


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Air University

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Washington Post

March 20, 2003

Pg. 1

U.S. Reaps New Data On Weapons

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. government has obtained potentially valuable new information on Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programs in recent days from scientists and intelligence agents confronted outside Iraq with threats that failure to cooperate could mean unpleasant consequences when Baghdad falls, according to two U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the effort.

In a top-secret adjunct to an openly reported diplomatic initiative, U.S. and allied intelligence services summoned scores of Iraqi operatives in foreign capitals to present a stark choice. They were told "they could either 'turn,' " said one official, using an expression for switching sides, or be expelled back to Iraq "to enjoy your very short stay in Baghdad."

Another official with access to written accounts of the conversations said the Iraqis were told that when the United States sorts friends and enemies after toppling President Saddam Hussein, "they'll be putting themselves and their families at the mercy of the new Iraqi government."

The State Department announced on March 6 that it had asked 60 friendly governments to expel alleged Iraqi intelligence operatives who lived abroad under diplomatic or commercial cover. Spokesman Philip Reeker portrayed the request as routine. But behind the announcement was Operation Imminent Horizon, in which Iraqis were pressured to provide information about the weapons programs and Iraqi operational plans. Among the nations that helped with the expulsions and recruiting efforts were Romania, Hungary, Australia and Sweden, officials said. The Defense Department is racing to integrate the new leads into an extremely risky and ambitious disarmament mission. The quality of intelligence on Iraqi chemical, biological or nuclear weapons could not only determine the threats facing U.S. troops on the battlefield in the days ahead, but also could become a factor in conclusions around the world about whether the war was necessary.

U.S. planners are urgently focused on the speedy capture of Iraqi scientists and identification of suspected weapons sites, to prevent attacks on U.S. forces and preserve evidence of proscribed programs. But they are also wary of booby traps and the possibility that small U.S. disarmament teams could be overwhelmed if they outrun friendly ground forces.

Officials said many U.S. analysts feared that the chaos of the Iraqi government's collapse could give an opening to Iraqi scientists or security officials inclined to seize and sell special weapons for profit or revenge. That would bring about the very proliferation that the war is intended to prevent.

One issue facing U.S. officials is the need for early and concrete proof of an ongoing Iraqi special weapons program even with the likelihood, as some officials see it, that the program would not be fully understood for months or years.

"A very important political component is if you find these things, how do you establish the proof of that to the satisfaction of 35 foreign ministries and those of you in the media?" said Jay Davis, who led the Defense Threat Reduction Agency until 2001 and has continued to consult on the Iraqi disarmament plan. "A large number of conspiracy theorists all over the world will say the U.S. government has planted all that stuff."

In a twist that could complicate the effort, the White House has decided, for now, to assign no role in the disarmament effort to the key U.N. agencies that were charged by the Security Council with carrying out the search for banned weapons. As recently as the last week of February, U.S. and U.N. officials said, the State Department asked the leading inspection agency, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, known as UNMOVIC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency for help in the postwar dismantling of Iraq's remaining long-range missiles and nuclear, biological, chemical and missile weapons programs.

But early this month, the White House reversed course, saying it was a military operation and would remain one for a long time to come, not suitable for civilians. Officials said the U.N. agencies could be given a role later. Two officials said the U.N. agencies would not likely be invited to participate until the United States was ready to turn over dual-use biological or chemical sites for long-term monitoring. U.N. sources said the IAEA believes it has ongoing legal authority over former Iraqi nuclear facilities, regardless of a change in government.

As a substitute for the U.N. expertise, the Bush administration has scrambled to recruit former inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, the agency that carried out inspections in Iraq in the 1990s. These inspectors may join military-civilian "exploitation teams" that will interrogate Iraqi weapons scientists and assess captured documents, but the first of them are just arriving in the region, and their roles remain undefined.

Charles Duelfer, who served as deputy executive chairman at UNSCOM for most of its eight-year life, departed for Kuwait on Monday. Duelfer was highly regarded among disarmament experts, but UNSCOM's back channels to Washington and London aroused suspicion among other nations on the U.N. Security Council. UNSCOM dissolved in controversy in 1999 over disclosures that the United States had used the commission's resources to eavesdrop on

the Iraqi military. Duelfer left no forwarding telephone number and did not reply to e-mail sent Tuesday to the address he supplied on his office voice mail.

Since there will be no independent U.N. witnesses in the search, U.S. officials said they give high priority to making a public display of the discovery of any weapons. "If we've got a good news story, in the sense that we find something, we will take reporters to see it," one defense official said. Another spoke of a mandate to find "a smoking gun real fast." He added: "And if the son of a bitch uses a couple of chemical artillery shells, he will have done the same thing."

Participants in the U.S. disarmament planning, most of them speaking this week without official permission and on condition of anonymity, expressed disquiet about the prospects of success. The venture, said one official who echoed other colleagues, remains improvised and unfinished, "with about 74,000 moving pieces." Few of those interviewed believed they could predict the performance of newly invented task forces that fuse civilian experts with intelligence, Energy Department and Justice Department employees -- all under military operational command. Some sources said the uncertainties reflect the relative inattention of top policymakers, who turned to disarmament only weeks ago after more than a year of concerted planning to remove the Iraqi government by force.

A senior defense official with responsibility for oversight of the mission, speaking for the Pentagon but insisting on anonymity, expressed pride in the on-the-fly assembly of experts but acknowledged they begin their work as there is great uncertainty.

"It's going to be very fluid," the official said. "Things might not be where we think they are. We may stumble onto things we didn't know about."

Officials said the United States has more information on Hussein's weapons programs than it has shared publicly or with U.N. inspectors. They said they withheld information only to preserve essential sources, methods or the secrecy of ongoing operations. But success or failure of the U.S. disarmament plan depends heavily on extracting more details from a group of 75 to 100 Iraqis with primary knowledge of Iraq's weapons design, procurement, manufacture and concealment.

Special Forces teams are poised to conduct raids from the earliest hours of the war to seize targets of opportunity among those men and women. U.S. intelligence is tracking their whereabouts, and in some cases "we have a pretty good idea where they are," one official said.

A handful of eleventh-hour recruits have come from among Iraqi scientists abroad who have also been approached lately by U.S. agents. The Baghdad government sent some of them overseas and elsewhere late last year to prevent their questioning by U.N. inspectors. Still other knowledgeable Iraqis have been detained at border points this month as they sought to flee the country before shooting started.

American experts are counting on many Iraqis to cooperate eagerly, but others, one official directly involved in the planning said, will be faced with "an interrogation that doesn't look anything like an interview with U.N. inspectors." The Iraqis can tell what they know, the official said, or face "handling as enemy combatants. They'll go to a war crimes tribunal with Saddam, or they will be in prison. You have a lot of leverage over them."

It was not clear, government officials said, whether all the central players in Iraq's weapons program would be offered amnesty for information. Asked whether any were regarded as war criminals or otherwise irredeemable enemies, five officials said the government had made no such decision.

Military planners see four stages in the disarmament campaign. The first is to take control of and assess any known site that might present an immediate threat to U.S. forces. The second is to disable the threat and any ongoing production. The third will be the responsibility of "exploitation teams," with linguists, tools to extract information from hidden or encrypted computer files, and field laboratories that include detectors for radiation and sophisticated tests for biological and chemical toxins. Full destruction, the fourth stage, will come much later.

"We are not going to be blowing up munitions and destroying things if they do not pose an immediate threat," a Pentagon civilian planner said. "We will secure it and then come back, when we're in a permissive environment, to destroy the material in a way that's safe to civilians and soldiers."

The weapons hunt draws on nuclear experts from the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, civilian scientists from the Energy Department's Nuclear Emergency Response Team, linguists from the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, and computer and records specialists from the Justice Department. The military is supplying specialists in missiles and biological and chemical weapons, drawn from Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency, the Army's Technical Escort Unit and the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57066-2003Mar19.html>

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Chemicals Use Considered Less Likely

Experts Say Iraq Does Not Have Means to Deliver Them Against Invaders

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

If Saddam Hussein has in fact maintained stocks of prohibited chemical or biological weapons, he might be hard-pressed to use them against invading troops, experts said yesterday.

