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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

Washington Post
January 28, 2004
Pg. 1

Kay Says Evidence Shows Iraq Disarmed

Action Done in '90s, Ex-Inspector Notes

By Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. weapons inspectors in Iraq found new evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime quietly destroyed some stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons in the mid-1990s, former chief inspector David Kay said yesterday. The discovery means that inspectors have not only failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq but also have found exculpatory information -- contemporaneous documents and confirmations from interviews with Iraqis -- demonstrating that Saddam Hussein did make efforts to disarm well before President Bush began making the case for war.

The fact that Iraq disarmed at least partially before 1998 but did not turn over records to U.N. inspectors even when threatened with war has led Kay to conclude that Hussein was bluffing about his weapons capability to maintain an aura of power.

Kay, who will testify this morning before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in an interview yesterday that inspectors recovered only partial records detailing the destruction of some of Iraq's forbidden weapons. But he said that while the full truth may not be known for years, if ever, that ambiguity should not be used to delay an examination of why the allegations about Hussein's weapons were wrong.

"If the weapons programs existed on the scale we anticipated," Kay said, "we would have found something that leads to that conclusion. Instead, we found other evidence that points to something else." Kay reiterated his view that 85 percent of the Iraq Survey Group's job has been completed and that "the major pieces of the puzzle" have been covered.

"We will be digging up smaller pieces for the next 15 years, but we should not wait for every piece and not be able to begin to reconstruct what happened," he said. Kay added that he is "afraid that ambiguity would be used as a delaying function by some people to delay trying to find out what went wrong."

Kay's revelation that Iraq had documented the destruction of its weapons is the most recent of several disclosures he has made, since his resignation Friday as special adviser to CIA Director George J. Tenet, that have put the White House on the defensive. Kay's statements have also enlivened the Democratic presidential race and caused a wave of recriminations from the CIA and on Capitol Hill, where Democrats are demanding a probe to determine whether the administration or the intelligence services are to blame for what has turned out to be false accusations about Iraq's weapons programs.

Bush, fielding numerous questions in the Oval Office based on Kay's earlier assertion that there are no weapons stockpiles in Iraq, said yesterday that it is premature to form judgments. "I think it's very important for us to let the Iraq Survey Group do its work so we can find out the facts and compare the facts to what was thought."

Though he did not repeat his earlier statements that forbidden weapons may yet be found in Iraq, Bush said: "I said in the run-up that Saddam was a grave and gathering danger -- that's what I said. And I believed it then, and I know it was true now. And as Mr. Kay said, that Iraq was a dangerous place."

In a private meeting between Bush and congressional leaders, Senate Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) told Bush it is important to determine what went wrong to produce the flawed prewar weapons charges. Democratic sources said that prompted a testy exchange between Bush and Daschle.

In his interview with The Post, as in his other interviews, Kay put the blame for the flawed weapons charges on the intelligence community, not on the Bush administration. Both the CIA and opposition Democrats -- in Congress and on the campaign trail -- took issue with that position.

Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean blamed the White House for the false accusations. "I think the biggest problem with David Kay's resignation is that the vice president evidently went to the CIA and influenced the writing of intelligence reports," he said in a radio interview. "In other words, the administration did cook the books." Sen. John F. Kerry (Mass.) said: "We were told by the administration 'they [the Iraqis] have a 45-minute capacity to deploy weapons of mass destruction.' They didn't. We were told that they had aerial devices that could spread these weapons over our troops. They didn't."

Kay's criticism of the quality of prewar intelligence has angered members of the intelligence community. He called U.S. intelligence "inaccurate" Monday on NBC, adding, "We need to understand why that was."

Yesterday, Kay broadened his statement: "Everyone was wrong. Outside experts like myself and other intelligence agencies . . . including the Germans and French believed he [Hussein] had weapons."

U.S. officials criticized Kay for saying that 85 percent of the work was done. One official noted that on November 2, in criticizing a story in The Washington Post, Kay said: "We have much work left to do before any conclusions can be reached on the state of possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program efforts." Another official familiar with the work of the Iraq Survey Group said that there are millions of pages of documents still to be translated from Arabic, that detainees and scientists need to be questioned, and that the review of weapons sites is ongoing.

In the interview yesterday, Kay said the ISG had found some "contemporary documents" that proved Iraq destroyed weapons in the mid-1990s -- steps that were not reported to U.N. inspectors.

Senior Iraqi scientists interviewed by Kay admitted hiding their chemical and biological weapons programs in the early 1990s. In 1995, however, Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamal, who directed the illegal weapons programs, defected. At about that time, the scientists said they tried unsuccessfully to convince U.N. inspectors that they had destroyed their weapons and agents. They tried to "come clean, but we wouldn't believe them," Kay said.

Kay said the Iraqi scientists did not have complete records to back up their claims because the destruction had taken place under pressure to keep it secret from U.N. inspectors. In addition to documents, Kay said, ISG members interviewed people who confirmed some of the destruction, but far from all of it. "That will be impossible, and there will always be some doubts," Kay said.

Kay said he believes Hussein may have been pursuing a course of "constructive ambiguity" before the war, bluffing about having weapons to give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent. "Saddam wanted to enjoy the benefits of having chemical and biological weapons without having to pay the costs," Kay said.

The retired chief weapons inspector said he has been somewhat surprised by the reaction to his conclusions in recent days. "I thought I was not saying anything more than the obvious," he said.

In response to the Kay revelations, White House officials and British Foreign Minister Jack Straw said yesterday that they never claimed that Hussein represented an "imminent" threat.

"I think some in the media have chosen to use the word 'imminent,'" White House press secretary Scott McClellan said. "Those were not words we used. We used 'grave and gathering threat.'"

Though Bush did not use the word "imminent," he said in a major speech in October 2002 that waiting to confront Hussein was "the riskiest of all options." The United States, he said, "must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. . . . we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring."

More critical information about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons program is expected to emerge from a report to be released today in London by a senior British judge who investigated the suicide of a scientist who had leaked information about the Blair government's white paper on Iraq. The report is expected to examine the claim that Iraq could prepare to launch its chemical weapons within 45 minutes, a charge Bush had echoed.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54353-2004Jan27.html>

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Washington Post

January 28, 2004

Pg. 1

Pakistanis Exploited Nuclear Network

Iran, Libya Aided Via Black Market, Investigation Finds

By Kamran Khan, Special to The Washington Post

KARACHI, Pakistan, Jan. 27 -- Pakistani investigators have concluded that two senior nuclear scientists used a network of middlemen operating a black market to supply nuclear weapons technology to Iran and Libya, according to three senior Pakistani intelligence officials.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, and Mohammed Farooq provided the help -- including blueprints for equipment used to enrich uranium -- both directly and through a black market based in the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, the officials said.

