would help researchers trying to quickly analyze emerging infectious diseases.

Roger Akers, a Synthecon vice president and a friend of Hatfill's who worked with him on an unpublished bioterrorism thriller, said he was questioned by FBI agents in recent months about whether Hatfill could have used the rotary cell culture device to grow anthrax bacteria. Akers said he found the questions silly, because anthrax bacteria are easy to grow without the aid of such sophisticated equipment.

Akers said Hatfill was trained in the use of the cell culture system, which he employed both at USAMRIID and during a previous government research appointment at a division of the National Institutes of Health.

The FBI has reviewed the manuscript of Hatfill's novel, which is on file at the U.S. Copyright Office.

*Staff writers Allan Lengel and David Snyder contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40034-2003May10.html>

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Korea Herald

May 12, 2003

## Hubbard Urges Deterring N.K. Nuke Sales

By Seo Hyun-jin

A top U.S. envoy in Seoul said yesterday that the international community should join forces to deter North Korea from potentially exporting nuclear materials to terrorist countries.

Speaking on an SBS television program, U.S. Amb. Thomas Hubbard said it is the policy of the United States and South Korea to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.

Hubbard also reconfirmed the U.S. opposition to the North possessing a nuclear arsenal, saying that the United States aims to realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and to have the North dismantle its nuclear programs in an immediate and comprehensive manner.

He stressed that Washington's basic stance on the matter has not changed.

Some U.S. media have recently suggested that Washington has shifted its North Korea policy from focusing on halting the North's nuclear programs to stopping its sale of nuclear material. U.S. officials have denied the report. North Korea claimed during nuclear talks in Beijing last month that it has nuclear weapons.

Touching on the issue of South Korea's participation in the nuclear talks, Hubbard hoped the South would be able to join the talks at the earliest possible date.

He said the participation of South Korea and Japan is essential in settling the nuclear issue, adding Russia and Australia may also find a seat at the dialogue table.

Hubbard said South Korean and U.S. officials have forged consultations regarding the realignment of 37,000 American troops stationed here, and they have reached a conclusion that they will relocate the headquarters of the U.S. military base in Yongsan, central Seoul, to outside the capital.

The American diplomat said the U.S. Senate may unofficially invite to Washington Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking North Korean ever to defect to the South. He said the former North Korean ruling party secretary's visit to the United States has been under discussion for the last two years.

Hubbard said Hwang's trip to Washington is dependent on the authorization of the Seoul government.

Hwang, architect of the communist country's ruling "juche" ideology, has recently expressed his hope of visiting the United States to publicize the dire human rights condition in North Korea.

[http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/archives/result\\_contents.asp?id=200305120049&query=\\*](http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/archives/result_contents.asp?id=200305120049&query=*)

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Washington Times

May 12, 2003

Pg. 16

**Q&A**

## Nuclear Nonproliferation Is Under Threat

John Zarocostas, special correspondent for The Washington Times, spoke last week in Geneva with Patricia Lewis, director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

**Question: Dr. Lewis, what's the state of play on the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty following the two-week preparatory committee review here?**

Answer: Well, I'd say things within the Non-Proliferation Treaty are in a very bad state in many respects, and certainly things are not boding well for the future. As you know there are five legally defined nuclear weapons states within the treaty — the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia — and there were three states outside the treaty, two of which have exploded nuclear weapons — that's India and Pakistan, and one country that is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons but has never admitted [it does], and that's Israel.

There are lots of issues within the NPT about the way nuclear-weapons states are disarming [or] not disarming as the case may be, and there's this general consensus among the other states that they're not disarming rapidly enough and are probably not committed in the way they should be to nuclear disarmament.

And from other points of view there's a great deal of worry about states that are breaking out of the treaty. Now early this year, in January, we had the North Koreans announce they were pulling out of the treaty. There's been a lot of debate as to whether that's actually legally taken place or not.

They were not in the room, their nameplate was held in custody by the chairman because it couldn't be decided what to do about North Korea, and the whole issue of whether North Korea is developing nuclear weapons or not is still a very big issue and no one knows how to deal with it.

The issue over the Iranian civil nuclear program has caused a great deal of problems within the discussions. The Americans are asking some very difficult and severe questions of the Iranians as to why they have such an extensive civil program.

The Iranians have been trying to answer these questions, but I would say they have not satisfied the United States or many of the other allies of the United States.

**Q: A cross section of industrialized and developing countries spearheaded by New Zealand are asking the nuclear powers to do more, and to do more in the area of compliance and enforcement as well.**

**The response from some of the P5 member states, such as the United States, is that "we are doing a lot," and they highlight the recent treaty with Russia, the Moscow treaty. Where are we here?**

A: Well of course, the Moscow treaty is a useful step. It takes a lot of weapons off alert, although how many are actually off alert is unclear, and it takes a lot of missiles probably into storage, but there is no real disarmament aspect. It is a good confidence step, and it is to be welcomed, but it is not a real disarmament treaty and, as such, doesn't fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

I think there are a number of compliance issues.

There's compliance with the treaty by those who have agreed not to possess nuclear weapons, and that clearly is eroding. It started to erode with Iraq and North Korea in the early '90s. We've still got the issue of North Korea. In Iraq, the situation has changed dramatically, obviously. But there are also now the concerns over Iran. A number of other countries were brought up as potential concerns in the future.

What we are talking about is 1945 technology, and we are now in 2003. So this technology — which was available [only] to very advanced technical countries in the '40s and '50s — is now much more accessible to other developing countries. The material is not so accessible. But if they can get hold of the material or manufacture their own material, and do that through a civil program, then obviously they could develop nuclear weapons.

**Q: We've heard from diplomats [that] we still have India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea outside the NPT umbrella. How do you get these countries to sign on at a moment [when] the United States has not ratified the [Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty], and that is also seen as a weak link in the universality of the process?**

A: I agree; the treaty is being attacked from within by noncompliance by the non-nuclear-weapons states, and noncompliance by the nuclear-weapons states, and it is being attacked from without by Pakistan, Israel and India not being in, and now North Korea having announced its withdrawal.

