Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

Bush Signals Patience On North Korea Is Waning
Directive Sent to Team At Talks in Beijing
By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer
After a Chinese request for greater flexibility during last week's six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, President Bush instructed the U.S. delegation to make it clear that the administration's patience in diplomatically seeking North Korea's dismantling of its weapons program could run out, U.S. officials said.

The instructions, delivered as a third day of talks began last Friday in Beijing, came as the negotiators at the talks struggled to draft a detailed, two-page statement laying out the steps for resolving the crisis. Bush, after consultation with Vice President Cheney and other senior aides, sent the curt directive after China sought to include in the statement a reference to North Korea's demand that the U.S. change its "hostile policy."

Bush's answer, once it was submitted by the U.S. delegation, essentially halted the discussions on the detailed statement, U.S. officials said. China, the host of the talks, instead began to press for a bland, process-oriented
statement that committed the parties to continuing the talks at a later date. But that effort failed as well after North Korea balked at the last minute.

Bush's previously unreported intervention showed the administration's ambivalence about how deeply to engage the North Korean government despite pressure to do so from allies in the region -- and exposed a continuing debate within the administration between those seeking diplomacy and those pressing for confrontation with North Korea. Moreover, diplomats said, the results undercut the public U.S. statements that progress was made at this round of talks. In fact, diplomats said, North Korea backtracked, taking its civilian nuclear program off the table after publicly suggesting in both December and January that it was willing to give that up. "The road ahead is not easy," an Asian diplomat said.

The meeting in Beijing last week was the second round of talks designed to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The first session, in August, was inconclusive. For months, China sought to lay the diplomatic groundwork for a statement to be issued at the end of the talks with the backing of all six countries that are participating. The group also includes Japan, South Korea and Russia.

But, in December, Bush's senior foreign policy advisers -- with Cheney in attendance -- rejected a proposed Chinese draft statement because it did not call for the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear programs. Officials decided to go to the next round of meetings without a draft statement in hand. Before the Beijing talks started, the U.S. delegation was instructed to win North Korean acceptance of what had become known in diplomatic circles as "CVID."

China, meanwhile, had delivered about $50 million in aid to North Korea -- including heavy fuel oil and the promise of a glass factory -- as an inducement to attend the talks, U.S. officials said. To achieve a successful outcome, China introduced at the start of the talks a draft statement that in effect was a laundry list of all of the proposals made by the six delegations.

The United States, for instance, described three "coordinated steps" that it was prepared to take if North Korea agreed to dismantle its programs, officials said. In the first stage, the United States was prepared to discuss multilateral security assurances if North Korea made the commitments sought by the Bush administration. Once the programs were nearly dismantled, the United States was prepared to enter negotiations leading to diplomatic relations.

North Korea stressed it wanted compensation -- such as energy aid -- for giving up its programs. Some of the other countries indicated they were willing to help if North Korea met certain conditions. But North Korea also said it will give up its nuclear weapons development if the United States dropped its "hostile policy," referring to Bush's declaration that North Korea was part of an "axis of evil" and other statements.

The delegations tried to whittle down the Chinese list to a detailed statement that would have included the commitment to dismantle the programs and how it would be accomplished. But the Chinese officials told the Americans that they were unlikely to win North Korea's agreement unless there was a public reference to the administration's "hostile policy."

For months, Bush had said publicly he had no intention of attacking North Korea. Now, according to U.S. officials speaking on the condition of anonymity, Bush instructed the delegation to say the administration's continued support of the six-party process rested on North Korea's commitment to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its programs. In diplomatic terms, the message was not subtle: The administration's goodwill could run out, and all options were still on the table.

China realized it would not be able to win agreement on a detailed statement, and instead work began on a joint declaration calling for the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and efforts to hold regular talks. But after Chinese officials suggested the United States would be isolated because North Korea appeared ready to agree to the statement -- and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell received Bush's approval to scale back U.S. goals -- Pyongyang pulled its own surprise, officials said.

On Saturday, the North Koreans sought language asserting there were significant differences between the United States and North Korea, and that the other nations at the table would work to narrow them. The United States and other countries found that unacceptable. Without an agreement, China was forced to issue the statement in its own name.


(Return to Articles and Documents List)
He seeks 'new era' with United States

By Kenneth R. Timmerman, United Press International

Sirte, Libya — Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi said yesterday that his country has turned the page on terror and weapons of mass destruction and seeks better relations with the United States.

Col. Gadhafi laid out the views to three American reporters a day after the opening of the Libyan People's National Congress, where he had announced "a new era" of cooperation with the United States.

Asked whether that new era had been inspired by the recent demonstration of U.S. resolve and military might in Iraq, Col. Gadhafi suggested that it had been a factor.

"We made our own decision and our analysis on the current world situation, and we came to the conclusion ... that we can't ... go ahead with having these programs," Col. Gadhafi said.

"We are part of the world. This is the reality of the world. This is the policy of the world."

Col. Gadhafi also spoke positively about recent talks with visiting U.S. congressmen, including Republican Reps. Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania and Nick Smith of Michigan, and Democratic Reps. Sylvestre D. Reyes and Solomon P. Ortiz, both of Texas.

"We are very much interested that we are able to understand each other," the Libyan leader said.

