


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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# Stalin to Saddam: So Much for the Madman Theory

By ERICA GOODE

By his word he could kill them, have them tortured, have them rescued again, have them rewarded. Life and death depended on his whim."

The psychoanalyst Erich Fromm used these words to describe the "refined sadism" of Josef Stalin, who took delight in playing with the minds of his victims before he ordered the destruction of their bodies.

But the revelations of recent weeks suggest that they might as easily be applied to another former dictator, Saddam Hussein.

The objects unearthed at Iraqi prisons, palaces and safe houses speak of brutality and indulgence. A gold machine gun. A cable used to deliver electric shocks to ears and genitals. Fantasy paintings of snakes, monsters and unclad women. A red wire cage with a cement channel in the floor for human excrement.

The stories behind the objects tell of paranoia and caprice — arbitrary imprisonment and equally arbitrary release, opulently furnished rooms never inhabited. And behind it all is a man who acted out his fantasies of omnipotence using a nation as his theater and its citizens as his props.

Psychoanalyzing political leaders is a dicey business, and psychiatrists are quick to caution that without extensive research or personal contact with Mr. Hussein, nothing can be said with certainty about his psychological makeup. But what is already known about Mr. Hussein is suggestive, the psychiatrists say.

Like Stalin and Hitler, Mr. Hussein has sometimes been referred to as a madman, in part because people are reluctant to accept such ruthlessness and cruelty as the product of anything but insanity.

But bad does not equal mad. Most historical analysts have rejected the notion that mental illness could explain the actions of either Stalin or Hitler. Experts familiar with Mr. Hussein's upbringing and years in power said that there was no evidence that he suffered from psychosis or any severe mental illness. The very fact that he was able to stay in charge for so long and exert such complete control argues against insanity, the experts said.

Two researchers, Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram, concluded in a psychological profile of Mr. Hussein that he was more accurately described as a malignant narcissist, a label that has also been applied to Stalin and Hitler. Dr. Post, a psychiatrist at George Washington University, and Dr. Baram, an expert on Iraq at the University of Haifa in Israel, wrote the profile for the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center. Dr. Post was also the founding director of the Central Intelligence Agency's political profiling program.

Malignant narcissism, as defined by psychiatrists, is a severe form of narcissistic personality disorder. Like classic narcissists, malignant narcissists are grandiose, self-centered, oversensitive to criticism and unable to feel empathy for others. They cover over deep insecurities with an inflated self-image.

But malignant narcissists also tend to paranoia and aggression, and share some features of the antisocial personality, including the absence of moral or ethical judgment, said Dr. Otto Kernberg, a psychiatry professor at Cornell University and an expert on personality disorders.

Far from being psychotic, malignant narcissists are adept at charming and manipulating those around them. Political leaders with this personality, Dr. Kernberg said, are able to take control "because their inordinate narcissism is expressed in grandiosity, a confidence in themselves and the assurance that they know what the world needs."

At the same time, he said, "They express their aggression in cruel and sadistic behavior against their enemies: whoever does not submit to them or love them."

Dr. Kernberg added that while he had studied Hitler and Stalin, and would categorize them as malignant narcissists, he knew little about Mr. Hussein and could not comment directly about him.

Dr. Post, however, said that the concept of malignant narcissism fit Mr. Hussein quite nicely.

"The overarching theme is the centrality of the self — that he is Iraq," Dr. Post said. This self-glorification, he said, was combined with "a deep-seated need to reassure himself through public adulation of how magnificent he is."

Dr. Post added that the bunker built beneath one of Mr. Hussein's palaces was a perfect metaphor for his personality.

"Here, under this grandiose palace with its inlaid woods and fine marbles, is this underground bunker with reinforced concrete and steel," Dr. Post said. "That's his psychology: a grandiose facade and under it a siege state, ready to be betrayed, to be attacked, to strike back."

In their profile of Mr. Hussein, compiled from news accounts and interviews, Dr. Post and Dr. Baram attributed much of the Iraqi leader's psychopathology to his early childhood.

They described how Mr. Hussein's mother suffered the death of both her husband and an elder son while she was pregnant with him. She tried to commit suicide and to abort her son, but was prevented in each case by members of a Jewish family who became her benefactors. When Saddam Hussein was born, the researchers wrote, his mother refused to look at him or take him in her arms.

Saddam went to live with a maternal uncle, Khairallah Tulfah, who imbued him with dreams of becoming a great Arab leader, like Saladin and Gamal Abdel Nasser. At 3, he returned to live with his mother for several years, but was psychologically and physically abused by her new husband, according to the profile.

"One course in the face of such traumatizing experiences is to sink into despair, passivity and hopelessness," Dr. Post and Dr. Baram wrote. "But another is to etch a psychological template of compensatory grandiosity, as if to vow, 'Never again, never again shall I submit to superior force.' This was the developmental path Saddam followed."

Other psychiatrists, however, cautioned that it was difficult to draw conclusions about psychological development from sketchy information about a leader's childhood, particularly when another culture was involved. "Certainly, childhood experiences are very important," Dr. Kernberg said, "but very often that's what we know least about, and what is most easily distorted by fancy speculation."

What is not speculative is the adult that Mr. Hussein became, a man obsessed with molding the world into a reflection of his own power.

Malignant narcissism is not the exclusive province of dictators. In another country, at another time, with a different set of dice, some psychiatrists say, Mr. Hussein might instead have become a corporate executive, a lawyer, a cult leader or a politician. His ambition, paranoia and violence might then have been modulated by legal codes and tempered by the checks and balances of a free society.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. "The best way to understand this," said Dr. Kerry J. Sulkowicz, a psychoanalyst in private practice in Manhattan, "is that occasionally in history there is a confluence of events, in which the severe psychopathology of a leader is allowed to flourish."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/weekinreview/04GOOD.html?pagewanted=1>

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New York Times

May 6, 2003

## **Woman On Most Wanted List Of 55 Iraqi Leaders Is Seized**

By Judith Miller

BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 5 — American authorities have picked up Dr. Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, a senior biologist in Iraq's suspected biological warfare program, according to a Defense Department official. She is the only woman on the military's 55-person most wanted list.

American military authorities in Iraq would not comment tonight on how or when the American-trained Dr. Ammash was detained.

A former dean of the College of Women and later of the College of Science at Baghdad University, Dr. Ammash has long been suspected of involvement in Iraq's biological warfare program. Richard Spertzel, a former inspector for the United Nations Special Commission, or Unsc, said she had traveled outside of Iraq in the late 1990's to acquire equipment, supplies and reagents for genetic experiments. "Several defectors have also said that she was involved in the germ warfare program," he said.

Experts on biological warfare said her arrest could be a major boost to American understanding of Iraq's biological programs, which senior Iraqis in the fallen government insisted were peaceful after 1991.

Meanwhile, a military planning group is arriving Tuesday to develop a transition plan between the Exploitation Task Force, the military unit that has been hunting for unconventional weapons, and the Iraq Survey Group, the replacement unit.

The detention of Dr. Ammash generated considerable excitement among weapons inspectors here in Iraq. Her detention is the first of a senior scientist in what American officials have charged was an Iraqi biological warfare program. Dr. Ammash also held a senior rank in Iraq's Baath Party.

In an interview tonight, Col. Richard McPhee, the commander of the Exploitation Task Force, said that neither the "site survey teams" nor the "mobile exploitation teams" were responsible for her arrest. He said he had not heard that she had been detained and did not know which American agency had detained her.

Dr. Nissar Hindawi, a pioneer of Iraq's germ weapon program, said in an interview late last week that Dr. Ammash was part of Iraq's illicit germ warfare program. He said he had been told by colleagues that Dr. Ammash had fled to Syria before the war along with another senior woman in the germ warfare program, Dr. Rihab Taha.

Colonel McPhee disclosed tonight that a portion of the task force, comprising 214 soldiers from the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, which he commands at Fort Sill, Okla., would be leaving soon, sometime after the arrival of the new Iraq Survey Group.

He said the departing group would include the soldiers who have been leading the exploitation teams that have conducted most of the hunts for unconventional weapons. He said those soldiers would be replaced by some of the 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers and civilians being sent in as part of the Iraq Survey Group. The replacements have not taken part in any of the military or survey operations during the war.

Asked whether the planned departure of some of the most seasoned weapons hunters would jeopardize current operations, just as some scientists are beginning to come forth to talk about their work, he replied, "The planning team will figure out how best to achieve continuity."

He said there would almost certainly be an overlap between veteran weapons hunters and the new arrivals. Some members of the new group reportedly include former American members of international inspection teams like Unscm.

There has been widespread frustration among the 150-member exploitation teams with the tactics in the hunt for weapons and the scientists who supposedly produced them. Too often, soldiers have complained, the search has amounted to little more than what they described as "check the block" exercises, inspections of more than 900 targets that were selected more than a year ago by the nation's intelligence agencies.

Apparently reacting to the chorus of complaints, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said Sunday that the United States was unlikely to find unconventional weapons or evidence of such programs at preselected sites. He said that although he remained convinced that allied forces would find evidence that Iraq was engaged in producing nuclear, chemical or biological agents and weapons, such information would most probably come from information provided by Iraqi scientists.

Colonel McPhee maintained that the transition from the exploitation teams to the new Iraq Survey Group would not result in any loss of expertise for those in the group. "There will be a period of overlap, and we will all be training together, not from ground zero, as the XTF did, or from what we expected to find, but from what we now know," he said.

He added that there was already a shift in focus from sites on the target list to missions generated by tips and other reports. He noted, for instance, that a mission was begun today to survey a mysterious white powder and a possible radiological source buried about two yards underground in the Iraqi sector controlled by Britain.

Asked if he believed that allied forces would eventually find proof of such programs, Colonel McPhee said: "I am confident that we have stopped Saddam Hussein's program and ended his capability to create a program in 5 or 10 years. That is why we're here, so that my son doesn't have to come back and fight five years from now."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/06/international/worldspecial/06WEAP.html>

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Washington Post

May 6, 2003

Pg. B5

## **The Front Lines Of Biowarfare**

*Today's Anti-Terrorism Effort Casts Early Test Subjects in New Light*

By David Snyder, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Army convoy rumbled across the vast Utah desert just before twilight, as the July heat waned and the searing wind settled across the barren salt flats. Deep inside Dugway Proving Ground, a desolate 800,000-acre government weapons range, 30 young draftees dressed in olive-drab fatigues dismounted from 2 1/2-ton trucks and took their positions.

Just breathe normally, Merlin Neff remembers his commanding officer saying. Sitting on crude wooden benches jutting incongruously from the sand, and surrounded by caged rhesus monkeys and guinea pigs, the soldiers sat still and waited.

Then the whirl of air-sampling devices indicated that the air they were breathing had been intentionally contaminated by the release of microbes that cause Q fever, a debilitating illness that could lay an army low for days. Within days, Neff and his fellow volunteers were racked with fever, chills and bone-shaking aches.

"You were really miserable for two, three days," said Neff, who was 23 then and now is a 70-year-old doctor living in California. "I really have never been any sicker than that."

It was July 1955, and Operation Whitecoat was underway.

Over the next 18 years, about 2,300 military draftees -- most of them stationed at Frederick's Fort Detrick and most Seventh-day Adventists whose beliefs discouraged combat duty -- volunteered for the Whitecoat program. They agreed to subject themselves to a broad range of potentially deadly pathogens -- tularemia, Venezuelan equine

encephalitis, sand-fly fever -- in the name of protecting the United States from the growing Soviet arsenal of biological weapons.

