


#258

5 May 2003

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



*Air University*

*Air War College*

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

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[Key Iraqi bio weapons scientist captured](#)

USA Today  
May 1, 2003  
Pg. 10

## **U.S. Official: Scientists Starting To Cooperate**

Captured Iraqi scientists have begun cooperating with the United States in the search for weapons of mass destruction, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said Wednesday. He said the scientists have volunteered information on the locations of other scientists, computer files and documents. However, finding the banned weapons could take months because the Iraqi regime had a more "well-developed and sophisticated strategy" for hiding the weapons than initially believed, Armitage said.

Some critics of the U.S.-led war have focused on the failure to find WMDs, but Armitage said he's confident that they will be found. President Bush gave Iraq's possession of WMDs as a reason for attacking it.

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New York Times  
May 1, 2003

## **North Korea Prompts U.S. To Investigate Nuclear Boast**

By David E. Sanger with Howard W. French

WASHINGTON, April 30 — White House officials have ordered the nation's intelligence agencies to conduct a review of whether North Korea could produce bomb-grade plutonium — as it says it has done — without detection by the United States, according to senior administration officials.

The order to the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies that have long monitored North Korea's nuclear program was prompted by the blunt and direct nature of the North's declaration last week, during negotiations in Beijing, that it was already a nuclear power. It said it had completed reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods that could provide enough plutonium for four to six additional weapons.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described the North Korean assertion in testimony today to a Senate subcommittee, saying, "The North Koreans, in very typical bellicose fashion, accused us of everything imaginable and then said, 'We reprocessed all the fuel rods that were in storage.'"

So far the United States has not been able to verify North Korea's claim to have produced weapons-grade plutonium. "We can't establish that as a matter of fact with our intelligence community, but they said they did it," Mr. Powell said.

Until last week, North Korea had never boasted about its nuclear weapons capability, insisting it was only interested in producing electric power from nuclear reactors. The change in tactics, the administration's Korea experts believe, may be an effort to raise the price of dismantling its program, if President Bush reversed himself and was willing to strike a deal to disarm the country.

"We think they are bluffing," a senior administration official said. "But we felt the necessity to go back and review every possibility, in the off chance that we missed something."

The C.I.A. has long believed that North Korea may have two nuclear weapons developed in the late 1980's or early 1990's, before a 1994 nuclear freeze accord was signed with President Bill Clinton. But the agency is worried about reprocessing, because North Korea could sell plutonium on the open market — a threat Mr. Powell said today that the North Koreans made explicit last week, saying their decision "depends on the American reaction."

The chemical process of reprocessing spent fuel into plutonium lets off a distinct signature — a form of krypton — that can be detected by sensors used by American intelligence agencies for decades, back to the days of the cold war. So far there has been no evidence of that gas, officials say, or other evidence that reprocessing has begun.

But some senior administration officials have long been concerned that the intelligence agencies have missed either a hidden reprocessing plant or one that operates at such a low level that it would not emit a detectable signature.

"I've never been satisfied that we knew everything we should about the nature of their program," one senior administration official said.

Others noted that the White House and the intelligence agencies jointly concluded that all past suspicions of North Korean nuclear activity — including unconfirmed reports that the North imported plutonium from Russia or a former Soviet republic in the 1990's — should now be revisited.

Five years ago the C.I.A. thought it had identified a huge underground plant that could be used for reprocessing. When American officials finally gained access, however, the cave turned out to be empty.

For several years the C.I.A. also suspected, but could not prove, that North Korea had a clandestine program to build a bomb using another process, involving highly enriched uranium. That process does not give off a distinctive signature. The evidence did not come until a year ago, however, and when the North was confronted with it in October, the current crisis began. North Korean officials did not refer to that program directly in the Beijing talks. The findings of the new intelligence review could affect a behind-the-scenes debate now underway within the administration over whether to continue talking to the North Korean government, or to move sometime in the next few weeks or months toward a kind of economic embargo not seen since the Cuban missile crisis.

North Korea has warned that economic penalties would be regarded as an act of war, and so far South Korea and China have argued that they would be a mistake, at a moment when North Korea appears willing to at least discuss giving up its nuclear ambitions.

But inside the administration, a growing number of senior officials believe that the North Koreans miscalculated when they declared in Beijing last week that they are already a nuclear power. The declaration, they argue, pushed China more toward the American position that the North Korean government of Kim Jong Il must not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

"We're in no hurry" to decide on sanctions, said one senior administration official, noting that South Korea's new president, Roh Moo Hyun, and Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, will both be in Washington in coming weeks.

In comments in Seoul today, Mr. Roh was openly skeptical of the North Korean claims, telling his staff that North Korea's admission that it possesses nuclear weapons amounted to "game tactics in North Korea-U.S. negotiations." The Roh administration, which took office in February, has tried to establish its bona fides with Washington after a difficult start to the relationship, as it was sometimes viewed as cool toward the United States.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/01/international/asia/01KORE.html>

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Washington Post

May 1, 2003

Pg. 22

## **N. Korea Calls Sanctions A 'Green Light' To War**

By News Services

SEOUL, April 30 -- North Korea reiterated today in an official news commentary that it has deployed nuclear weapons, and it accused the United States of using its comments on the issue at talks last week as a "mean trick" to hinder negotiations.

North Korea also said it would "take self-defensive measures, regarding it as the green light to a war" if the United States seeks a U.N. resolution authorizing economic sanctions, officials said in a statement issued by KCNA, the official news agency.

In the communique, North Korea said abandoning its nuclear weapons program would leave it defenseless. In the past North Korea has referred to sanctions as a step toward war.

An unnamed spokesman for North Korea's Foreign Ministry was quoted by KCNA as saying that recent U.S. aggression had compelled North Korea "to opt for possessing a necessary deterrent force and put it into practice." The governments of South and North Korea agreed after four days of meetings in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, that the dispute with the United States must be settled peacefully. The joint communique was unlikely to mark a change in attitude by North Korea, since the Communist state agreed to similar communiqués at previous cabinet-level talks.

South Korea's foreign minister, Yoon Young Kwan, declined to answer questions Tuesday as to whether his country would support U.N. sanctions. He described the issue as "very delicate and very sensitive."

North Korea has insisted that the South not meddle in the nuclear standoff, calling it a dispute only with the United States.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said the United States was reviewing an offer by North Korea to give up its missiles and nuclear facilities in exchange for substantial U.S. economic benefits.

The North Koreans floated the proposal in talks with U.S. envoys in Beijing last week. During that meeting, according to a senior U.S. official, North Korea said for the first time that it had nuclear weapons and was contemplating exporting them, depending on U.S. actions.

In Beijing, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, questioned whether North Korean officials had made such an assertion. He said that as far as he knew, they had "not made such a statement."

Liu added that China, which also participated in the Beijing talks, supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula but wants North Korea's "legitimate security concerns" to be addressed.

The German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, today urged the United States to exercise restraint in dealing with North Korea, joining Japan in calling for a diplomatic solution.

"We cannot use the same method as in the case of Iraq," Schroeder said after meeting with Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63008-2003Apr30.html>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced report follows article.)

Washington Times

May 1, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Terror Attacks Fewest Since '69**

*Powell hails U.S. efforts worldwide*

By Sharon Behn, The Washington Times

Terrorist attacks decreased sharply worldwide in 2002 to their lowest level since 1969, the State Department's annual report released yesterday shows, and Secretary of State Colin Powell hailed the war on terrorism for foiling the deadly plots.

"The last time the annual total fell below 200 attacks was in 1969, shortly after the advent of modern terrorism," said Cofer Black, State Department coordinator for counterterrorism.

The report showed a steep reduction in attacks by "international terrorists" to 199 in 2002 from 355 a year earlier — a 44 percent drop.

The number of deaths fell to 725 from 3,295 in 2001, a year that included the September 11 attacks, the report said.

"Terrorist cells have been broken up, networks disrupted and plots foiled," Mr. Powell told reporters as the report was released. "But terrorism still casts its grim shadow across the globe."

In the report, the United States again branded seven countries — Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan — as sponsors of terrorism.

Mr. Black said steps would be taken to remove Iraq from the list now that Saddam Hussein's government has been overthrown.

Cuba, which remained on the list, was accused of sending agents to U.S. missions around the world to provide false leads designed to subvert investigations into the September 11 attacks, the report said.

With the drop-off in attacks around the world, Mr. Powell said unprecedented progress has been made globally.

"With every passing month the campaign has intensified," and for terrorists still on the loose, "life has definitely become more difficult," Mr. Powell said.

But he warned against complacency. "We cannot and will not relax our resolve, our efforts, our vigilance."

The report designated Iran as the most active supporter of terrorism. Its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has referred to Israel as a "cancerous tumor."

The report said Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security have assisted Lebanon's Hezbollah as well as Palestinian groups such as Hamas that reject peace with Israel.

Iraq's ties to terror groups, which the Bush administration cited as one of its reasons for going to war to remove Saddam, threatened the United States and other Western countries, the report said.

A leading member of the Israeli Knesset was in Washington to talk with U.S. lawmakers yesterday, where he said Saudi Arabia would pick up where Iraq had left off and called on Washington to disengage from Riyadh.

"I would urge the United States to disengage from Saudi Arabia and make it known and open that this is a major problem," said Yuri Shtern, chairman of the Knesset's Internal Affairs and Environment Committee.

Mr. Shtern said the war on terrorism would be strengthened if governments shared security information and developed international legislation to cut off the money supply to groups using suicide bombers.

Mr. Shtern's visit came after the 89th suicide bombing in Israel over the last 2½ years. Yesterday's attack, on a popular beachside bar, killed two other persons and injured more than 50 others.

Suicide bombers "are something the modern world is not properly built against. We don't have a set of rules or proper punishment for that. I would like to start an international dialogue on that," he said.

Syria, which Mr. Powell is due to visit this week, permits some terror groups to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus and helps Iran supply Hezbollah via Damascus, the report said.

The Syrian government insists the offices are involved only in political and informational activities, the report said.

Mr. Powell has said he will talk to President Bashar Assad about Syria's support for terror and reports that it helped Iraq with military technology and did not stop Syrian fighters from joining the war against the U.S.-led coalition.

Thirty U.S. citizens were killed in 2002, including seven at a resort in Bali, Indonesia; five at Hebrew University in Jerusalem; Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal's South Asia bureau chief, in Pakistan; a hiker and a missionary in the Philippines; two American diners in a West Bank pizzeria; two attending church services in Islamabad, Pakistan; three persons at a missionary hospital in Yemen; and Laurence Foley, an administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Jordan.

The October bombing in Bali, which killed 202 persons, mostly foreign tourists, was the deadliest terror attack since the September 11 attacks.

In Africa, simultaneous attacks on a commercial airliner and a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in November were cited as dramatic evidence that sub-Saharan Africa continues to suffer from terror.

For the first time, Greece arrested members of the deadly November 17 group, the State Department said, in a significant step against domestic terrorism.

*This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030501-4235328.htm>

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## 2002

### Patterns of Global Terrorism

The annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report, released April 2003 by the Secretary of State and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. . . .

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/>

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Los Angeles Times

May 1, 2003

## 11 Islamic Groups Added To Terror List

*State Department says progress has been made in foiling plots. A new center will serve as a clearinghouse for threat information gathering.*

By Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The State Department added 11 militant Islamic groups to its official list of terrorist organizations Wednesday but said that international efforts had reduced worldwide terrorist attacks and doubled the number of Al Qaeda members in custody to more than 3,000.

In releasing the report, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said that around the world, "terrorist cells have been broken up, networks disrupted and plots foiled." Yet he warned that despite the progress, terrorists are planning "appalling crimes and trying to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction."

"We cannot and will not relax our resolve," he added.

Separately, U.S. officials said a new terrorism intelligence center is scheduled to begin operations today.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is supposed to solve information-sharing problems that plagued the CIA, the FBI and other agencies in the months before the Sept. 11 attacks.

The center was announced by President Bush in his State of the Union address last year. It initially will be based at CIA headquarters, with about 50 analysts and other experts, largely drawn from the CIA and FBI.

John Brennan, a longtime CIA official in charge of the new center, said it will have access to a variety of intelligence data and will produce a daily "threat matrix" distributed to top government officials. The matrix was previously drafted each day by the CIA and the FBI.

Brennan also said the center will provide the "analytic basis" for the government's color-coded threat alert system. In the annual terrorist activity survey, the State Department left unchanged its list of state sponsors of terrorism: Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Libya and Cuba. Nations on the list are ineligible for U.S. economic aid and arms sales and barred from buying so-called dual-use products that could be used for both civilian and military purposes.

Now that Saddam Hussein has been overthrown, Powell has recommended that Bush drop U.S. sanctions against Iraq, officials said.

Syria was included on the list even as Powell prepared to visit Damascus to seek greater cooperation from Syrian President Bashar Assad. Officials acknowledged that Syria has helped the United States in its hunt for Al Qaeda operatives but criticized the country for continuing to host and support such groups as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Syria also has come in for criticism from the administration in recent weeks for allegedly allowing Iraqi officials to flee through its territory and militants to cross it en route to attacking U.S. forces in Iraq.

Officials cited progress by Libya and Sudan, yet said that the countries still need to do more. Libya "has again failed to comply with United Nations requirements related to the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland," it said. The U.S. maintains that the Libyan government has not acknowledged criminal responsibility for the bombing — in which 279 people were killed — as the U.N. requires. The report faulted Sudan for permitting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to have a presence in the country.

The report said Al Qaeda suspects have now been arrested in 100 countries. About 1,600 Al Qaeda members were in custody at the time of last year's report.

The 11 newly listed Islamic groups included Ansar al-Islam, a group that was based in Kurdistan and took a heavy beating by U.S. and Kurdish forces in the war on Iraq. The U.S. has said it believes Ansar al-Islam was linked to Al Qaeda.

Also among them was Hizb-i Islami, founded by Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, a group affiliated with the Chechen rebels who attacked a Moscow theater last fall; and the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Uighur separatist group based in China's Xinjiang province. China has been urging the Bush administration to begin an effort against the group.

Just as it did last year, the report praised the international effort against terrorism. It said the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were an important part of the effort.

Officials sought to emphasize the decline in terrorist attacks, saying it brought the level of terrorism to the lowest point in 30 years. Cofer Black, the State Department's coordinator for terrorism, said the decline was "a remarkable achievement."

Yet the drop reflected, in large part, not efforts in the unsettled Middle East but a falloff in attacks by Colombian rebels against that country's oil pipelines. There were 41 such attacks in 2002, down from 178 the year before. The attacks are aimed at depriving the Colombian government of oil revenue.

Governments made some progress in freezing the assets of terrorist groups. In 2001, they had confiscated \$116 million; with this report, the total has reached \$134 million.

Deaths from terrorist attacks fell to 725, from 3,295 in 2001, a year that included the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Thirty Americans were among those killed in terrorist attacks in 2002.

Officials said 2002 included horrific attacks, including a bombing in Bali in October that killed about 200. The terrorist attack by Chechen militants on a Moscow theater involved 800 hostages, a record, officials said.

*Times staff writer Greg Miller contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-terror1may01,1,3942858.story>

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Time.com

April 30, 2003

## **The FBI Plans To Warn Nuclear Facilities**

*The bureau says there are no specific threats, but asks that plants stay on guard for suspicious actions*



By Elaine Shannon

TIME has learned that sometime today the FBI plans to send a classified Intelligence Bulletin to 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies over its secure telecommunications network, advising officials to pay attention to suspicious activities around nuclear power plants, and including people who are spotted photographing them and light aircraft flying near them. There have been a number of past instances in which light aircraft have flown too close to nuclear plants, and while the aircraft have turned out to be pilots who have flown off course or simply been curious about nuclear plants, all such sightings must be reported to the FAA by tail number immediately.

FBI officials say they have no specific intelligence that these plants are imminent targets of a terrorist attack. Still, says one FBI official, "It's one of the vulnerabilities, and it's something that's taken very seriously."

<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,448284,00.html>

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London Times

May 1, 2003

## **Chechen Siege Hostages Still Dying Of Gas Effects**

By Clem Cecil, Moscow

Forty people who survived the Chechen theatre siege last year have since died from the effects of the noxious gases pumped into the building, according to a lawyer representing the victims.

Igor Trunov has 100 clients who are suffering from the side-effects of the substance that was used to knock out the rebels in a rescue operation that killed 129 people at the time.

Forty Chechen rebels seized the theatre during the performance of the musical *Nord Ost* in Moscow on October 23 last year, taking more than 800 people hostage for almost three days.

Mr Trunov said yesterday: "Eighty per cent of the former hostages are suffering from different illnesses directly connected to their exposure to the substance."

One of his clients, Tatyana Karpova, head of Nord Ost, the charity set up for the victims of the siege, said in court yesterday that 40 former hostages had died since the storming of the theatre. Mr Trunov confirmed the statement.

The ingredients of the gas, which was pumped through air vents into the auditorium, has not been disclosed by the Government, rendering medical treatment almost ineffective as doctors struggle to diagnose the sufferers' symptoms.

A week after the siege, the Health Ministry disclosed the substance to be a compound based on fentanyl, a potent synthetic opiate that was first used as a painkiller in the Soviet Army. It is estimated to be 100 times stronger than morphine.

However, German doctors testing the urine of German hostages also identified traces of halothane, an anaesthetic, and American doctors speculated that the gas contained BZ, a hallucinogenic drug and a chemical warfare agent. The cocktail is proving to have lethal long-term effects. Nikolai Lyubimov, 71, worked as a night porter in the theatre complex when the rebels struck. The right side of his body was paralysed for three months after the bungled rescue and his face and arm are still paralysed, making speech difficult. He can no longer feed himself.

