



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at <http://cpc.au.af.mil/> for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy, joann.eddy.ctr@maxwell.af.mil.

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(Editor's Note: The USAF Counterproliferation Center is mentioned on page 98 of the following report.)
Department of Defense

Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress

April 2007

Executive Summary

It is our responsibility to provide our warfighters the best capability and support in the world. America remains a nation at war. The armed forces of the United States are engaged in a global war on terror while simultaneously deterring further attacks on Americans here at home. In doing so, our military faces many challenges, but one in particular—the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—is among our greatest.

DoD is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat. The purpose of this strategy is to build readiness for current and future challenges. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is a critical component supporting both the national strategies and

department's strategies. The program exists to provide chemical and biological defense capabilities in support of the goals and objectives of our national military strategies, ensuring that DoD operations are unconstrained by chemical or biological effects.

To effectively execute this program, the department depends on continued congressional support in three priority areas:

- Stable funding for the Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI) to fully exploit the advanced science and technology innovation necessary to successfully counter future genetically engineered biological weapons.
- Adequate long-term investment in the RDT&E infrastructure to enhance our research, development, test and evaluation capabilities, including the modernization and construction of laboratories and test facilities to ensure we develop advanced countermeasures against current and emerging chemical and biological (CB) threats.
- Consistent resources for the overall program itself to ensure that, year after year, we are able to field the improved defensive capabilities essential to ensure our military can operate in any environment, unconstrained by chemical or biological weapons.

With the support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress, we have developed and resourced an integrated CBDP to best serve the nation, to build readiness for current and future challenges, and to sustain our armed forces in time of war.

To continue countering the existing and future threat from hostile WMD and to meet the critical operational needs of our military, the department requires full support for the resources requested in the program budget.

This report is provided in accordance with 50 U.S. Code Section 1523. (The complete reporting requirement is detailed in *Annex L*.) The report describes the accomplishments, initiatives, management, and oversight of the CBDP, as well as strategies and plans for the development and acquisition of capabilities in each of the program commodity areas for the near term, midterm, and far term; a description and assessment of RDT&E programs and infrastructure; an analysis of CB defense logistics posture; and CB defense education, training, exercises, and doctrine.

This report also demonstrates compliance with the government Performance and Results Act (gPRA) by providing a performance plan, which is integrated into the overall structure of the report. The performance plan provides an assessment of the overall program for the most recently completed fiscal year (FY06).

Since its establishment in 1994 following congressional passage of the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act (50 U.S. Code, Section 1522), the CBDP has integrated research, development, and acquisition (RDA) funds into defense-wide accounts that are overseen by a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The CBDP vision is to *ensure DoD operations are unconstrained by chemical and biological effects*. The program's mission is to *provide chemical and biological defense capabilities in support of the national military strategies*. The vision and mission statements guide the program, and its activities and are supported by four corporate goals:

Goal 1: Provide CB defense capabilities to the warfighter to *reduce near-term operational risk*.

Goal 2: *Reduce force management risks* through enhanced joint CB defense education, training, and exercises.

Goal 3: Develop transformational CB defense technologies to *reduce future challenges risk* to DoD operations and forces.

Goal 4: *Reduce institutional risk* by improving DoD CB defense management practices – become a high-performance organization.

These goals reflect the CBDP's implementation of DoD's balanced scorecard concept, which provides a management and oversight framework to balance investment priorities against risks over time.

The CBDP budget request for FY08 is \$1.570 billion. An overview of the budget is provided in *Annex I*. This request focuses on *reducing the future challenges risk* by increasing resources for the science and technology base.

The CBDP seeks to ensure that DoD operations are unconstrained by chemical and/or biological effects by providing chemical and biological defense capabilities to build readiness for current and future challenges. The program depends on support in three priority areas: (1) stable funding for the TMTI; (2) adequate long-term investment in the RDT&E infrastructure, including laboratories and test facilities; and (3) consistent, predictable and sustained resource levels for the CBDP.

The CBDP employs multiple complementary processes to monitor performance and provide programmatic adjustments. First, the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution System is employed to ensure program performance goals and targets are implemented. The CBDP annual report to Congress as well as assessments by the Joint Requirements Office-CBRN Defense also play key roles. Additionally, each materiel solution's progress is measured by monitoring specific performance goals and targets in the planning years, and the results of the data analysis are compared against performance goals, operational goals, corporate goals, and the overall CBDP mission. These processes support the objective of fielding improved CB defense equipment to our military forces. (For complete report, please click link below.)

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/cbdreports/cbdpreporttocongress2007.pdf>

CBD&CDP Website

Official Website of the Office of the Special Assistant Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/>

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USA Today

www.usatoday.com

May 3, 2007

Phones studied as attack detector

By Mimi Hall, USA TODAY

WASHINGTON — The government is researching whether the best defense against a chemical, biological or radiological attack might one day be right in everyone's hands — or on their ears.

Homeland Security officials are looking into outfitting cellphones with detectors that would alert emergency responders to radiological isotopes, toxic chemicals and biological agents such as anthrax.

"If it's successful, it'll change the way chemical, biological and radiation detection is done," says Rolf Dietrich, deputy director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, which invests in high-tech solutions to secure the nation against terrorist attacks. "It's a really, really neat thing."

Dietrich says it's way too early to know whether the idea would work, and department officials are just beginning talks with phone companies and privacy advocates. If it does work, he says, it could be a "game-changer" in how the nation recognizes and responds to a deadly attack.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the government has spent billions of dollars putting sensors along borders, at airports, in subway stations and any other crowded place that might be a terrorist target. The idea is to detect an attack as soon as it happens, evacuate people quickly and get them the antidote or medicine they would need to survive.

Fixed sensors can't be placed everywhere. "If the intent is to have ubiquitous detection, there's nothing quite as ubiquitous as a cellphone," Dietrich says.

The Homeland Security Department says the program, called Cell-All, might work this way: Detectors would be placed in cellphones, most of which are already linked to the Global Positioning System. If a detector recorded a hit, the GPS would transmit the location and time to local emergency responders and Homeland Security's operations center.

