



# USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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January 9, 2004

## **Navy chemical detection technology now on market**

by JO1 (AW) John J. Joyce

Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Public Affairs

The non-exclusive license agreement signed by the U.S. Navy and Fredericksburg, Va.-based Science and Technology Research (STR) is expected to bolster homeland security by equipping American office buildings, factories, shopping malls and cruise liners with the same chemical detection technology currently used on Navy warships.

"Navy technology transfer programs encourage the private sector and government to creatively and effectively work together to increase the safety of our forward-deployed warfighters and protect Americans on the home front," said Capt. Lyal Davidson, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) commanding officer at the Dec. 23 signing ceremony held in Dahlgren, Va. "Today's technology transfer agreement with a local manufacturer of a portable chemical detection system created and developed at NSWCDD also demonstrates the capability of the Warfare Centers to partner with the commercial sector to fully leverage taxpayers' money."

With the non-exclusive license, STR, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Markland Technologies (OTCBB: MRKL), can now manufacture and sell a basic version of the patented Shipboard Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm (Ship ACADA) to non-federal government and commercial entities.

"This business model demonstrates how NSWC Dahlgren, Department of Homeland Security, and other Warfare Centers can assist small companies to create solutions for homeland security almost cost-free, since the Navy will realize return on investment in the new and emerging technologies being introduced into the marketplace," said STR President and Chief Financial Officer Ken Ducey Jr. "Markland Technologies will provide STR the infrastructure they need to bring ACADA to government, military and commercial customers nationwide."

Invented by NSWCDD engineers Mike Pompeii and Kevin Machlinski, the technology used in the Ship ACADA -- a portable chemical warfare (CW) agent detector used on U.S. Navy ships to immediately, accurately, and reliably detect nerve and blister Chemical Warfare agents -- prevents false detections and contains an easily reprogrammable computer chip to allow the detection of possible future threat agents.

"This technology can be used in many ways, including detection of chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and other chemical agents that may be used by terrorists," said Pompeii, head of the NSWCDD Chemical-Biological Defense Division. "This is just another example of technology being transferred to industry and other government agencies to ultimately help and protect the American people. I'm very pleased that the technology we developed here at Dahlgren is not only helping our Sailors in harm's way, but will also help and protect people in a variety of homeland security efforts."

These ongoing efforts to provide protection against CW will potentially encompass the commercial shipping and travel industries in the United States and overseas.

"The ship ACADA system has been proven to work very well in the shipboard environment," pointed out STR Executive Vice President and General Manager Edward Kessler. "We have the capability to expand its use to ferry boats, cruise ships and make the system available to other navies in the world."

Two versions of the devices will be built under the license, said Kessler. One version can be installed in the ventilation systems of office buildings and other structures to monitor circulating air for chemical agents. A smaller handheld portable device will be available for emergency response crews to check air quality in the event of a terrorist attack or accidental chemical release.

This example of U.S. industry's capability to expand NSWCDD-developed technology reflects the Warfare Center's technology transfer objective to actively share its dual-use technology, facilities, and expertise with the U.S. public and private sector; and incorporate into the Navy commercially available technology that supports mission-related needs.

"As the civilian world becomes more susceptible to a warfare-type threat, the ability to transfer technology developed for the surface Navy that we develop at Dahlgren Lab will become more practical than it has in the past," said Lorraine Flanders, NSWCDD Office of Research and Technology Assessment Manager. "The scientists and engineers at NSWCDD are encouraged to think 'out of the box' with regard to the application of their inventions and to actively seek civilian applications for their technology."

In addition to enhancing the safety of Americans, the business of transferring technology originally developed by the Navy to commercial enterprises is believed to strengthen the local economy and the U.S. industrial base. What's more, the per-unit cost to the Navy in any subsequent procurement of a Navy patented technological product, such as the shipboard ACADA unit, is expected to drop significantly.

"The non-exclusive license also ensures that other commercial sources are free to apply for and possibly use this Navy technology for similar purposes," Flanders pointed out. "This is an ideal situation where Navy technology and investment will be transferred and used by other government agencies and the commercial sector for the overall good of the United States and the American taxpayer."

Descriptive information about these promising NSWCDD technologies are prepared and distributed to the user community via various mechanisms such as Web sites, catalogs, displays, and government-industry conferences.

Specifically, the technology in Ship ACADA to prevent false detections is protected under U.S. Patent 6,459,079 granted to NSWCDD in October 2002.

"The team of engineers and scientists at NSWC Dahlgren that worked tirelessly on all aspects of the Ship ACADA deserve much of the credit," said Pompeii at the signing ceremony. "Many people spent countless hours designing, analyzing, testing, re-designing, re-testing and documenting. It was a total team effort."

Connecticut-based Markland Technologies Inc., an integrated homeland security firm, purchased STR on Oct. 22, 2003. Although STR is currently the nation's only manufacturer of the Ship ACADA, the Navy expects that more U.S. manufacturers will be interested in obtaining a license to the patent.

"Other companies," stressed Flanders, "are encouraged to leverage the 'non-exclusivity' of the license."

[http://www.dcmilitary.com/navy/seaservices/9\\_01/national\\_news/26894-1.html](http://www.dcmilitary.com/navy/seaservices/9_01/national_news/26894-1.html)

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## **Al-Qaida terror plot foiled, say French police**

**Jon Henley in Paris**

**Monday January 12, 2004**

[The Guardian](#)

The French police are convinced that their country has escaped a planned chemical or biological attack by an Islamist cell linked to al-Qaida.

An interior ministry official said evidence from Islamist militants arrested in the Lyon area last week made it "very plain" that an attack with the deadly botulism or ricin toxins was being actively prepared.

The eight suspects arrested on Tuesday were mainly relatives of Menad Benchellali, the son of a radical imam in the Lyon suburb of Venisseux, who has been in jail since December 2002, when he was arrested during a police investigation of French Islamists' efforts to send young Muslim volunteers to fight the Russian forces in Chechnya.

The ministry official, who asked not to be named, confirmed a report in Le Monde that the suspects admitted to the police that Mr Benchellali was a chemicals expert who had been trained in poison-making in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was actively trying to produce a botulism toxin and ricin.

He had tested his chemicals on animals, they said.

Mr Benchellali's arrest was said at the time to have thwarted suicide bomb attacks on Russian targets in Paris, including the embassy.

But Tuesday's arrests have proved a "goldmine" of further "unexpected but unsettling" evidence, the official said.

"After last year's arrests we thought we were dealing with a group planning bomb attacks on Russian interests, and possibly supplying false papers, money and lodgings to Chechens," an investigator said.

"It now seems a cell around the Benchellali family was trying to manufacture chemical and biological weapons for attacks around Europe."

Those arrested last week included Mr Benchellali's father, Chellali, a well-known and controversial radical imam; his mother; his brother Hafed; and his sister Anissa.

Another of his brothers, Mourad, is among six French nationals suspected of having ties to al-Qaida held by the US authorities at Guantanamo Bay.

Two women were released on Saturday, their lawyer, Jacques Debray, said, but six others were expected to be brought before the anti-terrorist magistrate, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, in Paris today.

About 150 Muslims in Venisseux protested against the arrests on Saturday. Muslim organisations asked people to gather in the market square and read a statement calling the arrests "a message to intimidate all France's Muslims". Le Monde said the imam had admitted that he was aware of his son's chemical experiments, the products of which were stored in Nivea face cream jars and 70cl flasks and later given to a local chemist, identified only as Mourad M, for safekeeping. Several relatives had helped buy 9-10kg of ingredients.

As little as one drop of the botulism toxin released into a building's ventilation system can be fatal. Ricin is one of the deadliest poisons to occur naturally, many times deadlier than cyanide and capable of being given in food and drink without affecting the taste.

The police are investigating whether the Lyon discovery is related to the British anti-terrorism police's seizure of ricin in a flat above a chemist's shop in north London in January last year.

At the time Scotland Yard said it might have been part of an untraced wider shipment. Tiny traces were found in a left-luggage locker at the Gare de Lyon in Paris in March.

Last week's arrests appear to confirm fears expressed by the French intelligence service DST in a hitherto secret note dated November 2002, which referred to an "organised attempt by al-Qaida-linked radical Islamists to manufacture or acquire chemical and biological weapons to be used in attacks".

It said the men involved were mainly "veterans of Afghanistan with chemical and biological expertise who have recently returned from fighting Russian forces in Chechnya".

It devoted an entire chapter to the possible role of the extended Benchellali family.

The arrests also reinforce evidence that several active al-Qaida cells are operating in Europe.

The Swiss authorities arrested eight people last week in connection with the suicide bombing of housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, last May.

The head of the DST, Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, said late last year that France had successfully foiled "quite a few" terrorist plots: 120 suspected Islamists had been arrested since the September 11 attacks and half of them convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,12469,1120823,00.html>

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USA Today

January 12, 2004

Pg. 8

## **Buried Mortar Shells May Contain Chemical Agent**

Danish troops found 36 shells buried in the desert in Iraq, and preliminary tests showed that they contained a chemical agent, Danish military officials said. The tests were done after Danish troops found the 120mm mortar rounds hidden in southern Iraq. The Danish army said the rounds had been buried since the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, which ended in 1988.

Results of final tests are expected in about two days. Before the war, the United States alleged that Iraq had stockpiles of mustard gas, a World War I-era blister agent. Blister agents are used to weaken troops by making the skin break out in painful blisters.

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Washington Post

January 10, 2004

Pg. 15

## **Syria Role On Iraqi Arms Is Studied**

By Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writer

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice reeled off a list of White House grievances against Syria yesterday and said the administration is investigating a report that Iraq stashed weapons of mass destruction across the border in Syria.

Rice, briefing reporters in advance of President Bush's trip to Mexico next week, said the United States will "tie down every lead" about any possible disposition of unconventional weapons by Iraq, including the possibility that some were smuggled into Syria. U.S. forces have searched for months without finding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, a failure that has bedeviled the White House.

Rice said the United States has "a number of issues that we'd like to talk to . . . the Syrians about." These include "the borders with Iraq and what may have happened in the past there and what may be continuing to happen there; Syrian support for terrorism in Damascus, particularly support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and their relationship with Lebanon in that regard," she said.

As for the possibility that Syria hid chemical and biological weapons for Iraq, Rice said: "I don't think we are at the point that we can make a judgment on this issue. There hasn't been any hard evidence that such a thing happened. But obviously we're going to follow up every lead, and it would be a serious problem if that, in fact, did happen."

Administration officials have been expressing increasing frustration with Syria and have said the country "is on the wrong side in the war on terror." U.S. officials believe some key leaders of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party escaped into Syria, which has a Baathist Party regime and remains on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The administration also has complained that Syria has let foreign fighters cross the border with Iraq to attack U.S. troops; Damascus has denied that.

Rice was asked about reports claiming that Hussein used ambulances to smuggle chemical and biological weapons to three sites hidden in Syria in the months before the U.S. invasion in March. News services said the claim was made yesterday on Britain's independent Channel 5 News by a Syrian dissident, Paris-based human rights campaigner Nizar Nayyounf, who said he had been given the information by a senior source inside Syrian military intelligence he had known for two years.

Rice said she "can't dismiss anything that we haven't had an opportunity to fully assess," but she said the administration has no "indications that I would consider credible and firm that that has taken place." The smuggling report followed an interview this week in which Syrian President Bashar Assad told London's Daily Telegraph that he would not abandon his country's suspected chemical and biological programs unless Israel gives up its undeclared nuclear arsenal.

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## **N. Korea boasts of nuke-fuel factory U.S. delegation took a tour of 'nuclear deterrent' facility**

By Barbara Slavin  
USA TODAY

North Korea says it has shown a U.S. delegation new evidence of its ability to make fuel for bombs in an apparent effort to strengthen its demands for aid in return for halting its nuclear program.

Members of the group visited North Korea's main nuclear site, Yongbyon, last week. They said they were taken to several buildings, including a site where the North Koreans claim to have reprocessed enough plutonium to make a half-dozen nuclear weapons since expelling United Nations weapons inspectors a year ago in a dispute with the United States over another alleged bomb program.

"The United States compelled us to make a nuclear deterrent force, which we displayed" to the U.S. group, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman said over the weekend, according to the country's official news agency.

"We visited several facilities at Yongbyon," said Frank Jannuzi, an aide to Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del, the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "We went to North Korea with the goal of trying to deepen mutual understanding and made some progress," Jannuzi said in a telephone interview from Beijing, where the group arrived Saturday from North Korea.

U.S. officials in Washington said they had not yet received a full briefing on the visit to Yongbyon and were awaiting the delegation's return this week. The group included Sig Hecker, a nuclear expert and former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

But one U.S. official said North Korea's willingness to provide access to the U.S. delegation probably would not change the Bush administration's refusal to negotiate directly with North Korea or offer concessions that North Korea demands, apart from a written assurance that the United States will not attack the country. North Korea also insists on economic aid.

The official said he saw nothing new in North Korea's latest statements.

The U.S. intelligence community is eager to interview Hecker, who has the expertise to evaluate what he saw at Yongbyon. No other foreign experts have visited the site since Dec. 31, 2002.

The North Korean spokesman said the visit was intended to remove "ambiguity" about the nuclear program and "serve as a foundation for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue."

So far, however, North Korea has not provided information about another effort to buy equipment to enrich uranium for weapons. A North Korean admission of that effort led to the collapse in October 2002 of a 1994 agreement with the United States to provide energy aid in exchange for a halt to activities at Yongbyon.