The middlemen, from South Africa, Germany, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka and elsewhere, allegedly also offered the Pakistani scientists' services to Syria and Iraq. But the deals apparently never materialized, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In return for the scientists' assistance in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran channeled millions of dollars to foreign bank accounts allegedly controlled by the two men, one of whom, Khan, amassed large real estate holdings in Pakistan and Dubai, the officials said. Khan and Farooq were longtime colleagues at the country's premier nuclear weapons laboratory, A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories, which is named for Khan.

The officials said the findings arose from an investigation being conducted by the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The probe, which officials say is nearing completion, was begun after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presented Pakistani officials late last year with evidence that Pakistani technology appeared to have played a role in the clandestine nuclear weapons programs of both Iran and Libya.

As a result of the probe, Khan has been confined to his house in an elite neighborhood in Islamabad, one of the officials said, and Farooq has been in detention since late November. Telephone calls to Khan's home seeking comment went unanswered on Tuesday.

In addition to concerns raised by the IAEA, U.S. intelligence officials have said they believe North Korea obtained uranium-enrichment technology and equipment from Pakistan in exchange for missiles. Pakistan is one of a handful of countries that remain outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and technically is not bound by many of the international restrictions on the export of nuclear technology.

Pakistan first tested a nuclear device on its own soil in 1998, the culmination of decades of research by Khan and other scientists as part of a program largely overseen by the Pakistani military. A variety of high-ranking military officials "looked the other way as insiders volunteered information about all sorts of problems in the highest echelon of the KRL bureaucracy," said one of the three officials, referring to Khan Research Laboratories.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, acknowledged last week that some of Pakistan's nuclear scientists appeared to have sold their expertise abroad. Musharraf and other officials have said the scientists acted without authorization and have vowed to take action against those involved. That, however, could provoke a political backlash in Pakistan, where many people regard Khan and his colleagues as national heroes.

"To show its commitment and international responsibility to nuclear nonproliferation, Pakistan has assured the IAEA of strong legal action against the culprits," said one of the three officials.

Although government officials assert that the nuclear program is now under tight control, they acknowledge that it has suffered from lax security in the past, when Khan and other senior scientists were given vast resources and freedom from outside scrutiny that may have contributed to the leaking of nuclear secrets.

"It was a no-questions-asked regime for the KRL," said a nuclear scientist who spent 30 years in the country's nuclear program. "Dr. Khan was never supposed to answer or explain his frequent foreign trips. He spent billions of dollars without any significant financial oversight."

Khan was chairman of the laboratory until 2001, when he was dismissed by Musharraf, at least partly because of concerns about financial improprieties at the lab, officials said.

One of the officials involved in the current investigation said that while the "money trail" provides some of the evidence against Khan and Farooq, the most damaging information was given by Iran and Libya to the IAEA, which then passed it along to Pakistani authorities.

"The governments of Iran and Libya have exposed the racket," one of the officials said. "They made no attempt to hide their sources, as if they wanted to settle score with Pakistani scientists."

A senior official close to the Pakistani president said that the information provided by the IAEA was so specific and incriminating that Musharraf decided to personally confront Khan in the last week of November. "For the first time ever, I saw tears in the eyes of the president, who thought that it was the worst-ever breach of the nation's trust," recalled the aide.

Musharraf is eager to pursue charges against the scientist, but some advisers are urging a milder punishment, such as dismissing Khan from his post as an adviser to the government on nuclear issues, the official added.

Khan has subsequently been questioned by Lt. Gen. Ehsanul Haq, chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, and Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, commander of the Strategic Planning and Development Cell, which was created several years ago to oversee nuclear security in Pakistan.

Pakistani investigators have determined that in addition to selling technology through black-market intermediaries, Khan also provided direct help to Iranian nuclear scientists by giving them blueprints for high-speed centrifuges used to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs, and the names of clandestine suppliers for centrifuge parts, officials said. Farooq, an engineer with expertise in centrifuges, helped facilitate Khan's efforts during several trips to Iran, the officials said.

Khan was well-compensated for his work in behalf of the Iranians, the officials said. He purchased houses for his children and spent considerable sums to organize seminars, distribute posters and publish books aimed at lauding his achievements in the country's nuclear program, officials said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54334-2004Jan27.html>

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Los Angeles Times

January 28, 2004

Pakistan Sheds No Light On Detained Scientists

A government lawyer stirs anger at a hearing when he refuses to explain why the nuclear arms experts are being held without charges.

By Paul Watson, Times Staff Writer

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan — A court hearing erupted in angry shouting Tuesday when a lawyer for Pakistan's government refused to satisfy a judge's demand that he explain why intelligence authorities were detaining nuclear weapons scientists without having filed charges.

Lawyers for the detainees' families say the military's Inter-Services Intelligence agency is holding at least eight scientists and three retired military officers amid allegations that Pakistanis sold bomb-making secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

President Pervez Musharraf and three senior government ministers have said at least some of the men taken in for interrogation over the last two months are rogue profiteers guilty of selling nuclear weapons secrets for personal gain.

The detainees' families say that the men have not sold any secrets and that it is impossible to do so because of tight security. Any sale to governments abroad of information crucial to Pakistan's national security, they say, could not have been done without the military's knowledge and approval.

Many here think that senior military officers are making scapegoats of national heroes who have helped Pakistan become the only nuclear-armed Islamic nation. The emotional debate, which is feeding widespread opposition to Musharraf, exploded in the courtroom here Tuesday.

High court Justice Maulvi Anwar ul-Haq had ordered last week that the government explain in writing Tuesday why the men were in custody. But instead, the government's lawyer, Tariq Shamim, asked for a fourth adjournment when he came into court, saying he needed more time to get the information. He also told the court that "in a few days' time, this matter will be over."

"Anybody who is responsible for [leaking nuclear secrets] will be dealt with by an iron hand, as the president said," Shamim told the judge. "They have scandalized the country, my lord. They have sold the country, my lord."

When Shamim added that anyone cleared of suspicion by the investigation could return to work at the Khan Research Laboratories, where Pakistan designs and builds its nuclear bombs, one of the scientists' relatives said: "We don't want them to be back on the job, we want them back at home."

The government's lawyer angrily shot back: "They have made enough money."

The court erupted in shouts of "Shame! Shame!"

The judge stormed from the bench and summoned the lead lawyer for each side to his chambers, where he told them the hearing would resume today.

Lawyers for relatives of the detainees said the government had shown disdain for both the high court justice and the basic principles of Pakistani law, which bars authorities from detaining anyone for more than 24 hours without the approval of a magistrate.