That is because the delivery systems he employed so successfully in the 1980s during Iraq's eight-year war with Iran are not likely to work as well today. In that war, Iraq showered Iranian troops with thousands of bombs, rockets and shells carrying chemical agents, killing or injuring more than 20,000 people, according to an October 2002 CIA report. The use of chemical weapons turned the tide of war and eventually led to Iran's decision to accept a truce negotiated by the United Nations.

"The problem for Iraq today is that the U.S. will control the air," said Jonathan B. Tucker, director of the chemical and biological nonproliferation project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a former U.N. weapons inspector. "And the massed hundreds of pieces of artillery needed to deliver tons of chemical agents to be effective on a target would be an easy target itself."

Tucker said Hussein "may very well use whatever he has" in a "last-ditch defense situation." He added, however: "He could contaminate areas, but against the U.S., even if used effectively, it can only slow the oncoming forces down -- since [American soldiers], unlike the Iranians, have protective suits."

The extent of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability today is still unknown; but what can be understood is how Hussein chose to use -- or not to use -- his once-vast stocks of chemical agents in the past.

Iraq hastily developed its chemical weapons program in the 1980s, when it found itself losing the war it had started against the revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. There were early missteps: Tucker recalled that Iraq fired mustard gas shells from valleys at Iranian troops on higher ground until "it found the heavier mustard gas coming back down on its own troops."

As the war progressed, however, the Iraqis developed sophisticated tactics that used the characteristics of different agents to their advantage. In one battle, for example, highly persistent mustard agents were used to force Iranian troops into a narrow path. Iraq then attacked with nearly 1,000 shells loaded with nerve agents, which created a covering cloud that killed more than 1,000 Iranian soldiers.

When the Reagan administration learned of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, the United States not only failed to protest but also kept supplying arms and intelligence to Baghdad. Also during those years, private U.S. labs supplied some strains of biological materials to Iraq. Only after chemical agents were used against the Kurds in the town of Halabja in 1988 did Secretary of State George P. Shultz raise a protest.

When Hussein seized Kuwait in 1990 and the first Bush administration put together a coalition to oust the Iraqis, there was great concern among the U.S.-led coalition forces that the Iraqi leader would use the massive stocks of chemical weapons to protect his victory. But Hussein made different decisions against this new, more sophisticated enemy.

In a Pentagon paper circulated in 1990, the Joint Staff noted factors for and against Hussein using chemical weapons in two situations. One was if he tried to advance from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia; the other was if the United States counterattacked and moved from Kuwait into Iraq.

The Joint Staff noted that if the Americans sought to attack from Kuwait, the prevailing winds would favor an Iraqi chemical attack because they usually blow eastward toward any incoming U.S. troops. Also, the Pentagon group said the "low humidity of the air makes it capable of accepting and dispersing more [chemical] agent." Another factor cited then and now are high temperatures, which can have an impact on the effectiveness of soldiers who must don heavy and cumbersome protective gear.

The Joint Staff noted, however, that "Hussein would be reluctant to use chemical weapons if it meant poisoning his own lands and water" as he sought to halt a U.S. invasion.

The most "likely Iraqi employment tactic" for chemical weapons would be "to neutralize a convoy column or possibly to deny the use of certain areas." The Pentagon paper said that Iraq would probably not use persistent mustard gas in an invasion of Saudi Arabia because that would create problems for its advancing forces. "It is possible, however, that the Iraqis might target rear-area installations and populations to instill fear and induce surrender."

However, just before the Persian Gulf War started in 1991, then-Secretary of State James A. Baker III delivered a letter from the president to the Iraqi government that threatened retaliation if chemical or biological weapons were

used. Although the Pentagon later said that none apparently were used, it was later disclosed that Hussein had turned some chemical weapons over to commanders for use should the coalition forces enter Iraq and cross a line 200 miles south of Baghdad.

In testimony before Congress, Charles A. Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, said he had discussions with high-ranking Iraqi officers who confirmed the Baker-delivered threat deterred Iraq from using chemical weapons in 1991. They also said chemical weapons would have been used if U.S. forces had kept going to Baghdad and that they believed that knowledge had somehow deterred the United States from overthrowing Hussein at that time.

In a 1997 paper, Tucker said that the "remarkable speed of the coalition advance, combined with the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign," had made it difficult for Iraqi commanders to select targets for any chemical attack. In addition, he wrote, the prevailing winds for six months in the 1990-1991 period had "blown from the northwest out of Iraq and shifted at the beginning of the ground war to the southeast towards the Iraqi lines." Thus, had they used such weapons, the result could have been threatening to Iraqi troops.

When the war ended, U.N. inspectors supervised destruction of "more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors, and seven different types of delivery systems including warheads for ballistic missiles," the CIA study said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56744-2003Mar19.html>

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Wall Street Journal
March 20, 2003

Intelligence Suggests Hussein Allowed Chemical-Weapon Use

By Greg Jaffe, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

Intelligence reports suggest Saddam Hussein already has given his field-level commanders clearance to fire off chemical and biological weapons, say Pentagon officials. Those reports have led defense officials to conclude there is a high probability the U.S. military will face them on the battlefield.

It is impossible to predict if or when these commanders might fire the weapons. In the last Gulf War, the military loaded up 75 Scud warheads, hundreds of aerial bombs and thousands of rockets and artillery shells with chemical and biological agents. Mr. Hussein told commanders to pull the trigger if U.S. troops appeared to move on Baghdad. They never did.

It is unclear precisely what orders field commanders have been given this time. One school of thought suggests that Mr. Hussein, realizing he will lose any international support the moment he unleashes his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, would hold back using the weapons until his demise is all but certain.

"If he uses them early on he has to know there will be hell to pay. Our best assessment is that Saddam will use them only when he realizes it's a lost cause -- when U.S. troops are moving on Baghdad," said one defense-intelligence official. These officials argue that the weapons tend not to be very effective on the battlefield, particularly in a dry, windy desert environment where they will dissipate quickly.

Another school of thought holds that Mr. Hussein knows he is doomed and will use his chemical and biological weapons early on in an effort to bring the Israelis into the war. The Israelis have said they would strike back against Iraq if Mr. Hussein launches a chemical or biological attack against Israel. A massive Israeli response, in turn, could alienate U.S. Arab allies in the Gulf.

To head off that possibility, the Pentagon has sent large numbers of special-operations commandos as well as high-tech surveillance to western Iraq to hunt down and destroy mobile Scud launchers within range of Israel. The U.S. also has been conducting a large-scale psychological-operations campaign, consisting of both leaflets and radio broadcasts, to warn Iraqi officers that they will be tried for war crimes if they follow orders and launch a biological- or chemical-weapons attack.

The United Nations estimates that Mr. Hussein has up to 200 tons of deadly VX nerve agent, which is so lethal that even a small drop on the skin can quickly lead to death. In addition, he likely has a massive store of mustard gas, which isn't as lethal as nerve agent, but still potentially deadly. Less is known about his biological-weapons program, which is thought to include potentially huge stores of anthrax, botulinum toxin and ricin.

But the Iraqi dictator's ability to deliver those weapons of mass destruction on the battlefield and in neighboring countries is limited. The Iraqis likely have only a couple of dozen long-range Scud missiles, capable of hitting Israel,

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These missiles, which can travel distances of about 400 miles, are woefully inaccurate and can carry only a relatively small payload of deadly agents.

In addition to his Scuds, Pentagon planners believe Mr. Hussein possesses hundreds of specially modified short-range rockets and artillery shells that can travel as much as 60 miles and deliver chemical and biological toxins. Each shell, however, can't carry much agent. And it is unlikely that Mr. Hussein's artillery pieces will be able to get off many shots before they are destroyed by U.S. planes. Finally, the Iraqi leader has assembled a fleet of unmanned planes, which are capable of spraying large amounts of agent, but are also slow moving and would make easy targets for U.S. fighter jets.

