



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER  
**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

---

---

Issue No. 310, 9 January 2004

**Articles & Other Documents:**

[Homeland Security Gets Small](#)

[N. Korea Offers U.S. A Deal](#)

[We Won't Scrap WMD Stockpile Unless Israel Does, Says Assad](#)

[Indians In Deal With Pakistanis For Peace Talks](#)

[Chinese Not Convinced Of North Korean Uranium Effort](#)

[U.S. Plans 3-Way Talks, Then Libya Inspection](#)

[U.S. Withdraws A Team Of Weapons Hunters From Iraq](#)  
[WMD IN IRAQ](#)

[Pakistan Called Libyans' Source Of Atom Design](#)

[Pakistan Denies Nuclear Transfer Report](#)

[Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper](#)

['Dirty Bomb' Was Major New Year's Worry](#)

[Visiting U.S. Team Hoping To Tour Secret Nuclear](#)

[Judge Decides Pentagon Can Resume Anthrax Vaccinations](#)

[US to defend WMD assessments](#)

---

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

(Book Review)

P C Magazine

December 24, 2003

## **Homeland Security Gets Small**

By John R. Quain

Ultimately, fighting the war on terrorism may have less to do with giant aircraft carriers and more to do with atomic-scale detection and prevention systems. Nanotechnology, which is expected to transform everything from computer processors to drug delivery systems, may also be the key to homeland security, argues a new book.

In *Nanotechnology and Homeland Security: New Weapons for New Wars* (Prentice Hall, 2003), Mark A. Ratner, a professor of chemistry at Northwestern University and a noted expert in molecular electronics, and his son Daniel Ratner, a high-tech entrepreneur, claim that current research in nanotechnology will lead to intelligent sensors, smart materials, and other methods for thwarting biological and chemical attacks.

"The number-one thing," says Daniel Ratner, "is going to be smart sensors. These could be immensely useful in finding weapons of mass destruction, for example. Today, you need a lab, and it takes days to analyze samples. In the future, a lab on a chip with nano-based sensors could give you a result in seconds." Such devices could also protect seaports by scanning all incoming shipping containers. Like reusable litmus paper, nanodot particles could instantly change color upon detecting the presence of anthrax DNA strands. And when sensors aren't enough, nanotechnology could be used to minimize the effects of terrorist attacks. "There are products coming for explosive mitigation," explains Daniel Ratner. "One is a blast-retardant foam that acts like an airbag for buildings and could be used in future construction." While the authors believe nanotech research will be essential to homeland security, Daniel Ratner says, "The biggest advances are still three, five, and up to ten years away."

<http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0.4149.1419829.00.asp>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

January 6, 2004

Pg. 1

## **Pakistan Called Libyans' Source Of Atom Design**

By Patrick E. Tyler and David E. Sanger

TRIPOLI, Libya, Jan. 5 — Pakistan was the source of the centrifuge design technology that made it possible for Libya to make major strides in the last two years in enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons, Bush administration officials in Washington and other Western experts said Monday.

The officials emphasized that they possessed no evidence that the Pakistani government of President Pervez Musharraf — a crucial ally in the pursuit of Al Qaeda — knew about the transfer of technology to Libya, which helped finance Pakistan's early nuclear weapons program three decades ago. Many of the centrifuge parts that Libya imported, and which Italy intercepted in October, were manufactured in Malaysia, according to experts familiar with the continuing investigation.

The timing of the transfer of the centrifuge design from Pakistan calls into question General Musharraf's ability to make good on his vow to President Bush that he would rein in Pakistani scientists selling their nuclear expertise around the globe. The general made that pledge shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States. Yet the main aid to Libya appears to have come since those attacks, suggesting that Pakistani scientists may have continued their trade even after the explicit warning.

"It has all the hallmarks of a Pakistani system," a senior official in Washington said. "These guys are now three for three as supplier to the biggest proliferation problems we have," the official added, referring to previously disclosed Pakistani aid to the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.

Libya agreed on Dec. 19 to dismantle its nuclear program and open itself to full inspections, which have already begun. But on Monday Mr. Bush issued a statement saying American economic sanctions against Libya would continue until it takes "concrete steps" to disarm.

The president pointed the way to a lifting of sanctions, however. "As Libya takes tangible steps to address those concerns," Mr. Bush said in a statement to Congress, "the United States will in turn take reciprocal tangible steps to recognize Libya's progress."

The United States and Britain have declined to identify publicly the sources of uranium enrichment technology shipped to Libya. They still will not discuss the origin of many of the parts that Libya obtained from middlemen and dealers. Those shipments are often hard to trace; the ship containing the Malaysian-made components in October picked them up in Dubai, a major transshipment point for both legitimate and banned technology.

One Western diplomat said Monday that some Pakistani nuclear scientists operated as though they were running "Nukes 'R' Us."

Still, a senior Bush administration official said it would be wrong to say the Pakistani government was involved in the shipment.

"This is intellectual property," the official said, "and the technology of uranium enrichment is out there on the black market." He added that to say the government of General Musharraf was involved would be like saying "an American drug smuggler arrested on the border was working for the United States government."

While Washington has waxed eloquent over the Libyan decision to disarm, some officials are concerned that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, could change his mind, especially if the United States does not to act on an implicit pledge to lift the economic sanctions.

To speed disarmament, the United States, Britain and Libya have agreed to begin negotiations later this week in London to work out detailed plans to verify and dismantle Libya's nuclear, chemical and other weapons programs.

Senior Western officials said Monday that over the weekend, the United States and Britain agreed on a common approach after a visit to London by John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state in charge of nonproliferation matters.

Separately on Monday, the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, said in the House of Commons that he had invited the Libyan foreign minister, Abdelrahman Shalqam, to come to London "soon" to discuss "the process of implementing the decision by Libya to dismantle its weapons programs." After the mechanics of a disarmament plan are worked out, Mr. Straw said, it will then be Libya's responsibility to report separately to the international agencies that will undertake the long-term monitoring of military laboratories in Libya to ensure that it does not renege on its pledges to give up illicit programs.

"We have committed ourselves to helping with the preparation" of Libya's submissions to the international treaty agencies, Mr. Straw said, "and to helping dismantle the programs Libya has agreed to destroy."

Mr. Straw's statement appeared to be a carefully calibrated division of labor among the main players in Libya's disarmament, and spoke of relevant international agencies playing a part, at least after initial talks.

Earlier comments from senior Bush administration officials had suggested that there was an effort by Washington to sideline Mohamed ElBaradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which he heads, from playing a key role in setting out a plan for dismantling Libya's nuclear program.

Monday's statements in London and by a senior American official suggested that Mr. ElBaradei would initially play a subordinate role as Britain and the United States move swiftly to inventory the full scope of Libya's illicit weapons programs and then take a prominent role in their dismantling.

In his statement to the British commons today, Mr. Straw alluded to the coming negotiations in London that will be carried out by diplomats from the three countries along with Central Intelligence Agency experts, British intelligence officers and Mr. Kussa, a Western official said.

"Britain and the United States will now be taking forward the practical issues of verification and of the dismantling of these weapons in partnership with Libya" and the international agencies that monitor the treaties banning the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons.

However, a senior Bush administration official said by telephone from the United States that personnel from the I.A.E.A. and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will not be present for the London talks.

*Patrick E. Tyler reported from Tripoli, Libya, for this article and David E. Sanger from Washington.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/06/international/asia/06CND-NUKE.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

January 6, 2004

## **N. Korea Offers U.S. A Deal**

*Regime says it would halt nuclear activities in exchange for economic concessions.*

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — North Korea said today it was willing to end production and testing of nuclear weapons in return for political and economic concessions from the United States.

The regime called its offer "bold and magnanimous" in a statement released over its official news service.

Although the proposal was substantially the same as one made last month — and rejected by the Bush administration — it appeared to signal that the isolated and impoverished nation is increasingly anxious to cut a deal.

The offer came the day that an unofficial delegation of five prominent Americans, including a leading nuclear expert, was scheduled to arrive in the capital, Pyongyang, on a five-day visit to North Korea.

The delegation has requested a tour of the country's largest nuclear complex, located at Yongbyon. If permission is granted, the visit would be the first to the controversial site since United Nations nuclear inspectors were expelled a year ago. Delegation members, interviewed Monday night by telephone in Beijing, cautioned that the trip to Yongbyon had not yet been approved by the North Korean government.

"We are hoping we can do some good, but we don't know yet," said Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory.

Other members of the delegation include Charles L. Pritchard, former State Department point man on North Korea and now an outspoken critic of the Bush administration's handling of the North Korean crisis; John W. Lewis, a professor emeritus of Chinese politics at Stanford University; and two Senate aides.

The delegation does not have the formal backing of the administration, but it hopes to smooth the way for official talks. The United States — along with China, Japan, South Korea and Russia — has tried for several months to

schedule another round of six-party talks over the North Korea nuclear issue. A round in August ended inconclusively.

South Korean officials said today that the next round probably would not happen until February or March at the earliest but that negotiations were continuing behind the scenes.

"There is no particular movement to set a date for talks," said Wi Sung Lac, a Foreign Ministry official.

Much of the negotiating concerns the timing of U.S. and North Korean concessions. The Bush administration insists that North Korea not be rewarded until it verifiably and irreversibly dismantles its nuclear weapons. North Korea, however, wants the lifting of economic sanctions, removal from the U.S. list of "terror-sponsoring" nations and energy aid before it would freeze its nuclear program.

In today's statement, the regime said it was "set to refrain from test and production of nuclear weapons and stop even operating nuclear power industry for a peaceful purpose as first-phase measures of the package solution."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor6jan06,1,3833688.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

January 6, 2004

## **Pakistan Denies Nuclear Transfer Report**

**Filed at 1:07 p.m. ET**

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) -- Pakistan on Tuesday denied a report that its scientists gave high-tech centrifuge design technology to Libya, the latest allegation linking the U.S. ally's nuclear program to Washington's bitterest enemies.