"The problem before was that we were not able, we did not have a chance to sit down with each other and have a dialogue. Now we are able to understand each other."

The following is a partial text of the interview:

Question: What impact did the Iraq war have on your decision to give up weapons of mass destructions?

Answer: We made our own decision and our analysis on the current world situation, and we came to the conclusion ... that we can't ... go ahead with having these programs.

Q: So Iraq was no factor at all, then?

A: We are part of the world. This is the reality of the world. This is the policy of the world.

Q: As part of internal reforms, will Islamic organizations be permitted to operate?

A: I would say that there isn't any justification or reason for that. The people themselves actually assume power and have the power to decide for themselves. Each one who has a word or a say or an opinion is free to do so in the People's Congress.

Furthermore, we don't want to involve Allah in material affairs like infrastructure and sewage. He has nothing to do with that. We are talking about material things; we need policy for that. We need technology for infrastructure.

We're talking about infrastructure — sewage, water.

This is policy. God is another thing. How can we involve Allah in [such things] of daily life? We're talking about houses and electricity.

Q: Last night you talked about Libya's past involvement with liberation movements and said that times have changed. How have you prepared your people for this change?

A: Our people are very much enlightened and aware, and practicing daily politics in the People's Congresses, and they are aware of the new reality in the world. Going back 27 years ago to the establishment of the People's Authority, the whole Libyan people starting practicing and exercising policies and authority. They are very much involved.

Q: You just met with delegations from the U.S. House of Representatives and from the Senate. How do you see the future of relations between Libya and the United States?

A: We are very much interested that we are able to understand each other. The problem before was that we were not able, we did not have a chance to sit down with each other and have a dialogue. Now we are able to understand each other.

Q: Your government has accepted responsibility for the Pan Am 103 [bombing in Lockerbie, Scotland]. But in your heart, do you believe the government of Libya was responsible for this act of terrorism?

A: [The Libyan leader talks with aides and asks for a detailed translation of the question.]

Lockbie is buried, and we don't want to dig it up. It has a bad reputation. We don't want to dig it up when somebody is buried. It is old.

Q: But last night you said you were going to reveal things and tell the Libyan people the truth, the whole truth. Were others involved besides the two people surrendered to the Scottish court — other countries?

A: [Discussion with aides. Translator appears to have difficulty. Protocol chief steps in.]

We're finished with Lockerbie. It's something of the past.

Q: Last night, you talked about Libya rejoining the Barcelona initiative. Do you want this to have relations with Israel, or is this not part of your plan?

A: About Israel, our opinion is very much explained in the "White Book," namely the establishment of "Isratine" or "Israeltine." They should let us rest and have one country that is one state together.

[The White Book is Col. Gadhafi's 2002 plan for merging the Jews and Palestinians of Israel into a single state.]
Q: The Bush administration has praised your cooperation regarding al Qaeda. Can you give us one example of what your government has done, or your intelligence agencies have done, that led to an al Qaeda arrest or foiled an al Qaeda plot?

A: Terrorism is the enemy of all of us, not the enemy of America. When we fight terrorism, we do that for ourselves. Kenneth R. Timmerman is a senior writer with Insight magazine.
http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040304-120159-9159r.htm

Washington Post
March 4, 2004
Pg. B3

Scientist Released After Ebola Scare

A scientist at Fort Detrick in Frederick who accidentally stuck herself with a needle while working with mice injected with a weakened form of the Ebola virus was released from quarantine yesterday. She had shown no symptoms of infection or disease.

The woman, who was not identified, stuck herself Feb. 11 at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, officials there said. The institute is the Defense Department's lead lab for medical and biological defense research and is equipped to study the most hazardous pathogens. The scientist had been researching possible treatments for Ebola, for which there is no vaccine.


Washington Times
March 4, 2004
Pg. 16

Gadhafi's Mea Culpa On Arms, Terror

Libyan explains reversal, sees 'new era' with U.S.

By Kenneth R. Timmerman, United Press International

SIRTE, Libya — In a turnabout from 35 years of hostility to the West, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi told delegates at the opening of the Libyan People's National Congress in this seaside resort town Tuesday that his government had renounced terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and declared that "a new era has started" of openness and cooperation with the United States.

In an address to the nation's top elected leaders as well as seven members of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Libyan leader gave the first detailed public account of the reasons behind his surprise announcement on Dec. 19 that Tripoli was prepared to abandon its hitherto secret nuclear-weapons program.

He also detailed Libya's extensive support for insurgencies, including the Irish Republican Army, South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress, while pledging an end to that era.

"We have guests from countries that have launched wars against us, and this pleases us," said Col. Gadhafi, in a nod to the U.S. congressman who had addressed the gathering just minutes before the Libyan leader appeared. "We are grateful to them for coming, but now the Libyan people shall hear the meaning of this."

Col. Gadhafi spent close to 90 minutes telling his story to the People's Congress, many of whom later said they heard the details for the first time.

"There were stories in the press and rumors that Libya might have a secret nuclear program," Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem told UPI after the speech, "but no one really knew for sure."

And although "people knew officially that we supported liberation movements" in the past, no Libyan government official had come out with such a frank account as Col. Gadhafi had.

"No one separated Libya from the world community," Col. Gadhafi insisted. "Libya voluntarily separated itself from others" by its actions.