Pentagon officials say their best bet for stopping a chemical or biological attack is to destroy Iraqi Scud launchers, which are heavy trucks with missiles mounted on their backs. In the first Gulf War, the U.S. didn't destroy a single launcher, however, as their mobility made them hard to find.

Just as it did in that conflict, the Pentagon has sent large teams of special-operations commandos into western Iraq, where the launchers would have to be located to be within range of Israel. In addition, the Pentagon has deployed new unmanned surveillance planes that are capable of loitering over a piece of ground for dozens of hours at a time and can beam live images to commanders, fighter pilots and special-operations soldiers on the ground.

The new planes, combined with better communications gear that allows commandos to talk directly with pilots circling above and improved precision munitions, should increase the odds of finding and destroying the launchers. But Pentagon officials caution that it is still likely that Mr. Hussein will be able to get off a few shots.

Another major concern worrying war planners is that Mr. Hussein will send a small group of commandos to carry out a chemical or biological attack using a crop duster, a truck or a boat. Potential targets include U.S. bases in the Middle East, major Middle Eastern or Israeli cities and possibly the U.S.

Such an attack would be difficult to pull off. If wind and temperature conditions weren't exactly right the cloud of chemical or biological agent might blow harmlessly out to sea or disappear into the upper atmosphere. Still, if the commandos were to strike a crowded base or city, thousands could die. At the least, panic would ensue.

To guard against this possibility, the Pentagon has quietly deployed large numbers of new chemical detectors, capable of detecting an agent in seconds, and biological detectors that can identify an agent in about 45 minutes, to U.S. bases abroad as well as the Pentagon and other potential targets in Washington, D.C. It has called up hundreds of thousands of reservists to guard U.S. bases both at home and in Europe.

And it has mobilized massive cleanup crews to quickly sanitize ports or airfields that are critical to supporting the war effort and likely targets. If Iraq were to hit a port or an airfield with long-lasting VX nerve agent, it could take weeks to clean up.

Paradoxically, military commanders are least worried about chemical and biological attacks against front-line ground troops pushing toward Baghdad. Because these troops will be fairly dispersed, they aren't a very good target for chemical or biological weapons.

Moreover, if the wind shifts during a chemical attack on front-line troops or the U.S. shoots down an Iraqi plane carrying chemical agent, Iraqi troops and civilians are far more likely to die in greater numbers than U.S. troops. "The real reason I think Saddam didn't use chemical or biological weapons during the first Gulf War is that he probably realized he was more likely to kill his own people than he was us," says retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales.

Still, such an attack could slow a U.S. advance by forcing soldiers to don heavy jackets, gloves and gas masks. Few military planners, however, believe that Mr. Hussein could inflict large casualties on advancing U.S. troops.

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InsideDefense.com

March 19, 2003

Commandant: Marines Prepared For Iraq's Chem-Bio Weapons

As the United States stands on the precipice of war with Iraq, deployed Marines are prepared for the threat of chemical and biological weapons, according to Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee.

"I believe we are as prepared as technology can make us today," Hagee told *Inside the Navy* in an interview today, noting Marines have received the necessary training and equipment.

How long a war with Iraq might last is unclear. "If it goes, we don't know if the Iraqis are going to come out with an American flag in one hand and a flower in the other, or whether they are going to come out and fight to the best of their ability until it's over," Hagee said.

The commandant said both chemical and biological weapons are threats U.S. forces might encounter in a war with Iraq, but he would not speculate on whether Iraq would use such agents in combat. "'We don't know' is the best answer, I think," he said. U.S. officials have several different plans, depending on what happens. "And so you plan for the best and you also plan for the worst -- and we have planned for the worst," he said.

"We have the best equipment that technology and science can provide us right now," added Hagee, noting the Marines have protective suits, masks and filters. The Marines have sufficient quantities of protective suits and filters to issue three to each individual, if necessary, he said. "Obviously they are not carrying all this stuff -- we'll rotate it if necessary."

Deployed Marines in the Middle East also have a low-tech tool that could confirm a chemical attack in the event one occurs -- pigeons, which are naturally more sensitive to such weapons than people.

U.S. forces, however, might not immediately detect any biological attacks, according to Hagee. "We can do soil samples and air samples and determine what it was after the fact," he said. "We're working hard on that, science is working hard on that."

Anticipating threats beyond those U.S. forces might encounter in Iraq, Hagee warned the United States is not very good at defending against new, "so-called fourth-generation chemical agents" -- dusty chemicals that can "penetrate almost anything." The United States must work harder to develop better protection, he said.

-- *Christopher J. Castelli*

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Washington Post

March 20, 2003

Pg. 24

N. Korea Stymied On Plutonium Work

Reprocessing Lab Called Antiquated

By Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writers

North Korea appears to be having trouble restarting a nuclear reprocessing facility that would separate plutonium for weapons from spent fuel rods, according to administration officials with access to recent intelligence.

The Bush administration had been bracing for the reclusive communist regime to time the start-up of the facility to coincide with the war with Iraq. But despite feverish activity that can be observed around the site, officials believe the North Koreans have been stymied in their rush to begin creating the raw material needed for nuclear weapons. "They are working 24/7," a senior administration official said. "But it is not going as fast as they wanted to."

The situation has raised concerns among officials that North Korea would take other provocative steps during the conflict with Iraq. Earlier this month, North Korean fighter jets intercepted a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Sea of Japan, which some officials interpreted as an attempt to kidnap the crew and force the United States to begin direct talks.

Officials said the reprocessing facility, a radiochemistry lab, is built with antiquated, poorly functioning equipment that is difficult for the North Koreans to replace. The lab is adjacent to the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon that the North Koreans recently restarted.

"They do not have cutting-edge technology," said another senior administration official familiar with the situation. He said steam has been seen intermittently coming out of the power plant that sits next to the six-story radiochemistry facility, which is based on a U.S. system developed in the 1950s. "They definitely are trying hard," he said.

North Korean officials have insisted the reactor, which had been shuttered as part of a 1994 agreement with the Clinton administration, is needed to produce electricity for the power-starved nation because the United States and its allies cut off fuel shipments late last year. U.S. experts, however, say the 5-megawatt plant is not large enough to provide significant electrical power and could only be intended to produce plutonium for weapons.

Robert Alvarez, a nuclear expert who as deputy assistant secretary of energy for materials asset management and national security analysis in the Clinton administration visited Yongbyon to work out details of the 1994 agreement, said the North Koreans are working with 1950s nuclear technology. He said the 5-megawatt reactor is a 1956 British design that in part still uses vacuum tubes rather than modern components. Even when operating it broke down frequently, he said.

He also said the reprocessing plant was "in the early stages of initial start-up when its activities were frozen in 1994." Trial runs would be needed before it could restart, and "it will likely require a significant amount of 'hands-on' operation that normally is done with more advanced remote controls in other countries."

Such operations in human hands generally result in spills, leaks and failures during the complex steps of extracting and purifying plutonium, Alvarez said.

While other experts have talked about the North Koreans being able to extract enough plutonium to make five or six bombs within months, Alvarez said these estimates were based on how modern, U.S. reprocessing plants operate. He said the much older, simpler North Korean facility, using older technology, could take "a span of several months to a year."

U.S. intelligence is closely monitoring the Yongbyon site from satellites and from aerial and surface scientific collectors that measure the effluent from the facilities. One clue to the return to operation of the reprocessing facility would be a brownish plume, according to one scientist.

The United States and North Korea have been in a standoff since October, when North Korean officials admitted to pursuing a covert program to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium in violation of the 1994 pact. The Bush administration demanded that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons programs before any negotiations could take place, and subsequently cut off shipments of fuel oil that were part of the pact. North Korea then evicted United Nations nuclear inspectors and dismantled monitoring equipment at the plant, and withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The administration has insisted that any discussions with North Korea over its nuclear ambitions take place within a multilateral forum that would include other key countries in the region. The administration has been unable to win much support for that approach from those nations, which have pressed the United States to begin direct talks.