Their exploits, secret for years, became public knowledge in the 1970s -- and then were largely forgotten after the end of the Cold War. Now they are gaining more attention, and even respect, as the threat of biological terrorism has grown. Frank Damazo, a 70-year-old surgeon and Adventist who hosted some of the volunteers in his Frederick home in the 1950s and '60s, is organizing a reunion this fall to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the program's conclusion.

National anxiety over future terrorist attacks has invigorated two long-dormant attitudes that made Whitecoat possible: trust in the government and tolerance of extreme means to ensure security, said Jonathan Moreno, director of the Center of Biomedical Ethics at the University of Virginia.

"Before 9/11, people went nuts if they heard about the Whitecoat experiments," Moreno said. "Now I think many people are more comfortable with the idea. . . . We've come full circle, in a way."

Many of the vaccines and devices that protect against biological agents -- critical elements of the \$6 billion Project BioShield proposed by President Bush in his State of the Union message -- were tried first on Whitecoat volunteers, who made up one of the largest human testing programs in the nation's history. None of the Whitecoat volunteers is known to have died as a result of testing.

At the same time, Army officials acknowledge that little is known about 1,000 former Whitecoat test subjects, and little has been done to find out whether the diseases to which they were exposed have had long-term effects.

"It is not clear at all that these people were given the full range of information, either about what they were being exposed to or what the long-terms effects would be," said Leonard A. Cole, an adjunct professor of political science at Rutgers University in Newark and author of "Clouds of Secrecy," a book detailing the government's tests during the biological weapons program. "In the 1950s and '60s, we were at the height of the Cold War. In general, the culture allowed for less questioning of authority, and it was more likely to be understood at both ends -- leadership and the general citizens -- that you could trust the government."

### **Facing the 'Eight Ball'**

The Whitecoat program began in 1954 as U.S. intelligence was gathering information on the development of biological arsenals by Cold War enemies. The nation's biological weapons program was based at Fort Detrick, and all of the testing, except for the Dugway experiment, was conducted in Maryland, where military scientists produced anthrax and a host of other deadly agents.

Many of the Detrick tests involved the million-liter steel sphere known as the "eight ball," where scientists would aerosolize biological agents, sending them in a swirling cloud through the sphere's interior.

Wearing face masks attached to portals in the sphere, Whitecoat volunteers would inhale. Afterward, they were quarantined and treated for any symptoms. Some Whitecoat volunteers went through an entire two-year tour of duty without undergoing a test. Some experienced as many as five "projects."

Recovery could be agonizing.

"Some of the guys said that first they were afraid to die, and then some of them were afraid they wouldn't die," said Richard O. Stenbakken, director of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries at the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists and chairman of the board of the recently founded Whitecoat Foundation.

The Adventists were deeply involved in Operation Whitecoat. The church had a long tradition of supporting military service, but not the use of church members for explicitly offensive military actions. That posture made the draft problematic for church members, and the Army offered an option other than serving as a medic: Allow drafted church members to volunteer for Whitecoat.

The young church members offered a nearly ideal group of test subjects -- healthy and, on average, better educated than the typical draftee, and therefore more likely to understand the significance of the experiments .

"Some of the men, myself included, thought that we would prefer doing that, as opposed to going to Vietnam," said Warren Martin, 60, of Myersville, a Whitecoat volunteer from 1963-'65 although he was never called for an experiment. "I don't think anyone in their right mind wishes they would be sick, but given the options, I'm glad that I did it."

Hundreds, if not thousands, of participants became violently ill. But Army officials say nobody died in the course of 153 tests from 1955 to 1973, when the last class of Whitecoat draftees left the sprawling Detrick compound in the city of Frederick. Operation Whitecoat continued for four years after President Richard M. Nixon called an end to the nation's biological weapons program in 1969, but it ended after the military stopped drafting young men in 1973.

### **Informed Consent**

During its time, Whitecoat was a model of sound medical ethics, Moreno and others said. The volunteers signed forms acknowledging that they understood that the tests could have serious health consequences.

They were told that they could back out of the test at any point before it began. By all accounts, the Army does not appear to have reneged on that promise, though some former participants have described a subtle, implicit coercion - turn down too many tests and you could be sent to Vietnam.

Unlike the infamous Tuskegee syphilis tests, when the government deliberately did not treat black men with syphilis from 1932 to 1972, Whitecoat operated under a doctrine of informed consent that was uncommon, if not unheard of, at the time, Moreno said.

"They were way ahead of their time," he said. "It was very public, very transparent, and the Whitecoaters seemed really to be volunteers. . . . In terms of follow-up, in terms of voluntariness, in terms of efficacy, it was a highly ethical program."

Even supporters acknowledge that the program was extremely risky. The Q fever tests conducted at Dugway in 1955 were not repeated, in part because of concerns that the amount of pathogens the soldiers were exposed to could not be controlled. Caused by a microbe called *Coxiella burnetii*, Q fever results in fever, chills and muscle aches and can lead to pneumonia. In rare cases, it can be fatal. The military was concerned that the disease, if weaponized, could incapacitate thousands of soldiers.

Fifty years after the program began, the Army has addresses for 1,000 of the 2,300 people known to have volunteered, said Lt. Col. Phillip Pittman, senior medical scientist at the U.S. Army's Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.

About 500 have responded to his inquiry about their health, and at least a handful have claimed lingering health effects. Pittman said there may be more former volunteers the Army does not know about.

One is Gene W. Crosby of Stevensville, Mont.

Crosby, 61, said that for decades, he has been racked with back pain and heart ailments caused by the autoimmune disease ankylosing spondylitis. Crosby said he believes that the disease is the result of a 1965 Whitecoat test. The Army has told him there is no clear connection.

"We've been getting stonewalled by the military," said Milt Datsopolous, Crosby's attorney. "[Whitecoat volunteers] were not adequately or appropriately advised of the potential medical complications or long-term consequences and were never fully advised upon discharge to look for any symptoms that would develop in the future."

As knowledge about the Whitecoat program has spread and volunteers have shared their stories, members of the group are increasingly aware of the importance of their work, said Damazo, the doctor who hosted volunteers at his house in Frederick.

The Whitecoat Foundation was formed last year to spread word about its history. Some members hope to publish narrative accounts of their experiences.

Today, Damazo, the reunion organizer, acts as the central clearinghouse for information on Operation Whitecoat and has boxes and boxes of files and photographs of the volunteers.

"From [the Whitecoat program], the whole country and the whole world learned a lot of valuable information about these diseases," Damazo said. "This is important, because at some point, there's going to be another biological event somewhere in this country."

*Staff researcher Bobbye Pratt contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17904-2003May5.html>

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Wall Street Journal  
May 6, 2003  
Pg. 1

## How Hunch May Have Hindered The Nuclear Ambitions Of Iran

By David Crawford, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

KRONBERG, Germany -- On a cold night last November, Frank Behlke left a family celebration and returned to work. A successful inventor, he has designed such things as a camper bus with a drive-in garage for his Ferrari. But it was his potentially most dangerous invention -- a high-voltage switch that can be used for disintegrating kidney stones or triggering a nuclear explosion -- that drew him back to the office after midnight.

His worry: He had never sold more than two of the switches in a year, but earlier that evening, his company had shipped a batch of 44.

What Mr. Behlke didn't know was that he had just sent enough switches to detonate a nuclear bomb to two businessmen with ties to Iran. But as he sat in his office that night, rummaging through files, his doubts about the way his company had handled the sale only increased.

"It was perfectly legal to ship the triggers," says Mr. Behlke. The devices are standard equipment in many high-energy physics laboratories. "I can't be expected to hire a private detective to investigate every one of my customers," he adds.

Neither he nor his company, Behlke Electronic GmbH, has been accused of breaking any laws. But the case of the Behlke switches illustrates the weaknesses of a patchwork regulatory system that puts the burden on businesses to choose between profit and policing of technology with both civilian and military uses.

Concern about such "dual use" technology -- especially devices that can be used in weapons of mass destruction -- is now high on the world's list of concerns. The U.S. military continues to hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, with President Bush vowing they will be found. Last month, North Korea asserted that it has nuclear weapons. German intelligence officials say the 44 Behlke switches were intended for the nuclear-arms program in Iran. These officials estimate Iran is about five years away from completing a nuclear weapon -- or less, if it can acquire critical technology from the West.

Officials at the United Nations and the European Union are meeting regularly to discuss better ways to control dual-use technology, but the challenge is enormous. The products can range from ordinary fertilizer chemicals, which can be used to make chemical weapons, to supercomputers, which can plot the trajectory of a missile. In 2001, the last year for which complete statistics are available, dual-use technology amounted to \$16.8 billion of U.S. exports, or 3% of the total, according to Scott Jones, a scholar with the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia.

Regulating this flow of goods is left to individual countries. Relatively strict nations, such as Germany and the U.S., require an "end-user" certificate for any export of dual-use technology -- a short letter from a laboratory or factory, pledging that the product will be put to civilian use. But the letters are often vague, and monitoring -- based largely on the honor system -- is far from thorough.

Some failures have been documented. In January, for example, Silicon Graphics Inc. in Mountain View, Calif., pleaded guilty to felony charges and was fined \$1 million for exporting supercomputers to a Russian nuclear laboratory in 1996.

Mr. Behlke, 43 years old, left the Biophysics Institute at the University of Frankfurt in 1988 to start Behlke Electronic. The company now employs 22 people and makes a variety of switches. Its potentially lethal high-voltage switch looks like a small black plastic brick. Mr. Behlke's improvement of the device involves "solid state" technology that lasts longer than earlier versions.

The switches can trigger the rapid firing of sound waves used to demolish kidney stones or set off pulses of electricity that can sterilize food. Thirty-two of them can ignite explosives arranged in a sphere around a refined-plutonium core. The explosion can compress the plutonium to a critical mass and detonate a nuclear explosion. In May 2002, intermediaries allegedly acting on behalf of Iran made an initial attempt to acquire Behlke switches. Eurotek Inc. USA, an electronics-supply firm based in Morganville, N.J., received an e-mail from Singapore: Eddie Johansson of MSD Electronics Industries wanted to buy 40 Behlke switches, valued at about \$70,000, according to Eurotek records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

MSD told Eurotek the switches would be used in power-supply equipment in Taipei. But Eurotek owner Jack Ross says that when he asked for a more specific end-use certificate, he never heard from Mr. Johansson again. German customs investigators say Mr. Johansson intended to deliver the switches to Tehran, not Taiwan. Mr. Johansson, 37, was born in the Iranian capital. As a boy of 10, he moved with his Iranian family to Sweden. He later acquired Swedish citizenship and changed his name from Hojat Nagash Souratgar, according to a Swedish government document reviewed by the Journal.

After failing with Eurotek, Mr. Johansson tried to find a way to avoid the need for an export license and end-user certificate in either the U.S. or Germany, according to German investigators. His technique was simple: He arranged to have the Behlke switches delivered to a German address. Domestic delivery -- followed by clandestine shipping to another country -- is one of the best-known ways of beating existing dual-use technology regulation, which focuses primarily on declared exports.

In mid-2002, Mr. Johansson contacted Harold Hemming, a German mechanical engineer living in Hong Kong, with whom he had worked closely since 1999, according to Mr. Hemming's lawyer. Mr. Hemming, in turn, contacted a hometown friend in Germany, Eva-Marie Hack.

