


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13 Jan 2003

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

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North Korea Says It Is Withdrawing From Arms Treaty

By Seth Mydans

SEOUL, South Korea, Friday, Jan. 10 — Stepping up pressure following an American offer to open talks, North Korea said today it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The announcement means that, in 90 days, North Korea will no longer be bound by the treaty.

The statement, carried by its official news agency and monitored here, said North Korea had no intention of producing nuclear weapons and was acting in self-defense because it was "most seriously threatened" by the United States.

"Though we pull out of the N.P.T., we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity," it said.

There was no immediate response from the United States.

Even as the reports began to percolate of North Korea's declaration, two representatives of the country's permanent mission to the United Nations were meeting with an American official to discuss the confrontation with Washington over the North's nuclear program.

Han Song Ryol and Mun Jong Chol met in Santa Fe, N.M., on Thursday night local time with the New Mexico governor, Bill Richardson, a former American ambassador to the United Nations who has experience working with the North Koreans on sticky issues.

The Bush administration made clear that the meetings were unofficial. Mr. Richardson was only empowered to deliver the same message that the administration had said in public: that there would be no negotiations until North Korea halted its two nuclear projects.

North Korea has not responded to an offer made on Tuesday by Washington to hold discussions with the participation of South Korea and Japan.

Instead of responding, North Korea's official radio station repeated the country's demand that Washington sign a nonaggression treaty as the price of an easing of tensions.

North Korea has repeatedly accused the United States of threatening to invade it and has said it reserves the right to develop nuclear arms in self-defense. It continues to insist it has no nuclear weapons at this stage.

It made a similar announcement of withdrawal from the treaty in 1993 when challenged about its suspected nuclear weapons program. That crisis was defused in 1994 when it agreed to halt its nuclear program in exchange for help in building a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes, an agreement it has now repudiated.

Tensions have risen here since October, when the United States said North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear arms program in violation of the 1994 agreement. It then threatened to reactivate the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that had been closed and monitored under the agreement.

Today's statement denounced the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose monitors North Korea expelled last week, as a tool of the United States. The agency has threatened to report North Korea's noncooperation to the United Nations Security Council.

"The I.A.E.A. is used as a tool for executing the United States hostile policy," it said, and therefore North Korea can no longer remain bound to the nonproliferation treaty, which it signed in 1985 and which it said caused "the dignity of our nation to be infringed upon."

The announcement of North Korea's break with the international treaty came the morning after North Korea agreed to hold cabinet-level talks with South Korea, the highest-level dialogue between the two since North Korea admitted last October that it was maintaining a secret nuclear weapons program.

North Korea proposed holding the talks on Jan. 21-24, the week after a high-ranking American envoy visits here. In the past, North Korea often balked at invitations for high-level talks, but the nation's new policy, as spelled out in a New Year's Day editorial, is to make joint action with South Korea a priority in an effort to drive a wedge between the South and the United States.

In Seoul, several moves were under way to repair ties with the United States. The relationship has been strained by widespread demonstrations calling for a more equal relationship with the United States.

The withdrawal of the 37,000 American troops here "could send foreign investors flooding out of the country in fear of instability, throw the economy into turmoil and give North Korea a chance for provocation," South Korea's Defense Ministry warned in a monthly newsletter, Defense News, which circulated here on Thursday. "North Korea tries to weaken the South Korea-U.S. alliance's capability of deterring war."

Public opinion polls here indicate that about 55 percent of South Koreans, a group that consists largely of older people, want the troops to stay. In an indication that South Korea's silent majority may be starting to stir, about 400 South Korean military veterans and housewives staged a pro-American rally on Wednesday, burning an image of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, clinging to a missile.

Separately, the office of President Kim Dae Jung issued a statement on Thursday implicitly asking South Koreans to tone down the weekly vigils outside the American Embassy here. The statement said, "We need to calm excessive worries of the international community about the anti-U.S. atmosphere."

Conservatives criticize the government for addressing symptoms of anti-Americanism without addressing an underlying cause: a deep erosion among young people in the belief that American troops are needed in South Korea. "Now is the time to sincerely consider whether or not to continue the weekend candlelit protests and risk our national security and healthy relations with the U.S. at this crucial time," The Korea Times newspaper, said on Thursday.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/10CND-KORE.html>

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Washington Post

January 10, 2003

Pg. 1

'No Smoking Gun' So Far, U.N. Told

Iraq Failed to Provide Enough Data, Blix Says, Urging Security Council Patience

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 9 -- Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said today that his investigators had uncovered no "smoking gun" evidence that Iraq has resumed its secret weapons programs, but he sharply criticized Baghdad for failing to adequately respond to questions about its previous arms programs or to supply a comprehensive list of Iraqi scientists engaged in weapons activities.

Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Security Council in a closed meeting today that it will be impossible to give Iraq a clean bill of health unless it backs up its claim to have eliminated any previous programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

But the two men also urged the council to be patient, noting that it could be months before they can provide a definitive conclusion about whether Iraq has restarted its weapons program. "We have now been there for some two months and been covering the country in ever wider sweeps and we haven't found any smoking guns," Blix told reporters before briefing the council. "We think that the declaration failed to answer a great many questions."

The inability of the United Nations to obtain definitive evidence of new weapons activities in Iraq is complicating U.S. efforts to galvanize international support for the military overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Germany's U.N. ambassador, Gunter Pleuger, reflecting a widely shared view among the 15-nation council, said there were still "no grounds for military action" and that inspections should be given more time to succeed. A leading British newspaper reported that Britain is seeking to persuade Washington to delay the onset of a war with Iraq until the fall.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, echoing remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, said today that Blix and ElBaradei will not be able to provide the council with a conclusive review of Iraq's efforts involving banned weapons by the time they are scheduled to present their first comprehensive assessment of those activities on Jan. 27. "We are just in the middle of the process," Blair said. Some senior U.S. officials had viewed the Jan. 27 presentation as a potential trigger for military action.

But Powell has played down the importance of the Jan. 27 assessment, saying Wednesday that "it is not necessarily a D-day for decision-making." Powell said that the United States could still make a case for military action against Iraq even if Blix fails to find hard evidence of arms violations. "You don't really have to have a smoking gun," he told NBC yesterday.

"We know for a fact that there are weapons there," added White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. "The problem with guns that are hidden is you can't see their smoke."

Still, the Bush administration seized on Blix's criticism of Iraq, insisting that Baghdad's latest failure to adequately cooperate with the inspectors or admit it possesses weapons of mass destruction constitutes a "further material breach" of its disarmament obligations and strengthens the case for military action.

"There is still no evidence that Iraq has fundamentally changed its approach from one of deception to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming in meeting the council's demand that it disarm," U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte told the council behind closed doors. "Iraq's cooperation with inspections to date has been legalistic and superficial; but it is far short of the genuine cooperation the council had demanded."

Senior Iraqi officials today denied that their lengthy weapons declaration was incomplete. "People who claim there are omissions in the report . . . are not fully acquainted with our voluminous declaration or they lost their way" reading it, Gen. Amir Saadi, Hussein's chief science adviser, said in Baghdad.

Blix indicated that the pace of inspections in Iraq would intensify as the inspectors increase their use of helicopters to conduct unannounced visits, establish a regional office in the southern city of Basra, and introduce reconnaissance planes to conduct high-altitude surveillance over Iraq. Blix also plans to push Baghdad to make Iraqi scientists available for interviews without the presence of Iraqi authorities. But he insisted he would not "force anybody to go abroad or force them to defect."

The issue of interviews has been a source of friction between the United Nations and the United States, which believes that Iraqi scientists would only speak freely if they are interviewed abroad.

Blix has recently assured the United States that he would "use all of his authority" to elicit pertinent information on Iraq's weapons programs from Iraqi scientists, according to a senior U.S. official. Although Blix stopped short of assuring Washington that he would exercise his right to conduct interviews abroad, American officials say they are confident he will do so. One U.S. official said that Washington and the United Nations are in the "final stages" of planning to carry out such interviews in Cyprus.