"My arm is like a piece of old rope — completely useless," he said. He was dismissed from his job and now struggles by on a tiny pension, which he cannot afford to spend on medicines to alleviate his condition. "I know I will carry my handicap to the grave," he said.

Younger people have also been chronically affected: a 30-year-old woman who wished to remain anonymous said that she was weakened severely and that she found it difficult to climb the five floors to her apartment.

"I often have dizzy spells, my memory has got worse and my liver aches. I am too weak to play with my son in the park and I have to take time off work," she said yesterday. Other former hostages are said to have similar symptoms.

The Moscow Healthcare Committee denied reports that 40 more people had died from the gas. Sergei Polyakov, the first deputy head of the Healthcare Committee, said: "The former hostages are under observation in the city's medical establishments."

Former hostages say that they have to pay for healthcare and that it is too expensive. They also say that treatment is ineffective because the doctors do not know what they are dealing with. Mr Milolidov, whose 14-year-old daughter, was killed, said: "They treat hostages as if they had been poisoned with household cleaning liquids."

German doctors said that the gas alone did less to kill the hostages than what followed. There was an insufficient medical presence near the theatre when it was stormed and hostages were carried carelessly into buses. Many swallowed their tongues, starving their organs of oxygen.

Mr Trunov, who has filed 61 lawsuits seeking moral damages from the Moscow city government, believes that doctors removed the vital organs of the dead hostages in order to make post mortem examinations impossible. Twenty of the 61 lawsuits have been rejected.

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-3-664958,00.html>

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Washington Times

May 2, 2003

Pg. 3

## Final Tests Find No Nerve Agents In Iraqi Chemical

By Guy Taylor, The Washington Times

TIKRIT, Iraq — Military officials yesterday said suspicious 55-gallon drums found in northern Iraq do not contain a chemical agent used to make weapons of mass destruction, nullifying earlier field tests that indicated nerve agents were present.

The fluid "appears to be a component of a liquid rocket fuel" that showed up in multiple tests as false positives of nerve and mustard agents, said Maj. Dean Thurmond, a spokesman for the Army's V Corps.

The drums were not holding a "weaponized chemical," Maj. Thurmond said.

Officials with the Army's 4th Infantry Division, the first to announce that initial tests on the drums were positive for chemicals used to make weapons of mass destruction, now say they are not able to comment because the matter is being handled by V Corps.

On several occasions since Saddam Hussein's regime was toppled, military officials have announced the potential discovery of unconventional weapons, only to have initial tests of the findings shot down by more intensive investigation.

Before the war, President Bush aggressively argued the need to strip Saddam of chemical and biological weapons and any remaining elements of a nuclear-weapons program, which Mr. Bush said were being hidden from United Nations weapons inspectors.

Military officials have said their field testing equipment is designed to err on the side of caution to protect soldiers in combat.

Maj. Thurmond said the fuel component inside the 55-gallon drums contained a derivative of the sarin chemical.

While the derivative is not used to make nerve agent, it evidently caused field testing equipment to turn up the false positives.

The Washington Times first reported Sunday that a 4th Infantry reconnaissance unit had secured the site where the 14 drums were discovered by U.S. special forces near the industrial town of Baiji, about 115 miles north of Baghdad.

Lt. Col. Ted Martin, the unit's commander, had said initial tests of a clear, waterlike fluid from one of the drums turned up positive for cyclo-sarin nerve agent and a mustard agent.

On Saturday, Lt. Valerie Phipps, a chemical- and biological-weapons specialist with a reconnaissance element of the 4th Infantry, said that tests of the fluid inside one drum "detected mustard [agent], and we detected another unknown agent."

"We've confirmed that we have a cyclo-sarin agent also known as CF," she had said, based on the initial tests conducted by soldiers using field equipment including kits with chemical test paper.

On Sunday, Lt. Col. Valentine Novikov, the 4th Infantry's chemical officer, said a second round of more sophisticated field tests also was positive for a nerve agent, although the tests were inconclusive about what type of nerve agent.

Stressing that field tests can turn up false positives, he had said a mobile exploitation team would need to take samples that would be sent to laboratories in the United States, Europe and the Persian Gulf to determine conclusively whether they contained a nerve agent.

However, Maj. Thurmond yesterday said the mobile exploitation team that went to the site conducted more thorough tests and "determined they didn't need to take samples to send to other labs."

Military officials have said they will continue the hunt for weapons of mass destruction and will be more careful about publicizing potential findings.

An Iraqi scientist who worked in the biological-weapons program in the 1980s has said he and colleagues lied to U.N. weapons inspectors.



Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, has said that coalition forces will "probably go through 1,000 sites" where weapons may be stored.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030502-72441960.htm>

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Washington Times

May 2, 2003

Pg. 18

## **U.S. Wants U.N. Atomic Agency To Probe, Cite Iran**

By Eli J. Lake, United Press International

The U.S. government is pressing the United Nations' atomic watchdog to take action on what Washington believes are violations by Iran of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, administration sources said yesterday. Should the Vienna, Austria-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) establish there is credible information that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, the consequences to Tehran could be international economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

The only countries ever to be found in violation of the treaty are Iraq and North Korea. If a similar determination were made in the case of Iran, U.S. officials would expect at least a meeting of the U.N. Security Council similar to the one held last month to discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The sources said U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brill, in a closed-door meeting of IAEA's board of governors on March 17, formally requested that the agency's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei submit a report by June 16 on whether Iran's nuclear-power program is directed only to peaceful purposes.

U.S. intelligence agencies have compiled new evidence in the past year indicating Iran is closer to developing nuclear weapons than earlier thought. Some U.S. analysts and outside experts predict Tehran will be able to produce weapons-grade material on a regular basis by late 2005.

"For a long time the U.S. government has had intelligence indicating that Iran indeed is seeking nuclear weapons," Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration, said earlier this week. "This would be the first time the international organization charged with monitoring Iran's performance would raise questions about Iran's intentions."

John Wolf, the present assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, also met with Mr. ElBaradei on Wednesday in Geneva to press the case against Iran.

"Despite professions of transparency and peaceful intent, Iran is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq," he said Monday to a gathering of diplomats in Geneva.

Earlier in April, Undersecretary of State John Bolton met with Mr. ElBaradei to push for a tough assessment of Iran's nuclear program.

"We hope the [IAEA] report will be as hard-hitting and thorough as possible," one senior State Department official said Monday.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030502-78717128.htm>

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Insight Magazine

May 13, 2003

## **The Hunt Is On For Saddam's Weapons**

By Kenneth R. Timmerman

Liberals on Capitol Hill and in the media are screaming, "Where are the weapons?" Since the White House had argued that disarming Saddam was the main reason for going to war, not finding his forbidden weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) all lined up like prizes at a seaside shooting gallery has excited the president's political enemies to cry foul.

Ewan Buchanan, spokesman for chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, assures Insight that "it's far too early to tell" whether forbidden weapons remain in Iraq or where they might be. "It doesn't surprise me that U.S. forces haven't found anything yet. The main job of the troops so far has been security, not looking for weapons," he says.

So far, coalition forces have found large quantities of chemical-weapons defensive gear, scattered chemicals and a variety of suspicious-looking sealed storage sites whose contents still are being examined. At one point, soldiers stumbled on a series of large buried containers that military analysts initially believed resembled the "mobile biological-production labs" Secretary of State Colin Powell described to the United Nations during his briefing in February. Once examined in more detail they turned out to contain documents, potentially promising, and equipment for a conventional-ammunition loading line. "It looked at first like it was [chemical weapons]-related," a defense official tells Insight, "but in the end, it wasn't."

And while these sites and others whose contents have not yet been made public indeed could house portions of Saddam's suspected arsenal of illegal weapons, Pentagon and White House officials acknowledge that they haven't yet found anything like the suspected 100 to 500 tons of chemical-weapons agents or precursors Powell mentioned before the war, let alone biological-weapons material, secret nuclear-production labs or telltale documents. Indeed, at a press briefing in Doha, Qatar, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) spokesman Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks acknowledged the obvious. "We've not found any weaponized chemicals, biological agents or any nuclear devices at this point," he told reporters, who promptly headlined CENTCOM's failure. Lost in the media spin was Brooks' more telling statement: "That work is ongoing, as I've mentioned. And we'll be patient about it, and we'll remain very deliberate about how we do our work."

One reason for the patience and the dogged determination is the wealth of detailed information, much of it already in the public domain, about Saddam's quest to build chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Information on Saddam's foreign suppliers repeatedly has leaked to the press, both from the U.N. inspectors and from various allied governments. For years, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) has spirited out defectors from Iraqi weapons programs who have provided details from inside Saddam's secret maze of weapons plants. The hard job now is getting up-to-the-minute intelligence. "What you think is good intelligence turns out to be not so good when you get up close," a top U.N. intelligence analyst who worked on the Iraqi programs tells Insight. "They [the Iraqis] were very skilled at cleaning up after their defectors so that, when we went to inspect, what they had told us about was already gone." The United States now is analyzing samples of chemical agents taken from dozens of locations and combing through computer hard drives and documents seized in government offices and from secret stashes discovered behind freshly cemented walls throughout Iraq. The search will be long, complex and riddled with ambiguity, not least because Iraq's known weapons facilities were cleared well before the U.N. inspectors returned to Iraq last fall.

U.S. and U.N. officials tell Insight that the Iraqis most likely have hidden vital equipment and material in underground tunnels or behind fake walls in hospitals and private homes, in the desert and in mountains and even in rivers, where U.S. troops found extraordinarily high levels of cyanide as they approached Baghdad. (The cyanide apparently had been dumped in haste by Iraqi intelligence units as coalition troops approached, with no concern for contaminating drinking water for the local population, to destroy traces of deadly weapons.) "The Iraqis built denial and deception into everything they did," one U.S. defense official tells Insight. If Saddam was producing weapons in secret in the weeks prior to the war, neither the United Nations nor the United States has figured out where he was doing it.

"I don't think we'll discover anything," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Pentagon employees at a town-hall meeting on April 17. "I think what will happen is we'll discover people who will tell us where to go find it. It is not like a treasure hunt where you just run around looking everywhere, hoping you find something."

On April 18, the Pentagon announced it was forming a 1,000-man "Iraq Survey Group" (ISG) to hunt for Saddam's forbidden weapons. Charles Duelfer, a former State Department official who was deputy-chief arms inspector for the United Nations before Hans Blix took over in 2000, has been tapped by the White House to join the U.S. inspection effort. The ISG will include U.S. military intelligence and CIA analysts, as well as other former U.N. arms inspectors who have been recruited by the United States because of their special knowledge of Iraq's weapons systems and its foreign procurement network. They will report to the Defense Intelligence Agency's deputy director for intelligence operations, a major general, who is expected to leave his current position and fly to Iraq by the time this issue of Insight reaches newsstands. They also are receiving invaluable assistance from the Free Iraqi Forces, U.S.-trained Iraqi irregular forces under the command of Arras Kareem, a top deputy to INC spokesman Ahmad Chalabi who personally has worked with Iraqi defectors and has extensive knowledge of Saddam's weapons programs.

Kareem's men already have tracked down many top Ba'ath Party leaders and turned them over to coalition forces for questioning and have led U.S. troops to suspected weapons sites. But it will take several weeks for the new U.S.-led inspection team to become fully operational and months before a clear picture emerges of Saddam's WMDs. In the meantime, the ranks of the ISG are expected to swell as specialists for other U.S. government agencies join the effort to hunt down Saddam's missing weapons.

Until now, whenever coalition forces have stumbled upon suspicious sites they have called in units of the 75th Intelligence Exploitation Task Force, a 3,000-man field-artillery brigade based in Fort Sill, Okla. But as priorities on the ground shift, two of the four Mobile Exploitation Teams (METs) of the 75th have been reassigned to tasks other than inspecting suspected WMD sites, including a search for sensitive documents that might provide clues to Saddam's relationship to al-Qaeda terrorists or the whereabouts of still-missing prisoners of war.

Pentagon officials now believe that many secret WMD production and storage sites already may have been looted, in some cases by Ba'ath Party runaways who have stripped them of incriminating evidence as they seek to avoid prosecution as war criminals. "Some of the looting is actually strategic," says Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith.

"The big advantage the United States has over us will be its ability to interview people," the U.N.'s Buchanan acknowledged. The United Nations politely asked the Iraqi authorities under Saddam if they could interview weapons scientists, but chief inspector Blix never insisted that the interviews take place without Iraqi-government surveillance and never provided security to the families of weapons scientists.

Buchanan believes the United States could have just the opposite problem now that Saddam is gone: "They could have too many people willing to come forward with leads and tips. Nobody here at the U.N. is crowing about how this is going. We know it's a long, painstaking job."

The U.N. intelligence analyst describes the limitations of Western intelligence before the war: "All we could do was look at the material balance between the equipment and chemicals we knew that Iraq had purchased from overseas, and what his people could show us or document that they had destroyed." The discrepancies were enormous and led to U.S. and U.N. allegations that Iraq was hiding between 100 to 500 tons of chemical-weapons agents, had destroyed several thousand liters of weaponized anthrax and had retained at least a dozen extended-range Scud missiles. "But the truth is, nobody really knows how many weapons Saddam could have," the analyst said. "What happened between the expulsion of U.N. inspectors in 1998 and our return in November 2002 is anyone's guess." The U.S. insistence that Iraq was hiding massive quantities of forbidden weapons was "either a great bluff or a game of chicken," he says. "If the Iraqis have nothing, as they claim, they should have been encouraging their scientists to come forward and tell us in private how they destroyed the weapons. But they weren't doing this."

Just weeks before the war, Blix finally convinced Amir al-Saadi to make available a handful of scientists out of the hundreds of names the United Nations had presented to the Iraqi authorities. But in every case, the scientists insisted on being accompanied by an Iraqi government "minder," or that their interview should be taped and turned over to Iraqi intelligence, out of fear they would be accused of having betrayed state secrets.

Not a single scientist Blix sought to interview agreed to the conditions set out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, which was adopted unanimously last November, that the interview be conducted outside of Iraq. When Blix reported on the lack of cooperation by the Iraqi government, he never recommended that the Security Council consider it a "material breach" of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. And France and Russia conveniently forgot that they had voted for the requirement in the first place.

The failure of international inspections has convinced the Bush administration that it has the moral authority and the duty to conduct this latest effort to find Saddam's weapons alone.

"We're looking at a jigsaw puzzle, not a smoking gun," a defense official tells Insight. "We'll find pages from a document here, other pages from another document there, and have to piece them together. But I have no doubt that in the end, we will find significant facilities. There has got to be an underground lab or an underground complex in addition to the mobile production labs. These scientists are not going to chase mobile labs around the country, day after day, week after week. They've got families, homes. They need to have fixed facilities where they do their research. And we'll find them. It's just going to take awhile. We need to have the patience and the abilities of a homicide detective. It will be one thing, one detail, that they forgot to clear away that will give them away."

In one case that has become public, an Iraqi scientist who had worked in the chemical-weapons program turned himself over to U.S. troops in mid-April and led them to sites where his bosses had stockpiled deadly ingredients for chemical weapons and production equipment. A New York Times reporter embedded with the 101st Airborne, which was overseeing the investigation, described the find as "the most important discovery to date in the hunt for illegal weapons."

The United States is hoping to get help from several top Iraqi weapons scientists and program managers who have been captured or have given themselves up to coalition forces. Top among them are Jaafar Dhia Jaafar, the head of the Iraqi nuclear-weapons program, and Lt. Gen. Amir Hamoodi al-Saadi, a presidential scientific adviser.

Al-Saadi gave himself up to U.S. troops in Baghdad after calling a German TV crew to give an interview, reiterating the official Iraqi posture that the regime had destroyed all weapons of mass destruction shortly after the 1991 Gulf War. A German-trained chemical engineer who is married to a German woman, al-Saadi is widely credited with having built Iraq's vast chemical-weapons infrastructure and petrochemical industry. In the 1980s he supervised the

procurement of missile technology in the West, especially from German companies, under the guidance of Saddam's cousin and son-in-law, Hussein Kamel al-Majid - who was murdered by Saddam's sons in 1996 when he returned to Iraq from Jordan after defecting several months earlier.

In an interview with this reporter in Baghdad in 1989, his first-ever with a Western journalist, al-Saadi boasted that Iraq had designed and produced its long-range missiles indigenously, at a time when most western observers found such claims unbelievable. Al-Saadi's genius for organization and for embedding weapons-production facilities within large civilian plants helped Iraq elude U.N. weapons inspectors in the immediate aftermath of Gulf War I. As Saddam's science adviser, he became the point man for the regime in misleading U.N. inspectors. "He and Jaafar may be telling a different story behind closed doors once they are sure what their fate will be," said the U.N.'s Buchanan. Both could face prosecution as war criminals and may be seeking to plea bargain with their captors in exchange for information.

"If anybody knows where the weapons are buried, it is Amir Saadi," a U.S. defense official says. "I'd be very surprised if he had been kept in the dark." Until the tongues of people such as al-Saadi, Jaafar and other Iraqi weapons scientists begin to wag, don't hold your breath that U.S. troops will stumble on Saddam's best-kept secrets by chance.

