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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced report follows article.)

Fox News

## **FBI: TERRORISTS MOVING TOWARD GREATER USE OF WMDS, ATTACKS ON SOFT TARGETS**

Wednesday, November 07, 2007

WASHINGTON — Radical Islamists who have been stymied in efforts to hit traditional military and diplomatic targets are increasingly eyeing so-called "soft targets," and could be moving toward greater use of chemical and biological weapons, reads a new terrorism threat report released by the FBI on Wednesday

The 68-page report, called "Terrorism 2002-2005" and obtained by FOX News, offers some information already known to the public but also provides details of new trends.

For instance, the report says Al Qaeda is looking increasingly at targeting market places, subways and other civilian sites. Those attacks are increasingly being carried out by trainees who set out to pursue their own regional agendas.

The review — only the second report of its kind compiled by the FBI since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks — states that the threat of terrorism is expected to continue from both international and domestic sources. Internationally, two trends are taking place, the report reads.

"First is a preference for high-casualty, high-profile attacks directed against lower-risk, unofficial, so-called soft targets, as traditional military and diplomatic targets become increasingly hardened," states the report. "Second, the dissolution of much of Al Qaeda's structure by international military and law enforcement efforts has resulted in the dispersal of its multi-national trainees to pursue their own regional agendas."

The latest evidence of this trend was demonstrated Tuesday in the arrest of 20 people across Europe accused of recruiting suicide bombers. Italian police who led the investigation said the recruits were being trained to go into Afghanistan and Iraq; investigators found explosives, detonation devices, various poisons and manuals on guerrilla warfare.

On Wednesday, U.S. Lt. Gen. Carter F. Ham at the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that an increasing number of suicide bombings is occurring in Afghanistan. He said Taliban and foreign fighters who have recently entered the country are reverting to terrorist attacks because larger scale operations have not been successful.

In another portion of the report, the top U.S. law enforcement agency also finds that the biggest threat from weapons of mass destruction are smaller, easier to manipulate chemical, biological and radiological weapons, rather than nuclear technology

"The use of WMD against civilian targets represents the most serious potential international and domestic terrorism threat facing the United States today and provides a glimpse into emerging terrorist scenarios of the 21st century. A variety of intelligence reporting indicates that Al Qaeda has energetically sought to acquire and experiment with biological, chemical, and radiological weapons of mass destruction," the report reads.

"Ricin and the bacterial agent anthrax are emerging as the most prevalent agents involved in WMD investigations," the report continues.

The report cites a series of arrests in the United Kingdom and elsewhere involving Ricin

*FOX News' Catherine Herridge and Ian McCaleb contributed to this report.*

<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,309221,00.html>

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

## **TERRORISM 2002-2005**

### **FOREWORD**

Since the mid-1980s, the FBI has published *Terrorism in the United States*, an unclassified annual report summarizing terrorist activities in this country. While this publication provided an overview of the terrorist threat in the United States and its territories, its limited scope proved inadequate for conveying either the breadth or width of the terrorist threat facing U.S. interests or the scale of the FBI's response to terrorism worldwide. To better reflect the nature of the threat and the international scope of our response, the FBI expanded the focus of its annual terrorism report in the 2000/2001 edition to include discussion of FBI investigations overseas and renamed the series *Terrorism*.