Blix and ElBaradei, who is scheduled to meet with Powell and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice in Washington on Friday, said that they would travel to Baghdad on Jan. 19 and demand that Iraq provide a fuller account of its weapons programs.

"If evidence is not presented which gives a high degree of assurance, there is no way the inspectors can close a file by simply invoking a precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative," Blix said. "I have not asserted . . . that proscribed items or activities exist in Iraq, but if they do, Iraq should present them and then eliminate them in our presence. There is still time for it."

ElBaradei indicated to the council that he would press the United States to provide him with additional evidence to support U.S. and British allegations that Iraq tried to import uranium from an African supplier in 1991. In an effort to deflect growing criticism that it has failed to provide useful intelligence to the inspectors, Powell told The Washington Post Wednesday that Washington has increased intelligence-sharing with the U.N. inspectors.

While acknowledging that Iraq has provided inspectors with unfettered access, Blix and ElBaradei delivered an unexpectedly tough account of Iraq's record of cooperation.

ElBaradei said that Iraq had so far failed to provide adequate documentation describing its efforts to design nuclear weapons and centrifuges used in the enrichment of uranium. He also said that 32 tons of a high explosive, HMX, that can be used to detonate a nuclear explosive, had disappeared from a facility that had been subject to U.N. monitoring until 1998, when the inspectors left Iraq on the eve of a U.S.-British bombing campaign. "Iraq . . . declared that it had blended the . . . 32 tons with sulfur and turned them into 45.6 tons of industrial explosive used mainly to cement plants for mining."

ElBaradei said that a preliminary investigation of Iraq's unsuccessful attempts to acquire large quantities of aluminum tubes yielded no evidence to support suspicions by some U.S. and British intelligence analysts that it may have been destined for a secret program to manufacture centrifuges.

"While the matter is still under investigation," ElBaradei told the council, "the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it."

Blix added to the criticism, faulting Iraq for failing to answer questions about its production of chemical and biological weapons in a 12,000-page declaration to the council last month.

He said the declaration "is rich in volume but poor in new information about weapons issues and practically devoid of new evidence on such issues." Said Blix, "In order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must provide credible evidence."

Blix noted that comparison of Iraq's declaration and its previous statements revealed "several cases of inconsistencies."

He said Iraq provided contradictory information on its VX nerve agent program, further clouding the U.N. effort to understand how far Iraq got in placing the chemical agent in a weapon.

He noted that Baghdad has failed to provide a convincing explanation for Iraq's illegal acquisition of "a relatively large number of missile engines" and other raw material used to produce solid missile fuel. And he cited an Air

Force document that Iraq recently turned over showing that Baghdad possessed 6,000 more chemical weapons bombs than it had admitted at the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

Blix reserved his harshest criticism for Iraq's failure to comply with the United Nations' demand to supply it with a comprehensive list of Iraqi scientists.

"We do not feel that the Iraqi side has made a serious effort to respond to the request that we made," he said. "The lists do not even comprise all those who have been previously listed" in Iraq's past declarations.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35529-2003Jan9.html>

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New York Times

January 10, 2003

Pg. 1

U.N. Inspectors Criticize Iraqis Over Arms List

By Julia Preston

UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 9 — The chief United Nations weapons inspectors sharply criticized Iraq today for failing to come forward with new information to clarify its weapons programs, but said they had "not found any smoking gun" indicating that Baghdad was concealing illegal weapons.

American officials seized on the inspectors' report as new proof that Iraq is not cooperating with the inspections as required by Security Council resolutions. American diplomats suggested that if Iraq did not change by the end of the month they would step up the pressure at the United Nations for military action to disarm the country.

The inspectors, Hans Blix and Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, made their statements to the Security Council in a closed briefing. In the session, Mr. Blix said in blunt terms that a declaration Iraq presented in December on its weapons programs was "rich in volume but poor in new information," adding that Baghdad had given an "inadequate response" to the inspectors' demand for a complete list of Iraqi weapons experts.

"We have not so far made progress" toward confirming that Iraq is clean of weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Blix said, according to the text of his statement released after the meeting.

John D. Negroponte, the American ambassador to the United Nations, said, "There is still no evidence that Iraq has changed its approach from one of deceit to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming."

Dr. ElBaradei, the United Nations chief nuclear inspector and the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said his inspection team had determined that aluminum tubes Baghdad tried to import over the last two years were intended to build rockets and not centrifuges to enrich uranium. The I.A.E.A. will, however, continue to look into the issue of the tubes.

The Bush administration had cited the tubes as a central piece of evidence for its claim that President Saddam Hussein was trying to restart his nuclear arms program. The nuclear agency challenged President Bush's assessment, although it noted that buying the tubes to make rockets would violate a 1991 Security Council resolution on importing military equipment.

The inspections chiefs cast serious doubt on Iraq's cooperation so far. Although Baghdad has allowed inspection teams to work unhindered, they said the inspections were not effective because Iraq has not produced information for them to verify, showing that prohibited weapons from the past have been destroyed.

Most of the 15 Council nations expressed concern about the inspectors' report, according to diplomats who attended the meeting. Only Russia, a permanent Council power, and Syria, the only Arab nation, refrained from echoing the inspectors' negative account.

Differences between the United States and other Council nations came clearly into view, however, over the timing of the next steps in the inspections. Washington is talking about the end of January as a time for reaching conclusions about Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolutions. Other nations, as well as the inspectors, are calling for more time before making decisive assessments.

Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei will travel to Baghdad for meetings on Jan. 19 and 20. On Jan. 27, they return to the Council to give an in-depth evaluation of their work. They have said that report will be far more thorough than the one today, which was an interim briefing they gave after the United States insisted on hearing more frequent reports from them.

The Jan. 27 meeting will be a special open session in which countries not currently on the Security Council can participate, diplomats said today. Two days later the Council will convene in a closed meeting to consider the inspectors' report.

Mr. Negroponte said that if Iraq did not come forward with better information by Jan. 27, it would be an "extremely serious matter." The United States will sharply increase its pressure on the Council to move toward a final conclusion on Iraq's cooperation, a Bush administration official said.

"Our understanding was that it would take 60 days for the Council to decide whether Iraq was cooperating," a Bush official said. "We're not going to let the Council slip in making those decisions."

Mr. Negroponte said Iraq's performance "does not constitute active cooperation."

Rather than showing that Mr. Hussein has been hiding secret weapons, American diplomats seemed to be building a case that Baghdad has consistently failed to cooperate fully with the inspections. Under Resolution 1441, a pattern of noncooperation by Iraq is a grave breach that can lead to war.

But other diplomats played down the importance of the Jan. 27 report. The British ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, urged everyone to "calm down" about Jan. 27.

"The inspectors need time to do their business," he said. He noted the inspectors had assured the Council that they would report immediately if any secret weapons were found.

The Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, insisted that the inspections were "in the early stages."

Concerning the issue of interviewing Iraqi weapons experts, Mr. Blix said the list of scientists provided by Baghdad did not even include all the names provided by United Nations inspectors who were in Iraq before the previous inspections were suspended in 1998.

"We do not feel the Iraqi side has made a serious effort to respond to the request we made," he said.

Mr. Blix, who leads the biological and chemical weapons team, cited "a significant discrepancy" in the Iraqi weapons declaration concerning the numbers of chemical munitions remaining in Iraq's arsenal. He also reported that Iraq had recently imported "a relatively large number" of missile engines whose purpose was not clarified by the Iraqi declaration. It also contained contradictory information about supplies of the chemical warfare agent known as VX, he said.

Dr. ElBaradei said Iraq had removed special seals on supplies of a high explosive called HMX and moved them around, but the arms declaration did not explain what happened to this matériel.