Ordinarily, a magistrate can permit someone's detention without charge for a maximum of 14 days. But Mohammed Farooq, the first scientist from the KRL facility detained in December, is still in custody without charge after nearly two months.

"They are acting as if there is the law of the jungle in Pakistan," Mohammed Ikram Chaudhry, a lawyer for the detainees, told the court. "There is no law. There is no constitution."

None of at least 26 people taken into custody since December for questioning about the alleged transfer of nuclear technology have appeared before a magistrate or been allowed to consult an attorney, relatives and their lawyers said.

Military intelligence officers are still holding 11 current and former staff members of the top-secret KRL nuclear facility, family members said Tuesday. Chaudhry told the court that they are in the custody of military intelligence officers at the ISI's headquarters in Islamabad, the capital.

The government's lawyer said Information Minister Sheik Rashid Ahmed had designated an official to help put the families in touch with the detainees. But Saima Adil, daughter of KRL's chief engineer, Nazeer Ahmed, 57, said the minister threatened her when he set up the phone call to her father.

"He said, 'What are you doing speaking to the media?' " she said outside court.

"We're concerned about his life," Adil added, speaking of her father. "We're concerned about his safety. He's an old man."

Ahmed, who was arrested Jan. 17, has been allowed to speak to his family by phone only twice, she said. The second call, arranged by the information minister Monday night, lasted one minute, she said.

When Chaudhry asked the judge to order the government to produce the detainees in court — in his private chambers if necessary — Shamim said authorities couldn't move the men for security reasons because they might be abducted, perhaps by "Indian agents."

Clearly frustrated by the lawyers' bickering and the government's refusal to heed his orders and produce at least some information on the detainees, the judge complained that newspapers around the world had more details than he did.

"Everyone in the world is serious [about this], but so far as my court is concerned, no one appears to be serious," Ul-Haq said. "Everyone is saying whatever he likes — except that nobody is telling me what is happening."

More than a dozen relatives of the detained scientists and retired military officers wore lapel buttons bearing photos of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, framed by nuclear missiles. Several said they thought that Khan was the prime target of the investigation.

Most Pakistanis idolize him as a national hero; he is far more popular than any of the country's political or military leaders, and the government risks a sharp backlash if it charges him with selling nuclear weapons secrets for profit. Although Pakistani officials say Khan has been questioned, they deny that he has been detained and say he continues to work as Musharraf's science advisor. Some reports have linked former military chief Mirza Aslam Beg to the nuclear leaks, but he and Musharraf deny that he is involved.

The government was forced to confront allegations that it helped spread nuclear weapons technology after Iran exposed the Pakistan link to U.N. inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency last year. At first, Pakistani officials insisted that only a few nuclear scientists were taken in for routine "debriefing." Officials attributed any leak of secrets to individuals acting on their own who might have sold the information as far back as two decades ago, well before Musharraf took power.

On Monday, Ahmed, the information minister, told reporters that Musharraf and other top officials had decided there were "one or two scientists who sold the country's nuclear technology to Iran and Libya."

Musharraf told a television interviewer: "We will punish them. And we will be very harsh with them because they are enemies of the state and they have done something for personal and financial gain."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-courtnukes28jan28.1.6874767.story>

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Washington Post

January 28, 2004

Pg. 21

The Fog Of WMD

By Peter D. Feaver

David Kay's surprising exit interview confirms that the old conventional wisdom -- that Iraq had an advanced and growing WMD program -- has given way to a new conventional wisdom: that the Iraqi program was to a remarkable extent smoke and mirrors. It is increasingly unlikely that new discoveries will change this assessment, so it makes sense to take stock of what the new conventional wisdom tells us about the old, and vice versa.

We should begin by discarding the self-serving rush to judgment of partisans. Democrats have gleefully claimed that since the Iraqi WMD program was (apparently) not as advanced as the Bush administration claimed it to be, the neoconservatives in the Bush administration must have deliberately lied. Despite its popularity on the campaign primary trail, this conspiracy theory is so nutty that Bush defenders have just as gleefully avoided tougher questions and contented themselves with knocking it down: How could even the all-powerful neocons have manipulated the intelligence estimates of the Clinton administration, French intelligence, British intelligence, German intelligence and all the other "co-conspirators" who concurred on the fundamentals of the Bush assessment?

But focusing on that extreme charge distracts us from recognizing some less obvious lessons that are clearer now with hindsight. Here are four:

*The alternatives confronting the Security Council in March 2003 were not viable. If eight months of largely unfettered investigations could not provide a smoking gun to prove the existence or nonexistence of a stockpile, certainly Hans Blix would fail as well. The alternatives some advocated -- I thought six more weeks of Blix inspections would have been a good compromise in March 2003 -- would have left us just as uncertain. Even giving Blix another year would have left us groping in the dark. Remember that the new conventional wisdom is built on the absence of discovery (something that Blix could have provided easily) and on the corroborating testimony of people who no longer have reason to fear Saddam Hussein (something that Blix could never have provided).

*Intelligence failure was inevitable given the nature of the Iraqi regime. The new conventional wisdom is that Hussein wanted us to think he had a more advanced WMD program than he thought he had, and that Hussein himself thought he had a more advanced WMD program than he really had. If Hussein could be deceived in a country where he had absolute power, where he regularly punished betrayers by slipping them through human shredders or having their wives raped in front of them, then any external intelligence service was going to be deceived as well. The intelligence community accurately reported that Hussein was hiding things, that he was pursuing WMD programs, that senior members of the Iraqi military-industrial complex were convinced Iraq was pursuing WMD. Given Iraq's record, it would have been heroic to connect those dots into the picture we now think we see, namely, that it was mostly Iraqi actors deceiving each other and everyone else.

*Intelligence failures beget intelligence failures. The intelligence community has a sorry record of assessing just how advanced an incipient WMD program really is. In fact, there is a striking pattern. In each of these cases, new evidence turned out to rebut the established consensus of the intelligence community: the Soviet Union in 1949, China in 1964, India in 1974, Iraq in 1991, North Korea in 1994, Iraq in 1995, India in 1998, Pakistan in 1998, North Korea in 2002, Iran in 2003 and Libya in 2003. In each of these cases, the WMD program turned out to be more advanced than the intelligence community thought. Iraq in 2003 may be the only exception (though there is reason to believe that North Korea is, like Iraq, exaggerating its nuclear progress).

*Intelligence cannot substitute for political judgment. Coercive diplomacy, the alternative to war, requires political judgment under conditions of uncertainty, a fact lost in the increasingly rancorous partisan debate. The critics who are bashing President Bush for pushing a hard line on Iraq are also bashing President Bush for not pushing a hard

enough line on North Korea. Ironically, the president is doing everything in North Korea that he was accused of not doing in Iraq: building an international coalition to support pressure on North Korea; not taking North Korean claims at face value; weighing carefully the costs of military action; and so on. The bottom line is that the hard cases -- North Korea, Iran and, yes, Iraq -- are hard cases precisely because the easy options have been tried and proved wanting.