*Kenneth R. Timmerman is a senior writer for Insight magazine.*

<http://www.insightmag.com/news/428701.html>

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Business Week

May 12, 2003

## **The Next Nuclear Power: Iran?**

Even though the Russian nuclear industry is showing promising signs of growth, one issue continues to dog it: involvement in Iran's nuclear program. Ever since Russian companies, led by Atomstroieksport, signed an \$800 million contract in 1996 to build Iran's only nuclear reactor, a 1,000-megawatt plant at Bushehr on the country's Persian Gulf coast, the U.S. government has feared - that the facility could be used to help Iran develop a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

It now seems that Tehran is dramatically closer to being able to produce atomic bombs than even Washington suspected -- although the Bushehr reactor and the Russians may actually play a marginal role. Early this year, Iran admitted that it had secretly built a sophisticated uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, north of the central Iranian city of Isphahan. Experts say that when the plant is completed in 2005, Iran would be able to produce several uranium-based bombs each year. The existence of the Natanz facility, along with that of a heavy-water plant at Arak in northwest Iran, was revealed by an Iranian opposition group last August and later confirmed by satellite reconnaissance. Iran later verified the information. "This is the elephant in the room that everybody is starting to notice," says Patrick Clawson, an Iran specialist and deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank.

The revelations, for one, could fray relations between the U.S. and other key nations, already under strain over the war in Iraq. The sophisticated centrifuges at the Natanz plant -- 160 are operational and 1,000 more are to come onstream in the next 18 months -- are believed to be based on Pakistani technology. And China has admitted to supplying the facility with uranium hexafluoride, a gas that is key in producing the fissile uranium 235 isotope. "We told China not to cooperate with Iran," says a senior Bush Administration official in Washington. Others -- the Russians, along with several European states -- may also be involved: "We're out there banging on people's heads." Europeans, however, have always rejected Washington's hard-line policy toward Tehran -- a member of the so-called axis of evil -- and may react negatively to new saber-rattling over the Iranian nuclear program. They still largely back reform-minded President Mohammed Khatami.

It could get worse. If Iran has already enriched any uranium, it would be in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, which it signed in 1970. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, made an emergency visit to Natanz in late February and is now quietly negotiating with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to persuade it to sign on to a tougher inspection regime. So far, Tehran is balking. ElBaradei will report on the matter to the IAEA's board in June.

So is the world faced with a potentially more serious, Middle East version of the showdown over North Korea's nuclear weapons program? Akbar Etemad, the former head of Iran's atomic energy program, thinks so. "A nuclear weapons program in Iran? I would be surprised if there were none," he says. "They have seen North Korea and the

fact that nuclear weapons make you more respected and make people talk to you." One of the world's most unstable regions may be about to become more dangerous still.

**By John Rossant in Paris**

[http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03\\_19/b3832062\\_mz014.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_19/b3832062_mz014.htm)

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Christian Science Monitor

May 2, 2003

## **Assailed By US Rhetoric, Syria Circles Its Wagons**

*Colin Powell is expected to deliver a tough message to Syria when he arrives Saturday.*

By Nicholas Blanford, Special to The Christian Science Monitor

DAMASCUS, SYRIA – Secretary of State Colin Powell arrives here tomorrow for crucial talks during which he is expected to pressure the Syrian government to drop its support for militant anti-Israel groups and abandon its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

But the Syrians, stung by a recent barrage of criticism from Washington, are reluctant to yield to what they see as uncompromising American diktats.

From the presidential palace sitting on a bluff overlooking Damascus to the narrow passageways of the Old City, Syrians view the recent flurry of accusations and demands from Washington with a mixture of alarm and anger.

"We take these threats very seriously," says a Syrian engineer who works for a US firm. "Syria is now surrounded by American countries - Iraq, Turkey, Israel, and Jordan," he says, sipping a tiny glass of steaming tea. "What can we do?"

Syrians were stunned when during the war in Iraq senior administration officials turned on Damascus, accusing it of allowing Arab volunteer fighters into Iraq, harboring fugitives from Saddam Hussein's regime, and smuggling weapons into Iraq.

Although US rhetoric has died down in recent days, the foreign ministers of France and Japan each called upon Syria on Wednesday to withdraw support from radical Arab groups such as Hizbullah. The ministers also asked Syria to support the US-backed "road map" plan for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But it is Washington's words that have most deeply rankled Damascus. Most Syrians and many diplomats in Damascus believe that the Bush administration is riding roughshod over Syrian sensibilities and complicating the efforts of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to usher in domestic reforms.

"It's a very difficult business for Bashar," says a European diplomat. "If he feels he's being humiliated from outside, like with these public demands from the Americans, then he has to retreat into the old nationalist rhetoric.

Otherwise, he will appear weak to the Syrian people."

Diplomats who have met Mr. Assad say that the president has a clear vision of how he would like to see Syria progress and speaks openly of the obstacles facing him, such as a sluggish and corrupt bureaucracy and the reluctance of the country's ruling elite to implement change that might threaten their influence.

He is forced to tread a narrow path through many conflicting interests in Syria. For example, Assad's staunch public opposition to the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq arose partly out of a genuine concern at US ambitions for the Middle East. But it was also a case of political expediency, reflecting the strong antiwar sentiment in Syria and the deep sense of Arab unity and pride felt by ordinary Syrians. Assad's stance lost him the sympathy of Washington, but he gained increased popularity among Syrians and other Arabs who viewed him as the only Arab leader willing to publicly challenge the US.

When Washington criticized Damascus midway through the war, Syria reacted defensively, denying the charges outright.

It apparently took the personal intervention of Jacques Chirac, the French president, who has close ties to Assad, to persuade Damascus to take Washington's threats seriously. The border with Iraq was closed and Iraqi refugees turned away.

"The Syrians are rattled by what happened in Iraq and the pressure from the Americans... but they cannot be seen caving in to US demands," says a diplomat.

Syrians are still fuming over a visit last weekend to Damascus by Tom Lantos, the top Democrat on the House of Representatives' International Relations Committee and a longtime critic of Syria.

Mr. Lantos publicly chastised the Syrian government, declaring it had made a "historic mistake" in supporting Iraq, and saying that "the time is long overdue to correct the course of Syrian policy."

He delivered to Assad a list of conditions that Damascus should fulfill "if Syria is to forge a new relationship with the United States." Syrians regarded Lantos's demands as the height of American arrogance and bad manners. "The Syrians are very sensitive to external pressure and unfortunately this is a factor that the Americans fail to appreciate," says Mohammed Aziz Shukri, a professor of international law at Damascus University. Professor Shukri, who was involved in a Syrian-US dialogue program with Houston's Rice University last year, says he is at a loss to explain what he describes as Washington's hostility toward the Arab world. "The US administration is acting so irresponsibly that they will end up paying for it," he says. "Sooner or later, the American people will realize that their government has led them into an unholy war with 1.5 billion Muslims." Syrians argue that Washington fails to understand the complexities and dynamics of Arab and Islamic society. They point to the example of the Bush administration's apparent surprise at the rapid mobilization of Iraq's majority Shiite community and opposition to the presence of American troops in Iraq. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Sharaa publicly mentioned this week what he called the "dangerous misunderstanding" between the Washington and Damascus in reference to US warnings for Syria and Iran not to interfere in nation-building efforts in Iraq. Syria has indicated a willingness to engage with Washington, toning down its opposition to the "road map" charting the path to Palestinian statehood which was released to the Israelis and Palestinians on Wednesday. But at the same time, Damascus insists that the road map include Syria and Lebanon, underlining a concern here that the two countries will be overlooked as the Palestinians and Israelis move ahead with their peace plans. On the more fundamental issues, such as Syria's support for groups like Hamas and Lebanon's Hizbullah, diplomats and analysts here believe that Damascus is unlikely to bend to Washington's demands if nothing concrete is being offered in return. "It's like we are being ordered to not only drop our guns but to bend down and kiss the Americans' feet as well. And all we get in exchange is a promise of a smile," a Syrian analyst says.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0502/p04s02-wome.html>

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Washington Times  
May 2, 2003  
Pg. B1

## Fort Detrick To Raze Old Anthrax Plant

By David Dishneau, Associated Press

FREDERICK, Md. -- Bernard "Lefty" Kreh met a simple qualification for a job mass-producing anthrax: he didn't smoke.

Safety procedures for entering and exiting the plant at Fort Detrick were so time-consuming that the Army frowned on smoke breaks, he said. So the young World War II veteran went to work in Building 470, a seven-story tower crucial to America's offensive biological weapons program.

"I was very lucky," said Mr. Kreh, 78, who survived an anthrax skin infection at the plant and is now a renowned fly fisherman. "I was one of the first civilians hired there."

Now, 50 years after it opened, the tower is coming down. The demolition, which is expected to begin this spring and conclude by year-end, will erase a Cold War landmark that operated in secrecy and which some still view with fearful fascination.

The brick-by-brick dismantling by Controlled Demolition Inc. of Phoenix, Md., at a cost of \$4 million to \$5 million, should put to rest a long-running rumor that Building 470 is too contaminated to tear down, said Cheryl Parrott, spokeswoman for the National Cancer Institute, which took possession of the building in 1988.

A decontamination completed in 1971 was thorough, she said, "and all the tests through October of 2002, when we last sampled, showed no evidence of *Bacillus anthracis*," the agent that causes anthrax.

The agency plans to build a parking lot on the site for its laboratory workers in two attached buildings, she said. The red brick tower is badly decayed, having stood unoccupied and unused - except for occasional storage - since President Richard Nixon banned production of biological weapons in 1969.

Fort Detrick remains a center for bioweapons defense research, focusing on vaccines and antidotes.

Behind the crumbling facade and peeling walls of Building 470, much of the laboratory equipment remains intact.

Most striking are two, 3,000-gallon stainless steel fermentation tanks, four stories tall, in which workers brewed batches of anthrax spores that were dried, processed and packaged into bombs that the Army says were never used except for testing.



The government designated Fort Detrick, about 50 miles northwest of Washington, as the primary research and development site for biological weapons in 1943. Other sites for research, field-testing or production were established at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah; Horn Island, Miss.; Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and Vigo, Ind. At Fort Detrick, the weapons were tested on animals in the Eight Ball, a million-liter steel sphere located elsewhere on the post that is on the National Register of Historic Places.

No such preservation is planned for Building 470, although Parrott said some of the equipment will go to the National Museum of Health and Medicine at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, home of the bullet that killed Abraham Lincoln and a stomach-shaped hairball removed from a 12-year-old girl.

Fort Detrick historian Norman M. Covert, the post's retired public affairs officer, said he'd like to see more of the artifacts preserved for local display.

"The equipment that's there is part of the history of the biomedical world. It made possible great medical advances," he said.

The building, while too decrepit to save, is "kind of a standing museum. It's a moment in time," Mr. Covert said.

"Certainly, in the folklore of Frederick, it has taken on a life of its own that has transcended what was really reality, mainly because people didn't always believe what the Army said - and some of that was justifiable because of the secrets that were kept over the years."

Nobody working in Building 470 died of anthrax - another persistent rumor - but three workers elsewhere at Fort Detrick died from infection with agents that were being researched as biological weapons, the post newspaper, the Fort Detrick Standard, reported.

Several others survived close calls, despite immunizations and stringent safety measures for those who worked with the germs. Mr. Kreh, a shift supervisor in Building 470, contracted the skin form of anthrax after tearing a protective glove on a valve.

"I can't even remember which hand it was," he said. "I do remember the hand got black. I was a month in the hospital with the thing."

The strain of anthrax that infected him was genetically changed by its human contact and named by researchers with Mr. Kreh's initials, BVK, according to former plant manager Orley Bourland, 76, of Walkersville, Md.

No one was hurt in the plant's most dramatic accident, a 2,000-gallon spill of anthrax slurry in 1958 when a technician tried to pry open a stuck valve with a screwdriver, Bourland said.

Mr. Kreh, who now lives in Cockeysville, said perhaps too much secrecy shrouded the bioweapons program, which also developed processes for high-volume freeze-drying and penicillin production.

"I've always felt we made a mistake there in being too secretive about things and not sharing some of the beneficial things," he said.

Another former plant worker, Alan M. Miller of Frederick, said he was proud of his work at Fort Detrick.

"I think we all think highly of ourselves and what we did back then, but it's not really needed in the present scheme of things," he said.

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New York Times

May 5, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Bush Shifts Focus To Nuclear Sales By North Korea**

By David E. Sanger

CRAWFORD, Tex., May 4 — Tacitly acknowledging that North Korea may not be deterred from producing plutonium for nuclear weapons, President Bush is now trying to marshal international support for preventing the country from exporting nuclear material, American and foreign officials say.

Mr. Bush discussed the new approach on Saturday morning with Australia's prime minister, John Howard, after the two men were given a lengthy briefing at Mr. Bush's ranch by the chief American negotiator with North Korea, James A. Kelly, officials said.

For a decade, the United States' declared policy has been that North Korea would be prevented, by any means necessary, from producing plutonium or highly enriched uranium. President Bill Clinton ordered the Pentagon to draw up plans for a military strike when the North threatened to begin production in 1994, but a nuclear freeze agreement was reached later that year.

Mr. Bush's new focus on blocking the sale of nuclear material to countries or terrorist groups reflects intelligence officials' conclusion that they cannot ascertain whether North Korea was bluffing when it claimed last month that it had already reprocessed enough spent nuclear fuel to make many weapons.

"The president said that the central worry is not what they've got, but where it goes," said an official familiar with the talks between Mr. Bush and Mr. Howard. "He's very pragmatic about it, and the reality is that we probably won't know the extent of what they are producing. So the whole focus is to keep the plutonium from going further."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in an appearance on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," insisted today that the administration's long-term goal was to force North Korea to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons programs. He vowed that it would get no international aid unless its government changed course.

"Everybody has now made it clear to North Korea that they will not find any assistance coming to them from the region in terms of economic development," he said, "unless they abandon their nuclear weapons programs."

But in recent interviews, several American officials have said that it was becoming clear that the policy that Mr. Clinton described in 1994 — when he warned that producing plutonium could result in an American attack to destroy the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon — was probably not sustainable anymore.

South Korea's new president, Roh Moo Hyun, who will visit Washington for the first time next week, "has made it clear he won't consider military action of any kind," said one senior administration official. "It's a different atmosphere than in 1994."

Another official who has discussed the issue with Mr. Bush said his thinking was that the North Koreans "are looking to get us excited, to make us issue declarations."

"And his answer to them is," the official added, "You're hungry, and you can't eat plutonium."

Still, Mr. Bush's approach is a major gamble — one that depends on superb intelligence about North Korea's efforts to sell its weapons. So far, though, the nuclear program has been what one American intelligence official calls "the black hole of Asia."

American officials have apparently been unable to find new facilities they believe North Korea is building — presumably underground — to produce highly enriched uranium, a technology obtained largely from Pakistan in a trade for missiles.

Unlike North Korea's missiles, which can be seen by satellites as they are loaded into ships and sent to Iran, Syria, Yemen and other nations, weapons-grade nuclear material is easily transportable. Experts say that material would be relatively easy to transport over North Korea's long border with China, part of the reason that Mr. Bush is working to engage the Chinese leadership in confronting North Korea about its nuclear program.

"It's a fantasy to think you can put a hermetic seal around North Korea and keep them from getting a grapefruit-size piece of plutonium out of the country," said Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard professor who worked on Korea issues in the Clinton administration, said today. "To allow North Korea to go nuclear is a major defeat for U.S. security."

The Bush administration has been deeply divided over how to counter North Korea's efforts to turn its nuclear program into cash, with some of the more hawkish members urging that talks be abandoned. They want the United States and its allies — including China, if it is willing — to enforce an embargo that could include the interdiction of North Korean freighters.

Spanish forces intercepted a ship full of missiles headed for Yemen last year, though Mr. Bush decided to let the ship deliver its goods after Yemen's president protested.

Mr. Powell was asked today how the United States would react to the development of a large nuclear arsenal in North Korea, and he answered, "Their nuclear weapons are not going to purchase them any political standing that will cause us to be frightened or to think that somehow we now have to march to their tune." He made no suggestion, however, that the United States would take military action against the main nuclear facilities that Mr. Clinton considered attacking.

But when asked whether the United States would ever allow North Korea to sell or transfer nuclear weapons, Mr. Powell said, "Absolutely not."

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said today that he and other former defense secretaries had been briefed on the military plan in 1994 by the secretary of defense at the time, William J. Perry. But he declined to draw the same "red line" for the North Koreans, saying that any decision on military action would have to be made by Mr. Bush. Mr. Bush and Mr. Howard said nothing about North Korea after their meeting on Saturday. Mr. Bush's aides say they hope to continue the low-key approach.

But they are counting on growing aid from China, which was the host of the talks last week. To build support among Chinese leaders there is talk within the administration of letting China convene another meeting. "We might be willing to go to a second round," one senior administration official said. "The North Koreans have to come prepared to say what they will do, rather than bargain for what they can get."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/05/international/asia/05KORE.html>

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Los Angeles Times  
May 5, 2003

## **Iraqi Scientists Cautiously Consider Surrender**

*Several senior weapons experts call former U.N. inspectors, seeking guidance on whether to give themselves up.*

By Bob Drogin, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Several of Saddam Hussein's senior weapons scientists, fearful of their fate if arrested by U.S. forces, have telephoned former U.N. inspectors here in recent days seeking guidance on whether and how to give themselves up, inspectors and others said.

The Iraqi scientists, including two who helped run Hussein's secret nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, said they can provide documents and other evidence to assist teams investigating Iraq's illicit efforts to procure sensitive equipment, components and raw materials from Germany and other countries.

One of the nuclear experts who called early last week has disappeared from his home outside Baghdad, raising concerns that he has fled the country. U.N. inspectors who raided his home earlier this year, after receiving a tip from the CIA, found sensitive documents about enrichment of uranium.

