


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



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## **U.S.: Iraqis know inspection sites Intelligence shows advance cleanups**

By John Diamond

USA TODAY

WASHINGTON -- U.S. intelligence suspects that Iraq is finding out in advance which sites United Nations weapons inspectors plan to visit, enabling Iraqis to clean up the areas, U.S. diplomatic and intelligence officials said Tuesday. The three officials, speaking in separate interviews on condition of anonymity, said the United States doesn't know exactly how the information is being obtained. One official said Iraq might have bugged the inspectors or found members of the inspection team willing to pass on information.

U.S. spy satellites and electronic eavesdropping sensors have collected evidence of Iraqi cleanup efforts as much as two days before inspectors arrived, the officials said. That has led intelligence officials to discount a theory that Baghdad organized rapid, same-day cleanups simply by deducing where the inspectors' motorcades were heading. The possibility that Iraq has penetrated the inspections process is contributing to the CIA's reluctance to share sensitive information with the inspectors, the officials said.

Disclosure of the U.S. concerns about Iraqi spy efforts comes as the Bush administration is trying to convince its allies that Iraq is not fully complying with U.N. inspections. The officials' willingness to disclose their concerns may stem in part from the administration's hope that suspicion about Iraqi concealment will translate into support for possible military action against Saddam Hussein's regime.

The U.N. inspectors have noticed the Iraqi cleanup efforts, but a spokesman for the U.N. team said they have not raised a concern that Iraq has penetrated the inspectors' schedule.

"Clearly we understand that the Iraqis would have a great interest in finding out our plans," said Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for the U.N. weapons inspectors.

"We take the best measures we can to protect the data we have and our transmissions."

President Bush, citing intelligence sources, said in his State of the Union speech Tuesday night that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors -- sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves."

One of the senior U.S. officials said that either Iraq is finding out ahead of time where the inspectors are going or "they're darn lucky" about the sites they are cleaning up.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030129/4819038s.htm>

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New York Times

January 29, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Bush Enlarges Case for War by Linking Iraq With Terrorists**

By Michael R. Gordon

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — President Bush, enlarging the case for going to war with Iraq soon, said tonight that there was intelligence showing that Iraq was helping and protecting terrorists. He warned that Saddam Hussein could distribute weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who could use them against the United States.

Iraq's alleged terrorist connection is just one reason Mr. Bush cited for preparing for war. He also said Iraq could threaten the Persian Gulf region if it developed weapons of mass destruction, and he assailed its record on human rights.

To that end, he pointed to the example of North Korea, which is already suspected of having nuclear weapons and is, Mr. Bush said, "an oppressive regime" that rules by fear and starvation.

The allegation that Iraq is conspiring with terrorists seemed tailored to address the question of why it is important to act now.

In essence, Mr. Bush argued that military action is needed to avoid the risk of a Sept. 11-style attack using weapons of mass destruction. In last year's State of the Union address, Mr. Bush identified Iraq as a potential target. Tonight, he sought to make the case for why the United States needs to strike Iraq soon if it does not disarm.

With American forces massing in the Persian Gulf region and estimates that the United States and its allies could be ready to strike by late February or early March, Mr. Bush's speech was yet another sign that the administration has no intention of yielding to reluctant allies and domestic critics who argue that the United States should allow more time for United Nations inspections in Iraq.

The countdown for a military attack seems to be under way. Signaling that the hour of battle is approaching, Mr. Bush went so far in his speech as to address American forces, saying, "some crucial hours may lie ahead."

"Before Sept. 11, 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained," Mr. Bush said. "But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that day never comes."

It is clear that his argument has enormous appeal for the administration in terms of its public diplomacy. For many Americans, protecting the nation against terrorists is a far more persuasive rationale for going to war than preventing Iraq from developing new weapons that could change the balance of power in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

Administration hard-liners have long been suspicious that there are hidden links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist groups, relations Iraq could exploit to attack the United States while masking its responsibility. "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody, reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda," the president said in his speech. "Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own."

Mr. Bush said Secretary of State Colin L. Powell would go to the Security Council next week and provide intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs, terrorist links and attempts to deceive the United Nations. But he did not spell out what that new information is.

Just a few months ago, the C.I.A. told Congress that Iraq was striving to develop weapons of mass destruction but was unlikely to orchestrate terrorist attacks in the United States unless Washington struck Iraq first. The C.I.A. has never amended that public assessment.

"Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the United States," the C.I.A. said, referring to chemical and biological weapons, in an Oct. 7 letter to Congress. "Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions," the C.I.A. added. "Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a W.M.D. attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him."

In laying out his case, Mr. Bush said Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was a danger to the Middle East, and he denounced its human rights abuses.

"It is important that the president argued that Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction creates a threat to the entire region and that Saddam has created a human rights catastrophe," said Kenneth M. Pollack, a former C.I.A. expert on Iraq now at the Brookings Institution.

"There is still skepticism around the world that Saddam would give weapons of mass of destruction to terrorists," Mr. Pollack said. "So it is important that this is not the only argument."

The speech tonight was a logical extension of Mr. Bush's address last year, in which he indicated the United States would not limit the fight against terrorism to governments that actively supported and harbored terrorists like the Taliban, but would also carry it to hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction.

In that speech Mr. Bush first declared that the United States was threatened by an "axis of evil" that included Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

Critics argued that the concept grouped together nations who were not allies and actually had little in common and that United States policies toward those nations would necessarily have to differ. By grouping them together, they said, Mr. Bush had inadvertently invited criticism that his foreign policy was inconsistent.

If the United States believes that rogue states are such a danger, why was it moving against Iraq and not Iran, which has stronger ties with terrorist groups and is also trying to develop nuclear weapons, critics asked. And why is Washington so patient with North Korea, which has a track record of selling missiles?

With Mr. Bush seeking to avoid a confrontation with North Korea and Iran even as he is trying to marshal a force for striking Iraq, he did not mention the "axis of evil" again. Instead, he suggested that Iran was going through a period of internal ferment and possibly change. Regarding North Korea, he stressed that the United States wanted to work with its allies to achieve a peaceful solution.

But Mr. Bush made it clear that the United States was determined to confront Iraq if it did not voluntarily disarm and would do so soon. In keeping with his doctrine of pre-emption, he indicated that Washington was prepared to act even in the face of allied objections and without explicit Security Council approval.

"We are asking them to join us, and many are doing so," Mr. Bush said of the allies. "Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/29/politics/29MILI.html>

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Washington Post

January 29, 2003

Pg. 13

## **U.N. Finds No Proof Of Nuclear Program**

### ***IAEA Unable to Verify U.S. Claims***

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 28 -- The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, said today that two months of inspections in Iraq and interviews with Iraqi officials have yielded no evidence to support Bush administration claims that Iraq is secretly trying to revive its nuclear weapons program.

ElBaradei said in an interview that "systematic" inspections of eight facilities linked by U.S. and British authorities to a possible nuclear weapons program has turned up no proof to support the claims. "I think we have ruled out . . . the buildings," he said. ElBaradei also cast doubts on U.S. claims that Iraq has sought to import uranium and high strength aluminum tubes destined for a nuclear weapons program.

ElBaradei's remarks, combined with a relatively upbeat assessment of Iraq's cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors he delivered to the U.N. Security Council on Monday, have complicated Bush administration efforts to make its case for military action against Iraq. The remarks also increased pressure on the United States to increase the provision of intelligence to inspection teams regarding Iraq's suspected nuclear weapons program.

The administration's concerns about Iraq's alleged intent to develop nuclear weapons formed the basis of the case President Bush made to the United Nations in September for disarming Iraq. Bush said in an Oct. 7 speech that satellite photographs revealed that "Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past." White House officials produced satellite images showing recent construction at a former uranium enrichment plant at Furat, one of several sites searched by U.N. inspectors.

"At the majority of these sites, the equipment and laboratories have deteriorated to such a degree that the resumption of nuclear activities would require substantial renovation," ElBaradei wrote in his report to the council.

ElBaradei said today that the findings did not prove that Iraq has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. He also faulted Baghdad for failing to provide more "proactive cooperation" that could shed light on Iraq's past weapons programs. ElBaradei said that continued inspections offered the best chance of deterring Iraq from rebuilding its weapons programs. "We are not getting optimal cooperation," he said. "But still we are inching forward, and we still believe that barring something exceptional we should be able in a few months to come to a conclusion on Iraq's nuclear weapons program."

Iraq was close to developing nuclear weapons before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. IAEA inspectors said they had destroyed all nuclear facilities and equipment, and removed all weapons material before the inspections ended in 1998.

President Bush raised the specter of a new Iraqi quest for nuclear weapons, telling U.N. delegates during his Sept. 12 address to the U.N. General Assembly that Iraq made "several attempts" to "buy high strength aluminum tubes to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapons."

In addition to the U.S. assertion that Iraq had attempted to buy aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, U.S. and British intelligence have claimed that Iraq had tried to purchase low-grade uranium for processing into weapons-grade material from a source in Niger. Despite repeated requests for evidence, ElBaradei said "we haven't gotten anything specific. Niger denied it, Iraq denied it, and we haven't seen any contracts."

ElBaradei said that a preliminary investigation into Iraqi efforts to acquire large quantities of the aluminum tubes between 2000 and 2002 suggested that they were destined for an Iraqi program to build 81mm artillery rockets. He said that further investigation is required to determine whether Iraq may have diverted the tubes to a nuclear weapons program.

"We know that these tubes . . . could be used for conventional rockets," he said. They "cannot be used directly for [uranium] enrichment." ElBaradei said that his inspectors would continue to investigate whether the tubes had been reworked for nuclear weapons use.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57632-2003Jan28.html>

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Washington Post  
January 29, 2003  
Pg. 14

## **As U.S. Girds For Worst In Iraq, Retaliation Isn't Clear-Cut Issue**

### ***Nuclear Response to Chemical or Bio-Attacks Has Pitfalls***

By Bradley Graham, Washington Post Staff Writer

As they prepare for the possibility that Iraq would unleash chemical or biological weapons against invading U.S. forces, Bush administration officials have remained deliberately vague about how the United States would respond. Officials have refused to rule anything out, including the use of nuclear weapons to counter or forestall the release of chemical or biological agents.

In reality, however, U.S. authorities face few clear-cut options, and a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapons would be especially problematic, according to current and former military officers who have dealt with the issue.

On the one hand, U.S. authorities could be expected to feel a strong desire to exact punishment and set an example in the interest of deterring a repeat attack by Iraq or the future use of nonconventional weapons by other adversaries.