If the current Kay exit interview had been available in March 2003, it's unlikely that the administration would have pressed for war. But since the war case rested on multiple pillars -- dealing with a problem now before it became an unmanageable problem later, recognizing that Hussein could not be trusted in the long run, recognizing that the war on terrorists involved getting tough on the causes of terrorism (stunted political development in the Middle East), recognizing that the status quo policy on Iraq was responsible for creating the conditions that gave rise to al Qaeda in the first place -- it is possible that reasonable people would have still advocated war.

So by all means, let us have a full investigation into the intelligence failure (though let us not expect one during a presidential campaign). But let us not think that much better intelligence would have been achievable or conclusive in helping us decide how to deal with Hussein.

The writer is a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54700-2004Jan27.html>

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Washington Post

January 28, 2004

Pg. 4

Terrorism Expert Calls Seaports Vulnerable

The nation's seaports are vulnerable targets that have attracted interest from terrorists, an FBI counterterrorism official told senators yesterday.

"The intelligence we have certainly points to ports as a key vulnerability," said Gary M. Bald, inspector-deputy assistant director of the FBI's counterterrorism division. "I can't be more specific as to the threats of attacks. We have received information that indicates there is an interest."

Bald and officials from the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection said they have made progress in securing the nation's 361 ports, which receive about 6 million cargo containers from overseas each year. Robert Jacksta, executive director of border security and facilitation for the bureau, said 5.4 percent of cargo containers entering the nation's ports in fiscal 2003 were inspected. He said that was nearly double the percentage from 2002.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54836-2004Jan27.html>

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Washington Times

January 29, 2004

Pg. 1

North Korea Offers Nigeria Missile Deal

U.S. warns ally to spurn pact

By Nicholas Kralev, The Washington Times

North Korea has offered to sell Nigeria advanced missile technology, the Nigerian government said yesterday, prompting the United States to warn its African ally that it might face sanctions if it strikes a deal with Pyongyang. Nigerian officials yesterday issued vague and contradictory statements about their intentions and the missile type on offer, although they acknowledged seeking ballistic-missile technology for "peaceful" purposes.

A sale would mark the first time that such technology has been introduced into sub-Saharan Africa, raising the prospect of a costly new arms race among some of the world's poorest and least-stable nations.

A North Korean delegation "came to us wanting a memorandum of understanding signed with us toward developing missile technology, and training and manufacture of ammunition," a spokesman for Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar was quoted as saying.

The delegation, led by Yang Hyong-sop, vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, discussed the proposal with Mr. Abubakar during a five-day visit to Abuja, the Nigerian capital.

The spokesman, Onukaba Ojo, was quoted by the Reuters news agency as saying that a memorandum would be signed soon.

The state-run News Agency of Nigeria also said that Mr. Abubakar had "expressed an interest in signing a defense pact with North Korea on the grounds that the Asian country was developed in that area."

That statement did not specify whether the missile sale would be part of the agreement. However, Agence France-Presse quoted Mr. Ojo as saying: "There hasn't been any interest shown on our side."

The United States, which is trying to undercut the North's ability to sell missile and nuclear technology around the world, said that rejecting Pyongyang's pitch would be "the right step" for Nigeria.

"We'd welcome a decision to turn down any such offers from North Korea," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told reporters. "We want to stop North Korea's missile activities, and we've gone to many countries to try to encourage them not to buy."

Another State Department official said that a deal could result in sanctions against both seller and buyer.

"The United States is committed to using all available measures, including interdictions and sanctions, when warranted, against North Korea's missile activities and those of its missile customers," the official said.

"The United States will continue to closely monitor missile-related trade involving North Korea and work with other like-minded countries taking steps to address such activities."

The Bush administration, along with 11 allied governments, began an effort last year to intercept illegal arms shipments on the high seas from rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran.

The plan, known as the Proliferation Security Initiative, is aimed at preventing lethal weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and dictators.

Washington has named North Korea as the world's largest exporter of ballistic missiles. It maintains that the profits from those sales go for developing nuclear-weapons programs.

The two countries are locked in a bitter standoff, which the Bush administration is trying to resolve in six-party talks along with China, Japan, South Korea and Russia.

The North is reported to have shared its technology with Libya, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Pakistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

Mr. Ojo insisted yesterday that Nigeria's interest in acquiring missiles does not mean it is pursuing weapons of mass destruction.

"I'm sure that Nigeria is not dreaming of nuclear weapons at all, just missile technology," he was quoted as saying.

"If you are acquiring technology for peaceful purpose, I don't think that should make our allies uneasy."

Nigeria, the most populous African nation with 126 million people, is the fifth-largest oil supplier to the United States. It receives substantial military and law-enforcement assistance from Washington.

It also has the strongest military in the region and often plays a leading role in peacekeeping missions, such as the one currently in Liberia.

Despite U.S. concerns about corruption and crime, the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo has good relations with the United States, although it is seeking new allies in Asia and other parts of the world.

During a visit to Nigeria last year, President Bush praised Mr. Obasanjo for his leadership on the African continent.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040128-114425-6730r.htm>

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New York Times

January 29, 2004

Pakistani Scientist Is Focus Of Atomic Sale Investigation

By David Rohde

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 28 — Pakistani officials said Wednesday that their investigation into the sale of the nation's nuclear technology to Iran had now focused on Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, and that a "security ring" had been set up around his house five days ago to keep him from leaving the country.

But it was unclear whether the government had the political will, to bring charges against the widely revered scientist.

In Washington, senior administration officials said that the investigations under way in Pakistan were beginning to tie together a number of nuclear programs and that soon American officials would be able to draw conclusions about the black market that fueled all those efforts. They were apparently referring to programs in Iran, North Korea and Libya, all of which dealt with Pakistani scientists.

The Bush administration is engaged in a delicate series of exchanges with Pakistan, encouraging the investigation of Dr. Khan and a handful of his closest aides for giving data obtained from Libya as it turns over nuclear designs and parts, and helping identify middlemen who sold parts for uranium enrichment and other technologies.

But the White House says it is simply aiding Pakistan, not leading the investigation, making it clear that Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is in control. General Musharraf has been strongly criticized for doing America's bidding in the investigation.

In Islamabad, a senior official said, "All these investigations are pointing toward Dr. A. Q. Khan. But who provided what to whom, this is very difficult to establish."

The investigation has led to the discovery of a nuclear smuggling network that one official called this week "a hydra-headed monster with its tentacles all over the world."