The responders would go to the scene; Homeland Security would issue warnings and inform police departments and FBI offices across the country.

If there was just one hit, it could be a false positive and there wouldn't be much cause for concern, Dietrich says. But multiple hits from the same area would prompt an immediate response.

There are bound to be hurdles along the way, including privacy concerns. Lisa Graves of the Center for National Security Studies, a non-profit civil liberties group, says the government should invest in intelligence officers instead of "pie-in-the-sky technologies that aren't proven to work."

Kevin Bankston of the Electronic Frontier Foundation says he's wary of any program in which "consumer products become surveillance devices for the government."

Dietrich stressed that the program, first reported in the security industry newsletter *Homeland Defense & Security Monitor*, would be voluntary. "Not all people would want to play in this game," he says.

http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2007-05-03-cellphone-attack-detector_N.htm

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Washington Times

May 5, 2007

U.S. Envoy Optimistic On Nuke Deal

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

The State Department's chief diplomat on the North Korean crisis said yesterday he thinks Pyongyang remains committed to the deal to give up its nuclear weapons programs despite having missed a deadline to shutter its main nuclear plant by nearly three weeks.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Christopher Hill said Pyongyang could still disable its Yongbyon reactor and give a full accounting of its nuclear programs by the end of the year, if a separate dispute over North Korean accounts frozen in a Macao bank is resolved quickly.

"North Korea has repeatedly signaled to us, to our partners and to [United Nations monitors] that it is prepared to implement the agreement once they get their money," Mr. Hill said in an address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

North Korea said it missed the April 14 deadline because it was still unable to get access to some \$25 million held in the Macao bank, blaming U.S. government sanctions that made other banks reluctant to handle the funds. The deadline was supposed to be the first milestone in a landmark Feb 13. accord struck in Beijing under which the North would give up its nuclear programs in exchange for aid, energy and other concessions.

The "six-party agreement" was endorsed by the United States, the two Koreas, China, Russia and Japan.

U.S. critics of the deal say the North's failure to shut down Yongbyon and invite U.N. inspectors back in show the fundamental determination of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to hang on to his nuclear weapons.

But Mr. Hill said the bank dispute had proven far more difficult to resolve than expected, and the administration saw no better method than the step-by-step approach to dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear threat.

"So far our view and the view of our partners is that, no, [North Korea] is not just using the banking issue" to get out of its nuclear disarmament pledge.

But, he added, "everyone is impatient right now. Everyone wants this to get going."

A top Japanese diplomat, speaking at an international conference on Iraq at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el Sheik, expressed frustration with the North's failure to act.

"We are not happy that this money issue takes so much time and blocks the process," Foreign Ministry spokesman Mitsuo Sakaba told reporters. "We are a patient people, but we are wondering how long we can be patient in this situation."

Separately, South Korean officials announced yesterday that military officials from the North and South will meet next week to discuss security for a potential rail link between the two Koreas -- the first such link in a half-century.

While Mr. Hill counseled patience to keep the six-party pact alive, he joked that North Korea was living up to its reputation as one of the world's most difficult negotiating partners.

"If there's an easy way to do something and a hard way, the North Koreans always choose the hard way," he said.

"They feel it builds character."

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070504-103152-5375r.htm>

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New York Times

May 7, 2007

Pg. 8

Effort To Repair Nuclear Treaty Gets Snagged Over Agenda

VIENNA, May 6 (Reuters) — A 130-nation meeting on how to fix the fraying Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty faces collapse on Monday unless Iran accepts a last-minute South African proposal to overcome its objections to the agenda.

The gathering, scheduled to run to May 11, was meant to set priorities to be fleshed out at follow-up annual meetings leading to the next decision-making conference on the treaty in 2010.

But the session quickly snagged on procedural disputes reflecting the standoff between Western powers and Iran over its suspected failure to comply with the treaty's safeguards, pre-empting debate on proposals to reinforce the treaty.

"I think a decision will come on Monday whether we will have to go home with nothing to show for this meeting," said a senior European diplomat, "because it was taken hostage by Iran."

The nonproliferation treaty binds members without nuclear bombs not to acquire them, guarantees the right of all members to nuclear energy for peaceful ends and obligates the original five nuclear powers from the post-World War II era to dismantle their arsenals in stages.

Iran blamed the United States for the impasse, accusing it of wording in the agenda intended to single out Iran as the main offender and to muzzle criticism of big powers over their slowness to phase out their own nuclear arsenals.

The United States has not answered those accusations and has stayed out of the debate.

A senior Western official said that many developing nations were not happy with Iran's position and noted that South Africa had intervened to try to resolve the issue.

South Africa proposed that the agenda phrase in dispute — "reaffirming the need for full compliance" with the treaty — be clarified with an attached declaration saying this meant compliance "with all provisions" of the treaty.

The change was intended to assure Iran that debate would also push states with nuclear weapons to do more to heed pledges to do away with them.

Japan, which is leading the meeting, will seek consensus for the idea when proceedings resume on Monday. Iran promised to consider it.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/07nuke.html>

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New York Times

May 8, 2007

U.S. Debates Deterrence For Nuclear Terrorism

By David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, May 7 — Every week, a group of experts from agencies around the government — including the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the F.B.I. and the Energy Department — meet to assess Washington's progress toward solving a grim problem: if a terrorist set off a nuclear bomb in an American city, could the United States determine who detonated it and who provided the nuclear material?

So far, the answer is maybe.

That uncertainty lies at the center of a vigorous, but carefully cloaked, debate within the Bush administration. It focuses on how to refashion the American approach to nuclear deterrence in an attempt to counter the threat posed by terrorists who could obtain bomb-grade uranium or plutonium to make and deliver a weapon.

A previously undisclosed meeting last year of President Bush's most senior national security advisers was the highest level discussion about how to rewrite the cold war rules. The existing approach to deterrence dates from the time when the nuclear attacks Washington worried about would be launched by missiles and bombers, which can be tracked back to a source by radar, and not carried in backpacks or hidden in cargo containers.