On the other hand, the United States would want to avoid a response that appeared excessive and that risked large numbers of civilian casualties or extensive damage to Iraqi facilities that might be helpful in reconstituting the government and the economy after the war.

A senior military officer involved in the war planning confirmed a report in the Los Angeles Times by defense analyst William Arkin that the range of possible retaliatory responses includes nuclear weapons. But the officer stressed that conventional bombs would be sufficient in a retaliatory strike. He suggested that the most likely response would involve intensified attacks on Iraqi leadership targets and those forces involved in firing chemical or biological weapons.

"If you want me to go get them with blast and steel and fire, I can do that without resorting to nuclear weapons," the officer said. "The nuclear option is on the table not to meet a military need but a potential political one."

In addition to threatening a severe military response, U.S. officials have taken other steps aimed at preventing a biological or chemical attack. The Pentagon has publicized preparations to equip U.S. troops with protective suits and inoculate them against biological warfare agents. President Bush and other officials have warned of war crimes prosecutions for any Iraqi officers who use chemical or biological weapons..

"Before the 1991 war that evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait, U.S. officials also struggled with how they would respond if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction. Buster Glosston, a now-retired three-star Air Force general who played a leading role in planning the air campaign then, said three options received serious consideration.

One involved the use of nuclear weapons. A second advocated widening the target list for U.S. airstrikes to include oil fields and a broader array of industrial plants and presidential palaces. And a third, which Glosston favored, proposed targeting several dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The destruction of the dams, the proposal calculated, would flood Baghdad with several feet of water and destroy much of the country's industrial base.

In "Crusade," his book about the Persian Gulf War, journalist Rick Atkinson reported that Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of U.S. and coalition forces, recommended in late 1990 to Gen. Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the United States send a demarche to the government in Baghdad threatening to use nuclear weapons if it unleashed chemical weapons. "His reasoning was that [Iraqi President Saddam] Hussein only understood brute force, and while the United States might never intend to use nuclear weapons, it wouldn't hurt to register the threat," Atkinson wrote.

In a prewar meeting in Geneva with Iraqi diplomat Tariq Aziz, James Baker, then secretary of state, also hinted at the possible use of nuclear weapons and cautioned that a chemical attack could cause the allies to amend their war aims and put the Iraqi government's existence at risk. But this and other U.S. threats were kept deliberately vague, reflecting the ambiguity within the administration over just how U.S. forces should respond.

Senior officials at the time worried that an overzealous retaliation, particularly a reliance on nuclear weapons, would bring disastrous political consequences in the Middle East and rob coalition forces of the moral advantage in the aftermath of an Iraqi biological or chemical attack on them. Most policymakers reportedly preferred some middle ground that would widen the Iraqi target base but not appear excessive.

Many of the same considerations exist now.

"It's not like this issue is brand-new," said a senior official who has participated in talks on the matter.

The specific options under review remain classified, but comments by several officials in recent interviews suggest the range of feasible alternatives is even more constrained this time by an overriding objective to limit civilian casualties and damage to nonmilitary targets. One high-level source, for instance, said top war planners do not favor the dam option that Glosson advocated in the 1991 war, viewing it as counterproductive.

Besides, the war plan already calls for bombing most militarily significant targets in the first few days of the air campaign, according to officials. This would leave only targets of secondary or tertiary importance to hit in some kind of retaliatory strike.

Still, senior commanders are understood to be preparing a retaliatory hit list that would attempt to focus even more firepower on those responsible for ordering a biological or chemical attack and those forces who fired the weapons. "The idea would be to hit them with greater velocity and greater force," the senior officer said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57395-2003Jan28.html>

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Washington Post

January 29, 2003

Pg. 4

## Senate Vote Ahead For Arms-Reduction Treaty

The Senate is planning a vote early this year to ratify a nuclear arms-reduction treaty with Russia, bolstering the Bush administration as it confronts global challenges involving atomic weapons.

The treaty, signed last May in Moscow by President Bush and President Vladimir Putin of Russia, would reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons by about two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200 each, from 5,000 to 6,000.

It would also strengthen U.S. relations with Russia at a time when Bush is depending on Putin for help in pressuring both Iraq and North Korea to renounce the development of nuclear weapons, analysts said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57942-2003Jan28.html>

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## U.S. Response III: Gas Masks Stocked at U.S. Capitol for Bush Speech

U.S. security officials had 800 gas masks ready at the U.S. Capitol yesterday during President George W. Bush's State of the Union address, Agence France-Press reported (see [GSN](#), Jan. 28).

The masks were stacked in corridors around the building before Bush's speech, according to a U.S. House of Representatives press gallery official.

The security measure was accompanied by extensive road closings and a heavy multi-agency law enforcement presence (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 29).

[http://www.nti.org/d\\_newswire/issues/newswires/2003\\_1\\_29.html#12](http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_1_29.html#12)

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Global Security Newswire (nti.org)

January 28, 2003

## U.S. Army Gave CBW Training To Iraqi Officers In 1960s

By David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army trained 19 Iraqi military officers in the United States in offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological warfare from 1957 to 1967, according to an official Army letter published in the late 1960s.

While the training was described as mostly defensive, it also included offensive instruction in such subjects as principles of using chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and calculating chemical munitions requirements,

according to a Dec. 12, 1969, letter from then-Army Chief of Legislative Liaison Col. Raymond Reid to then-U.S. Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wisc.). The letter was published later that month in the *Congressional Record*.

Iraqi and other foreign officers received the free instruction through the Pentagon's Military Assistance Program, according to the letter, at a time when the United States was seeking to counter Soviet power and influence around the world. Iran, then a close U.S. ally, and up to three dozen other countries, mostly Western countries, also received such instruction from the early 1950s through 1969, the letter said. The training was provided at the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Ala., it said.

The instruction for Iraq was provided before U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations were severed at the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and prior to Saddam Hussein taking power in Baghdad, first as vice president in 1968.

"It was obviously very thorough instruction we provided them," said Raymond Zilinskas, director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, after seeing the letter recently.

The letter prompted criticism from Kastenmeier, a prominent critic of U.S. chemical warfare policy at the time.

"I am disturbed over some of the more specific implications of the facts provided me by the Army, and I question the overall utility of continuing to disseminate offensive expertise in these forms of warfare so widely," he said on the House floor later that month.

### **Offensive Training**

A small percentage of the training provided Iraq was devoted to offensive instruction, according to Reid's letter. Iraqi officers took two types of courses.

One was called Chemical Officer Orientation, which provided general military education training such as map reading, weapons familiarization and also "unconventional warfare" including "principles of CBR [chemical, biological and radiological weapons] employment," "conducting CBR training," "calculation of chemical munitions requirements," intelligence organization and operations, and various CBR protective instruction. Other course elements included "defense against biological attack," "fundamentals of nuclear weapons effects," and "CBR protective devices and equipment." Seven percent of the instruction was offensive in nature, according to the letter. The other course, called Chemical Officer Career Associate, included "all categories of training," with 4 percent of the course offered offensive instruction, the letter said.

Despite the small percentages, Reid's letter noted a difficulty in differentiating offensive and defensive instruction. "As you will note from the course descriptions, the emphasis is on defensive aspects. However, it is not possible to separate offensive tactics from defense since some knowledge of the offense is necessary to prepare an adequate defense," he wrote.

"In addition, there can be no absolute guarantee that defensive tactics will not have some utility in framing offensive tactics," he wrote.

The instruction did not appear to teach participants how to manufacture such weapons, but rather, how to use them, manage them and defend against them.

"If they were trained by the U.S. military, it would be unlikely they got any training in development [or] production," said Terence Taylor, president of the Washington office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former U.N. arms inspector in Iraq.

### **The Training in Context**

The principal objective for such programs at the time, said Jeffrey Bale, an analyst at the Monterey Institute, was to counter Soviet and allied influence and capabilities.

"During the Cold War, the United States government provided all sorts of training to military personnel ... and I think the primary motivation at the time was to train these people to make them more effective to potentially resisting any kinds of Soviet military operations or subversive activity," he said

U.S. military officials at the time believed that the Soviet Union had an advanced chemical weapons program and had been supplying Middle Eastern countries with defensive equipment.

The U.S. assistance, Bale said, followed "a typical alliance pattern dating back to antiquity," of working with real or potentially unsavory regimes because it might offer help against a more serious threat.

Chemical and biological weapons at the time did not have the stigma for the military they have today, according to Harvard professor Matthew Meselson, co-director of the Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation.

"We [the United States] were very open, we advertised it because we wanted public approval. We needed funding. It was advertised as being humane, less expensive. The argument was you would lose fewer American lives if you fought a war because you would knock the enemy out right away," he said.

A prominent 1968 book by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh said the Army had sponsored a publicity campaign arguing biological and chemical weapons were a humane and effective deterrent.

“The Hiroshima argument I understand. Why would one ever train anyone else in offensive CW, BW use? That is bizarre,” said Tim Trevan, a former spokesman for the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq.

“It is not a humane way of killing people ... I can’t imagine a humane way of dying with chemical weapons” or from “using biological weapons under any circumstance,” he said.

All training was first approved, Reid’s letter said, by the U.S. ambassador and the chief military representative in the requesting country, as well as by the senior military commander responsible for the geographic region in which the country was located, the Army, and the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in coordination with the State Department.

Approval from the latter, Reid wrote, was intended to ensure that “training is conducted within the overall foreign policy objectives of the United States.”

More Iraqi officers were among those receiving the training than any other Middle Eastern nationality during that period. Of 36 Middle Eastern officers who attended the training, 19 were from Iraq. One Israeli received instruction during the period, according to the letter.

The 36 participating countries requested the training and were not solicited by the United States, according to Reid’s letter.

### **Lessons Not Learned Well**

Iraq’s use of chemical weapons suggests it probably applied its U.S. instruction poorly if at all, experts said.

“The tactics they developed during the Iran-Iraq war [were] something that didn’t exist during the first few years of the war,” Zilinskas said.

In the early years, they used chemical weapons “indiscriminately,” he said.

“After about four years, they started to use them more reliably. It seemed to me they developed that pretty much as they went along,” he said.

“They seemed to be on a pretty steep learning curve on the tactical use of chemical weapons,” said Jonathan Tucker, a visiting senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

“They used some on their troops by mistake. It doesn’t appear that they learned very much from the training they’d received,” he said.

Tucker noted, for instance, an Iraqi mistake in which forces fired mustard gas onto an Iranian position on a hill, “and as the gas was heavier than air, it floated down into the trenches where the Iraqi forces were based.”