The uncertainty among the Iraqi scientists over how U.S. forces will treat them, or even whether they can be prosecuted for war crimes or other charges, appeared to add another obstacle to the hunt for illegal Iraqi arms. The Pentagon-led weapons search and intelligence-gathering effort already has been slowed by staffing, logistics and communications problems.

Despite scores of tantalizing clues and false alarms since President Bush launched war on Iraq more than six weeks ago, U.S. forces have found no proof of any illegal Iraqi weapons or production activities. Iraqis now in custody have denied any knowledge of unconventional weapons, U.S. officials said, or have insisted under interrogation that Hussein destroyed his illegal arms programs years ago.

Bush, speaking Saturday at his ranch near Crawford, Texas, said he remains convinced that U.S. forces will find evidence of Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, which he had cited as the main justification for invading Iraq. "We will find them," Bush said. "It will take a matter of time to do so."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell echoed that confidence Sunday. "I'm absolutely sure they [the Iraqis] had weapons of mass destruction, and I'm sure we will find them," he said on CBS' "Face the Nation."

Special U.S. weapons teams have searched more than 100 suspected sites in Iraq, including those that the CIA had identified as the most promising targets. Unless scientists or others point the way, Pentagon officials have said, up to 3,000 factories, armories, vaccine plants, university laboratories and other facilities may need to be searched.

Only four senior Iraqi weapons scientists or officials and a handful of lesser weapons specialists — of several hundred on closely held U.S. lists — are known to have surrendered since Hussein's ouster last month. Their interrogations have yet to produce clear leads to hidden weapons caches or programs, officials said.

U.S. military and intelligence officials declined to say how long the Iraqi weapons experts will be detained, under what conditions or whether they are liable to face any criminal or war crimes charges. U.S. nonproliferation experts have urged the Bush administration to move quickly to help reintegrate the group into peaceful programs, if only to prevent them from selling their expertise to other countries or terrorist groups.

American-run radio in Iraq has urged scientists to come forward, promising that "anyone who provides information regarding weapons programs will be treated with respect and dignity."

But that hasn't persuaded some leading Iraqi scientists, who have reached out instead to former U.N. inspectors. The inspectors disclosed these communications to the Los Angeles Times in exchange for an agreement not to publish the scientists' names.

"They want some kind of assurance that they won't be detained," said David Albright, a former inspector who said he has received calls from several Iraqi nuclear scientists. "They don't feel like they've done anything wrong. Yet these others are in jail as far as they know."

Albright said all the scientists with whom he spoke insisted that Hussein had ended his nuclear weapons program after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and that none could shed light on whether Hussein had secretly revived other illegal weapons programs. He said it was unclear whether the scientists were telling the truth or were looking to cut a deal. He said he urged them to cooperate with the Americans.

"They come from a society where if you're going to be detained, that means something different than it does to us," Albright added. "It really does scare them."

Steve Black, another former U.N. inspector, agreed. "They're afraid they're going to get the bright-lights Gestapo treatment," he said. "So they aren't turning themselves in. It makes sense to me because no one has said who is getting charged with what kind of crime."

He added: "I keep hearing people say, 'Saddam is gone, so they have no reason to lie.' That's not the case. They have every reason to lie if they think they're going to get prosecuted."

Black said Hussein's secretive security services, particularly members of the Special Security Organization and the Special Republican Guard, were in charge of moving and hiding illegal weapons and that former members may know the location of crucial evidence. Finding them, however, may not be easy.

"We have thousands of names of Iraqi scientists," he said. "We don't have thousands of names of SSO and SRG people. They worked really hard at being nameless."

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld repeatedly has said that cooperation from knowledgeable Iraqis may be the only way for U.S. forces to find any hidden caches of poison gases and germ weapons, as well as any evidence to support Bush administration claims that Hussein secretly revived a nuclear weapons program.

Pentagon officials also have warned that those Iraqi weapons experts who don't confess or cooperate may be detained or could face unspecified criminal charges. Neither Rumsfeld nor his aides have publicly explained the policy, however. A spokesman at U.S. Central Command in Qatar, which is in charge of the weapons hunt, said Saturday that he could not comment on the issue.

The failure of the search has sparked a growing debate over the quality and reliability of the intelligence repeatedly cited by Bush and his aides before the war.

No traces have been found, for example, of the 100 to 500 tons of toxic agents that Powell told the U.N. Security Council in February was a "conservative estimate" of Iraq's chemical weapons stockpile. Nor has evidence been found of alleged thousands of gallons of anthrax and other deadly germ weapons.

The Pentagon has deployed about 200 experts, including two "mobile exploitation teams" and support personnel, to lead the weapons hunt. The effort will be expanded in coming months with several hundred additional experts. Advance teams for the reinforcements have begun arriving in the region.

A U.S. military officer involved with the search said last week that the two teams are "overwhelmed" with work.

Another U.S. official familiar with the effort complained that the teams have too few helicopters, vehicles and even radios to conduct a systematic search. In many cases, he added, looting has destroyed potentially valuable evidence.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-war-wmd5may05,1,7348412.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dnation%2Dmanual>

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Washington Post

May 5, 2003

Pg. 15

## **U.S. Warns Syria It Is Watching Its Actions**

*Back From Middle East, Powell and Rumsfeld Say Assad Was Told of Consequences*

By Karen DeYoung, Washington Post Staff Writer

CRAWFORD, Tex., May 4 -- Just back from their separate trips to the Middle East, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld both warned Syria today that the United States will be watching for positive changes in behavior.

Powell, who visited Damascus on Saturday, said he told President Bashar Assad that there will be "consequences" if Syria does not cease support for Palestinian groups that the United States regards as terrorist organizations, or if it attempts to harbor escapees from Iraq. "It's performance that we'll be looking at in the days and weeks and months ahead," Powell said of Assad.

"We had a good, candid exchange of views, and there are no illusions in his mind as to what we are looking for from Syria," he said.

"Words are one thing," Rumsfeld said. "Actions are another." Rumsfeld, who returned Friday from a tour of the Persian Gulf states and Iraq, and Powell, who arrived late last night, spoke on Sunday talk shows this morning.

Powell seemed to step back from comments he made after leaving Damascus on Saturday that Assad had shut down Palestinian offices there. "They did closures," he had said in a Beirut news conference. "I expect them to do more." Today, Powell said that Assad had indicated it was his intention to close the offices.

In Damascus, representatives of Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Resistance Movement ( Hamas ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the most prominent Palestinian groups, said they had not received orders to close and were operating as usual, Reuters reported today.

Both secretaries said that Pentagon adviser Newt Gingrich had spoken on his own behalf in a recent speech when he called Powell's visit to Damascus "ludicrous" and charged that the State Department is "broken." Rumsfeld called widespread speculation that Gingrich was a stalking horse for his own views "nonsense." He said he did not know about Gingrich's remarks in advance, although he declined to criticize them because he said he had not read them. But, Rumsfeld said, "if you don't like the decision [to go to Syria], don't blame the secretary; blame the president. He's the one who made the decision. I happen to agree with it."

The uproar over Gingrich's speech brought renewed attention to long-simmering policy disagreements between the State Department and Pentagon that the two Cabinet members have sought to downplay. Rumsfeld emphasized that he had spoken to Powell by telephone this morning before their separate television appearances, and there was little difference between their statements on a host of issues.

Powell appeared on NBC's "Meet the Press," CBS's "Face the Nation" and ABC's "This Week." Rumsfeld was on CNN's "Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer" and "Fox News Sunday."

Both said they were sure that evidence would surface regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, although they left open the possibility that weapons might never be found. "I am confident that we will find evidence that makes it clear he had weapons of mass destruction," Powell said of former leader Saddam Hussein.

He said he believes that the case he made to the Security Council on Nov. 5, based on U.S. intelligence reports, remains solid and that "the intelligence community still stands behind that information."

Rumsfeld said he does believe it is likely that chemical or biological weapons will be found by U.S. personnel searching for them. "I never believed that we'd just tumble over weapons of mass destruction in that country," he said. Instead, he said, "what we're going to do is we're going to find people who come and say, 'Look, we know where something is,' or 'Here is some documentation that was put in this house we just found.'"

On other issues, Rumsfeld acknowledged that he is considering a reconfiguration of U.S. troops based abroad. "It made a lot of sense to have a number of capabilities in Germany when you were worried about the Soviet Union coming across the north German plain. It does not make a lot of sense to have capabilities that you can't use or you have to go through circuitous routes. We're doing the same thing in Asia" and the Middle East, he said. "We ought to get ourselves organized and arranged for the future, not the past."

Rumsfeld discounted reports that he planned to quickly withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq, limiting them to about 20,000, with other countries taking up the slack.

"It's an open question," he said. "We are going to have a difficult job, and we have to see that that country has proper security, and we're going to have as many people in there as we need for as long as we need them. We will also have as few people as possible, but as many as there are necessary, and we'll stay as short a time as is possible, but as long as is necessary. And anyone who thinks they can look out into the future and know precisely what that's going to be just doesn't understand the variables that are involved."

Asked whether he thinks Hussein is still alive, Rumsfeld said he does not know. But "if I had to guess," he said, "I would suspect that he may very well be alive."

Powell was also asked about Cuba, which has long been on the U.S. list of states sponsoring terrorism and has come under sharp criticism in recent weeks for a crackdown on political dissidents. Echoing comments made by Cuban President Fidel Castro, singer Harry Belafonte and other U.S. entertainers and writers have charged that the United States has been harassing Cuba.

"This is absolute nonsense," Powell said. "But we've gotten used to absolute nonsense coming from Mr. Belafonte. This isn't the first time that he has praised the Cuban regime, and it's outrageous."

Last year, Belafonte used a racial metaphor to accuse Powell of acquiescing to Bush's aggressive policy against Iraq out of fear he would be demoted.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13848-2003May4.html>

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New York Times  
May 5, 2003

## **Praising Syria's President, Powell Also Hints At Sanctions**

By Steven R. Weisman



WASHINGTON, May 4 — Secretary of State Colin L. Powell labeled as "significant" today the promises he received from President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to shut down the offices of militant groups in that nation, but he said the United States would carefully scrutinize whether Mr. Assad would back up his words with actions in the coming weeks and months.

Speaking on a round of Sunday television interview shows the day after returning from the Middle East, Mr. Powell also hinted that the United States would be prepared to consider political and economic sanctions against Syria if no action was forthcoming, while positive steps could lead to economic benefits for Syria.

"Obviously, I welcome what he said he was going to do," Mr. Powell said on the CBS News program "Face the Nation," referring to Mr. Assad's promises to close the offices of some militant anti-Israel groups in Damascus. "And I hope he, on reflection, is willing to do even more. But the only thing that really counts is performance, not my temporary pleasure."

Both Mr. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld appeared on the Sunday television programs today, sounding common themes on the first weekend after their parallel trips to the region following the victory of allied forces in Iraq.

Echoing President Bush from the day before in Crawford, Tex., Mr. Powell and Mr. Rumsfeld said they were convinced that American forces would find evidence of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq, and that they had no second thoughts about declaring the possession of such weapons a major cause for the war.

Both also said there was nothing ready to announce with respect to what administration officials say is a plan to install L. Paul Bremer, a former director of counterterrorism operations at the State Department, as the head of American operations in Iraq.

Administration officials said last week that Mr. Bremer would be put in place in an effort to give a more civilian face to the American occupation efforts, particularly the process of selecting a transitional Iraqi authority that would function as a government.

Britain, other European nations and various international aid groups are asking for a civilian authority to avoid the appearance that the new government in Iraq would be chosen by the military.

Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Powell praised Jay Garner, the retired lieutenant general who has overseen the occupation until now.

But the main focus of Mr. Powell's comments was Syria, which has been labeled by some in the Bush administration as a junior member of the "axis of evil" because of its support for Hezbollah and other groups labeled as terrorist organizations, as well as its alleged possession of chemical weapons.

More recently, the United States has assailed Syria for providing safe haven for Iraqi leaders and for helping Arab fighters infiltrate Iraq during the recent war.

Mr. Powell said he gave Mr. Assad information about Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, groups that have engaged in attacks on civilians in Israel and elsewhere. "We will see how he acts on the different suggestions that we have provided to them," he said on CBS News.

Mr. Powell added, without referring to specific groups, that Mr. Assad "did say, however, that the offices were closed, and that other actions would be taken to restrict their public activities."

With respect to charges that Syria had provided haven to fleeing Iraqi leaders, Mr. Powell said that he had passed along some names of people suspected to have fled, but that "my sense from President Bashar Assad is that he has no interest in serving as a haven for any of these individuals." He noted that Syria had been "helpful over the past 18 months to two years on our efforts in the global war against terrorism."

Mr. Powell was not specific about what punishments Syria might face if it did not cooperate, but on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," he noted that Congress was looking at a measure known as the Syrian Accountability Act, and that it would impose certain kinds of penalties on Syria if it was passed.

On the other hand, Mr. Powell said on the ABC program "This Week," that there were "new options on the table that might benefit" Syria if it chose to cooperate. He said his time spent with Mr. Assad was "a profitable three hours." In that vein, Mr. Powell stressed that it was President Bush who authorized the meeting with Mr. Assad. Recent criticism of the trip by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich — who called it "ludicrous" to meet with a nation that has supported terrorism — was actually directed at the president, Mr. Powell said. For his part, Mr. Rumsfeld said he had endorsed the idea of the meeting with Mr. Assad.

In the last few days, Mr. Powell has seemed more willing to attack Mr. Gingrich, something he avoided at first. Asked about comments by Richard L. Armitage, his deputy secretary of state, that Mr. Gingrich had been "off his meds and out of therapy," Mr. Powell said on "Meet the Press" that he had been aware that Mr. Armitage was going to make the comment. "I think it's a pretty fair counterpunch," he said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/05/international/worldspecial/05DIPL.html>



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New York Times

May 5, 2003

## Militant Groups In Syria Dispute Reports Of Crackdown

By Daniel J. Wakin

BEIRUT, Lebanon, May 4 — Militant Palestinian groups in Damascus today challenged American statements that Syria had cracked down on them, and Syria's government sidestepped the issue, refusing to confirm one of the few Syrian concessions that seemed to emerge during a weekend visit by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

Mr. Powell, after meeting with President Hafez al-Assad of Syria in Damascus on Saturday, said here at a news conference that there had been "some closures" of offices belonging to the groups. The State Department identified the organizations, which it lists as terrorist groups, as Hamas; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command; and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The Syrian government today declined to confirm Mr. Powell's statement, however. "You have to ask him what he meant," said Bouthaina Shaaban, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, referring to Mr. Powell. "I'm really not entitled to answer."

She took umbrage at the issue of the militants' offices, which have been a longstanding concern of the United States. "We are more interested in what he said about a comprehensive peace rather than what he said about offices," she said. "This visit was one step in that direction, and the dialogue is continuing. And the Syrians and the United States understood each other better after this visit."

In opening a new diplomatic phase after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the display of American power in the Middle East, Mr. Powell discussed with Syrian officials a new peace plan for the Palestinians and Israelis. But he also confronted Syria about American concerns like the militants' offices, Syrian support for the Hezbollah militants in Lebanon and the presence in Syria of former Iraqi officials.

The Syrian government newspaper Al Baath today also skirted the matter of whether Syria was moving to close down militant groups' operations, saying only that the issue "will be solved in parallel" with other parts of Arab-Israeli peace efforts.

The three organizations said to have been closed in Damascus are among at least nine militant Palestinian organizations with a presence there. The groups say that they are waging a legitimate struggle against Israel in the West Bank and Gaza on behalf of the Palestinian people and that the offices in Damascus only provide information services.

Western diplomats in Damascus said it was too early to tell exactly what the Syrians planned to do about the offices. "Closings" could range from pressure to limit activities all the way to expulsions of top leaders, though where they would find haven is not certain.

Mr. Powell made it clear that the United States would be watching closely. He referred during this trip to an empty promise by Syria before the war to stop the smuggling of Iraqi oil into Syria, in violation of United Nations sanctions.

As for the militant groups, their Damascus offices were at least taking telephone calls today.

"We heard nothing of that," referring to the orders to close, said a woman who answered the phone at Al Quds Radio, which is operated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command. "We are still working as you can hear. Nothing new." The office, adorned with a Che Guevara poster and pro-Palestinian slogans, occupies the first floor and basement of a downtown building.

Nevertheless, there were signs that something was changing. Local journalists in Damascus reported that the offices of the three groups cited by the Americans were unusually quiet, with only skeleton staffs, relatively silent telephones and the absence of the usual hubbub on a normal work day for Syria. There were other hints as well. An official at Islamic Jihad said, "The leadership is committed to what the hosting country decides," and then referred calls to a spokesman in Beirut.

"We have nothing new," said the spokesman, Munir Abu Hadi. "This is a Syrian issue. Our main and central presence is inside Palestine. Our presence in Syria is similar to those Palestinian refugees who have been forced out of their territories due to Zionist occupation."

As for Hamas, the office in Syria is on the outskirts of Damascus and consists of a modest apartment in a residential building. An iron gate protects the door, and visitors must remove their shoes. A representative, speaking by phone, said he was not sure what was happening, and suggested that he was under some restraint. "I don't know if it is closed or not," he said. "If I am here, it doesn't mean it's open."

A Hamas spokesman in Lebanon also commented about the reported closing. "I haven't been informed of any such thing," Reuters quoted the Lebanon head of the group, Usama Hamdan, as saying. "The Americans know well that our presence is part of the Palestinian refugee presence in Syria and Lebanon."

Syria is the power broker in Lebanon, and Beirut is only a couple of hours from Damascus, so a shifting of the groups' presence in Damascus could be cosmetic.