One official said that the United States has "gotten vibes" that North Korea's opposition to multilateral talks may be softening. But another official said that despite proposals and ideas floated by the administration, North Korea had given no indication that any multilateral venue is acceptable.

"It would make political dialogue and finding a diplomatic way forward much more difficult if they've started the reprocessing facility," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said earlier this week.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57266-2003Mar19.html>

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Washington Times

March 20, 2003

Pg. 14

Nation's Biggest Nuclear Power Plant A Terrorist Target

By Bill Gertz and Jerry Seper, The Washington Times

Terrorists have targeted the United States' largest nuclear power plant near Phoenix, and security officials are looking for Iraqi government "sleeper cells" that might carry out the attack, The Washington Times has learned. The threat to the Palo Verde nuclear plant, located in the Sonora desert 50 miles west of Phoenix, prompted the deployment of National Guard troops to the facility, according to U.S. officials.

"We understand the sensitivity of this time, and we are very, very committed to protecting the safe operation of Palo Verde," Jim McDonald, a spokesman for the Arizona Public Service Co., which owns the reactor complex, said in an interview.

Mr. McDonald declined to comment on specific intelligence indicating a threat to Palo Verde but noted that the troops were added Tuesday by order of Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano.

One official said the report on the Palo Verde threat was contained in classified intelligence reports distributed to law-enforcement and security officials.

A second U.S. official confirmed the report and said it was "uncorroborated threat information" that was sent to appropriate U.S. security authorities.

Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power facility in the United States with three reactors that produced 30 billion kilowatt hours of electricity last year, Mr. McDonald said.

The threat to attack the facility came from sensitive information indicating that the plant was targeted by Middle Eastern terrorists who were not further identified.

The threat to Palo Verde comes as other intelligence reports indicate that Iraq has set up clandestine cells of operatives inside the United States or abroad that could be called on to conduct attacks or sabotage on behalf of Baghdad.

For example, recent intelligence reports indicated that Iraqi diplomats in Cairo had conducted surveillance of the U.S. Embassy there, U.S. officials said.

Officials did not say how many Iraqi cells are in the country. Baghdad has nearly 250 officials posted to the United States, most of them at its U.N. mission in New York.

A Bush administration official said the State Department has decided to expel the three Iraqi diplomats posted to Baghdad's interest section in Washington. The expulsion order is expected as early as today.

Only Iraqi officials engaged in improper intelligence or terrorism-related activity can be expelled from the U.N. mission.

Meanwhile, the FBI warned law-enforcement officials yesterday to watch for suspicious activity by people driving Iraqi diplomatic license plates.

"Suspicious activity involving vehicles bearing Iraqi diplomatic license plates should be reported immediately to the nearest Joint Terrorism Task Force," the FBI stated in a weekly intelligence bulletin.

Codes used by cars driven by Iraqi diplomats in Washington bear the "TF," and Iraqi U.N. diplomatic vehicles in New York have the "TS" code.

Intelligence officials said the administration has urged governments around the world to expel Iraqi diplomats, and several have complied.

Iraqi diplomats have been expelled in recent days from Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Thailand and Australia.

Two Iraqis also were expelled from the United States on March 5 after they were identified as intelligence officers, U.S. officials said.

Justice Department officials yesterday confirmed that the FBI is looking to interview as many as 50,000 Iraqis now in the United States for information that could help U.S. forces. They said a war with Iraq is expected to dramatically increase the chances of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in this country and abroad.

One senior department official said that while most Iraqis in this country are not believed to be terrorists or associated with terrorist organizations, Muslim extremists within the Iraqi community who are affiliated with al Qaeda could use a war as the reason for an attack.

Among the Iraqis being sought for questioning are 3,000 illegal immigrants said to be missing, amid U.S. concerns that some could be connected with groups or agents of the Iraqi regime.

Earlier this week, Mexican authorities detained six Iraqi citizens as they sought to cross into the United States from Tijuana. The six, including one woman, claimed to be German citizens on their arrival at the Tijuana airport Tuesday night on a flight from Mexico City. They have been returned to Mexico City for questioning.

It could not be learned if the detained Iraqis were connected to the plot to attack Palo Verde.

Border Patrol authorities also confirmed that a diary written in Arabic was found last week in a backpack discovered on a southern Arizona trail frequently used by illegal aliens. The diary, according to the sources, contained names and telephone numbers of at least two persons in Canada and Iran.

The FBI has since taken custody of the diary, but refused comment on it yesterday.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030320-43174000.htm>

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New York Times

March 20, 2003

The Pentagon's Scariest Thoughts

By Anthony H. Cordesman

WASHINGTON — Watching television images of American soldiers in the Kuwaiti desert, chemical-protection suits strapped to their belts, it's hard not to worry about what Saddam Hussein may have in store for them. Still, one needs to be careful in talking about worst-case scenarios: most "worst cases" will not happen.

Consider one of the possibilities Pentagon planners have most feared — an Iraqi infliction of smallpox, which can kill 30 percent of those infected. The fact is, there is no evidence that Iraq has smallpox — we know for certain only that it is one of the last countries where an outbreak occurred. Most allied soldiers have been vaccinated, and the rest can quickly be inoculated. Thus the serious threat would be to civilian workers at our ports and military bases. It could hamper our logistics while we immunize these people, but smallpox doesn't seem likely to go undetected or spread so widely that it could not be contained.

As for other methods of chemical or biological attack, all weapons of mass destruction are not created equal.

Though VX nerve gas is very lethal, chemical weapons and toxins still must be delivered in large amounts to

produce large casualties. Saddam Hussein relies primarily on large rockets and missiles with relatively simple unitary warheads and contact fuses, which cannot disseminate agents effectively over a wide area.

Iraq also still seems to rely on "wet" versions of biological agents like anthrax, which lose effectiveness in sunlight and in hot weather. The story will be very different, however, if Iraq has developed anthrax in the form of dry micropowders that are coated for wide dissemination and resistance to the sun, and that have been re-sized to increase their infectiveness.

This is possible, but we don't have enough evidence to say it is probable. This danger would be compounded if Iraq has built a covert delivery system, or has more sophisticated chemical and biological warheads and bombs. The discovery by weapons inspectors this month of warheads fitted with cluster bomblets that could spread chemical or biological agents, and of large unmanned drones, is worrisome. With improved delivery, the lethality of these agents could be 10 to 100 times higher.

The pilotless drone shown to reporters outside Baghdad last week may have looked like a flimsy toy, but Iraq may have developed more sophisticated craft, and they can be very dangerous. The most efficient way to use chemical and biological agents is a low-flying, slow-flying system that releases just the right amount of an agent in a long line over a target area or that circles in a spiral. Iraq has been working on sprayers for its unmanned vehicles for two decades. Iraqi soldiers could also fly helicopters or aircraft laden with agents in suicide missions, disguising them as reconnaissance or conventional attack missions.

What can our troops do? They have Patriot missile defense systems that are vastly improved from the Persian Gulf war — but the new Patriots, which could work on drones and aircraft as well as missiles, are untested in real combat. And they are not designed to deal with shorter-range artillery rockets and shells that might be fired at our troops in Iraq or at close-range targets in Kuwait.

The effectiveness of any missile or artillery attack by Iraq's army depends on its being able to fire large numbers of chemical rounds at relatively static targets. Thus the biggest concern would be when our forces concentrate, particularly on the edges of Iraqi cities and military bases. However, British and American forces have armored vehicles with filters and systems that increase the air pressure in the cabin, an extremely effective defense against chemical and biological agents. Further, they will carry out their major regroupings and maneuvers at night, when Iraq's army is blind.

Those factors usually get lost in press coverage, which tends to look at the chemical protection suit as the first and last line of defense from a chemical attack. Yes, even a false alarm could force our soldiers to suit up — the protective gear is unpleasant and being forced to use it could delay our soldiers' advance. But it is important to keep the risk of chemical or biological warfare in perspective.