Iraqi forces eventually used multiple chemical agents, including mustard, tabun and sarin, to cause more than 20,000 Iranian casualties during the war and used mustard and other agents in 1988 to kill an estimated 5,000 Iraqi Kurds at Halabja, according to a British government report published last year.

### **Chemical and Biological Warfare Cancelled**

Kastenmeier, in his comments in 1969, expressed concern that the Army’s acknowledgement of the offensive components of the programs would “seem to weaken existing deterrents against the use of CBW [chemical and biological weapons]” and undermine new policies enunciated by then-President Richard Nixon restricting chemical and biological weapons use by U.S. forces.

There was underway at that time a major U.S. policy shift against using chemical and biological weapons in combat that would eventually lead to the United States signing the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972.

Only a few weeks before Reid sent his letter, Nixon issued a statement on Nov. 25 saying the United States opposed first use of lethal chemical weapons and incapacitating chemicals and announcing that he would ask the Senate’s approval to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the first use of chemical and biological weapons. Nixon also then signed the Biological Weapons Convention and vowed to renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare, and confine biological research to defensive measures.

“Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between nations and among men,” Nixon said in a much-quoted passage from the statement.

It is not clear when Army training of foreign nationals in offensive chemical, biological and radiological warfare was discontinued. A spokesman for the Pentagon’s military assistance agency said the agency had no records on hand dating back to the time of the program.

The Army Chemical School, where the training was provided in the 1960s, continues today, providing U.S. soldiers and a detachment of foreign nationals defensive training at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

[http://www.nti.org/d\\_newswire/issues/newswires/2003\\_1\\_28.html#1](http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_1_28.html#1)

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Chicago Tribune  
January 28, 2003

## **Sailors Receive Smallpox Vaccine**

### ***Great Lakes fields few complaints***

By Sean D. Hamill, Tribune staff reporter

For some, it itches like crazy, for others, it causes headaches, but few of the nearly 400 medical personnel who have received smallpox vaccine at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in North Chicago have complained, officials said Monday.

"The best protection is to be vaccinated, that's why we're vaccinated first," said Petty Officer 1st Class Russ Dejidio, who is helping administer the vaccine to sailors.

Most of the sailors will get the vaccine this week. They will be among the first in Illinois to be inoculated since President Bush issued an order last month to prepare for the threat of a smallpox attack.

Unlike their civilian counterparts for whom the inoculations are voluntary, the sailors were ordered to receive the vaccine.

Few of the 385 sailors expected to receive the vaccine have expressed reservations, officials said. Statistically, the side effects can strike up to 52 people out of every 1 million vaccinated, with one to three people dying.

"We thought we were going to see more of it, but after they get the education, that takes care of 99 percent of the fears," Dejidio said.

Hospital personnel around the country are being inoculated so they would be able to administer the vaccine to others in case of an attack involving the disease.

The Navy personnel are being inoculated for two reasons, officials said.

"They're either in a position to go overseas, or they would be frontline first responders if there was [a smallpox] outbreak here," said Lt. Cmdr. John Wallach, a Navy spokesman.

Dejidio advises people getting the vaccine to avoid working out at gyms and to keep scabs from the inoculation covered to prevent transmission of the virus that is used to bolster the immune system.

Scott Air Force Base near Downstate Belleville is conducting the only other inoculation program in the state, according to the Illinois Department of Public Health.

An Air Force spokeswoman refused to say how many people were receiving the vaccine or when the inoculations began.

The state plans to inoculate about 10,000 health-care workers. In Chicago, which is overseeing its own program, officials said they expect to vaccinate about 4,000 hospital personnel.

The state and city programs are expected to begin in February, after questions about the legal liability involving the inoculations are resolved.

The inoculation involves either three or 15 skin pricks in the arm with two-pronged needles.

People who have never been inoculated against smallpox are pricked three times. People who have been inoculated get 15 pricks because their immune systems may still resist the vaccine.

In the United States, childhood vaccination against smallpox ended in 1972. Military personnel were inoculated on the first day of boot camp until 1990.

Dejidio, 41, a 17-year member of the Navy, has been given the vaccine four times.

"The only problem I had was an itch I never felt before that was pretty intense for a day or two," he said. "And it's a little irritating to be poked 15 times."

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/health/chi-0301280179jan28.1.2518951.story>

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New York Times  
January 30, 2003  
Pg. 1

## **Bush Officials Debate Release Of Iraq Secrets**

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 — President Bush's top national security aides are debating whether to declassify satellite photographs of suspected Iraqi weapons sites and truck convoys — along with telephone intercepts and interviews with defectors and detainees — to demonstrate that Iraq is defying inspections.

The rush to declassify comes as officials search for a way for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to make a credible argument at the United Nations next Wednesday, without harming the sources of the intelligence.

They need to prove not only that Iraq is blocking the inspections but also that it has active links to Al Qaeda — and without compromising the sources of the intelligence.

All day today, officials from the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department and intelligence agencies sifted through information that might be declassified in coming days. It ranges from satellite photographs suggesting that Iraq is trying to "sanitize" sites before inspectors arrive, to reports that "scientists" interviewed by the United Nations were actually Iraqi intelligence agents. The evidence — built as it is on telephone intercepts of discussions among Iraqi officials and the accounts of defectors and detainees — is never entirely reliable, which adds another layer of uncertainty. Nevertheless, it still may constitute the most powerful part of Mr. Powell's case. According to senior administration officials, Mr. Powell has said he wants to be armed with a brief containing a few select, vivid items of solid evidence, not a mosaic of murky material that could be discounted by skeptical allies and critics of the Bush administration. He plans, officials said, to catalog discrepancies between Iraq's recent weapons declaration and previous findings of biological and chemical weapons and agents during past inspections, and to offer more details of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

A crucial part of his case, officials said, will center on continuing Iraqi obstructions, including the fact that Iraq has so far made it impossible for United Nations inspectors to fly U-2 surveillance aircraft over the country. A senior White House official today called Iraq's refusal to allow the flights "the biggest material breach of all, so far." But some officials here and many abroad say new, convincing evidence is hard to come by. One senior official warned against expecting the kind of vivid pictures that Adlai E. Stevenson, the American representative to the United Nations during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, famously offered of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

"Those moments don't exist anymore," the official said, "precisely because they were so effective when Adlai Stevenson did it."

For instance, the administration today was still debating the credibility of intelligence about a Christmastime Iraqi truck convoy that some American analysts say could have been transporting weapons of mass destruction or scientists to Syria, where they would be safely out of United Nations inspectors' view.

"The convoy was unusually well protected," a senior official said. But after weeks of research, the contents of the shipment are still unclear. Complicating the issue, the Central Intelligence Agency doubts that there was a suspicious convoy at all, noting that there is a constant parade of trucks moving across the border.

Such disputes — nothing out of the ordinary in the intelligence world, where evidence is always incomplete and analysts from different agencies rarely come to the same conclusion — are plaguing the debate over how to best arm Mr. Powell.

"I worry about this one," said a foreign diplomat familiar with the intelligence. "Powell has one shot to do this right, and he's careful, so I'm sure his standard of evidence will be high. But expectations are high, and there's naturally a tendency to throw in everything you've got and ask hard questions later."

The competing views on what to declassify and how to build the case are being adjudicated by the National Security Council. The material is initially being reviewed by groups reporting to Stephen J. Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, but his boss, Condoleezza Rice, has also been deeply engaged. The final decisions, officials said, will probably be made by Mr. Bush and Mr. Powell himself, who, as one official said, "has to be comfortable with the material."

Mr. Powell was cautious today, acknowledging the tension over what he could release at the United Nations. "We will be as forthcoming as we can next week," he said, "but mindful of sources and methods." He told ZDF Television of Germany, a nation that has opposed military action of any kind, that the United States would "illustrate some of the things they have done to deceive the inspectors."

"We will also show information concerning the programs they have had over the years to develop chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons and why it is so important that the world must insist that Saddam Hussein disarm," he added.

Mr. Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld briefed some members of Congress today, and a few Democrats who emerged from the meeting said they were impressed with links that the two men had drawn between Mr. Hussein and Al Qaeda. Mr. Bush cited that threat in his State of the Union address on Tuesday night, but administration officials said today that most of the evidence had come from detainees who have been imprisoned for nearly a year.

Today, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain said intelligence gathered by his country showed links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. But British officials said he had based his comments largely on evidence that had been available for some time, and that Mr. Blair was careful not to overstate the connections.

Debate has enveloped even the seemingly easy decision to declassify satellite photographs showing that Iraq was moving machinery, rocket parts and other matériel away from areas that would be inspected.

A Pentagon official said the administration was torn over how to release classified imagery, for fear of what other countries might learn about United States technical capabilities. The official noted that trained imagery analysts could learn a lot from any photograph, including the location of the spy satellite and the time of day it flew over its target.

"When you let out this stuff, you give it up to China, Russia and other countries," the official said. "That's the sensitivity."

Even more sensitive is evidence gleaned from sources still in Iraq, who could be in grave danger if any their information was made public.

Another debate concerns how to deal with suspicions that the weapons inspection teams may have been penetrated by Iraqi spies.

Asked about the issue today, Mr. Rumsfeld said: "It's a dictatorial regime that attempts to assert control over everything. And there is every reason to know that the inspectors have a very difficult time arriving any place that it wasn't expected. They have a very difficult time talking to anybody that hasn't been programmed to talk to them.

How that happens, certainly one possibility is penetration."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/30/politics/30INTE.html>

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Washington Post

January 30, 2003

Pg. 14

## **Making The Case Against Baghdad**

### ***Officials: Evidence Strong, not Conclusive***

By Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writers

Senior White House officials are examining aerial photographs, communications intercepts, and reports from Iraqi informants and foreign governments that purportedly show Iraqi officials intimidating Iraqi scientists and hiding weapons equipment and documents from U.N. inspectors, Bush administration officials and congressional sources said yesterday.

The intelligence includes information on what U.S. authorities say are Iraq's efforts to hide weapons and documents from U.N. inspectors, its links to al Qaeda and its purchases of equipment that could be used to manufacture banned weapons, the officials said. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is to present the intelligence to the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday.

But the information, while constituting what officials described as a more graphic case against Iraq than presented by the administration to date, is still circumstantial, the officials said. It does not include new intelligence linking the Baghdad government to al Qaeda despite assertions by President Bush in his State of the Union address Tuesday and by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in London yesterday that the ties exist.

"There will be no single smoking gun," a senior intelligence official involved in the process said yesterday. "But it will include Iraq's concealment program of denial and deception, and what they are doing in the [chemical, nuclear and biological] weapons programs themselves."

Deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley is leading the White House effort to sift through the intelligence with the help of the CIA, and is trying to determine what can be released without damaging the agency's ability to gather similar information, according to several intelligence officials.

"They have reached no conclusions on exactly what will be said," an intelligence official said. "But a lot more is being done this week to get a decision on what's safe to reveal." Eventually, one official said, "the president will have to make the decision."

In his speech Tuesday night, Bush announced that Powell would present new evidence to the Security Council next week to help convince skeptical council members that Iraq is in violation of U.N. resolutions and that use of force may be warranted.

"The president showed very little leg," one senior intelligence official said, "but there are those now who are wanting to push disclosure up to the thigh" when Powell appears before the Security Council.

The administration is considering declassifying more information about Iraq's purchases and attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubing. U.S. intelligence officials believe the tubes could be used for producing weapons-grade nuclear material, but International Atomic Energy Agency analysts have determined the tubes were destined for artillery rockets.

A senior administration official said yesterday a case may be made that because the tube specifications, set by Iraq, are more precise than needed for a rocket, they could be destined for a centrifuge system associated with nuclear materials.

Almost all the new information about Iraq's alleged programs to build long-range missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons will show purchases of "essentially dual-use materials," a senior intelligence official said, meaning equipment and chemicals that can be used in the manufacture of either weapons or commercial goods.

"Not all of them can have peaceful uses. Any one of them can have a safe explanation, but not all of them. Through them, we will put together a mosaic that is convincing," the official said.

To support their position that the equipment is meant for prohibited weapons programs, the United States has intelligence showing that the items were often bought covertly, using false addresses and other deceptive documentation, officials said.

Powell's presentation to the Security Council will be a multimedia event, with photos, a slide show and charts, officials said. He is expected to elaborate on Bush's statement Tuesday that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from U.N. inspectors -- sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves."

Speaking to French television yesterday, Powell said he would bring intelligence -- "some of which has not been seen before" -- that will help bolster the case made to the Security Council on Monday by Hans Blix, the head of the U.N. inspections agency, "that Saddam Hussein is trying to deny the inspectors access to weapons of mass destruction capacity within Iraq."

Powell said he also would "be presenting information and intelligence that describes some of these programs and some of these weapons."

"There's a lot of evidence," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz told foreign journalists yesterday. Hussein has failed "to account for things we know about through a variety of sources. Some of these we probably will be able to talk about, but some of them come from people who've risked their lives to tell us."

Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, said he believed the administration's new case would be compelling but circumstantial -- "the transportation of 'X,' delivered to a shed where 'Y' is thought to be happening."

"There's a strong intelligence case that Iraq has not destroyed its weapons of mass destruction and is building the capability to use them," said Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), ranking member of the House intelligence committee.

"There's a growing al Qaeda presence in Iraq, and I think the case can be made that there is a growing affiliation" between Baghdad and terrorist groups.

Intelligence officials yesterday outlined their concerns that publication of materials could endanger technical collection efforts or reveal human intelligence sources or defectors who want their identities kept secret. In addition, information has come from foreign intelligence agencies that do not want their roles disclosed.

"There also are future defectors or potential foreign informants who may withhold their information if they see we on occasion disclose secret data," one senior intelligence official said.

Senior members of the National Security Council have for several months debated what intelligence would be provided Blix, what would be used for an eventual public presentation and what would be preserved to help the military target weapons sites should war begin.

Illustrating the problem was the recent discovery by U.N. inspectors, based on U.S. or British information, that Iraqis may have cleaned out a site the inspectors were about to visit. Describing that incident, a senior administration official said, "The minute you reveal the information, you risk making it untrue."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63538-2003Jan29.html>

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## **Bush to Seek Funds for Fighting 'Dirty Bombs'**

*By Joby Warrick*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, January 30, 2003; Page A11

President Bush will ask Congress next week for millions of additional dollars to prevent radiological "dirty bomb" attacks by terrorists, but his proposed budget would also freeze or cut several other key programs aimed at halting leaks of nuclear material and know-how from former Soviet republics, administration documents show.

Energy Department figures released yesterday call for a 30 percent jump in overall spending on initiatives for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- a threat that Bush described in Tuesday's State of the Union address as the "gravest danger facing America and the world."

Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, who described the highlights of the plan in a speech, said the proposed increase would be the biggest ever, "proof of this administration's understanding of the tremendous risks posed by proliferating nuclear weapons and materials."

But the proposal drew mixed reactions from nonproliferation groups and weapons experts, some of whom criticized Abraham's description of the spending package as misleading. Budget documents obtained by one group showed that most of the additional dollars -- 84 percent of the \$312 million increase -- are earmarked for a controversial domestic program, one that would convert surplus plutonium from U.S. nuclear weapons into commercial nuclear fuel.

Meanwhile, spending on several longstanding programs that improve security at former Soviet nuclear facilities would remain flat or would drop slightly, according to budget figures obtained by the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a research group with offices in Washington and Moscow.

"The major increase is to be spent in the United States, while key programs focused on Russian nuclear security have been cut below [fiscal 2003] levels or held to minimum growth," said RANSAC Director Kenneth Luongo, formerly the Energy Department's top nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration. "This is a shortsighted mistake," Luongo said.

Energy Department officials declined to comment on RANSAC's analysis and said the formal budget will be released on Monday.

Among the programs scheduled for funding cuts or freezes is the department's International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program, the primary initiative responsible for security upgrades for stockpiles of nuclear material in Russia and other former Soviet states, RANSAC said. A bipartisan panel two years ago ranked the safeguarding of Soviet-era nuclear weapons and fissile material as the nation's top security priority.

The nonproliferation experts praised other parts of the proposed budget, including plans to more than double the current \$16.3 million in spending on securing radiological material that could be used in making a "dirty bomb," a crude device that uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material.

Abraham also said that he will propose major funding increases for programs that purchase highly enriched Soviet uranium and that he plans to seek a 33 percent increase in support for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.-chartered nuclear watchdog.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63394-2003Jan29.html>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" follows article.)

Washington Times

January 31, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Bush approves nuclear response**

By Nicholas Kralev, The Washington Times

A classified document signed by President Bush specifically allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical attacks, apparently changing a decades-old U.S. policy of deliberate ambiguity, it was learned by The Washington Times.

"The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force — including potentially nuclear weapons — to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies," the document, National Security Presidential Directive 17, set out on Sept. 14 last year.

A similar statement is included in the public version of the directive, which was released Dec. 11 as the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and closely parallels the classified document. However, instead of the phrase "including potentially nuclear weapons," the public text says, "including through resort to all of our options."

A White House spokesman declined to comment when asked about the document last night and neither confirmed nor denied its existence.

A senior administration official said, however, that using the words "nuclear weapons" in the classified text gives the military and other officials, who are the document's intended audience, "a little more of an instruction to prepare all sorts of options for the president," if need be.

The official, nonetheless, insisted that ambiguity remains "the heart and soul of our nuclear policy."

In the classified version, nuclear forces are designated as the main part of any U.S. deterrent, and conventional capabilities "complement" the nuclear weapons.

"Nuclear forces alone ... cannot ensure deterrence against [weapons of mass destruction] and missiles," the original paragraph says. "Complementing nuclear force with an appropriate mix of conventional response and defense capabilities, coupled with effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction and domestic law-enforcement capabilities, reinforces our overall deterrent posture against [weapons of mass destruction] threats."

Before it released the text publicly, the White House changed that same paragraph to: "In addition to our conventional and nuclear response and defense capabilities, our overall deterrent posture against [weapons of mass destruction] threats is reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction and domestic law-enforcement capabilities."

The classified document, a copy of which was shown to The Washington Times, is known better by its abbreviation NSPD 17, as well as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4.

The disclosure of the classified text follows newspaper reports that the planning for a war with Iraq focuses on using nuclear arms not only to defend U.S. forces but also to "pre-empt" deeply buried Iraqi facilities that could withstand conventional explosives.

For decades, the U.S. government has maintained a deliberately vague nuclear policy, expressed in such language as "all options open" and "not ruling anything in or out." As recently as last weekend, Bush administration officials used similar statements in public, consciously avoiding the word "nuclear."

"I'm not going to put anything on the table or off the table," White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. said on NBC's "Meet the Press," adding that the United States will use "whatever means necessary" to protect its citizens and the world from a "holocaust."

But in the paragraphs marked "S" for "secret," the Sept. 14 directive clearly states that nuclear weapons are part of the "overwhelming force" that Washington might use in response to a chemical or biological attack.

Former U.S. officials and arms control experts with knowledge of policies of the previous administrations declined to say whether such specific language had been used before, for fear of divulging classified information. But they conceded that differences exist.

"This shows that there is a somewhat greater willingness in this administration to use a nuclear response to other [non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction] attacks, although that's not a wholesale departure from previous administrations," one former senior official said.

Even a slight change can make a big difference. Because it is now "official policy, it means that the United States will actively consider the nuclear option" in a military conflict, said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

"This document is far more explicit about the use of nuclear weapons to deter and possibly defeat biological and chemical attacks," he said. "If someone dismisses it, that would question the entire logic of the administration's national security strategy against [weapons of mass destruction]."

Mr. Kimball said U.S. nuclear weapons "should only be used to deter nuclear attacks by others."

A senior official who served in the Clinton administration said there would still have to be a new evaluation before any decision was made on the use of nuclear weapons.

"What this document means is that they have thought through the consequences, including in the abstract, but it doesn't necessarily prejudice any specific case."

Baker Spring, a national security fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said the classified language "does not undermine the basic posture of the deterrent and does not commit the United States to a nuclear response in hypothetical circumstances. In a classified document, you are willing to be more specific what the policy is, because people in the administration have to understand it for planning purposes."

Both former officials and arms control analysts say that making the classified text public might raise concerns among Washington's allies but has little military significance. On the other hand, they note, the nuclear deterrent has little value if a potential adversary does not know what it can expect.

They agree that there must have been "good reasons" for the White House to have "cleaned up" the document before releasing it. They speculated on at least three:

Although responding to a non-nuclear attack by nuclear weapons is not banned by international law, existing arms-control treaties call for a "proportionate response" to biological and chemical attacks. The question is, one former official said, whether any nuclear response is proportionate to any non-nuclear attack.

Second, naming nuclear weapons specifically flies in the face of the "negative security assurances" that U.S. administrations have given for 25 years. Those statements, while somewhat modified under different presidents, essentially have said the United States will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state unless that state attacks it together with a nuclear ally.

Finally, publicly and explicitly articulating a policy of nuclear response can hurt the international nonproliferation regime, which the United States firmly supports. That sets a bad example for countries such as India and Pakistan and gives rogue states an incentive to develop their own nuclear capabilities.