Pakistani investigators are trying to trace the origins and history of "large amounts" of money found in a series of bank accounts spread across the Persian Gulf region. The bank accounts, they say, were used by middlemen from Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, Sri Lanka and other countries who Iranian officials say sold them nuclear hardware and centrifuge designs in the late 1980's and early 1990's.

Accounts in Dubai and other Persian Gulf locations believed to be controlled by Dr. Khan have also been found.

Investigators are trying to determine whether Dr. Khan controlled some or all of the accounts.

Payments from Iran, they said, were at some point apparently funneled through a third party.

"It's very difficult to track money," the senior official said. "We have some leads and these leads are credible. People are pointing fingers at certain individuals."

Dr. Khan's annual salary as the head of the Khan Research Laboratories was \$2,000 a month at the most, an official said. But the scientist purchased numerous houses in Pakistan and lived lavishly. A senior official said that whether the hardware came from Pakistan is still being investigated. But he said there were "strong indications" that Dr. Khan sold the design for the centrifuges that ended up in Iran.

The official said that investigators widened their inquiry two weeks ago after receiving information from Libya that Pakistanis may have provided nuclear technology to Libya through middlemen based in Dubai.

A senior intelligence official said intelligence agencies had noticed that Dr. Khan was amassing wealth but had chosen to look the other way.

Dr. Khan did not respond to a call on Wednesday requesting comment.

Pakistani officials say they began their inquiry in November after Iranian officials told United Nations inspectors that they had received nuclear hardware and information from middlemen with ties to Pakistanis. General Musharraf has said "some individuals" appeared to have sold nuclear technology for personal gain, and he has promised to punish them.

Eleven employees of Khan Research Laboratories — Pakistan's nuclear weapons producing facility — had been detained for questioning since November. Officials said Wednesday that seven employees — four scientists, who are close allies of Dr. Khan, and three retired military officials involved in security at the labs — were still in detention.

Dr. Khan has been repeatedly questioned but not detained.

The government, which is dominated by the military, has questioned no senior military officials who were in power at the time.

Relatives of the detained scientists and an array of Pakistani analysts have questioned how any scientist — including Dr. Khan — could remove hardware from the country without the knowledge of the army, which closely monitored the nuclear program. Relatives say the scientists are being scapegoated, while senior military officials go unpunished.

Dr. Khan was accused of stealing a centrifuge design from a European company in the early 1970's. After returning to Pakistan, he ran a clandestine effort to buy the components needed to build thousands of precision centrifuges, which are used to produce highly enriched uranium, a key ingredient in a nuclear bomb.

The senior government official said there was no indication that Dr. Khan had sold the technology to pay for Pakistan's nuclear program.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/29/international/asia/29STAN.html>

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Moscow Times

January 29, 2004

Pg. 3

U.S. Presses Russia To Join Arms Body

By Carol Giacomo, Reuters

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton arrived in Moscow on Wednesday for talks aimed largely at persuading Russia to formally join a growing alliance of countries prepared to undertake interdictions to halt the trade in weapons of mass destruction, senior U.S. officials said.

Russia is the only member of the so-called Group of Eight industrial nations that is not yet a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Bush administration would like to see that absence remedied in time for the U.S.-hosted G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in June, the officials said.

The PSI is aimed at halting the flow of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons-related materials and missiles bound for states like North Korea and Iran.

During his visit, Bolton was to meet with Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Aviation and Space Agency chief Yury Koptev, Security Council Deputy Secretary Oleg Chernov and senior officials from the Foreign and Defense ministries, a senior U.S. diplomat told reporters in Moscow on Wednesday.

In addition to the PSI, Bolton was expected to urge Russia to continue to withhold fuel for a nuclear reactor that Moscow is building for Iran -- at least as long as Tehran's nuclear ambitions remain a subject of concern to the United States.

"With Canada now joining, it would mean Russia is the only G-8 country that's not a full participant in PSI. It would be nice if we could bring them in," a U.S. official in Washington said Tuesday.

While the G-8 summit agenda has yet to be finalized, the Americans hope to keep it tightly focused on no more than three broad topics, and nonproliferation efforts are likely to be among them.

When U.S. President George W. Bush announced the PSI last May, it included the United States, Australia, Britain, Japan, Poland, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands. In December, five more countries came onboard: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore and Turkey.

U.S. officials said the initiative already has had successes, including the seizure last October of a Libyan-bound ship carrying nuclear centrifuge equipment that helped persuade Tripoli to give up its nuclear ambitions.

Participating countries also have held multinational exercises that have provided experience in interdiction and intelligence-sharing for their militaries, officials said.

Washington and Moscow generally have had cooperative ties during Bush's tenure, especially on terrorism after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Two sources of friction have been the Iraq war and Russia's cooperation with Iran, which the United States accuses of aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

Although they were once wary of the PSI, now "the Russians are interested in knowing more about it and perhaps even participating," another senior U.S. official said in Washington.

This would be somewhat ironic, since the United States previously accused Russia of proliferation.

Henry Sokolski, of the Nonproliferation Education Center think tank, said that in one sense Russia's participation "doesn't change anything because the PSI is only asking countries to uphold their own laws."

On the other hand, if Russia joined, it would leave China -- whose transfer of weapons-related technology has also been a U.S. concern -- as the only member of the UN Security Council not participating.

"It would consolidate support for these [nonproliferation] principles and make it tough for countries that don't support them to get away with this behavior," Sokolski said.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/01/29/012.html>

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Los Angeles Times

January 29, 2004

Individuals Supplying Nuclear Trade, Officials Say

The global black market poses challenges for counter-proliferation efforts focused on states.

By Douglas Frantz and Maura Reynolds, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON — As U.S. and international officials trace the flow of nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran and other countries, they are uncovering new evidence that private individuals, rather than governments, have become key sources of nuclear parts and know-how.

Diplomats and U.S. investigators examining the Iranian and Libyan programs say that a nuclear black market has flourished beneath the radar of governments and international watchdogs, fed by scientists and engineers affiliated with Pakistan's nuclear arms program.

Bush administration officials believe that Pakistan's current inquiry into its scientists' activities will change the decades-long consensus on the nature of the nuclear proliferation threat.

Until now, most counter-proliferation measures — including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — have been focused on restricting the spread of weapons technology by states. A black market existing outside those controls presents a more complex problem, officials say.

Pakistan had been suspected of providing nuclear expertise to Iran and North Korea, but information that has emerged in recent weeks provided compelling evidence that Pakistani technology has been spread more widely than imagined, diplomats and nonproliferation experts say.

Pakistani scientists are believed by U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency officials to have sold to Iran, North Korea and Libya detailed plans for enriching uranium using gas centrifuges. The Pakistanis are also suspected of having provided a shopping list to Iran and Libya that allowed the nations to tap into a global black market producing arms-related components for the nuclear industry.