The alleged technology transfer to Libya took place after Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf pledged in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks that he would rein in his nuclear scientists in an effort to keep their expertise from falling into the hands of rogue regimes or terrorists, The New York Times said in a story in Tuesday editions.

There's no evidence the Pakistani government knew its scientists were selling information, but the alleged technology transfers raised doubts about Musharraf's ability to make good on his promise, the Times said.

"This is total madness. The report is absolutely false, and there is no truth in it," Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed told The Associated Press.

A senior official at Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, speaking to the AP on condition of anonymity, also denied government involvement, but stopped short of rejecting the charge of nuclear transfers outright.

"Pakistan should not be blamed for any individual's wrongful act," he said. "We do not know who has been helping Iran, North Korea or Libya."

In Washington, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the Libyan government was being "very forthcoming" just weeks after Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi pledged to give up nuclear weapons development.

"The next step is to make sure we have a clear understanding of what Libya possesses, make sure it matches up with what we think they possess and what they tell us they possess," Powell said, adding that the United States would work with the U.N. nuclear agency and other experts.

Powell said he didn't have enough information to comment on the charges of whether Pakistani scientists shared nuclear technology, saying, "We will be examining all of this."

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said the International Atomic Energy Agency will take the lead in monitoring Libya's progress in destroying weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration wants the monitoring done by a team of American and British experts.

"It was the atomic agency that sent in a team to follow through, it is the atomic agency that is going to inspect to ensure that Libya is really going to be rid of weapons of mass destruction," Annan said in New York.

A Western diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, declined to discuss the allegations involving Pakistan and Libya, but stressed that a black market in such components stretched across Europe and Asia.

"Certainly all fingers are pointing at Pakistan," the diplomat said. "But I don't think it's just Pakistan that needs to be concerned."

In December, Pakistan's government said it was questioning a number of its nuclear scientists on suspicion that "ambition and greed" may have led them to sell their knowledge to Iran. Islamabad denied government involvement in the plot and said any leaks were limited to Iran.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, was among the scientists questioned after officials received documents from the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency about Iran's nuclear program, officials say.

But Pakistani officials say Khan is not a suspect. He was seen Tuesday sitting with other dignitaries at a convention center where Pakistan is hosting the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Musharraf had "made his assurances" to President Bush that he would rein in Pakistani scientists.

"We fully expect President Musharraf and the government of Pakistan to follow through on those assurances," McClellan said Tuesday.

Still, the White House spokesman added, "We recognize it's always difficult to control the activities of rogue individuals whose motives are personal gain. We are working with many nations to overcome that issue."

Centrifuges can be used to enrich uranium for use in a nuclear device. Hundreds of centrifuges are needed to make enough material for a nuclear weapon. Each requires high-precision tubing that is difficult to produce.

The Iran link with Pakistan technology was disclosed after Tehran agreed to come clean about its nuclear program. Libya agreed in December to scrap its nuclear program and open itself to full inspections.

A diplomat with knowledge of the Iran investigation recently told the AP on condition of anonymity that U.S. intelligence also had "pretty convincing" evidence of a link between Pakistan and North Korea's weapons program, something Islamabad denies.

Pakistan has long been suspected of proliferation during its 30-year effort to build nuclear weapons as a deterrent against neighboring rival India. The two nations tested their first nuclear weapons in 1998.

-----

Associated Press reporters Munir Ahmad in Islamabad, Pakistan, and Nick Wadhams in New York contributed to this report.

<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Pakistan-Nuclear.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

London Daily Telegraph

January 6, 2004

Pg. 1

## **We Won't Scrap WMD Stockpile Unless Israel Does, Says Assad**

*The Syrian president talks exclusively to Benedict Brogan in Damascus*

Syria is entitled to defend itself by acquiring its own chemical and biological deterrent, President Bashar Assad said last night as he rejected American and British demands for concessions on weapons of mass destruction.

In his first major statement since Libya's decision last month to scrap its nuclear and chemical programmes, he came closer than ever before to admitting that his country possessed stockpiles of WMD.

Speaking to The Telegraph, Mr Assad said that any deal to destroy Syria's chemical and biological capability would come about only if Israel agreed to abandon its undeclared nuclear arsenal.

Since the capture of Saddam Hussein and Col Muammar Gaddafi's decision to dismantle his WMD programme, Mr Assad has risen towards the top of America's target list.

The White House and Downing Street have been waiting for his response to Col Gaddafi's appeal for other Arab leaders to follow his example or risk inflicting a "tragedy" on their people.

President Assad spoke for more than 90 minutes at his discreet villa, which he prefers to the grand palace overlooking Damascus built by his father, the late Hafez Assad.

Asked about American and British claims that Syria had a WMD capability, he stopped short of the categorical denial that has been his government's stock response until now.

Instead, he pointed to the Israelis' recent attack on alleged Palestinian bases in Syria and the occupation of the Golan Heights as evidence that Syria needed a deterrent. "We are a country which is [partly] occupied and from time to time we are exposed to Israeli aggression," he said. "It is natural for us to look for means to defend ourselves. It is not difficult to get most of these weapons anywhere in the world and they can be obtained at any time."

Mr Assad said that Col Gaddafi's surprise decision to allow international inspectors to supervise the dismantling of WMD programmes was a "correct step".

He called on the international community to support the proposal that Syria presented to the United Nations last year for removing all WMD from the Middle East, including Israel's nuclear stockpile.

"Unless this applies to all countries, we are wasting our time."

It is the worst kept secret in the Middle East that Damascus has one of the largest stockpiles of chemical agents in the region.

The latest CIA report on weapons of mass destruction says: "Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources [this year]. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. It is highly probable that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW [biological weapon] capability."

Mr Assad tempered his refusal to compromise on WMD by holding out the prospect of joint patrols with America along the Syria-Iraq border to prevent the passage of arms and fighters.

Acknowledging pressure from the US and Britain to crack down on Palestinian extremists based in Syria, he claimed that their offices had been closed and their activities curtailed. The groups could no longer "do anything military from these places. They are closed".

But he risked infuriating the West by stepping up his defence of Palestinian suicide bombers. He said the attacks had become "a reality we cannot control" and blamed them on "the Israeli killings, the Israeli occupations".

Despite his passionate advocacy of the Palestinian cause and his use in the past of inflammatory language about Israel and Jews, he denied hating them. "If you hate, you cannot talk about peace," he said.

Mr Assad repeated Syria's offer to resume negotiations with Israel over the occupation of the Golan Heights which were interrupted when a deal was in sight nearly a decade ago. But he said that an agreement was impossible as long as Israel insisted on starting negotiations from scratch rather than picking up where they left off.

Tony Blair, speaking on a flight back from Iraq before news emerged of the Assad interview, repeated his hope that Syria would follow Libya's example.

He said: "We offer Syria the possibility of a partnership for the future. But it is important that they realise that the terms are very clear and have been set out by ourselves and the Americans many times.

"You can see very clearly with what happened just before Christmas in respect of Libya that it is important to say to countries that may have engaged in such programmes: 'Look, there is a different way of dealing with this.'

"It can be dealt with diplomatically if people are prepared to do so, but it does have to be dealt with."

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/06/wsyrria06.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/01/06/ixnewstop.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

January 7, 2004

Pg. 1

## **Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper**

Since Gulf War, Nonconventional Weapons Never Got Past the Planning Stage

By Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

BAGHDAD -- Of all Iraq's rocket scientists, none drew warier scrutiny abroad than Modher Sadeq-Saba Tamimi.

An engineering PhD known for outsized energy and gifts, Tamimi, 47, designed and built a new short-range missile during Iraq's four-year hiatus from United Nations arms inspections. Inspectors who returned in late 2002, enforcing Security Council limits, ruled that the Al Samoud missile's range was not quite short enough. The U.N. team crushed the missiles, bulldozed them into a pit and entombed the wreckage in concrete. In one of three interviews last month, Tamimi said "it was as if they were killing my sons."

But Tamimi had other brainchildren, and these stayed secret. Concealed at some remove from his Karama Co. factory here were concept drawings and computations for a family of much more capable missiles, designed to share parts and features with the openly declared Al Samoud. The largest was meant to fly six times as far.

"This was hidden during the UNMOVIC visits," Tamimi said, referring to inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Over a leisurely meal of lamb and sweet tea, he sketched diagrams. "It was forbidden for us to reveal this information," he said.

Tamimi's covert work, which he recounted publicly for the first time in five hours of interviews, offers fresh perspective on the question that led the nation to war. Iraq flouted a legal duty to report the designs. The weapons they depicted, however, did not exist. After years of development -- against significant obstacles -- they might have taken form as nine-ton missiles. In March they fit in Tamimi's pocket, on two digital compact discs.

The nine-month record of arms investigators since the fall of Baghdad includes discoveries of other concealed arms research, most of it less advanced. Iraq's former government engaged in abundant deception about its ambitions and, in some cases, early steps to prepare for development or production. Interviews here -- among Iraqi weaponeers and investigators from the U.S. and British governments -- turned up unreported records, facilities or materials that could have been used in unlawful weapons.

But investigators have found no support for the two main fears expressed in London and Washington before the war: that Iraq had a hidden arsenal of old weapons and built advanced programs for new ones. In public statements and unauthorized interviews, investigators said they have discovered no work on former germ-warfare agents such as anthrax, and no work on a new designer pathogen -- combining pox virus and snake venom -- that led U.S. scientists on a highly classified hunt for several months. The investigators assess that Iraq did not, as charged in London and Washington, resume production of its most lethal nerve agent, VX, or learn to make it last longer in storage. And

they have found the former nuclear weapons program, described as a "grave and gathering danger" by President Bush and a "mortal threat" by Vice President Cheney, in much the same shattered state left by U.N. inspectors in the 1990s.