William M. Arkin, a military analyst, wrote in the Los Angeles Times earlier this week that the Bush administration's war planning "moves nuclear weapons out of their long-established special category and lumps them in with all the other military options."

Mr. Arkin quoted "multiple sources" close to the preparations for a war in Iraq as saying that the focus is on "two possible roles for nuclear weapons: attacking Iraqi facilities located so deep underground that they might be impervious to conventional explosives; and thwarting Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction."

He cited a Dec. 11 memorandum from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to Mr. Bush, asking for authority to place Adm. James O. Ellis Jr., chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, in charge of the full range of "strategic" warfare options.

NSPD 17 appears to have upgraded nuclear weapons beyond the traditional function as a nuclear deterrent.

"This is an interesting distinction," Mr. Spring said. "There is an acknowledgment up front that under the post-Cold War circumstances, deterrence in the sense we applied it during the Cold War is not as reliable. I think it's accurate." <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030131-27320419.htm>

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## **National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction**

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>

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New York Times

January 31, 2003

Pg. 1

## **Satellites Said To See Activity At North Korean Nuclear Site**

By David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 — American spy satellites over North Korea have detected what appear to be trucks moving the country's stockpile of 8,000 nuclear fuel rods out of storage, prompting fears within the Bush administration that North Korea is preparing to produce roughly a half dozen nuclear weapons, American officials said today.

Throughout January, intelligence analysts have seen extensive activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, with some trucks pulling up to the building housing the storage pond. While the satellites could not see exactly what was being put into the trucks, analysts concluded that it was likely that workers were transporting the rods to another site, either to get them out of sight, or to move them to a reprocessing plant to convert them into bomb-grade plutonium. The Bush administration has said nothing publicly about the truck activity, deflecting questions about the subject. American intelligence analysts have informally concluded that the movement of the rods, combined with other activity that now appears to be under way at the Yongbyon complex, could allow North Korea to begin producing bomb-grade plutonium by the end of March.

"There's still a debate about exactly what we are seeing and how provocative it is," said one senior official. "The North Koreans made no real effort to hide this from us."

The satellite photographs of the truck activity have been tightly held by the administration, and not yet shared widely with allies. The administration's lack of public expressions of alarm contrasts sharply with its approach to

Iraq, which the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, noted today was years behind North Korea in nuclear ability.

Some administration officials have said they want to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere with North Korea — they believe its leader, Kim Jong Il, is hoping to set off a crisis to extract concessions from Washington — while others say President Bush does not want to distract international attention from Iraq.

But a former nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration, Robert J. Einhorn, said tonight that by moving toward production of actual weapons, "the North Koreans may be taking a fateful step."

The spent fuel rods have been in secure storage since 1994, under a nuclear freeze agreement struck with the United States that year. But after American officials confronted Mr. Kim's government last October with evidence that it was violating the agreement by pursuing a new, clandestine nuclear program, North Korea renounced the 1994 agreement. It threw out international inspectors on New Year's Eve, and now appears to be moving the rods. Despite the uncertainty, there is a growing consensus in the administration that North Korea is working to produce bombs as quickly as it can, perhaps hoping this will give it more negotiating leverage once Iraq is out of the spotlight.

The satellite evidence may present the Bush administration with an excruciating military choice. Pentagon officials say the North Korean program could be set back for years with a precision strike on the reprocessing plant. The plant is above ground and away from population centers. Such a strike is part of the Pentagon's contingency plan for an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. The Clinton administration developed plans for a strike against the complex in case diplomacy failed in the 1994 nuclear crisis.

But such a strike would be enormously risky. American officials and their allies fear that North Korea would retaliate against South Korea or Tokyo, an attack that could result in tremendous casualties.

Mr. Bush has pledged in recent weeks that "we have no intention of invading North Korea." But the word "invading" appears, to some Korea experts, to have been carefully chosen, so that Mr. Bush was not taking off the table the threat of a strike on the plant.

On the other hand, administration officials have said such a strike may not accomplish much, because North Korea has now admitted to a second nuclear program, involving enriched uranium. "We don't know where that program is," said one senior official. "So if you hit the plutonium plant, they would just speed up on the uranium program." Several American officials said today that there were no indications that the Pentagon was preparing for a pre-emptive strike against the plant, emphasizing that Mr. Bush was still focused on reaching a diplomatic resolution to the crisis.

Nonetheless, military and Pentagon officials say Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is immersed in the crisis, even as he oversees the troop buildup in the Persian Gulf.

Within the last week, Mr. Rumsfeld has taken part in several videoconferences with commanders in the Pacific, including Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, the commander of American forces in South Korea. Mr. Rumsfeld is meeting with General LaPorte this week, while the general is in Washington for a conference.

Mr. Rumsfeld has pressed his top military advisers not only on the options for using force pre-emptively against North Korea, but also on how to ensure that as the United States prepares for a possible war with Iraq, American forces are positioned to deter and, if needed, wage a second conflict on the Korean Peninsula, officials said.

Despite American pledges to use diplomacy, North Korea is interpreting American behavior as threatening.

Responding today to the State of the Union address, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement, "This policy speech is, in essence, an undisguised declaration of aggression" against North Korea. The statement referred to Mr. Bush as a "shameless charlatan."

Ever since North Korea ejected the international inspectors and stripped seals and cameras away from its nuclear facilities, American intelligence officials have been searching for signs that the country was preparing to reprocess the fuel rods. North Korea is believed to have produced enough plutonium to make about two nuclear weapons prior to 1994; the current stockpile is enough for five or six more, though it is unclear whether Mr. Kim's scientists have the ability to detonate them.

It is unclear whether American intelligence officials will know for certain if North Korea begins reprocessing spent fuel rods. One defense official said that in addition to the truck traffic, the United States has also detected activity "you'd associate with an active weapons facility." The official declined to elaborate.

"They're making the motions to get restarted," the official said. "We're talking about late winter when the reprocessing center could be in operation." Officials say that if the reprocessing goes smoothly, North Korea could produce about one bomb's worth of plutonium a month.

Some in the Bush administration believe that North Korea could simply be conducting the nuclear activity as part of an elaborate bluff, hoping it will bring the Bush administration to the negotiating table.



But that strategy could backfire. "The North Koreans have to recognize what kind of signals they are sending here," Mr. Einhorn said. "Consciously or not, they are sending the signal that they are determined to acquire a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons. If they do that too strongly, there will be little incentive for the U.S. to do anything but isolate them."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/international/asia/31KORE.html>

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New York Times

January 31, 2003

Pg. 1

## **U.S. May Give The U.N. Data On Iraqi Labs**

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 — In his presentation to the United Nations next week on Iraq's concealment of weapons, administration officials indicate, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell will provide three major categories of intelligence: on Iraq's mobile biological weapons labs; on its purchase of materials for making chemical, biological and nuclear arms; and on its ties to terrorist groups.

In addition, two senior State Department officials told senators today that there was "clear evidence" that Iraq is hiding biological and chemical weapons, harassing weapons inspectors and harboring members of Al Qaeda.

One of the officials, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, said Mr. Powell was working "feverishly" to have photographs, communications interceptions and other intelligence relating to Iraq's weapons programs and ties to Al Qaeda declassified to make the administration's case more powerful. In particular, Mr. Powell is hoping to present convincing intelligence — possibly satellite photos — that Iraq has been hiding mobile biological weapons labs, Mr. Armitage told the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Powell "is going to be showing some new intelligence and some new information," Mr. Armitage said, adding, "No one will be able to evade the absolute conclusion about Saddam Hussein's denial, deception, his absolute lack of willingness to show any sign of a disarmament motive in his mind."

Other administration officials said that Mr. Powell would probably present intelligence, much of it gathered from detainees held at the Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, indicating that Qaeda members had sought training in chemical weapons in Iraq. Some intelligence officials have said they have been unable to corroborate the detainees' reports. In a remarkably candid moment, Mr. Armitage, a blunt-spoken former Navy officer, also acknowledged that the administration had on occasion tried to build its case against Iraq on ambiguous intelligence, and he pledged that Mr. Powell would bring only the most compelling, clear-cut data available to the United Nations.

As an example of such ambiguous information, Democrats today cited the administration's assertion, repeated by President Bush in his State of the Union address, that Iraq had bought aluminum tubes to restart its nuclear weapons program. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, has said the tubes can just as easily be used to build nonnuclear rockets.

"Clearly, there's a difference of opinion in the intelligence community" on the purpose of the tubes, Mr. Armitage said in response to questions raised by Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the committee's ranking Democrat. "Perhaps we miscalculated," he said. "I take your comments as a sign to, as we used to say in the Navy, 'Keep it simple, sailor,' go with your strong points."

Administration officials have been trying to keep expectations about Mr. Powell's presentation next week from rising too high. While they say the presentation will be compelling, they have also said it will not contain any intelligence as definite as the dramatic satellite photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba that Adlai E. Stevenson presented to the United Nations in 1962.

Instead, officials said today, the intelligence, some of it clearly incriminating, some more circumstantial, will represent the administration's attempt to "fill in the blanks" in the recent report to the United Nations by Hans Blix, the chief inspector for chemical and biological weapons.

A debate has persisted inside the administration over how much intelligence should be declassified for Mr. Powell's presentation. The information includes intercepted telephone conversations between Iraqi officials, photographs and accounts of defectors and detainees.

Administration officials have expressed concern not only that some of the intelligence is subject to varying, even contradictory, interpretations, but also that revealing it might compromise sources or help other countries learn about

American spy satellites. Some officials also worry that if Mr. Powell discloses precisely what the United States knows about Iraqi missiles, the Iraqis will move them before the United States can destroy them in a war. Previewing what Mr. Powell may present on Iraq's concealment efforts, Mr. Armitage told the committee that the administration had strong intelligence that Iraq maintains mobile labs for producing biological toxins, though it remains highly classified. "I'd be delighted if they were in the desert," Mr. Armitage said, asserting that there, they could be easily spotted and destroyed. "We believe they are hidden in one of these many tunnels or underground facilities, or garages."

In the second category, Iraq's weapons purchases, Mr. Powell will focus on a pattern of buying materials that could be used for manufacturing biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, the officials said. The aluminum tubes fit into this pattern, they added, because even if not intended for a nuclear program, they could be used for building long-range rockets — also a prohibited activity.

During the hearing John D. Negroponte, the American ambassador to the United Nations, raised particular concerns about Iraq's acquisition of 380 rocket engines, which had been imported in violation of United Nations sanctions. "Iraq has casting chambers for solid-fuel missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers and has imported other equipment, including 380 rocket engines," Mr. Negroponte told the senators. "We definitely believe that they are intended for prohibited purposes."