On Aug. 27, Ms. Hack, 43, called Behlke Electronic, according to company records. That same day, she got a fax back from Behlke Electronic quoting a price of \$72,695.25 for 44 switches of the sort that can, among other uses, trigger a nuclear explosion.

Mr. Behlke's employees had never heard of Ms. Hack's firm, CTC Offices Services in the small town of Engstingen, so they ran a credit check. The result: CTC had no staff and lacked any assets beyond office furniture, according to a copy of the report. That could have set off alarm bells at Behlke Electronic, but it didn't.

On Sept. 19, according to bank records, Mr. Johansson's brother transferred \$72,337.80 from an account at the Dubai branch of Bank Saderat Iran to an account Mr. Hemming kept with a unit of Credit Suisse Group. Mr. Hemming, in turn, wired the money to Ms. Hack. She transferred a 50,000-euro advance (then about \$48,835) to Behlke Elektronik on Sept. 27, according to bank records.

Mr. Hemming, Mr. Johansson and his brother, Abdollah Nagash Souratgar, didn't return repeated phone calls or faxes seeking comment. Ms. Hack declined to comment.

Over the next six weeks, Ms. Hack called every day to ask when the switches would be ready, according to Behlke employees. But, curiously, she refused to discuss her plans for the devices with Mr. Behlke's application engineer, Mark Jones. "Most customers tell me what they are trying to do, because they need advice," he says. But Ms. Hack cut off his inquiries, telling him: "My customer knows what he needs."

Mr. Jones was in a position to infer something illicit was going on, but he didn't act. He says he was new at his job and swamped with work. Mr. Behlke himself says he didn't follow the transaction closely and at the time was distracted by an unrelated audit of his export filings by the German Finance Ministry.

By November, the sale was almost completed, and the buyers flew to Germany to claim their prize. On Nov. 14, according to Mr. Hemming's lawyer, Mr. Johansson flew from Singapore to Stuttgart, where he was met at the airport by Mr. Hemming.

Mr. Behlke says he learned the details of the sale on Nov. 15, when his production manager asked him to discuss quality-control tests of the switches. Mr. Behlke was in a hurry to get to a family celebration that night, a nephew's wedding, but he was also puzzled by the transaction. Who could possibly use so many switches? Mr. Behlke says he asked a couple of questions but then raced off to the wedding. An express courier picked up the package for Ms. Hack at about 5:00 p.m.

In the early evening, Messrs. Hemming and Johansson and Ms. Hack assembled at her home in Hochenstein, according to investigators. At 6:20 p.m., Mr. Johansson put in a brief call to his brother, Mr. Souratgar, in Tehran, according to phone records reviewed by the Journal. Mr. Souratgar's Tehran number was later found by police in Ms. Hack's address book under his alias, "Majid," investigators say.

At 6:28 p.m., Mr. Johansson sent a two-page fax to Zaeim Electronic Industries Co. in Tehran. In a faxed reply to questions, Zaeim Electronic's managing director, Hassan Abghari, wrote, "We strongly deny that we have been in the way of acquiring military equipment [or] nuclear."

According to investigators, the switches arrived at Ms. Hack's home, and Mr. Johansson repacked them in a larger box, which he liberally filled with small foam balls. Computer parts were packed in the same box, closer to the top. Anyone who opened the box would at first see only the harmless computer parts.

Mr. Behlke says that when he returned to his office that night, the document that caught his eye was the one noting that Ms. Hack had ordered an express courier to pick up the switches at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday. That only made sense if someone needed the devices over the weekend. Otherwise, the package would have arrived Monday morning. But German technicians, including those at his own company, typically don't work weekends. "When I saw 'express courier,' " Mr. Behlke says, "I knew the triggers were leaving Germany."

He phoned the Frankfurt police at 3:00 a.m. Several hours later, customs investigators raided Ms. Hack's home, where they found the box containing the switches in a shed.

Mr. Johansson had already left for the airport and was able to leave Germany. Mr. Hemming was detained at his hotel. Investigators say they found his laptop computer, on which he allegedly typed and stored an invoice showing that the switches would be sold to a buyer in Singapore. Investigators suspect the document is fraudulent.

Mr. Hemming and Ms. Hack were held that day for questioning. Mr. Hemming was interrogated and then released, according to his lawyer. He left Germany for Hong Kong on Nov. 18. Ms. Hack remains in Germany.

The switches are still impounded, but Mr. Souratgar's lawyer says he hopes to persuade German investigators to release them to his client. The lawyer, Mak Kok Weng, says the devices were intended for sale to Macrooptica Ltd., an optical-glass company in Moscow interested in manufacturing high-power lasers. This explanation is backed by documents purporting to show a deal between the two firms. But Dr. Sergey Konstantinovich Semenov, general manager for Macrooptica, says he doesn't know anything about such a deal.

German authorities are examining these documents and the invoice found on Mr. Hemming's computer as part of an investigation of Ms. Hack and Messrs. Hemming, Souratgar and Johansson for possible violation of export laws, prosecutors say.



Mr. Hemming's lawyer, Sigrid Schmitz, says Mr. Hemming never violated any laws and is cooperating with German investigators. Ms. Hack's lawyer, Holger Böltz, says she did nothing wrong. A person who answered the phone at Mr. Johansson's Singapore office declined to identify himself and threatened, "We will find you. We will get you." For his part, as a manufacturer, Mr. Behlke says, "it is hard to put your ethics in front of your pocketbook." In the case of the 44 switches, it turns out that he never had to. On Nov. 19, three days after he had called in the police, he sent a letter to Ms. Hack, asking her for the rest of the money owed on the switches. On Nov. 22, she transferred the full amount, the equivalent of about \$23,860, to his bank account.

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Baltimore Sun  
May 6, 2003

## **Pakistan Raises Prospect Of Disarmament**

*Official says nation willing to scrap nuclear arsenal if India agrees to do same*

By Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- Pakistan raised the stakes in peace overtures with India yesterday, saying it would scrap its nuclear arsenal if its South Asian rival does the same.

The challenge to India -- which New Delhi did not respond to -- came after India's prime minister called for "decisive" talks with Pakistan to end the two countries' bitter rivalry.

Hindu India and Islamic Pakistan have gone to war three times since independence from Britain in 1947, two of them over mostly Muslim Kashmir, where guerrillas are fighting a bloody war against Indian rule. Both claim the region in its entirety.

"As far as Pakistan is concerned, if India is ready to denuclearize, we would be happy to denuclearize," Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan said. "But it will have to be mutual."

Pakistan insists that it developed nuclear weapons in response to the perceived threat from India and has called for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. India has rejected the idea, saying its nuclear program is not driven by Pakistan alone.

India began the overtures toward peace last week when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee delivered a speech in Kashmir and then called for talks, although he said peace could not be reached unless Pakistan stops backing Islamic militants in Kashmir.

Pakistan says it does not give financial support to the militants.

Both countries declared themselves nuclear powers after detonating atomic devices in 1998. Neither arsenal is open to inspections, and it's not known exactly what either country possesses.

Tension threatened to boil over again last year after India blamed Pakistan for an attack on its parliament in December 2001, sparking fears that they were heading for the world's first war between nuclear powers.

After Vajpayee called for talks, Pakistan matched New Delhi's reopening of diplomatic relations and invited him to Pakistan.

Khan said Pakistan had received a "positive response" to the invitation.

"We hope that the process of talks will start very soon," he said.

Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna said Vajpayee sent a letter to Pakistan's Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali on Saturday saying "careful preparations had to be made on the ground before a meaningful and sustained dialogue" could take place.

The diplomatic thaw has gathered pace ahead of a visit this week to the region by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.

Armitage is scheduled to arrive in India on Friday and to meet with Indian leaders Saturday.

While Pakistani opposition groups have welcomed the prospect of talks, the Indian government faces stiff opposition from Hindu nationalists, some of them in the national government.

"There is no use talking to Pakistan when they continue to aid infiltration and insurgency," Subash Desai, general secretary of Shiv Sena, a party in Vajpayee's coalition, said yesterday.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/printedition/bal-te.pakistan06may06.story>

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Los Angeles Times  
May 6, 2003

# U.S. Woos Russia On Nuclear Issue

*A State Department official visits Moscow to try to enlist its aid in pressuring Iran and North Korea on weapons programs.*

By David Holley, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW — In a bid to increase pressure on Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear ambitions, U.S. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton met here Monday with key Russian officials to seek additional help. The consultations preceded a series of summits and other meetings that could lead to U.N. Security Council consideration of Iran's alleged failure to live up to the country's nuclear commitments, Bolton said at a news conference. The issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program already has gone to the council.

The summits include a meeting in St. Petersburg between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin at the end of May and a summit of the Group of 8 major industrialized nations in France in early June, Bolton said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency board will consider the Iran issue at a mid-June meeting in Vienna. From there, it could go to the Security Council, Bolton said, implying that Washington wants Moscow's support for such action. Discussion at the Vienna meeting will focus in part on the IAEA's confirmation that Iran possesses centrifuges capable of producing weapons-grade uranium, he said.

"President Putin and President Bush have already agreed that it is neither in Russia's interest nor in America's interest to have a nuclear weapons-capable Iran," Bolton said. The reasons for Russia's growing concern "should be obvious," he added, because Iran also is developing ballistic missiles and "here in Moscow we're a lot closer to Iran than I am when I go back to Washington."

Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear program is critical because Russia has helped Iran construct a nearly completed 1,000-megawatt, light-water reactor in the western port of Bushehr and has considered additional nuclear power projects.

The United States believes that the Bushehr project, estimated to cost \$800 million, is a cover for obtaining sensitive technologies to develop nuclear weapons. Washington also suspects that Russian scientists, without government approval, are helping the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program, and it wants Moscow to crack down vigorously on such activity.

In recent months, Russian officials have begun to back away from their previous insistence that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

Moscow has also expressed growing concern about North Korea's diplomatic brinkmanship, particularly its recent withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

"There has indeed been a certain change in Moscow's attitude toward North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs," said Andrei Kortunov, vice president of the Russian Foreign Policy Assn.

But Moscow has greater "misgivings" about North Korea's government than about Iran's and is less confident in its ability to influence it, Kortunov said.

Concerning Iran, Russia is likely to try harder to draw a careful line between civilian and military technologies, he said, although this more careful approach has not crystallized into support for U.S. positions.

The Russian news agency Itar-Tass reported that at the meeting between Bolton and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, the two sides "expressed an interest" in having Iran sign an agreement with the IAEA on additional nonproliferation guarantees.

At a news conference last month, Rumyantsev expressed concern about Iran's nuclear program, saying that if reports of Iran's possessing centrifuges that can make weapons-grade uranium were true, "the situation is worrisome."

"There must be IAEA guarantees," he said. "Iran must declare such activities and provide for the possibility of control."

On Monday, Bolton said the IAEA's June meeting is critical because "if the IAEA board finds that Iran has violated its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the agency, then it's required to report the matter to the Security Council for such action as the council might deem appropriate."

He added that with regard to North Korea's nuclear program, Washington shares with Russia "the determination that if at all possible, the matter be resolved through diplomatic and peaceful means."

"I don't think there's any doubt that there's complete unity of opinion on the subject between Russia and the United States that it is not acceptable for North Korea to have nuclear weapons," he said. "Since the United States and Russia share a common objective, we ought to be able to find a peaceful way through this."

*Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nuke6may06,1,3600179.story>

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## Suspected Bioweapon Mobile Lab Recovered

### *Results of U.S. Probe on Iraqi Vehicle Due Today*

By Walter Pincus and Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Staff Writers

A suspected mobile biological weapons lab has been recovered in northern Iraq, a development that senior U.S. officials said yesterday would lend support to Bush administration allegations of a banned weapons program by the government of deposed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

A senior administration official said the Pentagon will announce today the results of a two-week investigation into a tractor-trailer truck that was stolen from a government depot in the northern Iraqi town of Mosul and later handed over to U.S. forces. He said equipment found on the truck included a fermenter bolted to the floor that could be used for the production of biological agents.

The official said the truck and the equipment inside it had been cleaned with bleach and, therefore, did not show any identifiable residue of biological agents. But intelligence analysts have concluded that "there doesn't seem to be any legitimate use for it, other than as a biolab."

The existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, in violation of U.N. resolutions dating to 1991, was a major part of the Bush administration's rationale for invading Iraq and overthrowing Hussein. But the administration has been unable to point to concrete evidence of illegal Iraqi weapons activity nearly a month after the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces.

The truck-mounted lab is of the type described by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the U.N. Security Council in February, when he outlined what he said was a pattern of concealment by the Hussein government.

But intelligence officials said yesterday that they were still trying to determine whether it was ever used to produce biological agents and, if so, when it was operated that way.

The search for illegal weapons in Iraq has coincided with a hunt for billions of dollars in financial assets accumulated by Hussein and his family. Treasury and State Department officials said yesterday that investigators were trying to recover an estimated \$1 billion in cash seized from the Iraqi central bank in Baghdad on Hussein's instructions in the hours leading up to the U.S. attack on Iraq.

The size of the bank heist, which reportedly involved enough \$100 bills to fill three tractor-trailers, is an indication of the challenges facing investigators as they seek to track down billions of dollars in ill-gotten Iraqi assets scattered around the world. Much of the money was raised through illegal oil smuggling operations to circumvent the U.N. sanctions that were imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

According to U.S. officials and private investigators, Hussein used a network of front companies from Switzerland to Panama to purchase both conventional and unconventional weapons. Little attempt was made to separate the funds allegedly used for buying the ingredients of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons from the money used for building presidential palaces and subsidizing the lavish lifestyles of Hussein and his two sons, Uday and Qusay. Officials said the truck suspected of serving as a mobile biological lab was stolen from an Iraqi government site near Mosul as Kurdish militia and U.S. Special Forces units moved into the city. When the thief saw what he had taken, he turned it over to Kurdish troops, who handed it over to U.S. officials.

A senior administration official said the truck resembled one of the mobile laboratories described by Powell in his Feb. 5 speech to the Security Council. Powell used diagrams to describe the interior of the mobile labs, based on what he said was information from an Iraqi chemical engineer who had witnessed an accident in which 12 technicians died from exposure to biological agents.

According to Powell, information from Iraqi defectors proved that Iraq had "at least seven of these mobile biological agent factories." As he described the system, two or three trucks would typically park alongside each other, connected by hoses when they were in production mode.

A senior intelligence official said analysts had concluded that the truck found near Mosul was not being used to transport equipment because the fermenter was bolted down and the rest of the equipment and systems were built-in. U.N. inspectors who worked in Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War heard about the mobile trucks in interviews with Iraqi scientists, but they never located one.

Terence Taylor, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-U.S. and a former U.N. weapons inspector, said yesterday that the mobile labs appeared to be linked to the Iraqi deception programs. "We found evidence that, during the 1990s, the Iraqis were using container trucks to move equipment away from inspectors," he said. "It was nothing to move one extra step."

The looting of the Iraqi central bank by former Hussein aides was first reported by the New York Times and confirmed by State Department and Treasury Department officials. According to the Times, quoting an Iraqi bank official, the operation was personally supervised by Hussein's second son, Qusay, who appeared at the bank with a seizure order signed by Hussein.

Over the past few weeks, U.S. troops have recovered stacks of dollar bills at various locations in Baghdad, including about \$600 million in Hussein palaces and about \$190 million in U.S. currency and euros in an armored vehicle. It is unclear whether this money was part of the \$1 billion stolen from the Iraqi central bank in the early morning hours of March 18.

A Treasury Department official said his agency is "90 percent sure" but not absolutely certain about the involvement of the Hussein family in the disappearance of the cash. A further \$400 million in U.S. currency and about \$40 million in Iraqi dinars are believed to have been stolen from Iraqi banks in the looting that coincided with the entry of U.S. forces into Baghdad on April 9.

"This is yet another chapter in the two-decade plundering of the Iraqi people," said Treasury spokesman Taylor Griffin, referring to the March 18 incident. "We will work diligently to hunt for these assets and return them to the people of Iraq."

Officials said Treasury Department investigators are in Baghdad to help restore the collapsed Iraqi banking system and to assist in the interrogation of former Hussein aides with knowledge of the financial networks used to conceal Iraqi assets.

In addition to the cash held in the Iraqi central bank, investigators believe that Hussein and his family had access to an estimated \$5 billion to \$10 billion in foreign bank accounts and front companies.

*Staff writer John Mintz contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22694-2003May6.html>

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Washington Times

May 7, 2003

Pg. 1

## **North Korea May Export Nukes**

*Reprocessing work called nearly complete*

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

North Korea threatened during recent talks in Beijing to export nuclear arms or add to its arsenal, in addition to saying it will test an atomic bomb, The Washington Times has learned.

North Korea's negotiator in the talks, Li Gun, made the threat during an "aside" session with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, said U.S. officials familiar with the closed-door meeting in Beijing.

"This was clearly a threat," said one official familiar with reports of the three-way talks among the United States, North Korea and China.

Additionally, the North Koreans said at the talks that they have nearly finished reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that were supposed to be kept in storage under a 1994 agreement with the United States.

Mr. Li, a North Korean Foreign Ministry official, told Mr. Kelly during the side meeting that Pyongyang will "export nuclear weapons, add to its current arsenal or test a nuclear device," one administration official said.

North Korea is considered to be a major supplier of missiles and other weapons to rogue states and unstable regions. U.S. officials said they do not doubt that North Korea would export nuclear weapons or technology.

North Korea is believed to have two or three nuclear devices and could make five or six more from the 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in storage until October.

The North Korean diplomat said the course that Pyongyang follows will be directly related to how the United States responds to its overtures. Mr. Kelly rejected the words as a threat and thus unacceptable as a means of resolving the nuclear crisis, the officials said.

Officials said the assertion of reprocessing work was either a lie by the North Koreans or it represents a failure of U.S. intelligence, which previously had concluded that North Korea had not begun the reprocessing work at the nuclear complex in Yongbyon.

The CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies are conducting a review of the matter to see whether they missed any North Korean reprocessing.

The fuel reprocessing is considered a key indicator of the seriousness of any move by Pyongyang away from its international obligations not to build more nuclear arms.

However, one official said the CIA has already changed its assessment that North Korea has not reprocessed any spent fuel. The new CIA assessment is that some reprocessing may have taken place, this official said. During the April 23-24 talks in Beijing, North Korea also attempted to initiate bilateral talks with the United States, but the United States rejected the attempt, officials said on the condition of anonymity.

Mr. Kelly had argued in favor of holding the two-way talks, but National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice rejected his request April 24.

The talks in China included U.S., Chinese and North Korean officials but excluded representatives from South Korea and Japan.

The talks ended with little progress toward resolving the standoff over North Korea's renewed effort to build nuclear weapons. The crisis began in October, when North Korea revealed that it had a secret uranium-based nuclear-arms program, in addition to the plutonium program that was supposed to have been frozen since 1994.

Senior Bush administration officials have met twice since the Beijing talks to decide how to proceed. The administration is debating whether to demand that any future talks with the North Koreans and Chinese include officials from Japan and South Korea.

North Korea in the past has refused to hold any talks with Japan or South Korea but agreed to allow its key economic ally, China, to take part.

The Chinese government said it did not know of the North Korean statement about exporting nuclear arms or building up its arsenal because the discussion took place on the sidelines of the formal talks and therefore was not part of the official negotiations, the officials said.

The Bush administration has said that it will not be pressured into negotiating any new agreements with Pyongyang's reclusive communist government.

Mr. Li also stated during the meeting in Beijing that North Korea's nuclear weapons are so large that it would be difficult to dismantle them, the officials said.

North Korea is demanding that the United States sign a nonaggression treaty and provide assurances that aid from Japan and other countries will not be cut off.

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun will discuss North Korea's nuclear program in talks with President Bush set for May 14 in Washington.

The Bush administration has said that it hopes to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomacy. However, the administration has not said how it will deal with the matter if diplomacy fails.

"If diplomacy fails, there are two alternatives," one official said. "Either you allow North Korea to remain a nuclear power or you exercise the military option."

The possibility of North Korea selling nuclear weapons and material was discussed last week by Mr. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, officials said.

The discussion was based on North Korea's statement at the Beijing talks, they said.

On Sunday, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said the United States would not be pressured by North Korea.

"We will not be blackmailed. We will not be intimidated," Mr. Powell said on NBC's "Meet the Press."

"Their nuclear weapons are not going to purchase them any political standing that will cause us to be frightened or to think that somehow we now have to march to their tune," he said.

Asked whether the United States would permit North Korea to export nuclear arms, Mr. Powell said, "Absolutely not."

Mr. Powell said U.S. intelligence cannot confirm the North Korean assertion about reprocessing the spent fuel rods into plutonium for weapons, but he noted, "That's what they say."

"And what they have gotten in response to these statements is nothing from us except condemnation," Mr. Powell said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030507-90177548.htm>

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Los Angeles Times  
May 7, 2003

## **Russian Sees No Clues Iran Sought Nuclear Bomb**

By Associated Press

MOSCOW — In a rebuff to the United States, a top Russian diplomat said Tuesday that there was no evidence that Iran pursued a nuclear weapons capability in violation of the international nonproliferation agreement.

Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov contradicted allegations about Iran's nuclear program that U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton made Monday in Moscow. Bolton had sought to persuade Russian officials to acknowledge that Tehran has a clandestine weapons program and to win Russian support for a critical report on Iran's nuclear efforts by the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"Very sound evidence is needed to accuse anyone. So far, neither the United States nor any other countries can present it," Losyukov said, according to the Interfax news agency.

Losyukov did acknowledge that Iran's nuclear program had some uncertainties, and said Moscow would work with Tehran to "add more transparency" to its program. As for Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, Losyukov said the work was "strictly in line with IAEA norms."

Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran has long been an issue between Washington and Moscow. The United States maintains that the technology and expertise Iran is gaining from Russia's construction of the \$800-million Bushehr nuclear power plant could be used for a weapons program

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-rusiran7may07.1.2318300.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dworld>

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International Herald Tribune  
May 7, 2003

## State Dept. Sees 'Credible' Threat Of Terrorist Attacks In Mideast

By Brian Knowlton

WASHINGTON - The State Department said Tuesday that there was "credible information" that terrorist groups might be planning new attacks on American interests in the Middle East, although tensions had eased with the waning of the Iraq war.

It was a calibrated caution to Americans traveling or living abroad that while clear progress has been made in the fight against terrorism — and dramatically so against militants belonging to Al Qaeda — risks of terrorism have hardly vanished.

Counterterrorism specialists say they were surprised and heartened by the near-absence of major terror attacks in association with the Iraq war. There are substantial grounds to believe that Al Qaeda has been severely undercut since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States, they say.

But they, like the U.S. and British governments, warn strongly against complaisance, and note that terror groups often work on long, patient — but unpredictable — schedules.

The State Department repeated strong language similar to that in a worldwide caution issued April 21.

