


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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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Washington Post

March 5, 2003

Pg. 1

Foes Giving In To N. Korea's Nuclear Aims

By Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, March 4 -- The United States and Asian countries have begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea, according to officials and analysts here and in Washington. Increasingly, the Bush administration is turning its attention to preventing the Communist government in Pyongyang from selling nuclear material to the highest bidder.

Envoys for the new South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, shocked Bush advisers in Washington recently when they said they would rather have a nuclear North Korea than a chaotic collapse of the government there, according to sources in Seoul.

And in Japan, located within missile range of North Korea, officials feel their neighbor cannot be stopped from producing a bomb. "We need to be debating how to live with North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons," Taro Kono, a lawmaker from the ruling party, said in an interview.

Washington had issued repeated warnings to North Korea not to begin reprocessing materials that could become fuel for a nuclear bomb, but administration officials have become resigned to North Korea taking that step sometime within the next two to four weeks. "The administration has acquiesced in North Korea becoming a nuclear power," said a Senate source who was briefed last week on the administration's evolving policy.

U.S. officials have begun to contend that a decision by North Korea to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium will represent a diplomatic opportunity to swing international opinion to its side in the impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, administration and congressional officials said today.

The administration thinks the shock of a decision by Pyongyang to export nuclear materials would force Russia, China, South Korea and other nations to drop their reluctance to confront the Communist state. According to that view, they would go along with the United States in mounting a tough campaign to further isolate the North and possibly to try to interdict suspected shipments of nuclear materials.

Production of plutonium that could flow abroad in clandestine sales "fundamentally changes the equation," contends an administration official. "Literally every city on the planet would be threatened."

During the last crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, in 1994, the Clinton administration warned Pyongyang that reprocessing materials for a nuclear bomb could prompt a military strike. Many officials in Asia believe that Washington will now set new "red lines" that it will not tolerate North Korea crossing. But Bush and his senior advisers have refused to do that, publicly at least, saying it would only encourage North Korea to charge past them. North Korea already is a major source of missile technology, and an Iranian resistance group recently said that North Korean experts are assisting Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Now officials worry about a new kind of export. "Our major fear is that North Korea would pass on fissile material or other nuclear technology" to "rogue states" or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage warned Congress last month. "I don't think, given the poverty of North Korea, that it would be too long" before such sales took place, he said.

"The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons material," said Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R-Ill.), who follows the North Korea issue closely. "Nuclear weapons transferred to the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking Jerusalem."

The Senate source said the administration was playing "a very dangerous game" in not acting to stop reprocessing before it starts, because the resulting materials could be hidden in the country's network of caves awaiting export. But administration officials argue they have no good military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear capability. A surgical strike might neutralize the plutonium plant, but the country's effort to enrich uranium is proceeding at another, unknown site.

President Bush told reporters this week that he was still seeking a diplomatic solution and that a "military option is our last choice." He also said that he would seek to "accelerate the development of an anti-ballistic missile system" to counter a potential threat from North Korean missiles.

U.S. officials quietly dropped the phrase that the United States has "no hostile intent" toward North Korea in their talking points about a month ago, an official said. "It's clear North Korea has hostile intent to us," he said.

"I wouldn't rule out use of military coercion if North Korea crosses . . . red lines," said Michael A. McDevitt, a retired rear admiral and director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington. "The one I am most worried about is if they produce enough plutonium to start hawking it on the open market."

An administration official said Chinese officials have told North Korea that China would consider any attempt to produce nuclear weapons a "direct threat to Chinese national security." While the Chinese told U.S. officials that they made it clear to North Korea they would not accept such a step, the Chinese statement did not address reprocessing or foreign sales of the resulting materials.

Many strategists have long asserted that the United States, China and Russia would not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea because it could dramatically alter the power structure in northeastern Asia and lead to an arms race as both Seoul and Tokyo demanded nuclear weapons.

Increasingly, however, it appears that North Korea is determined to defy those wishes. "In a way we are wasting our time to talk about dialogue with North Korea," said Masashi Nishihara, president of Japan's National Defense Academy. "Only after they develop a nuclear program will they come to the table."

Kessler reported from Washington.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42584-2003Mar4.html>

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Washington Post

March 5, 2003

Pg. 19

'Dream Team' Of Scientists Prepares For Worst

Group Focuses on Emergency Response

By Ceci Connolly, Washington Post Staff Writer

Long before there was Code Orange, the renewal of smallpox inoculations or a presidentially decreed war on terror, Jerome Hauer and a handful of counterterrorism experts were painting doomsday scenarios.

"People would look at us like we were crazy," recalled Hauer, 52, who helped create New York City's emergency management office. "They'd look at us like we were hysterical fanatics screaming the sky was falling."

Now Hauer and his hand-picked team at the Department of Health and Human Services are paid to think bleak thoughts. And if it were not for the serious nature of their work, they might just be saying, "We told you so."

For years, this disparate group spread across the military, academia and the FBI has tried to sound the alarm.

Members have the journal articles and congressional testimony to prove it.

But it wasn't until fall 2001 -- when al Qaeda and anthrax made domestic terrorism a reality -- that HHS devoted major resources to the threat of biological, chemical and nuclear attacks.