"No one has imposed sanctions on us or punished us. We have punished ourselves." The irony, Col. Gadhafi stated repeatedly, was "all these things were done for the sake of others."

In a brutally self-critical account of Libya's past support for radical movements worldwide, Col. Gadhafi concluded that the country had paid a high price for its adventures.
"Libya helped African nations" as they were breaking away from former colonial powers, "and we made other countries view Libya as an enemy."

Libya helped the Palestinians, and now "the Palestinian president enters the White House. And we tell [Yasser] Arafat we oppose America because of you? How can [Arafat] enter the White House and we not improve our relations with the United States?"

Because of the changing circumstances in the world, where former enemies have become partners, if not friends, Col. Gadhafi said, "we decided to review our decisions, and concluded that we had isolated ourselves from the rest of the world."

"If the Palestinians can recognize Israel, how can we not recognize that country?" he asked. "We cannot be more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves." The liberation struggles that Libya had supported "are finished, the battle is finished ... Now people are shaking hands. So should only we stay enemies?"

Turning to his previously secret nuclear-weapons program, he noted that Libya, like many developing nations, had sought to acquire nuclear weapons "without really thinking against whom we would use it."

"But today ... it becomes a problem to have a nuclear bomb. "At the time, it was maybe the fashion to have a nuclear bomb. Today, you have no enemy. Who's the enemy?" he asked.

"Yes, there was such a program," Col. Gadhafi said of Libya's nuclear-weapons effort. Libya chose to declare it to the United States and Britain and seek their help in dismantling it "because it's in our own interest and security."

When the American teams came secretly last year to Libya to begin verifying its declarations, they asked why Tripoli had not divulged the program before. "Because now there are new realities. We are adapting to the new realities," he said.

At another point, Col. Gadhafi said, "We got rid of it. It was a waste of time; it cost too much money." He called on all countries to "get rid of their [weapons of mass destruction]," naming the United States, Russia, China, India and Pakistan, but not Israel, which is not a declared nuclear-weapons state.

Turning to the United States, the Libyan leader said he was hoping for technology to help develop his country's economy, as well as joint ventures with U.S. firms. "We can be friends because we are not enemies anymore," he said.

"We were part of history tonight," Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennslyvania Republican, who led the seven-member congressional delegation, told UPI. "Colonel Gadhafi's statements were unequivocal. There were no ifs, ands or buts."

Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas Democrat, said Col. Gadhafi had shown political courage. "I have lots of respect and admiration for a man who publicly admits his mistakes. It takes a lot of guts to say what he said in front of all these people. But now, he must live up to it."

In his colorful presentation, Col. Gadhafi frequently sounded the theme that nuclear weapons and terrorism were no longer a guarantor of security, but a security risk. Having publicly abandoned its weapons and opened its nuclear sites to international inspections, Libya had enhanced its security, not diminished it, he said.

"If there is any aggression against Libya now, the whole world will come to defend Libya," he said. "Yesterday, that was not the case."

The U.S. congressmen applauded Col. Gadhafi when he spoke of his desire to build a strong new relationship with the United States, and were upbeat about the prospects for bilateral cooperation.

"At first, I was just listening to the speech, but what he was saying was so amazing that I started writing it down so I could report to my constituents," said Rep. Susan A. Davis, California Democrat. "I took 24 pages of notes."

"I thought it was very sincere and well thought out and vigorously pleaded," said Rep. Chris Chocola, Indiana Republican. The United States "should accept his posture, but trust and verify."

The U.S. government has commended Libya for its cooperation in disclosing and dismantling its ballistic missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons. "The Libyans are now waiting to see if we are going to come through, or whether we just wanted to get the weapons out," Mr. Weldon said.

In recounting his earlier relations with the United States, Col. Gadhafi pointed out that when he asked the United States to abandon its military bases in Libya, the army left "and we were still friends."

"The incredible thing about being here is to hear a former antagonist of our country say, 'What in the world was I thinking when I took on a superpower?"' said Rep. Sylvestre Reyes, Texas Democrat. "I thought it was an incredible historic moment. This could potentially redefine our relations with Africa, and potentially with the most conflicted part of the world, which is the Middle East."

"If I had not been here and had Chairman Weldon or Congressman Ortiz tell me about it, I would not have believed it," he added.
Mr. Weldon had led the first bipartisan congressional delegation to Libya from Jan. 25 to 27 and had met with the Libyan leader for more than two hours. He told Mr. Ghanem, the prime minister, at the time that he intended to return in the near future.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Delaware Democrat and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had been invited to address the People's Congress with Mr. Weldon, but previously unscheduled floor votes kept him in Washington until late Tuesday evening.

http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040303-094729-9764r.htm

New York Times
March 5, 2004
Pg. 1

**Russian Engineers Reportedly Gave Missile Aid To Iraq**

By James Risen

WASHINGTON, March 4 — A group of Russian engineers secretly aided Saddam Hussein's long-range ballistic missile program, providing technical assistance for prohibited Iraqi weapons projects even in the years just before the war that ousted him from power, American government officials say.

Iraqis who were involved in the missile work told American investigators that the technicians had not been working for the Russian government, but for a private company. But any such work on Iraq's banned missiles would have violated United Nations sanctions, even as the Security Council sought to enforce them.