It warned that terrorists might mount suicide operations, stage bombings or kidnappings, and could use biological or chemical agents, although conventional weapons were more likely. The broader picture, terrorism specialists say, is mixed.

"It seems like a fair conclusion that Al Qaeda's capabilities have been diminished by the string of very important arrests and disruptions," said Daniel Benjamin, co-author of "The Age of Sacred Terror." "That's very clear."

"At the same time, every time we have attacked Al Qaeda, whether in '98 or 2000 or after, we've been astonished by the depth of organization and surprised to find out how much bigger it was than we knew," he said. "We shouldn't have any illusions that we've solved the problem."

The State Department has gradually scaled back Iraq-related travel warnings for several countries in the Middle East and sent back diplomats who had been evacuated. Now, only Saudi Arabia is covered by a specific Iraq-related warning.

A warning issued May 1 reported increased security concerns, cited information that terrorists may be in the "final phases" of planning attacks on American interests, and warned against all but essential travel.

"To issue a warning like that now means they must have some very, very specific, extremely credible information about this," said a terror specialist, Evan Kohlmann of the Investigative Project, in Washington.

"Unfortunately, the problem with Al Qaeda is that the progress we make against it does not necessarily decrease the chances of a terrorist attack.

"Arrests of key figures, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, definitely disrupt attacks." Kohlmann added that terrorist planning had been significantly disrupted in several countries, including an alleged plot to fly an airplane into the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.

But such crackdowns can make other militants desperate, he said. They “start resorting to desperate attacks,” which can lead to desperate mistakes, making capture more likely; or, as lone wolf terrorists act without advice from above, their choices of targets and weapons can yield results he described as “horrific.”

Mr. Kohlmann said that he had seen an increase in activity by extremist groups, including the posting on the Internet of at least three different jihad manuals, apparently recently written, with advice on such matters as making chemical weapons. “People are trying to get even with us,” he said. “It may just be a matter of time.”

Crackdowns by the United States and its allies have made it harder for Qaeda members to travel, communicate, find haven and shift money or equipment. The “demonstration effect” of the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq will very likely make other governments more reluctant to support terrorist groups.

Major planners like Mohammed, who was linked to the 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, have been captured and reportedly provided useful information on others still afield.

President George W. Bush said last week from the deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln that nearly half of Al Qaeda’s senior operatives had been captured or killed.

But terrorism specialists warn that the absence of recent attacks offers little assurance about the future. In the past, planning for major attacks sometimes took years.

The United States and its allies have handled their terror warnings somewhat differently.

In the United States, the color-coded terror alert system was lowered in mid-April to yellow, or “elevated risk,” but the White House then warned that Iraqi agents still might attempt terrorist attacks against U.S. targets.

France, which opposed the war, last week returned its own terrorism alert scale to the lowest level, “yellow,” which calls for “increased vigilance against real but still unclear risks.” Security there has been heightened since the 2001 attacks.

Australia, a strong U.S. ally in the Iraq war, has kept its security threat rating at medium since the 2001 attacks, despite the Bali bombings and the Iraq war.

But it considers that an attack on a “soft target,” like the nightclub attack in October in Bali, remains a threat, despite inroads against terror groups.

“It’s harder for them now,” Bryce Hutchison, a government antiterror official, told a parliamentary committee last week. But extremist groups “still do retain a capability,” he said.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/95468.html>

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Washington Post

May 7, 2003

Pg. 31

## Loose Nukes Of The West

By Alan J. Kuperman

Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and especially since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has been trying to control “loose nukes” -- the former Eastern Bloc’s nuclear materials -- to prevent their being stolen or sold to make an atomic bomb. This effort is vital, but its narrow regional focus has obscured an equally pressing danger: the loose nukes of the West. In fact, while Russia has been gradually tightening controls on bomb-grade materials, the United States and Europe have been slackening theirs, and a bill moving rapidly through Congress would roll back protections still further. Unless remedial action is taken, Osama bin Laden may soon have better luck shopping for nuclear bomb material in Western markets than in the former Soviet Union.

A particular vulnerability is posed by civilian commerce in highly enriched uranium. This fissile explosive, which powered the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, is still used at many research and commercial facilities in North America and Europe that lack adequate security forces. If terrorists got hold of a sufficient amount, they could quickly fabricate an atomic bomb using the simplest design. According to the late Manhattan Project physicist Luis Alvarez, “terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half.” Just 100 pounds is enough for a Hiroshima-era bomb, while even less is needed for a moderately sophisticated design such as Pakistan’s.

Dangerous civilian commerce in bomb-grade uranium persists for two reasons. First, unlike modern nuclear reactors, a few old research facilities in Europe and America still use bomb-grade fuel. Second, pharmaceutical companies in Canada and Europe have rejected safer production methods and still use bomb-grade uranium to produce medical isotopes for hospitals.

Oddly enough, the West confronted this nuclear threat more seriously before the advent of al Qaeda than it does today. In 1978 it started developing technologies to fuel reactors and produce isotopes using much safer, low-enriched uranium, which is unsuitable for weapons. In 1992 a bill by then-Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), now a senator, was enacted that banned all further exports of bomb-grade uranium, except on an interim basis to facilities in the process of converting to low-enriched uranium.

But a decade later, despite the rise of catastrophic terrorism, pharmaceutical companies and reactor operators are trying to undermine this landmark anti-terrorism law. One culprit is a large new German research reactor that is the West's first in a quarter-century built to use bomb-grade uranium fuel. Located on a vulnerable university campus near Munich, the reactor is slated to require 1.2 tons of such fuel -- sufficient for at least a dozen nuclear weapons. President Bill Clinton refused to provide the fuel, but the Germans then struck a deal with Russia. President Bush, rather than discouraging such Russian trafficking, has legitimized it by seeking identical material from Moscow to fuel U.S. nuclear research reactors. The Germans could convert to safer fuel before starting up their reactor but have refused.

The biggest offender in the pharmaceutical industry is the Canadian isotope producer Nordion, which reneged on an explicit pledge to design its new facilities to eliminate any need for bomb-grade uranium. The Canadians have constructed an isotope plant that will require more highly enriched uranium than any other. Though the lightly guarded Ontario facility is yet to begin commercial operation, it already has stockpiled 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium -- enough for at least two nuclear weapons.

Still worse, the foreign pharmaceutical companies are lobbying to repeal the Schumer provision that requires them to gradually convert to low-enriched uranium as a condition for receiving bomb-grade uranium in the meantime. The repeal amendment, sponsored by Rep. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), already has been approved by the House in its new energy bill. In the Senate, it is being pushed toward quick enactment by Kit Bond, a Republican from Missouri, where the overseas isotope producer Mallinckrodt has its corporate home.

The shame is that the foreign pharmaceutical companies could have ceased their reliance on bomb-grade uranium years ago, if they had put as much effort into converting their production processes as they have into lobbying. There is no technical barrier to conversion. The United States has significant leverage on foreign producers, because we are the main source of bomb-grade uranium and the primary consumer of medical isotopes. Several years ago the State Department worked with these companies and the Nuclear Control Institute to draft a pledge under which all producers would agree to convert. Unfortunately, a mid-level official in the Bush administration's Department of Energy spiked the initiative in 2001.

In Iraq the United States has budgeted \$60 billion and sacrificed more than 100 American lives in a war premised mainly on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The very least that the pharmaceutical companies and our ally Germany can contribute is to stop undermining U.S. anti-terrorism law. And as the energy bill heads to the Senate floor, Congress must halt the special-interest effort to overturn this vital law.

*The writer is an assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy, and senior policy analyst for the Nuclear Control Institute.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22861-2003May6.html>

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Christian Science Monitor

May 7, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Rising Risks Of Nuclear N. Korea**

***Exports of nuclear material by Pyongyang would be bad, but so would a big arsenal.***

By Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, Staffs writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – Sudden expansion of North Korea's nuclear program might be a global disaster - even if the United States can successfully prevent Pyongyang from peddling plutonium or whole weapons on the open market. True, US intelligence already judges that Kim Jong Il's government possesses a few fissile bombs. But there's a big difference between an arsenal of three nuclear weapons, and one of 10, say experts.

If North Koreans have 10, say, they could perhaps afford to test one. This would shock and awe East Asia. It could develop a nuclear strategy, with multiple targets and a deterrent reserve.

Worse, the emergence of North Korea as a declared nuclear power would shuffle security calculations throughout the region. Japan might develop its own program. Other nations could weigh their options in light of Saddam Hussein's fate, and decide that adherence to a nonproliferation regime is for suckers.



"A half dozen other countries could go nuclear" if North Korea is permitted to do so, says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Published reports in recent days have indicated that the Bush administration has begun focusing on preventing North Korea from exporting nuclear material, as opposed to preventing it from gearing up its plutonium production pipeline.

Administration officials insist publicly that their policies have not changed - and that their long-term goal remains the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program in its entirety.

But the state of that program remains a mystery. If North Korea is to be believed, it has already begun reprocessing material to make more weapons, and may have passed a point of no return on its way to becoming a member of the exclusive club of world nuclear powers.

The Clinton administration drew up plans for military strikes against suspected North Korean plutonium production sites during its own standoff with the Kim regime in 1994.

Such preemption seems less likely now, however, given the US involvement in Iraq, and the lack of good intelligence about exactly what North Korea is doing, and where.

Furthermore, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun campaigned on a platform of peaceful engagement with the North, and has all but ruled out armed confrontation as a strategy. Mr. Roh will fly to the US this weekend for a week-long visit capped by a May 14 White House summit with President Bush.

Thus, to some extent, a switch in focus from preemption to containment would be a simple recognition of reality.

"The Bush administration has always operated under the presumption that it's virtually impossible to prevent the North Koreans from producing nuclear weapons," says Sung-Yoon Lee, a Korea expert at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Mass.

Don't expect a public declaration of such a policy, though. To do so might give an impression of defeatism or weakness that might embolden North Korea in future negotiations.

Of course, the US might also be trying something else - calling North Korea's bluff. By refusing to get worked up at North Korea's bluster about its progress with plutonium, the US might in essence be saying that it won't be blackmailed into giving North Korea the aid and recognition it desires.

In recent talks Pyongyang managed to be so bellicose that it may have offended even longtime ally China. "The North Koreans are now in danger of pushing themselves into a corner," says Professor Lee of the Fletcher School.

Next moves by all parties in this diplomatic dance, however, are difficult to predict. North Korea, for its part, has been as moody as an adolescent, alternating between nuclear threats and a sort of ominous silence. The US clearly remains split about how to handle a situation in which all options carry some aspect of risk.

Previous news leaks this year indicated that some in the Pentagon might favor a more muscular approach to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power, for instance.

"As for the Americans, who knows? They're almost more puzzling to figure out than the North Koreans," says Jim Walsh, an expert in international security at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Mass.

The course of events now depends crucially on North Korea's intentions, and whether China has finally decided to push Pyongyang into some sort of rapprochement with the rest of the world.

"My own personal view is that the North Koreans were interested in a bargain," says Mr. Walsh, "but at a certain point concluded they probably aren't going to get one, so they are hedging ... trying to prepare themselves to get a nuclear weapon."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0507/p01s01-woap.html>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink below is the Department of Homeland Security's public information web site for the exercise "TOPOFF2.")

## **"TOPOFF 2" Week-Long National Combatting Terror Exercise Begins May 12**

Beginning May 12 at 3:00 p.m. EDT, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of State, in cooperation with Federal, State, local, and Canadian partners, will undertake a five-day, full-scale exercise and simulation of how the Nation would respond in the event of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack.