A review of available evidence, including some not known to coalition investigators and some they have not made public, portrays a nonconventional arms establishment that was far less capable than U.S. analysts judged before the war. Leading figures in Iraqi science and industry, supported by observations on the ground, described factories and institutes that were thoroughly beaten down by 12 years of conflict, arms embargo and strangling economic sanctions. The remnants of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile infrastructures were riven by internal strife, bled by schemes for personal gain and handicapped by deceit up and down lines of command. The broad picture emerging from the investigation to date suggests that, whatever its desire, Iraq did not possess the wherewithal to build a forbidden armory on anything like the scale it had before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

David Kay, who directs the weapons hunt on behalf of the Bush administration, reported no discoveries last year of finished weapons, bulk agents or ready-to-start production lines. Members of his Iraq Survey Group, in unauthorized interviews, said the group holds out little prospect now of such a find. Kay and his spokesman, who report to Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, declined to be interviewed.

### **Poxes and Professors**

On Dec. 13, as a reporter waited to see the dean of Baghdad University's College of Science, two poker-faced men strode into the anteroom. One was an ex-Marine named Dan, clad in civilian clothes, body armor, a checkered Arab scarf and a bandolier of eight spare magazines for his M-16 rifle. The other identified himself to the receptionist only as Barry.

He asked to see the dean, Abdel Mehdi Taleb, immediately. Dan preceded Barry into Taleb's office, weapon ready, then stood sentry outside.

According to Taleb, Barry asked -- once again -- about the work of immunologist Alice Krikor Melconian. For months, Taleb said, the Americans had sent scientists and intelligence officers to investigate the compact, curly-haired chairman of the university's biotechnology department.

Three Iraqi scientists said U.S. investigators asserted they have reason to believe Melconian ran a covert research facility, location unknown. In July, colleagues said, Melconian emerged from her office with a burly American on each arm and was placed into the back seat of a car with darkened windows. U.S. investigators held her for 10 days in an open-air cell and then released her.

Described by associates as shaken by her arrest, Melconian said she has done no weapons research and knows of no secret labs. "I have never left the university," she said. "I have nothing more to say about this. I do not want to make any more trouble."

Like others on campus, and at a few elite institutes elsewhere, Melconian remains under scrutiny in part because investigators deem her capable of doing dangerous biological research. Investigators said they are casting a wide net at Iraq's "centers of scientific excellence" in an effort to confirm intelligence that is fragmentary and often lacks essential particulars.

Kay's Iraq Survey Group, which has numbered up to 1,400 personnel from the Defense Department, Energy Department national laboratories and intelligence agencies, is looking for biological weapons far more dangerous than those of Iraq's former arsenal. A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, published in October 2002, said "chances are even" that Iraqi weaponeers were working with smallpox, one of history's mass killers. It also said Iraq "probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents."

As the Associated Press first reported, a scientific assessment panel known as Team Pox returned home in late July without finding reason to believe Iraq possessed the variola virus, which causes smallpox. Even so, interviews with Iraqi scientists led to a redoubled search for work on animal poxes, harmless to humans but potentially useful as substitutes for smallpox in weapons research.

Rihab Taha, the British-educated biologist known in the west as Dr. Germ, has generally been described by U.S. officials as uncooperative in custody since May 12. But according to one well-informed account of her debriefing, she acknowledged receiving an order from superiors in 1990 to develop a biological weapon based on a virus. That same year, a virologist who worked for her, Hazem Ali, commenced research on camelpox.

If truthful and correctly recounted, Taha's statement exposed a long-standing lie. Iraq's government denied offensive viral research. One analyst familiar with the debriefing report, declining to be identified by name or nationality, said investigators believe that Taha's remarks demonstrate an intent to use smallpox, since camelpox resembles no other human pathogen.

"Hearing that from the lips of the people involved is kind of like that MasterCard commercial: 'Priceless,' " the analyst said.

There is no corresponding record, however, that Iraq had the capability or made the effort to carry out such an intent.

Taha, according to the same debriefing account, said Iraq had no access to smallpox. Ali's research halted after 45 days, with the August 1990 outbreak of war in Kuwait, and did not resume. And Taha, like all those in custody, continues to assert that biowar programs ceased entirely the following year.

### **Chimeras, Science Fiction**

More alarming even than Taha's statement, investigators said, were highly classified indications that Iraq sought to produce a genetically altered virus. Australian scientists reported in 2001 that an apparently innocent change in mousepox DNA transformed the virus into a rampant killer of mice. Investigators spent months probing for evidence that Iraq sought to master the technique, then apply it to vaccinia -- a readily available virus used to inoculate against smallpox -- and finally to smallpox itself.

Survey group scientists discovered no sign of pox research save at the Baghdad College of Veterinary Medicine, which declared the work to U.N. inspectors in 2002. Researchers there were manipulating the viruses that cause goatpox and sheeppox, in well-documented efforts to develop vaccines. U.S. investigators arrested Antoine Banna, the Cornell-trained dean, but soon released him. Much the same result followed a probe of avian virus research at the Ghazi Institute.

"It was legitimate research, but if they wanted to swing the other way they had some of the wherewithal to do that," said an analyst apprised of the results.

When investigators paid a call on Noria Ali, a genetic engineer who wears the head cover and long robes of an observant Muslim, "they said they knew there was [genetic] research on these viruses, and we had secret labs for this work," Ali said.

Ali acknowledged a history that attracted suspicion. In 1990, she said, Rihab Taha ordered her to build a genetic engineering lab at Iraq's principal bioweapons research center. The Special Security Organization warned her that "any person who talks about his work will be executed," Ali said. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait left the lab unfinished, an account confirmed by U.S. and European experts.

"We could have done a lot in this lab, but the fact is that this lab never existed," Ali said.

The survey group's most exotic line of investigation sought evidence that Iraq tried to create a pathogen combining pox virus with cobra venom. A 1986 study in the *Journal of Microbiology* reported that fowlpox spread faster and killed more chickens in the presence of venom extract. Investigators received a secondhand report that Iraq sought to splice them together.

Such an artificial life form -- created by inserting genetic sequences from one organism into another -- is called a "chimera," after the fire-breathing monster of Greek mythology commingling lion, serpent and goat.

"They have asked about developing some kind of chimera, a pox with snake-venom gene," said Ali Zaag, dean of the university's Institute for Biotechnology. "You have seen our labs. For us, these capabilities are science fiction." Investigators also searched for what one of them termed "starter sets" of pathogens, laboratory samples that could be used for later production. For each suspected weapon, the investigators carried a supply of "labeled antibodies," a classified technology used in field kits that resemble home pregnancy tests. "We didn't find anything, so certainly not anything engineered," a coalition scientist said.

Team Pox, as the group of investigators dubbed itself, eventually dropped the chimera investigation.

"You've got to learn to walk before you start running," said a European government scientist who studied Iraq's biological programs last year. "The evidence we have about the virus program is they hadn't started to walk yet." Recently, Zaag said, the chimera hunt resumed. This time the investigators are intelligence officers. Their approach, Zaag said, is "We'll give you a few more days to reveal something, and then we'll have to take you." Spokesmen for the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency declined requests for interviews.

### **What 'The Traitor' Knew**

Late last month, fresh evidence emerged on a very old question about Iraq's illegal arms: Did the Baghdad government, as it said, rid itself of all the biological arms it produced before 1991? The answer matters, because the Bush administration's most concrete prewar assertions about Iraqi germ weapons referred to stocks allegedly hidden from that old arsenal.

The new evidence appears to be a contemporary record, from inside the Iraqi government, of a pivotal moment in Baghdad's long struggle to shield arms programs from outside scrutiny. The document, written just after the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law on Aug. 8, 1995, anticipates the collapse of cover stories for weapons that had yet to be disclosed. Read alongside subsequent discoveries made by U.N. inspectors, the document supports Iraq's claim that it destroyed all production stocks of lethal pathogens before inspectors knew they existed.

The defection of Hussein Kamel was a turning point in the U.N.-imposed disarmament of Iraq in the 1990s. Kamel, who had married one of Saddam Hussein's daughters, Raghad, and controlled Baghdad's Military Industrial Commission, told his Western debriefers about major programs in biological and nuclear weaponry that had gone undetected or unconfirmed. Iraq was forced to acknowledge what he exposed, but neither inspectors nor U.S. officials were sure Kamel had told all there was to tell.



A handwritten Iraqi damage report, composed five days after the defection, now suggests that Kamel left little or nothing out.

The author is Hossam Amin, then -- and until his April 27 arrest -- the head of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate. As liaison to the inspectors he provided information and logistical support, but he also concealed the government's remaining secrets.

Sufiyan Taha Mahmoud, who was private secretary to Amin in 1995, said in an interview that Amin flew into a rage when he learned Kamel had slipped across the border to Jordan. "It was as if he was hit with a hammer," Mahmoud said.

Five days later, Amin dispatched a six-page letter to the president's son Qusay.

The person who provided a copy to The Washington Post had postwar access to the presidential office where he said he found the original. Iraqis who know Amin well and experienced government investigators from the United States and Europe, who analyzed the document for this article, said they believe it to be authentic. They cited handwriting, syntax, contemporary details and annotations that match those of previous samples. Markings on the letter say that Qusay read it, summarized it for his father and filed it with presidential secretary Abed Hamid Mahmoud.

Just before his "sudden and regrettable flight and surrender to the bosom of the enemy," Amin wrote, "the traitor Hussein Kamel" received a detailed briefing on "the points of weakness and the points of strength" in Iraq's concealment efforts.

