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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/aue/awgmate/aue-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/aue/awgmate/aue-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 933-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.

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USINFO.STATE.GOV
Washington File
29 March 2006

**United States, Allies Building Layered Defense Against WMD**

**Broad strategy seeks to deny terrorists nuclear, chemical, biological weapons**

Washington – The threat of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon attack by terrorists or hostile regimes requires a layered, global defense strategy, says Robert Joseph, under secretary for arms control and international security at the State Department.

In prepared remarks submitted March 29 to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Joseph outlined America’s comprehensive efforts, both domestically and with international allies, to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

“Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counter-proliferation and defenses,” Joseph stated. “We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from
those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.”

In his remarks, Joseph discussed:
• The three pillars in America’s national security strategy: counterproliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management;
• U.S. government programs in the departments of Defense, Energy and Treasury, coordinated by the National Security Council, to gather and analyze intelligence and meet the counterproliferation challenge; and
• America’s work with international partners.

That work includes efforts to strengthen control over WMD materials in Russia and the former Soviet Republics, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, requirements that nations take action to prevent WMD proliferation activities within their territory, strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigative powers, the Proliferation Security Initiative, an active, 70-state partnership that works to deter, disrupt and prevent illicit trade in WMD.

Joseph also outlined the challenges ahead, which he said include:
• Supporting international efforts to roll back Iran and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs,
• Eliminating the spread of WMD and related technologies, and
• Preventing WMDs from falling into the hands of terrorists.

“We will work to harness, in an effective multinational way, all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD terrorism,” Joseph said.

For further information, see Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The text Joseph’s prepared remarks follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. JOSEPH
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Senate Armed Services Committee
Sub-Committee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
March 29, 2006

U.S. STRATEGY TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide a written statement to the Sub-Committee regarding the threat to U.S. national security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery means, and the Administration's strategy for combating that threat.

Almost immediately upon assuming office, President Bush emphasized that WMD proliferation was the major security threat of the 21st century, requiring a new, comprehensive strategy. In a speech at the National Defense University on May 1, 2001, the President said:

“...this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world.”

Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.

A year later, in his first National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the President expanded both on the requirements to meet today's threats and on the tools we would marshal against them. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is the first of its kind -- a broad strategy uniting all the elements of national power needed to counter the full spectrum of WMD threats. Previous U.S. approaches had focused almost exclusively on nonproliferation. The Bush Administration has dramatically expanded U.S. nonproliferation efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related materials and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists. At the same time, the President recognized the reality that preventive efforts will not always succeed. Therefore, the National Strategy to Combat WMD put new, and necessary, emphasis on counterproliferation - to deter, detect, defend against, and defeat WMD in the hands of our enemies. Further, the National Strategy also focused on consequence management, to reduce as much as possible the potentially horrific consequences of WMD attacks at home or abroad.

The three pillars in the National Strategy of counterproliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management do not stand alone, but rather come together as seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. Underlining that point,
the National Strategy identified four cross-cutting enabling functions that are critical to combating WMD: intelligence collection and analysis; research and development; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile states and terrorists. To succeed in our effort to combat WMD proliferation, we must apply all elements of national power - diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military.

DIPLOMATIC TOOLS
The Bush Administration has given new vitality to the use of diplomatic tools to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. assistance to other countries to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles -- through DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important State Department programs -- has been at record funding levels. The President has committed an average of $1 billion a year to these critical efforts; we greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of the Sub-Committee, the Committee, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, for these essential programs. Moreover, with the proposal in 2002 for the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President successfully called on our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort to meet what is a global responsibility. We continue to work closely with the other G-8 members to realize fully the potential of this critical commitment. Although much remains to be done, the Global Partnership has already had important success in increasing non-U.S. funding for securing and eliminating sensitive materials, technologies and weapons.

While the bulk of U.S. nonproliferation assistance remains focused on the states of the Former Soviet Union, we have also expanded our efforts to address proliferation threats more broadly. It is noteworthy how these programs have evolved to meet today's threats, from an early focus on denuclearizing Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and on reducing the former Soviet strategic arsenal, to an increasing concentration on measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Landmark DOE programs include the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to reduce fissile and radioactive material worldwide, and the Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs to install radiation detection capability at major seaports, airports and land crossings. While the statutes authorizing the CTR program give it less flexibility than its DOE counterparts for work outside the former Soviet states, DOD is taking full advantage of the flexibility it has been given to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania.

The United States has also spearheaded the effort for the United Nations Security Council to take on its responsibilities to maintain peace and security against WMD threats. A major milestone was the passage in April 2004 of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council - for only the second time since its founding - invoked its Chapter VII authorities to require nations to act against a general, as opposed to a specific, threat to international peace and security. In particular, UNSCR 1540 requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation activities, such as we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further requires that states institute effective export controls, and enhance security for nuclear materials on their territory. The United States stands ready to assist other states in implementing UNSCR 1540; here too, DOE and DOD nonproliferation assistance programs, as well as those of the Department of State, are key instruments for the Administration's strategy to combat WMD.

The United States also has led the way to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect nuclear proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to increase the IAEA's safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the IAEA Additional Protocol, to strengthen the Agency's ability to uncover clandestine nuclear programs. The President submitted the U.S. Additional Protocol to the Senate, which gave its advice and consent to ratification in 2004, and called for all other countries to adhere to it as well. The President also successfully urged the creation of a new special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways to strengthen the Agency's safeguards and verification capabilities.

In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities - the very capabilities the treaty is intended to deny.

To close this loophole, the President has proposed that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities - the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons -- be limited to those states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning facilities. In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply, in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states that forego enrichment and reprocessing. We are working with other fuel provider states and with the IAEA to put in place assurances that will convince states with power reactors that their best economic interest is not to invest in expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle
DOE's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which Secretary Bodman announced last month, offers the promise for the longer term of enhancing global access to nuclear energy while strengthening nonproliferation. An important emphasis of the initiative is to provide a basis for states to benefit from civil nuclear power while avoiding the costs and challenges of enriching fresh fuel on the front end of the fuel cycle and disposing of spent fuel on the back end. To that end, GNEP envisions a cradle-to-grave fuel leasing regime under which states that currently have the full fuel cycle would provide fresh fuel for nuclear power plants in user nations. The spent fuel would then be returned to a full fuel-cycle nation and would be recycled using a process that does not result in separated plutonium. The Department of State is working closely with DOE to engage international partners to participate actively in GNEP.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES
We refer to another set of tools as "defensive measures." A key requirement of counterproliferation is to protect ourselves from WMD-armed adversaries. Combating WMD requires both offensive and defensive capabilities, to deter, detect, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of WMD and missile attack. As the President stressed in May 2001, we require new methods of deterrence against the proliferation threats of today. A strong declaratory policy and effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary deterrent posture, reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction and law enforcement. Because deterrence may not always succeed, our military forces must be able to detect and destroy an adversary's WMD before they are used, and to prevent WMD attack from succeeding through robust active and passive defenses and mitigation measures. All of those requirements place particular demands on the Department of Defense. Major milestones in implementing the Administration's comprehensive approach to combating WMD were marked in: January 2005, when the Secretary of Defense designated U.S. Strategic Command as the lead combatant command for this mission; in January 2006, when General Cartwright announced the initial operating capability of the new STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in partnership with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and in February 2006, when the Department of Defense issued the first National Military Strategy to Combat WMD. Another critical defensive measure undertaken by the Bush Administration to combat weapons of mass destruction is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which shows the close interaction among - and the creative use of - diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat proliferation. Within the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community and the Department of State all play essential roles in PSI. The participating countries are applying laws already on the books in innovative ways and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments, to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that support them. PSI has now expanded to include support from more than 70 countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-based approach, involving long, ponderous negotiations that yield results only slowly, if at all. Instead, it is an active -- and proactive -- partnership to deter, disrupt and prevent WMD proliferation. And it is working.

Economic and financial tools are also key elements of our defensive measures. Adopting many of the means developed in the war against terrorism, we are now working with our partners to cut off the financial flows that fuel proliferation. UNSCR 1540 requires states to take and enforce effective controls on funds and services related to export and transshipment that would contribute to WMD programs. Consistent with UNSCR 1540, in July 2005, G-8 Leaders called for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation through cooperation to identify, track and freeze financial transactions and assets associated with proliferation-related activities.

President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this area when he issued in July 2005 a new Executive Order, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities. Currently 16 entities - 11 from North Korea, 4 from Iran, and one from Syria - have been designated under the Order, and we are actively considering additional ones.

Our efforts to combat proliferation can also be aided by other financial tools which are not specifically designed against WMD proliferation. For example, in September, the Treasury Department applied authorities under the USA PATRIOT Act against an Asian bank that provides financial services to North Korean illicit activities, such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking. In designating Banco Delta Asia as a "primary money laundering concern" under the USA PATRIOT Act, Treasury acted to protect U.S. financial institutions while warning the global community of the illicit financial threat posed by the bank.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
I would emphasize three proliferation challenges to illustrate the path ahead.