"It became apparent we were totally unprepared," said D.A. Henderson, the epidemiologist who arrived at the department a few weeks after the first anthrax death in Florida. First alone, and then joined by Hauer, Henderson started assembling what has evolved into a new Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness. The office, which comprises what HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson describes as a "dream team of scientists," was established to oversee emergency response and long-range planning for protecting the civilian population from acts of terrorism, particularly biological and chemical attack.

Last summer, Henderson moved to an advisory role, and Hauer became acting assistant secretary of the office, overseeing a staff of 51. Hauer had also been responsible for the 105-person Office of Emergency Response, which moved to the new Department of Homeland Security on March 1.

"We've all had a level of commitment to this for a long time," said Robert Blitzer, 57, a vice president of Science Applications International Corp. who is consulting with HHS. "This is the first time we're in a work environment together."

Other HHS agencies play large roles in the anti-terrorism effort; the National Institutes of Health is mounting a massive research effort while the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is coordinating response activities with state and local health departments. Hauer's team has a more futuristic feel to it.

In a windowless warren kept locked at all times, the group pores over intelligence data, constantly re-ranking its threat list and possible countermeasures -- the detection systems, antidotes, vaccines and treatments of the future. Smallpox was at the top of the list because, as Henderson said, there is no treatment, and it can be fairly easily spread.

"Right behind is anthrax," he said, "because of its availability and the fact it has been used."

It is a reunion of sorts for the group of men (there are no women on the core team) and a new perspective for a department that historically had little connection to the world of national security. Henderson, 75, and Philip Russell, 71, an Army major general, came out of retirement to join the team. Medical doctors with extensive expertise in infectious diseases, both men focus on development of new treatments and vaccines.

Though the two are pleased with the speedy production of 200 million doses of smallpox vaccine and last week's announcement of three contracts to develop a safer, second-generation vaccine, there are many other deadly agents on their "to do" list.

"Soon we'll be pushing on with products for tularemia and Ebola," said Russell, who received the Legion of Merit and Distinguished Service Medal during his more than 31 years of active duty in the military. "We're also worried about people engineering new organisms."

Edward Eitzen, former commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., said he came to HHS for the chance to work with Henderson and Russell -- "giants in their field."

A highly decorated doctor who served in Operation Desert Storm, Eitzen, 49, is devoting much of his time to managing a botulism vaccine project. He scans the research horizon for other government, academic or corporate research that might apply to terrorism agents and coordinates with the Food and Drug Administration to smooth the licensing process.

The physicians rely heavily on Blitzer's reading of intelligence data, a skill he honed in the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section.

"I look for trends in the traffic, any pattern of activity," Blitzer said. The information he culls on an enemy's ability to produce a certain weapon of mass destruction helps the group develop a counterstrategy.

A few years ago, terrorism experts focused on chemical weapons such as sarin gas or the nerve agent VX, Hauer said. But those can be difficult to disseminate in a civilian environment, as opposed to a battlefield. "Now the greater threats are toxic industrial materials that travel the highways every day," Hauer said.

Though not a government employee, Blitzer provides a critical link to law enforcement and intelligence officials, many of whom he knows. "If we see something in the traffic, I make a call to the CIA or FBI," he said.

The personal relationships, built over decades, mean the group often circumvents governmental obstacles, Hauer said, noting, "This is a group of people that abhors bureaucracy."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42043-2003Mar4.html>

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San Francisco Chronicle

March 4, 2003

Pg. 1

Challenge Of Destroying Chemical Weapons

By David R. Baker, Chronicle Staff Writer

Later this month, workers at a Maryland military base will begin destroying some of the weapons the world fears most.

Shielded by Plexiglas barriers and rubber gloves, they will drain a thick, toxic liquid known as mustard agent from steel containers left over from America's defunct chemical weapons program.

The mustard agent, which blisters skin on contact, will be mixed with a hot water solution to neutralize it at the base's new treatment plant, built by San Francisco's Bechtel Corp. The chemical stew then will be trucked to another site, where microbes will devour any harmful compounds lingering in the mix.

The United States has years of experience destroying such weapons, now at the center of the showdown between President Bush and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Bechtel alone has worked on three of America's nine plants -- some active, some still under construction -- to neutralize or burn chemical weapons.

And yet, if American forces invade Iraq and find the chemical and biological weapons that Bush insists are there, getting rid of them may not be as easy as shipping them to one of those plants. Few people would welcome bringing such lethal cargo back to the United States for destruction. And some of the nerve agents believed to be in Iraq's arsenal require careful handling to destroy in the field.

"You could burn it and just not stand downwind. I wouldn't want to do that," said Greg Mahall, U.S. Army spokesman at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, site of Bechtel's new plant. "Nerve agents are a pesticide for people."

Much would depend on the kinds of weapons found, their proximity to cities or towns and their condition upon seizure. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, United Nations inspectors quickly had to craft a way to incinerate Iraqi mustard weapons that were starting to leak, said former U.N. biological weapons inspector Raymond Zilinskas.

"The alternative was to keep the damn stuff," said Zilinskas, now director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies' chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation program. "There's no middle ground here."

U.S. BOUND BY TREATY

Chemical weapons can be destroyed through heat and by exposure to other chemicals. The United States, bound by an international treaty to destroy its own stockpile, has used both ways.

Located about 30 miles from Baltimore, the Aberdeen plant mixes mustard agent with 190-degree water and sodium hydroxide. Trucks carry the solution to a nearby hazardous waste treatment plant for further processing.