He also said his team was investigating reports that Iraq tried to import uranium after 1991. He said that there was still "a significant amount of work to do" to clarify the status of Iraq's nuclear program.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/middleeast/10NATI.html>

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New York Times

January 10, 2003

Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited By Bush

By Michael R. Gordon

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 — The key piece of evidence that President Bush has cited as proof that Saddam Hussein has sought to revive his program to make nuclear weapons was challenged today by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In his remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in September, President Bush cited Iraq's attempts to buy special aluminum tubes as proof that Baghdad was seeking to construct a centrifuge network system to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs.

"Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon," Mr. Bush said.

But Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the I.A.E.A., offered a sharply different assessment in a report to the United Nations Security Council today.

Dr. ElBaradei said Iraqi officials had claimed that they sought the tubes to make 81-millimeter rockets. Dr. ElBaradei indicated that he thought the Iraqi claim was credible.

"While the matter is still under investigation and further verification is foreseen, the I.A.E.A.'s analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets," the agency said in its report. "While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it."

While the discussion of Iraq's procurement efforts is highly technical, it is politically very significant. The primary rationale for going to war with Iraq rests on fears that Baghdad is striving to develop a nuclear weapon. The argument

for military intervention, in effect, is that Iraq was much closer to a nuclear weapon before the 1991 Persian Gulf war than most experts thought and might be again.

United States officials have long been concerned that Iraq would try to revive its nuclear weapons program and have cited several pieces of evidence.

First, after the 1991 gulf war United Nations inspectors learned that Iraq had planned to build a centrifuge plant of 1,000 machines. Second, British intelligence has reported that Iraq wanted to produce a special magnet that would be suitable for a gas centrifuge system.

Another important indicator, officials said, was Iraq's efforts to procure special aluminum tubes. In a report titled "A Decade of Deception and Defiance," the White House asserted that Iraq had sought to buy thousands of tubes over a 14-month period to make centrifuges for enriching uranium. Though the shipments were blocked, officials said, the White House said they demonstrated that Iraq was striving to become a nuclear power.

Still, American intelligence was never of a single mind on the question of aluminum tubes. While there have been varying assessments, the dominant view among American intelligence analysts — one backed by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency — is that the precise dimensions and specifications of the tubes indicated that they were intended for use in making centrifuges. But some officials in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Energy Department have questioned this analysis, saying that the tubes might be intended to make rockets.

President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have taken the position that the C.I.A.'s case is compelling. Senior officials said that some of the tubes sought were of a type used to make centrifuges and carried technical specifications that made it difficult to think they could be used for anything else.

Asked about the new assessment, a senior Bush Administration official said: "I think the Iraqis are spinning the I.A.E.A. The majority of the intelligence community has the same view as before."

The agency, however, is not alone in questioning the United States view. In its report on Iraq's efforts to make weapons of mass destruction, Britain concluded that Iraq was "almost certainly" seeking the means to enrich uranium to make a nuclear weapon. But referring to Iraq's attempts to buy aluminum tubes Britain also concluded that "there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear program."

Today's assessment also raises new questions. The I.A.E.A. said that Iraq had offered only limited cooperation and that there were still important questions about its suspected effort to develop a nuclear program. But the agency also noted that the presence of its inspectors would make it hard for Iraq to resume its nuclear program.

To investigate the case of the aluminum tubes, Dr. ElBaradei said, inspectors visited Iraqi rocket factories, interviewed Iraqi officials, took samples of aluminum tubes that Iraq managed to buy, and reviewed Iraqi documents on purchases they had sought to carry out.

Iraq's attempts to buy aluminum tubes "was the key piece of evidence to support the assessment that Iraq was pursuing or trying to revive its gas centrifuge program," said Gary Samore, director of studies for the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the senior proliferation official on President Clinton's National Security Council. As a result of the agency's report, he added, "this particular piece of evidence is now much more ambiguous."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/middleeast/10ALUM.html>

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Washington Post
January 10, 2003
Pg. 16

Iraqi Scientists Not Likely To Be Interviewed Abroad

Despite Pledge, Official Says Arms Experts Not 'Ready to Go'

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 9 -- A senior Iraqi official said tonight that none of his nation's scientists is prepared to travel abroad for interviews with U.N. weapons inspectors, effectively ruling out chances the inspectors will be able to learn more about President Saddam Hussein's arms programs by questioning Iraqi experts in private.

"Nobody is ready to go outside to make an interview with UNMOVIC or the IAEA," said Gen. Hussam Mohammed Amin, head of Iraq's weapons monitoring directorate, referring to the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the bodies charged by the U.N. Security Council with determining whether Iraq possesses banned arms.

Although Iraq has agreed in principle to allow its scientists to leave the country for interviews, the government has signaled that they should not do so and should instead talk to the inspectors inside Iraq. Some scientists could still choose to disregard that guidance, but Amin's comment provided the strongest indication yet that this is unlikely, because Iraqis defying official policy in the past have met with severe punishment.

The interviews have emerged as a key issue in the confrontation between Iraq and the United States. The Bush administration has pressured U.N. inspectors to take important scientists and their families out of Iraq, saying debriefing sessions in another country would allow them to provide more candid disclosures about Iraq's alleged efforts to develop nuclear, chemical and biological arms.

After complaining that asking scientists to leave Iraq would violate international law, the government here relented late last month, largely because failing to do so would violate a Nov. 8 Security Council resolution requiring full cooperation with weapons inspections. U.S. officials have pointed to the interview issue as an important factor in deciding whether the United States will invade Iraq and try to destroy Hussein's Baath Party government.

Seeking not to run afoul of the resolution, Amin said individual scientists were free to decide whether they wanted to leave. "The matter is related to the person himself," he said. "Whether he will say, 'I accept,' or not, is something personal."

But Amin has made clear that he thinks they should not go, insisting "it's not necessary" for interviews to be conducted outside Iraq.

The inspectors have so far attempted to talk in private with two Iraqi experts. Both refused the interviews without Iraqi government representatives present.

One U.N. official said the inspectors likely would seek to interview other scientists in the next week. The official would not comment on whether any of the Iraqis would be asked to travel abroad. But Amin said one U.N. inspector has raised the possibility of taking some scientists to Cyprus. The inspectors use the eastern Mediterranean island as a staging area for personnel and supplies.

Despite Iraq's pledge to permit scientists to leave with their immediate families, some diplomats and U.N. officials say they believe the fear of retribution against extended family members may be dissuading some experts from leaving. "It's fine to take one's wife and children," one diplomat here said. "But what about the wife's brother? Or the husband's sister and her children? In Iraq, brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, cousins -- they're all considered close family members."

Earlier today, Hussein's chief science adviser, Gen. Amir Saadi, took issue with statements by U.N. officials that a lengthy declaration given by Iraq to the United Nations last month outlining its arms programs was incomplete. The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said the document "failed to answer a great many questions."

People who claim there are omissions in the report, Saadi said, either are "not fully acquainted with our voluminous declaration or they lost their way" in reading it.

Saadi and Amin also detailed what they said were questions asked by weapons inspectors aimed at "gathering intelligence." On Monday, Hussein assailed the inspectors for wanting to meet with Iraqi scientists and scour military facilities, saying such activities were aimed at collecting information for Iraq's enemies.

In a visit to the Shayk Mahzar airfield on Saturday, Amin said, the chief field inspector asked the base commander to outline the facility's chain of command, to detail construction at the site since 1998, to name his commander and to provide the base's phone number. During a search Christmas Day of an ammunition depot, he said, inspectors wanted to know about air defenses around the complex and whether any munitions had been recently moved.

"We think those questions are irrelevant to disarmament and they have an intelligence nature," he said.