Among the subjects of the meeting last year was whether to issue a warning to all countries around the world that if a nuclear weapon was detonated on American soil and was traced back to any nation's stockpiles, through nuclear forensics, the United States would hold that country "fully responsible" for the consequences of the explosion. The term "fully responsible" was left deliberately vague so that it would be unclear whether the United States would respond with a retaliatory nuclear attack, or, far more likely, a nonnuclear retaliation, whether military or diplomatic. But that meeting of Mr. Bush's principal national security and military advisers in May 2006 broke up with the question unresolved, according to participants. The discussion remained hung up on such complexities as whether it would be wise to threaten Iran even as diplomacy still offered at least some hope of halting Tehran's nuclear program, and whether it was credible to issue a warning that would be heard to include countries that America considers partners and allies, like Russia or Pakistan, which are nuclear powers with far from perfect nuclear safeguards.

Then, on Oct. 9, North Korea detonated a nuclear test.

Mr. Bush responded that morning with an explicit warning to President Kim Jong-il that "transfer of nuclear weapons or material" to other countries or terrorist groups "would be considered a grave threat to the United States," and that the North would be held "fully accountable."

A senior American official involved in the decision, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was discussing private national security deliberations, said, "Given the fact that they were trying to cross red lines, that they were launching missiles and that they conducted the nuclear test, we finally decided it was time."

Mr. Bush was able to issue a credible warning, other senior officials said, in part because the International Atomic Energy Agency has a library of nuclear samples from North Korea, obtained before the agency's inspectors were thrown out of the country, that would likely make it possible to trace an explosion back to North Korea's nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans are fully aware, government experts believe, that the United States has access to that database of nuclear DNA.

But when it comes to other countries, many of that library's shelves are empty. And in interviews over the past several weeks, senior American nuclear experts have said that the huge gap is one reason that the Bush administration is so far unable to make a convincing threat to terrorists or their suppliers that they will be found out. "I believe the most likely source of the material would be from the Russian nuclear arsenal, but you shouldn't confuse 'likely' with 'certainty' by any means," said Scott D. Sagan, co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, who has studied the problem known in Washington and the national nuclear laboratories as "nuclear attribution."

Mr. Sagan noted that nuclear material in a terrorist attack might also come from Pakistan, home of the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

The Bush administration is also finding a skeptical audience when it warns of emerging nuclear threats, since its assessments of Saddam Hussein's nuclear capacity in advance of the 2003 invasion proved wildly off the mark. On Sunday, defending his new book during an interview on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, made the case that any past errors should not blind the public to the threat of nuclear attack posed by Al Qaeda today.

"What I believe is that Al Qaeda is seeking this capability," Mr. Tenet said.

Pakistani officials have been visiting Washington recently offering assurances that their nuclear supplies and weapons are locked down with sophisticated new technology. During a presentation at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonprofit organization here that studies nuclear proliferation, Lt. Col. Zafar Ali, who works in the arms control section of the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division, said that while Al Qaeda and other groups may want a nuclear weapon, "there are doubts that these organizations have the capability to fabricate a nuclear device."

He bristled at the continuing questions about Pakistan's nuclear security, arguing that "there is no reported case of security failure subsequent to A. Q. Khan's case" in 2004, and suggested that American concerns would be better directed at Russia.

But few experts in the Bush administration are reassured, saying that their fear is not only leakage from Pakistan, but a takeover of the government of the president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. It is a subject they will never discuss on the record, but one that is the constant topic of study and assessment.

The issue of shaping a new policy even presents difficulties when dealing with a country like Iran, which, like North Korea, was once described by President Bush as a member of an "axis of evil." Tehran does not yet possess nuclear weapons, and inspectors believe that it has produced only small amounts of nuclear fuel, not enough to make a bomb, and none of it bomb grade.

In the cabinet-level discussion last May, Mr. Bush's top advisers concluded that issuing a warning to Iran might signal that the United States was preparing for the day when Iran becomes a nuclear-armed state, an impression that one former senior administration official said "is not the message we want to send." As a result, Iran did not receive a warning similar to the one issued to North Korea, whose test made clear that it is edging into the nuclear club. Mr. Sagan said he supported that approach, saying that if Mr. Bush issues a declaration specifically aimed at Iran, it may be heard among the most radical leaders in Tehran as a tacit acknowledgment that the United States has accepted the possibility that Iran is going to go nuclear.

"We need to distinguish between the leakage problem, where it would be inadvertent, and the provider problem, where it would be an intentional act," said Robert S. Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of "Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11."

"To the provider we should say, 'Don't even think about it,' and this more explicit declaratory policy can get us traction because these regimes value their own survival above all else," Mr. Litwak said. "For the leakage problem, we don't want to be trapped into a question of how we retaliate against Russia or Pakistan. But through calculated ambiguity, we can create incentives for the Russians and the Pakistanis to do even more in the area of safeguarding their weapons and capabilities."

The weekly meeting of the interagency group dealing with nuclear attribution is just one part of a governmentwide effort to prepare for what might happen after a small nuclear device was detonated in an American city, just as Washington once gamed out a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.

But it is a subject Mr. Bush and his aides have rarely referred to in public. In private, officials say, the Department of Homeland Security is trying to plan for more than a dozen scenarios — including one in which a bomb goes off, and terrorist groups then claim to have planted others in cities around the country.

While most of that planning takes place behind locked doors, officials responsible for it appeared at a workshop last month sponsored by the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration sponsored by Harvard and Stanford Universities.

The daylong discussion revealed major gaps in the planning. But it also demonstrated that while the first instinct of government officials after an explosion would be to figure out retaliation, "that would probably give way to an effort to seek the cooperation of a Pakistan or Russia to figure out where the stuff came from, what else was lost, and to hunt down the remaining bombs rather than punish the government that lost them," said one of the conference's organizers, Ashton B. Carter of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

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Fighting To Secure Defenses In Europe

By James Hackett

The Bush administration has undertaken its most aggressive diplomatic offensive in six years in office. The goal is to lay the groundwork for the future defense of Europe and the United States against missiles from the Middle East. President Bush is showing that his ABM treaty withdrawal, missile defense deployment in Alaska and on Aegis ships, overthrow of Afghanistan's Taliban regime and removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq were all part of a worldview in which national security is the highest priority. Further evidence is his determination to defend America and its allies against threats from Iran or elsewhere.