The first is to end the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs. The President has made clear repeatedly that, while all options remain on the table, our strong preference is to address these threats through diplomacy.
In the Six-Party Joint Statement of September 2005, North Korea committed to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. This was a notable development, but we still must agree on, and implement, the detailed requirements of North Korean denuclearization and its verification. That task will be difficult. Indeed, North Korea's demand for a light water reactor immediately after the Joint Statement was issued, and its more recent refusal to return to negotiations until the United States rescinds what Pyongyang calls "economic sanctions," underscore the problems ahead. We have made it clear that we are committed to pursuing successful Six Party negotiations, and we continue, with essential input from the Departments of Defense and Energy - to develop our detailed concepts for the verified denuclearization of North Korea. At the same time, we must and will continue our defensive measures, and expand them as required, to ensure that we can protect ourselves from the proliferation actions of the North, as well as from its illicit activities such as money laundering or counterfeiting.

In some ways, the challenge Iran poses to the nuclear nonproliferation regime is even more daunting and complex than the North Korean threat. We have now moved to a new phase, in which the Security Council can add its considerable authority to the international effort to counter Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.

The Council will not supplant the IAEA effort, but reinforce it - for example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and to take steps the IAEA Board has identified to restore confidence, and by giving the IAEA new, needed authority to investigate all aspects of the Iranian nuclear effort. The Council should make clear to the Iranian regime that it will face increasing isolation and pressure if it does not reverse course, take the steps called for by the IAEA Board, and return promptly to negotiations. We will continue to consult closely with the EU-3 and the European Union, with Russia, China, and many other members of the international community as this new diplomatic phase proceeds. Indeed, Secretary Rice is meeting tomorrow in Berlin with her colleagues from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China to discuss the way forward.

Absent even more provocative actions by Iran, we envision a graduated approach by the Security Council, interacting closely with the IAEA. The Security Council can take progressively firmer action, to the extent necessary, to induce Iran to come into complete compliance with its NPT and safeguards obligations, suspend all its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA. We have been negotiating a Statement by the President of the Security Council that would send a clear message to Iran that it must abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. If Iran defies the Security Council Presidential Statement, as it has the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, we will urge a Council resolution to put increased pressure on Iran to comply. The resolution could be grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, given the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear program. In issuing such a resolution, the Council could require Iran, within a specified short period of time, to comply with all elements of the IAEA Board resolutions, as well as with additional Council requirements such as opening up to substantially increased IAEA investigative authority. If Iran still does not comply, we will look to even firmer Council action. Our aim is that Iran will be persuaded to reverse course by the obvious resolve of the international community, shown first in the IAEA Board of Governors and beginning this month in the Security Council.

The second challenge is to end proliferation trade by rogue states, individuals and groups. As I described, we have made progress over the last few years. We have moved from the creation of international export control standards to their active enforcement - through enhanced national legislation, PSI interdictions, international law enforcement and financial cooperation. We have shut down the world's most dangerous proliferation network. We are steadily reducing the opportunities available to proliferators. But we must continue to expand and deepen our efforts - using all available national and international authorities and, where necessary, creating new ones -- until the proliferation trade has been effectively ended.

The final challenge that I would mention is the need to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, and especially of biological and nuclear weapons. If terrorists acquire these weapons, they are likely to employ them, with potentially catastrophic effects. The biggest hurdle that a well-organized terrorist group with appropriate technical expertise would have to overcome to make a crude nuclear device is to gain access to sufficient quantities of fissile material. Although terrorist use of other weapons is more likely, the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that the danger requires particular attention. On the biological weapons side, with today's dual-use capabilities and access to particular, dangerous pathogens - many of which exist in nature or could be relatively easily obtained and cultured -- the bioterror challenge presents a low-cost means to prosecute a potentially high-impact attack.

Many of the tools we have in place to combat proliferation by rogue states are relevant against WMD terrorism. A few examples are: reducing the global stocks of fissile material and securing those which remain; improved nuclear and biological detection capability; and the interdiction of trafficking in nuclear weapons and biological weapons components. A key difference, however, is one of scale. We cannot rest as long as enough material for even one nuclear weapon remains unsecured.
While many of the tools are the same, preventing WMD terrorism requires different approaches from those we have followed against state WMD programs or against conventional or non-WMD-related terrorism. For example, intelligence collection and action against the proliferation of WMD have traditionally focused on state-based programs, while anti-terrorist intelligence has focused on individuals and groups. Intelligence regarding the nexus of terrorism and WMD must cover the full range of state and non-state threats and their interrelationships. We are working hard to close any remaining gaps and to ensure that the intelligence process supports our strategic approach to combating WMD terrorism.

That strategic approach entails working with partner nations to build a global layered defense to prevent, detect and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. To prevent, we will undertake national, multilateral and global efforts to deny terrorists access to the most dangerous materials. To protect, we will develop new tools and capabilities with partner nations to detect the movement of WMD and to disrupt linkages between WMD terrorists and their facilitators.

Because we can never be certain of our ability to prevent or protect against all potential WMD terrorist attacks, we will cooperate with partners to manage and mitigate the consequences of such attacks, and to improve our capabilities to attribute their source. Thus, we will work to harness, in an effective multinational way, all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD terrorism.

CONCLUSION

The strategic approach to combat WMD proliferation that the President first laid out almost five years ago continues to provide an essential guide to action against this paramount threat. Our strategy, supported by the new measures we have adopted to implement it, is flexible and dynamic, suited to the changing nature of the proliferation threat. Under the overall interagency leadership of the National Security Council, the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy work closely together at all levels - along with the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community -- to ensure the full and coordinated implementation of the President's strategy.

While we have made substantial progress in countering today's proliferation threats, we cannot be satisfied. We must continue to heed the warning that the President gave in 2002: "History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."

(end text)

http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=March&x=20060329172805idybeekcm0.381283&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html

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Washington Post
March 30, 2006
Pg. 1

Security Council Pressures Tehran

Iran Is Urged to Halt Uranium Enrichment

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, March 29 -- The Security Council called on Iran Wednesday to suspend its uranium enrichment program within 30 days, ending three weeks of deadlock between Western powers and Russia and China over how to pressure Tehran to prove its nuclear efforts are not aimed at making weapons.

The 15-member council unanimously adopted a nonbinding statement on Iran after the United States and five other key countries finished difficult negotiations on its wording. The statement does not commit the United Nations to action against Iran and was written to avoid language that might clearly set the stage for sanctions or subsequent military moves -- the sort of direct pressure that Russia and China have declined to support.

But U.S. and other Western officials said the Security Council's action -- its first unified statement on Iran's nuclear program -- represents an important breakthrough and could set the stage for a tougher line later if Tehran refuses to meet the council's demands. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was set to meet Thursday in Berlin with foreign ministers of Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany to map out the next steps in confronting Iran over its nuclear program.

"Iran is more isolated now than ever," Rice said in a statement after the vote. "The Security Council's Presidential Statement sends an unmistakable message to Iran that its efforts to conceal its nuclear program and evade its international obligations are unacceptable."
Referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' atomic watchdog, she continued: "The international community expects Iran to comply with the IAEA's call to suspend all enrichment-related activity and to return to negotiations."

Iran's U.N. ambassador, Javad Zarif, told reporters his government has not decided on a formal response, but said that Iran will never give up its right to produce nuclear fuel for a peaceful nuclear energy program.

"Iran will want to cooperate with the international community, but it does not accept pressure or intimidation," he said. "We have made it clear at the highest levels of government Iran does not want nuclear weapons, nor does it want to pursue development, stockpiling or acquisition of these inhumane weapons."

The council accord was struck just hours after Rice urged Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a telephone call to support a French and British draft statement urging Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment within 30 days or face increased, but unspecified, international pressure. The statement also calls on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, which conducts inspections aimed at preventing the spread of atomic weapons.

U.S., British and French diplomats secured Russian and Chinese support by offering concessions that softened the tone of the statement, which was read by the council's rotating president, Cesar Mayoral of Argentina. They included extending the deadline for Iranian compliance from 14 to 30 days, and dropping language hinting that Iran's nuclear program constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

The agreement on the statement masked persistent divisions among the Security Council five veto-wielding powers over the threat of sanctions or the military force to compel Iranian cooperation.

Lavrov said in Moscow that "any ideas involving the use of force or pressure in resolving the issue are counterproductive and cannot be supported."

China's U.N. ambassador, Wang Guangya, told reporters in New York that the council's statement underscores the importance of pursuing a diplomatic settlement and letting U.N. inspectors, not the Security Council, take the lead.

John R. Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, insisted that the Security Council, which is vested by the U.N. charter with responsibility for responding to threats to international peace and security, has the obligation to prevent Tehran from producing nuclear weapons. He expressed frustration that Moscow and Beijing had blocked language in the statement highlighting the council's obligation to react to such threats.