Although Iraq ultimately failed to develop and produce long-range ballistic missiles and though even its permitted short-range missile projects were fraught with problems, its missile program is now seen as the main prohibited weapons effort that Iraq continued right up until the war was imminent.

After the first Persian Gulf war in 1991, Iraq was allowed only to keep crude missiles that could travel up to 150 kilometers, or about 90 miles, but the Russian engineers were aiding Baghdad's secret efforts illegally to develop longer-range missiles, according to the American officials.

Since the invasion last March, American investigators have discovered that the Russian engineers had worked on the Iraqi program both in Moscow and in Baghdad, and that some of them were in the Iraqi capital as recently as 2001, according to people familiar with the intelligence on the matter.

Because some of the Russian experts were said to have formerly worked for one of Russia's aerospace design centers, which remains closely associated with the state, their work for Iraq has raised questions in Washington about whether Russian government officials knew of their involvement in forbidden missile programs. "Did the Russians really not know what they were doing?" asked one person familiar with the United States intelligence reports.

A spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Washington denied any knowledge of the allegations of recent Russian technical support for Iraq's missile effort.

"The U.S. has not presented any evidence of Russian involvement," said Yevgeny Khorishko, a spokesman for the Russian Embassy.

Russia and the former Soviet Union were among Iraq's main suppliers of arms for decades before Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, leading to the first gulf war.

The Bush administration has previously said it had uncovered evidence that Iraq had unsuccessfully sought help from North Korea for its missile program, but had not disclosed the evidence that Iraq had also received Russian technical support.

C.I.A. and White House officials refused to comment on the matter, and people familiar with the intelligence say they believe that the administration has been reluctant to reveal what it knows about Moscow's involvement in order to avoid harming relations with President Vladimir V. Putin.

"They are hyper-cautious about confronting Putin on this," complained one intelligence source.

In his public testimony last week about the worldwide threats facing the United States, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, restated Washington's longstanding concerns about Russia's controls over its missile and weapons technology, without mentioning the evidence of missile support for the Hussein government.

"We remain alert to the vulnerability of Russian W.M.D. materials and technology to theft or diversion," Mr. Tenet said. "We are also concerned by the continued eagerness of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers — which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups seeking W.M.D. and missile-related assistance."
The Iraq Survey Group, the United States team that has hunted for evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, also found indications that Baghdad had received assistance from sources in Ukraine, Belarus and Serbia, according to American officials.

In an interim report on the progress of the Iraq Survey Group made public in October, David A. Kay, then the C.I.A.'s chief weapons hunter, reported that his group had found "a large volume of material and testimony by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to illicitly procure parts and foreign assistance for its missile program." It listed several examples detailing assistance from foreign countries, but apart from North Korea, no other countries were identified.

More than 10 months after the end of major military operations in Iraq, American teams have still not found conclusive evidence that Iraq had any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, raising doubts about one of the Bush administration's main arguments for going to war. Since he resigned from his post last month, Dr. Kay has said he believes that Iraq largely abandoned the production of weapons of mass destruction after the first Gulf war, and that it gradually destroyed its remaining stockpiles during the 1990's.

But Dr. Kay has said the evidence shows that Iraq tried to keep upgrading its ballistic missiles even as its other weapons programs were stalling out. In interviews with Iraqi scientists, examinations of documents and other sources, the Iraq Survey Group has determined that Iraq was actively seeking ways to upgrade its crude missile abilities in order to try to build a rocket fleet that could become a regional threat, reaching American forces based in neighboring countries.

American officials now say that the United Nations restrictions that allowed Iraq to keep missiles with ranges of up to 150 kilometers had an unintended effect. From the Iraqi perspective, it meant that it was still legal for Baghdad to continue some missile development activities, since short-range missiles were permitted. By contrast, United Nations sanctions completely banned Iraq from keeping any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and it now seems that Iraq eventually abandoned those programs.

Taking advantage of the loophole permitting short-range missiles, Iraq sought foreign advice on such technical matters as guidance and airframe systems in order to develop missiles with greater range and accuracy than its previous missiles, according to officials familiar with the intelligence. In his October interim report, Dr. Kay said Iraqi detainees and other sources had told American investigators that beginning in 2000, Mr. Hussein approved efforts to develop ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 kilometers.

Still, the evidence gathered by the Iraq Survey Group suggests that Iraq's missile development efforts were poorly organized and ultimately unsuccessful.

"They had too many scattered programs, and so they didn't focus their efforts on any one missile," said one person familiar with the intelligence on the matter.

When United Nations weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in late 2002 just before the war, they found that Iraq had produced short-range Samoud 2 missiles that had slightly longer ranges than the United Nations sanctions allowed. In the weeks before the war, Iraq agreed to destroy many of those missiles, but those highly publicized actions were not enough to convince the United States that Iraq was in compliance with United Nations sanctions. In fact, the evidence suggests that Iraq was seeking to upgrade to missiles with greater range and accuracy than the older, Scud-based Samoud.

After the war, the Iraq Survey Group found evidence that Iraq had agreed to pay North Korea $10 million for technical support to upgrade its ballistic missile program in violation of the sanctions. But American officials believe that North Korea never actually delivered anything to the Iraqis, even though it apparently kept Iraq's $10 million. By contrast, the Iraq Survey Group found evidence that the Russian missile engineers actually did provide technical support for the Iraqis for years.