Mustard agent, some of it made during World War II, has been sitting at Aberdeen for decades, a weapon the U.S. military chose not to use.

With shifts of personnel working days, nights and weekends, all 1,815 containers should be drained in less than a year, said Miguel Monteverde, public outreach manager for Bechtel's Aberdeen operation. The entire project will cost taxpayers about \$240 million, he said.

Elsewhere, the military has opted for incineration. Another new, Bechtel-built plant, at the Anniston Army Depot in eastern Alabama, has furnaces burning as hot as 2,000 degrees.

It can destroy mustard agent as well as the deadly nerve agents VX and Sarin, Mahall said, with the furnace exhaust scrubbed to remove residue. The plant has not yet started operations.

Critics charge that scrubbing can't catch everything. Weapons incineration projects in the United States have been dogged by complaints that they spew dioxins, mercury and other contaminants into the air.

"It's all your very favorite toxic chemicals," said Craig Williams, director of the nonprofit Chemical Weapons Working Group, which pushes for cleaner disposal methods.

PLANTS CALLED SAFE

Mahall insists the plants are safe.

"Nothing is clean, but they are some of the cleanest facilities of their kind, when stacked up against (energy) co-generation facilities or steel mills," he said. "I have no problems being around one of these facilities."

U.S. troops in Iraq probably wouldn't have access to treatment plants. Instead, they would most likely have to deal with chemical weapons caches in the field.

The work is tricky but not impossible. U.N. inspectors who entered the country after the Gulf War supervised the destruction of mustard weapons as well as nerve agents. Mustard agent stored in bulk was mixed with diesel fuel and burned in incinerators constructed on site, Zilinskas said. Although not as sophisticated as the carefully designed weapons incinerators in the United States, the furnaces worked.

Some weapons loaded with mustard agent were cracked open with explosives so it could be removed and incinerated, Zilinskas said. Nerve agents were taken to the Iraqi plant where they were manufactured, mixed with chemicals to deactivate them and dumped in the desert, Zilinskas said.

Leaking mustard weapons were destroyed in pits out in the desert, with their contents spilled into split-open oil drums filled with gasoline, Zilinskas said. The chemicals were then set on fire, with air samplers nearby monitoring for any toxic residue. The samplers didn't find any, he said.

"It's not a way you could ever do it in the United States, but you did have this vast open land without anyone being closer than 40 or 50 miles," Zilinskas said.

If the United States invades, Williams wants the military to avoid burning Iraqi chemical weapons and instead neutralize them, building special facilities if necessary.

"They're not that expensive, considering what this war is going to cost us," he said. "That, to me, is a reasonable approach from a troop-protection standpoint, a population-protection standpoint and an environmental-protection standpoint."

Although Bechtel has the expertise, and an extensive history of working with the Pentagon, a company spokesman declined to say whether his firm has been contacted to help dispose of chemical weapons during a possible war.

"There is no war in Iraq right now, and we don't have any business there right now," said spokesman Jonathan Marshall.

A Pentagon spokesman did not respond to questions about the military's plans for dealing with such weapons in a possible invasion.

Then there are the biological weapons -- including anthrax and botulism toxin -- believed to be lurking in Iraq's arsenal. Many biological weapons can be destroyed with heat or bleach. Although lethal once released, they can be relatively simple to kill, said Gregory Jones, a specialist in weapons of mass destruction at Rand.

"Most biologicals are pretty fragile," he said. "You could put them in the oven in my house for a couple hours, and most of them would be gone."

Anthrax spores, however, are tougher than that. They can be destroyed with formaldehyde or high heat if they haven't been released into the environment, Jones said. Once out, they can linger for years.

In the 1980s, Britain decontaminated a 520-acre island off the Scottish coast used for anthrax weapons experiments during World War II. Cleaning the island required soaking the ground in formaldehyde and seawater.

Some analysts fear a similar, potentially lethal mess if Hussein chooses to use his chemical and biological weapons during a possible U.S. attack.

"There would be no strategic reason for him to withhold available stockpiles," said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a defense policy group. "He won't be able to take them with him. They won't do anything for him when he's dead."

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/04/MN126465.DTL>

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Washington Times
March 6, 2003
Pg. 17

Governments Move To Ratify Arms Treaty

MOSCOW — A top Russian diplomat said yesterday that the Russian and U.S. governments may simultaneously submit their latest arms-control treaty to their legislatures for ratification.

Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov said he and U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow met yesterday and discussed forwarding the treaty, known as the Treaty of Moscow, to the Russian State Duma and the U.S. Senate. The pact, agreed to by Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush at a May summit, would require the two countries to reduce their stockpiles of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about two-thirds over the next decade, to between 1,700 and 2,200 each.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030306-25427560.htm>

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USA Today
March 6, 2003
Pg. 1D

How Prepared Are We Against Smallpox?

By Anita Manning, USA Today

In Chicago, if people began showing up in hospitals today, desperately ill and covered with smallpox pustules, there would be, at last count, seven medical workers who are vaccinated and ready to care for them

In New York City, as of the latest posting by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, six health workers had been immunized; in Massachusetts, 15.

In the weeks since Dec. 13, when President Bush ordered smallpox vaccinations for

The civilian plan, which began Jan. 24, is designed to allow groups of immunized health workers to form Smallpox Response Teams who would be able to help people if the nation were attacked.