"What happened here today is that Russia and China declined to quote from the U.N. charter," said Bolton, waving a copy of the charter. "We accept that . . . because the message is clear, nonetheless, that Iran's nuclear weapons program is unacceptable."

Russia's U.N. ambassador, Andrei Denisov, conceded that there are "suspicions, very strong suspicions" that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, but he said there is still no hard evidence and that it is up to U.N. nuclear inspectors to decide.

The U.N. statement expressed concern that the IAEA has not provided assurances, after years of investigation into covert aspects of Tehran's nuclear program, that Iran is not secretly developing nuclear weapons. It calls on Iran to comply with the agency's demand to halt all of its uranium enrichment activities to "build confidence" that Iran's nuclear activities are for an "exclusively peaceful purpose." IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is to report on "the process of Iran's compliance" in 30 days.

Iran says it needs to enrich uranium to produce electricity for an energy-hungry society. The IAEA has accused Iran of engaging in a pattern of deception and concealment that has fueled international suspicions. It acknowledges that Iran has the right to nuclear energy and that it cannot prove Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/29/AR2006032900317.html

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publicly expressed the dismay that many diplomats privately have voiced about what they consider an air of crisis that the Bush administration and some European governments have created with recent statements. He spoke on the same day that ministers of major powers meeting here struck a more conciliatory tone on Iran than heard in recent weeks. The meeting followed agreement Wednesday by the U.N. Security Council to give Iran 30 days to respond to requests from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, that it halt uranium enrichment research.

The United States and members of the European Union have made increasingly confrontational statements about what they claim is Iran's goal of eventually manufacturing a nuclear weapon. "There is no military solution to this situation," said ElBaradei, the Nobel Prize-winning director-general of the IAEA. "It's inconceivable. The only durable solution is a negotiated solution."

Russia and China, as well as several countries in the Middle East, have voiced concern that the U.S. and EU are pursuing tactics with Iran similar to those used in relation to Iraq a few years ago — creating a sense of crisis that makes it easier to make the case for military action.

ElBaradei said the international community should act only on concrete information. He warned against a repetition of the 2003 experience with Iraq, when IAEA inspectors did not find signs of an active nuclear arms program but were ignored by the United States, which proceeded to use unsubstantiated intelligence to make the case for war. Since then, the IAEA has been proved right that Saddam Hussein did not possess any of the alleged weaponry.

"I work on facts," ElBaradei said in his remarks reported by Reuters news agency. "We fortunately were proven right in Iraq, we were the only ones that said at the time that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons, and I hope this time people will listen to us."

Comments Thursday by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her counterparts from China, Russia, France, Germany and Britain made it clear that despite the Security Council's unity, deep ideological differences remained among the major powers over what the next steps should be. ElBaradei's comments seemed timed to influence them during the crucial monthlong period.

Britain, France and the U.S. have said they would be willing to level sanctions against Iran or ultimately use military force if Tehran continued to move forward in its effort to perfect uranium enrichment. Russia and China oppose any punitive actions at this point, a position they reiterated at Thursday's meeting, because they fear it would make Iran more confrontational and could lead to further turmoil in the Middle East.

The statement approved by the Security Council essentially buys the United Nations 30 days to figure out what to do if Iran remains defiant. Once the monthlong period ends, ElBaradei is required to issue another report on whether Iran has complied with the IAEA requests, which include: halting uranium enrichment research, answering questions about the nuclear program and ratifying IAEA regulations allowing U.N. nuclear inspectors more access to Iranian nuclear facilities and plants where parts are manufactured for its nuclear industry.

Iran insists that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes such as civilian energy generation. Uranium enriched to low levels can be used to generate electricity, but enriched more intensively, it can be used to make nuclear weapons.

Rice took a somewhat more moderate tone toward Iran on Thursday than in other recent statements. "This isn't the time to try and come to a conclusion about what the next step is," said Rice, speaking to reporters on the plane on her way to the meeting. "It's an opening discussion about those next steps…. A lot is going to depend on the Iranian reaction, and I would not at this point carve in stone anybody's decisions about what the next steps might be."

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also held out a hand. "We all very much hope that Iran will seize the opportunity offered to [it] to resume negotiations…. If Iran were to enter upon the path of cooperation, then it can rely on us entering those negotiations in a constructive spirit," he said.

Iran's initial response to the Security Council statement was unbending. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, said Thursday, "We will not, definitely, suspend again the enrichment."

Tehran, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. However, Iran's intentions have come under international scrutiny because it hid its nuclear program for 18 years, in violation of the treaty of which it had long been a signatory. Although Tehran is now largely in compliance with the treaty's requirements, the U.N. nuclear inspectors say there are still key questions Iran needs to answer about its program.

Tehran compounded international distrust when it ended nearly two years of negotiations with the European Union over a deal to halt its nuclear-fuel work altogether. Then, in January, Tehran resumed operations at a pilot uranium enrichment facility that it had suspended during the talks with the EU. It has begun enriching tiny quantities of uranium to test its centrifuges.

The IAEA, in its most recent report on Iran, said it could not rule out that Tehran had secret nuclear facilities or materials. The vague language underscores the chief problem for policymakers dealing with Iran: Key aspects of its program remain opaque.
In addition to the debate over Iran's intentions, analysts disagree over how fast Iran is moving to master the nuclear fuel cycle. Some administration and European officials have suggested that Iran could make enough enriched uranium for a bomb in three years. Many other experts say the technical difficulties would make such a short time frame almost impossible.

Russia and China, the two permanent Security Council members who are more closely allied to Tehran, want the IAEA, not the Security Council, to take the lead. That would diminish the likelihood of a rapid Security Council showdown with threats of sanctions and international humiliation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei V. Lavrov said the IAEA must determine whether Iran is pursuing only the civilian use of nuclear power or attempting to build a bomb. "Before we call any situation a threat, we need facts, especially in a region like the Middle East," Lavrov said. "All of us have very legitimate concerns. We wish to meet a peaceful solution."

Echoing Lavrov's sentiments, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo said Iran's nuclear program was "among the most difficult and complicated problems in today's world."

"This requires time, persistence and wisdom…. There has already been enough turmoil in the Middle East." Fleishman reported from Berlin and Rubin from Vienna.


Washington Post
March 31, 2006
Pg. 9

**Pentagon To Test A Huge Conventional Bomb**

By Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post Staff Writer

A huge mushroom cloud of dust is expected to rise over Nevada's desert in June when the Pentagon plans to detonate a gigantic 700-ton explosive -- the biggest open-air chemical blast ever at the Nevada Test Site -- as part of the research into developing weapons that can destroy deeply buried military targets, officials said yesterday.

The test, code-named "Divine Strake," will occur on June 2 about 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas in a high desert valley bounded by mountains, according to Pentagon and Energy Department officials.

"This is the largest single explosive we could imagine doing," said James A. Tegnelia, director of the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which is conducting the test.

The test is aimed at determining how well a massive conventional bomb would perform against fortified underground targets -- such as military headquarters, biological or chemical weapons stockpiles, and long-range missiles -- that the Pentagon says are proliferating among potential adversaries around the world.

Tegnelia said there is a range of technical hurdles to overcome. He suggested that big conventional bombs are unlikely to solve the overall problem of buried threats. "It's a lot easier to dig your tunnel 50 feet deeper" than to develop weapons that can destroy it, he told a meeting of defense reporters.

Such a bomb would be a conventional alternative to a nuclear weapon proposed by the Bush administration, which has run into opposition on Capitol Hill. The Pentagon for several years has sought funding for research into the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) -- also known as the "bunker buster" -- after the administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review stated that no weapon in the U.S. arsenal could threaten a growing number of buried targets. Congress, however, has repeatedly refused to grant funding for a study on a nuclear bunker buster, instead directing money toward conventional alternatives.

The June test will detonate 700 tons of heavy ammonium nitrate-fuel oil emulsion -- creating a blast equivalent to 593 tons of TNT -- in a 36-foot-deep hole near a tunnel in the center of the Nevada Test Site, according to official reports. It aims to allow scientists to model the type of ground shock that will be created, and to weigh the effectiveness of such a weapon against its collateral impact.

"To my knowledge, this will be the largest open-air chemical explosion that we've conducted," said Darwin Morgan, spokesman for the Energy Department's test site. Larger blasts have been carried out at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, including the nation's biggest open-air detonation, in 1985, a Pentagon spokeswoman said. The blast is not likely to be felt or heard outside the 1,375-square-mile test site, and the cloud of dust is expected to dissipate quickly from view, Morgan said. "They don't think people will see it in the base camp on the south end of the test site," he said.