So we've got a real problem with two issues that are very intimately connected. That is, universality and compliance. And the two things are linked. Because if you believe in the treaty, and you join the treaty for your regional security concerns, if you discover some states in your region are never going to join, then you start to rethink your own internal commitments to the treaty.

And I think that's what beginning to happen in the Middle East, and I think it maybe is what is beginning to happen in Asia.

**Q: There's been a big debate on the so-called nuclear-free zone for the Middle East, and Arab countries have been fingering Israel. At the same time, the official position we hear from some members is that this can only be resolved in a political settlement of the outstanding Middle East question. How does this play into the treaty process?**

A: In 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely, and it was part of a package deal. And the package deal related to nuclear disarmament. It related to the CTBT, and a resolution on the Middle East.

So the Middle East is a central issue in the whole way we approach compliance with the NPT. So it's a very real issue. The way it's being approached in the Middle East is looking at it from a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Which is being interpreted to mean nuclear, chemical and biological. That gives a bargain that Israel could potentially join with; if there could ever be a zone free of those weapons that everyone would have faith with, then there is a way out for Israel.

And the other connection, as you say, is in the wider context of the Middle East peace process. We now have the new "road map." We don't know how it will evolve. But any Middle East peace process that [involves] the Israel-Palestinian problems has to encounter the wider concerns over security within the Middle East, and the two things are very linked.

**Q: Is the friction between the United States and Iran on the nuclear issue not helpful in trying to get this nuclear-free Middle East zone.**

A: Well actually, Iran is not involved in the debates about the nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. There's been a lot of debate [about] how Iran fits into that. But at the moment, it sees itself as outside those debates. Therefore, that is not a major issue in those debates.

However, I would say in the region, given the surroundings — we've got Pakistan on one side of Iran, we had Iraq on the other side, and we've got a number of Arabic countries around Iran, then obviously this plays into the debates within each of the capitals where the debates are taking place.

**Q: There's concern [that] the biggest threat to security from nuclear weapons might be in a stolen weapon or a crude nuke being set off by some terrorist group. ... Is the system of enforcement and checks and balances by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and member-state cooperation like the nuclear suppliers group, sufficient to prevent technologies or weapons [from] falling into the hands of people who might be prepared to use them?**

A: I think the system is not yet sufficient. If it were sufficient, there would not be a worry about it. And this has been an issue that cropped up in the debate. It's clearly a very live issue and hot topic. There's a lot of concern, still, about the security and safety of facilities in the former Soviet Union countries, and how to cope with a possibility of leakage from them — whether it's already occurred, or whether it could occur in the future.

There's big concern over countries that might be developing nuclear weapons in the longer term [and] whether they might transfer material. And there's a great deal of concern about the link to the transfer of missiles — which is now ongoing — and there's no treaty, there's no legal impediment [for] stopping the sale of missiles.

**Q: The United States has been concerned that some of this [nuclear] technology could find its way into bomb-making, also through the civilian nuclear programs. Are the safeguards adequate, and is the International Atomic Energy Agency a good-enough watchdog to prevent these technologies from falling into the wrong hands?**

A: I think the IAEA could do that if it had enough resources and were given the powers to do it. The problem is the agency is very underresourced in terms of the task it needs to do right now. And its hands are tied in terms of the powers it has.

The "additional protocol," which is the new protocol to monitor compliance with the treaty, is a voluntary measure. And many countries have not signed up to it.

And there are many other issues over the protection of fissile materials, which the agency is working on. But again, it's where the political will lies, and where the funding and resources might come from.

**Q: So how do you garner the political will, and what can be done in the near future to strengthen the NPT?**

A: I think [that] in the end it comes down to the public. If the public is worried — as they should be — and are made aware how worried they should be about the issues that are hanging over nuclear weapons and the new directions which are going on in many countries, then I think they would put a lot of pressure on their politicians to do something about it.

The problem is, I think, the people are not aware of the dangerous situation that we're in. And they think [that after] the end of the Cold War that the issue of nuclear weapons went away. But I think they might be beginning to wake up and realize this is not the case.

**Q: The nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula. Getting mixed signals what's going on there. How dangerous is this, and is there a risk that we might see a nuclear-arms race spreading beyond North Korea and spilling over to other countries in the region?**

A: I think that is a risk.

Right now, I would say the countries in the region are committed to the NPT. But if this situation is not resolved satisfactorily, and if North Korea remains outside the treaty, and if North Korea is found to have gone further than now believed, I don't know how sustainable the NPT is in Northeast Asia.

Of course, there is the issue of the American nuclear umbrella and American protection that matters a great deal to South Korea and Japan. There is, of course, the concern that China must have about instability in the region. So there are lot of pressures working in the direction of a resolution.

But if that doesn't happen, who can actually predict what might happen in the long run in that region?

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030512-68247572.htm>

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USA Today  
May 12, 2003  
Pg. 4

## **Worst-case scenarios build better defenses Response to terror relies on training, equipment**

By Tom Weir, USA Today

Civil defense in America once meant knowing the quickest route to the nearest bomb shelter. How much that has changed will be evident this week when the nation's biggest homeland security drills begin in Seattle and Chicago. More than 8,500 people from federal, state and local agencies and the Red Cross will participate in the exercises to test the USA's ability to respond to terrorist attacks in more than one city. Seattle will mobilize after the simulated detonation of a "dirty bomb." Chicago will react to a scenario involving the release of a lethal biological agent.

As the nation braces for its next home-front confrontation with terrorists, such tests of disaster-response capabilities are becoming common, even in places that might seem unlikely targets:

\*Near Fulton, Mo., the Callaway Nuclear Plant staged a two-day drill last month. Officials from the Energy Department and the Federal Emergency Management Agency took part.

\*In Alabama, Birmingham will test its entire medical-response system in August. The city of Mobile drilled for a chemical plant disaster in February.

\*A nerve-gas drill in Memphis in September quickly sent 190 "victims" to hospitals. Tennessee's largest city, which reviews its disaster plans every two weeks at a new command center tucked safely away from downtown, has scheduled another major exercise this summer.