While the Americans were in North Korea last week, the government there said it would be willing to shut down its entire nuclear program as the first phase of a diplomatic settlement. Secretary of State Colin Powell called the proposal "positive" and "interesting." In an interview with Japanese television network NHK broadcast Sunday, Powell repeated that "President Bush has made it clear that he wants to find a political, diplomatic solution to this challenge, and I think we can."

A Chinese official arrives in Washington this week to discuss arranging a second round of talks between North Korea, its neighbors and the United States. An earlier round, in August, ended without progress.

Many Korea experts doubt an agreement will be possible this year, given the mistrust between the United States and North Korea and internal political divisions in both governments.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20040112/5829625s.htm>

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Time

January 19, 2004

## **Inside The A-Bomb Bazaar**

## *Evidence mounts that Pakistani scientists sold nuclear know-how to a triad of rogue nations*

By Johanna McGeary

Dapper Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was always a man with a mission — even if it was long shrouded in obscurity. Some 30 years ago, he allegedly stole blueprints for enriching uranium from the top-secret Dutch lab where he worked. For decades, his team in Pakistan labored behind heavily guarded walls to produce enough of the fuel to make A-bombs. In 1998 he watched proudly as Pakistan detonated its first nuclear devices beneath the scorched desert hills of Baluchistan, shocking an unsuspecting world. A public hero at last to exultant countrymen, he was hailed throughout the Muslim world as the "father of the Islamic Bomb."

Now Khan is earning new renown as the godfather of nuclear proliferation, a dangerous salesman who helped bring the Bomb within closer reach of other eager powers. Since Iran and Libya were exposed in recent months as nuclear-weapon owners in the making, Khan and more than six other scientists who worked with him, plus an undisclosed number of Pakistani diplomats and intelligence agents posted abroad, have been under investigation in Islamabad for sharing the playbook of atomic weapons with those states, well-placed foreign intelligence sources tell TIME. Khan has long been suspected of orchestrating Pakistan's nukes-for-missiles swap with North Korea, and his name even appeared in a 1990 letter from a Dubai middleman to Saddam Hussein offering to sell Iraq the scientist's nuclear know-how.

U.S. intelligence officers have joined the Pakistani probe, hoping it will provide clues to unmask and stamp out clandestine nuclear-procurement networks. The one Khan pioneered for Pakistan is considered a model for would-be Bomb builders. "I've always thought that A.Q. Khan's Rolodex is the most important thing of all in giving people advice on how to put all the pieces together," says Robert Oakley, former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan. Washington is worried that someone might barter away Pakistan's nuclear secrets to terrorists.

One question no one involved wants to address is whether Khan and his colleagues operated on their own or at the behest of the Pakistani government. President Pervez Musharraf, who under pressure from Washington sacked Khan as head of nuclear-weapons development in early 2001, insists that his four-year-old government has never dabbled in nuclear trade — whatever past regimes might have done. It's possible that Khan & Co. or the military and intelligence officers who long supported such deals acted independently. "I think that during his administration there was a lot going on," said Jay Rockefeller, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, declining to give details. Investigators in Islamabad tell TIME that a handful of scientists now being interrogated were selling the nation's nuclear secrets for their own profit or for ideological reasons. Those investigators absolve the government and steer clear of fingering Khan as the ringleader. Eager to keep Musharraf in power and a partner in the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration also tiptoes around the issue of Pakistan's official role. Yet some proliferation experts in the U.S. doubt that rogue scientists and their cronies in the security services could have arranged such supersecret, high-level deals without government approval.

The possession of nuclear weapons haunts the subcontinent. The West has long feared that religious extremism and the violent struggle for dominance in the disputed territory of Kashmir could ignite a nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India. In a welcome rollback of tensions, the two countries pledged last week to work out half a century of differences peacefully in negotiations beginning in February.

Fear of far larger India started Pakistan on the pursuit of A-bombs in the 1960s. The U.S. concluded then that Pakistan's old patron China, also hostile to India, gave Islamabad crude technology for brewing Bombs. But it was the young metallurgist Khan who initiated Pakistan's crucial breakthrough when he went to work for Urenco, the Netherlands consortium that perfected technology for enriching uranium to Bomb-grade strength in gas centrifuges. After Khan went home to Pakistan in 1976, Dutch authorities charged him with stealing the centrifuge plans and tried him in absentia. Khan's conviction was later overturned on a technicality.

Gas centrifuges indisputably formed the basis of Pakistan's nuclear success. At the Kahuta enrichment facility, later renamed the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), the scientist and his team mastered the art of making Bomb fuel. Khan was especially clever at setting up the secret supply network that Pakistan used through the 1980s and '90s to circumvent global controls on sensitive parts and materials, even as the government denied it was doing so. Using shell companies based in the Middle East and willing or unwitting middlemen, Khan managed to scavenge the necessary components from all over the U.S., Canada and Europe.

U.S. officials are convinced that Khan was the key player in the barterings that Pakistan made with North Korea. A 1994 agreement with the U.S. froze work at Pyongyang's nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant. Three years later, in exchange for the design of the centrifuges plus components to enrich uranium, Pakistan obtained from North Korea 600-mile-range, nuclear-capable Nodong missiles that Khan's lab retooled and renamed the Ghauri. U.S. intelligence alleges he made a dozen or so visits to Pyongyang over several years.

Iran may have been another client. Investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who examined suspected nuclear facilities in Iran late last year found signs of a Pakistan connection. They uncovered evidence showing that when Iran's own efforts to master enrichment failed in the late 1980s, Tehran acquired

Pakistani-style centrifuge technology, including parts and detailed designs for machines remarkably similar to ones in KRL's workshops. Western intelligence says Khan paid several clandestine visits to Iran's Bushehr nuclear-power plant, though he denies it.

When mercurial Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi abruptly renounced his nuclear ambitions at the end of December, he exposed another case of Pakistani proliferation. Investigators now exploring Libya's projects have found "interconnections" with Pakistan's technology and a backdoor trading network, according to a New York Times report. The U.S. thinks oil-rich Libya first began funding Pakistan's nuclear development in the 1970s and periodically supplied raw uranium. Washington officials say Gaddafi was eventually rewarded with Pakistan's centrifuge designs and secret supplies of essential materiel that helped Libya close in on nuclear-fuel production. Khan is hardly the only Pakistani scientist to raise international suspicion. Shortly after 9/11, two retired nuclear experts with ties to Muslim extremists were questioned by the FBI about allegations that they had discussed developing weapons with al-Qaeda. Islamabad's current inquiry is focused on a group of Khan subordinates. The investigators tell TIME that Khan acknowledges "authorizing" some of their trips to Libya, Iran and North Korea but says he had "no idea" whether they were conducting clandestine business on their own. But Khan is widely regarded as the man with the knowledge and the authority to make the big deals. He was in complete, unchallenged control of KRL until 2001. A former colleague of his claims that Khan could fly anywhere without permission, make any deal he wanted. The tall, silver-haired scientist amassed a personal fortune that pays for a lavish lifestyle. His position and revered status would earn plenty of perks. But many, including U.S. intelligence officials, believe he acquired those riches peddling his nuclear expertise.

In rare public statements, Khan has insisted he is a peaceful man opposed to nuclear proliferation. (He denied TIME's requests for an interview.) A former Musharraf aide says Khan's megaton ego — almost as much as U.S. charges that he ran a nuclear bazaar — persuaded Musharraf to force him into retirement. But Pakistani investigators remain leery of squeezing the national hero too tightly. Khan is a public icon, his hawkish face known to every schoolchild. Arresting him could trigger dangerous protest among Islamist extremists and senior military officers who feel Musharraf has already gone too far in appeasing the White House. Khan's travel has been restricted, and even inside Pakistan, he is always accompanied by two military officers. He rarely leaves his Islamabad mansion except to venture out to feed wild monkeys that swing down in the nearby forest. Officials in Washington meanwhile cross their fingers that Musharraf can and will make sure that with Khan sealed away, Pakistan's nuclear giveaway is over.

*Reported by Timothy J. Burger/Washington and Tim McGirk/Islamabad*  
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040119-574887,00.html>

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Washington Times  
January 13, 2004  
Pg. 15

## **Iraq Chemical Tests Due Later This Week**

COPENHAGEN — Results are expected by the end of the week from a new series of tests to determine whether 36 shells found buried in the Iraqi desert contain a liquid blister agent, the Danish army said yesterday.

On Friday, Danish and Icelandic troops uncovered a cache of 120 mm mortar shells, thought to be left over from the eight-year war between Iraq and neighboring Iran, which ended in 1988.

Preliminary tests on the plastic-wrapped but damaged shells, found near Qurnah, north of Basra, showed they contained a liquid blister agent.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/worldscene.htm>

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Los Angeles Times  
January 13, 2004

## **N. Korea Denies It Has A Warhead**

*Officials tell a U.S. delegation that claims about their nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment program were exaggerated.*

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — North Korean officials told an unofficial U.S. delegation last week that many claims about their nuclear program were exaggerated and that they did not have a nuclear warhead or a program to secretly enrich uranium for such a weapon, said sources familiar with the trip.

The North Koreans did, however, reiterate their claim to have produced weapons-grade plutonium and showed the delegation their facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and what was purported to be a sample of the plutonium. "They said, 'We have the potential to make nuclear weapons, but we do not have a weapon,' " said a South Korean official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "They were very adamant in their denials, especially about the highly enriched uranium."

The visit Friday to the Yongbyon compound about 60 miles north of Pyongyang marked the first time that outsiders have been allowed a glimpse of the nuclear program since the expulsion of U.N. arms inspectors a year ago. Among those in the six-person delegation was Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory in New Mexico, who also had lengthy conversations with North Korean officials at Yongbyon.

The delegation was shown the cooling pond where fuel rods from North Korea's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor are stored and what was said to be weapons-grade plutonium recently reprocessed from the fuel rods. But because the delegation was not allowed to take samples or photographs and was not given documents, it is difficult to confirm the exact nature of the material.

"The U.S. delegates consistently said they had a hard time making a final decision on what they had seen in the North," Wi Sung Lac, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official told reporters Monday.

Two members of the delegation, Senate Foreign Relations Committee aides Frank Januzzi and Keith Luse, briefed South Korean officials Monday in Seoul on the visit. The delegation is expected to make a complete report to the U.S. Congress on Jan 20.

The North Korean denial of producing highly enriched uranium — an alternate method for making nuclear bombs — was particularly interesting to the U.S. delegates because it seemed to mark a change in tactics. In October 2001, a North Korean official apparently boasted in a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly that they did have such a program. That meeting threw U.S.-North Korean relations into crisis.

Ever since, there has been much debate about exactly what was said in the 2001 meeting and how it was translated. The North Koreans have told the Chinese and the South Koreans that the Americans misunderstood their remarks. During last week's visit, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan told the U.S. delegates emphatically and unequivocally that there is no highly enriched uranium program.

U.S. and South Korean intelligence agents have gathered what they consider to be irrefutable evidence that the North Koreans were importing sophisticated centrifuges, aluminum and lubricants for uranium enrichment. The CIA also believes North Korea has produced one or two simple nuclear weapons.

"We don't necessarily believe them. I think they realize they made a mistake when they admitted it before and they want to take it back," said a South Korean official. "But we think they are very serious about wanting to negotiate in order to survive. They wanted to show the Americans that their nuclear program is transparent, that they are cooperative and they want to resolve this diplomatically."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor13jan13,1,4748774.story>

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Washington Post

January 13, 2004

Pg. 12

## **N. Korea Still Denies Enriching Uranium**

### ***U.S. Delegation Told There Is No Secret Program***

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

North Korean officials told an unofficial delegation of U.S. experts last week that the country has no clandestine program to enrich uranium, even though one member of the delegation had been present when a senior North Korean official admitted it during a meeting in October 2002, according to U.S. officials who were briefed on the trip.

The North Korean government granted the delegation a day-long tour of its Yongbyon nuclear facility -- and displayed what the North Koreans described as recently reprocessed plutonium. But the refusal to acknowledge the uranium effort has strengthened U.S. officials' suspicions that last week's display was intended to shift attention from that topic in upcoming six-nation negotiations.

The current nuclear standoff between North Korea and the United States began last year when the United States accused the communist government of secretly trying to enrich uranium, and the government surprised U.S. officials



by admitting it in private talks. Since then, however, the Pyongyang government has insistently denied it ever acknowledged to U.S. representatives that it tried to enrich uranium for weapons use.

Officials said the North Koreans were firm in repeating those denials last week.

"They absolutely, totally stuck to the script on the HEU [highly enriched uranium] program: 'We don't have one,' " a senior administration official said.

The Bush administration has insisted that North Korea must verifiably and irreversibly dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including both the enrichment project and the Yongbyon facility.

The official added that the delegation asked whether the North Koreans, in a good-faith effort, would make available any equipment associated with such a program, which U.S. officials said they know North Korea obtained. But North Korean officials simply repeated they didn't have an enrichment program, officials said.

North Korea also denied the existence of the program during the first round of six-nation talks in August designed to resolve the crisis. Since then, its contention appears to have picked up the support of China, the host of the talks. A senior Chinese official recently told Japanese and Korean diplomats it is not convinced of U.S. claims that North Korea has a uranium program, a statement that angered some U.S. officials.

Within the U.S. government, there is little dispute over the intelligence indicating North Korea has been secretly building uranium enrichment capability in violation of a 1994 accord. The main question has been when the program would be capable of making fissile material, with administration estimates ranging from the end of this year to 2007. .

Yesterday, North Korea publicly reiterated an offer it made to the unofficial delegation to "freeze our nuclear activities based on graphite-moderated reactors as a starting point for denuclearization," in exchange for compensation. The Yongbyon facility includes the reactors, as well as a reprocessing laboratory, but the location of the uranium enrichment program has not been determined by U.S. intelligence.