Mr. Powell will also present new information linking Al Qaeda to Mr. Hussein's government, the officials said. This third area could be the most contentious part of the administration's case. Many European diplomats have said that convincing data tying Mr. Hussein to Al Qaeda would make it easier for their governments to support a war. But they have also expressed strong skepticism that such evidence exists.

Today, Mr. Armitage told the senators, "It's clear that Al Qaeda is harbored, to some extent, in Iraq — that there is a presence in Iraq."

One indication of that, he said, was the recent presence in Baghdad of a leading Qaeda chemical weapons expert, Abbu Mussab al-Zarqawi. Some intelligence officials think Mr. Zarqawi masterminded the October assassination of Laurence Foley, an American diplomat in Jordan.

Mr. Armitage also said Mr. Powell would probably present intelligence tying Al Qaeda to Ansar al-Islam, a radical Islamic group that operates in northern Iraq. Kurdish groups allied with the United States have said that 60 to 200 Qaeda soldiers recently trained in Ansar camps in northern Iraq.

But some officials have said many of those soldiers may have already fled the region. Many American intelligence officials contend there is little if any intelligence indicating a clear connection between Mr. Hussein and Ansar.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/international/middleeast/31INTE.html>

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Wall Street Journal  
January 31, 2003  
Pg. 1

## **Army Places Gigantic Wager On Revamped Patriot Missile** ***Overhauled Missile Shield Would Get First Battle Test Against Iraqi Scuds***

By Anne Marie Squeo, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

As the U.S. edges toward another war with Saddam Hussein, the Patriot missile is back -- with a \$3 billion makeover and more than ever riding on its success.

For many Americans, the bright green explosions of Iraqi Scud missiles and Patriot interceptors provided the most memorable images of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Washington seized on the Patriots as a symbol of how its technical prowess was key to winning modern wars. A Patriot missile launcher even accompanied the victorious troops in a Manhattan ticker-tape parade.

But a decade later, Defense Secretary William Cohen said just before leaving office that the Patriot "didn't work." While Army officials insisted the Patriot had a strong success rate, Mr. Cohen bolstered the claims of skeptical scientists who had analyzed videotapes of the missile's wartime performance. The stunning TV images for the most part showed Patriots and erratic, often-malfunctioning Scuds exploding independently of one another.

Now the U.S. is deploying a revamped version of the Patriot as its front-line missile-defense system to protect U.S. troops and states neighboring Iraq. The latest Patriot, the Army says, is a big improvement over the old model, which knocked down missiles by exploding in their flight path. The new version destroys enemy missiles by slamming into them, a method known as "hit to kill."

Army and industry officials say the force of the collision, which the original Patriots couldn't deliver, allows the new models to dissipate chemical or biological warheads on impact. And since the Patriots can fly higher, and strike incoming missiles higher in their arc of descent, the poisons can be destroyed far above populated areas.

Much more depends on the new Patriot than the defeat of Mr. Hussein. A war against Iraq would mark the first combat test of the hit-to-kill technology, which is the basis of the missile-defense systems President Bush wants to field at home and abroad. The U.S. has tested hit-to-kill systems -- the equivalent of hitting a bullet with another bullet -- for decades, at the cost of tens of billions of dollars. Although the technology has made considerable progress, the U.S. still hasn't come up with a system that consistently does the job. President Bush has ordered the first stage of a missile-defense shield for the continental U.S. to be in place by the end of next year, though key elements, such as its rocket and missile-detection satellites, are years behind schedule.

If the new Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile (PAC-3) succeeds, it could help vindicate the Bush administration's vision of a sprawling missile-defense system. If it fails, it could provide fuel to critics who have long derided such systems as a costly pipe dream.

"There's definitely a feeling out there that this has to be perfect," says Lt. Col. Rob Jassey, who oversees the Patriot system as well as other missile-defense programs for the Army. "But those who know and build these weapons and those of us who fight with them know there's nothing we can build that's going to be perfect."

### **Against the Scuds**

The PAC-3s have performed ably in controlled tests against missiles and target aircraft but didn't do as well when operated by real soldiers in field tests. Moreover, the missiles haven't yet been tested against the Scuds that often outfoxed their predecessors and which make up the vast majority of Saddam Hussein's ground-attack arsenal. The U.S. did launch two Scuds in November to observe their performance but didn't attempt an intercept. A spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency says those tests were "data collection exercises" by the U.S. and Israel. Intercept tests on Scuds, the spokesman says, are being planned for White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

Despite the lack of a Scud test to date, Loren Thompson, executive director of the Lexington Institute, a Washington military think tank, says that the PAC-3's largely positive test record "is very rare" for a new missile.

In a possible war with Iraq, the U.S. could field as many as 10 Patriot battalions in Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other countries, each made up of five batteries. A battery is essentially a full Patriot system that includes radar, command center and eight individual launchers, each mounted on the back of heavy trucks. Each launcher can hold four Gulf War-era Patriots or 16 PAC-3s. The PAC-3s currently cost about \$2.7 million each, though the cost is expected to be between \$1 million and \$2 million once full production begins.

By contrast, the Scud, based on a 1960s-era Soviet design, is about as cheap as a missile comes nowadays. Called the "poor man's air force" by Army officials, Scuds tend to fly in erratic patterns, making them tough to track, let alone intercept. During the Gulf War, the U.S. was surprised by a version of the Scud dubbed the "Al Hussein," which was jury-rigged by the Iraqis to fly farther and faster.

As a result of the tinkering, it often broke up before mid-flight, but remained lethal nonetheless. Although Scuds directly killed only one Israeli during Mr. Hussein's bombardment, one of the missiles killed 28 American servicemen and wounded dozens more during the war when it hit a U.S. Army barracks in Dhamran, Saudi Arabia. Military planners fear that Mr. Hussein could top his missiles with warheads loaded with chemical or biological weapons, aiming them at American troops or population centers such as Tel Aviv or Kuwait City. Stopping such weapons requires that the Patriot hit the Scud before it begins breaking apart and sends smaller, poison-bearing munitions to the ground. "Little bomblets are pretty tough," says Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester from 1994 to 2001. "They can still fall on populated areas even though the rocket has been disabled."

Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, last October said he was "ready to declare [the PAC-3] useful as a military system" and accelerated its production rate to four missiles a month from two. Michael Trotsky, vice president of air-defense programs at Lockheed Martin Corp., which makes the PAC-3, says the new missile will allow the Patriot to hit Scuds more quickly after they are launched and at more than twice the altitude of its predecessor, significantly lessening the risk to people below.

Israel, which relied on the Patriot during the Gulf War, isn't taking any chances. With U.S. funding and technical backing, Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd., a government-owned company, has designed its own missile-defense system, which is intended to intercept enemy missiles at an even higher altitude than the PAC-3. The \$2 billion system, known as "Arrow," has been fielded at Palmachim Air Force Base near Tel Aviv and near the city of Hadera. But it too remains untested in battle or against the Scud.

Military planners say the best hope for containing the Scuds is to stop them before they take off. The U.S. intends to bomb them on their launch pads from the air or use ground troops to find and destroy them, as has been done in the past. Such an approach, says Mr. Coyle, is critical. "From everything I know, Patriot didn't work in the last Gulf

War, and we shouldn't expect it to work much better than 25% [of the time] if we go to war with Iraq" based on operational testing results, the former chief Pentagon weapons inspector says. "But it is better than nothing."

### **The Fog of War**

War is usually the ultimate proving ground for new weapons, forcing the military and defense contractors to make changes on the fly to address unexpected flaws or to adapt to battle conditions. That's been the case with the Patriots all along. The original system, first deployed in West Germany in 1985, was designed to shoot down Soviet bombers. It was never used in combat.

Back then, a less cost-conscious Pentagon did more flight testing and did so mainly in secret to avoid tipping off the Soviets or inviting public criticism. That began to change after the Cold War's end in 1989. Military contractors routinely provide financial and performance details of their more costly wares to investors, and the Pentagon frequently releases some test results on high-profile systems like the Patriot, making them far more available for critical scrutiny.

"In the old days, money was a little easier to come by, and we used to test a lot of missiles until we got it right," recalls Stephen Peth, head of business development for missile-defense programs for Raytheon Co., which developed the original Patriot system and is integrating the PAC-3 into its modernized batteries. The original Patriot, for instance, went through about 60 tests before being fielded in Germany, but those cost much less to conduct than current ones.

And it's been in a near-perpetual state of change ever since. Shortly after the first Patriot went to Europe, the U.S. observed that the Soviet SS-21 short-range missiles were getting a lot more accurate. So the Patriot of the time was upgraded to expand the area it could protect. Like its predecessor, the PAC-2 was designed to explode in front of an incoming threat, but it packed a lot more punch, releasing one-inch cubes of steel that are the equivalent of "slamming a car into a brick wall while going at a high rate of speed," Mr. Peth says.

During the Gulf War, the Patriot's software system went through a half-dozen upgrades. Technicians boosted the altitude where intercepts would occur and loaded more data into the Patriot's memory to help it better distinguish a Scud warhead. Engineers manned round-the-clock war rooms at Raytheon's Patriot facility in Bedford, Mass., and at the Army's missile headquarters in Huntsville, Ala. As problems emerged on the battlefield, Raytheon staffers were often dispatched with a day's notice to hand-deliver computer disks wrapped in brown paper to the launcher sites on the front lines.

### **The Good Fight**

After the Gulf War, criticism of the missile began to mount. Scientists and Clinton administration officials contended that the system didn't knock a single Scud out of the sky.

Congress's research arm, the General Accounting Office, at one point suggested the Patriot's overall success rate was closer to 9%. Meanwhile, some scientists in the U.S. and Israel did a frame-by-frame study of TV footage and videotapes of Patriot control-panel displays that the Israeli government had made. The scientists' conclusion? The system didn't work. Gen. Kadish of the Missile Defense Agency told a Senate subcommittee last December that the Patriot's performance in Desert Storm "was not impressive."

Raytheon and Army officials defend the system's performance during the Gulf War, and maintain that the Patriot's success rate was 70% in Saudi Arabia and 40% in Israel. The discrepancies have been nearly impossible to reconcile, say military analysts, because of inconsistent record keeping by the Army and the lack of an internal data recorder on the missile systems that would collect performance information automatically.

Since then, the Army has upgraded the system four times. It has added a link to the Global Positioning System, the satellite system that helps commercial airlines and guided missiles locate targets with pinpoint accuracy. It also greatly expanded the interceptor's range, both in distance and altitude.