The plan to put missile defenses in Poland and an ABM radar in the Czech Republic faces bitter opposition from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Despite that opposition, complete with Cold War rhetoric and threats to our European allies, Mr. Bush is engaged in a full-court press to make his plan a reality.

Europe is overrun with U.S. emissaries. Last week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with Mr. Putin and offered Russia unprecedented cooperation in missile defense development and testing, including sharing early warning data. In other trips to Europe, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretaries John Rood and Daniel Fried, Defense Undersecretary Eric Edelman, and Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency, have reassured our NATO allies and tried to reduce Russian angst.

This energetic diplomacy is getting results in Europe, but not in Moscow. The Polish and Czech governments remain firmly in support despite Russian opposition. NATO officials now agree the threat is real and suggest that planned missile defenses for NATO's armed forces would be enhanced by a U.S. defense of population centers. President Bush is personally involved, planning a trip to Poland in June to discuss the issue with President Lech Kaczynski.

But Russia continues to oppose the U.S. plan. Moscow's objections go beyond keeping America out of Europe. Mr. Putin has consistently fought the expansion of NATO to former parts of the Soviet empire. He got the U.S. military kicked out of Uzbekistan and resents NATO's presence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.

Awash in oil and gas money, Moscow is trying to re-establish control over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mr. Putin's objection to U.S. bases complements his efforts to block NATO's expansion to Georgia, Ukraine and other countries he considers in Russia's sphere of influence. Building new offensive weapons, suspending the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, threatening U.S. allies, and restricting gas shipments are all intended to show the Russian bear still has teeth.

Despite Russian claims to the contrary, the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran becomes more apparent as Tehran ignores U.N. sanctions and refuses to put its nuclear program under international control. In a recent editorial, the London Financial Times said it is increasingly urgent to find a response to a nuclear-armed Iran, and that the U.S. missile defense plan should go forward.

With Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denying the Holocaust and promising to wipe Israel off the map, while building longer-range missiles and developing nuclear weapons, additional sanctions on Iran are needed now. But with Moscow and Beijing opposing real sanctions, it is wise to build defenses against the growing threat. Just as support is developing in Europe, some members of the Democratic-controlled Congress want to reduce funding for the sites there. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee has cut the administration's \$310 million request by more than half, to \$150 million, which is the wrong message to send to our European allies. Subcommittee Chairwoman Ellen Tauscher, California Democrat, explained earlier that some members think more operational testing is needed.

This is the fallback position of missile defense opponents. They used to claim missile defense would not work, but successful tests have shown them wrong. So now they say more "operational testing" is needed, a view advanced by Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This call for more testing before sites can be built or interceptors bought is a phony argument. The key hit-to-kill technology has been proven and a robust flight test program is planned. Conducting more tests than needed is a waste of money. Besides, Iran's missile and nuclear programs won't wait. Congress should authorize and appropriate the full amount requested for missile defenses in Europe.

James Hackett is a contributing writer to The Washington Times and is based in Carlsbad, Calif.

<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20070507-102424-5466r.htm>

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Washington Times

May 9, 2007

Pg. 1

Kazakhstan Plans Nuke Fuel Bank

By David R. Sands, Washington Times

Russia and Kazakhstan are poised to sign an agreement creating a joint uranium-enrichment center, a possible first step toward an international nuclear fuel "bank" that could remove the need for countries such as Iran to pursue their own enrichment programs, Kazakh Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin said yesterday.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to sign an agreement to create the enrichment center in the Siberian city of Angarsk on a visit to Kazakhstan beginning today, Mr. Tazhin said in an interview with editors and reporters at The Washington Times.

Known for its huge oil and gas reserves, Kazakhstan is also the world's second-largest producer of uranium, and is expected to surpass market leader Australia in the next few years.

"Today it is just a bilateral arrangement, but it could be open to any country that wants to use the mechanism," Mr. Tazhin said.

He said the project was just getting under way and it would be up to Iran or any other nation to decide whether they want to participate.

"It is difficult right now to say who might want to join," he said.

Nonproliferation specialists have pushed the idea of a nuclear fuel bank as a way to discourage countries from developing their own domestic uranium-enrichment programs.

The Bush administration has led an international drive to block Iran's enrichment program, claiming it is secretly being used to produce fuel for nuclear weapons.

The U.S. Department of Energy last year initiated the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), a key part of which offered countries that renounced nuclear fuel-cycle activities access to U.S. nuclear fuel for civilian power needs.

At about the same time, Mr. Putin floated the idea of a network of international nuclear fuel-cycle centers, which Russian officials said could be used by developing countries seeking nuclear power.

The Angarsk site would be the first center in the network. Russian officials argue their plan could be implemented much more quickly than the American alternative.

A U.S. official familiar with the nuclear-bank debate said the Bush administration was "largely neutral" on the Russia-Kazakhstan plan. Both countries are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has strict standards designed to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

"Obviously, we would expect both countries to abide by the rules they have agreed to," the official said.

Iran insists its nuclear programs are for peaceful civilian use and has resisted intense international pressure to give up its enrichment programs.

Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran's representative to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, told an IAEA meeting last fall the fuel-cycle bank could lead to a cartel of suppliers who could deprive non-nuclear countries of their rights.

"The developed countries are seeking to create a monopoly," he warned.

Mr. Tazhin said Kazakhstan, which gave up the nuclear arsenal it inherited following the breakup of the Soviet Union, has "made no secret" of its participation with Moscow on the fuel-cycle center and not gotten any negative signals from Washington about its plans.

"We understand it will not solve all the world's problems in this area. But it can be done quickly, it is practical, and we can quickly see the results and consequences," he said.