As for other unorthodox threats, there is speculation that retreating Iraqi troops may be ordered to set the oil fields ablaze. The Iraqi military rationale is that the oil smoke would paralyze American operations. But this seems off the mark. Our missiles do not rely on lasers anymore — oil smoke does not affect satellite positioning technology. Our planes and helicopters can fly above and around such smoke. Most wells are in remote areas and thus the fires would have little tactical impact. In fact, setting the fields ablaze might do more to inhibit Iraq's military operations. Iraq could also use its dams and waterways to create a limited flood plain in the south and around Baghdad. Still, it really isn't clear that this would have more than a temporary effect. American and British forces could maneuver around most flood barriers by circling to the west through the desert; the standing water in most places wouldn't likely last more than a few days. Again, any flooding might well more seriously impair Iraqi land movement, as Saddam Hussein's troops will have no helicopter or air support.

The most likely "worst case" is extended urban warfare. Baghdad is being ringed with earth mounds and trenches. Militias are being trained and stiffened with security personnel and Republican Guard cadres. Iraqi forces may try to fight from dug-in positions some distance outside Baghdad, and then retreat into the city — blowing up bridges and possibly using chemical weapons.

Yet again the concern may be overwrought. It is far from clear that Saddam Hussein can count on his people to defend their cities street by street. Our Special Forces may be able to work in some places with local uprisings to create urban warfare against the regime's loyalists. Iraqis may know the ground, but they are ill equipped and have little training or experience in urban warfare. Most Iraqi government facilities and key strong points aren't in cities, anyway: they are in large, exposed compounds. They can be destroyed from the air with little fear of civilian casualties.

The bad news is that all of these risks are real. The good news is that Iraq doesn't have the equipment or military sophistication to pose the kind of serious threat that it might in a few years — or that North Korea is capable of posing now. War is never a cakewalk and the unexpected is a certainty. But most "worst cases" in Iraq are ones our troops are well trained and well equipped to handle.

Anthony H. Cordesman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/20/opinion/20CORD.html>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlinks for referenced manuals follow article.)

Washington Post

March 20, 2003

Pg. B2

Federal Diary

Agencies Told To Keep Workers Up To Date On Emergency Planning

By Stephen Barr

Federal agencies should hold "town hall" meetings with employees to discuss contingency plans for dealing with terrorist attacks and other emergencies, according to the president's top civil service adviser.

"In these times, the concern of federal employees is understandable," Kay Coles James, the director of the Office of Personnel Management, said in a memo this week to agency heads. "Often, this concern can be addressed by informing our workforce of the contingency plans in place for their safety and protection."

James added, "Please be aware that, from the calls we are receiving, this communication may not be happening consistently throughout government."

Last week, James published two manuals on the OPM Web site that provide general guidelines for dealing with an accidental or intentional release of chemical, biological or radiological material. The manuals were based on the advice of 23 experts from 16 agencies.

Yesterday, OPM officials met with members of the Human Resources Management Council, an interagency group of top federal personnel officials, to discuss the new manuals. OPM officials passed around an emergency kit -- containing light sticks, food, water, towels and a whistle -- that has been developed by OPM for its employees, an OPM spokesman said.

The meeting and James's memo represent a series of steps to highlight contingency planning. "We are trying to focus on providing as many ideas as possible across the government," the OPM spokesman said.

Employees in some agencies have complained that their bosses shrug off questions about contingency planning for terrorist attacks; others say their agencies have not done a good enough job explaining what steps they will take, and employees should take, in the event of a catastrophic event.

In her memo, James reminded agency heads that "you are ultimately responsible for the health and safety of your workforce and all appropriate contingency plans."

At a minimum, James said, agencies should have up-to-date emergency plans, should have conducted "threat assessments" with the help of law enforcement officers, should be holding regular evacuation drills and shelter-in-place exercises, and should have distributed emergency guides.

Agencies need to effectively communicate with employees on possible threats by holding town hall meetings and by using e-mail and other methods to provide information updates. In addition, agencies should know how to contact senior executives during an emergency, James said.

She also recommends that agencies test fire alarms and public address systems, check whether ventilation systems can be cut off, put up signs for evacuation routes and ensure that security personnel maintain communication through walkie-talkies, cell phones and pagers.

"Truly, these are weighty and difficult times for the federal workforce," James said in closing her memo. She asked the agency heads to report back to her by April 1 "on your progress in the completion of these minimum safety requirements."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57250-2003Mar19.html>

FEDERAL MANAGER'S/DECISION MAKER'S EMERGENCY GUIDE

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Working for America

<http://opm.gov/emergency/PDF/ManagersGuide.pdf>

A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY GUIDE

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Working for America

<http://opm.gov/emergency/PDF/EmployeesGuide.pdf>

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Forbes

March 31, 2003

Pg. 50

Missing In Action

Governments have trained hundreds of thousands of weapons scientists. And nobody knows where they are.

By Chana R. Schoenberger and Emily Lambert

The Soviet Union trained 100,000 weapons scientists before the Cold War's end. No one knows exactly where they all are. Toss in the two dozen other nations with active or dormant nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, and you have a scary game of "Where Are They Now?"

It only takes a handful of white coats to set up a bomb factory or disease lab. "For a few bucks and with a few people who know what they're doing, [a state] can really raise havoc," says Edward Badolato, an international security expert with the Shaw Group. These countries have created the biggest threats:

RUSSIA

Most of the world's weapons scientists speak some Russian, as the Soviets had by far the biggest program. After the Cold War many retired; others went off to grow potatoes. Hundreds emigrated, mainly to the U.S., Western Europe, and Israel.

The FSB, a descendant of the KGB, claims to monitor the former scientists, but Russia hands are skeptical. Several global programs, funded mainly by the U.S., employ Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh scientists. The U.S. will spend \$39 million this year on a program for 6,000 of them.

SOUTH AFRICA

Dismantled its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in 1989. The 1,000 or so scientists were steered toward other jobs, at universities or as retail clerks. The government tries to track the nuke experts, but it can't snoop too closely in a democracy. Several dozen went mercenary, hiring themselves out to Libya to help build bioweapons factories.

PAKISTAN

Two top officials in the Pakistani program recently were detained on suspicion of passing nuclear secrets to al Qaeda. Pakistani scientists are thought to have helped Iran get its nuclear program started by building a gas centrifuge in the 1990s, as well as aiding North Korea. One sales brochure recently turned up advertising the services of the main Pakistani centrifuge site for equipment sales and "consulting."

NORTH KOREA

Russia and China helped build North Korea's weapons program in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to 3,000 native scientists, the country may have 2 to 4 Russians on retainer to work on its nukes, of which it may have one or two small exemplars.

IRAQ

Some 600 bioweaponeers on staff. Saddam has long ties to French nuclear scientists, some of whom built the reactor that Israel bombed in 1981, as well as to German and British firms. Saddam probably employs a small handful of Russian scientists. They're most likely middle managers; if Saddam had a top guy, he would have a bomb by now.

CHINA

Tens of thousands of scientists work on all areas of weapons development, though some work was supposed to be cut back after a 1972 biowarfare agreement, which China signed in 1984. It is alleged to be producing viruses at Lop Nor in Central Asia.

U.S.

The U.S. tries harder to track its scientists. Since last year the 1,000 labs working with weapons-potential germs have had to register with the Centers for Disease Control or other agencies, and every scientist who wants to work on the bugs must get an okay from the Department of Justice, which vets researchers against intelligence databases.

Perhaps 100,000 scientists work for the Pentagon developing weapons of mass destruction. Anyone with a nuclear weapons security clearance must file paperwork annually and alert the government about all foreign travel.

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Washington Post
March 21, 2003
Pg. 20

Improved Air Defense Gets Tryout In Combat

By Bradley Graham, Washington Post Staff Writer

Yesterday's Iraqi missile attacks on U.S. troops in Kuwait provided the first combat test of a Patriot anti-missile system that Pentagon officials say is much improved over the version used when the United States last went to war against Iraq 12 years ago.