In 1994, Lockheed beat Raytheon in a heated competition to build the next-generation Patriot. While the hit-to-kill missile did well in early tests, which tend to be simpler, more recent tests by servicemen in the field have produced less-stellar results. In one test, the PAC-3 hit its target but failed to destroy it. And in several tests where multiple missiles were launched, at least one PAC-3 didn't make it out of the launcher.

"We did have some anomalies in the system about six or eight months ago when soldiers used the system," says Lockheed's Mr. Trotsky. "But most weren't missile-related and all have been addressed." The Army has ordered additional tests to confirm that the glitches are under control even as it dispatches the PAC-3 to the Middle East. The first PAC-3s were delivered to the Army in September 2001, and the service currently has 53 missiles, with four more arriving each month. Lockheed this month received a \$341 million contract to provide 88 more. The Army expects to have 346 by 2005. The newer missiles will be used alongside the older ones, military officials say.

The new Patriot system has improvements beyond the missile. Raytheon has doubled the power of the radar and updated the control computers and communications system. Fewer than half of the 50 or so Patriot systems have been upgraded at this point, and most if not all of them will be in the region in time for a fight that could start within

weeks. Pledges Lt. Col. Jassey: "We're putting our best foot forward, and it'll be a tremendous improvement over what we had in Desert Storm."

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## **BBC Says Al Qaeda Produced a 'Dirty Bomb' in Afghanistan**

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

LONDON, Jan. 30 — British officials believe that Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, successfully built a crude radiological device known as a "dirty bomb" in Afghanistan, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported today.

British intelligence agents found documents that showed Qaeda members had built a small device near Herat in western Afghanistan, the BBC said, citing unidentified British government officials.

The Foreign Office said the report substantiated expert opinion that Al Qaeda wanted to develop a nuclear weapon. "The evidence presented in the BBC report speaks for itself," a spokesman said. "It provides proof to substantiate expert opinion that Al Qaeda was interested in developing nuclear weapons."

In Washington, an American official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that Mr. bin Laden was no doubt interested in acquiring a "dirty bomb" — a conventional bomb capable of spreading radiation.

But the official said, "We have no evidence to substantiate that he's built such a device."

The British intelligence agents did not find the device itself and it has not since been recovered, BBC reported. But scientists at the British government's weapons research facility in Porton Down concluded that Al Qaeda had succeeded in constructing a small "dirty bomb" in Herat, based on documents and material uncovered by the British military and intelligence, the BBC said.

The scientists did not believe that Al Qaeda had been able to develop a full-blown nuclear device, it said. The report did not say when the device was thought to have been developed or how much radiation it could spread.

British officials showed some of the documents — including diagrams — to the BBC, the report said. As part of the operation, British agents infiltrated Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, posed as recruits and reported back, the BBC said.

The British officials told the BBC that Afghanistan's Taliban government helped Al Qaeda construct the device by providing medical isotopes.

Computers found by journalists and American troops at a variety of facilities in Afghanistan indicated Al Qaeda had tried to obtain and develop nuclear and other weapons.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/international/asia/31BOMB.html>

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USA Today  
January 31, 2003  
Pg. 4

## **U.S. Helps Ex-Soviet States Scrap Weapons**

By Peter Eisler, USA Today

OZERNOYE, Ukraine — In a world where it's getting harder and harder to distinguish U.S. friends from U.S. foes, the decaying, Soviet-era air base in this small city is caught in the middle.

U.S. and Ukrainian generals gathered here on a cold, snowy day in November to begin destroying 225 Soviet-made Kh-22 missiles. The missiles were built to carry nuclear, biological or chemical warheads to American and European cities. Now, they are being chopped up under a U.S.-funded "cooperative threat reduction" program that pays to secure and eliminate Soviet weapons of mass destruction.

The dissection of the first Kh-22 was cause for celebration: the generals drank vodka shots, toasting the project as a symbol of the post-Cold War friendship between Ukraine and the United States.

On that very day in Kiev, the capital, U.S. and Ukrainian officials squared off over charges that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma approved the sale of two sophisticated aircraft-tracking systems to Iraq. The portable systems can detect U.S. bombers and fighters, including stealth aircraft, without alerting the pilots that they've been spotted. The allegations were cause for concern: U.S. officials declared a "crisis in confidence" with Ukraine's government and suspended \$54 million in aid.

But the money for weapons destruction continues to flow.

The contradictory U.S. relationship with Ukraine typifies the diplomatic struggles Washington faces trying to secure and destroy the vast stocks of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons inherited by former Soviet states. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, that mission has become more urgent as concern builds that rogue states and terrorists could steal or buy some of those weapons.

In many respects, the U.S. threat reduction programs can claim great returns on the \$4 billion parceled out since their inception a decade ago. They've destroyed the world's largest anthrax production plant in Kazakhstan; they've helped to cleanse Belarus and other former Soviet states of thousands of nuclear warheads; they've upgraded security at Russian chemical weapons sites.

At the same time, the programs have forced U.S. officials to deal with nations and politicians notorious for everything from human rights abuses to arms trafficking.

Ukraine is typical.

"It's difficult to have a crystal-clear long-term strategy for dealing with a country like Ukraine," says a senior Western diplomat in Kiev. "Their non-proliferation record in general is pretty good. ... But you've got a head of state proactively approving a transfer of arms to Iraq. You can't just put that information in a box on a shelf and walk away. It has to have a major effect in the way we deal with him. So how do you also continue supporting other elements of society that you want to move forward and thrive?"

#### **A nuclear state, briefly**

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine emerged as the world's third largest nuclear power, trailing the United States and Russia. Perched on the European edge of the Soviet empire, Ukraine a decade ago was home to 1,900 nuclear warheads — enough to destroy every major city in the world. It also had scores of bombers and hundreds of missiles to deliver those warheads to Europe and America.

And it had no cash to maintain or secure that arsenal.

Since the early '90s, U.S. assistance programs have helped Ukraine eliminate virtually all of its weapons of mass destruction. Every warhead has been returned to Russia to be dismantled at facilities with U.S.-financed security upgrades. Dozens of medium- and long-range nuclear bombers have been torn up. More than 200 inter-continental ballistic missiles and silos have been destroyed.

Now the medium-range Kh-22 air-to-surface missiles and the Tu-22 bombers that carry them are the last items on the to-go list, slated for elimination by July 2004.

For all the disarmament work in Ukraine, the United States has spent about \$700 million — less than the cost of one B-2 bomber.

"It is only logical for the U.S. to render this assistance instead of giving the chance for these weapons to find their way into the hands of rogue states," Lt. Gen. Leonid Fursa, deputy chief of the Ukrainian air force, says in an interview. "We have too many weapons, and we don't have the money to eliminate them. The assistance is in everybody's best interests."

The logistical challenges of the weapons destruction programs are enormous. It took two years to prepare for the destruction of the missiles at Ozernoye: Facilities had to be built to extract the rocket fuel and crush key components; protocols had to be developed for destroying the missiles in ways that would forever prevent reuse; and the missiles themselves had to be moved to the base in highly secured transports from sites across a country as big as Texas.

Fursa, who once commanded a Soviet air regiment in East Germany, says the work has wiped out the Cold War distrust between him and his U.S. counterparts. "In those days, we saw Americans through the crosshairs," he says. "Now, we have a very human relationship."

The U.S. and Ukrainian generals are all smiles as they stroll into a metal-sided building to watch the first Kh-22 engine cone get flattened in a specially made industrial vice. They don safety glasses as workers in coveralls descend on the 38-foot missile body with big circular saws, throwing trails of sparks as they slice off the nose and tail sections along pre-drawn lines. They pose for photos at each step in the hour-long process.

But beyond the cheery camaraderie between the generals gathered at Ozernoye, the relationship between Ukraine and the United States is on the rocks.

#### **Charges of arms dealing**

The story surrounding the alleged sale of the Kolchuga aircraft tracking system is part spy novel.

It began in July 2000, when a military bodyguard to Kuchma secretly taped a conversation in which the Ukrainian president seemed to approve the sale of a Kolchuga system to Iraq for \$100 million. Ukraine's parliament, news and prosecutors battled over the tape's legitimacy and implications. The bodyguard said he feared for his life and fled to the United States. A copy of the tape ended up with the FBI.

After U.S. experts authenticated the recording last summer, U.S. and British investigators flew to Kiev to seek proof that Kolchugas reached Iraq. Their conclusion: inconclusive. The investigators found no proof that any systems were delivered, either directly or through other countries that purchased the devices, such as China. But the team also ruled that Ukraine had failed to document its claim that the Iraq sale was blocked.

"They want us to prove that something didn't happen. How do you do that?" says H.E. Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, Ukraine's ambassador to the United States. He says Ukraine has offered "unprecedented cooperation" in the Kolchuga investigation. "Non-proliferation is our concern, too. We have a range of export controls that look at sales of weapons, of dual-use items, anything that falls under any of the non-proliferation regimes."

But U.S. officials remain unconvinced, and there's been no effort to release the \$54 million in aid that was suspended last fall. That money represents 20% of annual U.S. assistance to Ukraine. Most of the aid goes directly to the central government. Much of the frozen money was to boost safety at nuclear power plants.

The Kolchuga case caps years of suspicions about Ukraine supplying arms to Iraq and other nations of concern to U.S. officials.

United Nations weapons inspectors pegged Ukraine as an Iraqi weapons source in the mid-1990s. They found records indicating that Iraq was contracting to buy missile guidance systems and other parts from Ukrainian firms in violation of the U.N. ban on arms sales to Saddam Hussein's regime. Some inspectors also said Ukrainian firms were interested in supplying Iraq with equipment that could be used in building nuclear weapons.

Gary Milhollin, head of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, says Iraq turns to Ukraine and other former Soviet states because "these countries are having problems shifting from an authoritarian economy to a more liberal economy, and they don't have great controls over their technology."

Inspections in Iraq yielded "documentation of negotiations or contracts" with weapons companies in Ukraine, Romania, Belarus and Russia, Milhollin says. "But what you often don't get is evidence that items were actually shipped. You have to find the equipment in Iraq, and that's not always possible."

Iraq isn't alone on the list of countries that are suspected of shopping for arms in Ukraine.

Ukraine also has been implicated in sending small arms to Liberia, Sierra Leone and other war-torn African countries. Similarly, there were charges that Ukraine was involved in shipping arms to warring factions in the Balkans.