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, which tracks nonproliferation issues, said the Russia-Kazakhstan venture is just one of a dozen ideas being floated to address the basic dilemma: controlling the enrichment process without denying states the right to nuclear power.

"It's attractive to the Russians because they can control it and because it's in an industry where they very much want foreign investment," he said.

But, he said, it was still very much in doubt whether the fuel-cycle bank idea will be able to resolve the "difficult cases" like Iran.

"We have to understand the limitations of these ideas," Mr. Kimball said. "No amount of fuel supply assurances are likely to satisfy countries like Iran, because fundamentally they want to preserve at least the option of enrichment for their own purposes."

IAEA member nations are set to meet this summer in Vienna to discuss the various fuel-bank ideas.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070508-115454-9343r.htm>

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New York Times

May 9, 2007

Editorial Observer

Wrestling Nuclear Genies Back Into The Bottle, Or At Least A Can

By Carla Anne Robbins

It has been more than three weeks since North Korea missed the deadline to shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, but we've heard only mild protests from the White House. President Bush, who once declared that he loathed North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, isn't eager for another fight these days. Still, the North Koreans have a way of making even patient people apoplectic.

In 1994, when Pyongyang first threatened to start churning out plutonium, Brent Scowcroft — the realpolitik-minded national security adviser for the first President Bush and a vocal opponent of this Iraq war — shocked the foreign policy establishment by calling for a strike on Yongbyon. President Clinton's advisers also began talking privately about sending in the bombers, and what it would take to evacuate thousands of Americans from Seoul. The issue became moot after former President Jimmy Carter freelanced a compromise that helped freeze all activity at Yongbyon for nearly a decade. That is, until Mr. Bush decided that he could get more from the North Koreans for less.

The North Koreans blame the current delay on Washington's delay in securing the release of their \$25 million in frozen bank funds. The Bush administration — which long insisted that the money was ill-gotten gains, not a bargaining chip — agreed to the unfreezing. But so far international bankers are balking at transferring money that the Treasury Department still says is tainted.

That should be a lesson about the perils to come, including more deadlines for Pyongyang to miss and more crisis points for Washington to manage or turn into a showdown.

Under the terms of a February deal, the North Koreans had until mid-April to "shut down and seal" Yongbyon's nuclear facilities. That should take less than a day. Within minutes at the small reactor, technicians can insert control rods that absorb the neutrons from the uranium fuel and stop the chain reaction. The reactor and the nearby reprocessing facility — which chops up spent fuel and chemically separates the plutonium — can then be padlocked. For that, and readmitting international inspectors, Pyongyang has been promised 50,000 tons of fuel oil and improved relations with its neighbors and the United States. Then things quickly get complicated.

In the next phase, Pyongyang is supposed to disable "all existing nuclear facilities" with the eventual goals of "abandonment" and "denuclearization." For that it has been promised 950,000 tons of fuel oil, security guarantees, and a return to international good graces.

But the agreement doesn't say a lot more. Vagueness was apparently the only way to get North Korea and the White House — who still aren't sure they want a deal — to sign on. It says nothing about the sequencing of concessions and rewards or what "disablement" and "abandonment" and "denuclearization" mean.

What makes this especially hard is that nearly all nuclear technology can be diverted to make weapons. That means that there are many North Korean genies, not one, to be wrestled back into the bottle — and a frighteningly large number of ways they can spring back out again.

To meet their commitment to disable the Yongbyon reactor, the North Koreans could do something easily reversible like disconnecting cooling pipes, or they could make it a lot harder on themselves by pouring concrete into the tubes that hold the fuel rods in place. The agreement offers no direction. It also doesn't say what is supposed to happen to the reactor's 8,000 fuel rods, which contain at least a bomb's worth of plutonium. The Americans will want them put into stainless steel cans and shipped as quickly as possible out of the country. Nor does it say what should happen to the Koreans' inventory of separated plutonium or the four to 10 weapons they may have built.

Jon Wolfsthal, a former Energy Department aide who spent a month in Yongbyon in the mid-1990s preparing for the canning of fuel rods, says that Washington and its allies are going to have to decide which parts of the program they most want to see gone and what level of irreversibility they will insist on. "The more we ask for, the higher the price the North Koreans will demand," he said.

And then there is the question of whether the North Koreans will come clean about a possible, parallel uranium enrichment program — and how hard Washington will press the issue. The 1994 deal fell apart in 2002 after the Bush administration accused the Koreans of hiding such a program. Since the February agreement, some U.S. officials have suggested that they may have overstated the North's progress, a suddenly convenient truth for the White House.

What there isn't these days is any serious talk about hitting Yongbyon. That falls off when you are sure an adversary has nuclear weapons.

That is why the North Koreans are likely to keep upping the price for abandoning theirs. And why Mr. Bush and whoever comes after are going to need a lot of international support, a lot of patience, a thick checkbook and a very thick skin.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/opinion/09wed4.html>

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New York Times
May 10, 2007

House Panel Considers Cuts For Missile Defense

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, May 9 — The Bush administration's proposal to construct two American missile defense bases in Europe has roiled relations with Russia and provoked sharp questioning even in NATO capitals, where critics ask: With the system still unproven and, under the best of circumstances, years from completion, why rush construction now?

Now the Democratic majority in Congress is moving toward budget cuts aimed at slowing the administration's plans to break ground this year on one of the bases, in Poland. Representative Ellen O. Tauscher, a California Democrat who is a member of the House Armed Services Committee, said the committee would approve "only prudent investments" in what she labeled "high-risk, immature programs" to shoot down long-range missiles, like the system advocated for Europe.

The administration wants to begin digging silos for 10 interceptors in Poland and laying the foundation for a tracking radar in the Czech Republic this year to defend Europe against what it calls a looming long-range ballistic missile threat from Iran. But in a vote scheduled for Wednesday, the House committee was expected to approve only a study of the "political, technical, operational, force structure and budgetary aspects" of the European sites.