A statement by U.S. Central Command credited Patriot interceptors with knocking down two missiles. But details about the attacks remained sketchy, preventing a full assessment of the Patriot's performance.

Reports varied, for instance, on the type of Iraqi missiles fired -- whether they were Scuds or shorter-range Ababil-100s or Al Samoud-2s. One Army air defense battalion commander in Kuwait said a Patriot interceptor failed to launch.

Also unclear was what type of Patriot interceptor actually scored the hits. According to the Central Command, two types were fired: the latest model and an older one.

For many Americans, images of Patriot interceptors appearing to blast Iraqi Scuds out of the sky were among the most memorable moments of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. U.S. officials touted the Patriots as emblematic of U.S. technological superiority, and missile defense advocates seized on the interceptors as evidence that a national anti-missile system also could work.

But the claims proved exaggerated as postwar analysis of television footage and videotapes showed the Patriot missiles had failed to intercept much of the time. More often than not, the analysis indicated, the Scuds, which were notoriously unstable, had themselves come apart in flight.

The revamped Patriot, known as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), is two generations improved over the 1991 model. Instead of knocking down missiles by exploding in their flight paths, the new version is designed to ram enemy warheads.

This force of collision, which the original Patriots could not deliver, promises greater effectiveness against warheads packed with chemical or biological agents. It also is the basis of the missile defense system that President Bush intends to begin deploying in September 2004 to shield U.S. territory.

Although the PAC-3 system performed well in an initial series of flight tests, it floundered in field tests last year. Interceptors failed to fire in several cases, and when they did, they missed nearly as often as they hit.

Army officials had expected that the test failures would delay plans to move to full production of the weapon. But senior Pentagon officials decided to boost production anyway, without waiting for another round of tests. With only about 50 new interceptors in the Army's inventory, the Pentagon's leadership worried that U.S. stocks would be depleted quickly by a war with Iraq.

In January, Lockheed Martin Corp. which makes the PAC-3 interceptor, received a \$341 million contract for continued production of the system. The contract called for delivering as many as 88 more missiles and associated ground electronics by 2005. Raytheon Co. is responsible for producing the missile's ground radar and command-and-control equipment.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1265-2003Mar20.html>

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USA Today
March 21, 2003
Pg. 5

Iraq Fires Missiles At U.S. Forces

No chemical, biological agents detected, but fears escalate

By David J. Lynch and Steven Komarow, USA Today

NORTHERN KUWAIT — Iraq attempted to strike back at U.S. and British positions in Kuwait on Thursday, launching at least five missiles just hours after the United States attacked targets in and around Baghdad. No one was injured by the missiles, two of which were intercepted by U.S. Patriot missiles, according to Army officials. Another fell harmlessly in the desert, and two landed in Kuwaiti waters. But fears that the missiles might contain chemical or biological weapons prompted soldiers to quickly put on gas masks and bulky protective suits, and sent air raid sirens wailing in Kuwait City.

No chemical or biological weapons were detected, U.S. officials said, though soldiers and residents in this region remained jittery. In Kuwait City, air raid sirens blared four times Thursday, each time followed quickly by an all-clear signal. One of the missiles was apparently intended for Camp Doha, an American headquarters near the harbor outside Kuwait City.

Initial reports of the Iraqi missile strikes were sketchy, and it remained unclear what sort of missiles were used or exactly how many were launched; estimates ranged from five to a dozen.

Army officials here insisted that two of the missiles were Scuds, which, if true, would represent an important political victory for the Bush administration. U.S. officials have justified their invasion largely on the claim that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, including dozens of Scud missiles banned by United Nations sanctions that limit Iraq's missiles to a 93-mile range. Some Scuds the Iraqis had — and might still have — could fly more than 500 miles. Key allies such as France, Germany and Russia contend those U.S. charges have not been adequately proved. But Pentagon officials in Washington were less sure the missiles used in the attack were Scuds. Furthering the confusion, Army officials here in Kuwait said the missiles were a Scud version called the Ababil-100. That missile actually is not a Scud but a solid-fuel missile developed by Iraq that has an official range within U.N. limits. CIA officials have claimed the Ababil-100 can be modified to exceed a 93-mile range, however.

Iraq has maintained that it destroyed all its Scud missiles after the 1991 Gulf War. "We don't have Scud missiles," Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf said Thursday in Baghdad.

U.S. intelligence in recent days had picked up signs that the Iraqis had moved artillery and missiles toward the border with Kuwait, putting U.S. positions within range. U.S. aircraft were ordered to attack the positions Wednesday night.

At 10:28 a.m. (2:28 a.m. ET), an Iraqi missile struck outside Camp Commando, headquarters for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which includes 85,000 Marines and British soldiers.

There was no warning of the attack, which sent Marines scrambling to don gas masks and race into sandbagged air raid bunkers. "I saw a big fireball and black smoke," said Pfc. Mark Johnson, 18, of Auburn, Ala. "I thought they were going to fire again."

"OK, we're finally at war," said Pfc. Justin Davis, 19, of Chattanooga, Tenn. "It's time to get serious and light some people up."

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030321/4976151s.htm>

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New York Times
March 21, 2003

F.B.I. Seeks Qaeda Suspect In U.S.; Troops Sent To Nuclear Plant

By Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau

WASHINGTON, March 20 — Federal law enforcement officials warned today about new domestic terrorism threats, including an "imminent threat" that might be posed by a suspected Al Qaeda member sought by the F.B.I. The officials also said they were worried about continuing intelligence reports that suggested terrorist attacks linked to the Iraq invasion.

The officials said that National Guard members were sent on Tuesday to a large nuclear power plant in Arizona after intelligence reports suggested that Al Qaeda or its sympathizers might be planning to attack it. The officials said a foreign spy agency had provided information about a threat to the plant, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Tonopah, 50 miles west of Phoenix.

The three-reactor site is classified as the largest nuclear power plant in the United States. The officials would not say which agency had supplied the information. Although he offered few details, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said there had been a "very specific piece of threat information" to suggest that the plant was in danger.

Law enforcement officials said there was not necessarily any connection between that threat and an announcement today by the F.B.I. that it was searching for the suspect from Al Qaeda, Adnan G. el-Shukrijumah, 27, who was born in Saudi Arabia. Residents of Miramar, Fla., said a man who appeared to be Mr. Shukrijumah was living there as recently as last weekend.

The F.B.I. announced the search as it said it was preparing to interview thousands of Iraqi-born residents of the United States in the next several weeks, to develop leads on possible terror attacks.

Law enforcement and counterterrorism officials said Mr. Shukrijumah had been identified as a potential terrorist from Al Qaeda by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the senior terrorist leader who was captured this month in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and has been intensively questioned.

The officials said suspicions about Mr. Shukrijumah and his intentions had grown with the discovery that he had flight training in the United States about the same time as several Sept. 11 hijackers, that he had recently traveled on a passport issued by Guyana and that he had used a variety of aliases.

The bulletin said Mr. Shukrijumah might try to cross American borders with a Saudi, Canadian or Trinidadian passport. The bulletin included photographs of the suspect, including one from a Florida driver's license issued in February 2001.

Neighbors in Miramar, south of Fort Lauderdale, said a man who identified himself as Mr. Shukrijumah had lived and had been seen there as recently as last weekend. Orville Campbell, 26, a commercial artist who lives in a nearby apartment complex, said he saw Mr. Shukrijumah barbecuing at 1 a.m. on Sunday with other people.

A senior Bush administration official said the government had evidence to suggest that Mr. Shukrijumah had attended the Airman Flight School in Norman, Okla., one of two schools that Zacarias Moussaoui attended in 2001. Mr. Moussaoui, a Frenchman, is awaiting trial in Virginia on charges that he conspired with the Sept. 11 hijackers. But the director of operations at the school, Dale Davis, said a search of its records found no student with any of the six names that Mr. Shukrijumah is believed to have used. In a telephone interview, Mr. Davis said the F.B.I. had not been in contact with the school for months and, to his knowledge, had never asked the school about Mr. Shukrijumah.