"If they move to Lebanon, then from our point of view, it's just a trick because they could only do that if Syria allows them to," said Martin Indyk, a former American ambassador to Israel and former assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs.

In his talks, Mr. Powell also expressed the hope that Syria would turn away from Hezbollah, the militant group that battled Israel when it occupied southern Lebanon and that Syria is believed to support, along with Iran.

"I doubt anyone would answer their call, for as long as there is occupation, no one can even propose disarming the resistance," Reuters quoted Sheik Hassan Izzedine, a senior official of Hezbollah, as saying. "We are not worried a bit about the future."

Al Baath said today that the Damascus offices were opened by Palestinians "to show their issues to the world public, a natural right for them." The Damascus-based Palestinian militants are sometimes quoted by pan-Arab newspapers, as well.

These groups draw some support from, and serve, the roughly 400,000 Palestinian refugees living in Syria. But they also serve Syria, as centers of opposition to Israel, as well as to Yasir Arafat, for whom Syria's leaders and many of the militant groups share a dislike.

A Western diplomat said the groups were "well controlled" in terms of what they could and could not do in Syria, adding, "This is a very ordered state."

The three groups, which oppose talks with Israel, have taken responsibility for or been accused of scores of attacks and suicide bombings.

Hamas, a potent rival to the Palestinian Authority, has a strong political and social service infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza and may suffer the least if its Damascus offices are closed. Today, it called its presence in Damascus symbolic.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad focuses mainly on violent action. It was founded in the late 1970's by Gaza students and has raised its profile with an Arabic Web site and recent appearances by its leaders on Arab television. American officials say it receives money and training from Iran and Syria. Its main leader is Abdullah Ramadan Shallah, a political scientist who once taught at the University of South Florida.

Ahmed Jibril, 65, runs the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command, which Israeli officials say was a source of weapons smuggled into Gaza by sea to arm Palestinian fighters. Its bases in Lebanon had for years been a target of Israeli warplanes, but the group lately has not been as active as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/05/international/middleeast/05SYRI.html>

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Christian Science Monitor

May 5, 2003

## **Korea Crisis Awaits Multistate Push**

*South Korea's president visits Washington next week, amid doubts about the North's nuclear claims.*

By Robert Marquand, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA – The United States will not attend another round of talks with North Korea unless China hosts the meeting, unless Japan, South Korea, and possibly Russia are included, or if it confirms that the Kim Jong Il regime has reprocessed the cache of plutonium fuel rods that it has claimed to, diplomatic sources told the Monitor.

"A second round [of talks] is up to China," says a senior US diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. "If the Chinese want to host it, we are ready. But we won't attend unless it is larger and genuinely multilateral."

The evolving US position on North Korea - and an evident eagerness in Seoul and Tokyo to join a process started by Beijing - builds on lengthy US efforts at a multilateral, diplomatic answer to the North's two nuclear programs. For months, Asian states had urged the US to engage in one-on-one talks with Pyongyang. But US officials say a nuclear Korea and the North's ability to sell fissionable material is serious enough to require a concert of Asian nations to pressure Mr. Kim, with China playing a central role.

Yet the position also suggests a disbelief in Washington that North Korean scientists could, undetected, reprocess some 8,000 spent fuel rods, as well as a willingness to overlook that claim as a negotiating position - though US officials have ordered an intelligence review to see if it is possible.

"The North Koreans sought to put as much on the table as possible [in the first meeting]," the diplomat says. "They are expert at slicing the salami and getting something for nothing. But that isn't going to happen this time. "We expect something specific and concrete," and it must be "complete and verifiable," the source added. "The ball is in North Korea's court."

Talks with North Korea held in Beijing April 23 came via a diplomatic breakthrough by China after a seven-month nuclear standoff that has thrown Asia into a deepening security crisis. In Beijing, a North Korean official told US envoy James Kelly that his country possessed nuclear weapons - the first such admission. He also said that the North had "almost finished reprocessing" fuel rods that were unsealed after Kim kicked out UN inspectors on New Year's Day, according to sources familiar with details of the meeting.

Since then, Asian states and US officials have scrambled to decipher the meeting. New South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun visits President Bush next week in Washington for the first time - a significant moment for the two allies to coordinate efforts. All sides in the crisis are feeling what might be called a "big squeeze."

Time is a factor, since Kim could ostensibly turn his plutonium into weapons-grade material in months. The standoff, with the US not taking military options or sanctions off the table, also involves risky gamesmanship: North Korea says it will treat sanctions as an act of war.

Washington policymakers are in trench warfare over Korea, between Defense Department hard-liners and State Department moderates. Beijing, for its part, wants to find a way to continue talks without giving the impression to North Korea that it is publicly choosing between Washington and Pyongyang. South Korea's economy is hard hit and its policy of engagement is stymied - pending resolution of the nuclear issue. Japanese are feeling "angst" about the North, as one source put it, and worry that a long delay will force an aggressive new defense posture in Tokyo that will create fears in China.

In North Korea, sources say Kim is facing internal pressures to deliver money and food. The North Korean people are squeezed due to food shortages and a disastrous economy partly funded by drug and counterfeiting mafias that may be state sponsored, according to Japanese foreign ministry sources. A North Korean ship allegedly carrying about 100 pounds of heroin was seized off the coast of Australia two days ago.

The main obstacle down the negotiations road may well be verification, analysts say. Both Kim and his generals are unlikely to accept inspectors into closed, highly guarded regions. But some US officials hold out hope from the Beijing talks that Kim desires to move his country off a US list of regimes like Cuba and Libya that are considered hostile.

Meanwhile, particularly in some quarters of the Japanese and South Korean press, doubt has been shed on whether North Korean officials really did confess to having a nuclear program. An opinion writer in Japan described Assistant Secretary Kelly as "listening to fairies," in the encounter with North Korean counterpart Ri Gun in Beijing at a dinner reception. But US sources say the dinner communication was straightforward and unambiguous.

North Korea had hoped the Beijing talks would be essentially bilateral, with China only playing host. During the first opportunity to speak informally, sources say, Mr. Ri and his interpreter approached Kelly, who was standing with his longtime Korean interpreter and David Straub, director of the Office of Korean Affairs at the State Department, also fluent in Korean. All three men heard Ri claim that the North possessed weapons, and that these would not be possible to negotiate away.

Both Mr. Straub and Kelly's interpreter immediately went over their notes, and agreed on what Ri said, according to a high level US diplomat.

Later in formal talks, Ri said "We are almost finished reprocessing" the fuel rods, and insisted the plutonium would be kept. This statement was the most surprising, sources say, since it was made in front of Chinese officials, who know that plutonium reprocessing crosses a "red line" for the Americans.

Days before the April 23 talks, Pyongyang official news asserted that the fuel rods were reprocessed, though there were competing interpretations of the report. Diplomatic sources affirm that North Koreans had told Russian officials a week before talks that they had completed reprocessing.

"We are telling the Americans, 'don't be shocked by these strong statements from the North,' " says a Japanese diplomat. "We are concerned about too strong a reaction from the US." Japan however, does take the position that if reprocessing can be confirmed, they will aid in taking the issue to the UN Security Council.

"We may view [North Korean admissions] as a negotiating position, we are still talking about that," says a US diplomat. "But it shows a mind-set of denial to say it didn't happen."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0505/p06s01-woap.html>

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## **Iraqi Nuclear Site Is Found Looted**

*U.S. Team Unable to Determine Whether Deadly Materials Are Missing*

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

NEAR KUT, Iraq, May 3 -- A specially trained Defense Department team, dispatched after a month of official indecision to survey a major Iraqi radioactive waste repository, today found the site heavily looted and said it was impossible to tell whether nuclear materials were missing.

The discovery at the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility was the second since the end of the war in which a known nuclear cache was plundered extensively enough that authorities could not rule out the possibility that deadly materials had been stolen. The survey, conducted by a U.S. Special Forces detachment and eight nuclear experts from a Pentagon office called the Direct Support Team, appeared to offer fresh evidence that the war has dispersed the country's most dangerous technologies beyond anyone's knowledge or control.

In all, seven sites associated with Iraq's nuclear program have been visited by the Pentagon's "special nuclear programs" teams since the war ended last month. None was found to be intact, though it remains unclear what materials -- if any -- had been removed.

Enclosed by a sand berm four miles around and 160 feet high, the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility entombs what remains of reactors bombed by Israel in 1981 and the United States in 1991. It has stored industrial and medical wastes, along with spent reactor fuel. Though not suitable to produce a fission bomb, the highest-energy isotopes here, including cesium and cobalt, have been sought by terrorists interested in using conventional explosives to scatter radioactive dust.

One team member said the quantities measured today would not suffice for that purpose, but others expressed doubt that the survey was complete. It was impossible to determine what may have been removed -- by unknowing looters, by knowledgeable thieves bent on black-market trade or by former Iraqi officials seeking to conceal evidence of banned weapons programs.

The most important looted nuclear site, less than a mile down the road, is the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, where U.N. weapons inspectors had catalogued tons of partially enriched uranium and natural uranium -- metals suitable for processing into the core of a nuclear weapon. Iraqi civilians have stripped it of computers, furniture and much equipment; whether dangerous nuclear materials were taken is unknown.

U.S. authorities do not know what is missing, if anything, because of an ongoing conflict between the Bush administration and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as a dispute within the administration about how much to involve the IAEA in Iraq. The unresolved struggle has kept U.S. forces out of Tuwaitha's nuclear storage areas, but a brief outdoor inspection on April 10 found the door to one of them had been breached.

The special nuclear team that surveyed the Baghdad facility this morning had been eager to make the trip for weeks. Twenty-three days ago, a smaller U.S. survey team passed by and recommended an immediate increase in security. The following day, April 11, the IAEA listed this site and Tuwaitha as the two requiring the most urgent protection from looters. U.S. Central Command sent a detachment of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division to control the facility's gate.

Rolling in at 8:15 a.m. today, accompanied by two reporters, Navy Cmdr. David Beckett said U.S. troops were reported to be securing the gate. Beckett's master sergeant, a Special Forces soldier who asked to be identified only as Tony, hopped out of the driver's seat and spoke to the lieutenant on duty.

"I don't believe this," he said, returning. "They let workers in here for the past week!"

"Local workers?" Beckett asked.

"Yeah," Tony said.

Employees of the research center -- or Iraqis who said they were employees -- had been coming in by the score for more than two weeks. The 3rd Infantry's security detail had no Arabic speaker and could not verify their stories. In addition, looters had been scavenging inside continuously since U.S. forces took control. At the peak, there were 400 a day. On Friday, the U.S. soldiers detained 62 of them, but many more got away.

"Looters, they see us in Bradleys or on foot," said Capt. Blaine Kusterle, a platoon leader in Alpha Company. "They can outrun us easily because they have a 300-meter start."

Not far inside the complex, a fraction of the plunder -- whatever Kusterle's men had managed to wrestle back -- lay strewn about. An acre of laboratory equipment sat by the roadside: a Braun sedimenter, an autoclave, a Nikon photo microscope, toxic gas monitors, a machine to measure tiny particles with laser diffraction.

The first hint that dangerous isotopes might be loose came when a monitor began beeping in the rubble. In a shallow hole protected by sandbags, the men found a yellow crate, shaped like a toolbox, that bore the warning, "CAUTION RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL." A nuclear-trained special operator named Rick -- all the men except Beckett gave only first names -- pulled out a suitcase-size detector. The box was throwing gamma rays, but nothing too dangerous.

What bothered the team was that one radioactive leak might mean there were others.

Kusterle, the company's NBC officer -- responsible for nuclear, biological and chemical hazards -- told Beckett that an Iraqi had come to the gate claiming that the head scientist here before the war had "worked on anthrax and buried an anthrax culture machine here."

"Are there any signs or reports of dead animals in the area?" Beckett asked.

"No," Kusterle said.

"Has [military intelligence] been called in?"

"No."

Beckett took the scientist's name and moved on.

The team took another road, armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Using a bathtub-size instrument that recorded time and location with each measurement, they began to build a three-dimensional radiation map of the site. Beckett, who directs special nuclear programs at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), made a more targeted survey.

He headed first for Osirak, the French-built research reactor that Israel destroyed just before it became operational in 1981. From a distance, the reactor's three towers and supporting bulk looked almost intact, though the cooling-pump building listed 45 degrees. Up close, the reactor was an empty hulk. A wall mural of a heroic Saddam Hussein -- with the gleaming reactor on one side and pharaonic splendors on the other -- stood amid the rubble.

Beckett climbed what appeared to be a bunker built up from the ground, covered by a sloping metal roof. A device the size of a TV remote control began vibrating at his ankle, and indicators lit for gamma and neutron bombardment. Beckett crawled under the low-slung roof and found what he estimated to be four rows and 20 columns of buried drums, each with a massive lid bolted flush to the ground.

An expert close to the IAEA's Iraq Action Team said the location of those drums, recorded with a reporter's hand-held global positioning device, corresponded to what the agency calls Building 39, a permanent storage site for low-level nuclear waste.

A more dangerous find by Beckett's team came in a black corrugated metal shed next to a low stone storage area, a site known to U.N. inspectors as Building 55. The IAEA lists those structures as "mechanical workshops and stores." But an Army Special Forces captain named Drew said he got "a huge spike" on his detector from 15 feet away, and he pinpointed a metal storage cylinder the size of a small fire hydrant. There were more of them, and they were corroding. The lock on the shed's door had been forced open.

"I'm getting thorium," Rick said, reading the energy spikes on his monitor. Then came cesium and cobalt. Short-term exposure to particles of those radioactive metals poses no serious threat, but they can be dangerous if inhaled.

"All right," Beckett called out. "Everybody who was inside that place, just go and stand over there." He checked them for contamination but found nothing dangerous in the dust clinging to their clothes.

A few hundred yards away, the team found more equipment that scavengers had tried to drag toward a parking lot. Next to a heavy lathe were 19 small yellow cylinders and four large gray ones. They were emitting so much gamma and neutron radiation that the team could not interpret the results.

"It overpowers the system," Beckett said. Scientists will do further analysis at DTRA headquarters in Virginia. David Albright, an expert on the Iraqi nuclear program who runs the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, said, "There are many radioactive areas within the berm. . . . Clearly, they do not appear adequately protected. If any radioactive material has been taken, it could pose a significant risk to those who have it. Does the military appreciate this risk?"

Meanwhile, at the nearby Tuwaiitha storage site, security remains a concern. Administration officials in Washington said again today that they intend to involve the IAEA eventually, because the radioactive materials there are under the U.N. agency's seal, which the United States is treaty-bound to respect. But the Pentagon and State Department are still trying to formulate guidelines for a U.S. search team to make a preliminary survey.

"It's very distressing," said a nuclear expert with close ties to the IAEA's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei. The agency "expects measures to be taken so that the looting that took place a month ago will not continue to take place this month. This material really should not be moved."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10888-2003May3.html>

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## **U.S. Experts Find Radioactive Material In Iraq**

By Judith Miller

TUWAITHA, Iraq, May 3 — An elite American team of nuclear experts found sources of radioactive material for research or industrial purposes today here at the complex that was bombed by Israel in 1981, but no new clues about the status of Iraq's nuclear program.

"It's a health hazard, more than anything else," said Rick Turcotte, a member of what is called the Direct Support Team. "Iraqis are going into this site, and they could get exposed to an unhealthy, large dose of radiation."

Cmdr. David Beckett, the team leader, led the eight-hour survey of the radiological material stored here at what was Iraq's oldest nuclear weapons research complex. He said that what was found at Tuwaitha was the "largest amount of radiological material that has been found at a nuclear site in Iraq."

Other team members cautioned that what was found was consistent with industrial or research use, which is what Iraq has long said about its nuclear efforts.

The Army relayed to its headquarters an unconfirmed report that looters may have taken anthrax samples from this sprawling research facility. In addition, a scientist working at the complex may have buried near it anthrax samples or equipment related to its production.

The team's mission is to "search, locate, and identify" sources of material that are dangerous to both soldiers and ordinary civilians, as well as radioactive materials connected to banned weapons. In the case of Tuwaitha, team members felt strongly that the greater threat was from the radioactive material left at the site.

Iraqis have looted the facility, and even today, about 20 former workers were permitted to enter to collect personal belongings. Their presence complicated the team's effort to map out all the areas where radioactive material might be hidden.

Mr. Turcotte, one of about 10 specialists in nuclear search techniques and identification, visited the site only two weeks ago to prepare for the survey. He said dangerous equipment and materials had been moved since his visit. For instance, a giant lathe had been moved outside its previous location, where radiological warnings were posted. He said it looked as if the equipment was about to be removed from the facility.

In addition, a warehouse where 19 lead-lined containers of Cesium-137, a highly radioactive substance used mostly for industrial or research purposes, is being stored was no longer padlocked. The team relocked it before leaving the site today.

The discovery of multiple sources of radioactive material at Tuwaitha did not surprise some team members. But the way the material was haphazardly stored and scattered about the half-square-mile site was definitely a concern. The team is an eclectic group of mostly Special Operations soldiers and nuclear specialists who have been sent to Iraq by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The agency has been eager to use some of its expensive equipment in the field, and has had a subtle rivalry with other agencies that also do nuclear testing and intelligence work.

Capt. Blane Kusterle, 24, from the Third Infantry Division, has been responsible for securing the facility for the last two weeks with only 20 soldiers. He said one of his officers had allowed some local Iraqis to return to the site, in search of personal papers and work-related materials.