Amin then listed, in numbered points, "the matters that are known to the traitor and not declared" to U.N. inspectors. Inspectors knew Iraq tried to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon, but not, Amin wrote, about the "crash program" to fabricate a bomb with French reactor fuel by 1991. They knew Iraq made biological toxins, but not that it put them in Scud missile warheads. There were major facilities -- Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, a centrifuge factory in Rashdiya, and the Al Atheer bomb-fabrication plant -- whose true purposes were unacknowledged to inspectors.

Shortly after Amin sent the letter, Kamel's debriefings and subsequent inspections exposed every item in Amin's catalogue.

Until now, Kamel's debriefers suspected that "maybe he decided to keep something for himself," said Ali Shukri, a Jordanian military officer who debriefed Kamel on behalf of the late King Hussein, speaking in an interview in Amman. After reading Amin's letter in silence and then rereading it, Shukri looked up and said Kamel had held back nothing.

The most significant point in Amin's letter, U.S. and European experts said, is his unambiguous report that Iraq destroyed its entire inventory of biological weapons. Amin reminded Qusay Hussein of the government's claim that it possessed no such arms after 1990, then wrote that in truth "destruction of the biological weapons agents took place in the summer of 1991."

It was those weapons to which Secretary of State Colin L. Powell referred in the Security Council on Feb. 5 when he said, for example, that Iraq still had an estimated 8,500 to 25,000 liters of anthrax.

Some things Amin's letter did not say may also be meaningful. If Iraq had succeeded in spray-drying anthrax to extend its life and lethality, that would have been among the most important secrets of its wide-ranging weapons program. The letter did not speak of it. The letter also enumerated Baghdad's nuclear secrets, but mentioned nothing to suggest Iraq manufactured unknown parts of an "implosion device" to detonate uranium.

There was only one important thing, Amin said, that Hussein Kamel did not know: some of the locations where Iraq hid its library of arms research. That supports long-standing suspicions that Iraq held back portions of a knowledge base that could speed revival of development and production one day.

A U.S. intelligence official, who was provided with a copy of Amin's letter for comment, said the government would not discuss it in detail. He said an initial check of records "suggests that we have not previously seen the letter."

Without the original and an account of its origins, he said, government analysts "cannot verify the authenticity of the letter." He added, "It is plausible and, from a quick scan of it, presents no immediate surprises."

### **'The Stupid Army'**

Thair Anwar Masraf, an affable project engineer, made an appointment last summer to see an investigator from David Kay's survey group. He had information, he said in an interview, that might help the Americans interpret two trailer-mounted production plants found near Mosul in April and May.

"I waited more than one hour in the Palestine Hotel," Masraf said. "He did not show up."

Masraf watched with curiosity, in coming months, as the Bush administration touted its discovery of mobile germ-weapon factories.

A joint study released May 28 by the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency called the trailers "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program." Two days later, in Poland, President Bush announced: "For those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them."

When Iraqi engineers told investigators that the discovered trailers were meant for hydrogen, the CIA dismissed the "cover story."

By July, with contrary evidence piling up, Kay described the trailer episode as a "fiasco." He told BBC Television, which broadcast the tape Nov. 23: "I think it was premature and embarrassing."

Even so, Kay's October report to Congress left the question unresolved. Kay said he could not corroborate a mobile germ factory, but he restated the CIA argument that the trailers were not "ideally suited" for hydrogen.

Had Masraf found Kay's investigator at the Palestine Hotel, he said he would have explained that Iraq actually used such trailers to generate hydrogen during the eight-year war with Iran. Masraf and his former supervisor at the Saad Co. said Masraf managed a contract to refurbish some of the units beginning in 1997.

According to the two men, Iraq bought mobile hydrogen generators from Britain in 1982 and mounted them on trucks. The Republican Guard used one type, Iraq's 2nd Army Corps another.

Iraqi artillery units relied on hydrogen-filled weather balloons to measure wind and temperature, which affect targeting. Munqith Qaisi, then a senior manager at Saad Co. and now its American-appointed director-general, said the trailers used a chemical -- not biological -- process to make hydrogen from methanol and demineralized water.

The feature that analysts found most suspicious in May -- the compression and recapture of exhaust gases -- is a necessity, Masraf said, when gas is the intended product.

In the late 1990s, the Republican Guard sent some of its trailers for refurbishment at the Kindi Co. The 2nd Army Corps signed a similar contract with Saad Co. Masraf said the first units were finished in 2001, including the two discovered by coalition forces around Mosul.

Qaisi's account may also clear up an unexplained detail from the May 28 intelligence report: traces of urea in the reaction vessel aboard one of the trailers. Qaisi said the vessels corroded badly because Iraqi troops disregarded strict orders to use only demineralized water.

"The stupid army pissed in it, or used river water," he said.

#### **Said's Last Experiment**

On Thursday, Dec. 11, a ruffled man with a high, balding crown arrived late for work at the University of Technology. In his unpainted office, about the size of a family sedan, electrical fixtures drooped from cement walls. Sabah Abdul Noor once moved among the nation's elites. He played a part in the most ambitious undertaking of Iraqi industrial science: creation from scratch, and largely in secret, of the wherewithal to design and manufacture an atomic bomb. When the 1991 Gulf War intervened, an Iraqi bomb was -- informed estimates vary -- six months to two years from completion.

Abdul Noor watched as that multibillion-dollar enterprise was reduced to slag under the cutting torches of U.N. inspectors, who arrived under Security Council mandate after Iraq's defeat in Kuwait. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Abdul Noor said, U.S. forces have been questioning him for indications that the nuclear program was secretly revived.

"I have just come from such an interview," he said, apologizing for the hour. "They didn't give names. They did not say where they were from. I am kept as long as they wish to keep me."

What the Americans want to talk about, almost always, is Khalid Ibrahim Said.

Until 1991, Said was going to be the man who built Iraq's atomic bomb. Other leading figures were responsible for uranium enrichment. Said led the team -- "PC-3, Group 4," in Iraq's cryptic organization chart -- that would form 40 pounds of uranium into a working nuclear device. Abdul Noor was Said's powder metallurgist.

Said died on April 8 when Marines opened fire on his moving car near a newly established checkpoint. His loss grieved Kay's nuclear investigators, who had many questions for him. When they came across Said's last experiment, the late bomb designer moved to the center of their probe.

Said spent his final days in a warehouse filled with capacitors and powerful magnets. He and his team were building what they described -- in a mandatory disclosure to the International Atomic Energy Agency -- as a "linear engine." The purpose, Iraq declared, was air defense.

The machine in Said's warehouse was more commonly known as a "rail gun." It used electromagnetic pulses to accelerate a small object to very high speed.

When U.S. investigators arrived, they found the gun had been "shooting an aluminum projectile at an aluminum target plate like the skin of an airplane," said an analyst who reviewed their report. But rail gun technology is thought to be decades from use in a practical weapon, and investigators believed Said might have something else in mind.

Impact of an extremely high-velocity projectile in a target chamber, they said, might be used to measure the behavior of materials under pressures that compare to a nuclear implosion. Such "equation of state" experiments, as physicists call them, could be applied to nuclear warhead design. When the U.S. nuclear team looked closely at that question, however, it "saw no evidence of equation of state work" with the rail gun, according to an authoritative summary of the team's report.

A sad look crossed Abdul Noor's face when he tried to explain his bafflement at suspicions that Iraq had secretly rebuilt -- "reconstituted," as the Bush administration put it in the summer and fall of 2002 -- a nuclear weapons program. He and his colleagues still know what they learned, Abdul Noor said, but their material condition is incomparably worse than it was when they began in 1987. "We would have had to start from less than zero," he said, with thousands of irreplaceable tools banned from import. "The country was cornered," he said. "We were boycotted. We were embargoed. The truth is, we disintegrated."

Of his late friend Said, Abdul Noor said: "I don't know what was in his heart. Probably he wanted to return to [nuclear weapons work] one day. That is in the category of dreams."

A common view among investigators today is that Said had the motive but not the means. One Western physicist who knew Said well said the rail gun enabled Said to maintain his team and "hone their skills on diagnostics, flash X-ray cameras, measuring very high speeds, and measuring impacts of ramming things together." The physicist added, "It's basic science. There's no relation to actual [bomb] design and fabrication."

Some investigators have yet to be convinced. They continue to look for warhead research in the guise of the rail gun. "Today they were asking me that again," Abdul Noor said. "I was not on the same wavelength. I could see they were not pleased with me."

### **Red on Red on Blue**

There is another explanation for the rail gun, according to one man who worked on it and does not want to be named. It was, he said, a deception operation against Saddam Hussein.

Hussein resented U.S. air patrols over "no-fly zones" where Iraqi aircraft were forbidden in northern and southern Iraq. After trying for years to challenge the patrols, another Iraqi said, "we had yet to scratch the wing of one American F-15."

Said gave the president an answer involving futuristic technology. He was a good enough applied physicist to understand the long odds against success, Said's anonymous colleague said, but the project earned him favor, prestige and a substantial budget.

In every field of special weaponry, Iraqi designers and foreign investigators said, such deceit was endemic. Program managers promised more than they could deliver, or things they could not deliver at all, to advance careers, preserve jobs or conduct intrigues against rivals. Sometimes they did so from ignorance, failing to grasp the challenges they took on.

Lying to an absolute ruler was hazardous, Iraqi weaponeers said, but less so in some cases than the alternatives. "No one will tell Saddam Hussein to his face, 'I can't do this,'" said an Iraqi brigadier general who supervised work on some of the technologies used in the rail gun.

David Kay's survey group has turned up other such cases. Analysts are calling the phenomenon "red-on-red deception," after the U.S. practice of using red to stand for enemy forces and blue to stand for friendly ones. In some cases, they said, "red on red" amounted to "red on blue" -- because Western intelligence collected the same false reports that fooled Hussein.