The Bush administration's reluctance to raise publicly the issue of Russian support for Iraq's missile program appears to stem from the White House's effort to cultivate better diplomatic relations with Moscow, particularly in the wake of last year's tensions over the war in Iraq. Russia opposed the war, but President Bush and Mr. Putin have still developed a good personal relationship, and there seems much less residual tension between Washington and Moscow over the war than there does between the United States and France and Germany.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States has also appeared more willing to view Russia's fight with separatists in Chechnya as part of the global war on terror.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/05/politics/05MISS.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)
Experts Say U.S. Never Spoke To Source Of Tip On Bioweapons

Information From Iraqi Relayed By Foreign Agency, CIA Notes

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration's prewar assertion that Saddam Hussein had a fleet of mobile labs that could produce bioweapons rested largely on information from an Iraqi defector working with another government who was never interviewed by U.S. intelligence officers, according to current and former senior intelligence officials and congressional experts who have studied classified documents.

In his presentation before the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said "firsthand descriptions" of the mobile bioweapons fleet had come from an Iraqi chemical engineer who had defected and is "currently hiding in another country with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him."

The claims about the mobile facilities remain unverified, however, and now U.S. officials are trying to get access to the Iraqi engineer to verify his story, the sources said, particularly because intelligence officials have discovered that he is related to a senior official in Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, a group of Iraqi exiles who actively encouraged the United States to invade Iraq.

Powell also cited another defector in his speech, an Iraqi major who was made available to U.S. officials by the INC, as supporting the engine's story. The major, however, had already been "red-flagged" by the Defense Intelligence Agency as having provided questionable information about Iraq's mobile biological program. But DIA analysts did not pass along that cautionary note, and the major was cited in an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and was mentioned in Powell's speech, officials said.

The administration's handling of intelligence alleging the existence of mobile bio weapons facilities has become part of several broad investigations now underway into the intelligence community's faulty prewar conclusions that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. The Senate and House intelligence committees are conducting probes, as are the CIA and a commission appointed by President Bush.

The investigation of claims about mobile weapons labs, however, does not just cover prewar intelligence, but also includes the performance of the intelligence community well after the invasion.

U.S. intelligence officials now describe as hasty and premature the May 28 public claim by the CIA and the DIA that two semitrailers discovered in Iraq in April were most likely part of the bio weapons fleet.

The highly publicized claim, one official said, was triggered by a May 11 NBC News broadcast featuring David Kay, then a network analyst in Iraq, who would later become the chief U.S. weapons inspector there. Kay was shown next to one of the found vehicles with a chemical officer from the Army's 101st Airborne Division who, on camera, agreed that the semitrailer was equipped to make biological weapons.

Days later in Washington, the CIA and the DIA put out an unclassified white paper that said the production of biological agents "is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles." The next day, Bush said the trailers showed that the United States had found former Iraqi president Hussein's prohibited weapons. "For those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong," Bush said. "We found them."

Since then, intelligence analysts and Kay, a nuclear-weapons expert with little experience with biological weapons, have said the trailers were probably not used in a bio weapons program. Kay has said he believes the trailers were likely used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons.

CIA Director George J. Tenet is expected to face questions today about the alleged mobile bio weapons fleet and other elements of Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs when he appears in a closed session of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He appeared before the Senate intelligence committee in closed session yesterday.

The Senate committee has drafted a highly critical report on the prewar intelligence of the CIA and other agencies. The problems uncovered in the mobile-bio weapons area illustrate what the panel has found in the collection and analysis of information about Iraq's chemical and nuclear programs.

Tenet has already disclosed that the agency has changed some procedures as a result of the problems discovered by its reviews. For example, there are new procedures on how to handle material flagged as coming from questionable sources, such as the Iraqi major. CIA analysts are now to be given more information from the CIA's operations division to help them assess the reliability of those who provide information.

CIA officials reviewing the bio weapons intelligence say that the engineer who provided the original tip never dealt directly with U.S. intelligence agencies, and that he passed along the information through a foreign intelligence service, which they refuse to name. U.S. intelligence analysts did not know his name before the war, relying entirely on foreign officials to vouch for his credibility, according to a former CIA employee as well as administration and congressional sources.
U.S. officials are trying to interview him, sources said, but the foreign intelligence service that originally forwarded his information has declined to produce him for questioning.

The May 28 white paper on the semitrailers is also under scrutiny. A retired senior intelligence official said recently that the unclassified paper was hastily put together before a full, classified analysis was written and circulated within the intelligence community.

The paper was produced so quickly, one senior administration official said, because of Kay's May appearance on NBC, in which he pointed to one semitrailer and said: "This is where the biological process took place . . . literally, there's nothing else you would do this way in a mobile facility."

Kay said he returned to Iraq as a U.S. weapons inspector a month after his television appearances and found that the DIA analysts who had inspected the trailers disagreed that they were part of mobile biological-agent production plants. By January, Kay had reassessed the matter, saying publicly that the "intelligence consensus" was that the semitrailers probably were for making hydrogen, not biological agents.