Others continued to enter the site through holes in fences and other means, despite warnings from American forces that it was contaminated. "They're hunting for screwdrivers, air-conditioners, light switches, chairs — just stuff to better their homes," he said.

The looters were persistent, he said. One man returned three times, despite having been handcuffed to a fence for nearly a day.

International inspectors had visited the facility several times. On Jan. 21, before the war began, the International Atomic Energy Agency, responsible for inspecting nuclear-related facilities, reported that it had conducted a "motorized radiation survey, checked sealed equipment and inspected buildings."

Tuwaitha itself is testament to Iraq's long history of efforts to acquire a nuclear capability. A centerpiece of the sprawling weapons complex is the French-supplied Osirak nuclear reactor, which Israel bombed in 1981, declaring that it needed to destroy an "Islamic bomb" before it was built. Another part of the complex is home to Russian-supplied nuclear reactors, which have also been dormant for almost 20 years.

Another member of the team said the facility was a vintage example of a "confused, chaotic" effort to acquire nuclear technology. The expert said he was struck by how old most of the equipment that had not been looted was.



After Tuwaitha's nuclear activities were believed to have ended, the facility continued as an agro-biological research center. International inspectors had visited those facilities too, but they found no evidence of a biological warfare program.

Today's visit was the team's second to Tuwaitha. It located and identified four radioactive areas. The first was a storage building in what appeared to be a research area. There, the team found a lead-lined container that held Cesium-137, which measured the highest source of radiation detected today — about 2.8 millirem per hour.

Normally, it takes about 1 rem per hour before health hazards are a concern.

Next to this was a poorly maintained storage shed that contained about 23 radioactive storage containers, some of them badly corroded. The experts also found Cobalt-60, a very dangerous radioactive material. But the amount was so small as to be consistent with a "check" source — material used for tests.

The third was an area they had not expected to visit — a series of nearly 80 circular cement discs where low levels of gamma radiation were detected under a corrugated sheet of metal, adjacent to an earthen berm nearly 150 feet high. It could not be determined what the discs were covering, but one expert said it might well be a storage area that once contained spent nuclear fuel rods. Because the matrix of concrete discs was next to a long-abandoned, bombed-out nuclear reactor, the theory was embraced by several members of the team.

In a ditch near the facility entrance, the team found a box labeled "Americium," a radioactive source that was found in a small quantity. The material was surrounded by sandbags, but no one at the site seemed to know who had put it there.

<http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-iraq-un-nuclear.html>

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Washington Times

May 3, 2003

Pg. 5

## Mobile Lab Might Be For Iraqi Arms

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

U.S. intelligence agencies are investigating a mobile laboratory discovered recently in northern Iraq that appears to be a transportable biological or chemical weapons facility, defense officials said.

Additionally, investigators in Iraq also have discovered what appear to be chemicals used in making chemical weapons, according to defense and intelligence officials.

The mobile lab was discovered near Mosul, in the north, last week and matches the description of Iraq's mobile weapons laboratories that were highlighted by senior Bush administration officials in the buildup to the war in Iraq. Military forces manning a checkpoint seized the truck after discovering it was filled with equipment.

"It appears to be a road-mobile weapons laboratory," said a senior U.S. official on the condition of anonymity.

"It's still being evaluated," said a defense official, who noted that the results of the evaluation are expected soon.

The lab was described by officials as a tractor-trailer vehicle outfitted with equipment.

The Bush administration has held off from going public with the recent find because of several cases in which suspected weapons of mass destruction were found to have been unrelated to Iraq's chemical and biological weapons program.

Several drums of chemicals and other equipment, including buried shipping containers, turned out to have been harmless, even though initial tests showed signs of chemical or biological weapons.

The recent discovery of 12 55-gallon drums and suspected weapons labs near the town of Baiji turned out to be a decontamination facility and storage containers used for other purposes.

The Los Angeles Times first reported the van discovery on Tuesday.

Officials said the vehicle appears to be one of the 18 mobile laboratories mentioned by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell during a presentation to the United Nations Security Council before the war in Iraq.

One official said the mobile lab appeared not to have been put into use by the Iraqis.

However, officials said they were optimistic that the van could be the first proof of Iraq's covert weapons program. In London yesterday, British Defense Minister Geoffrey Hoon said the hunt for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will be difficult because the now-ousted regime of Saddam Hussein has hidden its banned arms.

"We've always made clear that the effort to locate and precisely identify weapons of mass destruction would take some time," Mr. Hoon told reporters during a meeting with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Mr. Powell said in a detailed intelligence briefing at U.N. headquarters in New York on Feb. 5 that Iraq's mobile laboratories are "one of the most worrisome signs" regarding Iraq's effort to make biological weapons.

"We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories," Mr. Powell said. "The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few — perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. ... Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day."

Mr. Powell said the mobile biological laboratories were based on rail flatcars and on trucks and "are designed to evade detection by inspectors."

He said the mobile laboratories were described by at least three eyewitnesses in Iraq, including an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of the vans.

The engineer "actually was present during biological agent production runs," Mr. Powell said. "He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents."

Mr. Powell said the Iraqis wanted to use the mobile labs in order to conceal them and to be able to move them easily by disguising them as trucks that can be parked in garages, or moved on the thousands of miles of Iraqi roads and railroad tracks.

Mr. Powell said the mobile labs were "sophisticated facilities" that could be used to make anthrax or botulinum toxin.

"In fact, they can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people," he said. "A dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030503-6087871.htm>

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Springfield (MO) News-Leader

May 2, 2003

Pg. 1B

## **Fort Wood Tests Nuclear Detectors**

*The Missouri site is one of four to aid in fight against radioactive weapons.*

By Jeff Arnold, News-Leader

Fort Leonard Wood — The temporary metal boxes sitting just past the guard stations appear to be nothing out of the ordinary.

Inside, though, are detectors able to alert Army officials if radioactive material is passing through the installation's gates.

Fort Leonard Wood is one of four military posts nationwide where the Department of Defense is testing equipment aimed at cutting down unconventional nuclear threats — weapons containing radioactive materials but not necessarily a nuclear bomb.

"People (detected to have radiological materials) aren't necessarily looking to destroy a lot of things as much as they are trying to create terror and panic," said Dr. Chris Walker, who help designed the system for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Last year, the DOD received \$75 million for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to develop the program and demonstrate the ability to detect the material.

One site representing each branch of the military was selected for the testing. Demonstrations have also been done at Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico, King's Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia and Camp Lejeune, a marine corps base in North Carolina.

As part of an experimental project at Fort Leonard Wood, vehicles brought radiological materials onto the post.

When the sensors detect gamma and neutron rays, an auditory alarm is sounded and the system begins to analyze what type of materials are present — and at what levels.

If material is detected, vehicles are sent to a secondary inspection site where they are scanned with hand-held detectors.

"A lot of places (where testing has taken place) are surprised just how much radiological materials are coming onto their installations," DTRA project manager Catherine Montie said. "So the fact that this can be done without using a lot of manpower is very attractive to places like Fort Leonard Wood."

Much of the material making its way on to installations comes from industrial or medical sources. The sensors are strong enough, Montie said, to detect if a person riding in a vehicle has recently had medical work that placed the materials in their bodies.

"I think even before 9-11, the country was looking at ways to protect itself from different kind of threats," said Maj. James Hutton, director of public affairs at Fort Leonard Wood. "Many military installations were already closing gates and starting to keep more people out. So this (kind of protection) has been a long time in coming."

While most of the testing done at the four sites was identical, a detection and tracking system used to assist law enforcement officials is being tested around Fort Leonard Wood.

On Wednesday, DTRA officials placed four detection systems on the highways in and around St. Robert.

Like the sensors on post, the equipment for highway use can detect vehicles where radioactive materials are present. But the highway system can also track and photograph the vehicle, going as far as to predict the path where it will travel next. Wednesday's testing tracked four vehicles — all planted with material by the DOD.

"Law enforcement is going to want to know a description of the vehicle, where it is going and the seriousness of the threat it provides," said Jose Hernandez, project manager for the tracking system. "And that's what we're trying to give them with this system."

Montie said much more research into the legality of such a system needs to be completed before any further study is done on the tracking unit.

None of the sensors has been deployed for use. The equipment would cost about \$5 million per site.

If approved, the technology could be used not only by the military, but in civilian locations.

The Department of Homeland Security has also taken an interest in the system, Montie said, in an effort to find new ways to protect the country from threats.

"The technology we're using certainly isn't new, but the ways we're implementing it is," Montie said. "So we're excited to see where this goes from here."

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New York Times

May 4, 2003

Pg. 16

## **Bush Says It Will Take Time To Find Iraq's Banned Arms**

By David E. Sanger

CRAWFORD, Tex., May 3 — With his administration under growing international pressure to find evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed banned weapons, President Bush told reporters today that "we'll find them," but cautioned that it would take some time because, he said, Mr. Hussein spent so many years hiding his stockpiles. Mr. Bush's comments came after his senior aides, in interviews in recent days, had begun to back away from their prewar claims that Mr. Hussein had an arsenal that was loaded and ready to fire. They now contend that he developed what they call a "just in time" production strategy for his weapons, hiding chemical precursors that could be quickly loaded into empty artillery shells or short-range missiles.

But no evidence has been found that he did so, and Mr. Bush's comments reflected a growing concern in the administration that opponents of the war would claim that the United States exaggerated the evidence against Iraq in order to justify an attack that was intended to depose Mr. Hussein.

Referring to the growing number of Iraqi scientists and military officials now in custody, the president made it clear that he thought they would soon lead American forces to Mr. Hussein's weapons stores. "It may not be the aces, kings and queens and jacks that do the talking," he said, referring to the Iraqi officials whose faces have been placed on playing cards to help allied troops identify them. "It may be those carrying the water for the aces, kings, queens and jacks."

Speaking on his ranch this morning with Prime Minister John Howard of Australia, Mr. Bush appeared still ebullient after his two-day swing through California. On the trip, he declared an end to the military phase of the war in a made-for-television speech to the 5,000 crew members of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln off shore in the Pacific.

His aides describe that speech on Thursday as one of the best-staged events of his presidency. They are already discussing how clips of Mr. Bush in a flight jump suit, surrounded by returning troops, can be used in the 2004 re-election campaign.

Today, the president was engaged in another facet of marking the end of the war: He rewarded Mr. Howard, who took big political risks at home by ordering Australian forces into Iraq, with an overnight visit to his ranch. Mr. Bush regards this as an honor reserved for his closest allies, one he said recently that France's president, Jacques Chirac, would not be given anytime soon.

At meetings this morning, the two leaders spent much of their time discussing the crisis in North Korea, though they did not mention it at their news conference. The crucial issue is whether to proceed with negotiations or move to tighten economic penalties and perhaps maritime interdiction of North Korean missiles.

They spent Friday night talking over a dinner that included one of Mr. Bush's favorite dishes — green chili cheese grits — and the president took Mr. Howard on a brisk walking tour of the ranch. For Mr. Howard, the photos of that walk may prove as politically valuable as the pictures aboard the Lincoln are for Mr. Bush.

Mr. Bush's endorsement today of a free trade agreement being negotiated with Australia, which would remove most tariffs and other barriers on trade between the countries, may be equally valuable. Such an agreement is a major economic issue in Australia. Mr. Bush said today that "the idea is to try to get this done by the end of the year," and passed by Congress next year.

When he said it would be an important "step in our relationship," Mr. Howard said, "Amen to that."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/international/worldspecial/04PREX.html>

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Washington Post

May 4, 2003

Pg. 6

## **Future Of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Debated**

*Arms Control Experts Worry Pentagon's Restructuring Plan Means More Weapons*

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Cold War is over, but advocates and critics of nuclear weapons inside the Bush administration and on Capitol Hill continue to battle over how the United States should reduce and restructure its enormous stockpile.

The infighting will become public this week when Congress considers the fiscal 2004 defense authorization bill. It contains language that eliminates current restrictions on researching low-yield nuclear weapons, gives added money for research on a high-yield nuclear bomb for use against deeply buried targets, and completes funding for reducing to 18 months from three years the preparation time required for resuming underground nuclear testing.

Although arms control experts on Capitol Hill worry that the Bush administration is seeking new nuclear weapons, the man who runs U.S. Strategic Command is looking to reduce dependency on the current nuclear stockpile by turning to smart, precision conventional bombs and missiles.

Adm. James O. Ellis Jr., head of U.S. Strategic Command, has said he wants to reduce the country's dependence on nuclear weapons by using conventional, precision-guided bombs and missiles to destroy deeply buried targets that some in the Pentagon say can be threatened only by a new nuclear warhead.

If those conventional weapons cannot penetrate targets buried deep in mountains, Ellis said, the U.S. military can attack the sites by blocking their entrances and exits and making them unusable. Ellis said he also wants to be prepared to use special forces on the ground to guide air attacks on bunker sites or to seal the entrances.

"This innovative approach will enable [Strategic Command] to deliberately and adaptively plan and rapidly deliver limited-duration, nonnuclear combat power anywhere in the world," Ellis told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee last month.

But Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), said late last month that the Pentagon's proposals for new nuclear research "are raising doubts about our own long-standing policy on nuclear weapons." Kennedy said at a news conference sponsored by the Arms Control Association that the Pentagon's moves question "our commitment not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations."

Kennedy and others say the administration's plans, as outlined in last year's Nuclear Posture Review, could lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons. But Ellis told the senators that the review's impact will be to "raise even higher the nuclear threshold."

"The administration is sending mixed messages," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. "They are saying they will reduce the need for strategic nuclear weapons at the same time they are moving ahead with a new class of nuclear bunker busters and also perhaps low-yield ones to use against chemical and biological stocks."

To combat the proposed nuclear earth penetrator, Kimball and other arms controllers say smart weapons could do it more effectively because no nuclear weapon could go deep enough without destroying itself or creating enormous fallout. As Sidney Drell, the nuclear physicist, recently wrote, 50 feet is about as deep as a bomb or missile warhead could dig itself. To be effective, it would take more than 100 kilotons to reach a target 1,000 feet down. That size

weapon would create a much larger crater than Ground Zero at the World Trade Center and create a large amount of dangerous radioactive debris.

One solution, Drell said, is a new, so-called pilot hole conventional weapon system under development at the Sandia National Laboratories. In this program, Drell said, one detonation creates a hole, and using global position satellites, successive warheads are directed in the same hole. "You have successive explosions, and you can increase the depth to which you penetrate," Drell said.

As for researching new low-yield weapons, Drell said, "The issue is not testing or developing new designs; it's deciding if you want to package one so it can penetrate deeper without destroying itself by detonating."

Ellis has said he plans to build a nonnuclear strategic force around the country's long-range bomber force. The B-1 bomber, which was removed from the nuclear mission years ago, is "back into our force structure in its purely conventional role," Ellis said. The modification of four Trident strategic ballistic missile submarines into launchers for Tomahawk conventional cruise missiles will "improve joint war-fighting effectiveness," he added.

Ellis said studies are looking at putting conventional warheads atop intercontinental ballistic missiles and at developing hypersonic aircraft, aerospace vehicles and unmanned aircraft to deliver conventional arms. He said the military's use of precision-guided bunker-busting bombs and other conventional weaponry delivered by Strategic Command's B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers during the Iraq war was a sign of the trend toward conventional weapons.

One reason that Strategic Command may not be as focused on nuclear weapons as it was during the Cold War is that it has been given additional responsibilities. For example, Ellis also runs military space operations and Pentagon computer and information networks, which involves planning offensive and defensive electronic warfare. This comes on top of the command's traditional global strategic planning and counter-proliferation activities.

There is also a practical war-fighting fact in play as the Afghanistan fighting hinted and the Iraq war showed: In this new century, there will be few if any situations where a president of the United States will threaten to reach for nuclear weapons of any size or shape, despite repeated statements that such use cannot be ruled out or taken off the table.

Ellis has a different background from his predecessors at Strategic Command in that he came to the job with no experience in the strategic nuclear field. He is a navy aviator versed in aircraft carriers but has little experience on ballistic missile submarines.

As he told the Senate Armed Services Committee before his confirmation hearing, he has "not worked regularly" with the key agencies involved with strategic nuclear operations. These include the National Security Council; the Department of Energy, which develops and builds nuclear weapons; the Nuclear Weapons Council, the group of officials from the Pentagon and Energy Department that determines nuclear weapons needs; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which assesses the effects of nuclear weapons.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10591-2003May3.html>

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New York Times Magazine

May 4, 2003

Pg. 48

## The Thinkable

*During the last years of the cold war, weapons of mass destruction were mostly abstractions to be counted and negotiated. Suddenly, with too few people paying attention, they are proliferating, and those who now have or want nukes will use them to blackmail, or worse.*

By Bill Keller

In each of the major cities of Pakistan, you can find a strange monument depicting a saw-toothed mountain and a poised missile.

The mountain is a peak in the Chagai Hills, in whose granite depths Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests five years ago. In the Islamabad version of this tableau, which sits on a traffic island amid a congestion of garishly ornamented trucks, three-wheeled taxis and donkey carts, the mountain is bathed at night in a creepy orange light, as if radioactive. The camouflage-dappled missile is called the Ghauri, and it has a range of about 900 miles. If the chronic tensions along the border between Pakistan and India should ever escalate to a nuclear war, the Ghauri would try to deliver at least one of Pakistan's warheads onto New Delhi. Lest anyone miss the point, the missile was named for a 12th-century Afghan warrior whose most memorable accomplishment was conquering part of India.