"There is a black market that did not exist before and that nobody imagined," a senior diplomat in Vienna said in a recent interview. "We are seeing cases where what is bought is almost turnkey facilities."

The first glimpses of the market came late last fall. Iran, under pressure from the U.S. and other countries, agreed to open the books on its nuclear program to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. The information provided by Iran included the names of several Pakistanis who Tehran said had played a role in its nuclear efforts.

Diplomats familiar with the IAEA inquiry said that the trail led directly back to senior scientists with the Pakistani nuclear establishment, including Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's atomic bomb.

The diplomats also said centrifuges examined in Iran were identical to those of Pakistani design and had been used outside Iran to enrich uranium. A senior European diplomat said the IAEA was still awaiting tests on those centrifuges to determine whether they could have come directly from Pakistan.

Pakistani government officials initially rebuffed requests from the IAEA that they question Khan and other scientists, but after pressure from Washington, they launched an inquiry.

So far, Khan has been questioned and several of his associates from the nuclear program remain in custody and could face criminal charges. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said last weekend that information from the Iranians had implicated Pakistani scientists. He said the inquiry would be pursued as far as necessary to determine how Pakistan's nuclear technology was shared.

"We are carrying out an in-depth investigation and ... we will sort out everyone who is involved," Musharraf told reporters at the World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland.

Additional evidence implicating Pakistan emerged when IAEA inspectors were permitted into 10 nuclear-related sites in Libya in late December and earlier this month. Diplomats familiar with the findings said Libya had set up small numbers of centrifuges that were clearly based on more advanced, "second-generation" Pakistani designs.

"The Libyans had centrifuges based on both the Pakistani G-1 and G-2 designs," said a European diplomat. "They also had been given instructions on how and where to purchase other components."

The diplomat and other government officials cautioned that Pakistan was not the sole provider to Libya and Iran. They said restricted nuclear technology had come from a European country and other nations. A shipment of centrifuge components bound for Libya and seized in October by the United States originated at a factory in Malaysia, U.S. officials and diplomats from other countries said.

What is not clear is whether the Malaysian plant where the components were manufactured knew it was making centrifuges or was simply turning out components to specifications provided by Libya.

But some subterfuge was involved. Svend Andersen, the managing director of BBC Chartering & Logistic, a German firm that owned the ship carrying the components, said in an interview that they were in a container labeled "building materials" bound for Libya.

BBC Chartering, which was praised by U.S. authorities for its cooperation, picked up the shipment from a firm in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and did not inspect the contents.

A central question in the Pakistani investigation is whether it will implicate some of the country's past military leaders. Pakistan's nuclear program was under the tight control of the military, and many diplomats and nonproliferation experts said it was inconceivable that the scientists could have acted without the knowledge of senior military officials.

As for combating the black market in nuclear technology, government officials and experts said a mix of measures was required, starting with understanding how the material got to Iran and Libya.

"The U.S. has to undo the network and to do that we really need to know how the facility in Malaysia got started," said George Perkovich, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The U.S. also is expected to push for tougher penalties worldwide for individuals and companies that violate export laws on technology used in weapons of mass destruction, administration officials said.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nuclear29jan29,1,6985058.story>

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San Diego Union-Tribune
January 28, 2004

Biological Weapons Race Feared

Experts warn forum of an uphill battle

By Lisa Petrillo, Staff Writer

CARLSBAD – Discussing Armageddon and smallpox over scrambled eggs and bagels, bioterrorism experts gathered yesterday in Carlsbad warned that biological warfare is the next arms race.

Forget the old hardware-style weapons of mass destruction, they said, and worry more about poxes, plagues and potential mass infectious diseases that can strike anywhere.

Those nearly invisible dangers are what drive scientist and policy analyst Christopher Chyba to push government officials, scientists and businesses to better tackle the threat of biological weapons, and to do it faster than they are doing now.

"My fear is that we're in an endless arms race ... and that makes me very nervous, because I don't see how the defense wins," said Chyba, a leading authority on bioterrorism, weapons proliferation and emerging infectious diseases at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Chyba led yesterday's community forum on bioterrorism sponsored by California State University San Marcos and Biocom, a regional biotechnology industry group. The event at the La Costa Resort and Spa drew about 50 people from what one biotech executive called "the bioterrorism game," leaders in research, government and business. Chyba, a recipient of a MacArthur Foundation "genius grant," served on the National Security Council during the Clinton administration and was a student of scientist-author Carl Sagan.

He declined to dwell on issues such as how safe the water supply is or the most deadly method of biological attack.

"I want to avoid apoplectic self-dramatization," Chyba said. "There is this constant psychological pressure to engage in this talk about the terrible ways there are to die."

He said the problem is the steady decline since the Kennedy administration of scientists involved in public policy and independent scientific bodies. In his view, that has created a huge knowledge gap, leaving the nation ill-prepared for what might come from technologically capable "bad actors," such as the terrorists who released the nerve gas sarin in the mobbed Tokyo subway in 1995.

Another speaker, Kevin Anderson of La Jolla-based Chimerix Inc., spoke of the uphill battle private industry faces in joining the battle against bioterrorism.

Anderson, whose biotech company won a \$36 million government contract to develop a drug for people whose immune systems can't handle the smallpox vaccine, said, "The system has worked – slowly – to address a need."

Anderson cited the limitations on scientists' work, bureaucracy, a lack of government leadership and most of all, the absence of a guarantee that the government will even buy the finished smallpox pill once it is developed. He said such a thing cannot be sold on the open market, and most venture capitalists won't lend money unless profits will be delivered, so private industry lacks motivation for development risks.

Chyba concluded that the best hope lies with government and science tackling the problems together, to list priorities in the battle against infectious diseases and solve them one by one.

Chyba offered this advice: The public should not give in to the fear of the threat but face the dangers with a historic context.

"We survived the last century, with its wars and plagues and disasters, and we'll survive the next one," he said.

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20040128-9999_2m28bio.html

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New York Times
January 30, 2004

Nuclear Inquiry Skips Pakistani Army

By David Rohde

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 29 — For the past week, senior government and intelligence officials, speaking anonymously, have steadily disclosed details of a deepening inquiry into what seems to have been the transfer of Pakistan's nuclear technology to Iran and other countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's.

Their version of events — expected to be released publicly this weekend — blames the country's nuclear scientists, including Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, for selling technology for personal gain.

But one issue rarely addressed by officials of the military-led government is the extent to which the inquiry has examined the role Pakistan's powerful military — which had tight control over the nuclear program — may have played in the sale or sharing of nuclear technology.

In interviews this week, retired Pakistani civilian and military officials, former American diplomats and proliferation experts said the country's military-led government appeared to be glossing over evidence that senior military officials might have approved the sales.