Officials took pains to differentiate between the June conventional experiment and past nuclear testing. "The U.S. has no plans to conduct a nuclear test. President Bush supports a continued moratorium on nuclear testing," said Irene Smith, a spokeswoman for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The Pentagon agency is charged with countering threats to the United States from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.
On a related topic, Tegnelia said the State Department and the Pentagon are developing a proposal for a $100 million effort to help Libya get rid of tons of mustard gas and some precursor chemicals being stored in the Libyan desert. "The Libyans requested some support" from the U.S. government, and a DTRA team has visited Libya to consider various options for eliminating the weapons, he said.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/30/AR2006033001735.html

Los Angeles Times
March 31, 2006

U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal No Shoo-In

The signature Bush effort has failed to find champions on Capitol Hill. The left and right both fear proliferation of arms would increase.
By Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration's proposed nuclear deal with India is meeting with a chilly reception from lawmakers, who are predicting that instead of swift approval, the initiative faces revisions and delays, if not outright rejection.
The White House had hoped to win congressional approval by the end of May for the deal, which would open the way for cooperation on India's civil nuclear program, and is also designed to begin a new strategic relationship between the United States and a populous, economically vibrant democracy.
But the initiative has found few high-profile champions on Capitol Hill or elsewhere, while becoming a target for criticism from the right and left that it could further undermine international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons.
Since the deal was announced March 2, key lawmakers such as Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, have remained carefully neutral.
Meanwhile, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-El Cajon), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said this month that the president "is trying to ride a nuclear tiger…. I'm skeptical."
Former Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), a respected voice on security issues, also has voiced concerns and urged lawmakers to remain skeptical.
"It may be going too far to say there's panic within the administration, but I think there's deep concern that it hasn't been received nearly as well as hoped," said a Republican House staff member, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the political sensitivity. "They're trying to create the impression of momentum. Frankly, I don't think it's there."
The legislation before Congress would lift rules barring the U.S. government from providing nuclear technology to countries such as India that have declined to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In return for such help, India would agree to allow international inspections of its civilian reactors, though its military weapons program would remain unmonitored.
President Bush contends that by selling nuclear reactors to India, the program would ease competition for oil, help the environment and provide important new U.S. commercial ties. Administration officials also want to foster a better relationship with India because they believe it can be a strategic counterweight to China.
To provide India with nuclear knowledge, the United States must also win approval from a group of nations, known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, that controls the international nuclear trade. But in a meeting last weekend, the India proposal drew questions from representatives of many of the countries, and the administration failed to win permission to put the deal on the agenda for the group's May meeting, as it had hoped to do.
Administration officials, who have been intensively lobbying Congress this month, have said that attempts to add conditions to the agreement could destroy a carefully crafted deal. R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of State for political affairs, said in an appearance this week before the Council on Foreign Relations that the administration could accept conditions that would improve the deal "as long as they don't require us to go back and break the agreement, reopen negotiations."
But legislators say they're likely to add conditions anyway. Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, in Washington this week to meet with lawmakers, seemed to accept that some changes were likely. In a speech to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, Saran said New Delhi could accept revisions as long as they did not upset the "delicate balance" of the proposal.
Although it is not yet clear what kind of amendments Congress might seek, it could demand assurances that India would vigorously enforce its export controls on nuclear technology, or press to require New Delhi to put any new fast-breeder reactors, which produce material for bombs, under international monitoring. Congress also might try to
insist that India halt production of nuclear materials, as the United States and other leading atomic powers have done.

But India, which is building a nuclear arsenal in part as protection against China, has signaled that an attempt to impose such limits "would be a deal breaker," said the Republican staff member.

If Congress doesn't act before the summer recess, the administration could face a tougher challenge because of the difficulty of pushing through such a controversial agreement just before a midterm congressional election. Then the deal, which aides consider one of the most important accomplishments of the Bush presidency, could be put on hold until next year.

One State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity in keeping with agency rules, insisted that the administration was finding support for the deal on Capitol Hill and from countries such as Britain, Russia, France and Australia. "But we realize we have some questions to address," he said.


London Times
March 31, 2006

Defiant Sabre-Rattling
By Richard Beeston
IRAN is planning to send a blunt message to its enemies today, when thousands of troops are due to take part in a week-long military exercise stretching the length of the Gulf.

According to Rear-Admiral Mostafa Safari, the naval commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, about 17,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen will mount co-ordinated manoeuvres from the northern Gulf to the Sea of Oman. "We will gain the necessary and needed readiness to reply decisively to any kind of threat," he told state television. The operation appeared to be a warning to America that any use of military force to attack Iran’s nuclear programme will trigger a response in the Gulf, the conduit of much of the world’s energy supplies.

Rear-Admiral Muhammad Ibrahim Dehghan, the spokesman for the operation, said that the focus of the exercise would be the strategic Strait of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Gulf: “If the enemy wants to make the area insecure, he should rest assured that he will also suffer from the insecurity, since we know the location of his vessels.”

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2111720,00.html

Washington Post
March 31, 2006
Pg. 16

Iran Warned, But Russia, China Dissent On Action
Rice Says 'Strong Signal' Sent on Halting Nuclear Activity
By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

BERLIN, March 30 -- Senior diplomats from the five veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany warned Iran on Thursday to halt sensitive nuclear activities and return to the negotiating table, but strains were apparent as Russia and China appeared to rule out sanctions or military action.

One day after the Security Council approved a watered-down statement that gave Iran 30 days to end its uranium enrichment program, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her counterparts met here for 3 1/2 hours to consider ways to persuade Iran to restrain its nuclear ambitions. "This is a strong signal to Iran that negotiation, not confrontation, should be their course," Rice said.

In Vienna, Iran's chief representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, told the Associated Press that it was "impossible to go back to suspension" and that "this enrichment matter is not reversible."

Rice told reporters traveling with her to Berlin that the meeting would be used to "look ahead to what next steps we might wish to take." She suggested the range of options could include "strong messages," such as travel bans, which would affect the Iranian leadership personally, or measures to thwart Iran's ability to acquire materials needed for a civilian nuclear program.
A senior U.S. official in Rice's entourage said after the meeting that participants had demonstrated "substantial support" for considering the option of "moving toward sanctions." But in public comments afterward, Russian and Chinese officials expressed opposition to sanctions, on grounds they could lead to escalation and confrontation. "In principle, Russia doesn't believe that sanctions could achieve the purposes of settlement of various issues," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.
"There has already been enough turmoil in the Middle East," said Dai Bingguo, China's vice foreign minister, in a reference to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. "We do not want to see new turmoil being introduced to the region."

The Bush administration has pushed hard to bring the dispute over Iran's nuclear programs to the Security Council. But the resistance by both Russia and China to tougher action underscores the limits of that approach. Officials from both countries said the issue should be handled by the IAEA, the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog. Britain, France and Germany, leading an effort for the European Union, began negotiations with Iran three years ago to try to reach a solution, but the talks failed last year. Russia has also sought a compromise with Iran, but with little success.

It took three weeks of talks among Security Council members to reach agreement on the wording of Wednesday's statement. Russia successfully resisted language that would have called Iran's nuclear activities a threat to peace and security. Iran has said repeatedly that its nuclear program is for civilian energy only.
Lavrov noted that the IAEA has not ruled out a military dimension to Iran's program but neither has it concluded that Iran plans to build weapons with the nuclear fuel it hopes to produce.
"Before we call any situation a threat, we need facts, especially in a region like the Middle East, where so many things are happening," Lavrov said. "... So far, they have not been provided."

During the meeting, Rice and European officials sought to give the matter urgency by referring to reports that Iran has had unexpected success in assembling 164 centrifuges into a system known as a cascade, for uranium enrichment. That would be too small to produce enough fuel for a bomb, but Iran previously had worked with just 20 centrifuges. It appears to have completed the project about two months earlier than IAEA technical experts in Vienna had expected.
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said no country was trying to deny Iran the ability to produce electricity through nuclear power. "We have shown very great patience with Iran. They in turn have miscalculated" by misleading the IAEA about their program for 18 years, Straw said. "They thought the international community would be divided on this issue, but truthfully, it has become more and more united."
Before the meeting, Rice met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel for an hour. After the gathering, she departed for Paris for talks with French President Jacques Chirac.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/30/AR2006033000244.html

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Libya offered help destroying chem weapons

Pentagon specialists made an unannounced visit to Libya in January to see what it would take to help Libya destroy its tons of chemical weapons, a process that could cost $100 million.

James A. Tegnelia, director of a Pentagon unit known as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said Thursday that the officials who were in Libya are now writing a proposal for the State and Defense departments, spelling out various options for helping Libya comply with an international agreement to get rid of the banned weapons.

"It would be a difficult thing," Tegnelia said, in part because of the location, which he did not describe in detail.

Tegnelia said the Libya visit was in February, but the Pentagon later corrected him, saying it was Jan. 19-28.

In testimony before a Senate panel on Wednesday, Peter Flory, the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, said the site was in a remote area with inadequate access to water needed to neutralize the chemicals. Neither Flory nor Tegnelia identified the site, and when pressed for that detail by reporters, the Pentagon refused to specify the site. According to the private Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Libyans developed chemical weapons manufacture and storage facilities at three sites: Rabta, Sebha and Tarhunah.