Administration officials continued to describe the threat posed by Hussein's mobile biological-weapons facilities. On Jan. 22, Vice President Cheney told National Public Radio that Hussein had "spent time and effort acquiring biological weapons labs" and that the semitrailers "were, in fact, part of that program." He called the trailers "conclusive evidence, if you will, that he [Hussein] did in fact have programs of mass destruction."

On Feb. 24, Tenet told the Senate intelligence committee that there was "a big debate" about the trailers among CIA analysts "who still believe that they were for" bioweapons, and CIA and DIA analysts "who have posited another theory . . . and we haven't wrestled it to the ground yet."

Tenet said he had talked to Cheney and learned that his January statement was based on "an older judgment."


**Libyan Weapons Reported Destroyed**

THE HAGUE -- Libya has destroyed 3,300 bombs capable of delivering chemical payloads and is set to give a full account of its stockpiles, the chief watchdog organization said Thursday.

Bulldozers crushed the bombs after each was disarmed and inventoried "under stringent international verification," the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said.

Today, a Libyan envoy will hand over to the agency's Director-General Rogelio Pfirter a full declaration of the country's chemical weapons, its production capacity and any industrial activity that could be involved with making outlawed weapons.


**U.S., Certain That Iraq Had Illicit Arms, Reportedly Ignored Contrary Reports**

By Douglas Jehl

WASHINGTON, March 5 — In the two years before the war in Iraq, American intelligence agencies reviewed but ultimately dismissed reports from Iraqi scientists, defectors and other informants who said Saddam Hussein's government did not possess illicit weapons, according to government officials.

The reports, which ran contrary to the conclusions of the intelligence agencies and the Bush administration, were not acknowledged publicly by top government officials before the invasion last March. In public statements, the agencies and the administration cited only reports from informants who supported the view that Iraq possessed so-called weapons of mass destruction, which the administration cited as a main justification for going to war.

The first public hint of those reports came in a speech on Friday by Jane Harman, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. Speaking at the American Enterprise Institute, she said "indications" were emerging from the panel's inquiry into prewar intelligence that "potential sources may have been dismissed because they were telling us something we didn't want to believe: that Iraq had no active W.M.D. programs."
Other government officials said they knew of several occasions from 2001 to 2003 when Iraqi scientists, defectors and others had told American intelligence officers, their foreign partners or other intelligence agents that Iraq did not possess illicit weapons.

The officials said they believed that intelligence agencies had dismissed the reports because they did not conform to a view, held widely within the administration and among intelligence analysts, that Iraq was hiding an illicit arsenal. The Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment directly on Ms. Harman's remarks. But an intelligence official said: "Human intelligence offering different views was by no means discounted or ignored. It was considered and weighed against all the other information available, and analysts made their best judgments."

The government officials who described the contradictory reports have detailed knowledge of prewar intelligence on Iraq and were critical of the C.I.A.'s handling of the information. Because the information remains classified, the officials declined to discuss the identity of the sources in any detail, but said they believed the informants' views had been dismissed because they challenged the widely held consensus on Iraq's weapons.

"It appears that the human intelligence wasn't deemed interesting or useful if it was exculpatory of Iraq," said one senior government official with detailed knowledge of the prewar intelligence.

A second senior government official, who confirmed that account, said the view that Iraq possessed illicit weapons had been "treated like a religion" within American intelligence agencies, with alternative views never given serious attention. The officials said they could not quantify the reports.

In a speech at Georgetown University last month, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, acknowledged for the first time that intelligence agencies might have been mistaken about whether Iraq possessed illicit weapons. None have been found yet.

Mr. Tenet said it was too soon to make final judgments. But he also defended intelligence analysts' performance, saying that they had not been swayed by political pressure and that "as intelligence professionals, we go where the information takes us."

He met Friday morning in a closed session with members of the House intelligence committee, as part of its inquiry into the prewar intelligence. In another closed session on the subject on Thursday, he spent more than four hours with members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, whose chairman, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, issued a statement describing "a frank and useful exchange."

Senator Roberts said the committee hoped "sometime in the next several weeks" to issue an "initial report" based on its inquiry, which has focused on whether findings by intelligence agencies were supported by adequate evidence. Among the reports that were discounted, the senior government officials said, was at least one account from an Iraqi scientist who said mysterious trailers described by other Iraqi defectors as part of a biological weapons program were for another, benign purpose, which the officials would not describe.

In prewar presentations and documents, including the unclassified version of a National Intelligence Estimate from October 2002 and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's presentation to the Security Council in February 2003, the intelligence agencies and the administration cited only human intelligence reports supporting the view that the trailers were for biological weapons.

An unclassified report issued in May by the C.I.A., which is still on the agency's Web site, concluded that the trailers had indeed been for biological weapons. But in the months since the war, most American intelligence analysts have come to believe that the trailers were not for that purpose, and were probably for making hydrogen for weather balloons, according to senior government officials. In testimony before Congress late last month, Mr. Tenet said the intelligence community was divided on the issue.