A couple of things about these odd shrines are worth considering. The first is the way Pakistan flaunts its nuclear potency in such a proud, even provocative public display. Traditionally most countries that possess nuclear weapons

have maintained a discretion about them, befitting their stigma and mystique. Israel has never even publicly acknowledged the existence of its program, nor did the white rulers of South Africa before they quietly decided to dismantle their arsenal in 1989. Pakistan, too, used to be coy about whether it possessed nuclear weapons, but in the past few years the Pakistanis have decided that their weapons are more useful when brandished. Useful, first, in warding off the superior conventional army of India, but useful too as a nationalist proclamation and a beacon to Islamic pride.

A second salient fact about these roadside sculptures is that the Ghauri is, beneath its Pakistani cosmetics, a copy of a North Korean missile called the Nodong. A strong suspicion of American and Indian intelligence services is that Pakistan paid for this missile -- which can deliver a nuclear warhead -- in part by giving North Korea vital tidbits of information about the production and testing of nuclear explosives. Pakistani officials deny this categorically, but not very convincingly in the view of more impartial experts. (The father of the Pakistani bomb, A.Q. Khan, is known to have paid at least 13 visits to North Korea.) If the suspicion is justified, then Pakistan -- which lives at the busiest crossroads of Islamic terror -- is the first nation to have bartered away nuclear weapons technology on the black market.

What Pakistan has unwittingly memorialized is a new nuclear era. A dozen years after the Soviet Union crumbled, nuclear weapons have not receded to the margins of our interest, as many expected. On the contrary, in this second nuclear age, such weapons govern our foreign policy more than they have in decades.

We have been slow to wake up to this new order, but now we are in it with a bang. We just fought a war that began as a drive to disarm one tyrant with nuclear ambitions and to demonstrate America's resolve to others. There are so many ways to think about the war we have just concluded in Iraq that it is easy to overlook this one: it is the most audacious attempt to change the rules of arms control in half a century.

Nuclear proliferation is at the heart of our confrontations with North Korea and Iran, two states for whom the message of Iraq was intended. Proliferation is a persistent irritant in our relations with Russia and China, has contributed to America's official disappointment with the United Nations and is intimately intertwined with the consuming issue of our time, terrorism.

The first nuclear age, which began over Hiroshima, eventually matured into a great standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite a number of nuclear near misses during that confrontation's first 20 years -- the Berlin showdown, the Cuban missile crisis -- the two rivals slowly brought their fearsome weapons under control and negotiated a protocol for living with them. During the same period, other potential nuclear states were restrained -- by treaties, by the threat of sanctions and other diplomatic pressures, by the superpowers' semi-monopoly on technology and by the fact that weak nations could huddle under the nuclear protection of one bloc or the other. The alliances, Soviet and American, had a strong interest in limiting the number of states with nuclear weapons, and they generally kept things in check. In its way, the cold war worked.

In hindsight, you could say that the closing act of the first nuclear age took place in January 1994, when Ukraine agreed to give up the nuclear weapons it had inherited in the breakup of the Soviet Union. It was the last of the former Soviet states to relinquish its unconventional weapons, and probably the only one with the technological wherewithal to override Moscow's centralized control systems and become an overnight nuclear state. But at that time, possession of nuclear weapons was still understood as a serious impediment for a country seeking admission into the Western world. If you wanted to join the party, you checked your nukes at the door. The first Bush administration and then the Clinton administration bargained hard for the surrender of Ukraine's weapons, promising abundant financial aid and a military partnership that Ukrainians hoped would lead to American security guarantees. However, an attentive listener back then might have sensed that the old verities were beginning to lose their power. Ukrainian nationalists (including many Ukrainian-Americans) raised a serious clamor for retaining the weapons. Why should Russia, which has a history of throwing its weight around, be a nuclear power and not Ukraine? Who will take us seriously without the Bomb? Some of the diplomats who negotiated the end of Ukraine's nuclear interlude are not so sure that today their appeal would successfully withstand the riptide of nationalism.

The second nuclear age was heralded by a rumble under the Rajasthan desert in 1998, as India's newly elected Hindu nationalist government detonated five test blasts. Two weeks later Pakistan followed suit. India's tests were a declaration of national pride, a sign of anxiety about its rival China and a caution to Pakistan. Pakistan's tests were more simply reciprocal. Announcing them, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared proudly, "Today, we have settled the score."

Both countries were known to be developing nuclear weapons, but they came out of the closet brazenly. These were nuclear weapons with a regional agenda, unveiled with a populist flourish. And they had a religious subtext -- the Hindu bomb, the Islamic bomb -- that has become more acute as fundamentalists of the two religions gain ground in their respective countries.



India and Pakistan were, by many estimations, the forerunners of a new kind of nuclear power, ahead of the field but hardly alone. Iraq may be solved, but North Korea is regarded as already nuclear. Iran is believed to be moving rapidly toward acquiring nukes. Libya and Syria are watched with suspicion. Experts talk speculatively of the ripple effects -- of a nuclear Iran inspiring nuclear lust in Egypt, Turkey, even Saudi Arabia, of a nuclear North Korea prompting a breakout in Japan, South Korea, even Taiwan.

Long experience without catastrophic mishap has made us, perhaps, a little complacent about nuclear weapons. The Indian and Pakistani tests caused a media frisson and some halfhearted sanctions, but the sense of urgency quickly passed. They were just tests, after all, and half a world away, and everyone knows using nuclear weapons at war is -- the word is on every diplomat's save-get key -- unthinkable.

But each new country that gets nuclear weapons multiplies the potential for a war involving a nuclear state. And numbers are not the worst of it. The original nuclear era was primarily a boxers' clinch of two great industrial powers, each claiming to represent an ideology of global appeal. The second is about insecure nations, most of them led by autocrats, most of them relatively poor, residing in rough neighborhoods, unaligned with and resentful of Western power.

The arsenals of the first nuclear age were governed by elaborate rules and sophisticated technology designed to prevent firing in haste. Some of the newcomers are thought to have far less rigorous command and control, raising fears that the lines of authority could be abandoned in the heat of battle. The newer nuclear states, after all, are dealing with enemies close at hand -- minutes away by missile -- in conflicts that could unfold quickly.

Moreover, there is the danger of third-world weapons or weapons-grade material falling into the hands of terrorists - - the one enemy we know would probably not hesitate to use them. Sympathy for Taliban-style fanaticism thrives in the lower ranks of Pakistan's military, for example. American and Pakistani officials, and experts in rival India, say that Gen. Pervez Musharraf has Pakistan firmly under his control, but nobody imagines that the situation is foolproof. Or that Musharraf will endure forever.

"Then it's not a question of one or two warheads being diverted," said a senior administration official. "It's a question of a couple dozen Islamic bombs."

Even if a rogue state does not share weapons with terrorists, a nuclear Iran or North Korea or an extremist-led Pakistan could provide sanctuary to terrorists, and the United States might hesitate to pursue killers into a nuclear-armed refuge. Add to this the fear that emotional temperatures can spike when patriotism is tied up with national or religious identity. These are the same passions that have, at their worst, fed outbreaks of genocide, sectarian atrocities and suicide bombing. At the Wagha border crossing, where I left India for Pakistan, soldiers of the two countries stage a ritual every day at dusk. They shoulder rifles, compose their faces in warlike resolve and march straight at one another, stopping only when they are close enough to smell one another's breath. It is purely symbolic, but the symbolism is not abstract. India and Pakistan have fought three wars -- and India has mobilized for war twice in the past 18 months, following terrorist attacks by Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan.

In the first nuclear age, centered on Europe and the cold war, we were on familiar ground. The second, though, is happening across a swath of Asia and is steeped in historic grudges, suppressed national pride and regional ambitions that the West poorly understands, let alone controls.

Henry Sokolski, who was Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's deputy for nonproliferation policy in the first Bush administration, recalls leaving office in 1993 brimming with optimism. Communism was dead. Rampant democracy and rising prosperity would dispel the appetite for these awful weapons. "We had worked to end nuclear programs in Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine," said Sokolski, who now runs a conservative antiproliferation center. "It seemed all these countries were drifting away from tyrannical, authoritarian rule, and I thought: There's the formula! It's working!"

The optimists were soon disillusioned, with regard to both the proliferation of democracy and the proliferation of weapons. With the demise of the two big alliances, countries that had existed in the shadows of the superpowers were left to settle their own scores and to see to their own security.

For India, which conducted a nuclear test in 1974 but left the program on idle, the end of the cold war meant a rising profile for China, a longtime antagonist -- and a nuclear power. China, in turn, was helping arm Pakistan. And in this newly disordered world, nuclear weapons were a way to announce that India intended to be a player. "Whatever Indians say officially, there is a status attached to the bomb," said Kanti Bajpai, a political scientist and nuclear critic, when I rode out to see him on the campus of Jawaharlal Nehru University. "The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are all nuclear powers."

For an authoritarian regime with designs on its neighbors -- Iraq, say -- nuclear weapons could prevent the United States from coming to the rescue of allies. "It is a real equalizer if you're a pissant little country with no hope of matching the U.S. militarily," remarked one Bush administration official. "What if Milosevic had had nuclear weapons during the Kosovo crisis?"

Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and author of an international best seller on the Taliban, argues that some autocrats sought nuclear weapons not to protect their countries but to secure their own holds on power.

"In the 90's, it became an issue of regime preservation and survival," Rashid said over tea at his home in Lahore. Outside, hired men carrying automatic rifles guarded the driveway, the price Rashid pays for speaking as freely as he does. "Many of the Muslim states were client states of one bloc or another. Suddenly the props that the ruling elites leaned on are gone."

These autocrats dared not risk their authority by opening up their societies. Some looked instead to nuclear weapons as a way of demonstrating their own importance to the fate of the nation.

"Yes, Pakistan had the India problem, but one of the big justifications to go nuclear was that somehow going nuclear would free us of any other obligation to our own people," Rashid asserted.

Another reason nuclear weapons spread was that they could. In the first nuclear age, the secrets and ingredients of bomb-making were closely held. But the end of the cold war choked off political support for controls on the export of sophisticated technology and made borders more porous. In the second nuclear age, globalization seems to have made nuclear weaponry just another unsavory but probably uncontainable technology, like Internet porn. Poor countries can even finance their nukes by exporting other military material, as North Korea has done.

"Demand creates the market," George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, told Congress in February, and "knowledgeable nonstate purveyors" are increasingly available to supply it, leapfrogging the tedious pace of old-fashioned nuclear programs. "The 'domino theory' of the 21st century may well be nuclear," Tenet said.

Many critics, especially abroad, say the U.S. has played midwife to the new nuclear age by a lack of vigilance bordering on complicity. We may not be a peddler of nuclear weapons technology or a flouter of international protocols. But we are guilty of hypocrisy, bad example, permissiveness and carelessness. In the world's graduation from the first nuclear age to the second, we have been a great enabler. The United States has tended to look the other way when nuclear offenders happened to be useful allies. This is inarguably the case in Pakistan. We made little effort to shut down Pakistan's nuclear program during the 1980's, when the Pakistanis were valued partners in aiding Afghanistan's insurgency against the Soviet Union. We knew China was selling missiles to Pakistan, but we were also courting China to offset the Soviets.

Although we have leaned recently on President Musharraf to make sure Pakistani nuclear capabilities stay home, we are reluctant to lean too hard, because he is now an indispensable ally against terrorists. "We are doing pretty much what we did in the 80's," conceded an American official who deals with South Asia. "The exigencies change, but the dilemma is still the same. You need Pakistan for some reasons, and therefore you cut the Pakistanis more slack than is prudent."

Whether this is bad policy or just playing the hand history deals is a hard question. It is easy to say we should get tough on countries that fail to toe the line on proliferation, but how tough is enough? Do we crack down on Pakistan to the point where we endanger Musharraf, and get a new Taliban in his place?

Some of our nuclear worries have grown because of a simple lack of attention. In 1994, President Clinton signed an agreement to supply North Korea with energy if it stopped reprocessing nuclear fuel into bomb-grade material. The deal averted a showdown, but afterward the Clinton administration -- diverted by other problems and intimidated by Congressional critics who said the deal was a sellout -- let things slide. Now, nine years later, the problem is back to haunt us.

Bush officials love to castigate Clinton, calling his North Korea deal appeasement. In fact, the agreement could have been a successful first step in defusing a North Korean threat, but it became an excuse to kick the problem down the road.

"The United States has trained Iranian engineers at M.I.T., winked at Israel and certainly in the case of North Korea prevaricated and not paid enough attention," said Sokolski, the former Defense aide. "Is it all our fault? No. But no American administration has done enough, not by a long shot."

The world of people who worry about nuclear weapons for a living is divided into two hostile camps, which sometimes seem more absorbed in fighting each other than in containing the spread of nuclear weaponry. The traditional arms controllers are advocates of treaties, export controls, international agencies and sanctions -- an elaborate regime intended to avert the spread and use of nuclear weapons. They will tell you that arms control has worked, that the handful of countries we worry about as nuclear pretenders is the same handful we worried about 20 years ago. The number of nuclear states has held at eight (the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, Israel, India, Pakistan), plus, it is now presumed, North Korea. And several countries (Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan) have backed away. The arms controllers say that what is needed now is to shore up those multilateral disciplines, fortify their enforcement and restore the sense of taboo surrounding these weapons. At the heart of their argument is a conviction that nuclear weapons, per se, are a hazard of a unique kind, and that part of discouraging their spread is a willingness to reduce our own arsenals -- at least to minimal levels, and ideally, in some future verifiable realm, to nothing.

Opposing the arms controllers is a new and ascendant camp, which asserts that the old constraints have broken down. Against the ineffectual diplomacy of traditional arms control, they offer a relatively coldblooded self-interest and confrontation most fulsomely demonstrated by the invasion of Iraq, although the menu of options includes surgical intervention, blockades, economic sanctions and the purely political muscle of public exposure and brutal candor.

In the nuclear world, traditionalists talk about "nonproliferation." The new school prefers the more muscular term "counterproliferation," which refers to a subset of activities involving the military. It should not surprise you to learn that under President Bush, the White House office responsible for these issues has renamed itself to incorporate the word "counterproliferation." Iraq was the first "counterproliferation" war.

There are serious tactical differences within the administration about how thoroughly to purge the legacy of old-fashioned arms control. But the senior policy makers in the area of arms control -- at the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House -- are pretty uniformly of the diplomacy-has-failed school. The principal players, like Under Secretary John Bolton at State, Under Secretary Douglas Feith and Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch at Defense and Robert Joseph, who runs the nuclear franchise at the National Security Council, have voluminous records as fierce critics of the arms-control gospel from their days on the outside.

The counterproliferationists put little faith in treaties. Last year they successfully discarded the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which prohibited weapons to shoot down incoming missiles for fear that this kind of defense would ignite a new arms race. The White House has sworn that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would do what its name suggests, will never be ratified. As for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970 and is supposed to limit the spread of nuclear technology and material, the administration accepts it as a bequest from the past but regards it as pointless. Only those who find it in their interest to obey will do so, Bush officials say, and the rest will cheat.

To the counterproliferators, the main problem is not nuclear weapons; it is bad regimes armed with nuclear weapons. Treaties and test bans, they say, limit the behavior of only the kinds of law-abiding people who obey treaties -- people like us. Thus the administration opposes any treaties that might inhibit us from developing new additions to our nuclear arsenal. And counterproliferators insist on our right to explore new species of nuclear weaponry, like precision-guided bunker-busters to cope with defenders who have buried their defenses under thick layers of concrete.

The logic at times resembles the tautology of an N.R.A. bumper sticker: If nukes are outlawed, only outlaws will have nukes. The Bush policy is to worry about the outlaws rather than the nukes.

In the world of nuclear affairs, they are the party of new ideas. The first was missile defense, reviving the Reagan-era scheme to intercept incoming ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads by using killer rockets, lasers and other devices. Since abandoning the A.B.M. treaty last year, the administration has raced to deploy the first antimissile batteries, even before demonstrating that they are reliable. Missile defenses are generally presented as the answer to a rogue nuke from a regime like North Korea or a missile obtained by terrorists. But their actual purpose is more complicated. What missile defenses are supposed to do is give America greater freedom of action as it goes about the missions it sets for itself -- protecting allies, for example, or disarming new threats. In theory, missile defense means a thug with a nuke cannot hold us at bay.

Since the administration pushed forward with deploying the shield, other countries have begun approaching us to help them introduce missile defenses against nuclear neighbors. Officials in Japan, rattled by North Korea's nuclear threat, have accelerated talks with the U.S. about installing missile defenses. India, too, has proposed that America help it obtain antimissile batteries -- either Israel's Arrow or the American Patriot. The Defense Department has supported this proposal, seeing India as a counter to the long-range threat of China. The State Department is reluctant, worrying that it will provoke Pakistan into a nuclear arms race or a domestic upheaval.

The second new idea on the Bush agenda is the one we have just witnessed, a greater willingness to use force either to pre-empt a threat before it becomes imminent or to reinforce a new, coercive diplomacy. Arms controllers tend to regard counterproliferators as unilateralists, carelessly provocative in their speech and quick to reach for a gun. Counterproliferators, in turn, paint traditional arms controllers as idealists and wishful thinkers. Neither side is entirely wrong.

In February, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, paid a visit to Iran. His trip attracted little attention in a world absorbed by the search for illicit weapons in Iraq, and his subsequent public statements were characteristically bland. He did not accuse the Iranians of anything. But what drew him there was powerful evidence for the counterproliferators' complaint that arms control is not working. The essential bargain that induced nonnuclear states to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty was this: If you pledge to refrain from arming yourself with bad atoms, you will be rewarded with a supply of good atoms -- a peaceful nuclear energy program. Inspectors from the I.A.E.A. will drop by occasionally to make sure you stay within bounds

-- that the nuclear fuel for generating electricity is all properly booked and sufficiently diluted. (The most difficult ingredient for a bomb maker to come by is not the design or the engineering; it is uranium or plutonium, distilled to a weapons-grade concentration.)