Twenty months after the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington, efforts are accelerating to enable states and cities to respond aggressively the next time terrorists strike on a large scale. But experts say preparedness levels are mixed. Cities such as New York and Baltimore have invested heavily in training and sophisticated equipment. Other jurisdictions have done far less and have blamed insufficient federal funding and their own budget problems for the lack of activity.

### **Training and upgrades**

Public officials and homeland security experts from the private sector say continual training and equipment upgrades are the best way to prepare for a major attack.

Of all the improvements since 9/11, "Most important, I think, we're practicing a lot more now," says Randall Larsen, director of the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, a research group. "We should never be exchanging business cards on the day of a big event, and we were doing a lot of that on 9/11."

Jon Hanson is another outspoken advocate of continual training and equipment upgrades. He was assistant fire chief in Oklahoma City when the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building there was bombed. The attack on April 19, 1995, killed 168 people.

"In 1995, we found out the hard way how bad we need this training," Hanson says.

Baltimore, which many security experts hold up as a model of preparedness, launched its disaster planning long before the 9/11 attacks. More than a decade ago, the city began assembling \$80 million in state and municipal funds to build a communications system that allows all emergency agencies from the city, the county and surrounding communities to talk on the same radio band.

In some metropolitan areas, police assigned to opposite sides of town still can't do that. The problem contributed to deaths at the World Trade Center on 9/11, when word of the south tower's collapse didn't reach an estimated 120 firefighters who died when the north tower fell.



Baltimore is well regarded on other counts. Its handling of a fire in a major rail tunnel in 2001 was considered nearly ideal and led the FBI and Harvard University to ask whether they could study the city's disaster planning. The city requires all its firefighters to be certified as hazardous materials technicians. It also is reducing the city's stock of hazardous materials by switching from chlorine gas to bleach in its water-purifying system. But the change that Fire Chief William Goodwin says he's proudest of is the division of Baltimore into quadrants. Emergency equipment is spread evenly throughout the city "so we're able to operate independently of each other. ... We're self-sustaining, even if the infrastructure is cut off."

Emergency personnel drill constantly, often with no publicity. "We did it last year at the Preakness" horse race, he says. "We were deployed the same way we would have been for a major incident, and nobody even knew it." Most such drills contain surprise elements. At one event at Baltimore's harbor, a key medical official was taken out by a "sniper." That meant other people had to step up in the chain of command.

Baltimore's planning, Goodwin says, "has given us a sense of calm but not complacency. We take this very seriously. ... Most of the other places I talk with are not taking this that seriously."

Hanson, now retired, was an instructor last month at a disaster drill at the University of Central Oklahoma in the Oklahoma City suburb of Edmond.

### **Use skills or lose them**

About 350 firefighters and other emergency specialists from as far as Alaska and Connecticut responded to the simulated detonation of a "dirty bomb," a device that uses explosives to spread radioactive material. The university dorm, scheduled for demolition, was partially knocked down for the drill; students played victims.

At the outset, a police dog trained to sniff through rubble tugged at its leash, eager to get on the job. Technicians sent small, sophisticated robots on wheels into the debris to search for signs of life. University nursing students prepared to get soaked while guiding victims through decontamination showers. A team of Army experts on weapons of mass destruction set up a tent where tests could be conducted for traces of radioactivity or biological or chemical agents.

"It's like algebra. If you don't use it, you lose it," says Jeff Harris, who oversees such Army teams in the Southwest. "These teams have been established since 1999, but no one heard of them until 9/11. Since 9/11, I'd say we're probably threefold better, at least."

Just as important as the drill was the training firefighters got the day before. They practiced cutting through reinforced concrete to shore up buildings on the verge of collapse and directing a crane to lift cars and other large debris.

To duplicate the sleep-deprivation and fatigue that lead to what firefighters call "the 4:30 a.m. stare," the drill covered 22 hours, from 5 p.m. on a Friday until 3 p.m. Saturday.

The extensive training made it clear that long gone are the days when firefighters described their jobs simply as "putting the wet stuff on the red stuff."

Another benefit of such drills: teaching future teachers.

"If you can get five guys to go back and train 50 guys, that's priceless," says Lt. Mike Nugent of the Broward County, Fla., Fire Department. "Guys are going to perform like they train."

Emergency drills present the opportunity to field-test new equipment. America's Personal Security, a company that sells safety and security equipment, tested a fingerprint identification system to track which emergency workers were inside the disaster area.

Also tested for the first time was a portable shower tent for decontamination. The 78-pound tent, which can be set up in minutes by four people, can process 150 victims an hour.

Among the trainees was William Smith, deputy fire chief in Stamford, Conn. Smith paid his own way to Oklahoma. "The issue is to always keep practicing, because that's what it takes," Smith says. "I've decided I need to get more training than what the city and state will provide. I'm not bad-mouthing anybody, because we're in a fiscal crisis, as is everybody. But I can directly affect 52 people, and my goal is to bring it back to my community."

### **Drills to include 8,500 in USA**

Starting today in Seattle, the nation will undertake its biggest drills in response to mock terrorism attacks.

Seattle will undergo a simulated terrorism attack by a "dirty bomb" — the dispersal of radioactive material by conventional explosives.

On Thursday, Chicago will react as a simulated biological attack unfolds.

The drills, which are overseen by the Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with the State Department, will involve about 8,500 people from more than 100 federal, state and local agencies, the American Red Cross and agencies from the Canadian government.

The drills are designed to test and assess how well these cities and the nation can respond to a coordinated terrorist attack.

Letters and public service advertisements were issued during the weekend to tell residents in both cities about the drills.

No explosives or harmful devices will be used during the drills. Participants will fill the roles they would have in a real emergency.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030512/5148408s.htm>

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Washington Post

May 11, 2003

Pg. B2

## Here's The Way To Find The Weapons

By David Albright

A senior Iraqi nuclear scientist recently called me to ask for advice about contacting U.S. authorities in Baghdad. He said he and his colleagues want to cooperate with the United States, but he fears he will be detained if he turns himself in to U.S. military authorities. He also worries about people in Baghdad who might want to harm those who cooperate with the Americans, and he asked me whether he should voluntarily turn himself in or wait until U.S. authorities catch him.