Initially, states counted 450,000 health workers who could be offered vaccine in a one-month target period suggested by the CDC. That hasn't happened, and now, with so few immunized, the question arises: If smallpox were unleashed, is the nation ready?

Health officials say we're getting there.

Though the number of immunized workers is low, programs are just getting started in some states. In others, they're well underway. Nebraska has vaccinated 1,018 people, and Tennessee has immunized 1,488.

But many medical workers are balking at getting vaccinated, partly because of concerns that the vaccine itself can cause severe illness. It contains a live vaccinia virus, a relative of the smallpox virus, that can be passed from the vaccine site to other parts of the body or to other people and cause infection.

For instance, California health officials are investigating a case in which someone who had contact with a recently vaccinated person has an eye infection caused by the virus in the vaccine.

Experts say vaccine reactions are to be expected, despite careful screening to assure that people at highest risk are excluded. Still, the number of health care workers who have volunteered for vaccination is lower than expected, experts concede.

Citing unresolved questions about who might be held liable if the vaccine makes people sick and concerns over whether health workers will be paid for sick time taken to recover from vaccination, some medical unions have urged their members to hold back. Some hospitals are not offering vaccine to their employees because they fear that recently immunized health workers could pass the vaccine virus to patients.

And when stacked up against the vaccine's very real risks, many believe that the threat of a smallpox attack is a distant, theoretical possibility.

That's a mistake, says Julie Gerberding, director of the CDC, one of the medical leaders who helped shape the president's plan.

"One of the big changes since 9/11 is that the CDC is in the loop of communication on classified information that deals with threat assessment," Gerberding says. "I have been in rooms where this has been discussed. I can tell you for sure that I believe these steps for preparation are absolutely essential. The steps we're taking to assure our smallpox teams can protect the nation are essential."

But Gerberding would not go into detail. She falls back on a comment repeated often by a number of top health officials: "The president has said there is no imminent threat of smallpox. We know the risk is not zero, and we know the consequence of an attack could be devastating. The only way to prevent that risk is to take the steps for preparedness we're taking right now."

But whether it will take 15,000 or 500,000 immunized health care workers to stand between the smallpox virus and a vulnerable public is not known.

"We have said from the beginning that the focus on numbers was wrong," says George Hardy, director of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, so the initial target of vaccinating up to half a million public health and medical workers was never the "measure of success." Success would be "that we have offered vaccine in as safe a way as we can to people to serve on public health response teams, and that we have adequate preparedness teams in place.

"At this point in time, there are probably fewer people immunized than we would have expected or hoped," Hardy says.

'All hazards' approach

Once questions of liability and compensation are resolved, a huge hurdle will be removed, but other obstacles remain, Hardy says.

"There are people who think this vaccine is a greater risk to themselves and their patients than they are willing to take," he says. Some people question the focus on smallpox alone when there are dozens of other weapons that could be used by terrorists.

One reason for the attention to smallpox, Hardy says, is that "it's something you can do something about. You can vaccinate."

There are no vaccines yet against Ebola or plague, and short of duct tape and plastic sheeting, not much anyone can do about a chemical attack. But even though less publicity surrounds these threats, the CDC is taking an "all hazards" approach to preparedness, Gerberding says.

"You are hearing most about smallpox because we have a vaccine program for it, but our whole preparedness system is focusing on all biological threat agents, as well as chemical and nuclear."

A bioweapons attack could take any number of forms, experts say, though when it comes to smallpox, there is some disagreement about how easy it would be for terrorists to infect a lot of people, especially now that the USA has a huge supply of the vaccine and every state has a plan to implement a mass-vaccination campaign if needed. The vaccine is effective up to four days after exposure.

"We know the Soviets prepared it in a form that could be aerosolized," says Ronald Atlas, co-director of the Center for Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism at the University of Louisville.

Many experts believe spreading the virus from an airplane or bomb would be technically difficult, but not impossible. Another scenario is that one or more suicide bombers infected with smallpox could board planes or ride subways in big cities. A detonation could infect travelers, who would then infect their families, co-workers and friends in increasing numbers.

That could occur, says William Schaffner, an infectious-disease specialist at Vanderbilt University, but there are reasons it might not be very effective.

For one thing, he says, people who have smallpox can't pass the disease to someone else until they develop fever or rash, seven to 14 days after being infected. Though it's true that the first lesions may form in the throat or mouth, where they're not visible, by that time the infected person is very sick, Schaffner says.

"You're not in the mood, nor do you have the capacity, to dance through a mall or take long trips on the subway," he says.

And, he says, smallpox is not as contagious as the common cold or flu. It generally requires close and prolonged contact to spread, he says. "This means, even if you encounter a slumping person on the subway and bend over and say, 'How are you?' with that brief exposure, it's highly likely you weren't infected. We'd like to vaccinate you, but that's a very brief exposure, so the risk is small."

The trouble is that even a single case of smallpox could prompt national panic, experts say. State and federal response plans provide for teams of immunized people who could quickly respond to investigate the first cases and care for the victims, then to quickly vaccinate tens or hundreds of thousands.

It has been done before. In 1947, a single smallpox case in New York City prompted vaccination of 6.35 million people in four weeks, a strategy that quickly contained what might have been a major outbreak.