A U.N. spokesman would not confirm whether the questions cited by Amin were asked by the inspectors, but said inquiries about people who work at a facility, new construction and the movement of supplies were a crucial part of the inspections.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35290-2003Jan9.html>

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New York Times
January 10, 2003
Pg. 11

North Korea Opens Unofficial Channel For U.S. Talks

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 — The top North Korean diplomat at the United Nations met tonight in Santa Fe with the governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson, in an unexpected initiative by North Korea to open communications about its nuclear confrontation with Washington.

The White House said that the meeting came at the initiative of the North Koreans, not the United States, and that Mr. Richardson was only empowered to deliver the same message that the administration had said in public: that there would be no negotiations until North Korea halted its two nuclear projects.

The White House appeared to increase its demands tonight, emphasizing that, even if talks resumed, it would not be enough for North Korea to simply stop its efforts to enrich uranium and produce plutonium.

"The next step is for North Korea to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a visible and verifiable manner," Sean McCormack, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said this evening. He emphasized that the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon — frozen under a 1994 agreement with the Clinton administration — would have to be taken apart, though he declined to specify a timetable for that action.

Mr. Richardson, a former Democratic congressman, served as President Bill Clinton's ambassador to the United Nations. In 1994 he went to North Korea to negotiate the release of an American pilot shot down over North Korea. In 1996, when Mr. Clinton and Kim Young Sam, the South Korean president at the time, proposed talks involving North and South Korea, China and the United States, Mr. Richardson traveled to North Korea to urge the government to accept the offer.

[In Seoul on Friday morning, the official North Korean news agency said North Korea had announced it would withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, an announcement that sets the clock for a formal withdrawal 90 days from the date of the announcement. North Korea would be the only country to ever withdraw.]

Some in the administration have described the 1994 agreement as appeasement. In the past, the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has been critical of the accord, and others have suggested that its weaknesses were made evident last month when the North Koreans, reacting to a cut-off of oil by the United States and its allies, threw out international inspectors at the nuclear facilities and removed seals from the nuclear operations.

"We want to see the whole facility taken apart in pieces," one senior official said tonight.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who has been leading a faction within the Bush administration to open up channels of communication with North Korea, personally approved travel to New Mexico for Han Song Ryol, the top North Korean diplomat at the United Nations.

Because the United States has no diplomatic relations with North Korea, its representatives to the United Nations need State Department approval to travel beyond New York.

Still, administration officials were somewhat puzzled by the North Korean's choice of Mr. Richardson as a possible go-between.

While Mr. Richardson is familiar with North Koreans, he has virtually no connections to the Bush administration. One senior administration official characterized the North Korean's diplomatic approach tonight as "a bit bizarre, but perhaps more constructive than building nukes."

Asian experts in the State Department said they had only minimal expectations for the meetings, which were supposed to start with a dinner tonight and continue on Friday morning. The White House said Mr. Richardson was not empowered to negotiate but merely to state the administration's position.

"The only message we expect is what America's position is, that we are ready to talk, and that we will not negotiate," Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said. "That's the U.S. position. You should not see this as anything beyond that."

There was no immediate word about what occurred in meeting.

Still, the mission was reminiscent of former President Jimmy Carter's unofficial trip to North Korea in 1994, when he sought to defuse a crisis over some of the same facilities. Though Mr. Carter's diplomatic freelancing infuriated Mr. Clinton — it came just as he was ordering a reinforcement of American troops on the Korean Peninsula — it ultimately laid the groundwork for the 1994 agreement that froze nuclear activity at the Yongbyon plant.

That freeze lasted until December, when North Korea ordered international nuclear inspectors to leave.

In an administration that is clearly deeply divided about how to handle North Korea Mr. Richardson's involvement in the issue was not entirely welcomed at the White House.

But one participant in the debates in the administration said that "maybe this will break something loose, and let us get out of the macho spiral where we cut off their oil, and they stoke up the nuclear facilities."

Mr. Richardson, who took office on Jan. 1, said today, "I want to be able to help my country."

The initiative for the meeting was taken by Mr. Han who told the State Department that he was acting on orders from his superiors. The request came before the United States, South Korea and Japan agreed on Tuesday that the United States would talk to North Korea, even if it refused to enter negotiations.

The new diplomatic efforts came as intelligence officials warned the White House that American spy satellites might not be able to determine if the North Koreans take the next major step in their nuclear escalation: reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium.

The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that as soon as the reprocessing starts, North Korea will be able to produce enough material for five or six weapons in a matter of months. A C.I.A. report published this week confirms the agency's past estimate that before the 1994 agreement that froze their nuclear weapons program, "North Korea probably has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons."

The prospect that North Korea could produce more weapons in the next few months has prompted two debates within the administration.

The first is whether and when the president should declare that the United States will not allow North Korea to produce more nuclear weapons. He has been careful not to utter those words, in the hope that a diplomatic solution can be found.

But as one senior official noted this week, Mr. Bush has often declared, "I will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

The second debate is an argument within the administration over North Korea's ultimate intentions.

This is a debate between those who believe North Korea is simply using nuclear brinkmanship for security guarantees — and perhaps more aid — and those who believe that the North Korean military is now determined to produce a sizable nuclear arsenal. In the words of one White House official, Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, "looked at Iraq," saw that it took on the United States before it possessed nuclear weapons, "and concluded that was Saddam's big mistake."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/asia/10KORE.html>

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Washington Post

January 10, 2003

Pg. 14

China Treads Carefully Around North Korea

Delicate Relations Make Beijing Wary of Pressuring Unpredictable Neighbor on Nuclear Program

By Philip P. Pan, Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIJING, Jan. 9 -- Two days after Christmas, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan paid a visit to the sprawling, snow-covered compound of the North Korean embassy in Beijing, ostensibly to attend a New Year's celebration. In a routine statement, the Foreign Ministry said Tang and the ambassador congratulated each other on the past year's achievements and "exchanged views on issues of common concern."

But the visit was anything but routine. Tang had never attended New Year's events at the embassy before. He went to this one to quietly convey Beijing's concerns about North Korea's nuclear program, according to Chinese specialists who advise the government on Korean affairs.

Two days later, North Korea issued a statement in Pyongyang that said, in part: If "other countries" are worried about its nuclear activities, they should urge the United States to open a dialogue and guarantee North Korea's security. If they do not intend to do that, "it is better for them just to sit idle."

The exchange illustrated the delicate relations between China and North Korea. Neighbors and Communist allies that fought alongside each other in the Korean War half a century ago, the two countries now view each other with suspicion and, sometimes, resentment. This raises questions about Beijing's ability and willingness to help the Bush administration -- as Washington has repeatedly urged -- to break through a dangerous North Asian impasse by pressuring the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, into abandoning plans to develop nuclear weapons.

Although North Korea's response to minister Tang's message seemed like a brush-off, Chinese analysts detected a subtle concession. For the first time, North Korea was indicating a third party could help resolve its standoff with the United States. In the past, the analysts said, North Korea had always told China and others to butt out.

As North Korea's principal trading partner and a major source of food and fuel aid, China exerts more leverage over the "hermit kingdom" than any other nation. But in the weeks since Pyongyang alarmed the world by expelling U.N. inspectors and threatening to restart a plutonium-based nuclear reactor, the Chinese government has been conspicuously quiet, allowing South Korea and Russia to take the lead in diplomacy.

Chinese officials have told foreign diplomats that they have expressed their displeasure to North Korea, but they insist they must tread carefully around their unpredictable neighbor. Relations are already strained, and the Chinese say they are worried about provoking North Korea by pushing it into a corner.

"China's role is to make sure North Korea doesn't lose all hope, not to threaten or pressure it," said Qi Baoliang, an analyst on Korean affairs at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a research institute for China's intelligence services. "If everybody puts pressure on North Korea, it will despair. And if it doesn't see a way out, it will go ahead and develop nuclear weapons. That's not good for anybody."