A year ago, North Korea evicted international inspectors from Yongbyon, which had been sealed under the 1994 accord reached with the Clinton administration. North Korea announced it would begin reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been kept in a cooling pond -- enough to produce material for a half-dozen weapons. The cooling pond was empty last week during the delegation's visit, and the reprocessing plant was operating, officials said.

The Bush administration said the 1994 agreement had been nullified by Pyongyang's admission of the enrichment. One of the specialists who visited North Korea last week, former State Department official Charles L. Pritchard, was part of the U.S. delegation that reported hearing the North Korean admission. U.S. officials said they had three translators at the 2002 session and have no doubt the North Koreans confirmed the program.

One official present at the 2002 meeting said Pritchard and Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly began passing notes as Kang Suk Ju, North Korea's first vice foreign minister, "looking flushed and defiant," began a 50-minute monologue reacting to the U.S. declaration that it knew North Korea had an enrichment program. As the translation progressed, Pritchard and Kelly each passed notes, asking, "Is he saying what we think he's saying?" A half minute later, they passed notes again, in effect saying, "Never mind -- it's clear."

Yesterday, several officials said that the delegation last week was able to look at a substance described by the North Koreans as reprocessed plutonium, but it lacked equipment that would verify that assertion. One delegation member, Siegfried S. Hecker, is a metallurgist who headed Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1985 to 1997. U.S. officials plan to extensively debrief Hecker on what he saw in an effort to ascertain whether it truly was weapons-grade plutonium. Hecker engaged a senior North Korean scientist in a discussion on the use of plutonium in nuclear weapons, and determined the scientist was fairly knowledgeable, one official said. Harold Agnew, director of Los Alamos from 1970 to 1979, said Hecker is an expert on plutonium but it would be difficult to confirm the nature of the substance simply by looking at it.

*Correspondent Anthony Faiola contributed to this report from Seoul.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11364-2004Jan12.html>

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Washington Times

January 13, 2004

Pg. 13

## **U.S. Hopes Grow For New Nuke Talks**

*Yongbyon visit yields few clues*

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

The Bush administration yesterday expressed growing confidence that stalled talks over the North Korean nuclear crisis can be revived soon, even as two private American delegations that just visited the North offered few public clues about the state of Pyongyang's nuclear programs.

Chinese diplomats will be at the State Department today to discuss a possible new round of six-nation talks in Beijing, which have been on hold since August.

"We think that all parties are pretty fully engaged in this process," department spokesman Adam Ereli said yesterday. "The discussions that are being had between all the parties are serious and positive, and we're hopeful that talks can be resumed."

Beijing originally hoped to convene another round of the talks — which include North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan — before the end of last year. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told a Japanese newspaper yesterday he now hoped to hold a new round of negotiations next month.

Mr. Ereli said U.S. officials have received only a brief description of the trip to North Korea by two private delegations last week. The delegations, which toured the North's suspect Yongbyon nuclear facility and held high-level talks with North Korean officials, return to Washington later this week.

The Americans were the first outsiders to visit the site since the sharp escalation of the Korean Peninsula crisis in 2002. The United States accuses the North of reviving forbidden nuclear-arms programs at Yongbyon and other sites, and has demanded the North destroy them.

Pyongyang in turn has sent mixed signals on its nuclear capabilities, and demanded economic aid and a nonaggression pact from the United States as its price for giving up its nuclear efforts.

The official North Korean news agency yesterday repeated Pyongyang's offer to "freeze" its nuclear programs if the United States and its allies agree to economic compensation.

In Seoul, two U.S. Senate staffers who visited the Yongbyon site briefed South Korean government officials on their trip, but said a full public airing of their findings would be reserved for a Jan. 20 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

North Korea's state media said the private U.S. trips were designed to erase any doubts about the strength of the secretive, one-party state's nuclear deterrent. The Senate staffers, Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi, are not nuclear specialists, and South Korean officials said the briefings they had given were inconclusive.

"They said they were not scientists and could not fully understand what they had seen," Wi Sung-lac, the South Korean Foreign Ministry's director-general of North American affairs, told reporters in Seoul.

The second delegation to Yongbyon included Siegfried Hecker, who headed the U.S. government's Los Alamos nuclear research lab from 1987 to 1995. That delegation has not commented publicly on its five-day trip to the North.

In Washington, a noted U.S. specialist said North Korea's halting economic reforms, which have focused first on reform of the military services, could make a deal to eliminate the North's nuclear programs more difficult.

Under one reform scenario, North Korea would cut its vast conventional military forces as part of the economic-modernization program, leaving it more dependent than ever on its nuclear weapons to deter its adversaries, according to Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Economics.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040112-093735-8197r.htm>

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Washington Post

January 13, 2004

Pg. 2

## **Study Raises Projection For 'Dirty Bomb' Toll**

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

A well-executed "dirty bomb" attack on a U.S. city could expose hundreds of people to potentially lethal amounts of radiation, researchers said yesterday in a Pentagon-funded study that sharply raises estimates of the human toll from such an attack.

The study also predicts massive financial losses -- perhaps greater than those caused by the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- if a large dirty bomb were set off in the heart of New York or Washington. A dirty bomb uses conventional explosives or other means to spread radiation.

"The threat of a radiological attack on the United States is real, and terrorists have a broad palette of [radiological] isotopes to choose from," says the study by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. "It could cause tens to hundreds of fatalities under the right circumstances, and is essentially certain to cause great panic and enormous economic losses."

The year-long study concludes that a dirty bomb attack is "unlikely to cause mass casualties," such as would be expected if terrorists detonated a nuclear bomb or unleashed chemical or biological weapons. But it urges U.S. agencies to rethink the widely held assumption that human casualties in such an attack would be minimal. Previous

studies have predicted that few if any immediate casualties would result from radiation exposure in a dirty bomb attack.

The report calls on policymakers to take a number of steps to prepare for an attack, including stockpiling medicines to treat surviving victims.

"It is possible to kill a fair number of people and to sicken a lot more, such that you begin to stress the health care system," said Peter D. Zimmerman, a nuclear physicist who wrote the report with analyst Cheryl Loeb. "But it is also possible to make RDDs [radiological dispersion devices] less attractive to terrorists by becoming better prepared for dealing with them."

A dirty bomb has never been used in a terrorist attack, but several terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, have professed an interest in building one. Experts say dirty bombs are attractive to terrorists because they are technologically simple, yet capable of generating widespread fear and economic chaos. All that is needed is a quantity of radioactive material -- such as widely available cesium or cobalt -- and an explosive or other means of dispersal.

The economic impact of such an attack could be devastating, concludes the study, published by the Pentagon's premier education and research institution. A moderately sized device containing between 1,000 and 10,000 units of radioactivity, called curies, could contaminate an area the size of the Mall in Washington, requiring a cleanup that could last for years.

Even a small dirty bomb would force lengthy evacuations of homes and businesses for extensive decontamination, saddling property owners with enormous costs that would not be covered by standard business and homeowners' insurance. Buildings -- even skyscrapers -- that had massive contamination would have to be torn down and trucked away, the report says.

"An RDD is first of all an economic weapon," the study says. "Cost estimates to restore lower Manhattan after the September 2001 attack range up to \$40 billion plus loss of economic activity. The consequences of a large or super RDD might well be more costly."

The researchers derived estimates of human casualties from extensive studies of radiation accidents, including one in 1987 in Goiania, Brazil. In that case, workers ruptured a capsule of highly radioactive cesium after they discovered it inside an abandoned radiotherapy machine. Within weeks, 249 people suffered serious radiation injuries and five died. Many of the serious injuries came from internal exposure to tiny amounts of cesium that the victims ate or inhaled. "While the amounts ingested seem extremely small," the report says, "they were more than adequate to cause death or acute radiation sickness."

Such harmful affects can be ameliorated through medical treatment, but treatment is possible only if the victims are aware that they've been exposed, the study says. It notes that many of the most troubling scenarios involve the quiet dispersal of contaminants -- with no explosions that announce the crime.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11366-2004Jan12.html>

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Baltimore Sun  
January 14, 2004

## **Bush's Nuclear Security Chief Defends New Research On Low-Yield Weapons**

*Brooks rejects criticism that decision could lead to renewal of arms race*

By Laura Sullivan, Sun National Staff

WASHINGTON - President Bush's top nuclear security administrator defended yesterday the administration's decision to begin research on a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons, dismissing any notion that such research might lead to the development of new weapons or to a renewal of a Cold War-style arms race.

In a rare interview with reporters, Linton F. Brooks, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, said that Congress' recent repeal of a 1992 ban on such research would help keep weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile up-to-date and effective.

Congress had banned such testing in an effort to bring the nuclear arms race with the former Soviet Union to a halt. The ban was overturned in November, at the Bush administration's urging, under a defense authorization bill that Congress passed and the president signed.

"Research and development is about looking at a variety of things, including improving safety and security of existing designs, making existing designs more robust in the absence of testing," Brooks said.

"I am not uncomfortable looking other nations in the eye and saying what is absolutely true: The United States is a strong supporter of nonproliferation," he said.

Brooks' comments were, in part, an attempt by the administration to deflect criticism from groups that oppose nuclear weapons and some members of Congress who objected to a memo he wrote that was leaked to the Los Alamos Study Group, a nonproliferation think tank in New Mexico.

In the Dec. 5 memo, Brooks enthusiastically informs the directors of the nation's three largest nuclear labs of the ban's repeal and says, "We should not fail to take advantage of this opportunity."

"We are now free to explore a range of technical options that could strengthen our ability to deter or respond to new or emerging threats without any concern that some ideas could inadvertently violate a vague and arbitrary limitation. "I expect your design teams to engage fully," he writes.

Critics of the policy shift charged that the letter's tone seemed unnecessarily celebratory and reflected a desire to push beyond research into actual development and testing.

"It's the first significant commitment to what amounts to a kind of arms race," said Greg Mello, executive director of the Los Alamos group.

International accords have barred the development of new nuclear weapons since the early 1990s. Some continuing research on weapons that already existed was permitted.

Brooks suggested yesterday that, given the threats the nation faces today, the administration needs to research low-yield nuclear weapons that could act like "bunker busters" to destroy underground terrorist facilities, rather than the older-generation nuclear weapons that were designed to reach the Soviet Union.

The newer "mini-nukes" would still carry about one-third the force of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

In explaining why the United States should move ahead on the mini-nukes, Brooks said he believes Russia is doing its own "research and development" on nuclear weapons.

"As long as we have nuclear weapons, they have to be safe, secure and reliable and effective" against the latest threats, he said.

Nonetheless, he said, other nations should refrain from their own such research.

Senate Democrats, as well as nonproliferation advocates, have voiced objections to such reasoning and said most foreign nations would not accept it.

"It's like telling your kids not to smoke when you have a two-pack-a-day habit," said Joseph Cirincione, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Even more dangerous, critics argued, is the subtle yet decisive shift of U.S. policy away from having nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence.

"This is dangerous new territory, and it suggests we're lowering the nuclear threshold," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/nationworld/bal-te.nuclear14jan14.0.3359870.story>

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Jerusalem Post

January 14, 2004

## **Little Pressure On Israel Over WMDs**

By Herb Keinon

Israel has not come under serious pressure in recent weeks to change its weapons of mass destruction policy, despite various Arab calls for it to follow Libya's lead and dismantle its alleged WMDs, a senior diplomatic official said.

The official said that, in light of Libya's declaration that it will dismantle its WMDs and Iran's agreement to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities, the issue comes up with increasing frequency in various diplomatic talks.

But, he said, the subject is raised "in conversation" to sound out Israel's position on the matter, and has not taken on the form of pressure, subtle or otherwise.

A number of Arab countries have recently made high-profile declarations that, in light of the Libyan and Syrian moves, international pressure should be turned up on Israel to dismantle its alleged nuclear and WMD programs.

Israel's time-honored response to questions about its nuclear program is that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear arms into the region.

The official denied reports that Israel may consider joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) if all states in the region dispose of their chemical and biological arms, saying that no decision on this matter has been taken.

Earlier in the month, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held strategy talks with his inner security cabinet, in light of the capture of Saddam Hussein and the recent Iranian and Libyan moves.

The official said it is too early to say whether Libyan or Iranian moves have changed Israel's strategic situation.

Libya had not yet developed into a full-fledged threat, although it was heading in that direction. Even so, he said, the dismantling of all Libya's WMDs is a process that could take years.

While Israel does not belittle international efforts to keep Iran from achieving nuclear potential, said the official, Israel and the rest of the world will be watching very closely to see whether it lives up to its November commitments to suspend uranium enrichment and allow thorough inspections on demand of its nuclear facilities by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency.

The official said it is important to note that the Iranians have not declared that they are giving up their nuclear program. The process involving Iran is still in its "embryonic stage," he said, and it is much too early to judge the degree to which Iran's steps will change Israel's situation.

The official said the fact that both Libya's and Iran's nuclear programs were developed in contradiction to their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – which both countries signed – is a strong argument against Israel dismantling its alleged WMDs until the situation in the region undergoes fundamental changes.

<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JParticle/ShowFull&cid=1074013808180&p=1006688055060>

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Los Angeles Times  
January 14, 2004

## Scientists Suffer Nuclear Secrets' Fallout

*A Pakistani researcher has been detained for six weeks amid suspicions the regime transferred technology to Iran. His family thinks the U.S. may be involved.*

By Paul Watson, Times Staff Writer

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Living with a top scientist in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, members of Mohammed Farooq's family said they knew that military intelligence agents were watching and listening to them. Farooq joined Pakistan's effort to build an atomic bomb 27 years ago and answered to the armed forces. The military intelligence agency keeps a close eye on those entrusted with such national secrets.