More recent reports of proliferation — including allegations that the governments of the current president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto shared nuclear technology with North Korea — are also being given short shrift, they said.

The officials and analysts emphasized that they had no proof that the army was involved, but wondered why Pakistani investigators had not questioned any senior army officials.

George Perkovich, a proliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington, said General Musharraf, who seized power in 1999, was trying to appease American demands for an investigation while not angering the army, his base of support.

"The problem for Musharraf is that people in the army would know about this," Mr. Perkovich said in a telephone interview. "And he wants to protect his club."

One focus of suspicion is Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the commander of the Pakistani Army from 1988 to 1991, American analysts said. Robert B. Oakley, who served as the American ambassador in Islamabad from 1988 to 1991, said in a telephone interview that General Beg told him in the spring of 1991 that he was discussing nuclear and conventional military cooperation with Iran's Revolutionary Guards.

"He said he had a good conversation with the Revolutionary Guards about nuclear cooperation and conventional military assistance," Mr. Oakley said. "Iran was going to support Pakistan with conventional military aid and petroleum and the Pakistanis would provide them with nuclear technology."

In an interview this week, General Beg denied ever sharing nuclear technology with Iran. But he did confirm that he proposed that Pakistan adopt a doctrine of "strategic defiance" involving an alliance between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

General Beg said such an alliance would thwart an American invasion of all three countries that he expected after the United States defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf war of 1991. This week, he predicted that history would prove him right and that an alliance similar to the European Union would form and the three countries would become "the core of the Muslim world, to emulate."

Mr. Oakley said he was so concerned by General Beg's statements in 1991 that he went to Pakistan's prime minister at the time, Nawaz Sharif, and urged him to quash any such arrangement. Mr. Oakley said that Mr. Sharif agreed to speak to Iran's civilian leaders.

Mr. Sharif, who was toppled by General Musharraf and now lives in exile in Saudi Arabia, declined a request for an interview this week.

Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a cabinet minister and senior aide to Mr. Sharif, said he remembered that General Beg proposed an alliance with Iran and Afghanistan. But he said senior civilian officials did not take General Beg's ideas seriously.

Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, who served as the director of Pakistan's military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, from 1987 to 1989, said some officers joked that the country, which at the time was on the verge of defaulting on loan payments, should sell its nuclear technology. But he said none of the proposals were taken seriously.

"It was nothing more than loose talk," said General Gul, who is now retired. "Bizarre talk. Wild ideas."

Asked if he turned a blind eye to nuclear shipments, General Beg said no reports of proliferation came to him during his tenure.

Lt. Gen. Assad Durrani, who served as director of military intelligence from 1988 to 1990 and intelligence director from 1990 to 1992, said he received no reports of proliferation. General Durrani, now retired, said the agency only tracked efforts by foreign intelligence operatives to penetrate the nuclear program.

He said a separate branch of the nuclear program run by both civilians and military officials monitored the scientists. Government officials have said investigators are questioning two retired generals in charge of nuclear lab security.

"The security of Dr. A. Q. Khan was not our responsibility," he said. "The I.S.I. is not a security-providing agency." General Durrani and a close aide to General Musharraf both suggested that the intelligence service and the army were not the invulnerable, all-knowing institutions Pakistanis perceived.

"I have seen the workings of the I.S.I. and I have seen the workings of the military mind-set," said the aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Military officials probably saw the scientists as "national heroes" and never suspected them of wrongdoing.

But more recent allegations of proliferation involving North Korea, if true, are more likely to involve direct army involvement, said Mr. Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment. American officials believe that Pakistan traded nuclear technology for ballistic missile technology with North Korea in the mid-1990's. Pakistani officials vehemently deny it.

In 1993, Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan, visited North Korea and was given the plans for a ballistic missile, current and former Pakistani officials said.

In an e-mail response to written questions this week, Ms. Bhutto, who lives in exile in London, declined to comment on specific details of the nuclear program. But she said she consistently opposed the proliferation of Pakistani nuclear technology while in office.

She said that during her first term, from 1988 to 1990, she tightened security after concern grew that a foreign country might arrest a visiting Pakistani scientist to slow the country's clandestine nuclear program.

"I therefore directed that no scientist should leave the country without written government permission," she wrote, "and without being accompanied by a security detail."

There are also questions about General Musharraf's tenure. In July 2002, American satellites tracked a Pakistani plane as it picked up ballistic missile parts in North Korea, American officials have said. American intelligence officials also believe that within the last two years Pakistani centrifuge designs helped Libya's nuclear program. But none of the accounts prove that the army, or Pakistan's government, approved the transfer of nuclear technology. American and Pakistani analysts said the evidence that could prove the military approved the transfer would be the discovery of Pakistani nuclear hardware in Libya, North Korea or Iran. They said it was nearly impossible for hardware to leave Pakistan's tightly guarded nuclear facilities, and the country, without at least the tacit approval of the Pakistani Army.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/30/international/asia/30NUKE.html>

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Washington Post

January 30, 2004

Pg. 21

Calling Iraq's Bluff

By Charles Krauthammer

Before the great hunt for scapegoats begins, let's look at what David Kay has actually said about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

First, and most trumpeted, he did not find "large stockpiles of newly produced weapons of mass destruction." He did find, as he reported last October, WMD-related activities, from a very active illegal missile program to research and development ("right up until the end") on weaponizing the deadly poison ricin (the stuff London police found on terrorists last year). He discovered "hundreds of cases" of U.N.-prohibited and illegally concealed activities.

Significant findings, but still a far cry from what the administration had claimed last March. Kay has now offered the most novel and convincing explanation for why U.S. intelligence -- and, for that matter, U.N. inspectors and the intelligence agencies of every country that mattered -- misjudged what Iraq possessed.

It was a combination of Iraqi bluff, deceit and corruption far more bizarre than heretofore suspected. Kay discovered that an increasingly erratic Saddam Hussein had taken over personal direction of WMD programs. But because there was no real oversight, the scientists would go to Hussein, exaggerate or invent their activities, then pocket the funds. Scientists were bluffing Hussein. Hussein was bluffing the world. The Iraqis were all bluffing each other. Special Republican Guard commanders had no WMDs, but they told investigators that they were sure other guard units did. It was this internal disinformation that the whole outside world missed.

Congress needs to find out why, with all our resources, we had not a clue that this was going on. But Kay makes clear that President Bush was relying on what the intelligence agencies were telling him. Kay contradicts the reckless Democratic charges that Bush cooked the books. "All the analysts I have talked to said they never felt pressured on WMD," says Kay. "Everyone believed that [Iraq] had WMD."