Worried about the long-term stability of a dictatorship that has allowed its people to starve by the hundreds of thousands, Chinese leaders do not want to see North Korea armed with nuclear missiles. For one thing, the missiles could be aimed at Beijing. For another, North Korea's actions could trigger a regional arms race, with Japan and perhaps even South Korea and Taiwan developing their own nuclear weapons, or at least missile defense systems. But China is unwilling to support sanctions against North Korea that could send a flood of refugees across the border into its economically troubled northeast, where as many as 200,000 Korean migrants are already hiding. If North Korea collapsed, moreover, China would face the unwelcome prospect of sharing a border with a unified Korea that would be a U.S. ally and a host to U.S. troops.

"They're walking a tightrope," said an Asian diplomat who has discussed the issue with the Chinese. "They don't want a nuclear North Korea, but they have to be careful about how they apply pressure. They don't want to antagonize the North Koreans too much, but at the same time, they need to get them to change their position."

Some former Clinton administration officials have argued that China played an important role in persuading North Korea to freeze its nuclear program during a similar crisis in 1994. A pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong suggested then that the Chinese government threatened to restrict oil shipments to North Korea if it did not back down.

Complicating the situation this time, though, is China's leadership transition, said one Chinese security analyst. President Jiang Zemin has handed the Communist Party's top post to Hu Jintao, but Jiang will remain president until March and could stay on as head of the military even longer. That has raised questions about who should take the lead in dealing with Kim Jong Il, the analyst said.

"The transition makes it harder for any Chinese leader to handle the issue," he said. "No one wants to risk taking the blame right now if it doesn't go well, and it's possible Kim knows that."

Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have never been entirely steady. North Korea's founder and its current leader's father, Kim Il Sung, often sought to play China off the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In 1992, China angered North Korea by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea.

But the collapse of the Soviet Union left China as North Korea's only major source of aid. Nicholas Eberstadt, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, estimates that China provides as much as \$470 million in indirect aid annually to North Korea, which amounts to more than a third of its outside financial assistance. China accounts for 70 percent to 90 percent of North Korea's fuel imports and about a third of all grain imports.

Today, China sees North Korea as much as an economic burden and potential troublemaker as a valued friend, and Pyongyang has resisted its encouragement to adopt Chinese-style market reforms. Relations improved as Kim Jong Il visited China in 2000 and 2001, but friction was evident again last year when Beijing arrested a Chinese-born businessman picked by Kim to run a special economic zone on the border.

The fragile state of relations leaves China with no good options in the current crisis, said a Chinese expert on Korean affairs who has served as an intermediary with North Korea.

"If Kim tells Jiang he is going to test a nuclear weapon unless Jiang gives him more aid, what do we do? We give him more aid. We don't have a choice," he said. "We have some influence, but we don't have the kind of relationship where we can tell Kim what to do. If we tell him to do something, he doesn't listen. If we threaten him, he listens even less. If Jiang called him, he might hang up."

The intermediary said North Korea is unhappy with China's increasingly closer ties with the United States and feels threatened by the Bush administration's characterization of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil." China's best course of action, he said, is to reassure Kim it will not abandon him, and to convince the Bush administration to find a way to back down and offer Kim the security assurances he wants.

The argument, repeated by Chinese officials in conversations with foreign diplomats, assumes that North Korea's goal is not to build nuclear weapons, but to wrest concessions from the West. Chinese leaders appear unmoved by the U.S. position that North Korea can no longer be trusted to stop its nuclear activities and may already have produced two weapons.

It is unclear how Chinese leaders would react if they are proven wrong and North Korea defies them by testing a nuclear weapon. "That's the big question," said one Western diplomat involved in talks with China on the subject.

"I'm not sure if even the Chinese know what they would do."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35293-2003Jan9.html>

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Dallas Morning News
January 10, 2003

Farms Not Immune To Terror

By Associated Press

LUBBOCK – The United States is better prepared for the potential of a terrorism attack on livestock than it was before terrorists hijacked and crashed four planes 16 months ago.

But the country remains vulnerable to attack, and raising awareness among producers is paramount to preventing an outbreak of swine fever or foot-and-mouth disease in the country's livestock populations, said Floyd Horn, an expert on agricultural terrorism with the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

"Just a few sick animals could become a disaster in a short time," he said before speaking to about 120 people Thursday at Texas Tech University. "It's a ripe target."

Mr. Horn was the keynote speaker at the first of eight forums of the Lubbock Regional BioScience Initiative sponsored by Market Lubbock Inc., a city-appointed economic development corporation.

The group's mission is to promote regional economic development, support established companies and foster entrepreneurialism within the bioscience industries.

Mr. Horn said there are still limitations in science that make it unlikely that a livestock terrorism attack would be detected, identified and reported quickly.

"We need to reach out now ... to state and local partners and to the private sector in a major way, providing educational material and lines of communication and rapid response programs," he said. "That partnership needs to be strengthened. But time is of the essence, and the terrorists are here now."

Mr. Horn pointed to the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth in England and swine fever in The Netherlands in the late 1990s, which cost those countries' economies billions of dollars, to spotlight the devastation that a terrorist-planted livestock disease could wreak havoc in this country.

People at cattle feedlots, for instance, need to be trained to know what to look for and to better watch who goes into animal facilities.

"The temptation when you see a sick animal is 'I'm getting rid of this animal from my herd, I'm selling it.' That won't work. Everybody loses," Mr. Horn said.

But, he said, an attack wouldn't be about watching Americans go hungry.

"It is in fact about disrupting our daily lives, our economy and our social and political mores, and [terrorists] are trying to find ways to change our fundamental way of life."

There are no known direct threats against American agriculture now, but every country that has had an offensive biological weapons program, including the United States prior to 1969, has had an anti-agriculture component, Mr. Horn said.

In the former Soviet Union prior to the early 1990s, there were facilities at which thousands of scientists were dedicated to potentially damaging agriculture in Asia and North America, Mr. Horn said. The whereabouts of many of those scientists and their technology is unknown, he said.

"It's a serious and sobering set of issues, and one that I hope gives you pause," Mr. Horn said. "The vulnerability of American agriculture is very significant. A significant effort has been made to minimize that, but there's a long way to go."

In caves near Kandahar, Afghanistan, U.S. troops found evidence that al-Qaeda was briefed on agricultural terrorism issues and knew about the potential.

"But, again, we have no indication they selected that from the portfolio," Mr. Horn said. "There were other things seemingly were of more interest to them."

John Abernathy, the dean of the College of Agriculture Sciences and Natural Resources at Tech, said educating farmers and livestock producers about agricultural terrorism is important because much of the High Plains' economy is built on agriculture.

"People don't realize how vulnerable we could be," he said.

<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dallas/tsw/stories/011003dntexlivestock.cc2ea.html>

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Moscow Times
January 10, 2003
Pg. 4

Nuclear Robbery

BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan (AP) -- Masked men armed with clubs forced their way into a formerly secret chemical and metal smelting plant in Kyrgyzstan and stole 460 kilograms of europium oxide, a powder that can be used in nuclear reactors, police said Thursday.

The attackers beat, tied up and disarmed two guards at the plant in Orlovka, 80 kilometers northeast of the capital Bishkek, then cut the locks on a storage area and fled with 23 20-kilogram containers of the material, the Interior Ministry said.

Police were searching for the assailants in the pre-dawn attack Wednesday, who they believe were acting on order of somebody who wanted to sell material from the plant, said Interior Ministry spokesman Dzholdoshbek Buzurmankulov.

Among other uses, Europium oxide can be used in the rods that control nuclear reactions.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/01/10/031.html>

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Washington Post
January 11, 2003
Pg. 14

NSC Weighs Giving U.N. Inspectors More Sensitive Data On Iraq Arms

By Walter Pincus and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush's National Security Council is debating whether to turn its most sensitive intelligence on Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs over to United Nations inspectors or hold some to offer later to the U.N. Security Council as a reason for war, according to senior administration officials.