The exercise consists of simulated attacks in the Chicago and Seattle metropolitan areas. The State of Washington, King County, and the City of Seattle respond to a hypothetical explosion containing radioactive material. The State

of Illinois, Cook, Lake, DuPage and Kane Counties, and the City of Chicago respond to a covert release of a biological agent. Nineteen Federal agencies and the American Red Cross will become involved during the five-day exercise. The National Capital Region, including the District of Columbia, State of Maryland, and Commonwealth of Virginia, are participating in the first day of the exercise. . . .

<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink below is the "TOPOFF 2" press page web site with detailed information on the venues, day-by-day schedules, etc.)

## **TOP OFFICIALS 2**

*(TOPOFF 2), is the most comprehensive terrorism response exercise ever undertaken in the United States. A Congressionally mandated, national weapons of mass destruction (WMD) exercise series, TOPOFF 2 is designed to provide training for Federal, State, and local responders and top officials, and execute a coordinated national (and international) response to WMD attacks. On May 12-16, 2003, 19 Federal agencies and the American Red Cross, in cooperation with participants in Washington State, Illinois, Canada, and the National Capital Region, will undertake a five-day, full-scale demonstration of how the nation will respond in the event of an attack using weapons of mass destruction.*

*The Media will be given the opportunity to learn more about TOPOFF 2 during the full-scale exercise at scheduled events and viewing locations in each Venue location.*

*This website provides information about TOPOFF 2, a comprehensive schedule of media events during the TOPOFF 2 Full-Scale Exercise (May 12-16, 2003), and links to additional resources about TOPOFF 2 and Homeland Security. . . .*

<http://www.topoff2media.net/pressroom.htm>

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New York Times

May 8, 2003

Pg. 1

## **New U.S. Concerns On Iran's Pursuit Of Nuclear Arms**

By Steven R. Weisman

WASHINGTON, May 7 — The Bush administration is concerned that Iran has stepped up its covert nuclear program, and the government is now seeking broad international support for an official finding that Tehran has violated its commitment not to produce nuclear weapons, officials said today.

The officials said that the United States was pressing nations that sit on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which oversees peaceful nuclear programs, to declare that Iran has violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it has signed.

Such a finding could lead to punitive action by the United Nations, adding pressure on Iran, which is already nervous about American troops in Iraq, the officials said. The atomic energy agency is to meet on the matter next month.

Administration officials also said today that a new intelligence assessment had led them to conclude that North Korea may have resumed production of small amounts of plutonium, which could be used for nuclear weapons. Previously, intelligence officials had assured the White House that no plutonium was being produced there.

While the North Korea situation has received more public attention recently, in part because it has acknowledged its nuclear ambitions, administration officials said that Iran was an equally urgent problem because its program is further along than previously thought.

"It's not just that Iran is speeding up its nuclear plans," an administration official said. "It's also that we've only recently learned some things about their program that have been going on for two years. There's also a lot of hammering from the Israelis for us to take this problem seriously."

Of greatest concern is the recent disclosure that Iran has built a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz in central Iran, a site not known to nuclear experts until last year.

The site contains large underground structures believed by intelligence experts to contain centrifuges used in producing highly enriched uranium, a fuel for nuclear weapons.

The Natanz site is said by experts to be more worrisome than the Russian-assisted nuclear reactor at the Persian Gulf city of Bushehr, which they say has the potential of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

In February, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, led a team of inspectors to Natanz. But American officials said the visit was not a formal inspection, and that Dr. ElBaradei at first seemed reluctant to pronounce the site a nuclear-weapons facility.

Iran maintains that the Natanz site is to be used for peaceful purposes, a position reiterated this week by Iran's nuclear energy director, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, in meetings with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

But American officials say that a recent evaluation of what Dr. ElBaradei found in February, as well as other nations' intelligence, has convinced American and other experts that Natanz is so obviously a weapons facility that the International Atomic Energy Agency can be persuaded to act on it.

"We were surprised by the scale of the discoveries by the director general," an administration official said, referring to Dr. ElBaradei. "We knew that Iran was working on a centrifuge program. But we were surprised by the number of centrifuge pieces waiting to be assembled. They had a hundred-plus centrifuges built, and they were building more." American officials said that Dr. ElBaradei now appeared more likely to present a tough picture of the Natanz site at an agency meeting in mid-June. Meanwhile, the administration is pressing Russia, Western European nations and others to get him to do just that.

But the American-led ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iran's neighbor and longtime enemy, has complicated matters. There is now sharp disagreement within the administration over whether the new situation gives the United States more leverage over Tehran or less.

As a consequence, administration officials say that they are embroiled in yet another internal debate about how best to deal with Iran's nuclear threat.

This time, the hawkish faction centered at the Pentagon favors working through the United Nations, hoping that the pressure will get Iran to abandon its program. They say that Iran has an incentive to cooperate because of the American military presence next door.

The moderates want the United States to engage in talks with Iran on all the issues of concern in Washington — not just about nuclear matters but also about American fears of a revolutionary brand of Islamic fundamentalism in Iraq supported by Iranian-backed Shiites.

The United States is also trying to get Iran to stop backing Hezbollah and other militant groups linked to terrorist acts against Israel and American targets around the world. This topic was pressed on Syria, an Iranian ally, last weekend by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

Mr. Powell is to return to the region this weekend for meetings in Israel and with leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Administration officials and other experts say the Iran problem will be a major subject because it has the potential to destabilize the entire region.

"I can't conceive of a viable security order for the Middle East, post-Saddam Hussein, that does not take Iran into account," said Flynt Leverett, until recently a senior director of Middle East affairs with the National Security Council staff.

Mr. Leverett, now a fellow with the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, said the United States had to address both Iran's nuclear weapons capability and its "continuing willingness to work through proxies on the ground" to subvert Iraq and other nations in the region.

In the last year, the United States has dealt privately with Iran, administration officials say.

Both Zalmay Khalilzad, the White House envoy, and Ryan Crocker, a deputy assistant secretary of state, have had secret contacts with Iranian officials — some as recently as earlier this year — in New York and Europe, the officials said.

Results have been mixed, the officials said. There has been cooperation on ousting the Taliban and Al Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan, especially in western parts of the country where Iran has influence.

Iran was also said to have understood American intentions in Iraq, at least in part, some officials said, and tacitly agreed to help with refugees, downed American aircraft and other problems near its border during the recent war. A possible signal of Iranian willingness to talk with the United States came last month with a call by Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's former president, for a referendum on possibly improving relations with the United States. Until now, officials said, such talk would have been anathema.

On the negative side, with the Iraq war over, the United States has been concerned about Iran's possible interference with revolutionary operatives in Iraq loyal to Teheran and uninterested in any efforts by the United States to extend its influence.

Last week, in what officials said was a significant warning to Iran, American forces in Iraq signed a cease-fire with the People's Mujahedeen, a group Washington had designated as a terrorist organization and which opposes Iran and the Iranian-backed groups in Iraq.

The original decision to list the People's Mujahedeen as a terrorist organization was considered a gesture toward Iran. So the cease-fire was said by some in the administration to signal that the United States was determined to play rough in extending its influence in the region.

There are parallels to how the United States is now dealing with Iran and North Korea, the two remaining members of what Mr. Bush called an "axis of evil."

As with North Korea, whose nuclear weapons program could lead, if it continues, to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, the United States fears that an Iranian program could lead to nuclear ambitions by Iran's neighbors. They would include Saudi Arabia, which is believed capable of quickly acquiring such weapons from its ally, Pakistan, and Israel, which is already assumed to be an undeclared nuclear weapons state.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/international/asia/08DIPL.html>

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USA Today  
May 8, 2003  
Pg. 1

## Possible Arms Lab Studied

*Iraqi trailer could be evidence U.S. needs*

By Tom Squitieri, USA Today

WASHINGTON — A trailer found in northern Iraq has the necessary specifications and equipment to be a mobile biological weapons laboratory, but more tests are needed before a final conclusion is reached, U.S. officials said Wednesday.

If the trailer turns out to be a weapons lab, it will be the first major piece of evidence to support U.S. allegations that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. Those charges were a key justification for launching the Iraq war.

Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United Nations Security Council on Feb. 5 that Iraq had as many as 18 such mobile labs and that one of them could create enough biological weapons in a month to kill "thousands upon thousands."

One month after the end of most of the fighting in Iraq, however, no biological or chemical weapons — or the compounds that might be used to make them — have been found, including in the trailer, U.S. officials said.

The Bush administration is under increasing pressure to prove its allegations that Iraq possessed an advanced program of weapons of mass destruction. It has stepped up efforts to locate such weapons.

Pentagon officials said a new team of 2,100 American experts will arrive in Iraq by the end of the month to head the search. They will supplement a force of 600 that has already searched 110 of 616 suspected weapons sites.

"I'm sure we will discover the weapons of mass destruction program was as extensive as reported," Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of Defense for intelligence, said at a Pentagon briefing. However, Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, cautioned that "it is far too early to tell" what ultimately might be found.

The trailer that U.S. officials believe is a weapons lab was seized by Kurdish forces on April 19 at a checkpoint outside the northern Iraqi town of Tall Kayf. It was turned over to U.S. forces and is being taken to Baghdad for further testing.

Technical experts believe the trailer was designed to produce biological agents, and "they have not found another plausible use for it," Cambone said.

Asked whether it is the "smoking gun" the Bush administration has been seeking, Cambone said, "This is the one that has come to light at this point." He said the trailer had been washed thoroughly with a caustic cleaning agent, then painted military green — two steps which prevented any easy testing for residue.

Aboard the trailer was equipment that can be used to make biological weapons, including a fermenter, Cambone said. Other equipment included gas cylinders to supply clean air for agent production and a system to capture and compress exhaust gases to evade detection of weapons production, he said.

Pentagon officials said three biological agents could have been made on the trailer: anthrax, botulinum toxin and staphylococcus.

Earlier Wednesday, Lt. Gen. William Wallace said U.S. forces have collected "plenty of documentary evidence" suggesting that Saddam had an active weapons program. "It's just taking us a while to sort through all of that," Wallace, commander of the Army's V Corps, said in Baghdad.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030508/5139766s.htm>

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Washington Times

May 8, 2003

Pg. 1

## Papers Suggest 'Active' Program Of Illicit Arms

By Paul Martin, The Washington Times

CAMP AS SAYLIYA, Qatar — U.S. military officers are examining "very promising" documents that they believe will allow them to put together a comprehensive picture of Iraq's secret weapons programs.

Some of these documents, described as complex, technical and difficult to translate accurately, have revealed orders for chemical-weapons precursors, said the U.S. Central Command official in charge of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense. Precursors are materials that could have either military or civilian uses.

In his first extensive interview to a journalist, Lt. Col. Tom Woloszyn said his objective is to put together a comprehensive "cradle-to-grave" portrait of a wide-ranging set of Iraqi programs to design, assemble and deploy weapons of mass destruction.

He said he remains convinced that these exist and will be uncovered.

He expressed fears that scientists may be withholding information out of fear of war-crimes prosecutions and said the possibility of them or engineers having smuggled some key elements of the programs out of the country before the invasion or in the guise of postwar looters was "one of our concerns."

He also said Saddam Hussein's regime could have moved some of the materials to other countries or onto the high seas.

But, he said, "I'm sure enough remains."

The commander of U.S. Army troops in Iraq, meanwhile, said American forces have collected "plenty of documentary evidence" suggesting that Saddam had an active program for weapons of mass destruction.

Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, commander of the Army's V Corps, said Saddam might not have used unconventional weapons against invading coalition forces because they were buried too well to retrieve before the coalition dash to Baghdad.

"We've collected evidence, much of it documentary, that suggests there was an active program" for unconventional weapons, Gen. Wallace told Pentagon reporters in a videoconference from the Iraqi capital.

"A lot of the information that we're getting is coming from lower-tier Iraqis who had some knowledge of the program but not full knowledge of the program," the Associated Press quoted him as saying. "And it's just taking us awhile to sort through all of that."

Col. Woloszyn said his task is being complicated by reports of reputed chemical or missile finds and an overenthusiasm by officers in the field to display their finds to journalists.

"It's certainly trying at times when things are shown prematurely," he told The Washington Times as he and team members, including an intelligence official, pored over photographs of what appeared to be three rocket-shaped cylinders.

"Nothing more has been found that I can speak to," he said.

It is the comprehensive picture "put together like a giant puzzle, a mosaic," rather than any spectacular finds, that would provide the necessary proof of Saddam's weapons programs, he said.

A major problem would be to convince scientists and engineers involved that they did not face arrests or war-crimes trials if they volunteered information.

"They have to realize that we are not out to crucify anyone; we just want the truth," said Master Sgt. Ricardo Soto, Col. Woloszyn's colleague.

Sgt. Soto, who worked as a U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq in 1994 destroying chemical-weapons elements, pointed out that former inspectors from the United Nations would be able to do a better job now. Before, Iraqis generally had advance knowledge of the officials' movements and potential informants had lied out of fear, he said.

Col. Woloszyn estimated that about 1,000 people were involved in the weapons hunt in various ways.

He believes a radio and leaflet campaign before the invasion may have succeeded in preventing firing or use of chemical and biological weapons but that it also made scientists and engineers fearful.

"We said if you pull the trigger on these we will come after you. We were pretty blunt, and we suggested war crimes. So I'm sure a lot of people thought, 'Well, if they will do that for people who just pull the trigger, what will they do to those who design them?'"

New radio messages have been aimed at ending this fear, he said.

Col. Woloszyn has urged the new Iraqi leadership to start programs to re-employ scientists in peace-related activity to stop them from moving to other countries where clandestine weapons programs are being developed.

"Iraq has got some very innovative scientists, and we need to make sure that their research now points to positive endeavors," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030508-20021312.htm>

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New York Times

May 8, 2003

## **U.S. Aides Say Iraqi Truck Could Be A Germ-War Lab**

By Judith Miller

BAGHDAD, May 7 — Senior Bush administration officials in Washington said today that a joint British-American team of experts had concluded that a tractor-trailer truck found in northern Iraq several weeks ago could be a mobile biological weapons lab.

The trailer's design closely fits that of a mobile biological weapons laboratory described by a defector, but the officials could not say whether it had ever produced biological agents for weapons.

"While some of the equipment on the trailer could have been used for purposes other than biological weapons agent production, U.S. and U.K. technical experts have concluded that the unit does not appear to perform any function beyond what the defector said it was for, which was the production of biological agents," said Stephen A. Cambone, the under secretary of defense for intelligence.

The van was seized on April 19 at a checkpoint controlled by Kurdish allies near Tallkayf in northern Iraq. It was hauled atop a heavy equipment transporter normally used for tanks, Dr. Cambone said.

The Kurdish troops who stopped the trailer said it might have been traveling in a convoy of military vehicles, perhaps with a decontamination truck.

When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell addressed the United Nations in February to describe intelligence on Iraq's biological and chemical weapons program, he cited a defector's report on mobile laboratories that could develop unconventional weapons and be moved around Iraq to avoid detection and attack.

In his address on Feb. 5, Mr. Powell described a configuration of two or three trucks parked alongside each other, which when they were producing biological agents, were attached to one another by hoses.

The defector said mobile laboratories had been used to produce anthrax, botulism and staphylococcus.

Dr. Cambone said the trailer, now on its way to Baghdad for further testing, had a number of "common elements" with those described by the defector, including "the external superstructure and its dimensions; the equipment, such as the fermenter on board, the gas cylinders to supply clean air for production; and, significantly, a system to capture and compress exhaust gases to eliminate any signature of the production."

Only the van's surfaces have been tested thus far, although "what we'll do now is a much more thorough and complete and more intrusive examination of the system," which will include dismantling the van and its equipment, he said.

"That means that there will be many more tests that will be taken, and so it will be another considerable period of time before the next round of testing comes back and we get some results," Dr. Cambone said.

He said that at some point before it was seized by coalition forces, the van had been scrubbed with "a very caustic substance," perhaps ammonia, and had been painted.

During a Pentagon briefing, Dr. Cambone said the effort to uncover Iraq's weapons of mass destruction would soon be turned over to a major general who would command an Iraq Survey Group with about 2,000 people.

"Its mission is to discover, take custody of, exploit and disseminate information on individuals, records, materials, facilities, networks and operations as appropriate relative to individuals associated with the regime, weapons of mass destruction, terrorists and terrorist ties and their organizations, information having to do with the Iraqi Intelligence, Security and Overseas Services, and those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and P.O.W.'s," he said.

Teams now on the ground have inspected about 70 sites on a list of almost 600 that American officials had drawn up before the war, and had visited another 40 sites identified for the first time through intelligence and research since the war began.

"This is piecing together a major jigsaw puzzle, and we're only just beginning to gain insights and to work the puzzle," said Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Also today, Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, commander of the Army's V Corps in Iraq, said American forces had collected much "documentary evidence" that "suggests there was an active program" for weapons of mass destruction.

"A lot of the information that we're getting is coming from low-tier Iraqis who had some knowledge of the program but not full knowledge of the program, and it's just taken us a while to sort through all of that," he added.

Two days ago at the headquarters of the Exploitation Task Force, or XTF, which is responsible for the hunt for unconventional weapons, officials said the unit's experts had not concluded that the equipment constituted a mobile biological weapons lab.

The senior officers said that while early tests using handheld samplers had registered the presence of biological agents on some of the equipment, subsequent tests run by the XTF's more sophisticated labs on those same samples had proved "negative" — that is, the tests showed no indication of the presence of any biological agent or toxin.

If the trailer proves to be a mobile weapons lab, it would be the first uncovered in Iraq, and the discovery would support the Bush administration's claims that Iraq continued to pursue weapons of mass destruction in violation of United Nations sanctions and its 1991 pledges to end such programs. American allegations of such an illicit program and stockpiles of unconventional weapons were a major justification for the war against Iraq.

A senior administration official said today that he was untroubled by the fact that the tests conducted by the XTF's sophisticated labs had not detected the presence of agents. "We never expected to find such proof," he said, "because the vehicles were decontaminated."

One official said that while he could not prove that the tractor-trailer labs had actually produced germ warfare agents, they had been designed and configured to do so.

"If it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it has got to be a duck," the administration official said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/international/worldspecial/08WEAP.html>

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New York Times

May 8, 2003

## **U.S. Suspects North Korea Moved Ahead On Weapons**

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, April 7 — After assuring the White House for months that North Korea had not begun producing plutonium for nuclear weapons, American intelligence officials changed their assessment last month, concluding that the country may have produced relatively small amounts, according to senior administration and intelligence officials.

The new assessment was delivered to the White House in mid-April, after President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, ordered a review of the intelligence. A little more than a week later, North Korean officials, meeting with the United States in Beijing, boasted that they had already turned 8,000 spent nuclear-fuel rods into weapons-grade material, and strongly hinted they would export it unless they struck a deal with the United States. Intelligence officials say they believe that the North Korean claim was an exaggeration, intended to extract concessions from Mr. Bush, who said late last month he would not give in to what he has termed "blackmail." But his aides remain divided about what blend of incentives and threats to use in dealing with the government of Kim Jong Il.

Mr. Bush's top foreign policy advisers met today to review their next steps on North Korea, with some officials at the Pentagon urging that Mr. Bush move vigorously to intercept missiles and illicit drugs being shipped out of the country. Those exports create much of the hard currency that the North uses to finance its nuclear program.

At the same time, officials say they are likely to engage in a second round of talks with North Korea. That is partly to satisfy China, which has become a major player in pressuring the North to dismantle its nuclear facilities.

The changed assessment reflects the inexact nature of intelligence about North Korea. But the possibility that the North is already reprocessing nuclear material — and thus could soon begin producing weapons beyond the two the C.I.A. believes it manufactured more than a decade ago — is bound to change the tenor of Mr. Bush's meetings in the next two weeks with the leaders of South Korea and Japan.

"It means we don't have forever to solve this problem," one senior American official said.

In the last few days, intelligence officials have seen renewed activity around the main reprocessing site, at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. But officials familiar with the intelligence said that this did not necessarily mean that the North was now running the the main reprocessing facility. "It's fair to say the experts have come to no hard conclusions," the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, told reporters today.

One senior intelligence official said today that "we don't have confirmation that they are reprocessing on a large scale." But small-scale production, the official said, was a distinct possibility.

The history of intelligence gathering in North Korea features numerous major mistakes. Its suspected development of two weapons during the first Bush administration went undetected until the International Atomic Energy Agency got into the country and found that a significant amount of plutonium was unaccounted for. In 1998, the intelligence community raised alarms about a large cave that they suspected was the site of a hidden reactor and reprocessing facility. The United States demanded entry, but the cave turned out to be empty.

The United States was also slow to detect the fact that the North had set up a clandestine, second nuclear project using highly enriched uranium. While such a project had long been suspected, it was South Korea that came up with the evidence two years ago that the effort was speeding forward. The current crisis arose when the United States confronted the North Koreans with that evidence seven months ago.

Today, the effort to assess whether reprocessing is under way suffers from the absence of nuclear inspectors, who were ejected from the country on New Year's Eve. "Without the I.A.E.A. inspectors there, there is a much greater level of uncertainty about whether reprocessing is taking place or not," said Joel Wit, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

So the administration finds itself, he noted, in the opposite situation it faced in Iraq. There, the government of Saddam Hussein insisted it held no weapons, and Mr. Bush is seeking to prove that it did. In North Korea, the government is boasting of a major program, in hopes of winning a negotiating advantage — or threatening American allies.

"That's the whole point of all of North Korea's behavior," Mr. Wit said. "You don't know whether it's a threat or whether it is the truth."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/international/asia/08KORE.html>

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Charleston (SC) Post and Courier  
May 7, 2003

## **Staged Attack Offers Lesson In Port Security**

By Ron Menchaca, Of The Post and Courier Staff

Terrorists struck a handful of the nation's busiest shipping ports, including Charleston, in a series of fictitious national emergencies acted out Tuesday in a military classroom in Washington D.C.

U.S. Rep. Henry Brown, R-S.C., who joined an assemblage of top Bush administration officials and 13 other congressmen, had just minutes to consider a bold and risky proposition of shutting down the nation's seaports in a scenario not unlike what federal aviation officials faced on Sept. 11.

"I don't know if that would be the right thing to do," Brown said he advised during the exercise staged by the National Defense University's Strategic Gaming Center at Fort McNair. "We can't close the lanes of commerce." In the scenario, an "incident" in Charleston blocked part of the harbor, said Air Force Col. James Haas, a senior military fellow who ran the game at the university. He declined to give many specifics about the incidents because the scenarios might be used again.

"Part of the exercise is determining 'is it a terrorist incident or is it an accident?' Then you have to figure out which (government) agencies are going to be involved."