Because most practicing doctors and nurses have little or no experience with smallpox, because there hasn't been a natural case anywhere since 1977, the CDC has launched a massive education campaign. It includes satellite broadcasts, in-person training for state and local health agencies and extensive information on its Web site. This week, the CDC sent 3.5 million doctors information about the vaccine and the disease.

'Vigilant and prepared'

Most medical leaders say they do not believe there is a need to vaccinate the general public before a smallpox attack. "Given the potential side effects," Atlas says, "for the mass population we remain best described as vigilant and prepared to vaccinate."

He says he worries that reports of reactions to the vaccine among health care workers and military personnel could cause a backlash.

"If we do get attacked, we need a public willing to stand online to get vaccinated. If the public is afraid because they've seen some adverse reactions, we have a worse situation" than if no vaccinations had been given before the attack.

Americans have high expectations of public health effectiveness that could prove unrealistic if smallpox is ever released into the world, Schaffner says.

"We're less tolerant. There is an unstated expectation of no transmission. Zero. My first response to that, as a real-world public health person, is 'get over it.' "

An attack probably would result in some deaths, Schaffner says, and no smallpox preparedness plan could avert that. That's why it's so important to have response teams ready to go, Atlas says. A significant number of people vaccinated for the first time have reactions, including rash or fever, that cause them to miss a day or two of work. That won't do in an emergency, Atlas says. "You want a group of responders who won't need to go home for a day or two. You want people able to respond without hesitation at the point we might have an attack."

http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2003-03-05-smallpox_x.htm

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Philadelphia Inquirer

March 7, 2003

Critics Fear For Troops In A Toxic Attack

By Jessica Guynn, Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - Critics are asking whether the military's equipment and training would protect U.S. forces from biological or chemical weapons in a war with Iraq.

Sens. Russell D. Feingold (D., Wis.), Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.) and six other senators yesterday expressed strong concern in a letter to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. "We are concerned that... training and preparedness for confronting the harrowing threat of chemical and biological warfare lags behind the pace of deployment" of forces, the letter said.

Critics point to Army audits and congressional studies questioning the quality of protective gear and training. In July, Army investigators concluded that many soldiers "weren't proficient in operating and maintaining chemical and biological defense equipment."

An Army audit also found that in the first Gulf War, 62 percent of gas masks and 90 percent of chemical and biological detectors did not work.

The Pentagon said this week that equipment and training had been upgraded since then and that U.S. forces were prepared for a possibly toxic battlefield.

"Our soldiers are trained and ready, and their equipment is world-class," said Gen. John C. Doesburg, who heads the Army's soldier and biological chemical command.

With 300,000 troops being deployed in the gulf, concern is mounting, especially among Gulf War veterans, that troops will be exposed to hazardous materials ranging from depleted uranium to pesticides that could cause serious health problems.

At a news briefing Wednesday, critics including Ralph Nader suggested that troops had not received medical and mental-health screenings, including blood sampling, that are required by a 1997 law.

Such testing would give doctors and scientists clues to help diagnose illnesses triggered by exposure to biological or chemical weapons, said Steve Robinson, a Gulf War veteran and executive director of the National Gulf War Resource Center.

The Pentagon says it has complied with the law - that troops headed for the gulf were screened and would be screened again on their return.

"The health and safety of America's sons and daughters who go in harm's way is the top priority of those in [the Department of Defense]," spokeswoman Barbara Goodno said.

The Pentagon has distributed protective suits that are lighter and sturdier than earlier gear. Each member of a unit gets at least two; Marines get three. They can be worn for 45 days and laundered six times. The Pentagon also has two older suits for each person deployed.

U.S. forces have been outfitted with new gas masks and systems to detect biological or chemical agents. In addition, each unit has a biological- and chemical-weapons specialist, said Col. Thomas W. Spoehr, who commands the Third Chemical Brigade at the U.S. Army Chemical School. A pool of specialists from chemical units will be on the ground in Iraq if war is ordered.

Owen Cote, a defense specialist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said that "there are limits to what you can do about a biological or chemical attack." But he believes it is unlikely that Iraq has enough biological and chemical agents or the means to deliver them to pose a major threat to American troops.

Jonathan Tucker, an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the U.S. Institute of Peace, disagreed. He said Saddam Hussein more than likely had a substantial arsenal of such agents.

"This time the United States has made it clear that the objective of invasion is to overthrow his regime," Tucker said. "He has nothing to lose."

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/5334617.htm>

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Washington Post

March 7, 2003

Pg. 25

Pentagon Pursues Nuclear Earth Penetrator

New Weapon Would Be Aimed at Missile Production Facilities Underground

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon is about to take the first public step toward obtaining a controversial, high-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon that could be aimed at North Korea's underground nuclear and missile production facilities, according to senior Bush administration officials.

Within a week, an Air Force report is to be delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services committees stating the military requirements for the "robust nuclear earth penetrator," a device designed to dig into the ground before it explodes and crushes any facility buried beneath it. Already five times more powerful than the device detonated at Hiroshima, the bomb would have an even greater impact because a nuclear weapon's force is multiplied when its shock wave penetrates the rocky crust of the earth.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon this week sent to Capitol Hill language that would, if approved, lift an eight-year-old congressional restriction on development of a so-called low-yield warhead, one below five kilotons. Such a device would be used to attack facilities holding chemical or biological weapons. In principle, the heat or radiation of the low-yield weapon would destroy the toxicity of the agents before they were spread by the force of the blast. These moves drew criticism yesterday after Energy Department officials were questioned at a House Armed Services Committee hearing.