Adding to the complexity of the discussions are Pentagon officials who want to withhold intelligence on Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons sites because they would be among the first targets for the United States should an attack take place, the officials said. Disclosing the locations of these weapons would inevitably lead to their being moved, the military targeters said.

At issue is the best way to use U.S. intelligence to convince Security Council members and the world that Hussein has chemical and biological weapons, especially since U.N. inspectors so far have failed to uncover any "smoking gun."

U.S. officials have said that omissions in Baghdad's December declaration of its weapons of mass destruction mean Iraq remains in material breach of U.N. resolutions calling for it to disarm. But the White House has recognized it needs evidence of Hussein's weapons or an open obstruction of the inspectors before it can put together a coalition for military action, senior officials said.

A key issue in the internal White House debate is releasing intelligence that could endanger either the human spies or technical collection systems that originally obtained the information. "It all comes down to weighing revealing sources and methods versus making a public case," a senior administration official said yesterday.

Two weeks ago, this official said, "everybody started saying that we should 'do an Adlai Stevenson,'" a reference to the Kennedy administration's U.N. ambassador showing aerial reconnaissance photographs to the Security Council in 1962 to prove Soviet missiles were being put in Cuba.

"Maybe that will be the answer," the Bush official said, "[maybe] at some point, protection of sources and methods will be outweighed by the need to convince the American public, the British Labor Party and the people in Turkey that there's a very, very strong case out there."

"The White House is trying to decide what to lay out to inspectors before they report on January 27 or whether to wait and do it after," another official said yesterday. "If we then go forward [attacking Iraq], the question also is how much leg do you show ahead of time," the official added.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said this week that the United States has begun delivering some intelligence to the inspectors and is reviewing other more sensitive material with an eye toward presenting it to the Security Council if inspections fail to uncover a smoking gun. One senior official familiar with U.S. intelligence said recently that the quality of U.S. data "is not that good," adding, "I don't expect anything dramatic before January 27." Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld discussed the intelligence dilemma earlier this week, telling reporters it would eventually have to be settled by Bush. "I think he would probably make a calculation as to the advantages that would accrue from revealing intelligence information and the disadvantages that would result from doing so," Rumsfeld told reporters Tuesday.

"On the one hand you have the advantage of persuading the public and the world and countries of the facts of the matter," he said. On the other hand, he said, "To the extent that prior to using force we were to reveal intelligence information in a way that damaged the ability to conduct the conflict, it would be, needless to say, unfortunately risky for the coalition forces' lives engaged."

The U.S. intelligence transferred over the past week has been general in nature but included satellite photos of some suspected storage sites, according to former inspectors familiar with the current system. Only Hans Blix, executive director of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and his top intelligence assistant, the former deputy head of Canada's intelligence service, James Corcoran, initially review the data. It is then turned into orders passed on to field inspectors in Iraq who do not know its origins.

Sensitivity of the information has slowly increased as the security of the system has been tested. It has remained general and the internal administration debate will determine how specific future sensitive information will be.

Illustrating the problem was the complaint yesterday by one of the two chief inspectors that he needed "more actionable information" from U.S. intelligence agencies. Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who supervises the search in Iraq for a nuclear weapons program, told reporters, "We need specific information on where to go and where to inspect."

He said a good process has been established with the United States and other countries' intelligence agencies and he hoped that in coming weeks "we'll get additional information that can accelerate our job in the field."

Asked about ElBaradei's remarks, State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher said, "I can certainly say that they're getting the best we've got, and that we are sharing information with the inspectors that they can use, and based on their ability to use it."

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer yesterday added the need to protect security of data as another reason for limiting the sensitive U.S. information being given the U.N. inspectors.

"The more secure their ability is to maintain the information, as new equipment arrives to help them to do so, the more information they receive," he said, adding that Iraq in the past has used its abilities to intercept messages and stay one jump ahead of the U.N. personnel.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40285-2003Jan10.html>

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Washington Post

January 11, 2003

Pg. 7

No Serious Problems In Military Inoculations

Second Group Gets Shots for Smallpox

By Steve Vogel, Washington Post Staff Writer

None of the more than 170 military personnel vaccinated for smallpox at Walter Reed Army Medical Center more than three weeks ago has experienced serious complications or caused secondary infections in others, according to Army officials.

Walter Reed doctors overseeing use of the live virus vaccine say their experience -- the first of any hospital -- should offer reassurance to nervous officials at civilian hospitals. They are being encouraged by the Bush administration to begin inoculating medical workers who would respond to a smallpox outbreak. The voluntary civilian program, ordered by the president to help guard the nation against a potential terrorist attack, is tentatively scheduled to start this month.

Walter Reed completed a second major round of vaccinations this week, inoculating more than 250 military medical workers on Thursday.

During the first round of inoculations, conducted Dec. 16-18, "the complaints were much less than I expected," said Army Lt. Col. Lisa A. Black, chief of occupational health at Walter Reed. "We really didn't see any major problems."

The personnel who have been inoculated are military health care providers based in the Washington area. Under Department of Defense rules, their identities and their units cannot be disclosed.

"These are the folks who would be treating a true case of smallpox," Black said.

One of the biggest concerns of health officials is that workers inoculated with the live virus used in the smallpox vaccine would inadvertently infect others, including family members or hospital patients.

In the case of Walter Reed, there have not been any incidents in which the inoculated medical workers have infected other people with whom they have been in contact, which include seriously ill patients with immune deficiencies, officials said.

The medical workers have not had to be put on leave or otherwise kept from sick patients "like some facilities are concerned," Black said.

Some of the inoculated personnel have missed work, suffering headaches, rashes and sore arms, doctors said, describing the overall phenomenon as "the yucks" or "feeling punk."

"A few people had very robust reactions," said Col. Renata Engler, chief of the Walter Reed clinic administering the shots.

Walter Reed conducted lengthy briefings and individual health screening to ensure that the inoculation was not given to medical workers who have conditions that would put them at risk, including eczema.

To prevent the spread of the virus, a strict series of precautions has been instituted. Medical workers who have received the inoculation are required to have daily evaluations of their condition before being allowed contact with patients. The monitoring continues until the scab left by the vaccination falls off.

On Thursday, more than 30 health care workers sat in chairs waiting for the vaccination in a line that snaked around the corner. Some waited up to 90 minutes.

Army Sgt. Mark Dearlove, an immunization technician wearing a blue medical smock over his camouflage uniform, stuck his head out the door. "Next patient!" he called.

"You mean, 'Next victim,' " grumbled the next man in line, an Army sergeant.

The patient rolled up his T-shirt to expose his left shoulder. Dearlove, donning a fresh pair of medical gloves, used a blue permanent marker to place four dots in a small diamond shape on the man's arm, identifying the area where the inoculation would be given. Dearlove lowered safety glasses over his eyes, took a bifurcated needle and dipped into a small vial of the smallpox vaccine sitting on a table.

Holding the man's arm with one hand, Dearlove jabbed the area within the diamond with the needle 15 times in rapid-fire motion. "There is trace blood," he told a nurse -- a sign that the skin had been penetrated.

Among those administering the shots was Air Force Master Sgt. Ray Anspach, a senior immunization technician and instructor at Walter Reed.

Anspach, 40, has been giving inoculations for 22 years, administering "probably millions" of shots. He was a bit bemused by all the fuss surrounding the smallpox inoculation, which he gave often during his first years in the service. "When we were giving it in the '80s, it was a routine immunization," said Anspach, a resident of Columbia.

Some of those waiting for their vaccination Thursday were relatively senior officers, but that was nothing new for Anspach. On a Saturday last month, Anspach was sent to the White House to inoculate the commander in chief.

President Bush, wearing a white T-shirt and shorts after a workout, was relaxed about the vaccination, Anspach said. Bush offered some locker room humor, expressing where he would like an onlooking member of the White House medical staff to be given the smallpox vaccine, according to the sergeant. "He made a little joke about getting it in the butt," Anspach said.