The bill, still under consideration late Wednesday, would cut \$160 million from funds proposed for construction in Poland, as part of \$764 million in cuts from the \$8.9 billion the administration has sought for the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency in 2008.

A cut of \$160 million would prevent breaking ground on the interceptor silos in Poland, while leaving funds to move forward with buying the 10 interceptor missiles and installing the radar for the Czech Republic, Congressional officials say.

The bill would also face a vote by the full House. Similar discussions are under way in the Senate, where the new Democratic majority is also skeptical of missile defense.

Administration officials say the proposals for two antimissile bases in former Soviet satellites in Central Europe are a modest but important step toward establishing a system of high-technology global sentries capable of shooting down warheads fired off by an adversary with a limited arsenal of ballistic missiles.

But in a critical assessment of the missile defense program issued in March, the Government Accountability Office noted that the antimissile program "cannot yet be fully assessed because there have been too few flight tests conducted to anchor the models and simulations that predict overall system performance."

In an interview, Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, director of the Missile Defense Agency, took issue with the report, saying, "I do believe we are on the right path." The American military is moving at full speed to prove that the system is capable of destroying a long-range enemy warhead in an environment that he says mirrors a real-world threat, and has its next test scheduled along the West Coast for the end of this month.

Even so, the administration says the United States must begin pouring concrete soon to have the European system operating by 2012 — to counter an Iranian long-range missile ability that American intelligence warns will be reached between 2010 and 2015. Pentagon officials have said that the emerging European system can also incorporate improvements in technology.

Last month, the administration opened a campaign in which the secretaries of state and defense, along with a team of other senior officials and generals, canvassed European capitals, including Moscow, to explain the limited nature of the system under consideration.

Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, said recently that the missile defense system in Europe was intended to help protect American forces serving in NATO nations, and to help guarantee the security of those allies, at a time when the United States was moving ahead with its own system of missiles and radars to guard American territory.

"The fact is alliance security should be indivisible," Mr. Fried added. "And if Europe is vulnerable to Iranian missiles, that means we're insecure as well."

Russia has little to fear from the bases proposed for the former Soviet satellites, American officials say, because the limited missile defense architecture under consideration — the 10 interceptors — is not even a tiny shadow of the Reagan-era "Star Wars" program that dreamt of an impenetrable missile shield. The price tag of the European system is small by comparison, at \$3.5 billion.

Kremlin leaders rejected a peace offering of American-Russian cooperation on missile defense that was carried to Moscow by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, but Russian leaders agreed to set up a joint commission to examine the fine print of the plan. The Russians also demanded a high-level session to debate details of proposed missile defenses in Europe, which is likely to lead to a meeting in September between Mr. Gates, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and their Russian counterparts, Mr. Fried said.

As discussions with the Russians accelerate, administration and military officials are expected to emphasize their position that the location, size and design of the missile defense sites in Central Europe clearly illustrate that the system poses no threat to Moscow's hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads.

General Obering said the sites in Central Europe were not positioned to intercept Russia's strategic nuclear missiles, as they would fly over the North Pole, and not over Europe, if fired at the United States.

"It doesn't matter that the deployment poses no plausible physical threat to Russia's deterrent, because Moscow fears it might serve as a toehold that could be expanded and upgraded in the future," said Wade Boese, research director for the Arms Control Association, a research and advocacy group here. "The administration should be careful that its response to a projected or hypothetical threat does not create a much bigger problem with Russia." <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/washington/10missile.html?ref=washington>

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(Editor's Note: Referenced Presidential Directives follow article.)

Washington Post

May 10, 2007

Pg. 12

Bush Changes Continuity Plan

Administration, Not DHS, Would Run Shadow Government

By Spencer S. Hsu, Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush issued a formal national security directive yesterday ordering agencies to prepare contingency plans for a surprise, "decapitating" attack on the federal government, and assigned responsibility for coordinating such plans to the White House.

The prospect of a nuclear bomb being detonated in Washington without warning, whether smuggled in by terrorists or a foreign government, has been cited by many security analysts as a rising concern since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The order makes explicit that the focus of federal worst-case planning involves a covert nuclear attack against the nation's capital, in contrast with Cold War assumptions that a long-range strike would be preceded by a notice of minutes or hours as missiles were fueled and launched.

"As a result of the asymmetric threat environment, adequate warning of potential emergencies that could pose a significant risk to the homeland might not be available, and therefore all continuity planning shall be based on the assumption that no such warning will be received," states the 72-paragraph order. It is designated National Security Presidential Directive 51 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20.

The statement added, "Emphasis will be placed upon geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and infrastructure in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted Government Functions."

After the 2001 attacks, Bush assigned about 100 senior civilian managers to rotate secretly to locations outside of Washington for weeks or months at a time to ensure the nation's survival, a shadow government that evolved based on long-standing "continuity of operations plans."

Since then, other agencies including the Pentagon, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA have taken steps to relocate facilities or key functions outside of Washington for their own reasons, citing factors such as economics or the importance of avoiding Beltway "group-think."

Norman J. Ornstein, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and an adviser to an independent Continuity of Government Commission, said the order "is a more explicit embrace of what has been since 9/11 an implicit but fairly clear set of assumptions."

He added, "My frustration is that those assumptions have not gripped the Congress in the same way."

Other former Bush administration officials said the directive formalizes a shift of authority away from the Department of Homeland Security to the White House.

Under an executive order dating to the Reagan administration, responsibility for coordinating, implementing and exercising such plans was originally charged to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and later DHS, the Congressional Research Service noted in a 2005 report on a pending DHS reorganization.

The new directive gives the job of coordinating policy to the president's assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism -- Frances Fragos Townsend, who will assume the title of national continuity coordinator -- in

consultation with Bush's national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, with the support of the White House's Homeland Security Council staff. Townsend is to produce an implementation plan within 90 days. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff will continue to coordinate operations and activities, the directive said. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/AR2007050902719.html>

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National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD 51
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-20

Subject: National Continuity Policy

Purpose

(1) This directive establishes a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of Federal Government structures and operations and a single National Continuity Coordinator responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of Federal continuity policies. This policy establishes "National Essential Functions," prescribes continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies, and provides guidance for State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector organizations in order to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that will enhance the credibility of our national security posture and enable a more rapid and effective response to and recovery from a national emergency.