Noting the Bush administration's standoff with North Korea over that country's plans to build nuclear weapons, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), a senior member of the Armed Services panel, said, "I don't see how we look at all the nuclear wannabes in the face when we have announced a half-hearted attempt to take down half our own big nuclear weapons and we are going to now launch ourselves into a whole series of new weapons."

David Albright, a physicist who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security and an expert on North Korea, said, "It is a bad idea to develop these things, which probably would never be used, and do so openly. It develops a lot of paranoia among proliferating states who believe the U.S. is planning to attack them."

When the "earth penetrator" was first discussed in the 1990s, it was conceived as having a low yield -- a relatively small output of radiation, heat and explosive force -- so that if it exploded in the basement of a palace in the outskirts of Baghdad, it would not create much fallout.

Today, however, the goals are different. Potential enemies are hiding their war-making facilities underground, said Everet H. Beckner, deputy administrator for defense programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration, and there is a need for developing a weapon whose nose cone could penetrate frozen soil or rocks.

One of the suspected sites for North Korea's covert uranium enrichment plant is a uranium milling facility built underneath a mountain. Three other suspected nuclear production sites are also hidden near or in large areas carved out of mountains.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54638-2003Mar7.html>

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USA Today
March 7, 2003
Pg. 7

Senator Says Best Intelligence Data Not Given To U.N.

By Dave Moniz, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee said Thursday that the United States has shared only a fraction of its best intelligence on Iraq's suspected weapons sites with U.N. inspectors. Sen. Carl Levin said the Bush administration has not taken U.N. inspections seriously, and the failure to pass on some of its best information has damaged the U.S. case for war at the United Nations.

Levin's remarks marked a split within the U.S. government over tactics for dealing with Saddam Hussein's regime.

"I think we have a strong case (for war) in the Security Council," Levin said. "But the administration has undermined the inspection process and mocked the inspectors. We have reduced the possibility that we catch the SOB with the stuff and galvanize the world community," the Michigan Democrat said at a breakfast with reporters in Washington. He said his information is based on intelligence briefings given to congressional leaders.

CIA Director George Tenet responded Thursday to a letter Levin sent Feb. 25 highlighting concerns about intelligence sharing. In his letter to both Levin and Sen. John Warner, the Republican chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Tenet said U.S. agencies have provided "extensive intelligence and other support to the U.N. on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction for over 10 years."

The CIA director also said the United States recently supplied information to the United Nations on all "high value" sites suspected of harboring biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.

Vince Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism official, said he agreed with Levin's assessment that the U.S. government has possibly withheld useful information from U.N. inspection teams.

But Cannistraro said making U.N. inspections work was never the intent of the Bush administration. "The objective is not disarmament, it's to get rid of Saddam. We won't take yes for an answer on this," Cannistraro said.

Levin said he could not disclose the number of suspected weapons sites compiled by U.S. intelligence sources or say how many were identified to U.N. inspectors because the information is classified.

He said that even with the best intelligence the U.S. government could provide, it's unlikely that U.N. inspectors could find chemical or biological weapons hidden carefully by Saddam's regime.

"But it is at least possible and worthwhile doing," Levin said. "There is a significant gap in the number of sites that our intelligence has said are significant and the number that have been shared with U.N. inspectors."

Contributing: John Diamond

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030307/4927257s.htm>

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Los Angeles Times
March 7, 2003

Marines Deploy Combat Chickens In Kuwait

The birds serve as a low-tech system to warn troops of biological or chemical attack by Iraq.

By Tony Perry, Times Staff Writer

CAMP GRIZZLY, Kuwait --No one would dare call Geraldine the chicken of the sea.

The U.S. military has spent millions of dollars perfecting high-technology devices to detect even a whiff of certain kinds of chemical or biological agents and to develop protective suits for troops. Marines have found a low-tech supplement.

Enter Geraldine of Arabia, part of a squad of combat chickens. They are the updated version of the age-old strategy used by coal miners who carried caged canaries to detect poisonous gas. Since canaries are scarce here, and chickens are plentiful, the military has adopted what Marines archly call the Foster Farms Takes Arms game plan.

And so Geraldine sits in her tiny cage outside the command post. Her sister chickens are in similar billets wherever there are Western troops.

If a nerve agent, for example, is present in the air, ideally a high-pitched horn attached to an electronic sensor will blare automatically. Marines will don suits and masks, prepare to inject themselves with antidote, and, in some cases, be decontaminated with a thorough dousing of water.

Specialists from the U.S., German and Czech militaries are working together to detect any use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and to alert troops immediately.

Geraldine and the other chickens are a backup system, what the military calls a "redundancy." Although experts at the Pentagon doubt the scientific validity of using chickens as an early-warning system, troops here say the pullets increase their confidence.

"It's a comfort zone kind of thing," said Cpl. Thomas Rivel, 23, of Upper Darby, Pa., " a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons specialist at Camp Grizzly. "If you watch the chicken and it starts dancing around, croaking and dying, you know Saddam is up to something."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-chicken7mar07,1,1227139.story>

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Washington Post

March 7, 2003

Pg. 5

U.S. Not Resigned To Nuclear North Korea, Powell

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Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said the United States is opposed to North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and had not resigned itself to trying to contain the expansion of nuclear efforts by the communist regime.