The reports of threats to the power plant and the search for Mr. Shukrijumah circulated as law enforcement and counterterrorism officials said they were continuing to see new intelligence to suggest that Al Qaeda, Iraqi intelligence agencies and others would try to carry out terrorist attacks timed to an invasion of Iraq.

The F.B.I. said it was preparing to interview 11,000 Iraqi-born Americans and immigrants in the next few weeks for information that they may have about threats. The program is expected to involve almost 5,000 agents. F.B.I. officials said that the interviews, which they described as voluntary, began months ago but were stepped up this week.

"It's an accelerated process," an official said. "The intensity has picked up. Agents were knocking on doors and saying, 'Hey, is there anything you know that could be helpful as we are waging war against your former country?'" A spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Ibrahim Hooper, said the stepped-up Iraqi interviews and the F.B.I.'s expanded powers to detain illegal immigrants were another effort to single out unfairly Arabs and Arab-Americans in the United States.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/21/international/worldspecial/21HOME.html>

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New York Times
March 21, 2003

Biological And Chemical Weapons Would Slow But Not Stop Troops

By Nicholas Wade

American and British soldiers ready to invade Iraq know they may face not just bullets but also the chemical and biological agents that Iraq is suspected of having in its arsenal. Prepared troops, however, can be well protected against such threats, experts say.

Saddam Hussein made extensive use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, causing an estimated 100,000 casualties among Iranian troops. He also used chemicals in 1987 and 1988 in a campaign against Iraqi Kurds, attacking hundreds of villages and the town of Halabja, where some 5,000 people died.

In these attacks, his army is believed to have used chemicals such as mustard gas, a blistering agent, and sarin, which attacks the nerve centers. Such agents are terrifying and deadly to civilians and unprepared troops. But against

well-equipped armies, their main effect is to force soldiers to wear protective gear. That slows them down, especially in hot weather, but little more.

Iraq's ability to wage chemical and biological warfare against the American and British forces depends both on the agents it may have prepared and on the available means of delivering them. Iraq is thought to possess sarin and another nerve agent, VX, as well as large quantities of mustard gas. On the biological side it has had anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin, according to reports by United Nations inspectors.

The means for delivering significant quantities of chemical weapons against American troops appear to be limited, said Dr. Elisa D. Harris, an expert on chemical and biological warfare who worked on the National Security Council during the Clinton administration.

Scud missiles can be shot down, and a helicopter or plane has little chance of getting anywhere near American and British troops. Chemicals can be delivered in artillery shells, but their range is only two miles or so, and large numbers must be fired to deliver a lethal quantity of chemicals to the battlefield.

"It's hard for me to imagine they could carry out a large-scale artillery barrage because we would knock them out before they could be used," said Dr. Harris, who is now at the University of Maryland.

Against a chemical or biological attack, the first line of defense is simply moving out of the area or upwind.

Vehicles like the M1A1 tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle are pressurized, denying entry to chemical and biological agents.

Even if a chemical or biological agent is delivered, American troops are equipped with an elaborate set of protective garments, including boots, gloves and a helmet. These are used in various combinations, ranked in levels from zero through 4 according to the severity of the threat.

"We have excellent detectors which can give troops enough warning to get into full protective gear," Dr. Harris said. The equipment - called MOPP, for mission-oriented protective posture - prevents chemical agents like mustard gas from harming the skin and protects the wearer from inhaling both chemicals and biological agents.

A special filter attached to the mask contains activated charcoal with a metal catalyst that breaks down and absorbs all four categories of chemical weapons, said Dr. C. Gary Hurst, chief of the unit that trains military doctors at the Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense.

The mask is hard to wear but effective. "It makes everything much more difficult," Dr. Hurst said. "You can drink water through a tube, but it's not fun."

In case troops are exposed to a nerve agent, they carry seven autoinjectors that include the antidote atropine and diazepam, an anti-seizure medicine.

An additional defense against biological weapons is vaccination. American troops are vaccinated against anthrax; some have also had smallpox vaccinations. They also carry an antitoxin for use against botulinum toxin.

Although the chemical sensors used in the field are effective, less is known about the adequacy of sensors for detecting a biological attack. "We will be hard-pressed to know real time if biological agents are deployed," Dr. Harris said. "We may only know people have been exposed after they begin to become ill. If Iraq finds some way to deploy biological agents effectively, we may have a real problem on our hands."

Biological agents are more fragile than chemicals and harder to disperse. Though Iraq is known to have developed bombs for dropping chemicals from planes, it is not certain that it has techniques for dispersing biological agents effectively.

But experts say that neither chemical nor biological weapons are expected to be as effective against American and British troops as traditional ones.

"Most military experts will tell you they are ineffective battlefield technologies," Dr. David Heyman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington said of chemical and biological weapons. "My guess is that if the Iraqis use chemical or biological weapons, it will be to create fear and slow down an attack."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/21/international/worldspecial/21BIO.html>

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Washington Times

March 21, 2003

Pg. 17

Toxin Specialists Can Aid, Not Invade

By Bruce I. Konviser, The Washington Times

PRAGUE — The United Nations' failure to approve an attack on Iraq has sidelined two U.S. allies from "new Europe," meaning that some of the world's best chemical-detection units will not be deployed with the frontline troops.

In recent weeks, 460 specially trained troops from the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been based at Camp Doha in Kuwait, preparing to accompany U.S. troops into Iraq.

The Czechs and Slovaks' nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) units offer decades of accumulated expertise and highly sensitive equipment that can detect trace amounts of deadly agents.

They are deft at disinfecting; they can decontaminate 1,000 people and 300 vehicles per hour.

They can also provide medical care.

The White House considered the Czechs and Slovaks to be on board for the campaign. But parliamentary mandates of the troops' nations prohibit them from crossing into Iraq as part of a military offensive not explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations.

The Czechs may support the U.S. venture but they cannot join the offensive, said Tomas Klvana, spokesman for President Vaclav Klaus.

"The [Czech] government is not part of the coalition," Mr. Klvana said. "It's not part of the forces that attacked Iraq last night. But the forces there are mandated to take part in any humanitarian operation."

U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic Craig Stapleton said that despite being locked out of frontline action, the Czech and Slovak units could play an important role.

"The newest [parliamentary] resolution allows that unit to protect Turkey, to protect Israel and to move into battle if weapons of mass destruction are used," Mr. Stapleton said.

They can be dispatched throughout the region — including into Iraq — to provide medical aid and clean up the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack.

Otherwise they will be relegated to monitoring the air, water and ground in Kuwait.

The United States' NBC units have made major advancements since the Persian Gulf war of 1991. Much of it has been gleaned from Czech and Slovak expertise honed on the Soviet side of the arms race during the Cold War.

Twelve years ago NBC units from then-Czechoslovakia detected low levels of nerve toxins in the air but U.S. commanders largely ignored their alerts.

It took five years but it was these measurements that ultimately convinced the Pentagon that thousands of soldiers were in ill health as a result of the war, said Austin Camacho, a spokesman for the Pentagon's Deployment Health Office.

"We discovered later that some warheads contained sarin and we realized that some servicemen may have been exposed to it," Mr. Camacho said. "It didn't cause an immediate health reaction, but it could pose a long-term problem."

When alerted to the Czech detections of both sarin and mustard gas, U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf dispatched American detection units that were unable to verify the results.

In an e-mailed response to questions, U.S. Navy Cmdr. Donald Sewell said, "We didn't have the biological and chemical detection equipment that we have today. We are able to field a number of new items ... that give us a greatly enhanced capability over what we had in 1990-91."

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030321-64215682.htm>

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Washington Times

March 21, 2003

Pg. 5

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Iraqi CW shells

U.S. intelligence officials tell us the evidence that Iraqi artillery units are preparing to use chemical warfare shells is based on reconnaissance photographs of the shells.

The rounds were identified as chemical weapons-capable shells with slots where a vial of nerve agent or biological-weapons dust is inserted before firing.

No evidence of the actual chemical or biological agents has been spotted so far. Officials said the weapons of mass destruction vials are kept separate from the artillery shells and then brought to the units before being fired.