In the past month, some senior intelligence officials have acknowledged that some information from human sources on Iraq was mishandled, including reports based on interviews in early 2002 with an Iraqi defector who later that year was labeled a fabricator by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The information the defector provided was nevertheless included in the administration's statements, including the October 2002 intelligence assessment and Mr. Powell's speech. Intelligence officials have described the inclusion as a mistake.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/06/politics/06WEAP.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

New York Times
March 7, 2004

U.S. Lags In Recovering Fuel Suitable For Nuclear Arms

By Joel Brinkley and William J. Broad

WASHINGTON, March 6 — As the United States presses Iran and other countries to shut down their nuclear weapons development programs, government auditors have disclosed that the United States is making little effort to
recover large quantities of weapons-grade uranium — enough to make roughly 1,000 nuclear bombs — that the government dispersed to 43 countries over the last several decades.

Among the countries that received the highly enriched uranium, generally with the expectation that it would be returned, were Iran and Pakistan. The chief nuclear weapons expert in Pakistan recently made the stunning disclosure that his network had secretly sold uranium and nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

The auditors said they found that "large quantities of U.S.-produced highly enriched uranium were out of U.S. control."

The bomb-grade uranium was loaned, leased or sold to dozens of countries starting in the 1950's under the Eisenhower administration's Atoms for Peace program, which was intended to help other countries develop nuclear energy facilities or pursue scientific or medical initiatives. The dispersals continued until 1988. But the government's effort to recover the uranium, either in the form in which it was delivered or as spent fuel, was lackadaisical, the report suggests.

In the last 50 years, the report says, the government has recovered approximately 2,600 kilograms (about 5,700 pounds) of 17,500 kilograms dispersed, leaving almost 15,000 kilograms still in foreign hands. That remains true even as the Bush administration warns that Al Qaeda and possibly other terrorist organizations are trying to obtain nuclear materials to make a bomb.

In general, it takes about 10 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to make a bomb. Nuclear weapons experts say most of the exported uranium was weapons grade, and Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, estimated that the exported uranium material could make "about a thousand nuclear" weapons.

"It could be hundreds if the design was unsophisticated, or thousands if it was more advanced," he added. Much of the uranium is in the hands of Western European or other allied nations, officials said. But the report, by the Energy Department's inspector general, says that about half of the uranium is in the hands of government agencies, universities or private companies in 12 countries that are "not expected to participate in the program" to return it. Among those countries are Iran, Pakistan, Israel, Mexico, Jamaica and South Africa. Reasons for declining to return the material vary; some of the uranium, for example, is in use at research universities that are loath to give it up.

Some of the report's findings were first reported in The Wall Street Journal on Feb. 13.

The Energy Department is in charge of recovering the uranium, but the effort is housed in the department's Environmental Management Program, an office that has been the subject of many stinging audits and self-evaluations in recent years that have criticized it as inefficient. The recovery program was placed there in 1996 because that office seemed best suited to manage the safe transport of any nuclear material that was returned, a senior department official said.

The failure to recover most of the uranium "shows a complete loss of perspective," said Steven Aftergood, a security expert at the Federation of American Scientists, an arms control group in Washington. "The failure to vigorously pursue it is a scandal. Few things are more important than this. It's a serious matter that has not been taken seriously."

Jeanne Lopatto, a spokeswoman for the Energy Department, said: "We agree with the findings of the I.G. report, none of which came as a surprise to us. In fact, long before the report came out, a working group" within the department "was studying the program and making recommendations for improvement. Our plan is in place to make this a more effective nonproliferation program."

The senior official said the Energy Department impaneled a working group last fall to address the problems. At that time, the inspector general had finished his investigation but had not published his report. It was issued Feb. 9. The working group recommended that the recovery program be taken out of the environmental office and put in another office more directly involved with nuclear proliferation problems, the official said.

Jon Wolfsthal, who ran the recovery program from 1995 to 1997, said one important reason so little uranium had been returned was that "we are charging these countries $5,000 a kilogram to get it back." The fee structure was set in 1996, to help pay for the program, he added.

The senior official said the department was likely to begin waiving the fee in many cases and offering other incentives he would not specify to encourage countries to return the uranium. He declined to be identified, Ms. Lopatto said, because that is what department policy requires.

The department's inspector general issued a similar report in 2002, saying the Energy Department had not made sufficient effort to recover nuclear fuel rods dispersed to other nations under the Atoms for Peace program. Those rods contained far smaller quantities of uranium, generally not enough to make a bomb.

Joel Brinkley reported from Washington for this article and William J. Broad from New York.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/07/international/worldspecial2/07NUKE.html
Libya Turns Over Rest Of Its Nuclear Materiel

By Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writer

CRAWFORD, Tex., March 6 -- Libya surrendered all of its remaining nuclear weapons equipment to international inspectors, and a cargo ship laden with 500 tons of centrifuges and other gear left for the United States on Saturday, the White House announced.

Administration officials said the shipment includes parts for centrifuges needed to enrich uranium; all the equipment from Libya's former uranium conversion facility; and longer-range missiles, including five Scuds, along with their launchers.

In a surprise agreement in December that followed nine months of secret talks, Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi pledged to turn over his country's weapons of mass destruction to U.S. and British authorities and to halt Libya's nuclear development program.

President Bush has touted the accord as a diplomatic success story in the war on terrorism, and administration officials said they had effectively disarmed one of the world's most feared dictators without firing a shot.

Citing security concerns, officials would not say when the ship will arrive or where it is going. In January, Libya turned over 55,000 pounds of documents, missile components and equipment used to develop nuclear weapons. The material was shipped to the United States for examination and destruction at the Oak Ridge, Tenn., nuclear weapons plant.