"The position of the United States is we don't want to see nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula," Powell told a Senate committee. "It is also the position of China. It is also the position of Japan and South Korea."

Powell disputed a report this week in The Washington Post that the United States, Japan and South Korea are beginning to accept the prospect of North Korea having nuclear weapons and that the United States is focused on preventing North Korea from trading nuclear material.

"I don't know of any basis to the report that we have decided to live with a nuclearized North Korea," he said.

President Bush aims to defuse the standoff with North Korea by attempting to persuade regional allies and China to exert pressure on the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, to adhere to agreements to halt nuclear arms development.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54175-2003Mar6.html>

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Wall Street Journal

March 7, 2003

Let Us Inspect

By Mohamed ElBaradei

For the past three months, a cadre of highly trained inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency has been on a focused mission: to verify, through intrusive inspection, the existence or absence of a nuclear-weapons program in Iraq.

These inspections have recently been characterized by some as a "mission impossible" -- a task too challenging to warrant continued pursuit. This, in my view, is a mischaracterization. I cannot speak for UNMOVIC -- the United Nations organization tasked with chemical, biological and missile inspections in Iraq. However, the facts on the nuclear side speak for themselves: After three months back in Baghdad, nuclear-weapons inspections are making marked progress.

The inspector's role is not that of a cloak-and-dagger detective, but neither are inspectors the passive "observers" that some have suggested. The IAEA's nuclear-weapons inspectors are physicists, chemists and engineers with decades of experience in nuclear-weapons research and development, nuclear-material safeguards and intrusive international inspection.

A high percentage of the current IAEA team had experience in Iraq during 1991-98. This was a period when the IAEA successfully seized nuclear-related documents based on information provided by defectors, convinced Iraq to provide volumes of additional information describing its existing nuclear-weapons program, destroyed or

neutralized Iraqi facilities and equipment related to nuclear-weapons production and confiscated and removed from Iraq its nuclear weapons-usable material.

In the past three months, they have conducted over 200 inspections at more than 140 locations, entering without prior notice into Iraqi industrial facilities, munitions factories, military establishments, private residences and presidential palaces. They have followed up inspection leads provided by other states, confiscated nuclear-related Iraqi documents for further scrutiny, interviewed scientists and engineers known to have played a key role in Iraq's past nuclear-weapons program and lowered themselves by rope into abandoned underground-reactor chambers. Taking advantage of the "signature" of radioactive materials, they have conducted radiation surveys over thousands of kilometers of Iraqi roads and collected samples of soil, air, water and vegetation and particulate matter from key locations in Iraq for laboratory analysis.

In short, the nuclear inspectors in Iraq have been far from idle, and their efforts far from futile. The IAEA's inspectors have systematically examined the contents and operations of all Iraqi buildings and facilities that were identified through satellite surveillance as having been modified or newly constructed since December 1998, when inspections were brought to a halt. They have determined the whereabouts and functionality of Iraq's known "dual-use" equipment -- that is, equipment that has legitimate industrial uses, such as precision machining, but that could also be used for the high-precision manufacture of components relevant to a nuclear-weapons program.

While the task is by no means complete, the inspection results achieved to date are worthy of careful consideration. In my update to the U.N. Security Council today, I will present the latest inspection results in detail. These will cover issues such as whether Iraq has used aluminum tubes and high-strength magnets as part of efforts to enrich uranium, Iraq's indigenous capability for flow-forming aluminum cylinders and the reported attempts by Iraq to import uranium from Niger.

A key facet of these inspections has been the degree of cooperation on the part of Iraq. Throughout the past three months, Iraqi authorities have provided access to all facilities without conditions and without delay and have made documents available in response to inspectors' requests.

However, the level of cooperation was initially "passive." Thus in our reports to the Security Council and meetings with Iraqi officials, we emphasized the need for a shift to more "proactive" support on the part of Iraq -- that is, making every effort to assist inspectors by voluntarily making available documentation, people and physical evidence that could help to fill in the remaining gaps in our understanding.

This urging, backed by the threat of the use of force, ultimately led to improvement. In recent weeks, Iraq has agreed to the use of overhead surveillance flights by American, French, Russian and German aircraft in support of the inspecting organizations and, as requested, committed to encouraging its citizens to accept interviews in private in Iraq. It has also provided lists of additional Iraqi personnel who might be relevant to verification issues. This kind of cooperation should speed up the verification process and generate additional credibility for the assurances that result.

Nuclear-weapons inspections in Iraq are making marked progress. To date, we have found no substantiated evidence of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear-weapons program -- the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction. No verification program can provide absolute guarantees that every facility or piece of equipment has been seen. There is always some degree of risk -- and for that reason we need to continue to maintain a monitoring and verification presence in Iraq well into the future.

For the present, we intend to continue our program of intrusive inspection, making use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council and all the information provided by other states. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, and provided that the level of cooperation by Iraq accelerates and support by other states continues, the IAEA should be able in the near future to provide the Security Council with credible assurances regarding the presence or absence of a nuclear-weapons program in Iraq.

Mr. ElBaradei is the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and head of nuclear inspections in Iraq.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia

By Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs And Trade, Before The House Committee On Armed Services.