### **U.S. policy called inconsistent**

Ukrainian officials say arms sales are important to the country's economic survival. Ukraine was a key cog in the Soviet military production machine and built a reputation for high-tech work on everything from missile guidance systems and nuclear reactors to conventional weapons and aircraft.

Now, officials in the cash-strapped country aren't shy about trying to sell armsmaking expertise or remaining stocks of conventional weaponry. But they insist that they stay within the law and that their weapons deals are no more suspect than those of the United States or Russia and the other former Soviet states.

Mikhaylo Pogrebinsky, a Ukrainian political analyst and Kuchma associate, says U.S. officials single out the country unfairly. When Russia runs afoul of U.S. foreign policy objectives, he says, it gets a rhetorical slap on the wrist.

"The U.S. pays special attention to Ukraine because we have a high level of military and technical expertise, but we have a lower level in political culture," he says. "They need Russia to help them solve their international problems; they don't need Ukraine."

Also, Pogrebinsky says, Ukraine is easier to bully because it's desperate for acceptance into NATO and the European Union.

Ukraine's defenders say the clearest proof of a double standard lies in Russia's construction of a nuclear reactor for Iran. Russia has contracted to build and fuel the Bushehr reactor despite U.S. objections. Officials in Washington say the reactor can be used to make nuclear weapons. Iran says it's necessary for electric power.

Under U.S. pressure, Ukraine gave up a lucrative subcontract to build turbines for the Bushehr reactor. But the Russians have refused to abandon the project — and they've suffered no tit-for-tat reduction in U.S. financial aid. Ukraine has "lost thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars as a result of our decision to abandon this project," says Gryshchenko, the Ukrainian ambassador. "The impression is that the U.S. non-proliferation policy is very inconsistent, that it focuses on immediate goals without any consistent, long-term commitment."

U.S. officials acknowledge that Ukraine made a major sacrifice in walking away from the Bushehr project. They also concede that Russia's importance as an ally in the war on terrorism has made it difficult to get really tough with Moscow on the Iran reactor.

But U.S. officials say they've given Ukraine plenty of credit for its good moves — to the point of staying quiet on occasions when the country's arms deals have run afoul of U.S. interests. The Kolchuga case, they say, was too egregious.

"What if a U.S. pilot was shot down in Iraq with the help of one of those systems?" U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual says in an interview. The Bush administration had no desire to confront Ukraine, he adds, but it felt compelled to respond aggressively.

"The timing couldn't possibly be worse," Pascual says. The dust-up is a distraction in building a coalition against Iraq, he adds, and it puts the United States on rough ground with a country that has the potential to be a key ally.

"It's almost easier to predict where this country will be in 25 years than in three years," Pascual says. That, he adds, is precisely why the United States must keep supporting Ukraine's efforts to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction. "It's the best security money we've ever spent."

*Portions of this story were reported in a joint project with Channel One News, a television news network for middle and high school students.*

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030131/4828245s.htm>

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San Diego Union-Tribune

January 30, 2003

## **Charge Filed In Anthrax Case**

### ***Marine who refused the vaccination could face prison time***

By Jeanette Steele, Staff Writer

CAMP PENDLETON – Cpl. Anthony Fusco has become the first San Diego County-based Marine to face court-martial for refusing the anthrax vaccination since the military resumed the controversial program last fall.

Fusco, a switchboard operator, said he believes the vaccine isn't safe, based on his Internet research.

"They haven't really done any studies on long-term side effects," Fusco, 22, said in an interview. "I believe it's your own body. It's your own right to put something in your body."

Fusco, a Santa Clarita native, was charged this month with disobeying a lawful order and probably will go to a special court-martial in February, he said. If convicted, his maximum sentence would be a year in military prison and a bad-conduct discharge.

Fusco is the only member of the 45,000-person 1st Marine Expeditionary Force charged with refusing since the vaccinations resumed, said 1st Lt. Dan Rawson, a Camp Pendleton spokesman.

For the military community, it is an old debate coming to the forefront again.

Fusco is accused of the same offense that at least 37 service members were convicted of when they refused inoculations in the late 1990s. The Pentagon largely suspended its anthrax vaccination program in 2001 because of low supply from troubled manufacturer BioPort Corp. of Michigan.

With a potential war against Iraq, the Marines in September began inoculating troops bound for the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

All members of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton and Miramar Marine Corps Air Station are expected to get the shot if they might deploy.

The anthrax bacterium can be deadly, especially when inhaled. Spores enter the lungs and migrate to lymph nodes, where they produce lethal toxins that destroy vital organs. Five Americans died in late 2001 when anthrax-laced letters circulated through the postal system.

Rawson said the Marine Corps has tried to educate troops about the safety of the vaccine – the same version given to service members in the late 1990s.

"Whenever a Marine thinks about refusing the anthrax vaccine, that refusal is thought to be a misunderstanding of the purpose and efficacy of the vaccination," he said.

"The Marine is given multiple opportunities to sit down one on one with a number of individuals in the chain of command and learn and have his questions answered. If that fails, charges can be brought."

Fusco said he fears the vaccine might cause autoimmune diseases and birth defects when he and his wife decide to have children.



He studied a Web site called [www.majorbates.com](http://www.majorbates.com), which is a collection of articles and documents about the vaccine. The site is run by retired Air Force reservist Lt. Col. John Richardson, who launched it in 2000 after fruitless attempts to get the military to change its mandatory vaccine policy.

Richardson disputes the military's claims of the vaccine's safety.

"Objective information makes me believe it's not safe," he said yesterday. "I've talked to victims."

Fusco, who joined the Marine Corps in 1999 during the height of the earlier courts-martial, said he had never heard of the controversy until he was offered the shot, if he wanted it, while stationed in Japan later that year. He declined. In December, he was ordered to be inoculated when his 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit was scheduled for a six-month deployment to the Persian Gulf in June. He refused.

Fusco said he was removed from his unit and initially was offered nonjudicial punishment, which he intended to accept to avoid a negative discharge. With hopes of becoming a police officer, he worries that a bad-conduct discharge could hurt his chances.

Then his superiors told him the deal was off, Fusco said. Now he has been told he faces a special court-martial, the second-highest kind of military trial.

Fusco said he still hopes for a less-severe general discharge. But if he doesn't get it, he won't be sorry.

"Even if it's hard for me, I'll do my own business or something," Fusco said. "I'll make it."

"I still don't hate the Marine Corps. I just think what they are doing is very wrong."

[http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20030130-9999\\_1mc30anthrax.html](http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20030130-9999_1mc30anthrax.html)

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## Trinidadian Islamic group threatens to use chemical and biological weapons

*By Andrew Gumbel in Los Angeles*

30 January 2003

An unexpected new front in the "war on terrorism" has opened this week in Trinidad after an announcement by a local Islamic group that it is manufacturing chemical and biological weapons and might use them against British and American targets on the island.

The announcement, made through two reporters for Trinidad's leading newspaper, who were blindfolded and taken to a plausibly alarming secret chemical laboratory, has caused ferment on the island, alarmed authorities in London and Washington and prompted at least one foreign company, the P&O shipping line, to keep tourists away.

"With our weapons we are going to reach you," the group said in its statement. "We will reach you where you sleep, we will reach you where you take your baths, we will reach you where you take your meals and have your drinks, even a glass of water you hold in your hand to drink may not be safe."

The group claimed it had been manufacturing and storing chemical and biological weapons for two years. It said it hoped not to have to use them, but was deadly serious about stopping Britain and the United States "persecuting Muslims worldwide".

The reporters for the Trinidad Express talked to a man who said he was a chemical engineer who had received explosives training in the United States. They were shown various materials and told they could be used to manufacture a form of nerve gas as well as toxins strong enough to poison the island's water supply. An expert from the Caribbean Industrial Research Institute watched video footage of the reporting trip and said the man in the lab "sounded as though he knows what he is talking about and what he intends to do".

It is not clear who the Islamic group is, although it is likely to be related to Jamaat al-Muslimeen, a radical sect that launched an unsuccessful coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990. The group told the Trinidad Express it sympathised with Osama bin Laden and the Bali bombers, and harboured ambitions to stage an Islamic revolution on the island, even though Muslims make up only 6 per cent of the local population.

Even before the Trinidad Express story ran on Sunday, Britain's Foreign Office had issued a warning on tourist safety. "We believe Trinidad and Tobago to be one of a number of countries where there may be an increased terrorist threat," a statement on the Foreign Office website said.

Since the story, American and British officials have been cautious in public on how much credence to lend to the group. Patrick Manning, Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister, is treading a careful line, trying not to harm the tourist industry, a mainstay of the local economy, while ordering Special Branch officers to investigate the threat as thoroughly as possible.

<http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=373929>

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Stars and Stripes

Friday, January 31, 2003

## Vaccine reaction keeps GI in hospital

By [Sandra Jontz](#), Stars and Stripes

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ARLINGTON, Va. — Two U.S. servicemembers are recuperating following nonlife-threatening adverse reactions possibly linked to receiving smallpox vaccinations, a Pentagon spokesman said.

On Saturday, a 30-year-old servicemember stationed in the States developed a rash 10 days after receiving the vaccine, spokesman Jim Turner said. The rash consisted of the development of pustules, or pus-filled blisters, he said.

Medical personnel are evaluating the rash to see if it qualifies as “generalized vaccinia,” one of the expected skin reactions some people can develop to the vaccine, he said.

The servicemember is “otherwise well and continues to work at his usual location,” Turner said.

On Sunday, a 23-year-old servicemember who was vaccinated in the States and then deployed was hospitalized at an overseas hospital after developing encephalitis, or an inflammation of the brain, Turner said. He remains hospitalized in stable condition.

The overseas servicemember’s brain swelling happened eight days after he received the vaccine, Turner said.

“The possibility of a connection between the encephalitis and the vaccination is being investigated,” Turner said.

For privacy reasons, information about the servicemembers, including their names and where they are stationed or hospitalized, is not being released, he said.

Smallpox vaccinations for military personnel became mandatory Dec. 13. Since then, roughly 3,000 military medical personnel have been vaccinated. An undisclosed number of troops deployed to high-risk areas also have been vaccinated.

The Pentagon’s Department of Health Affairs is expected to release in the next few days a status report of the Defense Department’s smallpox vaccine program.

Side effects from the vaccine range from flulike symptoms to, in extreme and rare cases, death. Experts have estimated that 1 to 4 out of every 1,000,000 people vaccinated could die from the vaccine. In the past, about 1 in 1,000 vaccinated people experienced reactions that were serious, but not life-threatening, according to the Army’s official smallpox Web site.

— Information is available at [www.smallpox.army.mil](http://www.smallpox.army.mil)

<http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=12808>

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