I knew this scientist in the 1990s when I worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection effort in Iraq. At the time, he impressed me as someone who had been instrumental in devising a strategy during the 1980s that would have enabled Iraq to build a sizable nuclear weapons arsenal -- if Saddam Hussein had not invaded Kuwait and been forced to let international weapons inspectors into the country. In our discussions over the past two weeks, he told me of living in constant fear for himself and his family under Hussein if he failed to perform as required, a claim supported by foreigners who knew him.

The United States is now focusing on finding and interrogating Iraqis like him who were once involved in Iraqi programs to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on "Fox News Sunday" last week that because top Iraqi officials in custody are not revealing any WMD programs, the United States is "going to have find people not at the very senior level . . . people down below."

In pursuing those scientists, however, the Pentagon is acting like a city prosecutor, threatening prison terms to extract information. Instead, the low- and mid-level scientists whose cooperation we need to unearth weapons of mass destruction and the ingredients to make them should be treated as valuable witnesses, not defendants, political prisoners or war criminals. Many of them are eager to help the United States, and can provide information about Iraq's past nuclear weapons programs, its efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors and its illicit foreign procurement activities. In addition, these scientists can help the United States gain control over any remaining dangerous Iraqi nuclear assets, including classified documents, sensitive materials and sophisticated equipment.

Respectful treatment of the Iraqi scientists and technicians also could help prevent them from fleeing, and possibly helping states or terrorist groups hostile to the United States and its allies. The knowledge these experts possess could be invaluable to others seeking WMD. If Pentagon teams use a confrontational approach, they could increase the risk that these scientists will go into hiding or leave Iraq.

Why not treat them as war criminals? Because when it comes to WMD, the top priority must be preventing proliferation -- not punishing people. Stopping the spread of these weapons is more important than putting scientists behind bars.

The administration based much of its case for war on Iraq's alleged possession of large stocks of chemical and biological weapons, and on its serious nuclear weapons development program. After several weeks of searches for such weapons, the United States has not turned up these large stocks or any evidence of a nuclear weapons effort. Although the United States is pursuing a promising lead about a mobile biological weapons production truck, so far the extent of the finds is far less than expected.

The credibility of President Bush and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is at stake if no or few weapons are found. Although opinion polls suggest that the American public may not care now whether weapons are discovered, the public may once again question the reasons for the war if the reconstruction of Iraq founders or if Islamic fundamentalist groups or Baathist remnants disrupt Iraqi democracy and attack U.S. forces. Moreover, governments that opposed the war, and some who supported it, will react angrily if WMD are not found within the next few weeks.

I believe the administration had a good foundation for its suspicions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and has good reason now to keep hunting for them. During my investigations in the mid-1990s, I often felt that Iraq was

hiding at least low-level nuclear weapons activities from inspectors and would reconstitute a full-scale nuclear weapons program if given the chance. In addition, last fall and winter Iraq failed to cooperate with international weapons inspectors on many issues; it refused to allow free access to scientists inside or outside Iraq; and it provided inadequate evidence of its claims to have unilaterally destroyed its chemical and biological weapons.

A special concern now is the Tuwaitha nuclear research site, south of Baghdad, which has been heavily looted. A tiny contingent of U.S. troops guarding the facility let through many of the looters, who identified themselves as employees. Earlier, local villagers are reported to have dumped natural uranium yellowcake powder on the ground in order to use the barrels for storing water, creating a radiation health hazard and raising questions about what else is missing. The site also contains low-enriched uranium, which can be upgraded into bomb material and which requires IAEA safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The IAEA has asked to return to Tuwaitha as soon as possible to determine what nuclear material is missing, reestablish its safeguards, and help clean up radioactive contamination caused by the looters. So far, the United States has refused the IAEA's request, thus undermining U.S. criticism of countries such as Iran and North Korea for violating IAEA safeguard agreements. The U.S. effort to locate, secure and destroy any Iraqi weapons of mass destruction needs to be shifted from a mission that was expected to make a quick grab of such assets to a longer-term, more comprehensive program to discover them. To accomplish that, the United States should draw experienced experts from many countries. U.N. inspectors should be brought back to Iraq to help in the search and destruction, and to monitor Iraqis who had been involved in those weapons programs. Instead, the United States has stubbornly refused to permit U.N. inspection agencies to return to Iraq.

Iraqi scientists are critical to this effort. Hussein's regime assigned its best scientists and engineers to work on weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Several thousand Iraqis worked in these areas during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several of the scientists featured on the Pentagon's "deck of cards" have turned themselves in to U.S. authorities and remain in custody. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, the father of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, was not in the deck of cards, but turned himself in to authorities anyway. He, too, is reported to be in custody.

In Baghdad, U.S. radio broadcasts have asked other WMD scientists, who have generally stopped showing up at work, to turn themselves in. American forces have gone to Baghdad residential neighborhoods in search of the experts, but finding their homes remains difficult because telephone books and other directories do not appear to be available. Iraqi scientists being sought have learned of U.S. searches from friends and neighbors and are uncertain how to proceed. That's one reason the scientist above and some of his colleagues have called me. These experts hesitate to cooperate with the United States without knowing their fate once they do so. Are they to be treated as potential war criminals and detained indefinitely, or will they be questioned by competent experts and allowed to return home to their families?

They wonder whether the interrogation process will be fair. If an Iraqi disputes U.S. claims about weapons, can he expect to be detained until he becomes more "cooperative"? One senior Iraqi nuclear expert said he does not want to be subjected to pressure to confirm certain Bush administration claims that he says are erroneous.

The scientists also fear retaliation by Baath Party officials loyal to Hussein or past government officials who want to destroy any evidence of their own link to WMD and leave open their chances to join a new government unblemished. Because of such concerns, the United States may need to take some scientists and their immediate families out of Iraq to interview them.