Definitions

(2) In this directive:

- (a) "Category" refers to the categories of executive departments and agencies listed in Annex A to this directive;
- (b) "Catastrophic Emergency" means any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions;
- (c) "Continuity of Government," or "COG," means a coordinated effort within the Federal Government's executive branch to ensure that National Essential Functions continue to be performed during a Catastrophic Emergency;
- (d) "Continuity of Operations," or "COOP," means an effort within individual executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-Essential Functions continue to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies;
- (e) "Enduring Constitutional Government," or "ECG," means a cooperative effort among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government, coordinated by the President, as a matter of comity with respect to the legislative and judicial branches and with proper respect for the constitutional separation of powers among the branches, to preserve the constitutional framework under which the Nation is governed and the capability of all three branches of government to execute constitutional responsibilities and provide for orderly succession, appropriate transition of leadership, and interoperability and support of the National Essential Functions during a catastrophic emergency;
- (f) "Executive Departments and Agencies" means the executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1), Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1), and the United States Postal Service;
- (g) "Government Functions" means the collective functions of the heads of executive departments and agencies as defined by statute, regulation, presidential direction, or other legal authority, and the functions of the legislative and judicial branches;
- (h) "National Essential Functions," or "NEFs," means that subset of Government Functions that are necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency and that, therefore, must be supported through COOP and COG capabilities; and
- (i) "Primary Mission Essential Functions," or "PMEFs," means those Government Functions that must be performed in order to support or implement the performance of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of an emergency.

Policy

(3) It is the policy of the United States to maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions under all conditions.

Implementation Actions

(4) Continuity requirements shall be incorporated into daily operations of all executive departments and agencies. As a result of the asymmetric threat environment, adequate warning of potential emergencies that could pose a significant risk to the homeland might not be available, and therefore all continuity planning shall be based on the

assumption that no such warning will be received. Emphasis will be placed upon geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and infrastructure in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted Government Functions. Risk management principles shall be applied to ensure that appropriate operational readiness decisions are based on the probability of an attack or other incident and its consequences.

(5) The following NEFs are the foundation for all continuity programs and capabilities and represent the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation during a crisis, and therefore sustaining the following NEFs shall be the primary focus of the Federal Government leadership during and in the aftermath of an emergency that adversely affects the performance of Government Functions:

(a) Ensuring the continued functioning of our form of government under the Constitution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of government;

(b) Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and maintaining the trust and confidence of the American people;

(c) Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests;

(d) Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations;

(e) Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests;

(f) Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences of an attack or other incident;

(g) Protecting and stabilizing the Nation's economy and ensuring public confidence in its financial systems; and

(h) Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health, safety, and welfare needs of the United States.

(6) The President shall lead the activities of the Federal Government for ensuring constitutional government. In order to advise and assist the President in that function, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) is hereby designated as the National Continuity Coordinator. The National Continuity Coordinator, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs (APNSA), without exercising directive authority, shall coordinate the development and implementation of continuity policy for executive departments and agencies. The Continuity Policy Coordination Committee (CPCC), chaired by a Senior Director from the Homeland Security Council staff, designated by the National Continuity Coordinator, shall be the main day-to-day forum for such policy coordination.

(7) For continuity purposes, each executive department and agency is assigned to a category in accordance with the nature and characteristics of its national security roles and

responsibilities in support of the Federal Government's ability to sustain the NEFs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as the President's lead agent for coordinating overall

continuity operations and activities of executive departments and agencies, and in such role shall perform the responsibilities set forth for the Secretary in sections 10 and 16 of this directive.

(8) The National Continuity Coordinator, in consultation with the heads of appropriate executive departments and agencies, will lead the development of a National Continuity Implementation Plan (Plan), which shall include prioritized goals and objectives, a concept of operations, performance metrics by which to measure continuity readiness, procedures for continuity and incident management activities, and clear direction to executive department and agency continuity coordinators, as well as guidance to promote interoperability of Federal Government continuity programs and procedures with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate. The Plan shall be submitted to the President for approval not later than 90 days after the date of this directive.

(9) Recognizing that each branch of the Federal Government is responsible for its own continuity programs, an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President shall ensure that the executive branch's COOP and COG policies in support of ECG efforts are appropriately coordinated with those of the legislative and judicial branches in order to ensure interoperability and allocate national assets efficiently to maintain a functioning Federal Government.

(10) Federal Government COOP, COG, and ECG plans and operations shall be appropriately integrated with the emergency plans and capabilities of State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and to prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of authority. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate the integration of Federal continuity plans and operations with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to provide for the delivery of essential services during an emergency.

(11) Continuity requirements for the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and executive departments and agencies shall include the following:

- (a) The continuation of the performance of PMEFS during any emergency must be for a period up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed, and the capability to be fully operational at alternate sites as soon as possible after the occurrence of an emergency, but not later than 12 hours after COOP activation;
- (b) Succession orders and pre-planned devolution of authorities that ensure the emergency delegation of authority must be planned and documented in advance in accordance with applicable law;
- (c) Vital resources, facilities, and records must be safeguarded, and official access to them must be provided;
- (d) Provision must be made for the acquisition of the resources necessary for continuity operations on an emergency basis;
- (e) Provision must be made for the availability and redundancy of critical communications capabilities at alternate sites in order to support connectivity between and among key government leadership, internal elements, other executive departments and agencies, critical partners, and the public;
- (f) Provision must be made for reconstitution capabilities that allow for recovery from a catastrophic emergency and resumption of normal operations; and
- (g) Provision must be made for the identification, training, and preparedness of personnel capable of relocating to alternate facilities to support the continuation of the performance of PMEFS.