"People associated with the nuclear program fully understand the secrecy involved in it," Farooq's son Osman, 19, said in an interview. "They know before joining any nuclear-related organization that they will be constantly monitored, around the clock."

But they don't expect to disappear. About 10 p.m. on Dec. 1, days after news broke that Pakistani scientists may have passed bomb-making secrets to Iran, military intelligence agents led Farooq from his home. His family has not heard from him for six weeks.

Farooq's family and Pakistan's political opposition fear that the military is setting up the former chief of overseas procurement at the Khan Research Laboratories, or KRL, as a fall guy.

His wife, Kush Niaz, was allowed to visit him briefly the day after his arrest, when he was in the custody of military intelligence agents at an office of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency in Rawalpindi, a suburb of Islamabad. In a cryptic telephone call a day later, Farooq warned his family not to go to court for information about him. But his wife filed a petition this month, and a judge is expected to hear the case Thursday.

The Foreign Ministry said Dec. 23 that if any scientists transferred nuclear weapons secrets to Iran, they acted out of greed or ambition, and they broke the law. Farooq's family feels betrayed by the charge.

"It is impossible that he did what he has been accused of," said the scientist's nephew, Mahar Aamir Shahzad. "As an employee of KRL, he was monitored going from the bathroom to the dining room. How is it possible for him to supply any sensitive information?"

Pakistan's government awarded Farooq, 55, the country's highest civilian medal — the Sitara-i-Imtiaz, or Star of Distinction — for his nuclear weapons work. His relatives describe him as a humble patriot who traveled outside Pakistan only once, on a 10-day religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in 1996 or 1997.

"My father is a very simple man," Osman said. "He doesn't even know how to use the Internet."

Pakistan's alleged nuclear proliferation dates back to the late 1980s, when former military dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq ruled. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who succeeded Zia after he died in a 1988 plane crash, has so far not commented on the claims.

Her Pakistan People's Party is demanding that President Pervez Musharraf, who is also commander of the armed forces, allow parliament to investigate possible transfers of nuclear technology.

"Inquiries under Musharraf have lost their credibility," said Sen. Farhatullah Babar, the exiled Bhutto's spokesman in Pakistan. "The judiciary has been subverted. It should be an inquiry by parliament so that the scientists are not scapegoated."

Farooq's family fears authorities are torturing him or may have let U.S. agents take him out of the country for interrogation. So they are seeking a court order for information even though he warned them not to.

"In his last phone call, he asked us not to file a writ in any court of law, saying: 'It will harm me,' " the scientist's nephew said. "But we decided to file the writ because we don't know where he is."

Farooq is one of at least three scientists being questioned over alleged links with Iran.

U.S. officials have said they also suspect Pakistan might have supplied North Korea and Libya with blueprints for aluminum centrifuges of the type Pakistani scientists used to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs before they changed methods. Pakistan denies aiding the two countries, insisting that it always has maintained strict control over its nuclear program.

Foreign experts say the KRL facility at Kahuta, southeast of Islamabad, produces enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

Pakistan first tested a nuclear bomb in 1998, soon after neighboring India conducted underground blasts. Farooq was in charge of the control room during the May 28 test.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered as a national hero for developing Pakistan's nuclear bomb, was also questioned during the recent investigation, but the scientist and the Foreign Ministry say he was not detained. The third scientist questioned last month was Yasin Chohan, another KRL director, who was allowed to return home in mid-December. Days later, sources familiar with the investigation said Farooq was cooperating and had identified an Iranian based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as the main link between the Pakistani scientists and Iran.

His wife's petition, filed Jan. 7 in the Lahore High Court, asks the judge to order authorities to produce Farooq and list any charges against him. It says she "has a strong apprehension" that Pakistani officials may move him out of the country "under pressure and influence of the U.S. government and FBI, and are giving him torture without any reason but to obey the dictates of the U.S. (Bush) regime."

Bruce Kleiner, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, said Monday that he could not comment on a local legal matter. Foreign Minister Mian Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri said the scientists were being debriefed, not interrogated, to follow up on information provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Iranian government.

Pakistani authorities acted after receiving information pointing to "certain individuals [who] might have been motivated by personal ambition or greed," Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan told reporters Dec. 23. Khan said Monday that unidentified scientists were still being debriefed in an internal investigation. "No foreign agency is involved. No foreign country is involved," he said.

"Allegations or speculation about torture is outlandish," said Khan, who also insisted that no Pakistani government agency or institution had been involved in nuclear proliferation.

Farooq's relatives say their first hint of trouble came Nov. 21, when they noticed two men in a black Honda parked in front of their house in Rawalpindi. The men sat there, silently watching, for eight days, until the family called the police. But Shahzad, the scientist's nephew, said police couldn't do anything because the officers inside the car ranked higher than them. Shahzad said that when he approached the men, they claimed to be there for the family's security and agreed to park at the end of the street.

Three days later, seven plainclothes agents pulled up in three cars to take Farooq away. The family's complaint identifies the agents' commander as Col. Ahmed Nisar.

When asked what the charges were against Farooq, Osman said, Nisar referred the family to The Times, which three days earlier had reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency was investigating possible links between nuclear programs in Pakistan and Iran. Two former Iranian diplomats also told The Times that Khan had made several trips to Iran starting in 1987 to help with its nuclear program and was rewarded with a villa on the Caspian Sea.

Farooq's family said he never earned more than a civil servant's salary.

"There is no truth in government allegations that the nuclear scientists have transferred nuclear secrets out of personal greed," Osman said. "We have just one house and one car — no other properties at all."

*Special correspondent Mubashir Zaidi contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-scientists14jan14.1,7015021.story>

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Wednesday, January 14, 2004

Fox News

## Tests on Iraqi Shells Find No Chemical Agent

**COPENHAGEN, Denmark — Mortar shells found in southern Iraq by the Danish military do not appear to contain chemical weapon agents as originally suspected, Fox News has learned.**

After a 16-man team from the **Iraqi Survey Group** ([search](#)) was sent to the scene to examine the mortar shells, tests of five of them yielded no traces of chemical agent, a Danish military official told Fox on Wednesday.

Initial testing by the Danes and the British indicated that the set of 36 shells possibly contained blister gas, a type of chemical weapon agent.

One shell was to be brought back to Baghdad for further testing, Fox News learned, and an electronic assessment of the shells was to be sent to a U.S. lab for further analysis.

Both the Danish and U.S. officials told Fox that the latest negative finding wasn't conclusive and said a more final assessment could come in the next three to five days.

The news came just as a U.S.-led team started a series of tests Tuesday to determine whether the liquid blister agent was in the cluster of mortar shells.

Fourteen members of the ISG, made up of intelligence analysts, interrogators and translators, were testing the 120mm shells with a mobile laboratory at the Iraqi site over the next few days, Maj. Kim Gruenberger of the **Danish Army Operational Command** ([search](#)) told The Associated Press.

The U.S. military believes the shells are remnants from the 1980-1988 war between Iraq and neighboring Iran. "They have been working since this morning," said Gruenberger, who spoke from the Danish army's command center in Karup, 165 miles northwest of Copenhagen.

Danish troops and Icelandic de-miners uncovered the shells Friday after receiving tips from local residents near Qurnah, north of the city of Basra, where Denmark's 410 soldiers are based.

Preliminary tests on the plastic-wrapped but damaged shells showed they contained a liquid blister agent. But initial tests by field troops are designed to favor a positive reading, erring on the side of caution to protect soldiers. More sophisticated tests are often necessary.

Some Iraqis have told Danish soldiers that other mortar shells were buried in the area, including a stockpile dumped in the Tigris River that could contain as many as 400 rounds, Gruenberger said.

Danish engineers will start investigating those sites after they are done with the present case, he said.

In October, Dutch marines found several dozen artillery shells dating to the 1991 Gulf War in southern Iraq, but the shells contained no biological or chemical agents. In April, U.S. troops found a dozen 55-gallon drums in northern Iraq. Preliminary tests found possible evidence of a nerve agent and a blister agent, but later tests found the contents were not chemical weapons.

Before launching the war on March 20, the United States asserted Iraq still had stockpiles of mustard gas, a World War I-era blister agent that is stored in liquid form. The chemical burns skin, eyes and lungs.

U.S. intelligence officials also claimed Iraq had **sarin** ([search](#)), **cyclosarin** ([search](#)) and **VX** ([search](#)), which are extremely deadly nerve agents.

During the war, potential chemical and biological findings were sent to a U.S. government laboratory in Fort Detrick, Md., and to a British government laboratory in Porton Down, Britain. In some cases, a third set was sent to the United Nations' chemical weapons watchdog agency in The Hague, Netherlands. All the tests came back negative.

Since the war ended, the U.S.-led coalition has found several caches that tested positive for mustard gas but later turned out to contain missile fuel or other chemicals.

Other discoveries early in the U.S.-led occupation turned out to be old caches that already had been tagged by U.N. inspectors and were scheduled for destruction.

*The Associated Press contributed to this report.*

<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,108390,00.html>

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Washington Post

January 15, 2004

Pg. 18

## **Libya Ratifies Nuclear Treaty**

***Once Approved by Others, Pact Will Ban Weapons Tests***

By Associated Press

VIENNA, Jan. 14 -- Libya has ratified the nuclear test ban treaty and approved establishment of a monitoring station on its territory, U.N. officials said Wednesday.

The Vienna-based Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization said that in ratifying the pact earlier this month, Libya agreed to host a monitoring station at Misratah. That would be part of a network of 337 stations being set up worldwide to verify compliance with terms of the treaty.

Libya announced Dec. 19 that it was giving up its weapons of mass destruction after months of secret talks with the United States and Britain. It said then that it would sign the test ban treaty and become a party to the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

Once it is ratified by the needed number of countries, the treaty will ban any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment.

Libya's nuclear program was far from being capable of producing a weapon, and the treaty is 12 nations short of the 44 needed for it to enter into force. Still, the announcement by the U.N. agency overseeing the agreement appeared to be a further sign of commitment by Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi to give up nuclear weapons ambitions.

A Western diplomat who works with the preparatory commission said the ratification "fit the picture" of Libya's actions to prove it was serious about scrapping programs or nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. government have sent experts to Libya to take inventory of its nuclear activities ahead of supervising their destruction.

Differences remain over who should take the lead, however.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said this month that the IAEA should assume that role. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei also staked out his agency's claim. But U.S. officials insist that with U.S.-British negotiations leading to the Libyan decision, Washington and London should have primacy.

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Atlantic Monthly

January/February 2004

Pg. 79

## **Spies, Lies, And Weapons: What Went Wrong**

*How could we have been so far off in our estimates of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs? A leading Iraq expert and intelligence analyst in the Clinton Administration—whose book *The Threatening Storm* proved deeply influential in the run-up to the war—gives a detailed account of how and why we erred*

By Kenneth M. Pollack

Let's start with one truth: last March, when the United States and its coalition partners invaded Iraq, the American public and much of the rest of the world believed that after Saddam Hussein's regime sank, a vast flotsam of weapons of mass destruction would bob to the surface. That, of course, has not been the case. In the words of David Kay, the principal adviser to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), an organization created late last spring to search for prohibited weaponry, "I think all of us who entered Iraq expected the job of actually discovering deployed weapons to be easier than it has turned out to be." Many people are now asking very reasonable questions about why they were misled.

Democrats have typically accused the Bush Administration of exaggerating the threat posed by Iraq in order to justify an unnecessary war. Republicans have typically claimed that the fault lay with the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, which they say overestimated the threat from Iraq—a claim that carries the unlikely implication that Bush's team might not have opted for war if it had understood that Saddam was not as dangerous as he seemed.

Both sides appear to be at least partly right. The intelligence community did overestimate the scope and progress of Iraq's WMD programs, although not to the extent that many people believe. The Administration stretched those estimates to make a case not only for going to war but for doing so at once, rather than taking the time to build regional and international support for military action.

This issue has some personal relevance for me. I began my career as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA, where I saw an earlier generation of technical analysts mistakenly conclude that Saddam Hussein was much further away from having a nuclear weapon than the post-Gulf War inspections revealed. I later moved on to the National Security Council, where I served two tours, in 1995-1996 and 1999-2001. During the latter stint the intelligence community convinced me and the rest of the Clinton Administration that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programs following the withdrawal of the UN inspectors, in 1998, and was only a matter of years away from having a nuclear weapon. In 2002 I wrote a book called *Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*, in which I argued that because all our other options had failed, the United States would ultimately have to go to war to remove Saddam before he acquired a functioning nuclear weapon. Thus it was with more than a little interest that I pondered the question of why we didn't find in Iraq what we were so certain we would.

### **What We Thought We Knew**

The U.S. intelligence community's belief that Saddam was aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction predated Bush's inauguration, and therefore cannot be attributed to political pressure. It was first advanced at the end of the 1990s, at a time when President Bill Clinton was trying to facilitate a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and was hardly seeking assessments that the threat from Iraq was growing.



In congressional testimony in March of 2002 Robert Einhorn, Clinton's assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, summed up the intelligence community's conclusions about Iraq at the end of the Clinton Administration:

"How close is the peril of Iraqi WMD? Today, or at most within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons against its neighbors (albeit attacks that would be ragged, inaccurate, and limited in size). Within four or five years it could have the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing fissile material produced indigenously—and to threaten U.S. territory with such weapons delivered by nonconventional means, such as commercial shipping containers. If it managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities of already produced fissile material, these threats could arrive much sooner."

In October of 2002 the National Intelligence Council, the highest analytical body in the U.S. intelligence community, issued a classified National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD, representing the consensus of the intelligence community. Although after the war some complained that the NIE had been a rush job, and that the NIC should have been more careful in its choice of language, in fact the report accurately reflected what intelligence analysts had been telling Clinton Administration officials like me for years in verbal briefings.