Treating Iraqi scientists as sources of information rather than as suspects also could expose the illicit procurement Iraq conducted during the past several years. That would help the United States identify the collaborating foreign companies and governments and hold them accountable both as a way to achieve justice and to deter future illegal exports.

In the long term, Iraqi scientists and technicians can help reconstruct Iraqi industry and society. No one is recommending social welfare for them, but a program to reintegrate them into society would benefit Iraq and reduce the risk of WMD falling into the wrong hands. The United States could model its policies in Iraq on those it developed at the end of the Cold War to channel former Soviet weapons experts into civilian jobs at home. If Iraqi scientists insist on emigrating, the United States should steer them here or to friendly countries.

In South Africa, a group of ex-nuclear weapons scientists and engineers were instrumental in South Africa's successful transition from a nuclear-armed pariah state to a responsible, international leader in nonproliferation efforts. A corps of Iraqi ex-WMD scientists, working in conjunction with other nations, could help create a system of laws and norms to ensure that a new Iraq would remain committed to achieving nonproliferation both at home and abroad.

*David Albright was a nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq during the 1990s. He is now president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37168-2003May9.html>

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Washington Times

May 13, 2003

Pg. 1

## **U.S. Keeps Pre-Emption Doctrine 'Open'**

*Rebuffs Roh's call to exempt N. Korea*

By Joseph Curl, The Washington Times

The Bush administration yesterday rebuffed a call by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to exempt North Korea from the U.S. military doctrine that allows for pre-emptive attacks on rogue states that develop weapons of mass destruction.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said yesterday that the United States will keep "all options open" in the nuclear standoff with the communist North, effectively denying the request made by Mr. Roh in an interview with The Washington Times published yesterday.

Miss Rice said that the world "needs better tools to deal with a state like North Korea that appears to be determined to violate its international agreements, and I think we're going to work more aggressively with other states to see what other tools we can build."

But President Bush remains open to multinational talks with the communist regime and is committed to diplomacy to stem the nuclear standoff, a White House spokesman said.

"As we've said, we, of course, seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the issues involving North Korea," National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said yesterday. "While not taking any options off the table, we're working very hard toward that goal — a multilateral solution."

Mr. Roh, elected in December, arrived here on Sunday for a weeklong tour that includes a White House meeting tomorrow with the president.

The standoff prompted Mr. Roh to offer his bluntest criticism of North Korea.

"North Korea has two alternatives: It can go down a blind alley or it can open up," he said in a speech yesterday to the Korea Society in New York. "Pyongyang's nuclear program poses a serious threat to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia as well as the Korean Peninsula."

Mr. Roh also held out the prospect of assistance were his neighbor to become "responsible" and renounce its nuclear ambitions.

"Pyongyang must give up its nuclear project and come forward as a responsible member of the international community. When the North takes this route, the Republic of Korea and the international community will extend the necessary support and cooperation," he said.

In his New York visit yesterday, Mr. Roh also rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange and praised the courage of Americans as he laid a wreath at ground zero, the site of the World Trade Center towers destroyed in the September 11 attacks.

For its part yesterday, the North Koreans heightened tension in the region by nullifying a 1992 deal with South Korea to keep the peninsula free of nuclear weapons, the last remaining international obligation for Pyongyang not to build nuclear weapons.

North Korea's government-run news agency blamed the decision on "a sinister and hostile U.S. policy against North Korea."

The new South Korean leader told The Times on Friday that he planned to urge Mr. Bush to join him in a promise to resolve tensions with North Korea by peaceful means, exempting Pyongyang from the military doctrine of pre-emption, which was cited to justify the attack to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

"I would like to discuss with President Bush that the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula may not be appropriate for applying this principle from the very beginning," Mr. Roh said. "The mere thought of a military conflict with North Korea is a calamity for us."

While meetings with foreign leaders often end with a joint statement framing their discussions and setting out mutual goals, the White House would not say yesterday whether the two leaders will issue such a statement after their meeting at 6 p.m. tomorrow.

One senior administration official said, however, that Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh are likely to release a joint statement calling for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula while urging a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the standoff with North Korea.

A State Department spokeswoman said the 90-minute private meeting tomorrow will give the two presidents an opportunity to discuss the nuclear standoff and the "bilateral security relationship." Among the issues will be the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, which have proved an irritant in recent years.

The spokeswoman said the meeting also would be an opportunity for the leaders "to get to know each other personally." This is first U.S. trip for Mr. Roh, a former human rights lawyer.

Since his election, Mr. Roh has been busy repairing damage to bilateral ties from anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea, which has prompted hundreds of thousands to march to protest the stationing of U.S. troops along the demilitarized zone 30 miles north of Seoul.

After Mr. Rumsfeld said in February that the United States may relocate some of its forces, Mr. Roh and other South Korean officials sought to make clear that they supported the presence of U.S. troops.

Shortly before Mr. Roh's election, Pyongyang began adopting a more bellicose stance toward Washington and Seoul. It announced that it had restarted its nuclear-weapons program and has since contended that it had reprocessed 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, which could yield several atomic bombs within months.

In January, North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and during trilateral talks in Beijing last month, Pyongyang said it had nuclear weapons and offered to drop its programs in exchange for a U.S. "nonaggression treaty" that also provided economic aid.

While the United States has not rejected the offer, Miss Rice said yesterday: "We see no reason to respond point by point to what the North Koreans have said."

"The North Koreans know what they need to do, and what they need to do is stop blackmailing the world into dealing with them," she said in an interview with Reuters news agency.

Private Korea watchers said yesterday that while U.S. officials have repeatedly said there is "no intention" of using force against Pyongyang, it is highly unlikely that Mr. Bush will categorically renounce military force in dealing with North Korea.

"Clearly, the American administration is not going to take the military option completely off the table because that would be just an invitation to the North to raise its negotiating demands," said Victor D. Cha, an associate government professor at Georgetown University and director of its American Alliances in Asia Project.

"You can't negotiate with North Korea that way," Mr. Cha said.