Under these ostensible safeguards, the Russians sold Iran a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor and helped install it in Bushehr. The Russians agreed to supply the nuclear fuel for the entire life of the reactor and to cart away the used fuel so it could not be reprocessed into something dangerous.

So ElBaradei must have felt some chagrin when, on Feb. 9, Iran's president, Mohammad Khatami, disclosed that Iran had a little something going on the side. While the world was preoccupied next door with Iraq, Khatami offhandedly divulged that Iran had secretly begun building two plants for enriching uranium. After his visit, ElBaradei said that one plant was nearly ready for operation and that a much larger one was under construction. The Bush administration is convinced that Iran has exploited the peaceful auspices of the Nonproliferation Treaty to shinny up the pole toward a nuclear-weapons program. Khatami's disclosure -- although accompanied by the ritual promises of purely civilian intentions -- is about as close to a confession as critics could want. It seems to confirm not only that the system can be circumvented, but also that the system actually gives would-be violators a leg up. One American official told me that if the Iranians run the Bushehr reactor for five or six years, withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty (as North Korea just did) and route all their radioactive material through a reprocessing plant, they would end up with enough radioactive material to build something like 100 nuclear weapons. And this is not a problem that would necessarily be solved by regime change. In Iran, which lives in a hostile neighborhood and retains more than a little Persian pride, the reformers seem just as dedicated to a nuclear future as the mullahs. The administration's solution, so far, is to lean hard on the Russians (as President Clinton also did, to little effect). The Bush officials hope the new disclosures will finally embarrass the Russians into clamping down. They also hope the Iranians and their sponsors will take the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as fair warning.

"I think the presence of 200,000 American troops on their border for X period of time may tend to concentrate their attention," observed a senior American official.

The ElBaradei visit also illustrates a second congenital flaw in the nonproliferation regime: enforcement depends almost completely on the cooperation of the suspects. The International Atomic Energy Agency, created at the United Nations in the 1950's to manage the distribution of nuclear materials, was born toothless. President Eisenhower wanted the agency to retain strict control of material and conduct intrusive inspections. The Soviet Union, India and France wouldn't hear of it. ElBaradei's minions cannot pop a surprise inspection. They go where they can persuade the inspected countries to let them go.

ElBaradei, upon learning that Iran had a parallel nuclear processing program growing in secrecy, could do little more than plead with the culprit for additional inspection authority that would "enable us to provide more comprehensive assurances" that Iran's program is just intended to produce electricity. Iran promised to think about it. Another way in which the nonproliferation rules work against their professed intentions is illustrated by Pakistan. Like India and Israel, Pakistan is an outlier, a nuclear country that never signed the treaty. The five nuclear powers that signed are obliged to have no hand in the nuclear programs of these outsiders, lest we confer legitimacy. But the biggest fear in Pakistan is not that its program might be legitimized. It is that Pakistan's nuclear weapons may be vulnerable -- to precipitous use in a conflict or to acquisition by terrorists.

Thus it might be a good idea for the U.S., which has abundant experience helping Russia lock up its nuclear material against diversion, to help Pakistan do the same. But the treaty forbids even this benign form of cooperation. Despite the treaty, one U.S. official who deals with South Asia told me, the administration has offered to help Pakistan impose more sophisticated controls on its nuclear program, like "physical safeguards" to lock down sites where fissile materials are kept.

"We've entered a dialogue," the official said. "We'll figure out how we come to terms with our conscience later." Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba's office in the headquarters of the Japanese Defense Agency is furnished with dozens of meticulous replicas of Japanese warplanes and battleships displayed in glass cases. Although Japan technically does not have an army, a navy or an air force, this is scale-model testimony to the fact that it actually has one of the world's largest military budgets. Thanks to the nuclear tantrums of North Korea, Ishiba's collection is likely to grow.

Could it grow to include Japanese nuclear weapons?

Even to suggest such a thing causes media hyperventilation in Japan, the only country to have had its citizens incinerated by nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo is backed by strong public opinion. North Korea's flamboyant withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty, however, raised the prospect of a hostile and unstable regime holding nuclear warheads just an eight-minute ballistic-missile flight from Tokyo. And some Americans in the neoconservative choir that accompanies the Bush administration have been advocating a nuclear Japan as a countermove to North Korea.

When I visited Tokyo in March, to see if I could glimpse a nation with the first inkling of an urge to get in the nuclear game, the defense minister and everyone else I talked to, including the most hard-line nationalists, said it is not about to happen. Even Shingo Nishimura, a staunch parliamentary militarist who was described to me as "the Richard Perle of Japan" (he was once fired from the cabinet for lamenting Japan's nuclear impotence), said he does not favor Japan producing nuclear weapons. What he advocates is the United States stationing a battery of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Japan, under American control, and even that is viewed as a fringe opinion. But not all the ripple effects of nuclear proliferation are nuclear. The convulsions over North Korea have given a serious boost to the idea of Japan collaborating in the American missile defense system. That standoff has also prompted a discussion of whether Japan might even need the ability to "pre-empt" a North Korean attack. Shortly before I visited Ishiba in March, he suggested that if the North Koreans seemed poised to attack Japan, Japan would have the right to launch a pre-emptive attack. This set off a very Japanese cycle of hand-wringing. What did he mean by that? Would it violate Japan's Constitution, which takes "defense" extremely literally? Did it reflect doubts about America's commitment to defend the islands?

Between draws on a smoke-ender nicotine inhaler, Ishiba explained to me that, alas, Japan does not have the ability to pre-empt anything. Its F-15 fighters cannot make it to North Korea and back without refueling, and Japan has no refueling planes. Nor does it have the precision-guided weapons to take out enemy silos once they get there.

"There are some Japanese who are surprised that while spending the world's second-largest military budget, Japan still does not have any capability of that kind," Ishiba lamented. You can expect to see refueling planes and precision munitions on Japan's next defense shopping list.

The defense minister said that if he had the requisite hardware, he could conceive of striking North Korea only in response to an imminent threat -- if, as he put it, North Korea vowed to turn Tokyo into a "sea of fire" and then began fueling its missiles. But by then it would probably be too late to do anything about it.

It was hard to tell whether this pre-emption talk was a tentative step toward a more assertive Japan or a devoted client's nod to the Bush doctrine or simply a shrewd politician grabbing a chance to expand his budget. Maybe all three.

The idea of nuclear pre-emption did not begin with the Iraq war. Robert Litwak, director of international studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, has found five earlier instances when states seriously considered using military force to prevent the spread of unconventional weapons. President Kennedy contemplated a preemptive strike on China's nuclear facilities before its first test explosion in 1964, but decided America could cope with a nuclear China. Israel in 1981 bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, enduring much criticism but setting back Saddam's nuclear program significantly. The 1991 gulf war plan targeted Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, although it was a secondary motive for the war. President Clinton thought hard about taking out North Korea's nuclear facilities in 1994, but instead managed to negotiate his way out of what advisers feared would be a new Korean war. And U.S. cruise missiles destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998, ostensibly linked to production of nerve gas -- a claim that has been disputed.

Litwak told me he intended his research, published in the winter issue of the quarterly *Survival*, as "an antidote to both right-wing triumphalism and left-wing hysteria about pre-emption. The bottom line is, it is an instrument of policy, but not a silver bullet."

That is exactly the reality the Bush administration has run into in North Korea. While the Pentagon has a contingency plan to bomb the country's nuclear facilities, and it could become a serious option, a senior official told me, "Nobody's really seriously arguing that within the administration -- that we should do it soon, anyway." The North Korean leader may just be crazy enough to respond by raining artillery shells on the metropolis of Seoul, or lobbing a missile at Japan.

So, what does a counterproliferation strategy for North Korea look like? I asked two Bush officials, both senior enough to have a say in what the administration ultimately decides. The first official argued that the best way to deal with North Korea is to encircle it, cut off all aid and wait for Kim Jong Il to fall. Buying his disarmament with food and oil, even if Kim was willing to bargain, would just perpetuate the regime and would be "morally repugnant," he said. And the administration is pretty sure Kim will not bargain away such a powerful weapon.

"If we could have containment that's tailored to the conditions of North Korea, and not continue to throw it lifelines like we have in the past, I think it goes away," said this official. "It's a bankrupt economy. I can't imagine that the regime has any popular support. How long it takes, I don't know. It could take two years."

And what is North Korea doing during that time?

"I think it'll crank out, you know, half a dozen weapons a year or more. We lived with a Soviet Union that had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, including thousands of them pointed at us. We just have to cope."

I recounted this fatalistic view to officials in Asia and to American experts, and most were horrified. As they pointed out, it has some rather serious holes. First, North Korea, unlike the Soviet Union, will sell anything to anybody for

the right price. Second, a collapsing North Korea with nukes may not be as pretty a picture as my official informant anticipates. Third, if this collapse means a merger of the peninsula into a single, unified Korea -- that is, if South Korea becomes a de facto nuclear power -- that will bring little joy to Japan or China. The second American official I spoke to agreed with his colleague that the Bush policy should include economic sanctions, and that a failure of the regime would be a desirable goal. But he was uneasy with the idea of letting North Korea's nuclear arsenal grow until the day of collapse. Before that would be tolerated, the administration would take a closer look at a military strike. "The only acceptable end state," he said, is "everything out."

Tolerance of a nuclear North Korea, he said, would send a message to the Iranians and others: "Get your nuclear weapons quickly, before the Americans do to you what they've done to Iraq, because North Korea shows once you get the weapons, you're immune."

I asked this official whether he would favor letting nuclear weapons fall into the hands of friendly countries in Asia. After all, say some of the most ardent hawks, there are no bad weapons, just bad regimes. Some say this would produce a grand strategic result: China, which they see as America's most likely threat in the long run, encircled by nuclear-armed allies of America. We could even bring home our troops and let our friends police the region.

The official weighed his answer for a minute. "I notice a lot of my friends are saying, By God, give them to the Japanese, give them to Taiwan," he said. "I'd rather not. My ideal number of nuclear-weapons states is one." Within the Bush administration, that official's comments represent the sober (and, at least for now, prevailing) view. We want nukes out of the hands of bad guys, and we are not yet proposing to give nukes to good guys. To critics, though, including much of the world abroad, that last sentence also reflects a frightening arrogance. My ideal number of nuclear-weapons states is one. Why is the ideal number not zero?

Nuclear weapons have always been more about psychology than about war. The power consists in having them, not in using them. A sense of awe, mingled with something like shame, characterized the first nuclear era. Previous American presidents at least paid lip service to the ultimate dream of a nuclear-free world -- and some, notably Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, seem to have genuinely believed in it.

The stigma attached to nuclear weapons had real power. Kenneth Watman, chairman of the war-gaming department at the Naval War College, told me that throughout the cold war he observed or read about innumerable simulations of crises between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In almost every case, the actors portraying the decision makers balked at using their nuclear weapons. Even in a game, even with their backs to the wall, even players who were foaming at the mouth held back, Watman said. "It's the pure lunacy of it. The disproportion between ends and means."

Watman says he believes this important psychological threshold has lowered since the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, when the rest of the world could not muster a strong response. Some say the Bush administration is further eroding the sense of taboo by advertising its Home Depot of new nuclear gadgets, by scorning treaties aimed at preventing bigger and more modern nuclear arsenals, by insisting on the right to test, by dreaming aloud of an American monopoly.

"In the cold war, they were viewed as weapons of last resort," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who is one of his country's most articulate disarmament advocates. "Now they are viewed as a means to fight wars. This is the final nail in the coffin of a nuclear-free world. What kind of message is that sending to the rest of the world?"

This is not the view of traditionalists alone. Henry Sokolski, a critic of the way the Nonproliferation Treaty has been implemented and a supporter of President Bush, says the cavalier attitude of some in the administration on testing, new battlefield nukes and international agreements is dangerous. Sokolski argues that nuclear weapons are like the slave trade -- an evil that transcends the sovereign rights of states, and one that should be battled by all means. Several Bush hawks have picked up the slave-trade analogy and used it to argue, for instance, that we have a right to intercept weapons traffic on the high seas. But Sokolski says some that administration officials miss the point. As long as the U.S. exempts itself from the opprobrium bestowed on nuclear weapons, it will lack the moral authority to bring the rest of the world along.

"Ultimately, like slavery, you have to be willing to argue against it wherever it is -- including getting away from our own reliance on it," he said.

Paul Bracken, a Yale political scientist who set out to define the second nuclear age in a prescient book published four years ago, "Fire in the East," began as a scholar of military strategy, but got bored with the subject and added a second career as an expert in global corporate strategy. He still teaches political science at the Yale School of Management, and when I called him at his campus office not long ago, he sounded exasperated at the polarization of the debate over nuclear proliferation. He agrees with the Bush hawks that the old arms-control regime has become increasingly irrelevant, and he regards the war in Iraq as "the most important arms control action in 50 years." Yet he



agrees with the traditionalists that the administration hawks fail to understand the dangers of overheated rhetoric and the real value in arms-control diplomacy. Neither side, he says, seems able to climb up from its ideological trench. "We had a nonproliferation regime that worked into the 90's, and then failed," Bracken said. "How many other government programs can you point to that worked for 25 years? If I can find a new arms control that works for 25 years, and then fails, I will break open the Champagne."

What might a new arms-control regime look like?

In the first nuclear age, the Americans and the Soviets studied each other intensely, negotiated constantly and over time learned to communicate their intentions clearly. The new players are more mysterious to us, and the administration sometimes seems more inclined to moralize about them than to study them and their motives for seeking to go nuclear. We know little, for example, about how North Korea's leader thinks, and even Iran -- which is both more accessible and more complicated than North Korea -- is regarded in some parts of Washington as a cartoon evil.

A new arms-control regime might begin by assessing the motives that tempt states to go nuclear, and then figuring out how to remove the temptation. It would necessarily be more engaged, less smug and more versatile. Some potential nuclear states might be amenable to swapping their weapons programs for a chance at prosperity. Some might respond to assurances that they will not be attacked, backed up by security guarantees or new alliances the U.S. would foster. Arms controllers are mostly dogmatic in their rejection of missile defenses, but it's worth studying whether missile defense -- which may or may not ever be useful to protect America from a nuclear attack -- could be useful in some regions to persuade potential nuclear states that they can live without these weapons. Some countries could lose interest in nuclear weapons if we played a more active role in defusing the regional grievances that keep them on edge -- notably the border dispute between India and Pakistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A few will prove incorrigible, at which point we choose between containment and forcible disarmament.

The administration is clearly right that a new arms control cannot rest entirely on the illusory safety of talks and treaties and U.N. resolutions. The autocrats most likely to be dangerous to us if they get nuclear weapons are the leaders least likely to care about staying in the good graces of the "international community," whatever that is. A new arms-control regime should distinguish among threats and offer a menu of options appropriate to the danger, from inspection to coercion. It would draw on military pressure and economic sanctions, along with the softer diplomacy that the counterproliferators scorn. It would not disdain international agreements but would demand smarter treaties, backed by intrusive inspections and rigorous enforcement.

And it would accept the solemn responsibility -- a particularly American responsibility -- to restore the special stigma of nuclear explosives. The destructive power of these weapons is unique and breathtaking, and almost impossible to confine to military targets. Chemical and biological weapons, horrible as they are, cannot match them as agents of catastrophe. A strategy that focuses exclusively on regimes and not on weapons themselves has several flaws, and the most obvious one is this: when regimes change, weapons remain.

*Bill Keller is a Times columnist and a senior writer for the magazine.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/magazine/04NUKES.html>

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## **Key Iraqi bio weapons scientist captured**

WASHINGTON (AP) — Coalition forces have captured one of Iraq's top biological weapons scientists, defense officials said Monday. Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, among the top 55 most wanted members of Saddam Hussein's fallen regime, was taken into custody on Sunday, a Defense Department official said. He had no other details about the development.

U.S. intelligence officials said that Ammash, 49, is believed to have played a key role in rebuilding Baghdad's biological weapons capability since the first Persian Gulf War in 1991.

In one of several videos of Saddam released during the war, Ammash was the only woman among about a half-dozen men seated around a table. The videos were used as Iraqi propaganda as invading forces drew closer to Baghdad and it was not known when the meeting happened nor what was the significance of her visibility on camera.

American officials say Ammash is among a new generation of leaders named by Saddam to leading posts within Iraq's Baath party.

On the Pentagon's list the 55 most wanted, Ammash is number 53 and referred to as the party's Youth and Trade Bureau Chairman. She is the 'Five of Hearts' on the infamous deck of cards.

The U.S. officials said she was trained by Nassir al-Hindawi, described by United Nations inspectors as the father of Iraq's biological weapons program.

Ammash has served as president of Iraq's microbiological society and as dean at University of Baghdad.

Ammash and al-Hindawi are among Iraq's top weapons scientists. Others include Amir al-Saadi, a chief chemical weapons researcher, and Dr. Rihab Taha, a woman who was dubbed "Dr. Germ" by inspectors.

Her father was a high-level party revolutionary who was believed to have been ordered killed by Saddam, officials said.

Ammash received a master of science in microbiology from Texas Woman's University, in Denton, Texas, and received an undergraduate degree from the University of Baghdad. Ammash, 49, later spent four years at the University of Missouri-Columbia in pursuit of her doctorate in microbiology, which she received in December 1983.

[http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-05-05-bioscientist-captured\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-05-05-bioscientist-captured_x.htm)

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