A declassified version of the 2002 NIE was released to the public in July of last year. Its principal conclusions:

\*"Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade." (The classified version of the NIE gave an estimate of five to seven years.)

\*"Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess [that] Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program."

\*"If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year ... Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade."

\*"Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX ... Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents."

\*"All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW [biological warfare] program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war ... Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war."

U.S. government analysts were not alone in these views. In the late spring of 2002 I participated in a Washington meeting about Iraqi WMD. Those present included nearly twenty former inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the force established in 1991 to oversee the elimination of WMD in Iraq. One of the senior people put a question to the group: Did anyone in the room doubt that Iraq was currently operating a secret centrifuge plant? No one did. Three people added that they believed Iraq was also operating a secret calutron plant (a facility for separating uranium isotopes).

Other nations' intelligence services were similarly aligned with U.S. views. Somewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France's President Jacques Chirac told *Time* magazine last February, "There is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right ... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed." In sum, *no one* doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

### **What We Think We Know Now**

But it appears that Iraq may not have had any actual weapons of mass destruction. A number of caveats are in order. We do not yet have a complete picture of Iraq's WMD programs. Initial U.S. efforts to seek out WMD caches were badly lacking: an American artillery unit that had too few people for the task and virtually no plan of action had been hastily assigned the mission. Not surprisingly, its efforts garnered little useful information. According to Judith Miller, a *New York Times* reporter who was embedded with the unit, by mid-June—nearly two months after the end of major combat operations—the United States had interviewed only thirteen out of hundreds of Iraqi scientists. Documents relating to the programs are known to have been destroyed. Much of Iraq is yet to be explored; as David Kay, of the Iraq Survey Group, which took over the search for WMD in June, told Congress, only ten of Iraq's 130 major ammunition dumps had been thoroughly checked as of early October (the time of his testimony). Now that

Saddam Hussein is in custody, it is possible that new information may be forthcoming, or that closemouthed Iraqis will offer fresh details.

Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of the ISG will probably not change dramatically, at least not in their broad contours. Kay summarized those findings in his October testimony.

\*Iraq had preserved some of its technological nuclear capability from before the Gulf War. However, no evidence suggested that Saddam had undertaken any significant steps after 1998 toward reconstituting the program to build nuclear weapons or to produce fissile material.

\*Little evidence surfaced that Iraq had continued to produce chemical weapons; only a minimal amount of clandestine research had been done on them. For instance, the production line at the Fallujah II facility (the plant that intelligence officers believed was Iraq's principal site for making chlorine, an ingredient in some chemical-warfare agents) turned out to be in derelict condition and had not operated since the Gulf War. Nevertheless, Iraqi officials seemed to believe that they could convert existing civilian pharmaceutical plants to chemical-weapons production, and that Saddam was interested in their ability to do so.

\*Iraq made determined efforts to retain some capabilities for biological warfare. It maintained an undeclared network of laboratories and other facilities within the apparatus of its security services, and as Kay put it, "this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production." To disguise its biological-warfare programs Baghdad had scientists working on overt projects that were closely related to proscribed activities.

\*Iraq seemed to have been most aggressive in pursuing proscribed missiles. In Kay's words, "detainees and cooperative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least [240 miles] and up to [620 miles] and that measures to conceal these projects from [UN inspectors] were initiated in late 2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors." The Iraqis were also working on clustering liquid-fueled rocket engines in order to produce a longer-range missile, and were trying to convert certain surface-to-air missiles into surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 150 miles. Most troubling of all, the ISG uncovered evidence that from 1999 to 2002 Iraq had negotiated with North Korea to buy technology for No Dong missiles, which have a range of 800 miles.

Overall, these findings suggest that Iraq did retain prohibited WMD programs, but that those programs were not so extensive, advanced, or threatening as the National Intelligence Estimate maintained.

More-cautious analysts had argued that the NIE's assessment that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons was unlikely, because such munitions deteriorate rapidly and can be quickly produced in bulk if production lines and precursor agents are available (making stockpiles unnecessary as well as inefficient). These analysts instead believed that Iraq had a "just-in-time" production capability—that it could churn out these weapons as needed, using hidden or dual-use facilities. But not even this more conservative scenario was borne out by the ISG's investigations. Sources told the group that Saddam and his son Uday had each, on separate occasions in 2001 and 2002, asked officials associated with Iraq's chemical-warfare program how long it would take to produce chemical agents and weapons. One official reportedly told Saddam that it would take six months to produce mustard gas (among the easiest such agents to manufacture); another told Uday that it would take two months to produce mustard gas and two years to produce sarin (a simple nerve agent). The questions do not suggest the presence of large stockpiles. The answers do not support a just-in-time capability.

The ISG's findings to date are most damning in the nuclear arena—as it happens, the segment of Iraq's WMD program in which the initial findings are most likely to be correct, because nuclear-weapons production is extremely difficult to conceal. The perceived nuclear threat was always the most disturbing one. The U.S. intelligence community's belief toward the end of the Clinton Administration that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and was close to acquiring nuclear weapons led me and other Administration officials to support the idea of a full-scale invasion of Iraq, albeit not right away. The NIE's judgment to the same effect was the real linchpin of the Bush Administration's case for an invasion.

What we have found in Iraq since the invasion belies that judgment. Saddam did retain basic elements for a nuclear-weapons program and the desire to acquire such weapons at some point, but the program itself was dormant. Saddam had not ordered its resumption (although some reports suggest that he considered doing so in 2002). In all probability Iraq was considerably further from having a nuclear weapon than the five to seven years estimated in the classified version of the NIE.

### **The View From Baghdad**

Figuring out why we overestimated Iraq's WMD capabilities involves figuring out what the Iraqis, especially Saddam Hussein, were thinking and doing throughout the 1990s. The story starts right after the Gulf War. An Iraqi document that fell into the inspectors' hands revealed that in April of 1991 a high-level Iraqi committee had ordered many of the country's WMD activities to be hidden from UN inspectors, even though compliance with the inspections was a condition for the lifting of economic sanctions imposed after the invasion of Kuwait. The

document was a report from a nuclear-weapons plant describing how it carried out this order. According to UNSCOM's final report, "The facility was instructed to remove evidence of the true activities at the facility, evacuate documents to hide sites, make physical alterations to the site to hide its true purpose, develop cover stories, and conduct mock inspections to prepare for UN inspectors."

A great deal of other information substantiates the idea that Saddam at first decided to try to keep a considerable portion of his WMD programs intact and hidden. His efforts probably included retaining some munitions, but mainly concerned production and research elements. In other words, Saddam did initially try to maintain a "just-in-time" capability. However, it became increasingly clear how difficult this would be. In the summer of 1991 inspectors tracked down and destroyed Saddam's calutrons. Their discoveries may have convinced him that he would have to put his WMD programs on hold until after the sanctions were lifted—something he reportedly thought would happen within a matter of months.

But the inspectors proved more tenacious and the international community more steadfast than the Iraqis had expected. Accordingly, from June of 1991 to May of 1992 Iraq unilaterally destroyed parts of its WMD programs (as we know from subsequent Iraqi admissions). This action appears to have served two purposes: It got rid of unnecessary munitions and secondary equipment that the inspectors might have found, which would have constituted proof of Iraqi noncompliance. And it helped Baghdad conceal more-important elements of the programs, because the regime could point to the unilateral destructions as evidence of cooperation and could claim that even more material had been destroyed. (Since the fall of Baghdad scientists have told the ISG that key equipment was in fact diverted from these destructions and hidden.)

In 1995 matters changed. That August, Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and the head of Iraq's WMD programs, defected to Jordan, prompting a panicked Baghdad to hurriedly turn over hundreds of thousands of pages of new documentation to the United Nations. According to the former chief UN weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus, Kamel's statements and the Iraqi documents squared with what UNSCOM had been finding: although all actual weapons had been eliminated, either by the UN or in the earlier destructions, Iraq had preserved production and R&D programs. Although the Iraqis tried to withhold any highly incriminating documents from the UN (and, ridiculously, claimed that Kamel had been running the programs on his own, without anyone else's knowledge), in their rush they overlooked several containing crucial information about previously concealed aspects of the nuclear and biological programs.

Other secrets were laid bare that same year. A U.S.-UN sting operation caught the Iraqis trying to smuggle 115 missile gyroscopes through Jordan. (UN inspectors later found other gyroscopes hidden at the bottom of the Tigris River.) Iraq was forced to admit to the existence of a facility to build Scud-missile engines, and to destroy a hidden plant for manufacturing modified Scud missiles. It was also forced to admit to having made much greater progress on its nuclear program before the Gulf War than it had previously acknowledged. Most important, it was forced to admit that a very large biological-weapons plant at al-Hakim, whose existence had been concealed from UN inspectors, had produced 500,000 liters of biological agents in 1989 and 1990, and that it was still functional in 1995. Three years after this confession Lieutenant General Amer al-Saadi, Saddam's principal liaison with the UN, told inspectors that Iraq would offer no excuse or defense for having denied the existence of its biological-weapons program. He stated matter-of-factly that Iraq had made a political decision to conceal it.

Either late in 1995 or at some point in 1996 Saddam probably recognized that trying to retain his just-in-time capability had become counterproductive. The inspectors kept finding pieces of the programs, and each discovery pushed the lifting of the sanctions further into the future. It's important to keep in mind several other events of this period. Saddam's internal position was very shaky. He had faced disturbances in several of his most loyal Sunni tribes. In addition to Kamel, a number of high-ranking officials had defected to the West, including Saddam's chief of military intelligence, Wafic Samarai. Coup plots abounded. In 1995 the Kurds smashed two Iraqi infantry brigades at Irbil, humiliating the Iraqi army. In 1996 Iraqi intelligence uncovered a CIA-backed coup attempt whose participants had penetrated some of Saddam's most sensitive intelligence services. Iraq's economy was suffocating under the sanctions, and inflation was rampant. Given this precarious situation, Saddam probably decided to scale back his WMD programs (with the likely exception of work on proscribed missiles, which could be concealed by Iraq's permitted missile program) by destroying additional equipment, keeping the bare minimum needed to rebuild them at some point, in order to reduce the risk of further discoveries. This would have meant giving up the idea of just-in-time production capabilities and limiting his efforts to hiding documents and only key pieces of equipment. In short, Saddam switched from trying to hang on to the maximum production and research assets of his WMD programs to trying to keep only the minimum necessary to reconstitute the programs at some point after the sanctions had been lifted.

### **What Was Saddam Thinking?**

Having decided to give up so much of his WMD capability, why didn't Saddam change his behavior toward the UN inspectors and demonstrate a spirit of candor and cooperation? Even after 1996 the Iraqis took a confrontational

posture toward UNSCOM, fighting to prevent inspectors from going where they wanted to go and seeing what they wanted to see. The governments of the world inferred from this defiance that Saddam was still not complying with the UN resolutions, and the sanctions therefore stayed in place.

The first and most obvious answer is that Saddam still had some things to hide, and was fearful of their discovery. Although he did unquestionably have some things to hide, this answer is not entirely satisfying. Iraq was able to conceal the minimized remnants of its WMD programs so well that UNSCOM found little incriminating evidence in 1997 and 1998. This early success should have given Saddam the confidence to begin to cooperate more fully with the UN resolutions. But throughout the period leading up to the war Saddam remained as obstinate as ever.

An alternative explanation, offered by Iraq's former UN ambassador, Tariq Aziz, and other officials captured after last year's war, goes like this: Saddam was pretending to have WMD in order to enhance his prestige among the other Arab nations. This explanation doesn't ring completely true either. It is certainly the case that Saddam garnered a great deal of admiration from Arabs of many countries by appearing to have such weapons, and that he aspired to dominate the Arab world. But this theory assumes that he was willing to incur severe penalties for the UN's belief that he still had WMD without reaping any tangible benefits from actually having them. If prestige had been more important to him than the lifting of the sanctions, it would have been more logical and more in keeping with his character to simply retain all his WMD capabilities.

Saddam's behavior may have been driven by completely different considerations. Saddam has always evinced much greater concern for his internal position than for his external status. He has made any number of highly foolish foreign-policy decisions—for example, invading Kuwait and then deciding to stick around and fight the U.S.-led coalition—in response to domestic problems that he feared threatened his grip on power. The same forces may have been at work here; after all, ever since the Iran-Iraq war WMD had been an important element of Saddam's strength within Iraq. He used them against the Kurds in the late 1980s, and during the revolts that broke out after the Gulf War, he sent signals that he might use them against both the Kurds and the Shiites. He may have feared that if his internal adversaries realized that he no longer had the capability to use these weapons, they would try to move against him. In a similar vein, Saddam's standing among the Sunni elites who constituted his power base was linked to a great extent to his having made Iraq a regional power—which the elites saw as a product of Iraq's unconventional arsenal. Thus openly giving up his WMD could also have jeopardized his position with crucial supporters.

Furthermore, Saddam may have felt trapped by his initial reckoning that he could fool the UN inspectors and that the sanctions would be short-lived. Because of this mistaken calculation he had subjected Iraq to terrible hardships. Suddenly cooperating with the inspectors would have meant admitting to both his opponents and his supporters that his course of action had been a mistake and that, having now given up most of his WMD programs, he had devastated Iraqi society *for no reason*.

This suggests that in 1995-1996 Saddam took one of his famous gambles—gambles that almost never worked out for him. He chose not to "come clean" and cooperate with the UN for fear that this would make him look weak to both his domestic enemies and his domestic allies, either of whom might then have moved against him. But he would try to greatly diminish the chances that UNSCOM would find more evidence of his continuing noncompliance by reducing his WMD programs to the bare minimum, in hopes that the absence of evidence would lead to the lifting of sanctions—something he desperately sought in 1996.