In March 2004 the Libyan government declared to the international organization that oversees compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention that it had 23 tons of mustard gas, plus one inactivated chemical weapons production facility and two chemical weapons storage facilities. It is required under the convention to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons and weapons facilities by April 2007.

Libya also has acknowledged holding more than 1,300 tons of chemicals that can be used in weapon making.
Flory said “there’s a good chance” the cost of destroying the mustard gas and other materials would be more than $100 million. “And in that case we have to consider what are the opportunity costs of doing that particular bit of work compared to other, similar work in the former Soviet Union, in Central Asia or other regions.”

The Libya project is part of a broader American government effort to minimize the risk of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons falling into the hands of terrorists who could use them to attack the United States.

Tegnelia did not offer details of what the U.S. team found in Libya. He said Libya, which declared publicly in December 2003 that it was renouncing nuclear, biological and chemical arms, has “tens of tons” of mustard gas as well as chemicals that can be used in the production of chemical weapons.

In order to come into compliance with the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, Libya would have to destroy the mustard gas as well as the precursor chemicals, Tegnelia said. The question facing the Bush administration is whether it wants to help, either with the cost or with the technical expertise it would require.

A Pentagon statement issued hours after Tegnelia made his remarks Thursday said there was reason to help the Libyans.

“Such assistance would reinforce the wisdom of Libya’s decision to eliminate its WMD programs,” it said, referring to weapons of mass destruction that Libya had longed denied it possessed.

Libya became a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2004, shortly after Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi announced that he would unconditionally disclose and dismantle all programs related to weapons of mass destruction.

“In the end, meeting the Chemical Weapons Convention responsibility is the Libyan government’s responsibility,” Tegnelia said. “In today’s world, it’s not like they don’t have resources to be able to do that.”

Tegnelia said the U.S. government must carefully consider the benefit of helping Libya destroy the weapons.

Among the questions, he said, is whether money for the project could be better spent in speeding up a program already in place to help Russia secure its inventory of tactical nuclear weapons, which U.S. officials have worried could wind up in terrorists’ hands. He noted that the target date for fully securing 15 targeted storage facilities in Russia was recently moved up to 2008 from the previous goal of 2012.

Other questions, he said, include: “What are the Libyans prepared to do to help? What is the condition of their (chemical) weapons systems? I mean, if they aren’t a terrorist threat, that would have a bearing on how important it is to try to secure it.”


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Los Angeles Times

April 1, 2006

**Iran Minister Downplays Chances Of Nuclear Face-Off**

By Maggie Farley, Times Staff Writer

PRINCETON, N.J. — Iran's foreign minister said Friday that his country would not give up its right to develop nuclear know-how, but sought to play down the possibility of a confrontation over it.

In speeches for international audiences on Thursday and Friday, Manuchehr Mottaki stepped back from the escalation promised earlier by Tehran if Iran's nuclear issue was taken up by the United Nations Security Council.

On Wednesday, the 15-member council demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment within 30 days. Although Mottaki made it clear that Iran had no plans to stop enrichment, he said that his country would not use oil as a weapon and that it would not withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He also renewed a proposal for an international nuclear fuel consortium in Iran to operate under strict supervision of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iran made the same offer last year, and it was rejected by the United States.

"I wish to stress that Iran's nuclear question can be approached from two perspectives: Cooperation and interaction or confrontation and conflict. I underline that my country has prepared itself for both possibilities," Mottaki said Friday in a speech to a Geneva security think tank that was broadcast by video link to a conference at Princeton University.

For the moment, Iran's strategy seems to be to issue a series of mixed messages that reflect domestic divisions, as well as an attempt to maintain the nuclear program while avoiding international isolation, experts say. In an apparent show of strength Friday, Iran's military announced it had successfully test-fired a radar-eluding missile with multiple warheads.

U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said that the missile test underscored Iran's determination to pursue weapons, including nuclear arms.
"I think it demonstrates that Iran has a very active and aggressive military program underway," he said. "That includes both, as we've talked about before, efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, as well as delivery systems."

Iran's dual signals also exploit international uncertainty on how to move forward, say experts.

"It has been the general pattern over the two months to send a message that they are ready to talk, but at the same time, show a very resolute defiance," said M. Hadi Semati, a Tehran University professor who is a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. "They are trying to send a signal that they won't concede but won't provoke, either."

Iranian President Mohammed Ahmedinejad has won popularity at home with his defense of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology and his hard-line statements about wiping Israel "off the map." However, his comments have raised concern, both in the international community and among moderates at home who fear that he is pushing Iran into a conflict.

Ali Ansari, an expert on Iranian history at Scotland's St. Andrew's University, said Iranian officials were taken off guard by the nuclear issue being referred to the U.N. Security Council.

"The report to the Security Council was not expected," he said. "The experience for three years had been that the West would back down."

In the Security Council, a show of unity is papering over divisions. Of the five permanent members with veto power, the United States, France and Britain are pushing for sanctions if Iran fails to stop uranium enrichment activities that could be used for producing energy or weapons. But China and Russia oppose sanctions without clear evidence that Iran is a threat.

The council asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to report in 30 days on Iran's compliance. A negative conclusion would pave the way for sanctions. But the agency's director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, said Thursday that Iran did not pose an immediate threat and that sanctions would not be helpful. He urged all parties to tone down their rhetoric.

In his remarks to the U.N.'s Disarmament Conference in Geneva on Thursday, Mottaki expressed confidence that the Security Council did not have the unity to impose harsh penalties.

"We don't think there is a lot of chance of sanctions being put into place," he said.

In a meeting Thursday of foreign ministers from the permanent Security Council members and Germany, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly failed to muster support for targeted sanctions that would not affect ordinary Iranians, such as a travel ban and freeze on the assets of Iranian leaders. That leaves diplomats scrambling for alternatives.

One proposal floated by the International Crisis Group think tank calls for a three-phase, decade-long program in which Iran would suspend enrichment for a few years to build confidence, then do limited amounts under close supervision. The U.S. has rejected the idea, contending that once Iran gains the technology to do a limited amount of enrichment, it can easily replicate it and secretly operate a parallel enrichment program.

"The alternative is use of force, which people are talking about, but nobody really thinks is feasible or effective," Semati, of Tehran University, said. "It very much depends on the next few months and how the puzzle pieces fit, and how Russia and China react. But after Iraq, they have serious concerns that proliferation is a tool of other objectives, namely regime change."

Times staff writer Paul Richter in Washington contributed to this report.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran1apr01,1,5923867.story

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openly declared Al Qaeda's intention to obtain weapons of mass destruction, of which chemical agents would be the easiest to acquire and use.

Nevertheless, the plot of "24" is misleading in one important respect: the source of the chemical weapons. The script has the terrorists stealing nerve-gas canisters that were secretly produced for the U.S. military and stored in an airport hangar. In fact, since 9/11, the Cold War stocks of chemical rockets, bombs and shells awaiting destruction at seven U.S. Army depots across the country have been well secured, most in heavily protected concrete bunkers. At much greater risk of theft are chemicals in depots in Russia, which has the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons — about 40,000 metric tons. And Russia is also far behind on the timetable for eliminating them under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the United States and Russia have signed and ratified.

To date, the United States, Canada and European Union countries have committed about $2 billion to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons, but the program has suffered repeated delays. Although the Russian government claims that all of the weapons will be eliminated by 2012, that date is probably unrealistic. Only the smallest of Russia's stockpiles — 1,143 metric tons of the blister agents lewisite and mustard at Gorny — has been destroyed. A second blister agent destruction facility at Kambarka began operation recently.

Two other storage sites, at Shchuchye on the Kazakhstan border and at Kizner, about 650 miles east of Moscow, contain millions of munitions filled with nerve agents. Destruction of those chemical weapons won't begin until December 2008 at the earliest.

According to Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), some of the artillery shells stored at Shchuchye are small enough to smuggle out in a suitcase. Although the U.S. has spent $20 million on security upgrades at the two sites, it hasn't conducted routine follow-up inspections to ensure that they stay secure.

Security also used to be seriously inadequate at Russia's other depots, where about 28,000 tons of munitions filled with deadly blister and nerve agents were stored aboveground in decrepit warehouses with rusty perimeter fences. These weapons could be a bonanza for terrorists or criminal gangs.

Moscow says these problems have been corrected — but it hasn't let any Westerners in to verify that claim.

Helping Russia eliminate its vast chemical weapons stockpile is critical for U.S. homeland security and counterterrorism, yet Washington's commitment to the effort appears to be waning down, even though the job isn't done. Congress should spend more to fund security upgrades at Russia's vulnerable chemical weapons depots and at a nerve agent destruction facility in Kizner.

Viewers of "24" can rest assured that by the end of the series, Bauer will save L.A. from a devastating chemical attack.

In real life, however, the best way to make sure it doesn't happen here is to lock up Russia's chemical weapons stockpiles and destroy them as quickly and safely as possible.