That includes the Clinton administration. Kay told The Post he had found evidence that Hussein had quietly destroyed some biological and chemical weapons in the mid-1990s -- but never reported it to the United Nations. Which was why President Bill Clinton in 1998 declared with great alarm and great confidence that Hussein had huge stockpiles of biological and chemical arms -- "and some day, some way, I guarantee you he'll use the arsenal." The intelligence failure is quite spectacular, but its history is quite prosaic. When the U.N. inspectors left in 1998, they assumed that the huge stockpiles of unaccounted-for weapons still existed. What other assumption could they make? That Hussein had destroyed them and not reported that to the very agency that could have then vindicated him and gotten sanctions lifted?

Secretary of State Colin Powell correctly makes the case that this very fact -- the concealment of both the weapons and their possible destruction -- clearly justifies the legality of the Iraq war, since the terms of the 1991 cease-fire placed the positive obligation on Iraq to demonstrate its own disarmament. It clearly and repeatedly failed to do that.

But beyond the legal question is the security question. People forget that when the Bush administration came into office, Iraq was a very unstable place. Thousands of Iraqis were dying as a result of sanctions. Containment necessitated the garrisoning of Saudi Arabia with thousands of "infidel" American troops -- in the eyes of many Muslims, a desecration (cited by Osama bin Laden as his No. 1 reason for his 1996 "Declaration of War" on America). The no-fly zones were slow-motion war, and the embargo was costly and dangerous -- the sailors who died on the USS Cole were on embargo duty.

Until Bush got serious, threatened war and massed troops in Kuwait, the U.N. was headed toward loosening and ultimately lifting sanctions, which would have given Hussein carte blanche to regroup and rebuild his WMDs. Bush reversed that slide with his threat to go to war. But that kind of aggressive posture is impossible to maintain indefinitely. A regime of inspections, embargo, sanctions, no-fly zones and thousands of combat troops in Kuwait was an unstable equilibrium. The United States could have either retreated and allowed Hussein free rein -- or gone to war and removed him. Those were the only two ways to go.

Under the circumstances, and given what every intelligence agency on the planet agreed was going on in Iraq, the president made the right choice, indeed the only choice.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61949-2004Jan29.html>

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Washington Times

January 30, 2004

Pg. 5

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Bio-weapon sensors

The U.S. government is having a difficult time developing accurate sensors to detect the presence of biological weapons.

The Pentagon is in the process of preparing all U.S. military bases and facilities to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and high-explosive attacks.

The challenge faced by the Pentagon is that the current sensors cannot reliably tell when a real biological-warfare agent triggers the sensors.

State-of-the-art technology uses a method that detects the presence of an agent such as anthrax when minute particles come in contact with a special strip.

Unfortunately, other particles in the air also trigger the sensors, something that could lead to large-scale disruption of activities as the result of false alarms.

Iraqi nerve agent

David Kay, the former CIA head of the Iraq Survey Group that sought Saddam Hussein's hidden weapons, revealed this week that some of the VX chemical agent unaccounted for was lost in a traffic accident.

Sen. Susan Collins, Maine Republican, on Wednesday asked Mr. Kay what happened to the 1.5 tons of VX that could not be accounted for by United Nations arms inspectors.

Mr. Kay stated during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the missing agent is "still a subject of investigation." He said the Iraqi government tried to account for the missing agent.

"One large amount of VX apparently ... had been forward deployed in Iraq towards the Kuwaiti border," Mr. Kay said. "As they were moving it back in 1991, there was a traffic accident. The truck carrying it was totally consumed in a fire. They documented it in part, but there was the usual embarrassment of 'do we tell Saddam we've just burned up a large amount of chemical-warfare agent?' So it wasn't fully reported and fully documented. They didn't do analytical sampling, so they had only partial records."

Mr. Kay believes the Iraqi explanation. "Some of it was simply accounting errors that were wrong in material balance," he said. "Others are going to be in what I call this 'unresolved ambiguity' that we may simply never know."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/inring.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

January 30, 2004

Bush To Seek More Money To Thwart Bioterrorism

By Jon Marino, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration, continuing to disclose its proposed increases for selected programs before sending the 2005 budget to Congress on Monday, announced Thursday that it would seek \$274 million next year to fight health threats, largely to deter bioterrorism.

That would be at least double this year's spending.

Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson said they would focus the funds on monitoring hospitals and clinics for unusual disease trends and drug use, inspecting imported foods and improving data sharing between branches of government.

"We'll be able to get information from hospitals, pharmacists and clinics across America on a daily basis," Thompson said. "It is vital that we detect, monitor and treat any disease outbreak as quickly and efficiently as possible."

Patients' identities will remain protected, Thompson said, though public health officials will have access to information like patient records that have been off limits.

The \$274 million would not all go toward combating bioterrorism. It would also be used to track avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome, West Nile virus, mad cow disease and other public health threats. Some of the money would be aimed at research and development of vaccines, including an augmented prevention and control effort against smallpox. Security patrols would be increased at airports and shipping docks.

Ridge said the 30 cities now being monitored for biological pathogens would be increased to more than 60 in 2005. "Every day there become fewer gaps and weaknesses for terrorists to exploit," Ridge said. "Early detection and early response are critical to saving lives in the event of a terrorist attack."

The \$274 million proposal includes \$135 million for the Health and Human Services Department and \$129 million for Homeland Security. The final \$10 million would go to the Agriculture Department for its food, animal and plant inspections.

Homeland Security's bio-surveillance budget would get a 135% increase from its \$55-million 2004 allocation if Congress approves.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-bioterror30jan30,1,466004.story>

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Moscow Times
January 30, 2004
Pg. 3

Bolton Talks Nonproliferation

By Associated Press

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton opened talks Thursday with high-ranking officials on promoting nonproliferation, including a Washington initiative on intercepting vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying components of weapons of mass destruction.

His visit came after Secretary of State Colin Powell's two-day stay, which focused on potentially damaging differences over Russian domestic and foreign policy. (Story, Page 4.)

Bolton met first with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, who is in charge of arms control and nonproliferation issues. He was also scheduled to meet with Colonel General Yury Baluyevsky, the first deputy of the military's General Staff, Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, State Duma international affairs committee chairman Konstantin Kosachyov, Security Council Deputy Secretary Oleg Chernov, and Yury Koptev, the chief of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.

Kislyak told Interfax that he and Bolton had "synchronized watches," to check their progress in meeting nonproliferation and disarmament commitments.

"We had a serious, businesslike, pragmatic conversation aimed at further expanding the two countries' cooperation in these spheres," Kislyak said.

He confirmed that he and Bolton had discussed the 2002 Moscow Treaty, cutting both sides' missile arsenals, and the American Proliferation Security Initiative put forward by U.S. President George W. Bush.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/01/30/016.html>

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