In other respects Saddam's fortunes began to rise in 1996. Although the CIA-backed coup attempt may have signified internal weakness, the fact that Saddam snuffed it out, as he had many previous attempts, signified strength. Also, to avenge the Iraqi army's 1995 defeat at Irbil, Saddam manipulated infighting among the Kurds so as to allow his Republican Guards to drive into the city, smash the Kurd defenders, and arrest several hundred CIA-backed rebels. As the historian Amatzia Baram has persuasively argued in his book *Building Toward Crisis* (1998), these successes made Saddam feel secure enough to swallow his pride and accept UN Resolution 986, the oil-for-food program, which he had previously rejected as an infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. Oil-for-food turned out to be an enormous boon for the Iraqi economy, and commodity prices fell quickly, stabilizing the dinar.

The oil-for-food program itself gave Saddam clout to apply toward the lifting of the sanctions. Under Resolution 986 Iraq could choose to whom it would sell its oil and from whom it would buy its food and medicine. Baghdad could therefore reward cooperative states with contracts. Not surprisingly, France and Russia regularly topped the list of Iraq's oil-for-food partners. In addition, Iraq could set the prices—and since Saddam did not really care whether he was importing enough food and medicine for his people's needs, he could sell oil on the cheap and buy food and medicine at inflated prices as additional payoff to friendly governments. He made it clear that he wanted his trading partners to ignore Iraqi smuggling and try to get the sanctions lifted.

By 1997 the international environment had changed markedly, in ways that probably convinced Saddam that he didn't need to cooperate with the inspectors. The same international outcry—against the suffering inflicted by the Iraq sanctions—that prompted the United States to craft the oil-for-food deal was creating momentum for lifting the

sanctions completely. At that point it was reasonable for Saddam to believe that in the not too distant future the sanctions either would be lifted or would be so undermined as to be effectively meaningless, and that he would never have to reveal the remaining elements of his WMD programs. Only in 2002, when the Bush Administration suddenly focused its attention on Iraq, would Saddam have had any reason to change this view. And then, according to a variety of Iraqi sources, he simply refused to believe that the Americans were serious and would actually invade.

Another explanation should be posited. This is the notion that Saddam did not order the program scaled down, but Iraqi scientists ensured that it did not progress and deceived Saddam into believing that it was much further along than it in fact was. Numerous Iraqi scientists have claimed that although Saddam ordered them to produce particular things for the WMD programs, they dragged their feet or found other ways to avoid delivering them. There is most likely a germ of truth to these stories: prevarication on the part of some Iraqi scientists may have helped to account for the modest state of Iraq's WMD programs in 2003. But they probably form only a part of the explanation. Many of the accounts of scientists' quietly thwarting Saddam are undoubtedly self-serving, concocted in the aftermath of his defeat. As we have heard time and again from Iraqi defectors, those who did not meet Saddam's demands risked torture and murder for themselves and their families. We have consistently found that in Saddam's Iraq very few people took that risk.

One last element may also have been at work all along: the possibility that Saddam genuinely feared that the inspections were a cover for a CIA campaign to overthrow or assassinate him. The Iraqis repeatedly cited this fear in denying UNSCOM access to certain "sensitive" sites—particularly palaces—that were associated with Saddam personally. The rest of the world assumed that it was merely an excuse to keep inspectors out of places that contained evidence of WMD programs. However, the Iraqis may have been telling the truth on this point (and the initial debriefing of Saddam lends some credence to this scenario). After all, as various sources have now disclosed, the United States did run a covert-action campaign against Saddam, starting in 1991, and U.S. intelligence did use UNSCOM operations (without UNSCOM's knowledge) to gather intelligence for that campaign.

### **The Perils of Prediction**

Everyone outside Iraq missed the 1995-1996 shift in Saddam's strategy—that is, to scale back his WMD programs to minimize the odds of further discoveries—and assumed that Iraq's earlier behavior was continuing more or less in a straight line. This misperception took on considerable weight in the following years.

Context is crucial to understanding any intelligence assessment. No matter how objective the analyst may be, he or she begins with a set of basic assumptions that create a broad perspective on an issue; this helps the analyst to sort through evidence.

The context for the 2002 NIE assessment of Iraq's WMD programs began to take shape before the Gulf War. Prior to 1991 the intelligence communities in the United States and elsewhere believed that Iraq was at least five, and probably closer to ten, years away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Of course, after the war we learned that in 1991 Iraq had been only six to twenty-four months away from having a workable nuclear weapon. This revelation stunned the analysts responsible for following the Iraqi nuclear program. The lessons they took from it were that Iraq was determined to acquire nuclear weapons and would go to any lengths to do so; that in pursuit of this goal Iraq was willing to use technology that Westerners considered crude and obsolete; that the Iraqis were superb at concealment and deception; and that inspections were inherently flawed—after all, there had been inspectors in Iraq prior to 1990, and they had been completely fooled.

These lessons were strongly reinforced by the revelation of Iraq's attempts in the first four years after the war to preserve significant parts of its WMD programs. By about 1994 UNSCOM believed, incorrectly, that it had largely disarmed Iraq; its members were privately discussing switching its operations from active inspections to passive monitoring. Many intelligence analysts in the United States, Britain, and Israel disagreed with UNSCOM's assessment, but they were hard-pressed to substantiate their suspicions—until Hussein Kamel's defection, in 1995, and subsequent Iraqi admissions regarding the extent of deception. These developments came as a profound shock to the UN inspectors, who resolved that Iraq could never again be trusted. Thus, just when Iraq was in all likelihood giving up efforts to maintain its just-in-time production capability, the rest of the world became hardened in its conviction that Saddam would never abandon or even reduce his efforts to acquire WMD.

Another important contribution to the context is the continuation of Saddam's hostility toward the inspectors. If anything, the Iraqis became even less accommodating over time. By 1998 they were physically harassing the inspectors—on one occasion firing two rocket-propelled grenades into an UNSCOM building in Baghdad, on another grabbing the controls of an UNSCOM helicopter in flight and nearly causing it to crash. Western intelligence agencies understandably took these actions to mean that nothing in Saddam's weaponry plans had changed.

In December of 1998 the inspectors withdrew from the country. Their decision to do so came after Iraq announced, in August of that year, that it would no longer cooperate with them at all, and after repeated crises demonstrated that Baghdad's announcement was not just bluster.

The end of the UN inspections appears in retrospect to have been a much greater problem than anyone recognized at the time. The inspectors had been the best source of information on Iraq and its WMD programs. UNSCOM had a large and highly capable cadre of weapons specialists who focused exclusively on Iraq. Many Western intelligence agencies, faced with other issues that demanded their resources, increasingly relied on UNSCOM's data and assessments and did little to bolster their own (meager) capabilities in Iraq. And UNSCOM had something that American intelligence did not—physical access to Iraq. Without an embassy there it was very hard for U.S. case officers to penetrate the country.

The end of the inspections eliminated the single best means of vetting what information intelligence agencies could gather independently about Iraq. These agencies usually shared (in some form) new information or analyses about the WMD programs with UNSCOM. If a defector claimed that biological-weapons material was stored at a given site, inspectors would look for it. If satellite imagery indicated unusual activity at a particular location, inspectors would try to confirm it. Although Iraq's counterintelligence efforts were formidable (UNSCOM estimated that only six of its roughly 250 inspections actually caught the Iraqis by surprise), UNSCOM was usually able to gauge, if only broadly, whether a source or a deduction was correct.

When the inspectors suddenly left, the various intelligence agencies were caught psychologically and organizationally off balance. Desperate for information on Iraq, they began to trust sources that they would previously have had UNSCOM vet. If a defector came out of Iraq after 1998, the CIA had to gauge his credibility by comparing his account with those of other defectors—who might be unreliable or just unproven—or by checking it against whatever they could glean from satellites and other indirect sources. With so little to go on, intelligence agencies believed many reports that now seem deeply suspect.

In the absence of hard evidence, the intelligence analysts tended to fall back on the underlying assumptions they had begun with. Those assumptions included the belief that Saddam was determined to preserve his extant WMD capabilities and acquire new ones. And now there were no weapons inspectors to hinder him. The inspectors had also been a moderating influence on Western intelligence agencies; the information they provided, and the mere fact of their presence in Iraq, helped those agencies stick to reasonable suppositions and keep unsubstantiated fears at bay. After 1998 many analysts increasingly entertained worst-case scenarios—scenarios that gradually became mainstream estimates.

Another element that contributed to faulty assessments before the 2003 invasion was Iraqi rhetoric. Imagine that you were a CIA analyst in June of 2000 and heard Saddam make the following statement: "If the world tells us to abandon all our weapons and keep only swords, we will do that. We will destroy all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons. But if they keep a rifle and then tell me that I have the right to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has become a means to defend our country against anybody who may have designs against it, then we will try our best to acquire the rifle." It would be very difficult not to interpret Saddam's remarks as an announcement that he intended to reconstitute his WMD programs.

The final element in the context for our pre-invasion analysis involved discrepancies between how much WMD material went into Iraq and how much Iraq could prove it had destroyed. Before the Gulf War (and to a certain extent afterward) Baghdad imported enormous quantities of equipment and raw materials for WMD. The UN inspectors, with remarkable diligence, obtained virtually all the import figures, either from the Iraqis or from their suppliers. They then asked the Iraqis to either produce the materials or account for their destruction. In many cases the Iraqis could not. The difference between what they had imported and what they could account for was seen as important evidence of an ambitious clandestine WMD program. These are the numbers—of bombs, of liters of precursor chemicals, and so on—that the world regularly heard Bush Administration officials intone during the run-up to the 2003 war.

In hindsight there are legitimate reasons to question these numbers. According to David Kay, a number of Iraqi sources have told the ISG that some of the material that was unaccounted for was diverted from the unilateral destructions that took place from 1991 to 1996. However, it is not clear whether or not any of that material was destroyed later. And it is likely that some of the discrepancies between UNSCOM and Iraqi figures are no more than the result of sloppiness. Saddam's Iraq was not exactly an efficient state, and many of his chief lieutenants were semi-literate thugs with no understanding of esoteric technical matters and little regard for how things should be done—their only concern was that Saddam's demands be met.

### **The Politics of Persuasion**

The intelligence community's overestimation of Iraq's WMD capability is only part of the story of why we went to war last year. The other part involves how the Bush Administration handled the intelligence. Throughout the spring and fall of 2002 and well into 2003 I received numerous complaints from friends and colleagues in the intelligence

community, and from people in the policy community, about precisely that. According to them, many Administration officials reacted strongly, negatively, and aggressively when presented with information or analysis that contradicted what they already believed about Iraq. Many of these officials believed that Saddam Hussein was the source of virtually all the problems in the Middle East and was an imminent danger to the United States because of his perceived possession of weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism. Many also believed that CIA analysts tended to be left-leaning cultural relativists who consistently downplayed threats to the United States. They believed that the Agency, not the Administration, was biased, and that they were acting simply to correct that bias. Intelligence officers who presented analyses that were at odds with the pre-existing views of senior Administration officials were subjected to barrages of questions and requests for additional information. They were asked to justify their work sentence by sentence: "Why did you rely on this source and not this other piece of information?" "How does this conclusion square with this other point?" "Please explain the history of Iraq's association with the organization you mention in this sentence." Reportedly, the worst fights were those over sources. The Administration gave greatest credence to accounts that presented the most lurid picture of Iraqi activities. In many cases intelligence analysts were distrustful of those sources, or knew unequivocally that they were wrong. But when they said so, they were not heeded; instead they were beset with further questions about their own sources. On many occasions Administration officials' requests for additional information struck the analysts as being made merely to distract them from their primary mission. Some officials asked for extensive historical analyses—a hugely time-consuming undertaking, for which most intelligence analysts are not trained. Requests were constantly made for detailed analyses of newspaper articles that conformed to the views of Administration officials—pieces by conservative newspaper columnists such as Jim Hoagland, William Safire, and George F. Will. These columnists may be highly intelligent men, but they have no claim to superior insight into the workings of Iraq, or to any independent intelligence-collection capabilities.

Of course, no policymaker should accept intelligence estimates unquestioningly. While I was at the NSC, I regularly challenged analysts as to why they believed what they did. I asked for additional material and required them to do significant additional work. Any official who does less is derelict in his or her duty. However, at a certain point curiosity and diligence become a form of pressure. If your employer asks you every so often about your health and seems to take an appropriate interest in the answer, you probably feel that he or she is kind and considerate. If your employer asks you about your health every ten minutes, in highly detailed, probing questions, you may have a more nervous reaction.

As Seymour Hersh, among others, has reported, Bush Administration officials also took some actions that arguably crossed the line between rigorous oversight of the intelligence community and an attempt to manipulate intelligence. They set up their own shop in the Pentagon, called the Office of Special Plans, in order to sift through the information on Iraq themselves. To a great extent OSP personnel "cherry-picked" the intelligence they passed on, selecting reports that supported the Administration's pre-existing position and ignoring all the rest.

Most problematic of all, the OSP often chose to believe reports that trained intelligence officers considered unreliable or downright false. In particular it gave great credence to reports from the Iraqi National Congress, whose leader was the Administration-backed Ahmed Chalabi. It is true that the intelligence community believed some of the material that came from the INC—but not most of it. (In retrospect, of course, it seems that even the intelligence professionals gave INC reporting more credence than it deserved.) One of the reasons the OSP generally believed Chalabi and the INC was that they were telling it what it wanted to hear—giving the OSP, in a kind of vicious circle, further incentive to trust these sources over differing, and ultimately more reliable, ones. Thus intelligence analysts spent huge amounts of time fighting bad information and trying to persuade Administration officials not to make policy decisions based on it. From my own experience I know that it is hard enough to figure out what the reliable evidence indicates—and vast battles are fought over that. To have to also fight over what is clearly bad information is a Sisyphian task.