Brown said Charleston's port was hit by a "dirty bomb," resulting in a major blockage of its shipping channels. An oil tanker blew up in Houston's port, he said.

In the end, most of the group agreed that sealing off seaports would be a bad idea, Brown said. "If you close for one day, it takes 10 days to catch back up."

Tuesday's simulation, called "Impending Storm," was part of an ongoing effort by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to teach members of Congress about the nuances of national security, Haas said, adding that it included terrorism incidents at some landside transportation sites.

Those participating included Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Asa Hutchinson, Homeland Security's undersecretary for border and transportation security.



"It was pretty exciting to be there with the decision-makers," Brown said. "I guess it would have scared you to death if it was real."

In planning the exercise, university officials visited Charleston to learn about its port operations, Haas said. "This could occur in Charleston. It could occur someplace else, too," he said. "Our hope is to create smarter and better government decision-makers."

Similar but much larger efforts are planned for five days later this month. What federal officials say will be the largest homeland security exercise in the nation's history is set to begin May 12. Dubbed TOPOFF 2 (for top officials), the exercise will cost an estimated \$16 million and involve more than 100 federal, state and local agencies, the American Red Cross and Canadian leaders.

Brown said he came away from the game concerned that ports aren't inspecting enough shipping containers. He said it comes down to money, and finding sources to pay for added security measures.

U.S. Customs inspectors examine only a minute percentage of imported containers, saying they rely on other tools such as combing accompanying paperwork to focus their efforts on "flagged" cargo.

Citing a recent war scenario by a Transportation Department contractor that showed that an attack on a U.S. port could cause the economy to collapse within 20 days, U.S. Sen. Fritz Hollings, D-S.C., recently lobbied unsuccessfully to tack an extra \$1 billion for port security onto the federal budget.

[http://charleston.net/stories/050703/loc\\_07game.shtml](http://charleston.net/stories/050703/loc_07game.shtml)

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Los Angeles Times

May 9, 2003

## **U.S. Wants Nuclear Declaration On Iran**

By Times Wire Services

VIENNA — The United States, concerned that Iran may be running a nuclear weapons program, is pushing for the International Atomic Energy Agency to declare that Tehran has violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, diplomats said Thursday.

Washington has accused Tehran of secretly embarking on a program to enrich uranium at Natanz in central Iran that U.S. officials fear could be used to make nuclear weapons.

The diplomats said U.S. requests for support have gone out to Russia, France, Britain, Germany and other members of the 35-nation Board of Governors — the key decision-maker at the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency — ahead of its meeting next month.

In Washington, President Bush expressed concern Thursday that Iran might be developing nuclear arms and said the United States would take the lead in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Bush noted the IAEA's upcoming meeting and said, "We'll wait and see what it says."

Tehran is said to be on track to produce enough enriched uranium by 2005 to make many nuclear bombs a year.

A declaration, depending on its language, could restrict itself to expressing concern about a violation or increase pressure on Tehran to account for its activities by referring the issue to the Security Council.

That would further strain U.S.-Iranian relations, which took a turn for the worse last year after Bush labeled Tehran part of an "axis of evil" for its alleged support of terrorism.

The nature of the work at the Natanz site was not known until last year. The diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the IAEA, was taken aback at what he saw on a visit there in February.

"It's a sophisticated uranium-enrichment plant, and they had come a long way," said one diplomat familiar with the findings of the visit.

An agency spokeswoman, Melissa Fleming, said it was too early to comment on whether Tehran had violated its treaty commitments.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-war-iran9may09,1,4722380.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dworld>

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Washington Times

May 9, 2003

Pg. 15

# U.S. Satellite Photos Hint Of Nuke Activity

## *Smoke seen at North Korean facility*

By Daniel Cooney, Associated Press

SEOUL — The United States has given South Korea a satellite photograph showing smoke coming from a North Korean nuclear facility, a sign the communist nation may have started reprocessing spent fuel rods, a South Korean official said yesterday.

Reprocessing the rods would be a key step toward producing nuclear weapons.

The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said other signs of nuclear activity, such as traces of chemicals used in reprocessing or heat signatures, had not been detected from the Yongbyon nuclear complex. He said the smoke was coming from radiation and chemical laboratories in the facility.

During talks in Beijing last month, U.S. officials said North Korea asserted it had reprocessed 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods — a move that could yield several atomic bombs within months.

However, U.S. and South Korean officials said they could not verify the claim and suggested North Korea may be bluffing in an attempt to increase its leverage in talks with the United States about its reported nuclear weapons programs.

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun travels to the United States on Sunday to meet President Bush. They are to discuss a North Korean proposal in which Pyongyang is believed to offer to end its nuclear activities in exchange for economic aid and a security guarantee from Washington.

A Roh spokesman said officials in Seoul were working closely with the United States to determine whether the North has started reprocessing.

"It is true that signs have been detected in late April, but no additional activities or unusual movement had been confirmed since," he said.

A spokesman for South Korea's Unification Ministry, Kim Jung-ro, said yesterday that the renewed activity at Yongbyon did not necessarily mean the North was reprocessing.

"We are not sure if they are doing it as an extension of the bluffing or if it is a step to develop nuclear weapons. We need more evidence," he said.

In a letter to his armed forces chiefs, South Korean Defense Minister Cho Young-gil said the likelihood that North Korea is committing "provocations" to raise its negotiating power is rising.

"We should strengthen our surveillance of the enemy and our vigilance while shaping up our operations and other military plans," he said in the letter, which was published yesterday in the Defense Ministry's newspaper, Korea Defense Daily.

He said that South Korea and the United States have tried to resolve the nuclear dispute through negotiations, "but if North Korea's aim is achieving nuclear weapons itself, the possibility of a diplomatic resolution could inevitably be limited."

Tension over the nuclear dispute spiked last month during the Beijing talks, when, according to U.S. officials, North Korea claimed to have nuclear weapons and threatened to use or export them, depending on U.S. actions.

The talks were the first since the crisis flared in October, when Washington said North Korea admitted running a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of a 1994 treaty.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030509-82919666.htm>

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New York Times

May 9, 2003

# U.S. Official Is 'Optimistic' On India-Pakistan Dispute

By Carlotta Gall

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 8 — After meeting with the Pakistani president and other officials here, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage said today that he was "cautiously optimistic" about the prospect for renewed relations between India and Pakistan.

On the first day of a tour of Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, Mr. Armitage said the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, had assured him that infiltration by Islamic militants from Pakistan into the part of Kashmir controlled by India had stopped, and that any militant camps found in Pakistan would be closed.

The Kashmir issue has been the major complaint from India, which deployed hundred of thousands of troops on its border after militants attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001. With the two nuclear powers close to war

last year, Mr. Armitage won an agreement from General Musharraf to curb infiltration along the border, and today he said that levels were down.

"Infiltration and cross-border violence, and the lethality, are down from this time last year," he said at a news conference today in the Pakistani capital. "That doesn't fill me with great enthusiasm because, as I say, if anybody suffers I think it is a cause for concern."

He added, "President Musharraf gave me an absolute assurance that there is absolutely nothing happening across the Line of Control, there were no camps in Azad Kashmir and if there were camps they would be gone tomorrow."

Azad Kashmir is the portion of Kashmir that is controlled by Pakistan.

More violence was reported in the disputed territory of Kashmir, where attacks have occurred almost daily. Six people were killed and nine wounded on Wednesday when Indian forces shelled a road on the Pakistan side of the border, hitting a jeep full of people, Agence France-Presse reported today.

Nonetheless, India and Pakistan have surprised many with their sudden overtures for peace in the last two weeks, announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations and road, rail and aviation links. Mr. Armitage described the call for talks by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee as "far-reaching" and welcomed the Pakistani prime minister's telephone call to his Indian counterpart as the beginning of a dialogue.

"I pronounce myself as cautiously optimistic at the beginning of what might be a very good process," he said today. Mr. Armitage said that he had not come to bring pressure on either country in their dispute over Kashmir, but that he hoped to encourage a dialogue. He said he detected confidence on both sides that they could eventually address all the issues between them, including arms control.

Mr. Vajpayee dismissed Pakistan's earlier call for a nuclear-free South Asia in a speech to the Indian Parliament today. "Pakistan's atomic program is India-specific, while ours is not," he said.

Although Pakistani-Indian relations dominated his visit today, Mr. Armitage had other issues on his mind. In a 90-minute meeting this afternoon with General Musharraf, the discussions covered Iraq, Afghanistan and the Pakistan leader's coming visit to Washington in June.

Pakistan currently presides over the United Nations Security Council, and Mr. Armitage said he wanted to lay out the American and British plan to replace the United Nations' oil-for-food program in postwar Iraq. The plan is expected to be presented to the Council at the end of the week. Mr. Armitage did not elaborate on the plan's details, but Pakistan has supported calls for a role for the United Nations in Iraq.

The United States has also asked Pakistan to provide troops for a peacekeeping or stabilization force in Iraq. A senior Pakistani diplomat said Islamabad had not yet decided whether to commit any forces.

Afghanistan was another important topic today. Pakistan has been an American ally in the campaign against global terrorism, yet it has been repeatedly accused of allowing Taliban fighters to launch attacks from its territory against American and Afghan forces, and humanitarian organizations, in Afghanistan.

Five American soldiers have been killed and several more have been wounded in attacks in the last five months, and United States military officials have expressed frustration that Pakistan is not doing enough to curb militant groups on their side of the border.

The United Nations raised its concerns at the increasing attacks on civilian organizations today. Taliban suspects shot and wounded two Afghan personnel with a mine-removal organization in southeastern Afghanistan earlier this week, a United Nations spokesman said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/09/international/asia/09STAN.html>

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Washington Times

May 9, 2003

Pg. 5

## **Inside The Ring**

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

### **Russian germ weapons**

U.S. intelligence officials said Russia is secretly continuing to build deadly biological weapons in violation of an international treaty.

"Their BW production is actually increasing," said one official with access to reports on the issue.

Moscow for decades denied that its military had any offensive biological weapons.

Then in 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that both the Soviet Union and Russia had top-secret offensive germ-weapons programs.

The arms programs violated the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which banned such munitions. Mr. Yeltsin issued an edict that called for Russia to eliminate the biological weapons programs.

However, recent intelligence from Russia makes it clear that the Russians under President Vladimir Putin are continuing the banned germ-weapons programs.

Defense officials said the work is being carried out in still-secret defense laboratories in Russia that are supposed to have halted all work on biological weapons.

Intelligence on the Russian biowarfare programs are particularly embarrassing to officials in charge of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which has spent millions of taxpayer dollars in recent years to supposedly disarm Russian biological warfare centers.

Russia's secret germ-weapons program was believed to be the most advanced of its kind, according to the officials. In addition to anthrax and other traditional warfare agents, Russian scientists had developed genetically engineered weapons that were resistant to antidotes and vaccines.

### **Wolfowitz on Korea**

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is skeptical about the latest offer by North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program — in exchange for major concessions from the United States.

"I think what we're really dealing with on their side is a certain pattern of believing that bad behavior can be rewarded with more concessions from us and our allies," Mr. Wolfowitz told us. "One would have to ask whether what they're talking about is revisiting essentially the whole 1994 agreement but with bigger rewards, or are they really talking about something that is actually realistically dismantling their program and not replacing the framework."

North Korea agreed in 1994 to give up its nuclear arms. But in October, the Bush administration forced Pyongyang to disclose it had been secretly developing a uranium-enrichment program, which can only be used for making fuel for nuclear arms.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030509-90251296.htm>

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