PAUL F. WALKER follows Russian environmental and security threats at Global Green USA. JONATHAN B. TUCKER is a senior fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-tucker1apr01,1,2323990.story

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But terrorism experts considered Iranian-backed or controlled groups -- namely the country's Ministry of Intelligence and Security operatives, its Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah -- to be better organized, trained and equipped than the al-Qaeda network that carried out the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The Iranian government views the Islamic Jihad, the name of Hezbollah's terrorist organization, "as an extension of their state. . . . operational teams could be deployed without a long period of preparation," said Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism.

The possibility of a military confrontation has been raised only obliquely in recent months by President Bush and Iran's government. Bush says he is pursuing a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but he has added that all options are on the table for stopping Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Speaking in Vienna last month, Javad Vaeedi, a senior Iranian nuclear negotiator, warned the United States that "it may have the power to cause harm and pain, but it is also susceptible to harm and pain. So if the United States wants to pursue that path, let the ball roll," although he did not specify what type of harm he was talking about.

Government officials said their interest in Iran's intelligence services is not an indication that a military confrontation is imminent or likely, but rather a reflection of a decades-long adversarial relationship in which Iran's agents have worked secretly against U.S. interests, most recently in Iraq and Pakistan. As confrontation over Iran's nuclear program has escalated, so has the effort to assess the threat from Iran's covert operatives.

U.N. Security Council members continue to debate how best to pressure Iran to prove that its nuclear program is not meant for weapons. The United States, Britain and France want the Security Council to threaten Iran with economic sanctions if it does not end its uranium enrichment activities. Russia and China, however, have declined to endorse such action and insist on continued negotiations. Security Council diplomats are meeting this weekend to try to break the impasse. Iran says it seeks nuclear power but not nuclear weapons.

Former CIA terrorism analyst Paul R. Pillar said that any U.S. or Israeli airstrike on Iranian territory "would be regarded as an act of war" by Tehran, and that Iran would strike back with its terrorist groups. "There's no doubt in my mind about that. . . . Whether it's overseas at the hands of Hezbollah, in Iraq or possibly Europe, within the regime there would be pressure to take violent action."

Before Sept. 11, the armed wing of Hezbollah, often working on behalf of Iran, was responsible for more American deaths than in any other terrorist attacks. In 1983 Hezbollah truck-bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241, and in 1996 truck-bombed Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. service members.

Iran's intelligence service, operating out of its embassies around the world, assassinated dozens of monarchists and political dissidents in Europe, Pakistan, Turkey and the Middle East in the two decades after the 1979 Iranian revolution, which brought to power a religious Shiite government. Argentine officials also believe Iranian agents bombed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, killing 86 people. Iran has denied involvement in that attack.

Iran's intelligence services "are well trained, fairly sophisticated and have been doing this for decades," said Crumpton, a former deputy of operations at the CIA's Counterterrorist Center. "They are still very capable. I don't see their capabilities as having diminished."

Both sides have increased their activities against the other. The Bush administration is spending $75 million to step up pressure on the Iranian government, including funding non-governmental organizations and alternative media broadcasts. Iran's parliament then approved $13.6 million to counter what it calls "plots and acts of meddling" by the United States.

"Given the uptick in interest in Iran" on the part of the United States, "it would be a very logical assumption that we have both ratcheted up [intelligence] collection, absolutely," said Fred Barton, a former counterterrorism official who is now vice president of counterterrorism for Stratfor, a security consulting and forecasting firm. "It would be a more fevered pitch on the Iranian side because they have fewer options."

The office of the director of national intelligence, which recently began to manage the U.S. intelligence agencies, declined to allow its analysts to discuss their assessment of Iran's intelligence services and Hezbollah and their capabilities to retaliate against U.S. interests.

"We are unable to address your questions in an unclassified manner," a spokesman for the office, Carl Kropf, wrote in response to a Washington Post query.

The current state of Iran's intelligence apparatus is the subject of debate among experts. Some experts who spent their careers tracking the intelligence ministry's operatives describe them as deployed worldwide and easier to monitor than Hezbollah cells because they operate out of embassies and behave more like a traditional spy service such as the Soviet KGB.

Other experts believe the Iranian service has become bogged down in intense, regional concerns: attacks on Shiites in Pakistan, the Iraq war and efforts to combat drug trafficking in Iran.
As a result, said Bahman Baktiari, an Iran expert at the University of Maine, the intelligence service has downsized its operations in Europe and the United States. But, said Baktiari, "I think the U.S. government doesn't have a handle on this."

Because Iran's nuclear facilities are scattered around the country, some military specialists doubt a strike could effectively end the program and would require hundreds of strikes beforehand to disable Iran's vast air defenses. They say airstrikes would most likely inflame the Muslim world, alienate reformers within Iran and could serve to unite Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, which have only limited contact currently.

A report by the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks cited al-Qaeda's long-standing cooperation with the Iranian-back Hezbollah on certain operations and said Osama bin Laden may have had a previously undisclosed role in the Khobar attack. Several al-Qaeda figures are reportedly under house arrest in Iran. Others in the law enforcement and intelligence circles have been more dubious about cooperation between al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, largely because of the rivalries between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Al-Qaeda adherents are Sunni Muslims; Hezbollah's are Shiites.

Iran "certainly wants to remind governments that they can create a lot of difficulty if strikes were to occur," said a senior European counterterrorism official interviewed recently. "That they might react with all means, Hezbollah inside Lebanon and outside Lebanon, this is certain. Al-Qaeda could become a tactical alliance."

Researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/01/AR2006040100981.html

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London Sunday Telegraph
April 2, 2006

Sleuths Look For The Tiniest Smoking Gun That Could Lead To War On Iran

By Colin Freeman, in Seibersdorf, Austria

When David Donohue hunts for clues to Iran building a secret nuclear bomb, the smoking gun he looks for is likely to be 100 times smaller than a human hair.

A single stray picogram of plutonium, one trillionth of a gram, is all that is needed to raise suspicions that a civilian nuclear plant could be making weapons-grade material. "It is like looking for fingerprints," said Mr Donohue. "To make a bomb you need about 10kg of plutonium or enriched uranium, but we can find nanograms or picograms, which are about 15 orders of magnitude less than that. There's just no way you can hide it."

Mr Donohue is part of a multinational team of scientific sleuths attached to the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose latest monitoring report on Iran's nuclear programme is due next month.

If the agency uncovers evidence of suspicious activities, or reports that Teheran is failing to co-operate with its inspectors, it could pave the way for international sanctions and, ultimately, military strikes. As the Sunday Telegraph reports today, Britain is putting into place secret plans in the event of an American-led attack on Iran, despite the insistence of Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that military action is "inconceivable".

On Wednesday, the Islamic republic upped the stakes by announcing that it would defy a United Nations Security Council request to halt proscribed uranium enrichment research, which Teheran insists is for purely peaceful purposes.

With attention focused on the outcome of its work, last week the agency granted reporters a tour of its laboratories in the quiet town of Seibersdorf, 25 miles from its headquarters in Vienna.

Tucked away on an industrial estate, it is the atomic equivalent of a Scotland Yard forensics lab - a network of rooms full of chemistry sets, computers and electron microscopes designed to pinpoint proof of wrongdoing.

Yet the first step in its nuclear detective work is rather more low-tech: an agency inspector visits a plant, takes a cotton swab, and looks for places that have not been dusted recently.

No matter what efforts are made to hide evidence of illicit atomic distillations, radioactive particles will find their way into the atmosphere and any dust that settles will most likely contain a few.

The swabs are sent to Seibersdorf to be put through a mass spectrometer, a chemical analysis device that can pinpoint the slightest traces of suspicious elements. "You could get rid of 90 or 99 per cent, but there is still enough for us to find it," said Mr Donohue.

The Seibersdorf facility analyses about 600 samples a year, taken from nuclear facilities in the 50-odd countries deemed of "interest" to the agency. All are signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
To ensure international confidence in the agency's findings, Mr Donohue and his colleagues are never told what country the swabs are from. Duplicate samples are also sent to laboratories in Russia, America, France and Japan for independent analysis.

Chemical analysis is, however, just one tactic that the agency has developed in its cat-and-mouse games with states such as Iran, North Korea, and Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Equally important is the work of the 200-strong team of field inspectors, who tour plants, interview technicians and check stockpiles to see if any uranium or plutonium has disappeared.

Pilfering from a nuclear plant is not easy, according to John Kinney, a British inspector at the agency's Vienna office. "Most nuclear facilities have a stringent paper trail for all fuel," he said. "If you are going to steal material, you have to falsify documents, all of which tend to be interlinked. The process is so complicated that it is difficult to do anything without getting caught."

The agency also puts up remote monitoring cameras to watch vaults of fuel and other sensitive spots, built to higher security specifications than those in high-deposit bank vaults. The tamper-proof cameras are safeguarded against being short circuited to display a false image.

Massimo Aparo, the head of the agency's surveillance laboratory, said: "Our cameras have a device that authenticates each picture, so that can't happen, and lasers that can detect movement."