The artillery units with the special shells were bombed Wednesday in southern Iraq in a pre-emptive strike. Officials believe the Iraqis, if they use weapons of mass destruction, will draw on their hidden stocks of VX nerve agent, an extremely potent poison.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030321-87375993.htm>

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Christian Science Monitor

March 21, 2003

For Gas Alert, Masks, Panic, Hubris

Thursday's Scud warning tested training, and sparked frenzy, for cities and troops.

By Ann Scott Tyson and Phil Smucker, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor

CAMP NEW YORK AND KUWAIT CITY – "Gas!! Gas!!" The masked soldier was yelling as he ran into the Bravo Company tent.

It was about 12:30 p.m. Thursday in an Army camp in northern Kuwait, and although the soldiers didn't know it at the time, this was no drill.

Minutes earlier, Iraq had launched three missiles with unknown contents toward US ground forces in Kuwait. Radios crackled with the news in battalion headquarters, and the surreal image of Oliver North broadcasting for Fox News in a gas mask appeared on a television screen.

Across the desert, in the packed bomb shelters of the Kuwait City Sheraton Hotel, it looked like a scene from a hastily made science-fiction movie: Employees and journalists scrambled to the sound of air-raid alarms, donning gas masks and metallic chemical-weapons suits.

Nearby, a dozen Filipina pastry-shop workers in black aprons lunged for one door, bumping up against Kuwaiti military men in black masks heading for another. After a few minutes, several dozen journalists in ultra-modern security suits marched down a black stairwell to a specified bomb shelter.

As the slow-motion scenes unfolded, miles of sand apart, concern and chaos swept over civilians and soldiers alike. In Kuwait City, few people knew which they were running from: bombs, anthrax, or nerve gas. In some cases - and in some sectors - people were ready with gas masks, hideaways, and airtight rooms. But for others, it was like the first hectic fire drills of childhood. And beneath the rush of motion and ripples of fear were the gnawing, enduring questions: Does Saddam Hussein still have Scud missiles? Will he launch them? And are they tipped with chemical or biological weapons?

In Kuwait City, official warnings came half an hour after Iraqi missiles landed some 30 miles north of the city center. Kuwaiti police continued to man machine guns as other security officials double-checked suspicious cars for possible Al Qaeda agents hiding out in the sea of panicked people.

As foreign workers streaked toward shelters outside, a gaggle of stoic, unfazed taxi drivers stood smiling with their arms crossed, showing how ill-prepared even Hussein's closest, wealthiest neighbors are for the possibility of a real chemical attack.

While well-heeled Kuwaiti families - who enjoy some of the world's highest per capita incomes - shuttered their windows and dashed for duct-taped chambers, poor workers in the downtown district showed far less concern for their own safety.

Among a crowd of about 100 foreign workers in line for pita bread at one of Kuwait City's largest bakeries, only one of them - a short, pot-bellied Indian gentleman - had a gas mask in his pouch at his side. Others in the line said they could not afford the \$100 it could take for such precautions.

When the air-raid warnings sounded, male workers in a Yamaha motorcycle sales and repair shop tossed down their wrenches and pens and ran for cover.

Sales manager Tasir Saleh unleashed a nervous chuckle, but remained behind his desk eating a morning meal of rice and mutton. "That is music to the ears of Saddam Hussein," he said. "I'm not going to pay him the respect to panic." For the Camp New York troops, though, it wasn't an issue of respect. Soldiers scrambled to put on their M40A1 gas masks - something they train to do in nine seconds. They pulled the straps tight, slapped their hands over the air filters, and breathed in, hoping the masks would collapse - the sign of a tight seal.

"Get in the bunker!" a sergeant yelled, and the troops piled into a tunnel-like concrete structure reinforced with sandbags. With sweat beading on their faces, they sat in rows holding their rifles until the next order came, moments later: "Go to MOPP 4!"

MOPP 4 means full chemical gear: charcoal-filled pants and hooded jacket, rubber boots and lined rubber gloves.

"Battle buddies" helped each other with ties and snaps.

By then, the heat was almost suffocating, and the soldiers sat quietly, conserving energy. Some drank water from special straws that ran from their masks to one-way openings on their canteens. Finally, word came that the danger had passed: "All clear!"

For the most part, the soldiers had reacted swiftly. But there were mishaps, some of them major. One soldier discovered he had no mask. "We can't make you want to live," a sergeant scolded him. "Things can happen this fast," he said, snapping his fingers.

Given the threat of more attacks by Iraqi missiles and artillery filled with chemical agents, US ground forces preparing to invade Iraq are likely to cross the border already wearing their chemical protective suits.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0321/p06s02-woiq.html>

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New York Times
March 21, 2003

Poison Found In Paris Train Station Locker

By John Tagliabue

PARIS, March 20 — A small quantity of the poison ricin was found Monday in a locker at the Gare de Lyon train station, the French Interior Ministry said today.

Police officers who searched the locker found "two vials with a powder, a bottle filled with a liquid and two smaller bottles also containing a liquid," the ministry said. The two smaller bottles, the ministry said, contained "traces of ricin in a mixture that turned out to be a very toxic poison."

Officials said the containers were being analyzed to determine the contents of the vials and third bottle.

City officials are on high alert because of the outbreak of war in Iraq. Because of the alert, all train station lockers must be opened every three days and their contents examined, officials said, leading to the discovery of the vials at the station, which serves the south of France.

Officials said they could make no immediate link with the outbreak of the war in Iraq.

Ricin, which is derived from castor beans, is relatively easy to make and stockpile. It can exist as powder form or mist and can be sprayed as an aerosol, added to food or drinks, or injected into a victim.

It causes severe and rapid bleeding to the stomach and intestines. If the poison gets into the bloodstream, it can attack the liver, kidneys and spleen, often leading to death. There is no treatment or antidote.

A small quantity of ricin was found in London in January during an antiterrorist sweep in which six men were arrested on suspicion of terrorism.

American officials later said they had received intelligence reports that the British authorities suspected that group arrested in London may have been trying to gain access to the food supply on at least one military base in Britain.

After those arrests, the French authorities placed ricin on an alert list circulated among French centers specialized in treating cases of severe poisoning.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/21/international/europe/21RICI.html>

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Moscow Times
March 21, 2003
Pg. 4

Ukraine Will Send Chemical Unit To Gulf

By Associated Press

KIEV -- The Ukrainian parliament on Thursday approved President Leonid Kuchma's request to send an anti-chemical weapons force to Kuwait to help neutralize the effects of Iraqi attacks.

But lawmakers also harshly condemned the U.S.-British strikes, adopting a resolution that accused Washington and London of "a blatant violation of international law."

Kuchma later addressed the nation, reiterating Ukraine's opposition to war and promising that the Ukrainian force would only be used for humanitarian work.

Earlier, lawmakers voted 253-121 to authorize deployment of Ukraine's 19th Army Battalion.

"Ukraine by our vote should identify its attitude to the consequences of the war rather than to the war itself," said opposition leader and former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. "It is in Ukraine's interest to minimize the consequences, and we're ready to render necessary peacekeeping assistance."

The vote reflected divisions among parliament's four main opposition groups. Leaders of the Communists, Socialists and reformist Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc were "categorically opposed." About half of Yushchenko's faction joined pro-Kuchma forces in supporting the proposed law.

Carlos Pascual, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, called the decision "a vital contribution to the region's security ... [and] a positive development in U.S.-Ukraine relations."

Kuchma offered to send the troops last month in an attempt to repair relations that nose-dived in September following U.S. claims that he approved the sale of radar systems to Iraq in 2000.

The United States has indicated it is ready to help fund the mission, which could cost up to \$1 million a month. Before the vote, scores of people rallied outside the parliament.

"If Ukraine decides to send troops to Iraq, we're joining America's aggression," said demonstrator Lyudmila Kayetkina, of the fringe Progressive Socialist Party. "If Iraq asked us to send troops, that would be another thing." <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/03/21/015.html>

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