The Bush officials who created the OSP gave its reports directly to those in the highest levels of government, often passing raw, unverified intelligence straight to the Cabinet level as gospel. Senior Administration officials made public statements based on these reports—reports that the larger intelligence community knew to be erroneous (for instance, that there was hard and fast evidence linking Iraq to al-Qaeda). Another problem arising from the machinations of the OSP is that whenever the principals of the National Security Council met with the President and his staff, two completely different versions of reality were on the table. The CIA, the State Department, and the uniformed military services would present one version, consistent with the perspective of intelligence and foreign-policy professionals, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Vice President would present another, based on the perspective of the OSP. These views were too far apart to allow for compromise. As a result, the Administration found it difficult, if not impossible, to make certain important decisions. And it made some that were fatally flawed, including many relating to postwar planning, when the OSP's view—that Saddam's regime simultaneously was very threatening and could easily be replaced by a new government—prevailed.

For the most part, the problems discussed so far have more to do with the methods of Administration officials than with their motives, which were often misguided and dangerous, but were essentially well-intentioned. The one action for which I cannot hold Administration officials blameless is their distortion of intelligence estimates when making the public case for going to war.

As best I can tell, these officials were guilty not of lying but of creative omission. They discussed only those elements of intelligence estimates that served their cause. This was particularly apparent in regard to the time frame for Iraq's acquisition of a nuclear weapon—the issue that most alarmed the American public and the rest of the world. Remember that the NIE said that Iraq was likely to have a nuclear weapon in five to seven years if it had to produce the fissile material indigenously, and that it might have one in less than a year if it could obtain the material from a foreign source. The intelligence community considered it highly unlikely that Iraq would be able to obtain weapons-grade material from a foreign source; it had been trying to do so for twenty-five years with no luck. However, time after time senior Administration officials discussed only the worst-case, and least likely, scenario, and failed to mention the intelligence community's most likely scenario. Some examples:

\*In a radio address on September 14, 2002, President Bush warned, "Today Saddam Hussein has the scientists and infrastructure for a nuclear-weapons program, and has illicitly sought to purchase the equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year."

\*On October 7, 2002, the President told a group in Cincinnati, "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."

\*On November 1, 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton told the Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism, "We estimate that once Iraq acquires fissile material—whether from a foreign source or by securing the materials to build an indigenous fissile-material capability—it could fabricate a nuclear weapon within one year."

\*Vice President Cheney said on NBC's *Meet the Press* on September 14, 2003, "The judgment in the NIE was that if Saddam could acquire fissile material, weapons-grade material, that he would have a nuclear weapon within a few months to a year. That was the judgment of the intelligence community of the United States, and they had a high degree of confidence in it."

None of these statements in itself was untrue. However, each told only a part of the story—the most sensational part. These statements all implied that the U.S. intelligence community believed that Saddam would have a nuclear weapon within a year unless the United States acted at once.

Some defenders of the Administration have reportedly countered that all it did was make the best possible case for war, playing a role similar to that of a defense attorney who is charged with presenting the best possible case for a client (even if the client is guilty). That is a false analogy. A defense attorney is responsible for presenting only one side of a dispute. The President is responsible for serving the entire nation. Only the Administration has access to all the information available to various agencies of the U.S. government—and withholding or downplaying some of that information for its own purposes is a betrayal of that responsibility.

### **What Is to Be Done?**

That we have learned about Iraq's WMD programs since the fall of Baghdad leads me to conclude that the case for war with Iraq was considerably weaker than I believed beforehand. Because of the consensus among American and foreign intelligence agencies, outside experts, and former UN weapons inspectors, I had been convinced that Iraq was only years away from having a nuclear weapon—probably only four or five years, as Robert Einhorn had testified. That estimate was clearly off, possibly by quite a bit. My reluctant conviction that war was our only option (although not at the time or in the manner in which the Bush Administration pursued it) was not entirely based on the nuclear threat, but that threat was the most important factor in it.

The war was not all bad. I do not believe that it was a strategic mistake, although the appalling handling of postwar planning was. There is no question that Saddam Hussein was a force for real instability in the Persian Gulf, and that his removal from power was a tremendous improvement. There is also no question that he was pure evil, and that he headed one of the most despicable regimes of the past fifty years. I am grateful that the United States no longer has to contend with the malign influence of Saddam's Iraq in this economically irreplaceable and increasingly fragile part of the world; nor can I begrudge the Iraqi people one day of their freedom. What's more, we should not forget that containment *was* failing. The shameful performance of the United Nations Security Council members (particularly France and Germany) in 2002-2003 was final proof that containment would not have lasted much longer; Saddam would eventually have reconstituted his WMD programs, although further in the future than we had thought. That said, the case for war—and for war sooner rather than later—was certainly less compelling than it appeared at the time. At the very least we should recognize that the Administration's rush to war was reckless even



on the basis of what we thought we knew in March of 2003. It appears even more reckless in light of what we know today.

The problems that led to our mistaken beliefs about the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction must be addressed immediately. Unfortunately, to some extent the problems are contradictory, and therefore the solutions may work against one another. For example, a remedy used in the past to address influence from the executive branch on the intelligence process has been to increase oversight of intelligence operations and analysis by Congress. However, in this instance increasing congressional oversight could have exacerbated another problem: the failure of the intelligence community to sufficiently challenge its own assumptions about Saddam's strategy. The more that intelligence agencies must report to both Congress and the White House, the more they fear becoming a political football, and the more they will tone down their estimates, stick to mainstream judgments, and avoid taking controversial positions. Arguing that Iraq had minimized its WMD holdings after 1996 would have been a very controversial position indeed.

Some of the problems that led to our misunderstanding of Iraq's WMD may be insoluble, at least by bureaucratic changes. The forms of pressure exerted on the intelligence community by the Bush Administration were perfectly legal; it would probably be impossible to regulate against them. Moreover, doing so could preclude useful and necessary questioning of intelligence analysts by Administration officials. Still, some fixes do suggest themselves. In the future we as a nation must be willing to devote enough resources to intelligence so that we will always be able to sustain a large, aggressive program to collect all manner of information and a sophisticated analysis program on all high-priority issues. In retrospect, our over-reliance on UNSCOM inspectors lulled us into a false sense of security; this in turn contributed to our inflated estimates of Iraq's WMD progress after 1998. Even though Iraq was a difficult environment for any intelligence service to operate in, and the CIA did devote substantial assets to it at all times, it would have made some difference if the Agency could have devoted still greater resources to it, even when that seemed redundant with UNSCOM's missions.

Our failings in the WMD experience also argue for a more powerful and independent director of central intelligence. The DCI currently serves at the pleasure of the President, and although he is the nominal head of the entire intelligence community, in reality he does not have much authority over most of the intelligence agencies, whose budgets and personnel come largely from the Department of Defense. The United States could make the DCI position similar to that of the director of the FBI: the President would nominate a candidate who would then need to be confirmed by Congress, and who would serve a fixed term. And the DCI could be made the true head of intelligence, with control over the budgets and personnel of all the intelligence agencies. Many of the intelligence agencies that currently report to the Secretary of Defense, including the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office, to name just two, should instead report to the DCI. These changes would put the DCI in a stronger position to resist pressure from the executive branch (or Congress) and to protect his people from the same. Strengthening the DCI and increasing his independence might make for smarter, bolder analysis. The less intelligence analysts have to worry that the DCI is going to take heat for unpopular if accurate judgments, the more willing they will be to make them. This is not a slur against DCI George Tenet, who I think handled the difficulties of his situation extraordinarily well. But it is a recognition that DCIs must not be put in the position that Tenet was forced into.

Another step worth considering is forbidding the CIA or anyone else in government from making any intelligence estimates public for five or ten years. As someone firmly committed to the concept of open government, who believes that the CIA has benefited from its efforts in the past decade to be more open to the public, I dislike the idea of greater secrecy. However, when intelligence estimates become public, they have a huge impact on the course of foreign-policy debates, and administrations therefore find themselves with a great incentive to make sure the Agency's estimates support the Administration's preferred policy. If such estimates were not made public, an administration would have little reason to try to influence them. The government could still produce white papers, but they should come from the State Department—the agency that is, after all, officially charged with public diplomacy.

Finally, the U.S. government must admit to the world that it was wrong about Iraq's WMD and show that it is taking far-reaching action to correct the problems that led to this error. Iraq is not going to be the last foreign-policy challenge in which we must make choices based on ambiguous evidence. When the United States confronts future challenges, the exaggerated estimates of Iraq's WMD will loom like an ugly shadow over the diplomatic discussions. Fairly or not, no foreigner trusts U.S. intelligence to get it right anymore, or trusts the Bush Administration to tell the truth. The only way that we can regain the world's trust is to demonstrate that we understand our mistakes and have changed our ways.

*Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*.*

<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/pollack.htm>

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Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily  
January 15, 2004

## **Growing Evidence Of Syrian Involvement In Iraqi WMD, 'Resistance'; Early Suspicions In Egyptian Air Disaster Investigation**

Analysis. By Jason Fuchs, GIS (Global Information System) UN Correspondent.

GIS sources termed "very credible" an early January 2004 report by Syrian journalist and human rights activist Nizar Najoeff on the specific locations of Iraqi WMD in Syria. Najoeff, now living in France, in a letter to the Dutch daily *Die Telegraaf* identified three sites in Syria which he claimed housed Iraqi WMD:

1. A North Korean-built tunnel system beneath near al-Baida, about two kilometers from the town of al-Misiyf. This tunnel complex is believed to house Office 489 of the Cipher and Document Security, a branch of the Syrian "national security apparatus".
2. A factory controlled by the Syrian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Arabiya as Souriya) near the village of Tal Snan, between the cities of Hama and Salamiyeh.
3. A second tunnel system near the city of Sjinsjar on the Syrian side of the Syrian/Lebanese border. This complex is used by the 661 battalion of the Syrian Air Force.

Najoeff said that he had received this information from a "senior Syrian intelligence official". His claims were consistent with earlier reports by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources about the movement of Iraqi WMD into Syria with the full consent and cooperation of both the Syrian Government of Pres. Bashar al-Asad and the Iraqi Government of the now-deposed former Pres. Saddam Hussein. On October 28, 2002, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report entitled *Iraq Moves WMD Matériel to Syrian Safe-Havens* noted:

*Highly-authoritative, experienced GIS sources have reported that the Iraqi Government and Armed Forces have moved substantial caches of chemical weapons and related materials to safe-havens across the border into Syria, to avoid any chance of discovery by United Nations (UN) inspectors. Iraq moved stockpiles of chemical weapons and nuclear matériel as well as key production machinery and key experts to the Hsishi compound near Kamishli [al-Qamishli], in Syria, along with strategic weapons, ammunition, military fuels and other defense matériel, gold reserves, national archival records and national art treasures. It is believed that the moves took place in late August and early September 2002.*

Najoeff's mention of Sjinsjar was particularly notable because of its proximity to Lebanon and the significant possibility if not probability that segments of the Iraqi WMD matériel moved to Syria had subsequently been moved to Lebanon, in particular the Beqa'a Valley. Because of Iran's influential rôle in the Beqa'a, the presence of Iraqi WMD there would additionally implicate Iranian acceptance of their presence, at the very least; between a few hundred and a few thousand Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran) are based in the Beqa'a, with their command divided among their own institutional chain of command, the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, and the Iranian Embassy in Damascus. There had been numerous other reports of the movement of Iraqi WMD into Iran proper under the watch of Pasdaran commander Mohammed Baqer Zolghadr, although GIS sources could independently confirm these claims.

The January 9, 2004, finding by Danish Forces of as many as 200 120mm mortar shells just south of the Iraqi city of Amara potentially containing some form of blister agent could, if confirmed, be expected to be used by various elements in Washington to their own ends, respectively. [Iraq disclosed to UNSCOM that it filled 120mm mortar shells with CS tear gas starting in the early 1980s, but UNSCOM was unable to determine how much CS tear gas had actually been produced or how many shells had been filled; GIS UN sources noted that UNMOVIC remained suspicious of Baghdad's claim that CS was the only chemical agent actually utilized in this fashion.] Members of the US Bush Administration in favor of strong action against Syria, notably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-Pres. Dick Cheney, would likely attempt to buoy their case by building on this discovery, advocating that the finding of Iraqi WMD in Iraq strengthens the popular international legitimacy of the March-April 2003 US-led Coalition action against Iraq, easing the way for a harder-line approach toward Damascus.

National Security Adviser Dr Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and chief political adviser Karl Rove, all of whom had played a rôle in preventing US military forays into Syria under a "hot pursuit" rubric during the major conflict stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, would conversely point to the finding of WMD in Iraq as weakening the "case" that Iraqi WMD had been moved into Syria. Already, on January 9, 2003, National Security Adviser Rice told a press conference that the US had no credible evidence that any such movement of Iraqi WMD

into Syria had occurred, saying: "We don't, at this point, have any indications that I would consider credible and firm that that has taken place ..."