Sufiyan Taha Mahmoud, who worked for Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate throughout its 12 years, said spurious programs also led to needless conflict with U.N. arms inspectors.

"They couldn't build anything," Mahmoud said of overpromising weaponeers, "but they had to hide the documents because they related to prohibited activities."

Secrecy and a procurement system based on smuggling, Iraqi scientists said, abetted those who inflated their reports. George Healey, a Canadian nuclear physicist and longtime inspector in Iraq, said entire programs were devised, or their design choices distorted, in order to siphon funds.

"They had a system to graft money out of oil-for-food," he said, referring to the U.N. program that supervised Iraqi exports and imports after 1991. "What you had to have was a project -- the more expensive the better, because the more you can buy, the more you can graft out of it. You'd have difficulty believing how much that explains."

Intertwined with internal deception, many analysts now believe, was deception aimed overseas. Hussein plainly hid actual programs over the years, but Kay, among others, said it appears possible he also hinted at programs that did not exist.

Hans Blix, who was executive chairman of UNMOVIC, the U.N. arms inspection team, said in a telephone interview from Sweden that he has devoted much thought to why Hussein might have exaggerated his arsenal. One explanation that appeals to him: "You can put a sign on your door, 'Beware of the dog,' without having a dog. They did not mind looking a little bit serious and a little bit dangerous."

Defectors who sold false or exaggerated stories in Washington, Iraqi and American experts said, layered on still another coat of deception.

"You end up with a Picasso-like drawing -- distorted," said Ali Zaag, the Baghdad University biotechnologist.

### **'Long Pole in the Tent'**

One line of thought in the survey group now, as it constructs a narrative of the Iraqi threat, is that the Baghdad government set out to revive its nonconventional programs in sequence. Instead of beginning with "weapons of mass destruction" -- nuclear, biological or chemical -- Iraq began with the means to deliver them .

"Missiles are very significant to us because they're the long pole in the tent," Kay told "BBC Panorama." "They're the thing that takes the longest to produce. . . . The Iraqis had started in late '99, 2000, to produce a family of missiles that would have gotten to 1,000 kilometers [625 miles]."

Kay was referring to Tamimi's work, though the designer and details have not been made public before. If reached, a 625-mile range would have menaced Tel Aviv, Tehran, Istanbul, Riyadh, the world's richest oil fields and important U.S. military installations from Turkey to the Persian Gulf.

When that might have happened -- or whether -- is difficult to forecast. Of all Iraq's nascent programs, Tamimi's was among the most advanced. A closer look at its prospects helps answer a question common to all four fields of forbidden arms: Was the country capable of carrying out the presumed intentions of its leader?

Tamimi is a man of robust self-esteem, but he expressed no confidence about his long-range missile, which depended on clustering five engines in a single stage. (An intermediate version called for two engines.) Western missile experts, who suggested questions and reviewed answers from a reporter in multiple rounds of interviews with Tamimi, emerged uncertain of the timetable or outcome.

Their best estimate was that it would take six years -- if the missile worked at all -- to reach a successful flight test. Tamimi would need less time with major help from abroad, but considerably more if he had to conceal the work from U.N. monitoring that persisted until the United States invaded in March. U.S. government spokesmen declined to provide an estimate.

Tamimi "was the star" of Iraq's three rival rocket establishments, said a French expert who has known him for years. Another European rocket scientist said of Tamimi: "In our country he would be a very good design engineer."

But Tamimi lacked access to the modern tools and technical literature of his profession. He left Czechoslovakia's Antonin Zapoteky Military Academy in 1984 with a doctorate degree and a collection of Russian rocketry texts now entering their third decade in print. For the essential modeling of thrust, flight qualities, trajectory and range, he relied on unsophisticated software written in Baghdad. In an e-mail exchange, Tamimi expressed strong curiosity about what the "more accurate modeling programs" of overseas experts might show about his designs.

Tamimi faced challenges he had not encountered before, some of which he knew about and others he did not. He knew he would have difficulty lashing together multiple engines and igniting them at the same instant. "The main problem was synchronization, which we hadn't solved yet," he said.

To fit multiple engines in an airframe based on the existing Al Samoud missile, Tamimi's designs called for a flared missile that nearly doubled in diameter -- from 760mm (30 inches) to 1500mm (59 inches) -- from top to bottom. Foreign experts said the shape would produce enormous strains. "If it didn't break up going up, it would most likely do so on reentry," said a Western expert who did not want to be named, after submitting Tamimi's sketches and descriptions to an evaluation team. "To avoid that, they would have to develop some sort of separation system to abandon the wider bit, and also master terminal guidance after the separation."

Tamimi said "we did not consider the problem of separation." For terminal guidance, which steers a missile in its final approach to target, Tamimi pinned his hope on Russian technology he did not have in hand.

In test flights, the Al Samoud missile never landed -- literally -- within a mile of its target. In 2001, Tamimi obtained a small black-market supply of precision Russian gyroscopes. He hoped they would increase the missile's accuracy from about 1.5 miles to 500 yards. To increase accuracy still further, he said "we were near success" in negotiating a contract -- he would not say with whom -- for a complete Russian-built inertial navigation system.

"He knew very well where he was going, especially in guidance and gyroscope equipment," a foreign expert said.

An enormous problem for Tamimi's program, however, was that he designed it to allow procurement of parts under cover of the openly declared Al Samoud. When inspectors ruled the Al Samoud illegal and destroyed its production lines in March, Tamimi said, he began to doubt the project's viability.

"Saddam Hussein ordered this work, but where would we get the materials?" said an Iraqi general who declined to be named and who kept close tabs on Tamimi's missile designs. "This was the case in every field. People would prepare reports under the order of Saddam Hussein and the supervision of the people around Saddam Hussein. But it was not real."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60340-2004Jan6.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

# Indians In Deal With Pakistanis For Peace Talks

By Amy Waldman

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 6 — Two years after nearly going to war, India and Pakistan announced Tuesday that they had agreed to restart formal peace talks in February, an extraordinary turn in relations between two countries — and now nuclear powers — that have been at odds for more than half a century.

A joint press statement released by the two countries' foreign ministers said they had agreed to a "composite dialogue" on all issues between them, including the disputed, and divided, territory of Kashmir.

Pakistan, which has backed an Islamic separatist insurgency against India in Kashmir, said it would not permit Pakistani territory to be used to support terrorism, its first such direct assurance to India.

Since they were carved out of the British Empire in 1947, Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan have gone to war three times. Both countries have nuclear arsenals, making their continuing tension perhaps the world's most perilously volatile relationship.

The agreement on the joint statement — which was largely unexpected when a regional summit meeting started here last weekend — came after an hour-long meeting between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, on Monday, and other less publicized negotiations by both sides. It was sealed by a telephone call from Mr. Vajpayee to General Musharraf Tuesday morning.

"History has been made," General Musharraf said in a press conference at the presidential palace after the agreement was announced. "We never reached in the past where we have reached now."

In the six simple paragraphs released Tuesday, the two leaders managed to stitch a mutual satisfaction that had eluded them for years.

For each leader, the statement represented a culmination of processes unleashed by both personal vision and geopolitical pressure. Last April, Mr. Vajpayee, 79, who has long made clear that he would like peace with Pakistan to be his legacy, offered India's neighbor a "hand of friendship" after almost two years of estrangement, saying he wanted to make one last attempt at peace.

General Musharraf pledged to crack down on militants whom Pakistan has long supported and who have been blamed for at least one of the two assassination attempts that nearly killed him last month. His assurance appears to complete the U-turn he made after Sept. 11, 2001, when he abandoned Pakistan's support for the Taliban government in Afghanistan and instead pledged it to the American hunt for Al Qaeda.

In turn, Pakistan won the dialogue it has long sought on Kashmir, the former princely state that acceded to mostly Hindu India at the time of the 1947 partition. Pakistan has insisted for more than a half-century on the right of self-determination for the mostly Muslim Kashmiris, or at least discussion of their status.

India, which controls two-thirds of Kashmir, having lost the rest to Pakistan in a war after the partition, has resisted any such negotiations. It has argued that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and, as its only Muslim-majority state, proof of its secular identity.

India, for its part, got the first public written commitment from General Musharraf that he would not allow terrorists — a reference to the anti-Indian insurgents Pakistan has termed freedom fighters — to operate from Pakistani soil. "Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility, and terrorism must be prevented," the statement said. "President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner."

India's foreign minister, Yashwant Sinha, said the assurance combined with a "certain situation on the ground" — a reduction in infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir and militant activity there — gave India the confidence to proceed.

"There would be no joint press statement if the satisfaction was not there," Mr. Sinha said.

The two nations had nearly gone to war after India said that Pakistan was responsible for an attack in December 2001 on Parliament in New Delhi.

In the nine months since Mr. Vajpayee's speech, the two sides have engaged in a series of confidence-building measures intended to improve relations, including the restoration of diplomatic and transport links and a cease-fire along the front line that divides Kashmir.

General Musharraf had tried to compartmentalize Pakistan's support for Islamic militancy in Kashmir, half-heartedly cracking down on Kashmiri groups, and failing to end the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistan into India.

With the agreement, he has implicitly agreed to abandon the waging of a proxy war in Kashmir, although only time will show whether he has both the will and power to fulfill that pledge. At his news conference, he also vowed that Pakistan would adopt more measures to crack down further on religious extremism in Pakistan.

"Any extremism, any terrorism from here will not be allowed," he said, adding later, "We have to take to task any extremist here of whatever shape and color — and we'll take them to task."

He credited Mr. Vajpayee's "vision" and "statesmanship" for the agreement, and the flexibility both sides had shown in negotiations. Asked whether friendship with India — the nemesis on which generations of Pakistanis, and more

importantly the Pakistani Army, have been raised — was part of his "strategic vision," General Musharraf looked taken aback.