As a final check, the cameras are checked by selected foreign intelligence agencies to see if the real-life equivalents of the Bond films' Q can find any way to fool them. So far, Mr Aparo says, none has managed to do so.


India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell

Rice Set to Defend Landmark Accord She Orchestrated Without Congress

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew into New Delhi a year ago and set in motion a revolution in U.S. policy on nuclear weapons and relations with India.

She didn't tip her hand publicly during the brief stop, sticking to bland expressions of "a new relationship" with "great potential." The outlines of her plan were known by only a handful of people in the U.S. government.

Four months later, on July 18, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved a landmark accord at the White House.

Beyond the invasion of Iraq, few of Bush's decisions have as much potential to shake the international order than his deal with India, supporters and opponents agree. The debate over the deal has pitted against each other two powerful national security goals -- the desire to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and the desire to counter the rise of China, in this case by accelerating New Delhi's ascent as a global power.

After three decades of treating India as a pariah because it used a civilian nuclear program to produce fissile material for weapons, Bush decided the United States would forgive the transgression. India would be able to buy foreign-made nuclear reactors if it opened its civilian facilities to international inspections -- while being allowed to substantially ramp up its ability to produce materials for nuclear weapons.

Previously, the administration had favored an incremental easing of the nuclear rules regarding India. This agreement, as one of Rice's aides put it, was "the big bang," designed to bring historically nonaligned India firmly into the U.S. camp. But the deal has spawned fierce controversy in Washington, in part because going forward would require Congress to change laws for the nuclear sales. Rice will defend the agreement in congressional testimony this week.

The story behind the agreement also sheds light on how foreign policy is conducted in Bush's second term. For an administration frequently criticized for not being nimble, the India deal highlights the flexibility of Rice's foreign-policy team, which has also shifted policies toward Europe, on Iran and other areas in the past year. It demonstrates how, in contrast to the first term, foreign policy is largely driven by Rice and a close circle of advisers, not the White House staff.

But the India deal also shows the drawbacks of this approach, critics say. The agreement is in trouble partly because -- in what some critics say is an echo of the Iraq invasion -- there was little consultation with Congress or within the foreign-affairs bureaucracy before it was announced. Last month in New Delhi, Bush and Singh reached agreement on how India will implement the deal. But nuclear specialists in the U.S. government say their concerns about weapons proliferation also were overridden in final talks.
Now, nuclear experts from across the political spectrum have urged Congress to modify the accord, which the administration and Indian officials say would be tantamount to killing it. "There are times when you have to engage in incremental diplomacy and there are times you need someone who is willing to make a bold move," Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns said in an interview. "The president was willing to make a bold move towards India, and it is going to pay off for the United States now and into the future." Many diplomatic turning points, such as President Richard M. Nixon's historic decision to open relations with China, are first conducted in secret because established bureaucracies tend to resist new ideas. Senior U.S. officials reject complaints that the expertise of government nonproliferation specialists was ignored. But, as one person involved in the policy development put it, "it is no accident that [nuclear experts] were not included, because you didn't have to be a seer to know how much they would hate this."

The agreement is also controversial in India, where close association with the United States is viewed with suspicion and the eagerness of the Bush administration to strike an agreement frequently took the Indian establishment by surprise. Before Bush arrived in India last month, Singh had little support in his cabinet for reaching a final accord on implementing the agreement, Indian officials said.

"I would say it is not only an act of statesmanship but an act of faith," said Ronen Sen, India's ambassador to the United States. "Both our countries were departing from something which has been well ingrained in the mind-sets of most of our people. We knew there was going to be significant opposition to change. Change is always viewed with suspicion and often viewed as subversive."

The following account is based on interviews with more than 20 U.S. and Indian officials, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivities involved.

**A New Approach**

During the 2000 presidential campaign, Rice indicated that a future Bush administration would take a new approach to India. In an article in Foreign Affairs magazine, she said that "India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one" and pointedly noted that "India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too."

Rice was national security adviser during Bush's first term and Robert D. Blackwill, one of her closest associates during the campaign, was named ambassador to India. As early as October 2001, he cabled Washington urging a rethinking of nuclear policy toward India, said Ashley Tellis, a Bombay-born expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former aide to Blackwill. But former secretary of state Colin L. Powell had endorsed a more incremental approach to increasing sensitive trade with India. "We also have to protect certain red lines that we have with respect to proliferation," he said in a 2003 interview.

During Rice's confirmation process, she was asked in a written questionnaire whether the administration anticipated that Congress would need to change laws regarding India policy. She answered no. But within weeks, U.S. officials say, the White House decided to sell F-16 jets to Pakistan. Rice went to New Delhi to break the news -- and to cushion the blow by offering India the prospect of a broader strategic relationship, including military, economic and even nuclear cooperation.

Rice's presentation, while still vague about the specifics, sent shockwaves through New Delhi. "As Rice put across an unprecedented framework for cooperation with India, the establishment in Delhi was stunned," according to "Impossible Allies," a book on the deal by Indian journalist C. Raja Mohan, published last month in India. "Few had expected Rice to go this far."

From the Indian perspective, the partnership Rice suggested offered a way to finally remove the nuclear impediment to closer ties with the United States. "If you are going to be looking at India as a partner . . . then you have to treat India as a partner and not as a target," Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said. "Both these things cannot be done together."

Because of international restrictions, India's nuclear program is largely homegrown, cut off from international markets. This has hobbed India's use of nuclear power -- it provides only about 3 percent of installed electricity capacity -- and left it desperate for energy as its economy has soared.

A key designer of the new approach was Philip Zelikow, Rice's counselor and longtime colleague. Upon Rice's return from Asia, Zelikow began exchanging memos with Tellis, resulting in a 50-page "action agenda" for U.S.-Indian relations completed in mid-May.

The paper promoted geostrategic cooperation between the two countries rooted strongly in U.S. defense and military sales to India as a way to counter China's influence. "If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025." Tellis wrote.

Ten days after Rice's visit, when Bush announced the F-16 sale to Pakistan, State Department officials held a background briefing on the new India policy. One official -- identified by Mohan as Zelikow -- said the policy's
"goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement."

One U.S. official involved in the briefing said Zelikow's statement went beyond the talking points drafted for the news conference -- but as time passed, it was clear his bolder pronouncement reflected the administration's true position.

"We had been thinking about this question: How much should you go for? Would an incremental approach be better, would it be more easily digestible [by Congress]?" a senior official asked. "We decided to go for the big bang."

At this critical junction, one of the leading skeptics of a nuclear deal with India -- John R. Bolton, the undersecretary of state for arms control -- was nominated U.N. ambassador. The long battle over his appointment delayed confirmation of his replacement, Robert G. Joseph, until May 26. Other key posts in the nonproliferation ranks were unfilled, leaving officials in that area thinking they had no voice in the debate. The Pentagon, meanwhile, fully backed closer relations with India.

By the time Joseph arrived at the State Department on June 1, the initiative with India was largely underway. Rice dispatched Burns to begin negotiations with India, working mainly with his counterpart, Foreign Secretary Saran. Because neither Zelikow nor Burns was an expert in nuclear specifics, Joseph and John D. Rood, his successor and counterpart at the National Security Council, began outlining, with input from their staffs, commitments they hoped to extract from India.

Leading the nonproliferation interests of the administration, Rood and Joseph envisioned a deal in which India would, among other things, agree to limit production of plutonium to a level that ensured the minimal deterrent capability it sought.

The two nuclear experts also wanted India to place all of its electricity-producing reactors under permanent safeguards to be monitored by U.N. inspectors. Such an arrangement would ensure, in accordance with U.S. law, that any American technology going to India would not be used for its weapons program.

But by the time U.S. negotiators agreed on a number of requests -- just days before Singh's arrival on July 18 -- many of the key items on the Joseph-Rood list had been taken off the table, said senior officials who were involved.

"We never even got to the stage where we could negotiate them," one official said. The Indians had already made clear to Burns in discussions weeks earlier that they were not interested in outside influence over their nuclear weapons program. "We knew well before Singh's arrival that the Indians wouldn't accept most of that," another senior U.S. negotiator said.

When the final negotiations began before Singh's visit, Joseph wasn't there. Instead, he went overseas on other business, leaving Rood as the lone senior nonproliferation voice on a negotiating team stacked with officials eager to clinch a deal upon Singh's arrival.

Officials said Rood delivered forceful presentations to Burns and others throughout the negotiating process, laying out key nonproliferation concerns. Without a limit on fissile material production, the deal could allow India to make many more weapons than it needed. There was also concern about rewarding a country that built nuclear weapons in secret, which North Korea and Iran are accused of doing. Some in the administration said the deal would hurt U.S. efforts to pressure those countries on their programs.

Few Indian officials expected a breakthrough during the Bush-Singh meeting in July, but Rice was determined to see the negotiations succeed. Bush had reached the conclusion that the nuclear concerns carried less weight than the enormous benefits that a broad partnership with a large and friendly democracy could bring.