GAO-03-526T, March 4.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-526T>

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Senate Backs U.S.-Russian Nuclear Pact

Deployments to Be Cut by Two-Thirds

By *Helen Dewar*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Friday, March 7, 2003; Page A01

The Senate yesterday unanimously approved a treaty to slash U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons deployments by two-thirds over the next decade, another milestone in the disarming of two powers that once threatened each other with horrific attacks. The vote was 95 to 0.

The treaty, signed last year in Moscow by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin and awaiting approval by the Russian parliament, calls on each nation to reduce deployments of strategic, or long-range, weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the year 2012 -- their lowest level since the 1950s.

The pact does not require the actual destruction of the weapons, leading some senators, especially Democrats, to question whether stockpiled Russian weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue countries.

Bush has hailed the Moscow Treaty as strengthening ties between the former Cold War rivals. The administration pushed for swift approval at a time when it is seeking to persuade Russia not to block a new United Nations resolution paving the way for military action against Iraq.

"As important as the substance is, it is the form -- the trust between the United States and Russia -- that shines through," said Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.). It may not be perfect, but it is "an important step toward a safer world," said Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.).

Over the years, the Senate has approved a series of arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union, although its record on international weapons pacts is mixed. Most recently, it approved a chemical weapons ban but rejected a treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing.

Most of the two-day Senate debate over the three-page pact, which omitted many of the details and complexities that characterized far longer Cold War-era agreements, centered on what was not in it rather than what was. While Democrats said they supported the treaty as a step forward in U.S.-Russian relations, they said it lacks verification requirements, enforcement provisions, mechanisms for weapons destruction or timetables for interim deadlines.

At the end of the process, both countries will have no fewer weapons at their disposal than they have now, said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "I guess it's fine to have an agreement for the sake of agreement, but for what value?" he asked.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said he was concerned that Russia lacks the financial resources to protect its mothballed stockpiles of nuclear weapons, exposing them to possible theft or clandestine sale to hostile individuals or nations. He called for greater funding of the Nunn-Lugar program of assistance for the destruction of Russian weapons of mass destruction.

Later, Biden joined Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.), Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.) and other Democrats in proposing a separate resolution assailing the administration's actions on weapons proliferation and outlining proposals of their own. The resolution, which did not come to a vote, urged the administration to start building an anti-proliferation coalition, to engage North Korea to deter it from pursuing its nuclear weapons program, to increase funding for nuclear security programs and to put more resources into homeland security. In one of the few votes on amendments, which Senate leaders had discouraged, a proposal to require Senate notification before the United States could withdraw from the treaty was rejected, 44 to 50. Another to require annual intelligence reports on compliance was defeated, 45 to 50.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said Bush should act shortly after the pact is ratified to reduce the high-alert status of U.S. nuclear arsenals and urge Putin to follow suit. Recalling a 1995 incident in which the Russian military initially interpreted the launch of a U.S. weather rocket as a possible nuclear attack, she said the high-alert status means weapons are ready to be launched at a moment's notice, and are thus vulnerable to mistakes or sabotage.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53879-2003Mar6.html>

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Fri Mar 7, 3:19 AM ET

Russia welcomes U.S. Senate ratification of nuclear arms reduction treaty

By MARA D. BELLABY, Associated Press Writer

MOSCOW - The Russian Foreign Ministry on Friday welcomed the U.S. Senate's ratification of the latest bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty, saying the agreement reflected a new era of cooperation, but prominent lawmakers warned that Russian passage could be complicated by a war against Iraq ([news](#) - [web sites](#)). The Moscow Treaty is a "substantial practical expression of the new relations of strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United States," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

U.S. President George W. Bush ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) was initially reluctant to codify the arms reductions, but he later acceded to Russian President Vladimir Putin ([news](#) - [web sites](#))'s insistence on a legally binding treaty, and the two leaders signed the agreement in Moscow in May. The U.S. concession was seen as a diplomatic victory for Moscow. Ratification of the treaty has been a top priority for Moscow before the next U.S.-Russian presidential summit, again in May. It came up for a Senate vote as the United States was pressing Russia not to use its U.N. Security Council veto to block a resolution authorizing a war against Iraq — but did not appear to budge Moscow from its stand against a military solution to the crisis.

The pact, unanimously approved by the U.S. Senate on Thursday, calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads by 2012 — down from about 6,000 for the United States and 5,500 for Russia. It brings the missile levels to the lowest point in 50 years.

Ratification by Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma, is expected within weeks. Two senior Russian lawmakers said Friday that they don't foresee any obstacles to the treaty's ratification, but expressed concern that if the United States does decide to take unilateral action against Iraq, the Duma debate could become complicated. Lawmakers "sentiments will of course depend on the situation around Iraq," Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Duma's International Committee, was quoted as telling the Interfax news agency. "I hope there will be no direct connection."

He said lawmakers must remember that the treaty "touches on our immediate bilateral relations and deals with agreements about strategic deterrence."

Ret. Gen. Andrei Nikolayev, head of the defense affairs committee in the Duma, also was quoted as telling Interfax that he doesn't see "any obstacles" to ratification, but added that "some difficulties might arise if the United States begins a military operation against Iraq."

The Foreign Ministry, predicting Russian ratification, said that "in the current difficult international environment, the agreement serves as an example of a legal and political resolution of the most complicated and critical problems of security through bilateral and collective efforts (taken) by the great powers in the interests of the entire world community."

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20030307/ap_wo_en_ge/eu_gen_russia_us_treaty_2

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