(12) In order to provide a coordinated response to escalating threat levels or actual emergencies, the Continuity of Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON) system establishes executive branch continuity program readiness levels, focusing

on possible threats to the National Capital Region. The President will determine and issue the COGCON Level. Executive departments and agencies shall comply with the requirements and assigned responsibilities under the COGCON program. During COOP activation, executive departments and agencies shall report their readiness status to the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's designee.

(13) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall:

- (a) Conduct an annual assessment of executive department and agency continuity funding requests and performance data that are submitted by executive departments and agencies as part of the annual budget request process, in order to monitor progress in the implementation of the Plan and the execution of continuity budgets;
- (b) In coordination with the National Continuity Coordinator, issue annual continuity planning guidance for the development of continuity budget requests; and
- (c) Ensure that heads of executive departments and agencies prioritize budget resources for continuity capabilities, consistent with this directive.

(14) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall:

- (a) Define and issue minimum requirements for continuity communications for executive departments and agencies, in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chief of Staff to the President;
- (b) Establish requirements for, and monitor the development, implementation, and maintenance of, a comprehensive communications architecture to integrate continuity components, in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chief of Staff to the President; and
- (c) Review quarterly and annual assessments of continuity communications capabilities, as prepared pursuant to section 16(d) of this directive or otherwise, and report the results and recommended remedial actions to the National Continuity Coordinator.

(15) An official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President shall:

- (a) Advise the President, the Chief of Staff to the President, the APHS/CT, and the APNSA on COGCON operational execution options; and
- (b) Consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security in order to ensure synchronization and integration of continuity activities among the four categories of executive departments and agencies.

(16) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

- (a) Coordinate the implementation, execution, and assessment of continuity operations and activities;
- (b) Develop and promulgate Federal Continuity Directives in order to establish continuity planning requirements for executive departments and agencies;
- (c) Conduct biennial assessments of individual department and agency continuity capabilities as prescribed by the Plan and report the results to the President through the APHS/CT;
- (d) Conduct quarterly and annual assessments of continuity communications capabilities in consultation with an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President;

(e) Develop, lead, and conduct a Federal continuity training and exercise program, which shall be incorporated into the National Exercise Program developed pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 of December 17, 2003 ("National Preparedness"), in consultation with an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President;

(f) Develop and promulgate continuity planning guidance to State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators;

(g) Make available continuity planning and exercise funding, in the form of grants as provided by law, to State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators; and

(h) As Executive Agent of the National Communications System, develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive continuity communications architecture.

(17) The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall produce a biennial assessment of the foreign and domestic threats to the Nation's continuity of government.

(18) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall provide secure, integrated, Continuity of Government communications to the President, the Vice President, and, at a minimum, Category I executive departments and agencies.

(19) Heads of executive departments and agencies shall execute their respective department or agency COOP plans in response to a localized emergency and shall:

(a) Appoint a senior accountable official, at the Assistant Secretary level, as the Continuity Coordinator for the department or agency;

(b) Identify and submit to the National Continuity Coordinator the list of PMEFs for the department or agency and develop continuity plans in support of the NEFs and the continuation of essential functions under all conditions;

(c) Plan, program, and budget for continuity capabilities consistent with this directive;

(d) Plan, conduct, and support annual tests and training, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, in order to evaluate program readiness and ensure adequacy and viability of continuity plans and communications systems; and

(e) Support other continuity requirements, as assigned by category, in accordance with the nature and characteristics of its national security roles and responsibilities

General Provisions

(20) This directive shall be implemented in a manner that is consistent with, and facilitates effective implementation of, provisions of the Constitution concerning succession to the Presidency or the exercise of its powers, and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. 19), with consultation of the Vice President and, as appropriate, others involved. Heads of executive departments and agencies shall ensure that appropriate support is available to the Vice President and others involved as necessary to be prepared at all times to implement those provisions.

(21) This directive:

(a) Shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and the authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations;

(b) Shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect (i) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, and legislative proposals, or (ii) the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures; and

(c) Is not intended to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by a party against the United States, its

agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(22) Revocation. Presidential Decision Directive 67 of October 21, 1998 ("Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations"), including all Annexes thereto, is hereby revoked.

(23) Annex A and the classified Continuity Annexes, attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into and made a part of this directive.

(24) Security. This directive and the information contained herein shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure, provided that, except for Annex A, the Annexes attached to this directive are classified and shall be accorded appropriate handling, consistent with applicable Executive Orders.

GEORGE W. BUSH

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<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070509-12.html>

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Boston Globe
May 11, 2007

Six Nations Agree To Ask Iran To Resume Enrichment Talks

US says it would negotiate directly

By Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune

BERLIN --Senior diplomats representing the United Nations Security Council and Germany agreed yesterday to resume negotiations with Iran in a bid to persuade it to stop its uranium enrichment program.

Nicholas Burns, the US undersecretary of state for political affairs, said Washington has agreed to suspend sanctions and is prepared to negotiate face to face with Iran for the first time in 28 years.

In return, Iran would have to suspend its uranium enrichment program.

Burns added that the US offer to negotiate directly with Iran should not be taken lightly by Tehran. "We are offering to negotiate. We are waiting for a response from Iran."

The UN Security Council started last year to impose sanctions on Iran on an incremental basis. The Europeans are willing to revive an offer of technological assistance and other economic and trade incentives if Iran halts enrichment.

The diplomats from Britain, the United States, France, Russia, China, and Germany said they will give Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, approval to meet Ali Larijani, Iran's nuclear negotiator, probably next week.

"We wanted to agree to the mandate for those talks," said a German government official. "What is on the table is a two-track suspension proposal."

In the absence of progress, the countries involved could return to the United Nations to propose new sanctions, officials said.

The United States and its allies accuse Iran of planning to develop nuclear weapons, which Iran has repeatedly denied.

Burns said that if Iran does not accept the offer by the time of a Group of 8 summit meeting, slated for June 6 to 8, then a new round of sanctions will be considered.

http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/05/11/six_nations_agree_to_ask_iran_to_resume_enrichment_talks/

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