Complicating the regional dynamics by January 12, 2004, were the remaining unanswered questions regarding the January 3, 2004, crash on take-off from Sharm el-Sheikh of Flash Airlines Boeing 737, which killed all 148 passengers, including 135 French tourists, four with dual US-French citizenship. Forensic evidence at the crash site was still being collected, but GIS sources noted that the aircraft literally disintegrated a fraction of a second after all electric/electronic systems died without warning. GIS sources described this sequence of events as "odd, to say the least", and noted that it implied a physical intervention at a junction of the aircraft's electrical system. This was possible, by the use of an explosive or corrosive device, because, on this older-model Boeing 737, there was, indeed a single point at which all electrics could be cut, but it was not possible for them all to fail concurrently through normal means.

Perhaps critically, the 737 crashed into the Red Sea. It is standard practice, where feasible, for terrorists to bring down targeted flights over water in order to obfuscate any subsequent investigation into such an incident's cause; nitrates, a main component of bombs, are damaged by seawater, preventing authorities from recovering the sort of microscopic residue that could conclusively prove the cause of a given crash, as had been the case in Pan American Flight 103 which crashed over land on December 21, 1988, after it exploded in mid-air over Lockerbie, Scotland. Pan Am 103 would have exploded over water, as planned, but the aircraft had been delayed for almost an hour on the runway in London, altering its expected location when the bomb's timer activated the explosives.

GIS sources also deemed credible, though by all means not conclusive, a claim of responsibility for the downing of Flash Airlines Boeing 737. The claim was made by the Osama bin Laden-affiliated Yemeni group Ansar al-Haq (Followers of the Truth) in a telephone call to the Agence France Press (AFP) bureau in Cairo, warning that Air France flights would subsequently be targeted because of the recent French banning of Muslim headscarves in state schools. GIS sources confirmed that the operative who called in the message on behalf of the Yemeni group was actually an Egyptian himself. This appeared indicative of the layered, multi-ethnic nature of the bin Laden network, which remained marked by the presence of a hard core of expert Egyptian Islamists led by the Egyptian Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and intimately linked to the government of Iran. On this point, GIS sources maintained that Zawahiri was now spending significant amounts of time in Iran, by some accounts rather openly.

Bin Laden, too, had been "in and out" of the Iranian Islamic Republic since the fall of the Taliban Administration in Afghanistan following the US military action against that Administration beginning in October 2001. The al-Qaida leader's presence in Iran had been decidedly lower profile than Zawahiri's with reports that bin Laden had altered his appearance, having gained weight, died his beard black, and was now regularly wearing an Iranian-style black turban.

As reported in GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on December 17, 2003, by mid-December 2003 Iran had deployed Lebanese HizbAllah chief Imad Mugniyah to Iraq to coordinate "spectacular" attacks against Coalition Forces with the aid and assistance of Iraq-based Pasdarandetachments. GIS sources acknowledged but could not confirm rumors circulating in the region that Mugniyah was specifically planning major upcoming anti-Coalition attacks for some time in late March or early April 2004, maintaining that intelligence about any planned Iran-backed Mugniyah attacks was, as yet, still not time-specific.

*See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, December 17, 2003: Imad Mugniyah Now in Iraq; "Iraqi Resistance" Set to Evolve in Response to US Offensive, Capture of Saddam.*

At the same time as Iran increased its involvement in Iraq, there was also growing information about the key rôle of Syria in organizing the "Iraqi resistance". GIS sources confirmed further reporting from Najjoef's "Syrian intelligence official" as well as from some US-based Syrian opposition groups on the specifics of Damascus's involvement in these activities.

GIS Bosnian Muslim sources also confirmed on January 14, 2004, that a regular "pipeline" of Bosnian Islamist fighters, plus some foreign mujahedin were moving from Bosnia to Syria and then on to Iraq, with complete Syrian Government assistance, and were in many cases taking weapons with them.

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USA Today  
January 16, 2004  
Pg. 6

## **N. Korea: U.S. Can't Wait Out Standoff**

*Regime surviving, American reports*

By Barbara Slavin, USA Today

WASHINGTON — North Koreans warned visiting Americans last week that "time is not on the U.S. side" in a nuclear standoff between the two nations. They sought to prove their point by displaying a metal they claimed was bomb fuel and an empty storage facility that once held the raw ingredients for a half-dozen nuclear bombs. In the first detailed public account of the visit to North Korea by a private U.S. delegation, Jack Pritchard, a former diplomat who was part of the group, also said Thursday that economic activity has increased in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, and that those who argue that the United States can simply wait for the isolated regime to collapse are not being realistic.

The Bush administration says it wants a negotiated solution to the standoff, which began in October 2002. That's when both sides walked away from a 1994 agreement after North Korea admitted to a secret program to enrich uranium for weapons. But the prospects for a deal are poor. The North Koreans now deny having any uranium program, and U.S. officials say they will not settle for shutting down a complex that produces plutonium, another bomb fuel. The complex had been mothballed for eight years under the now-defunct 1994 accord.

Pritchard said that while the North Koreans emphasized their willingness to take part in negotiations, the visiting Americans did not detect any sense of urgency on the North Korean side. China has been trying to arrange talks in Beijing next month bringing together the United States, North Korea and North Korea's neighbors. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan warned the Americans that a failure to resolve the crisis will cause his country to intensify its bombmaking efforts, Pritchard said. "Are they bluffing? I don't think so," he said.

North Korea says its needs the bomb to deter a "hostile" United States.

The U.S. delegation was the first to visit North Korea's main nuclear facility at Yongbyon since North Korea expelled United Nations inspectors a year ago. Though technically a private mission, the group included two U.S. Senate aides and Sig Hecker, the former head of the Los Alamos nuclear laboratories, who required official clearance to go. Since returning to Washington, delegation members have briefed the departments of State and Energy.

At Yongbyon, the group was shown an operating nuclear reactor and an empty storage pond. Experts say that the reactor can produce a bomb's worth of plutonium a year and that the 8,000 fuel rods that had been in the pond could be reprocessed to yield plutonium for a half-dozen bombs. North Korea was believed to have one or two bombs' worth of plutonium before it restarted the Yongbyon site a year ago.

Pritchard conceded that he could not verify North Korean claims that the fuel rods had been reprocessed but said Hecker would provide expert testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday.

Another former U.S. official who has visited Yongbyon in the past and has been briefed on the delegation's findings said the North Koreans also produced a sample of plutonium metal, but no weapons were displayed.

Pritchard, who has visited Pyongyang several times, said he was struck by the changes in the usually drab capital. Lights were on in apartment buildings at night, there was traffic on the streets, and at a private market, hundreds of vendors sold items from food and clothing to furniture and electronics. "I was stunned by the activity," he said. Since a famine in the mid-1990s killed as many as 2 million North Koreans, the government has tolerated small-scale private markets. Reforms introduced in July legalized the markets and increased prices and wages, nurturing an apparent economic improvement.

In a study released this week, Marcus Noland, a North Korea expert at the Institute for International Economics, rated the chances of the North Korean regime collapsing at about 3%. North Korea receives about \$1 billion a year in foreign aid, Noland says, enough for survival rations for its 22 million people.

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20040116/5845258s.htm>

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InsideDefense.com

January 15, 2004

## **DOD Official: International WMD Initiative Producing Results, Experience**

An international crackdown on shipments of weapons of mass destruction is yielding results, a senior Pentagon official told reporters today.

In addition to tangible successes like the seizure last October of a Libyan-bound ship carrying nuclear centrifuge equipment, the Proliferation Security Initiative is providing interdiction experience to world militaries through multinational exercises, the official said.

A weeklong naval exercise in the Arabian Sea is due to culminate Jan 16 and Jan. 17, when Spanish special operations forces are scheduled to conduct a forced boarding of a merchant marine vessel purportedly carrying WMD. Six other nations are participating in the exercise.

The exercise, called Sea Saber, "is forcing participants to act as they would in the real world, with limited information about their target," the senior official said.

President Bush last May announced the initiative, featuring 11 participating countries. Since then, five simulations have taken place. Sea Saber is the first PSI exercise sponsored by the United States.

In addition, five new countries announced in late December that they will join the original 11 countries as active PSI participants. The new countries are Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore and Turkey.

Italy, one of the original participants, is due to lead a live air-interdiction exercise in the coming months, the official said.

Interdicting airplanes poses unique problems, the official said. "The challenge is you can't pull an airplane over and park it on a cloud."

Shooting down aircraft "is an inherent right of self-defense for any country under international law," he added, but "that's not something we've exercised as part of PSI."

Other means of interdicting airplanes have taken priority in PSI discussions, he said, including denying airspace to suspected WMD transport airplanes or escorting those aircraft down when they enter the airspace of a cooperating country.

The upcoming Italian exercise likely will involve the latter scenario, he said.

-- *David Perera*

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Inside the Air Force

January 16, 2004

Pg. 1

## **DSB: Guard Civil Support Teams Should Be Grown To Regional Units**

The structure of the Air and Army National Guard Civil Support Teams should be extended to regional units with a wider set of capabilities, according to recently obtained results of a Defense Science Board 2003 summer study on Defense Department roles and missions in homeland security.

Capabilities needed to protect the homeland are still immature, according to the DSB report, which offers several measures to mature those concepts and resources needed for DOD to project its forces and fulfill its homeland defense mission.

Among the findings includes a recommendation that the National Guard Bureau expand 10 support teams to give them a capability equivalent to the Marine Corps' Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force, a highly trained unit of about 375 marines and sailors who forward deploy in response to a threat or to protect nationally significant events. The CBIRF supports local, state and federal authorities as well as combatant commanders.

The CST growth "would permit strategic positioning of ten additional CBIRF-equivalents throughout the United States, while leveraging the Guard's command-and-control and operational integration with the civilian emergency response community," the DSB study says.

WMD-CSTs are 22-member units of Air and Army National Guard personnel deployable on a 24-hour-a-day basis to evaluate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive agents and impart their highly specialized knowledge of the agents to emergency responders at the scene of an incident involving WMD. The teams are equipped with advanced mobile communications suites to confer with other emergency responders and reach back to subject matter experts, the study notes.

In recent years, WMD-CSTs have been activated for several major U.S. events, including the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and for several disasters, including a search for highly toxic rocket fuel expelled after the Space Shuttle Columbia exploded last year over Texas.

To date, DOD has established and certified 33 teams in 32 states; California has two teams. The fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization Bill included language to bring the total number of CSTs to 55, equipping the remaining 23 states and several territories with the specialized units. Funds to match the authorization, however, were not provided in the legislation.

The fiscal year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into law Oct. 1, provided \$88 million to fund a dozen more teams. Several House and Senate legislators pushed for this latest round of defense legislation to fund the implementation of at least one WMD-CST in each U.S. state and territory by the end of FY-04.

DOD argued, however, that training requirements and available facilities make that mandate essentially unattainable. A WMD-CST unit takes about a year to train, and the Pentagon now only has the facilities to train

about 10 teams, according to a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate filed last spring. The final FY-04 spending bill concedes to those factors.

Nonetheless, the remaining teams should be "funded and activated as quickly as possible," DSB states.

The study also recommends that laws dictating CSTs be used only in continental United States operations be amended "to allow limited overseas deployment in support of combatant commanders in an emergency."

The civil support team recommendations are included in the study's "emergency preparedness and incident response observations," one of six "key areas" under which the DSB hashes out its formal recommendations.

"Should the U.S. homeland be attacked, DOD could be called on to assist with incident response. Execution of this mission could require capabilities in areas where the Department is deficient," the DSB warns.

In five other key areas, the study summarizes the following DOD deficiencies and needs in fulfilling its homeland security mission:

\*"Improvements are needed in many areas of information sharing, assurance, and collection;

\*"DOD is not doing enough to address the vulnerabilities of mission critical infrastructure and services, particularly in areas outside its direct control;

\*"Ocean vessels, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft are credible delivery systems available to adversaries. DOD needs to take steps to counter these threats as a complement to ongoing initiatives to defend against ballistic missiles;

\*"DOD can enhance homeland security by 'exporting' relevant core competencies that match the needs of other organizations that have homeland security responsibilities;

\*"U.S. Northern Command must be empowered for the nation to achieve its homeland security and homeland defense goals."

--Elizabeth Rees

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Friday, January 16, 2004.

8:10pm (AEDT)

ABC News Online

## US weapons hunter won't return to Iraq: report

David Kay, the chief United States weapons hunter in Iraq, has told the CIA he will not return to his post, a US government source said today.

"He has told the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet) that he doesn't want to go back, they have been trying to get him to stay," the source told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

It was unclear whether the CIA had had any success in persuading Mr Kay, who came back to the United States for the Christmas holidays, to stay on the job, the source said.

A CIA spokesman declined to comment.

Mr Kay, reached earlier this week, also declined to comment and referred questions about his status to the CIA. Tenet last June appointed Mr Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector, as a special adviser to lead the search for biological and chemical weapons and any signs of a resurrected nuclear weapons program in Iraq. But the hunt, which is being conducted by the Defence Department's Iraq Survey Group, has come up empty, finding no stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons or any evidence that Iraq had restarted a program to develop nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration cited weapons of mass destruction as its main justification for the war against Iraq that ousted Saddam Hussein from power last April.

A US official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, called Mr Kay's status "up in the air."

Major General Keith Dayton of the Defence Intelligence Agency, who heads the Iraq Survey Group under Mr Kay's guidance, was returning to Iraq this week to continue the weapons search.

US officials last month said Mr Kay had told administration officials he was considering leaving the job as early as January, citing family obligations.

At that time, officials described Mr Kay as frustrated that no banned weapons were found and that some of his staff had been diverted to other tasks.

The White House also said the weapons hunt was a priority for the administration whether or not Mr Kay stayed on the job.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last week issued a report that accused the Bush administration in the lead-up to the war of making the threat from Iraq sound more dire than the underlying information warranted.

The report's authors said they did not expect any large stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons to be found.

--Reuters

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1026893.htm>

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