Analysts said they still expected the meeting tomorrow to go more smoothly than the chilly first meeting between Mr. Bush and President Kim Dae-jung, Mr. Roh's predecessor, in March 2001. After that meeting, Mr. Bush expressed deep skepticism about the South Korean's policy of opening up to the North.

"There may not be complete agreement in these talks, but I think both sides are very well aware of each other's sensitivities," said Larry M. Wortzel, director of the Heritage Foundation's Davis Institute for International Policy Studies.

*David R. Sands contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030513-565813.htm>

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USA Today  
May 13, 2003  
Pg. 11

**News Analysis**

## **U.S. Begins To Downplay Hunt For Banned Weapons**

By Bill Nichols and John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The recent surrender of a key Iraqi biological weapons scientist gives the Bush administration another potential source of help in finding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction — a key justification for the war that remains to be proven true.

But U.S. officials and arms experts downplay the possibility that Rihab Rashid Taha — better known as "Dr. Germ" — will provide the smoking gun U.S.-led forces in the region have been seeking. U.S. intelligence officials say other former Iraqi leaders taken into custody have continued to deny the existence of banned weapons, perhaps because they fear being prosecuted as war criminals and are angling for a plea bargain.

Instead, administration officials have tried to shift expectations about the weapons hunt. They emphasize that it could take weeks or months to uncover the arsenal that President Bush and senior officials repeatedly said contained enough chemical and biological munitions to kill tens or hundreds of thousands.

"Every person we get our hands on helps, but I think by their own actions and even admissions, the U.S. government is shifting from the hope that they will find treasure troves full of weapons to having to follow a paper trail and work on a jigsaw puzzle," says Jon Wolfsthal, an arms expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It appears that they no longer expect to find, in the near-term, major caches of weapons, ready to go."

While they insist that proof of Saddam Hussein's arsenal will eventually be found, administration officials have shifted from prewar warnings of a clear and present danger to more cautious statements that suggest Iraq may have deeply buried its weapons, quickly destroyed them before the war began or shipped them off to Syria.

Though officials are clearly concerned about a backlash from voters and U.S. allies, the worry may be unnecessary. Some recent polls suggest that the public won't be particularly bothered if banned weapons are not found. On May 1, a USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll showed 79% believe the war was justified even if no conclusive evidence is found to show Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

In Congress, however, Democratic lawmakers are demanding answers.

"Though I was convinced of the (weapons of mass destruction) case made prior to the war, I am increasingly concerned about the lack of progress in uncovering the Iraqi weapons," Rep. Jane Harman, D-Calif., ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, said last Friday. "We need a thorough accounting of what intelligence was available to Congress and war planners before and during the conflict."

A failure to find proof could undermine future efforts by the Bush administration to use intelligence as a basis for its doctrine of military pre-emption against enemy states.

Reflecting that concern, the Pentagon says it will double to roughly 1,300 the number of people involved in the search for Iraqi weapons, whether through actual field inspections, interrogation of regime officials or interpretation of captured documents. Pentagon officials said last week that U.S. forces had searched 110 of 616 suspected weapons sites.

Since U.S. forces and weapons teams gained full access to Iraq in the days after the war began on March 19, there have been a number of suspicious materials found.

\*U.S. officials said last week that a trailer found in northern Iraq has the necessary specifications and equipment to be a mobile biological weapons laboratory, but more tests are needed before a final conclusion is reached. A second trailer also is being examined.

\*A special U.S. military and intelligence team found potassium cyanide at a camp in northeastern Iraq used by Ansar al-Islam, a group with alleged ties to al-Qaeda. A U.S. intelligence official said that "tens of pounds" of material found at the camp was suitable for terrorist-style attacks. But the material is not regarded as a chemical weapon, and both the group and the camp were beyond Saddam Hussein's direct control.

\*A 55-gallon drum found in the Tigris River town of Baiji, north of Baghdad near Saddam's hometown of Tikrit, initially tested positive for the nerve agent cyclosarin. It later turned out to be rocket fuel.

The problem for the administration is that nothing has been found yet to substantiate U.S. claims that were sweeping and precise: Iraq had technology for enriching uranium for nuclear weapons; Iraq had weaponized thousands of liters of anthrax, aflatoxin and botulinum; and some of these weapons could be launched on as little as 45 minutes notice.

Since the end of the fighting, administration officials have offered a variety of theories about why those weapons haven't been found: Iraq hid the weapons deep in bunkers or caves as yet undiscovered; the weapons were exported to Syria or some other country; Saddam ordered them destroyed to avoid discovery by U.N. inspectors or by coalition invaders; captured Iraqi officials are not telling all they know; quick coalition action prevented Iraqi commanders from using the weapons.

Yet critics counter that no specific evidence has been supplied to support any of these theories. For example, if front-line forces had weapons of mass destruction, as the Bush administration alleged, it remains a mystery why they were not seized as U.S. ground forces rapidly overran Iraqi defenders.

Or if the massive weapons caches alleged by U.S. officials were destroyed or exported, how was that not detected by the blanket surveillance over Iraq by U.S. spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft?

U.S. officials say time will prove them right. Banned weapons "will be found," Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month. Referring to his dramatic charges about Iraqi weapons at the U.N. Security Council Feb. 5, in which he laid out the intelligence supporting administration claims about Iraq, Powell insisted, "Everything we had there had backup and double sourcing and triple sourcing."

*Contributing: Judy Keen and Barbara Slavin*

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030513/5151422s.htm>

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## Frustrated Hunt For Banned Weapons

*With suspected sites in Iraq largely turning up dry, the US emphasis shifts to intelligence and detective work.*

By Howard LaFranchi and Faye Bowers, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – Finding Iraq's "smoking gun" - the large quantities of chemical, biological, and other weapons the US cited to help justify a war - was supposed to be a certainty.

Instead, the search is turning out to be a puzzle. The surprising difficulty and complexity of the weapons-sleuthing has already caused a rethinking of the initial inspections effort that began even before the war started.