"We're going to examine and study the pieces of equipment" in the shipment that departed Saturday, said National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack. "Ultimately, some or much of it will be destroyed. But as of right now, the ultimate disposition of each particular piece has not yet been determined." McCormack said inspectors and monitors will remain in Libya for some time, but that Gaddafi's government has been very cooperative.

"We believe this is everything having to do with their nuclear program and the equipment associated with it," he said. "Libya is now disarmed of its mass destruction and long-range missile programs."

U.S. inspectors have discovered that Libya had been aided by what one expert called an "international supermarket" for nuclear parts and weapons designs much broader than Western intelligence agencies had thought. The black market is also believed to have aided Iran, officials said.

Diplomats and weapons experts have said the unprecedented access to Libya's laboratories and storage depots has shown that its weapons program was ambitious but likely years away from producing actual nuclear warheads. McCormack said that "all Libya's known chemical munitions have been destroyed," and that the country's stocks of mustard gas have been moved from scattered warehouses into a single secure facility.

U.S. officials are scheduled to open talks with Libyan weapons scientists on Sunday about retraining for peaceful work.

Ten days ago, the administration rewarded Gaddafi by lifting restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Libya and promising to expand its diplomatic presence to its largest size since the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was closed in 1980. As part of Bush's reelection campaign, he is pointing to the agreement with Gaddafi as a byproduct of his decision to confront Iraq. "Because we acted," he says in his stump speech at Republican fundraising events, "nations like Libya have gotten the message and renounced their weapons programs."


Libya Discloses Production Of 23 Tons Of Mustard Gas

By Judith Miller

In a formal declaration on Friday, Libya disclosed that it had produced and stored some 23 tons of deadly mustard gas, according to an international disarmament body that monitors the ban on chemical weapons.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, based in The Hague, said a Libyan delegation had turned over to the organization more than a dozen folders containing details of the illicit chemical weapons program.
In an effort to normalize its relations with the West, the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, announced last December that his country was renouncing chemical, biological and nuclear arms.

As officials at the chemical weapons organization and American officials in Washington began analyzing the Libyan declaration, a State Department-chartered ship loaded with more than 500 metric tons of equipment from Libya's nuclear and other weapons programs was preparing to leave Saturday morning.

The ship, whose name American officials refused to disclose, is carrying nuclear centrifuges and components, equipment from a uranium conversion facility and Libya's five SCUD-C, longer-range missiles, among other equipment and material, administration officials said.

A senior official said that the administration was still discussing the ultimate fate of this material, but that much of it would undoubtedly be destroyed. In late January, two American aircraft flew to the United States carrying nuclear weapons plans, centrifuge designs and components, and containers of chemicals used to enrich uranium. "This is an astounding achievement," the senior official said of the impending departure of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. "Libya's W.M.D. program will soon be sailing away."

In its declaration to the chemical weapons organization, officials said Libya had acknowledged that it had made the mustard gas over a decade ago at Rabta, a production facility in the Libyan desert 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. It said it had kept the gas and a variety of chemical precursors intended for the production of sarin and other nerve agents at two storage facilities.

Libya also declared that it had tested the gas as a weapon and made thousands of bombs to deliver the lethal agents as part of its chemical weapons program. Libya said the chemical program began in the 1980's and ended in 1990, officials said.

In an interview on Friday, Rogelio Pfirter, director general of the chemical weapons organization, described the mustard gas stockpile as quite sizable, though the former Soviet Union and the United States both declared that they had made thousands of tons of the deadly agent. Mr. Pfirter noted that 23 tons of mustard gas could still have caused serious havoc to civilians and armies of the region had it been used.

He said Libya had also told his organization that while the mustard gas had been tested, it had never been used in a conflict or even put into bombs or other weapons.

Libya had been repeatedly accused of having used mustard gas and perhaps other chemical weapons in 1987 in its conflict with neighboring Chad, accusations Libyan officials had denied. The chemical weapons organization never found the allegations sufficiently persuasive to justify sending a mission to Chad to investigate, an organization official said today.

Officials of the organization are now poring over the declarations for information about which countries or companies might have helped Libya make chemical weapons or provide precursor chemicals. Officials said that while Libyan scientists had made the mustard gas, Libya had received precursor chemicals for deadly sarin and other nerve agents from entities in other countries.

One official said there was no indication yet that such precursors came from Pakistan. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, has acknowledged having sold nuclear materials and expertise to the nuclear programs of Libya, Iran and North Korea.

Officials at the organization said they expected that Libya's dossier on its chemical weapons program would be accurate and complete.

Only a handful of states have not signed and ratified the treaty banning chemical weapons. Israel has signed, but not ratified the treaty. Egypt, Syria and Lebanon have not signed it. Nor has North Korea, another state whose nuclear and other weapons programs deeply trouble the United States.

Mr. Pfirter said his organization was working closely with American and British inspectors who had visited Libyan weapons sites and advised Libyan officials on how best to carry out the government's renunciation pledges.

Last weekend, the organization monitored the destruction in Libya of more than 3,300 bomb casings that had never been filled but were designed to hold chemical agents.

Officials from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said the group would now begin plans for building a facility to destroy the mustard gas inside Libya.