The Final Push

Burns, Saran and other officials conferred for nearly three days. From the start, negotiators said the conversations were tense as it became clear that the U.S. goals were not what India was hoping to hear. One by one, Indian negotiators balked at requests, indicating they would walk away before accepting conditions for inspections and other safeguards.

Rice went to Saran's suite in the Willard Hotel on Sunday, July 17, to provide a final push. At 6 p.m., she and Burns thought they had an agreement, but then Saran called Burns at 10:30 p.m., saying the deal was off -- it was too much politically for the Indian government to swallow all at once.

On Monday, July 18, the morning that Singh was to meet with Bush, Rice called Burns at 5:30 a.m. and said, "We're not going to give up." She met with Singh at 8 a.m. and persuaded him to let the negotiators try again.

Thus, as Bush and Singh met one-on-one in the Oval Office, senior U.S. and Indian aides closeted in the Roosevelt Room were furiously scribbling out the text of a deal that would overturn three decades of U.S. policy on stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.

There were several highly technical issues holding up the announcement. But, in essence, India wanted the coveted status of an official nuclear state, a recognition that would get it into the most exclusive club in the world. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, only the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain are weapons states. All other countries, except for Pakistan, India and Israel, signed on to the agreement, promising to forgo nuclear
weapons in exchange for civilian nuclear technology. Now India wanted the technology, wanted to remain outside the treaty and wanted membership in the club. The final agreement fudged the issue.

"They were really demanding that we recognize them as a weapons state," said a senior official who was knowledgeable about the discussions. "Thank God we said no to that, but they almost got it. The Indians were incredibly greedy that day. They were getting 99 percent of what they asked for and still they pushed for 100."

Last month, Bush and Singh agreed on an implementation plan specifying that 14 of India's 22 nuclear plants would be subject to international inspections. But the country's eight other reactors, and any future ones for military purposes, would be off-limits. And although the Bush administration originally wanted a pact that would let India continue producing material for six to 10 weapons each year, the plan would allow it enough fissile material for as many as 50 annually.

U.S. officials said Bush had kept his focus on a core idea -- that India is a thriving, pluralistic democracy, one of the good guys in international relations -- and thus was willing to sweep away nuclear orthodoxy. The goal, an official said, was to position India to be one of the United States' two or three closest partners.

Only after the announcement did the administration begin to brief members of Congress. One U.S. official involved in the negotiations said the failure to consult with Congress or to build support for the agreement within the bureaucracy has created lasting problems: "The way they jammed it through is going to haunt us."

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Staff writer Dafna Linzer contributed to this report.

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New York Times
April 3, 2006

Iran Says It Test-Fired Underwater Missile

By Nazila Fathi

TEHRAN, April 2 — Iran said Sunday that it had test-fired what it described as a sonar-evading underwater missile just two days after it announced that it had fired a new missile that could carry multiple warheads and evade radar systems.

The new missile is among the world's fastest and can outpace an enemy warship, Gen. Ali Fadavi of the country's elite Revolutionary Guards told state television.

General Fadavi said only one other country, Russia, had a missile that moved underwater as fast as the Iranian one, which he said had a speed of about 225 miles per hour. State television showed what it described as the missile being fired.

"The missile carries a very powerful warhead that enables it to operate against groups of warships and big submarines," he said.

He contended that the boats that would launch the missile were able to evade detection systems but that "even if an enemy's warship sonar can detect the missile, no warship can escape from this missile because of its high speed."

General Fadavi said the missile launched Sunday took six years to develop.

The test, as well as the one described Friday, was part of a week of naval maneuvers. State television showed the missile as it was fired. The news agency IRNA said the maneuvers were to display "the country's defensive capabilities."

Iran's military show of force follows increasing international pressure over its nuclear program. Last Wednesday, the United Nations Security Council urged Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and asked the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency to report on Iran's compliance within 30 days.

Iran has refused to comply. On Sunday, Iran's representative to the atomic energy agency, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, appearing on CNN's "Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer," said of the Security Council's action, "We express our regret for such a hasty decision because the wisest decision was no action."

The state television video broadcast Sunday showed crew members on a submarine and described them as preparing to launch the missile. Another film clip showed what was described as the missile being fired from the deck of a ship and diving into the water.

The Revolutionary Guards air force chief called the antiradar missile that was test-fired Friday "a very advanced missile."

Mr. Soltanieh, told CNN on Sunday that he did not believe that the weapon could carry a nuclear warhead. "The world should not worry because any country has its own self-defense conventional military activities," he said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/world/middleeast/03iran.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

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Australia To Sell Uranium To China For Energy
By Jane Perlez

SYDNEY, Australia, Monday, April 3 — Australia, one of the United States' closest allies, signed an agreement with China on Monday to sell uranium for use in China's nuclear power plants, in its continuing drive to meet its soaring energy needs.

The deal also opens the door for Chinese investment in Australian uranium mines.

The agreement, negotiated over the last year in Beijing, is the highlight of a three-day trip to Australia by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China, and underscores the importance of Australia as a base for China's widening demand for natural resources.

Mr. Wen spent Sunday in Western Australia, the state that provides much of the raw materials Australia exports to China.

Australia is scheduled to deliver its first liquid natural gas to China from the North West Shelf gas development in Western Australia in the next several months and is already one of China's biggest suppliers of iron ore.

But because uranium is used in nuclear weapons, it is in a different category from that of other commodities.

The conservative government of Prime Minister John Howard has emphasized that China has agreed not to use Australian uranium in its weapons program, or for other military purposes.

The Australians also emphasize that China, unlike India, which the Bush administration agreed last month to provide with nuclear technology, has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Australia described the accord as a safeguards agreement that stipulated conditions for the sale and will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

A senior Australian official in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said Sunday that the United States was "hardly in a position" to criticize the sale of uranium for peaceful purposes to China after announcing that it would seek an exemption from Congress to sell fuel to India for its civilian nuclear plants.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was informed of Australia's plans to sell uranium to China on her visit here last month. "She simply listened to the fact we have negotiated an agreement within the framework of the nonproliferation treaty, the Australian official said.

An American specialist on nuclear issues, George Perkovich, who criticized the Bush administration's accord with India as allowing India to amass nuclear weapons, said he did not consider China a similar case.

Unlike India, China had all the fissile nuclear material it needed for weapons, said Mr. Perkovich, the director of studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"There is every reason to think China will be using uranium for civilian uses," he said. "If you're a country that sells uranium to countries for nuclear power, there is no argument for not selling it to China."

The deal with China, which was signed in the capital, Canberra, has been greeted with fanfare in Australia, and was preceded by a long interview of Prime Minister Wen in the newspaper The Australian.

Mr. Wen made clear that China's growing economic relationship with Australia locked in an important American ally as an important Chinese friend as well. "We believe that countries which are allied with the United States can also be China's friends, and Australia is one of them," he said.

The Howard government, while supportive of the Bush administration in Iraq, has told the United States that it cannot count on Australia to be at its side in the event of a conflict with China over Taiwan.

The uranium accord comes as China tries to reduce its heavy reliance on fossil fuels. It has nine nuclear power reactors, but has announced an ambitious program to build as many as three reactors a year.

Australia holds an estimated 40 percent of the world's reserves of easily extractable uranium and sells it in the form of uranium oxide to the United States, Canada and South Korea for use in civilian nuclear reactors.

The sale of uranium has long had opponents in Australia, who have argued that because uranium is used in nuclear weapons, it should be left in the ground. Australia has no nuclear power industry of its own, and uranium production has been limited to three operating mines. The argument that nuclear power can help reduce the emission of greenhouse gases has also cut opposition to the deal.

But in an effort to show that it supports an economic boom that rides so heavily on exports of natural resources to China, the major opposition party, the Australian Labor Party, indicated this weekend that it would favor more expansive uranium production. That leaves the small Green Party as the major vocal opponent to the sale.

After visiting India last month, Mr. Howard said his government might reconsider its current position on not selling uranium there.

One of the features of the accord signed Monday for which China was most eager, Australian officials had said, is an agreement that China could invest in the Australian uranium industry.
The Chinese ambassador to Australia, Fu Ying, last year went to the state of South Australia and visited the Olympic Dam uranium mine, which is owned by BHP Billiton, the world's largest mining company. The Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, said recently that once a safeguards agreement was reached on uranium sales, there was no reason that a Chinese company could not apply to the Foreign Investment Review Board for approval to invest in uranium mining.

Amplifying on those remarks, an Australian official at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said over the weekend that it was likely that the Chinese would seek minority equity in a uranium mining company as a way of assuring its supply. The agreement to be signed Monday paved the way for such an investment, he said. Formal negotiations for the accord with China began in Beijing in August, but informal talks began many months before, Australian officials said. The negotiations were led by John Carlson, director general of the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, and were completed last month.

According to an account by the Foreign Affairs and Trade Department, Australia will rely on China's inspections agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear monitoring arm of the United Nations, to ensure that the Australian uranium is used only for nuclear power reactors.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/world/asia/03australia.html

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