Just weeks into the search process, the effort is being overhauled to reach beyond the early focus on suspected weapons sites - which have largely turned up "dry" - to a greater emphasis on intelligence and detective work. A Defense Department official says a team of perhaps 2,000 specialists will interrogate former Iraqi officials, interview key Iraqi scientists, and comb through documents - which might shed light not only weapons but on links between Saddam Hussein's regime and terrorist organizations.

"What we're seeing is the transition from the Easter egg hunt to the complex, more analytical and expert-driven phase of the operation," says Gary Samore, an expert on nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "The first wave of military personnel was good at searches. The problem is, nothing substantial has come up."

The lack of any big hits is worrisome for more than just the morale of the search teams. The lack of hard evidence of the ousted Iraqi regime's weapons is also raising questions about the credibility of prewar assessments by President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Beyond that, it is also casting doubts over the quality of US intelligence and about the quality of planning for the weapons search.

With pressure to produce results mounting, the Pentagon plans to modify and expand the operations beginning next week.

The Pentagon plans to augment the 75th Exploitation Group - made up of some 600 people from the military, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and FBI - more than tripling its size. This Iraq Survey Group will be led by the DIA's Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton.

The group will have a "fusion cell" housed within the DIA made up of US government experts. "Their job is going to be to do that kind of in-depth analysis that's necessary in order to make this a successful effort over time," Stephen Cambone, Defense undersecretary for intelligence, told reporters last week.

### **Clues in a trailer**

So far, the 75th Exploitation Group has visited about 70 of 600 sites on its original top-priority list - without finding the "smoking gun" of unconventional arms. The most interesting piece of equipment discovered so far is an Iraqi trailer that was turned over to the US by Kurds in northern Iraq on April 19.

"The Kurds reported to us that the trailer may have been in the company of military vehicles ... along with a decontamination truck," said Mr. Cambone. He added that there were "common elements" between a defector's statement that was used in Secretary of State Colin Powell's February presentation to the UN Security Council and the mobile production facility.

"While some of the equipment on the trailer could have been used for purposes other than biological weapons agent production," Cambone said, "US and UK technical experts have concluded that the unit does not appear to perform any function beyond ... production of biological agents."

The trailer was brought from Mosul to Baghdad, where it is undergoing more extensive testing. It is likely to take weeks before results are available.

The time it is taking to substantiate the dire early claims of Iraq's weapons holdings is not a surprise to all weapons experts. But it is causing a certain discomfort in the Bush administration.

The complexity of weapons inspections always meant surprises were in store, even in a presumably amply scrutinized country like Iraq. "I've been saying for several months that I expected to find chemicals and filled missiles, bombs, or 122mm rockets filled with chemicals," says David Franz, a former UNSCOM inspector who now works for the University of Alabama. "But I wouldn't be shocked if we didn't find biologicals."

Dr. Franz explains that it's very easy to destroy biological agents because they are normally produced in such small quantities. He says that during the first inspection period in the early 1990s, under UNSCOM, investigators looked for biological warfare programs - something the size of a factory. But in the later 1990s, under UNMOVIC, inspectors were looking for "something the size of your kitchen and a weapon smaller than a toaster."

### **Fallout for US credibility**

Still, the slow progress on the weapons front is causing jitters in Washington - worrying some officials that cases against other states suspected of weapons proliferation may now be more difficult, or that the American public may doubt future claims of dangers from countries with weapons programs.

President Bush, in his January state of the Union speech, said Iraq had hundreds of tons of chemical weapons, tens of thousands of missile warheads, and tens of thousands of liters of biological weapons, anthrax, and botulinum toxin among them.

Similarly, Secretary Powell captivated television audiences around the globe with a little vial of mock anthrax he displayed at the Security Council in February

It created a vivid picture of a fearsome threat for a nation and a world where "WMD" - for weapons of mass destruction - had become household jargon.

Like Alabama's Franz, Mr. Samore in London says "no one should be surprised" that no biological agents have been found. "The big surprise so far," he says is that neither large stocks of munitions or chemical agents - both more difficult to dispose of or hide - have turned up.

That doesn't mean the evidence cited in the prewar months was fabricated. "I really don't think anyone did that," Samore says. It could mean arms remain hidden, were moved out of Iraq, or that the regime destroyed them. "We still don't know."

Other experts say the slow search is a reminder that the US suffered from inadequate intelligence and was outmaneuvered by Mr. Hussein in the past. For example, it was the 1995 defections of Iraq's secret weapons chiefs, who were Hussein's sons-in-law, that led UN inspectors to learn that Iraq was about four years ahead of where they thought it was in its WMD programs.

"Everyone from Colin Powell on was talking about ... all the materials the UN knew Saddam had at one point and for one reason or another resisted accounting for," Samore says.

He expects that puzzle to be more complete "in six months to a year. It's going to take a lot of work."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0513/p01s03-woiq.html>

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Los Angeles Times

May 13, 2003

## **Bush Is Seeking Newer, Smaller Nuclear Bombs**

*Cold War-era devices are too big to be a believable deterrent, and the U.S. needs options to confront current threats, proponents say.*

By Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — A dozen years after the Cold War's close raised hopes for an end to the nuclear threat, the Bush administration is embarking on a quest for a new generation of nuclear bombs that are smaller, less powerful — and that the Pentagon might actually use in battle.

In the administration's view, the frightening size of Cold War strategic nuclear weapons diminishes their deterrent value today: No one believes that the United States would use them against a smaller foe. As a result, they argue, the United States needs the option of smaller nuclear weapons to deter the terrorist groups and rogue states, such as North Korea, that are today's foremost dangers.

Although officials insist that they have no present plans to build such bombs, recent steps make it clear that they want to fully explore their options, and get the deteriorating U.S. nuclear weapons complex in shape so they could move to quickly develop and test such arms, if the order comes.

This month, the administration is taking a step toward a new generation of weapons as Congress moves to repeal a 10-year-old ban on the development of small nuclear arms. Over the protests of outnumbered arms control advocates, the Senate Armed Services Committee on Friday voted 15 to 10 to lift the ban; the repeal language is expected to survive as the defense authorization bill moves through the full House and Senate this month.