Bush showed no reaction as he was given the inoculation, Anspach said, but like many who take the shot, "he looked away."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40460-2003Jan10.html>

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Smallpox Vaccine Risk Is Lower For Prior Recipients

U.S. Military Program Records No Deaths From '42 to '90

By Guy Gugliotta, Washington Post Staff Writer

Reports gathered by the U.S. armed forces over nearly five decades provide new evidence that the modest risk of serious side effects or death from smallpox vaccine drops dramatically in people who have been vaccinated before. From 1942 to 1990, when smallpox inoculations ceased for military personnel, the armed forces did not record a single fatality from the vaccine, records reviewed by The Washington Post show. The overall incidence of adverse reactions was so low that the military program continued years after experts counseled that there was no longer a reason to vaccinate, since smallpox had been eradicated worldwide.

Information on the military's experience in published materials and internal military documents from the 1960s through the 1980s comprises the only known body of evidence describing the effects of the U.S. vaccine in a large population over a long period of time.

The armed forces vaccine was made from the same strain of vaccinia virus, a cousin of the smallpox virus, that the government plans to use in the coming months to immunize as many as 11 million police officers, firefighters and medical workers who may be called upon to deal with a biological warfare attack.

But Lt. Col. John Grabenstein, deputy director of the Military Vaccine Agency, cautioned that the armed forces' successful experience with the vaccine cannot be used to predict the likely consequences of vaccinating the civilian population, since military personnel are a selected group of mostly young, healthy adults.

The lessons to be learned "are one of the unknowables," Grabenstein said. "There were millions -- tens of millions -- of vaccinations given, mostly to young, physically fit adults. Although we may know the health of the people in the service, we don't know the health of people not in the service."

Similar concerns prompted the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to "play down" their own 1960s data, which showed sharply lower rates of adverse reactions among previously vaccinated people. "There's no question the rates are lower," said Larry J. Anderson, special adviser for smallpox in CDC's Office of Terrorism Preparedness and Response. "But is it tenfold lower or fivefold? We just don't know."

Also, he said, residual immunity produced by the vaccine declines over time -- so someone vaccinated 30 years ago is likely to have more chance of an adverse reaction than someone vaccinated more recently.

Despite the shortage of good scientific data, physicians have long recognized that the best protection against an adverse reaction may simply be to have been vaccinated before.

"Just anecdotally, we're seeing reactions much gentler than those in first-time vaccinees," said pediatrician Margaret Rennels, who is supervising part of a national clinical trial on revaccination at the University of Maryland. Rennels said the trial had vaccinated 52 people between the ages of 30 and 70 over the past month, and there were "no high fevers, nobody missing work" but "just a few sore arms."

Official estimates of the risks of the smallpox vaccine are based on the 1960s CDC studies showing that one or two people die and 15 to 52 suffer serious illness for every million persons vaccinated. The most common serious effects include encephalitis -- brain inflammation -- and several potentially deadly rashes and skin conditions.

But in those who have been previously vaccinated, the rates plunged to one death in every 4 million vaccinees.

There were none from encephalitis, regarded as the most dangerous side effect because it cannot be predicted.

"Vaccinia is a superb vaccine against itself," said Michael Lane, emeritus professor of medicine at Emory University and author of two of the CDC studies. "If you've been vaccinated even 30 years ago, there's lots less risk."

The armed forces did not systematically collect data or conduct studies on its experience with the vaccine, but starting in the 1960s, a Commission on Immunization in the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board reviewed the vaccine policy annually.

The commission at times included world-renowned smallpox experts and was briefed by others such as D.A.

Henderson, who was supervising the World Health Organization campaign that eradicated smallpox worldwide and now serves as an adviser to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson.

Summaries and transcripts of the commission meetings show that on several occasions, members mentioned that the U.S. Armed Forces had not had a fatality as a result of a vaccine reaction since an encephalitis case in India in 1942. Although the United States ceased routine vaccination of civilians in 1972 and the last case of smallpox in the world was reported in 1977, the commission recommended that year that the armed forces continue vaccination indefinitely.

"The cost to the Armed Forces for the vaccination program is insignificant as far as complications are concerned," noted Chairman Abram S. Benenson that year. At the same meeting, the Army reported it had had no cases of encephalitis from 1971 through 1975, and had 64 adverse reactions. The seriousness of the reactions was not described.

The military vaccinations continued -- for recruits only -- until 1990, largely because of the perceived threat of biological warfare, the documents show. But that year the panel decided, for a number of reasons, "that threat was no longer enough," Grabenstein said.

The Soviet bloc was falling apart, and the first crop of unvaccinated 18-year-olds was coming of age. Also, Grabenstein noted, supplies of vaccinia immune globulin used to treat some of the vaccine's adverse reactions were running low, and the armed forces decided not to pay for a special production run.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40356-2003Jan10.html>

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Pacific Stars and Stripes

January 13, 2003

GIs Teach S. Korean Troops How To Battle Chemical Attack

By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes

TAEGU, South Korea — If Pfc. Kim Min-soo ever has to treat a fellow soldier after a battlefield chemical attack, he knows exactly what to do.

Kim is a KATUSA, a South Korean soldier assigned to the U.S. Army. He's a member of the 23rd Chemical Battalion at Camp Carroll in Waegwan.

The chemical battalion's soldiers are trained to decontaminate terrain, buildings and people who have had contact with chemical agents.

Infantry and other units are responsible for treating their own soldiers for chemical contamination. The 23rd Chemical Battalion's main mission is decontaminating terrain and "fixed sites" such as buildings.

Still, treating individuals is part of the battalion's job.

Kim knows he can use a handheld meter to detect chemical agents on a soldier's body. And he can use what he calls "M291 paper," a small paper towel impregnated with charcoal, to decontaminate the soldier.

"I take off his mask, use M291, and we just decon your face and hands," said Kim.

He also knows what can happen to a soldier hit by chemical attack if the unit doesn't include such a decontamination specialist.

"Then, he will die, actually," said Kim, "and his buddy can die, too."

But Kim knew none of that when he arrived four months ago. He and other KATUSAs received Korean Army basic training but not the advanced chemical training that their U.S. counterparts receive after basic training.

To give the KATUSAs that additional instruction, the battalion runs its own school, the Decontamination Training Academy-Korea, or DTAK.

Of the unit's 460 troops, 270, or 60 percent, are KATUSAs. They have at least some English-speaking ability.

"It was activated so we could rapidly integrate the KATUSAs into the units so they could successfully perform their duties," said Maj. Jim Bonner, the battalion's executive officer and DTAK commandant.

"It means that when a soldier arrives to his company, he is fully trained, and prepared to integrate with his squad or platoon," said Lt. Col. Bill Barnett, battalion commander.

The DTAK runs five to seven classes a year and trains about 140 KATUSAs. Three instructors from the Army's Korean Service Corps Battalion teach the classes.

Each class cycle spans about seven weeks, with 15 to 25 students per class.

The school devotes the first four weeks to decontamination training. The fundamentals of NBC — nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare are covered first. Then comes training in how to detect NBC agents. A third phase covers NBC equipment.

Next comes 100 hours of driver training spread across three weeks. Driving skills are critically important because so much of the unit's equipment is truck-mounted and, said Cho Hyong-suk, DTAK senior instructor, most soldiers lack experience driving big vehicles.

Besides classroom and driving instruction, Bonner said, students rely heavily on the KATUSA who functions as their platoon sergeant.

"The platoon sergeant has come through the company, went through the DTAK course before, has served 18 months already in the company," he said. "The platoon sergeant plays a key part."

Sgt. Oh Yung-ho, the platoon sergeant, remembers arriving at the battalion about a year and a half ago, a nervous, apprehensive young KATUSA private.

“At that time, first of all, I am Korean and I am here — a lot of U.S. soldiers, and it’s my first time,” said Oh. “And all the senior KATUSA soldiers, they are senior to me, so it’s natural I’m very nervous.”