"Of course," replied the general, whom India blamed for orchestrating an incursion into its part of Kashmir five years ago.

He elaborated by saying that South Asia, home to one fifth of the world's people and half its poor, was the only region of the world where governments were not cooperating for the benefit of their people.

"It is the India-Pakistan relationship that is acting as an obstacle" to the region's uplift, he said.

At a summit meeting of seven regional leaders, including those of India and Pakistan, that ended Tuesday, it was clear that the global economic environment was forcing change on South Asia. The seven leaders spoke of their concern about how to cope with new trade arrangements, and the need to resolve differences to enable formation of a regional trade bloc.

Pakistan agreed to join a regional free trade agreement the leaders signed Tuesday, which would lower tariffs over 10 years. Previously, Pakistan had resisted regional economic cooperation until its dispute with India was resolved. General Musharraf faces other pressures as well. His government has been grappling with a series of damaging disclosures on his country's role in the spread of nuclear technology, and the Tuesday agreement, sure to generate international goodwill, may provide a welcome distraction.

General Musharraf also has earned the enmity of Islamic extremists angered by his support for the American war on terrorism and perhaps as well by his gradually growing flexibility on Kashmir. A suicide bomber identified in one of the assassination attempts last month was linked to a Kashmiri militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammad. The sophistication of the second attempt has prompted concern that Al Qaeda could be involved.

The attacks suggested that General Musharraf could now be forced to face up to the connections between Kashmiri militant groups and the terrorists he has vowed to uproot.

While he said Tuesday that the agreement was a victory for moderates in both India and Pakistan, General Musharraf acknowledged that he would face "fallout" from extremists wedded to separating Kashmir from India.

Many of those extremists were trained or supported by Pakistan's intelligence services.

General Musharraf appeared unconcerned about his personal safety. "I have nine lives — I haven't consumed them all," he said.

The language used Tuesday was a far cry from the hostile rhetoric that preceded, and followed, their last meeting, at Agra in 2001.

"Please don't look at this document as a victory for one side or the other," Brajesh Mishra, the Indian national security adviser, said in a theme echoed repeatedly Tuesday. "It is a win-win situation."

The statement did not refer to the wishes of the Kashmiri people, weary after 15 years of conflict between two hostile giants. Instead, it said that "the two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides." But Umar Farooq, a Kashmiri leader in Srinagar, in Indian-controlled Kashmir, said the process was now "moving in the right direction," and at the appropriate gradual pace.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/07/international/asia/07STAN.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

(Editor's Note: See "Correction" from the Washington Post following article below.)

Washington Post

January 7, 2004

Pg. 1

## **'Dirty Bomb' Was Major New Year's Worry**

By John Mintz and Susan Schmidt, Washington Post Staff Writers

With huge New Year's Eve celebrations and college football bowl games only days away, the U.S. government last month dispatched scores of casually dressed nuclear scientists with sophisticated radiation detection equipment hidden in briefcases and golf bags to scour five major U.S. cities for radiological, or "dirty," bombs, according to officials involved in the emergency effort.

The call-up of Department of Energy radiation experts to Washington, New York, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Baltimore was the first since the weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. It was conducted in secrecy, in contrast with the very public cancellation of 15 commercial flights into this country from France, Britain and Mexico -- the other major counterterrorism response of the holiday season.

The new details of the government's search for a dirty bomb help explain why officials have used dire terms to describe the reasons for the nation's fifth "code orange" alert, issued on Dec. 21 by Homeland Security Secretary

Tom Ridge. U.S. officials said they remain worried today -- in many cases, more concerned than much of the American public realizes -- that their countermeasures would fall short.

"Government officials are surprised that people [in the United States] aren't more hyped about all this," said one source familiar with counterterrorism preparations.

Even now, hundreds of nuclear and bioweapons scientists remain on high alert at several military bases around the country, ready to fly to any trouble spot. Pharmaceutical stockpiles for responding to biological attacks are on transportable trucks at key U.S. military bases.

Officials said intelligence can be misleading, and some in law enforcement acknowledged that there is no way to know the actual urgency of the threats. Officials said one of their key challenges is determining whether al Qaeda is planting provocative but false clues as a diversion or as deliberate disinformation to test the U.S. response. Some foreign governments have voiced concerns that the United States is overreacting.

In recent days, intelligence has become even more difficult to sort through, officials said yesterday, because of what one described as "circular" repeating of information that has been made public.

The attention to a potential dirty bomb, for example, resulted not from specific recent information indicating such an attack but from the belief among officials that al Qaeda is sparing no effort to try to detonate one.

The terror crisis began late on Dec. 19, when analysts assembled what they described as extremely specific intelligence, including electronic intercepts of al Qaeda operatives' telephone calls or e-mails. One fear was that al Qaeda would hijack and crash an overseas flight into a U.S. city or the ocean. Another was that terrorists would shoot down an airliner with a shoulder-fired missile.

U.S. officials also became concerned that a large, open-air New Year's Eve celebration might be targeted. While the perimeters of football stadiums can generally be secured, outdoor celebrations are much more vulnerable, they said. One of the U.S. officials' main fears was of a dirty bomb, in which a conventional bomb is detonated and spews radioactive material and radiation across a small area. Security specialists say such a weapon is unlikely to cause mass casualties but could cause panic and devastate a local economy.

On the same day that Ridge raised the national threat level to orange ("high") from yellow ("elevated"), the Homeland Security Department sent out large fixed radiation detectors and hundreds of pager-size radiation monitors for use by police in Washington, New York, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Chicago, Houston, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Detroit.

Homeland Security also ordered the dispatch of scores of Energy Department radiation experts to cities planning large public events. One of them was Baltimore, where Coast Guard and Energy Department personnel patrolled the waterfront with sophisticated radiation detectors in preparation for a New Year's Eve party at the Inner Harbor.

Dozens of others fanned out in Manhattan, where, on New Year's Eve, up to 1 million people were scheduled to gather in Times Square. Still others converged on Las Vegas, home of a huge yearly New Year's Eve party on the Strip, and on Los Angeles, where the Rose Bowl parade on New Year's Day draws as many as 1 million people.

The Energy Department scientists proceeded to their assigned locations to take covert readings with their disguised radiological equipment in a variety of settings.

"Our guys can fit in a sports stadium, a construction site or on Fifth Avenue," one Energy Department official said. "Their equipment is configured to look like anybody else's luggage or briefcase."

Starting on Dec. 22, the teams crisscrossed those cities, taking measurements 24 hours a day. FBI agents persuaded businesses in some cities -- including hotels and truck-rental firms in Las Vegas -- to voluntarily turn over lists of guests or customers for comparison with terrorism watch lists.

On Dec. 29 in Las Vegas, the searchers got their first and only radiation "spike," at a rented storage facility near downtown. The finding sent a jolt of tension through the nation's security apparatus; the White House was notified.

The experts rechecked the reading with a more precise machine that told them that inside the cinderblock storage unit was radium, a radioactive material used in medical equipment and on watch dials.

As rare snow fell on the city that early morning, FBI agents secured the industrial neighborhood around the site, and a small army of agents and scientists converged on the business. Soon the renter of the storage closet in question, a homeless man, happened on the odd scene and asked the officers not to cut his padlock. He supplied the key.

The scientists sent in a robot to snag a duffel bag in which the man had been storing a cigar-size radium pellet -- which is used to treat uterine cancer -- since he found the shiny stainless-steel object three years before. Not knowing what the object was, he had wrapped it in his nighttime pillow. Officials said he has not exhibited any signs of ill health, yet. The man, whose name could not be obtained, was released.

Five tense hours after their radiation detectors had spiked, officials concluded there was no security crisis in the storage locker.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60519-2004Jan6.html>

Washington Post  
January 8, 2004  
Pg. 2

### **Corrections**

A Jan. 7 article ('Dirty Bomb' Threat Was Big New Year's Eve Worry) incorrectly said that Baltimore was one of the cities where Department of Energy nuclear experts used radiation equipment to search for radiological, or "dirty," bombs over the holiday season. U.S. Coast Guard vessels carried out stepped-up patrols of waterways in Baltimore and some other cities using radiation detectors, but Energy Department officials were not on Baltimore's streets.

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post  
January 7, 2004  
Pg. 16

## **Chinese Not Convinced Of North Korean Uranium Effort**

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

China told Asian diplomats last week it is not convinced of U.S. claims that North Korea has a clandestine program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, according to U.S. officials who have been briefed on the discussions. The previously unreported conversation -- raising doubts about the central element in the Bush administration's case against Pyongyang -- underscores how Chinese and U.S. aims appear to be diverging in the diplomatic effort to restrain North Korea's nuclear ambitions. China has taken the lead in organizing another round of six-nation talks, but the effort has bogged down over disputes among the parties about the scope and content of the negotiations. North Korea yesterday announced what it called a "bold concession" of offering to freeze both its nuclear weapons production and its nuclear power facility as "first-phase measures" of a package deal that would call for the United States to lift sanctions and provide energy aid. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said the statement was "a positive step" that could lead to a rapid resumption of talks.

The talks have not been scheduled in part because of U.S. insistence that a statement issued after the talks include North Korea's agreement to a "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of its nuclear programs. Asian and U.S. officials said yesterday that both sides now appear willing to go into the talks without a joint statement agreed on in advance, even though there are concerns that an open-ended session could result in little movement by either side.

Some U.S. officials are worried that the Chinese effort to play down the revelations about North Korea's uranium enrichment program suggests Beijing is preparing the diplomatic groundwork to merely freeze the nuclear facility at Yongbyon, while leaving aside the issue of nuclear enrichment. Yongbyon once before was shuttered under a 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea.