In the same bill, the Senate committee approved \$15.5 million to conduct further research on a huge nuclear weapon, called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, that would be used to destroy deeply buried targets such as weapons stockpiles or enemy leadership sites.

The panel agreed to spend \$6 million to research other advanced nuclear weapons concepts. And it earmarked \$25 million to enable the Pentagon to resume, if necessary, the nuclear weapons testing that President Clinton suspended.

The moves dismay arms control advocates.



They fear that by developing small nuclear weapons that could be used in battle, the United States is legitimizing weapons that have been all but unthinkable, encouraging other countries to build nuclear arsenals, and undermining arms control treaties. They maintain that such bombs aren't even needed, because of the enormous capabilities of conventional precision munitions.

When Congress imposed the ban on small nuclear arms in 1993, it appeared to take one more step away from the age of nuclear weapons.

The United States already had disposed of most of its smaller, or tactical, nuclear weapons, and U.S. and Russian officials were busy negotiating to get rid of the thousands of strategic nuclear weapons as well.

Other states of the former Soviet Union were taking steps to get rid of their weapons, and it was widely understood around the globe that having a nuclear arsenal was an obstacle to countries joining the prosperous Western world. It appeared that nuclear weapons would be, at most, a secondary security issue.

Yet these hopes began to fade as the 1990s ended and it became clear that unstable Third World regimes still coveted the bomb.

Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon in 1998. There were signs of increasingly international traffic in nuclear materials, and worries about the nuclear aspirations of such states as Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

Even before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials grew alarmed that nuclear bombs might fall into the hands of groups such as Al Qaeda, which sought martyrdom, and might not be deterred at all.

When President Bush took office, it was soon clear that he and many on his team had a different view of nuclear weapons.

Bush trumpeted his desire to sharply cut the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals, and he signed a Treaty of Moscow under which the countries pledged to cut their strategic arsenals by two-thirds over 10 years.

Yet arms experts note that unlike other recent presidents — including Ronald Reagan — Bush did not declare his desire for a world free of nuclear arms.

And while there are differing views within the administration on arms issues, many senior officials have made no secret, in previous careers, of their doubts about arms control treaties. These include John Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, and Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of Defense for policy.

The administration says it is committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, which aims to limit the spread of nuclear technology. Last week, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell issued a statement praising its goals.

But privately, many administration officials say the treaty's weakness is evident in the cheating by North Korea.

They contend the treaty can't restrain any country that seriously wants to break the rules.

The administration withdrew last year from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, which had prohibited defenses against long-range missiles in hopes the step would discourage a nuclear arms race. The administration has also refused to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which seeks to ban testing as a way to block the building of nuclear arsenals.

As they have expressed doubts about traditional arms control, officials have sketched out their thinking on nuclear policy.

In its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, the administration urged development of a wide range of new nuclear capabilities, and said the United States might in some circumstances use nuclear weapons against countries that do not have them: Syria, Libya, Iran and Iraq. It said the United States should consider moving preemptively against countries that are developing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Administration officials also believe that they need to be flexible in developing and using nuclear force because in the new environment, threats may develop quickly and come from unexpected quarters.

"The nuclear weapons enterprise has to be ready to respond rapidly and decisively," Linton F. Brooks, acting administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, told a congressional committee last month.

As part of that effort, the administration has been pouring money back into the nuclear weapons manufacturing complex, which maintains the remaining weapons stockpile at numerous sites around the U.S.

Spending on the nuclear complex averaged \$4.2 billion a year during the Cold War, and bottomed out at \$3 billion in 1995. This year, the administration is proposing to raise spending to \$6.4 billion on the complex, which has about 100,000 employees.

Included is spending to refurbish various labs and facilities, to buy new plutonium cores for nuclear warheads, and to restart production of tritium, a gas that increases the force of thermonuclear explosions.

"There are upgrades all across the complex," said Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Opponents can try to stop any new bomb-making program by holding up appropriations for research, development and manufacture.

But arms control advocates acknowledge that's harder than it seems. Since many lawmakers see nothing wrong with research and development, and once a weapons program is big enough to provide large numbers of jobs, it gains broad political support.

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Los Angeles Times  
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## North Korea Nullifies 1992 Nuclear Accord

*Pact with South Korea is voided as South's president visits U.S. over weapons crisis.*

By Associated Press

SEOUL — North Korea said Monday a 1992 agreement with South Korea to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons was nullified, citing a "sinister" U.S. agenda.

The accord was the last remaining legal obligation under which North Korea was banned from developing atomic arms. In January, Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a global accord to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

"The joint [inter-Korean] agreement to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear free was nullified because of a sinister and hostile U.S. policy against North Korea," the North's official news agency, KCNA, said. The statement was monitored by South Korean news agency Yonhap.

The two Koreas signed the agreement in January 1992, pledging to renounce hostilities and ban the development and deployment of nuclear weapons on the divided peninsula.

Monday's announcement came as South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun visited the United States on a weeklong trip that will focus on seeking a peaceful solution to the crisis over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs.

Roh, who is scheduled to meet President Bush at the White House on Wednesday, paid a solemn visit Monday to ground zero in New York City.

North Korea has accused the United States of planning to attack the isolated country, using the nuclear dispute as an excuse for invasion. Washington says it wants to resolve the crisis through dialogue, though U.S. officials have not ruled out a military option.

"We have realized that as long as the United States does not abandon its hostile policy against the North, efforts to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear free is nothing more than an illusion," KCNA said. "We will further boost our already mighty military power."

A spokeswoman for Roh said the North Korean statement might be a negotiating ploy in the wake of talks last month with U.S. officials in Beijing.

During the talks, U.S. officials said North Korea claimed it had reprocessed 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods — a move that could yield several atomic bombs. North Korea offered to drop its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid, according to U.S. officials who were reviewing the proposal.

The Beijing talks were the first since the crisis flared in October, when Washington said North Korea admitted running a secret nuclear weapons program.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor13may13,1,108417.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dworld>

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