Now, it’s Oh the KATUSAs seek out.

“During the formation I ask them, ‘What’s going on and what you guys need?’”

Differences of language, culture and organization actually pose minimal difficulties, even with KATUSAs making up more than half the troop strength.

“There’s really very few challenges,” Barnett said. “The KATUSA soldiers are already very well versed in the English language, and we use Korean Service Corps as well as KATUSA soldiers to instruct.”

That makes the unit extraordinary.

“Absolutely, it’s unique in that this school is run by the battalion,” Barnett said. “I know of no other organization that does this type of training, particularly as it relates to KATUSA soldiers.”

<http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=12504>

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Baltimore Sun
January 12, 2003

India Reportedly Building Nuclear-Capable Missile

NEW DELHI, India - India is developing a powerful, nuclear-capable missile with a range of 1,800 miles, said a government adviser, expanding its military reach to more targets in rival Pakistan and parts of China.

The new surface-to-surface Agni-III missile is likely to be test-fired this year, according to a report yesterday by the independent Press Trust of India.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/printedition/bal-te.world12jan12.story>

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New York Times
January 12, 2003

4 Are Charged By Britain In Toxin Case

By Reuters

Four North African men were charged with chemical weapons and terrorism offenses today after a small amount of ricin, a lethal toxin, was found in a north London apartment, the British police said.

The discovery of the ricin during a raid on the apartment a week ago by antiterrorist police officers raised fears of a possible terror campaign.

The men, who are to appear in court on Monday charged under the Chemical Weapons Act and Terrorism Act, were identified as Mustapha Taleb, 33, Mouloud Feddag, Sidali Feddag and Samir Feddag.

They are among seven men arrested after the ricin was found.

The police said they would not release details of the men’s country of origin, which has been reported to be Algeria, their addresses or their relationship to each other before the court appearance.

A fifth man being held, Nasreddine Fekhadji, has been charged with two lesser offenses under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act. The police said a sixth man was "de-arrested" under the Terrorism Act and re-arrested on drug charges. He was expected to be released on bail. The seventh man was released into the custody of the Immigration Service.

Ricin, one of the deadliest naturally occurring poisons, is derived from castor plant beans, which are grown worldwide to produce castor oil.

The police fear that the traces of ricin and equipment they found in a the apartment above a pharmacy in the drab suburb of Wood Green could be just the tip of the iceberg. Security experts said larger amounts of the poison could still be in the hands of extremists in Britain or abroad, while doctors around the country were on alert for the flulike symptoms that might be traced to ricin.

The poison was developed during World War II by the United States and its allies and has a long history of use in espionage, but experts say it is difficult to use as an agent of mass death.

Its best known victim was the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, assassinated by a jab with a poison-tipped umbrella in London in 1978. He died a few days later.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/international/europe/12BRIT.html>

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New York Times
January 12, 2003

A Deadly Weapon For Beginners

By William J. Broad

As with the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb and other deadly weapons, the United States long ago investigated ricin, the poison that authorities in London recently found in the hands of terror suspects.

The American government judged it unsuitable for wide killing and ricin became a castaway that Baghdad picked up and United Nations inspectors are even now searching for in Iraq. The Federal Bureau of Investigation confirmed on Friday that it issued a warning to local police forces about the dangers of ricin.

Experts see ricin as a growing terrorism threat because the toxin is easy to make and stockpile, if hard to use for mass destruction. It is often, experts say, the choice of neophytes eager for chemical and biological mayhem.

"They're picking the lowest technology," Jonathan B. Tucker, an unconventional weapons expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, said of the seven suspects arrested in London last week. Though the British authorities found small amounts of ricin in an apartment, some experts fear there is a large cache and detectives are now hunting for other suspects.

Ricin (pronounced RICE-in) is made from castor beans, which have been cultivated for centuries. The ancient Egyptians used the plant for its oil's lubricating and laxative effects, and the toxicity of castor beans was known for eons.

Scientists in the late 19th century succeeded in extracting the toxic protein from the castor plant, *Ricinus communis*, and named it ricin. Near the end of World War I, the American military began studying ricin as a weapon, according to "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," a military text. With British help, the Americans made a ricin bomb in World War II but apparently never used it in battle.

After the war, the American military continued studying the toxin until President Nixon renounced such work in 1969.

From the start, ricin's prospects as a weapon of mass destruction were mixed. While no treatment or vaccine can counter its deadly effects, it is 1,000 times less poisonous than botulinum toxin.

A solid, it is harder to disseminate than a liquid, limiting its spread through the air. And unlike many nerve agents, which tend to be simple chemicals, it is a large protein the skin has difficulty absorbing. The oral route is also hard. Ricin can be inhaled, scientists say, but it must be administered as a fine powder, like talc, and milling it safely takes skill.

The deadliest route is injection, which is how ricin first came to public attention in 1978. Bulgarian intelligence operatives used a specially modified umbrella to shoot a ricin pellet into Georgi I. Markov, a dissident. A tiny pellet -- the size of a pin head -- had been drilled with holes and filled with about 500 micrograms of ricin, according to the military text. Mr. Markov died after three days of intense fever and vomiting.

The castor plant is widely grown. Legitimate uses include pressing the castor bean to make castor oil, a laxative. The oil is also used in brake fluid, dyes, soaps and cosmetics.

In 1988, "Silent Death," a book on unconventional weapons, gave a ricin recipe. Soon, right-wing publications in America carried advertisements for assassination kits based on ricin. In 1991, antigovernment activists in Minnesota bought one and plotted to kill public officials, resulting in the arrest and conviction of four people.

In October 1995, United Nations inspectors searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction reported evidence of ricin work. Baghdad, they said, had made gallons of concentrate and test fired it in artillery shells. "The test was considered to be a failure," the inspectors wrote, adding that Iraq said the work was then abandoned.

But in 1997, the inspectors found new evidence of weapon production. "It was a surprise inspection," recalled Terence T. Taylor, the inspector who made the discovery. "We caught them with a full report of the development work."

After the inspectors left Iraq, in 1998, American and British forces bombed Baghdad's castor plant. But in a September report, the British government charged that Baghdad had rebuilt its castor plant at Al Fallujah and "can produce" ricin as a weapon.

Last month, United Nations' inspectors went to the military-industrial complex at Al Fallujah but said nothing publicly about finding ricin.

Mr. Taylor, who runs the Washington office of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, said no ricin finds were likely, given Iraq's propensity for deception.

As for the terror suspects, Dr. Tucker of the Monterey Institute cautioned about making connections between them and Iraq or the rumored experiments with ricin by Muslim extremists linked to Al Qaeda along the Iraq-Iran border. "It's too early to speculate," he said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/weekinreview/12BROA.html>

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Production manual for toxic ricin found in Chechnya

Interfax. Monday, Jan. 13, 2003, 5:26 PM Moscow Time

MOSCOW. Jan 13 (Interfax) - A special task force has destroyed a group of rebels led by Aslan Maskhadov in the Gudermes region of Chechnya, Russian presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky told Interfax on Monday. A manual for the production of ricin, a highly toxic substance, was found on one of them, he said.

The special services of countries that are cooperating with Russia in the international anti-terror coalition and in non-proliferation efforts have been informed of this discovery, Yastrzhembsky said.

A group of suspected terrorists was previously arrested in Great Britain. According to foreign media reports, the men are believed to have undergone training in Afghanistan, in the Pankisi Gorge, and in Chechnya.

Ricin is a highly toxic substance that comes from castor beans, which are used to make castor oil. Analysts say that ricin cannot be used as a weapon of mass destruction and is most effective on individuals. Nevertheless, memos listing the symptoms of ricin poisoning have been sent to all London hospitals.

The extremists are believed to have planned an attack on Russian facilities in Paris, including its embassy, foreign media reports state

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/doc/HotNews.html#32712>

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