U.S. officials have said that North Korean officials admitted they had a clandestine program during a meeting in October 2002 -- which sparked the current crisis -- but the North Koreans have since denied that.

"As long as they continue to deny the existence of the highly enriched uranium program, it is guaranteed the talks will fail," one administration official said. "We cannot have a long-term solution to the problem if we cannot agree on the facts."

Although the Bush administration has been deeply divided over how to respond to the North Korean crisis, there is little disagreement inside the government over the intelligence indicating North Korea has been secretly building uranium enrichment capability in violation of the 1994 accord. The main question has been when the program would be fully functioning and capable of making fissile material, with the Energy Department and Defense Intelligence Agency estimating the end of this year and the CIA and State Department providing a more conservative forecast of 2006 or 2007.

U.S. officials briefed key allies, including China, on the highlights of its evidence immediately after the October 2002 confrontation with North Korean officials. Citing the admission, the U.S. cut off shipments of heavy oil to Pyongyang, saying the 1994 agreement had been nullified. North Korea then evicted United Nations inspectors from Yongbyon and said it had begun reprocessing spent fuel rods into plutonium for weapons.

But last week, at a meeting in Seoul between Chinese, South Korean and Japanese officials on the North Korean crisis, one of the most senior Chinese diplomats dealing with the issue declared China did not believe North Korea had a highly enriched uranium program, according to U.S. officials who have been informed about the meeting by the Japanese.

At the meeting, the Chinese official, Fu Ying, and her Japanese counterpart, Mitoji Yabunaka, were discussing a possible freeze of North Korea's nuclear programs when Yabunaka noted it would be necessary to freeze both Yongbyon and the highly enriched uranium program.



Fu responded that North Korea has denied having an enrichment program, and that China also did not believe that it had one. She added that the U.S. government briefing provided to China had not been sufficient to convince China that North Korea had such a program.

Chinese officials, in their own briefing to U.S. officials on the talks, said that Fu merely noted to Yabunaka that the United States and North Korea have not come to an agreement on whether the enrichment program exists.

Chas Freeman, a former assistant secretary of defense and senior U.S. diplomat in China, said to some extent the administration is paying the price for the controversy over its intelligence on Iraq's weapons. "Post-Iraq, the credibility of U.S. intelligence is not very high" around the world, he said.

But Freeman said that increasingly "we've been the odd man out" among the five nations meeting with North Korea on the crisis, offering a policy that he described as "all sticks and no carrots." He said China usually has wanted stability on the North Korean peninsula above all else, but lately has adopted the U.S. goal of a nuclear-free peninsula. "If they have doubts about the evidential basis of our concern," he said, China may be reverting to its traditional goal of stability.

Sun Weide, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, checked with Beijing on the Japanese account of the meeting. He noted that at the first round of six-nation talks in August, North Korea and the United States disagreed on whether Pyongyang had been pursuing uranium enrichment.

"China has never taken part in DPRK's nuclear program," Sun said, using the initials for North Korea's official name. "We have no knowledge of DPRK's nuclear program or its capabilities. We do not know if DPRK has a HEU [highly enriched uranium] program. According to our understanding, the Japanese are not completely aware of the situation, either."

Japanese officials declined to comment.

A nongovernmental delegation, including a former State Department official, flew yesterday from Beijing to Pyongyang after receiving hints from the North Korean government that it may be able to visit the Yongbyon facility. U.S. officials view the offer as another attempt by the North Koreans to shift the focus from the uranium enrichment project, whose location has not been determined.

"It is very easy to freeze Yongbyon," one official said. "It is not the most interesting place to be in North Korea right now."

*Correspondent Philip P. Pan in Beijing contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60332-2004Jan6.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Miami Herald  
January 7, 2004

## **Visiting U.S. Team Hoping To Tour Secret Nuclear Site**

*A nongovernmental U.S. delegation flies to North Korea hoping to see the Yongbyon nuclear installation.*

By Tim Johnson, Knight Ridder News Service

BEIJING - After offering to suspend its nuclear program, North Korea was expected to open its doors to an American delegation that expects to tour a top-secret nuclear facility.

A nongovernmental U.S. delegation, headed by nuclear weapons expert Sig Hecker, a former director of the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, N.M., flew from Beijing to North Korea on Tuesday. The group hopes to see the secluded country's Yongbyon nuclear installation before leaving Saturday.

The actions signaled that North Korea might be looking to revive stalled international talks on its nuclear program -- or simply is eager to prove that it has nuclear capabilities, in an effort to strengthen its bargaining position.

North Korea issued a brief statement saying it would refrain from building and testing nuclear weapons and would halt its nuclear power industry as initial steps toward "a package solution."

Pyongyang coupled the offer of a nuclear freeze to a demand that the U.S. government no longer label North Korea a sponsor of terrorism and that it lift political and economic sanctions and give the destitute nation oil and other energy resources.

Washington has demanded irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program before it will deliver new aid. Still, Secretary of State Colin Powell said North Korea's statement was positive and encouraging. "We hope that it will allow us to move more rapidly toward six-party framework talks," he said in Washington.

North Korea sat down to negotiations with the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia in Beijing in August. No date for new talks has been set.

Powell said he was convinced that all six countries wanted to resume talks.

"A lot of papers have gone back and forth and we are in touch with our four partners in this effort, and some of our partners are directly in touch with North Korea," he said.

A Beijing-based diplomat who is informed about behind-the-scenes maneuvering to resume international talks said North Korea's offer was unlikely to satisfy Washington.

"A freeze is not enough. It could be just a starting point," the diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "But it is better than nothing."

Some analysts think North Korea's totalitarian leader, Kim Jong Il, was unnerved by the capture three weeks ago of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and by Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's recent offer to open his country to international weapons inspectors. They say North Korea is showing a willingness to resolve the crisis through negotiations.

Others think North Korea might give the U.S. delegation concrete evidence of its nuclear capabilities, prodding the Bush administration to give greater concessions.

The delegation included Charles L. Pritchard, a former State Department official who was a special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, and John W. Lewis, professor emeritus at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

If allowed to inspect the Yongbyon facility, the members of the group would be the first outsiders to visit the secret site since North Korea expelled U.N. nuclear monitors in late 2002 during a confrontation with Washington over its nuclear program.

The Americans said little on their departure from Beijing.

"It's a very private visit," said Pritchard, who is now at the Brookings Institution, a Washington research center.

<http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/7648138.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Philadelphia Inquirer

January 7, 2004

## **U.S. Plans 3-Way Talks, Then Libya Inspection**

*British and U.S. analysts want details - including how much of the technology came from Pakistan.*

By Barry Schweid, Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration plans three-way talks with Britain and Libya as a prelude to U.S. and British analysts making an on-site survey of the Libyan nuclear-weapons program.

Libya announced Dec. 19 that it would abandon its quest for weapons of mass destruction. "The next step is to make sure we have a clear understanding of what Libya possesses," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said yesterday.

In the meantime, Powell told reporters in his first public appearance since prostate-cancer surgery three weeks ago, the United States intends to aggressively pursue reports that Libya obtained much of its nuclear technology from Pakistan.

"We know that there have been cases where individuals in Pakistan have worked in these areas," Powell said. He credited President Pervez Musharraf with "moving aggressively to investigate all of that."

In Islamabad, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed denied that Pakistan's government had helped Libya acquire centrifuge-design technology critical for producing nuclear weapons. He called such allegations a smear campaign against his country.

Pakistani officials have acknowledged recently that individual scientists might have sold their nuclear knowledge to Iran. And a senior official at Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, speaking on condition of anonymity, stopped short yesterday of dismissing recent reports of nuclear transfers to Iran and Libya. The official said Pakistan should not be blamed for any individual's wrongful act.

A series of U.S. meetings with British officials, which began last week with a trip to London by Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton, will culminate with top-level Libyans joining the conversation after additional U.S.-British meetings, a senior U.S. official said in Washington.

Then U.S. and British analysts will go to Libya, working on a parallel track with the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose estimate of the Libyan program is considered understated by some senior Bush administration officials.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said yesterday that the IAEA would take the lead in monitoring Libya's progress in destroying weapons of mass destruction, in apparent contradiction with the U.S. position.

"It was the atomic agency that sent in a team to follow through," Annan said in New York. "It is the atomic agency that is going to inspect to ensure that Libya is really going to be rid of weapons of mass destruction."

U.S. intelligence has uncovered an elaborate network of technology assistance to Libya, including the shipment of thousands of pieces of equipment for processing enriched uranium.

A shipment was intercepted in early October and diverted to Italy. There may have been other interceptions under a program initiated in May, but senior U.S. officials declined to provide any details.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/nation/7648400.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times  
January 8, 2004

## Judge Decides Pentagon Can Resume Anthrax Vaccinations

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — A federal judge on Wednesday lifted his injunction halting the military's mandatory anthrax vaccination program, and the Pentagon swiftly ordered the resumption of shots for all its personnel except the six anonymous people who brought the suit.

The judge, Emmet G. Sullivan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, ordered lawyers for the government and the plaintiffs to return in a week for a "status hearing" to discuss the next steps in what promises to be a protracted legal fight.

"We are disappointed, but not surprised that the injunction has been stayed for all but the six plaintiffs," said Mark S. Zaid, a lawyer for the six "John Doe" military or Pentagon personnel who brought the suit.

Mr. Zaid pledged further legal action to challenge the effectiveness of the vaccine, the way it is administered and the scientific basis cited by the Bush administration for its approval. "The government's victory today may only be fleeting," he said.

David S. C. Chu, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, signed a memorandum late Wednesday ordering the resumption of the vaccination program.

Bryan Whitman, the Pentagon's deputy spokesman, said after the court action that "the Department of Defense believes this is a safe and effective vaccine" and that "it is an important force-protection measure for our troops" who may be faced with such an unconventional threat.

"It would be irresponsible not to provide the maximum amount of protective measures available to keep our service members safe," Mr. Whitman added.

Though Judge Sullivan was swayed by arguments put forth by government lawyers in staying his injunction, he wrote that the timing of a new Food and Drug Administration rule declaring that the anthrax vaccine was effective against the greatest potential danger raised suspicions.

In issuing his preliminary injunction on Dec. 22, Judge Sullivan accepted the plaintiffs' arguments that the vaccine used in the Pentagon's mandatory program had been approved by the F.D.A. to protect against skin exposure to anthrax — but not against anthrax that is inhaled, the far greater battlefield threat. Thus, the judge said, the vaccine was an "investigational" drug being forced on the troops for an unapproved purpose.

The Pentagon halted the program the next day, pending clarification of the legal issues, and the day after that the Justice Department filed a motion asking the judge to withdraw the injunction — or at least limit his ruling solely to the six plaintiffs whose suit prompted it.

On Dec. 30, the F.D.A. announced a new "final rule and order," which officially declared the anthrax vaccine effective against the inhaled form of the bacteria.

The Justice Department immediately moved to capitalize on the new rule, filing an emergency motion later that day asking Judge Sullivan to vacate the injunction, writing, "There can be no doubt that the F.D.A. order removes the legal basis upon which relief was sought and granted."

In his two-page order issued on Wednesday, Judge Sullivan wrote, "Although the timing of the issuance of the rule is arguably highly suspicious, nevertheless, the rule has been issued and the principle reason for the issuance of the injunction has been addressed by the government."

Mr. Zaid, a plaintiffs' lawyer, said after the court action that the agency's rule should be interpreted as an admission that the vaccine "was being used illegally by the Department of Defense before that time." He said any military personnel or Pentagon civilians penalized for refusing the mandatory vaccine "were unjustly punished."

The plaintiffs' lawyers challenged the rule as "primarily based on animal studies that have no proven correlation to human efficacy." They also filed documents on Tuesday asking the court to consider the anthrax case as a class action, to include all military personnel and Pentagon civilians.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/08/national/08ANTH.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times  
January 8, 2004

# U.S. Withdraws A Team Of Weapons Hunters From Iraq

By Douglas Jehl

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — The Bush administration has quietly withdrawn from Iraq a 400-member military team whose job was to scour the country for military equipment, according to senior government officials.

The step was described by some military officials as a sign that the administration might have lowered its sights and no longer expected to uncover the caches of chemical and biological weapons that the White House cited as a principal reason for going to war last March.

A separate military team that specializes in disposing of chemical and biological weapons remains part of the 1,400-member Iraq Survey Group, which has been searching Iraq for more than seven months at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. But that team is "still waiting for something to dispose of," said a survey group member.

Some of the government officials said the most important evidence from the weapons hunt might be contained in a vast collection of seized Iraqi documents being stored in a secret military warehouse in Qatar. Only a small fraction have been translated.

A report published Wednesday in The Washington Post cited a previously undisclosed document that suggested that Iraq might have destroyed its biological weapons as early as 1991. The report said investigators had otherwise found no evidence to support American beliefs that Iraq had maintained illicit weapons dating from the Persian Gulf war of 1991 or that it had advanced programs to build new ones.

The report also documented a pattern of deceit that was found in every field of special weaponry. It said that according to Iraqi designers and foreign investigators, program managers exaggerated the results they could achieve, or even promised results they knew they could not accomplish — all in an effort to appease Saddam Hussein. In some cases, though, they simply did it to advance their careers, the report said, or preserve jobs or even conduct intrigues against their rivals.

Senior intelligence officials acknowledged in recent days that the weapons hunters still had not found weapons or active programs, but in interviews, they said the search must continue to ensure that no hidden Iraqi weapons surfaced in a future attack.

"We worry about what may have happened to those weapons," Stuart Cohen, the vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, said in an interview broadcast late Tuesday on the ABC News program "Nightline." "Theories abound as to what may have happened."

The search for Iraqi weapons remains "the primary focus" of the survey group, a senior Defense Department official said. But he acknowledged that most of the dozens of new linguists and intelligence analysts to join the team had recently been given assignments related to combating the Iraqi insurgency rather than to the weapons search.

David Kay, the head of the survey group, made it known last month that he might leave his post. Government officials said Wednesday that he had not reached a decision but that both he and his top deputy, Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton of the Defense Intelligence Agency, were in Washington, in part to discuss what direction the hunt should take.

"I am sure that if they had found important evidence, we would know about it," said Representative Jane Harman of California, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, who has said the administration exaggerated the Iraqi threat.

Bill Harlow, the top spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency, said Wednesday that "the team needs to complete its work, and no one should jump to any conclusions before it has an opportunity to examine all of the circumstances."

American intelligence officials who described the seized documents said they hoped the documents might eventually help to unravel the mystery of whether Iraqi weapons remained hidden or whether they were destroyed long before what the Bush administration initially portrayed as a mission "to disarm Iraq."

In the television interview, Mr. Cohen, who as vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council led the team that formally concluded in October 2002 that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons, insisted that "it is too soon to close the books on this case."

A report to be released Thursday by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has concluded that it was unlikely that Iraq could have destroyed, hidden or sent out of the country the hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons and related production facilities that American officials claimed were present "without the United States detecting some sign of this activity."

Through their spokesmen, Dr. Kay and General Dayton have declined repeated requests for interviews.

The cache of Iraqi documents cover subjects extending far beyond illicit weapons, according to senior military officials, and are so voluminous that, if stacked, they would rise 10 miles high, according to estimates by senior government officials.

The warehouse in Qatar has become the center of work by the Defense Intelligence Agency to translate and analyze the documents, the officials said.

The 400-member team withdrawn from Iraq, known as the Joint Captured Matériel Exploitation Group, was primarily composed of technical experts and was headed by an Australian brigadier, Defense Department officials said. Its work included searching weapons depots and other sites for missile launchers that might have been used with illicit weapons, the officials said, and it was withdrawn "because its work was essentially done."

"They picked up everything that was worth picking up," one official said. The weapons disposal team still in place, known as Task Force D/E, for disablement and elimination, has been used to collect suspicious material, although none has proved to be part of any illicit weapons program.

In an interim report in October, Dr. Kay acknowledged that his team had failed to find illicit weapons or active weapons programs in Iraq, but said they had discovered evidence that Mr. Hussein intended to develop such weapons and might have retained the capacity to do so.

Dr. Kay has not said when he intended to issue his next report, and that remains a subject of debate within the administration, government officials said.

American intelligence officials, including Mr. Cohen, have vigorously defended their estimates of Iraq's weapons program, saying the evidence was strong, credible and backed up by a number of sources. But staff members of the Senate and House intelligence agencies are preparing reports suggesting that the administration and intelligence agencies had seriously overestimated the nature of the threat posed by illicit Iraqi weapons.

Ms. Harman said in a telephone interview that she expected that Dr. Kay, appointed last June 11 as a special adviser to George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, was probably stepping down, a development that she said would be "very disappointing."

"I have to believe that if they were about to pounce on a large stockpile of chemical or biological weapons, he would be there for the announcement," Ms. Harman said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/08/international/middleeast/08WEAP.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced report follows article.)

London Financial Times

January 9, 2004

## **US to defend WMD assessments**

By Mark Huband

US intelligence chiefs are planning to mount a defence of the information used to justify the war in Iraq, which a Washington think-tank yesterday said had been politicised to support the Bush administration.

Congressional hearings into the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and its assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction are expected to be held in the next two months.

Senior officials say the CIA is expected to use the hearings both to justify the assessments it made of the threat from the former Iraqi regime and rebut accusations that the intelligence information was politicised.

A report into Iraq and the WMD issue by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, released yesterday, argued: "The intelligence community appears to have overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq but had a generally accurate picture of the nuclear and missile programmes."

The report went on to say that discrepancies in intelligence assessments on Iraq between the publication of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in October 2002 and the creation of an intelligence assessment group within the US Defense Department "suggest that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers' views sometime in 2002".

Despite exasperation within the CIA at the criticism levelled against it by some Defense Department officials in the run-up to the war, US officials yesterday denied that the agency was unduly influenced by the administration's need to justify the war.

"The (intelligence) judgments were not politicised. What good would there be in coming up with a bent judgment if you're in the end going to be proved wrong?" a senior US official said yesterday.

He said that the CIA intended to provide substantial explanatory detail during the congressional hearings.

"The thrust of what (CIA director) George Tenet is going to say is that the judgments were the best possible judgments, that they were arrived at correctly, for non-political reasons.

"He will try to demonstrate that these were reasonable judgments," the official said.

Intelligence officials from several countries involved in gathering information on Iraq were angered by the creation of the Pentagon's intelligence assessment group and believe it tarnished their reputation.

"There clearly was rivalry between the CIA and the Pentagon, and the latter was trying to find its own justification for what was going on," said a senior intelligence official yesterday.

However, he criticised the Carnegie report for reaching "premature" decisions on the agencies' competence - decisions he said could be judged only once the 1,200-strong Iraq Survey Group (ISG) finished its task of finding evidence.

The US is reported to be planning to reduce the size of the ISG by 400.

<http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1073280896765&p=1012571727102>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

## **WMD IN IRAQ**

### ***Evidence and Implications***

[Joseph Cirincione](#), [Jessica T. Mathews](#), [George Perkovich](#), with Alexis Orton

### **Summary**

This new study details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.

The report distills a massive amount of data into side-by-side comparisons of pre-war intelligence, the official presentation of that intelligence, and what is now known about Iraq's programs. . . .

<http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/IraqReport3.asp?from=pubdate>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)