This second edition of *Terrorism* provides an overview of the terrorist incidents and preventions designated by the FBI as having taken place in the United States and its territories during the years 2002 through 2005 and that are matters of public record. This publication does not include those incidents which the Bureau classifies under criminal rather than terrorism investigations. In addition, the report discusses major FBI investigations overseas and identifies significant events—including legislative actions, prosecutorial updates, and program developments—relevant to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The report concludes with an "In Focus" article summarizing the history of the FBI's counterterrorism program. While the discussion of international terrorism provides a more complete overview of FBI terrorism investigations into acts involving U.S. interests around the world, *Terrorism* is not intended as a comprehensive annual review of worldwide terrorist activity. The chronological incidents, charts, and figures included in *Terrorism 2002-2005* reflect only those incidents identified in the *Terrorism/ Terrorism in the United States* series. For more complete listings of worldwide terrorist incidents, see the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center at [www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov) and the Terrorism Knowledge Base compiled by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism at [www.tkb.org](http://www.tkb.org). The FBI hopes you will find *Terrorism 2002-2005* to be a helpful resource and thanks you for your interest in the FBI's Counterterrorism Program. A full-text and graphics version of this issue, as well as recent back issues of *Terrorism* and *Terrorism in the United States*, are available for on-line reference on the FBI home page at [www.fbi.gov](http://www.fbi.gov).

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Counterterrorism Division . . .

(For complete report, please click on link below.)

[http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/publications/terror/terrorism2002\\_2005.pdf](http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.pdf)

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Yahoo! News

Thu Nov 8, 9:06 PM ET

## **Gates Urges Asia To Work On Common Threats**

By Agence France-Presse

TOKYO--US Defence Secretary Robert Gates called on Asian nations Friday to work more closely together to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other common threats.

In a speech, Gates said bilateral alliances that the United States forged after World War II with Japan and other nations have been cornerstones of security in the region.

"But we would like to see more engagement and cooperation among our allies and security partners -- more multilateral ties rather than hubs and spokes," he said.

Gates said a security dialogue under way between the United States, Japan and Australia was a good model to follow, warning that the challenges facing the world could not be dealt with by states acting on their own.

"The major challenges facing the region -- such as North Korea and nuclear proliferation -- cannot be overcome by one or even two countries, no matter how wealthy and powerful," he said.

Gates said the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials was a major threat, but that countries also needed to keep maritime routes "free and secure" and to prepare collective responses to disasters like the 2004 tsunami.

In addition to Japan and Australia, Gates highlighted growing US security ties with India and Mongolia, and changes in the US military roles and missions in South Korea, the only country on the East Asian mainland where US troops are garrisoned.

He reiterated US concerns about China's rapid military buildup and warned that "a lack of transparency carries the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and naturally prompts others to take action as a hedge against democracy."

His speech came at the end of a week-long trip to Asia that began in Beijing, where Gates met with senior Chinese leaders before travelling on to South Korea and then Japan.

"I do not see China as a strategic adversary. It is a competitor in some respects and a partner in others. While we candidly acknowledge our differences, it is important to strengthen communications and to engage the Chinese on all facets of our relationship to build mutual understanding and confidence," he said.

The trip was his first to East Asia since becoming defence secretary in December.

In Japan, his visit was dominated by a domestic political struggle over whether to resume a Japanese naval refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean in support the US-led "war on terror."

Gates urged Japan to resume the mission, saying Tokyo needed to play an international security role in line with its global stature.

[http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071109/wl\\_asia\\_afp/japanusmilitarygates\\_071109020644](http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071109/wl_asia_afp/japanusmilitarygates_071109020644)

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Financial Times

Published: November 8 2007 18:20

## **Officials Fail To Ease Nuclear Threat Fears**

By Jo Johnson and Farhan Bokhari

Pakistani intelligence officials on Thursday dismissed suggestions that the country's nuclear arsenal could be at risk of falling into terrorist hands in the volatile political climate created by General Pervez Musharraf's imposition of a state of emergency and brushed aside concerns expressed by a senior US general and Nicolas Sarkozy, French president .

"Pakistan has come a long way since the A.Q. Khan episode," one senior Pakistani official told the Financial Times, referring to the illicit trade in nuclear secrets conducted by Pakistan's top nuclear scientist that was exposed in 2004. "The problem is that the west doesn't believe us. No matter how much we clarify, they will still suspect our intentions."

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a defence analyst and former visiting professor of Pakistan studies at Columbia University, said mounting instability was bound to trigger fresh international concerns for the security of the country's nuclear assets: "If we head towards growing confrontation on the streets, there is bound to be growing global pressure on Pakistan on the nuclear front."

Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, Lieutenant General Carter Ham, director of operations for the US joint chiefs of staff, said the Pentagon was watching developments in Pakistan closely. "Any time there is a nation that has nuclear weapons that has experienced a situation such as Pakistan is at present, that is a primary concern," he said. Adding his voice to calls for swift elections, Mr Sarkozy, on a visit to the US, said: "This is a country of 150m people, which happens to have nuclear weapons. This is very important for us that one day we shouldn't wake up with a government, an administration in Pakistan which is in the hands of the extremists."

The US has stepped up its nuclear security co-operation with Pakistan in the wake of Mr Khan's activities, famously described as a "nuclear Wal-Mart" by Mohamed ElBaradei, the International Atomic Energy Agency chief.

Islamabad, however, has made it clear that it will not allow US visits to its sensitive nuclear sites and the effectiveness of US monitoring is unknown.

In his recently published memoir George Tenet, former Central Intelligence Agency chief, recalled a conversation with Gen Musharraf in which the president assured him that Pakistani nuclear experts had dismissed the possibility that "men hiding in caves" could build a nuclear bomb. "Mr. President, your experts are wrong," Mr Tenet said he replied.

"Securing the Bomb 2007", a report by Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government on behalf of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-proliferation advocacy group, concluded that Pakistan posed a serious challenge to efforts to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining nuclear weapons.

It said Pakistan's relatively small nuclear stockpile faced "huge threats" from al-Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist groups, as well as from insiders with a demonstrated willingness to sell sensitive nuclear technology throughout the world and proven sympathy for extreme jihadi causes.

"If al-Qaeda terrorists can twice come close to assassinating President Musharraf with help from Pakistani military officers, who can rule out the possibility that other military officers guarding nuclear weapons might be convinced to help al-Qaeda?" the report, written by Matthew Bunn, said.

Recent US intelligence assessments, including the National Intelligence Estimate, suggest that al-Qaeda's central command has been reconstituting its ability to direct complex operations from the border areas of Pakistan. The Pakistani government has rejected suggestions that al-Qaeda has found a haven in the tribal areas.

Islamabad claims that Mr Khan's export of sensitive nuclear technology to third countries, believed to include Iran, were unauthorised, suggesting that his activities over two decades represented a massive security failure. Pakistani officials say they have since taken wide-ranging – but unspecified – measures to ensure that rogue proliferation cannot happen again.

A non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Pakistan may have up to 100 nuclear weapons in a number of locations, analysts say. Facilities are heavily guarded, though probably not equipped with state-of-the-art protection and material control and accounting technologies, according to Securing the Bomb 2007.

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/01dd1614-8e26-11dc-8591-0000779fd2ac.html>

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Washington Times

November 9, 2007

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**Inside The Ring**

By Bill Gertz

## **Munchkins win**

John R. Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, reveals in his new book how bureaucrats in the State Department undermined efforts at the United Nations against North Korea. The bureaucrats are particularly strong in the East Asia-Pacific bureau, known as EAP and dubbed "EAPeasers," because of the penchant for appeasement over tough diplomacy and action.

The book, "Surrender Is Not an Option," is Mr. Bolton's fascinating insider account of his work at Foggy Bottom and Turtle Bay and also shows how the appeasers succeeded in undermining U.S. efforts to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program as part of the six-party nuclear talks.

Under Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, a series of endless concessions to North Korea is producing an outcome similar to the Clinton administration's failed diplomacy with Pyongyang, he said.

In a section titled "The Munchkins Win on North Korea," Mr. Bolton said tough diplomacy under his leadership succeeded in passage of two relatively tough U.N. resolutions, over initial objections of China and Russia, on North Korea's missile and nuclear tests, while concessions at the six-nation nuclear talks are a disaster.

"Strong diplomacy in the Security Council produced two tough resolutions," he wrote. "Weak diplomacy in the six-party talks has allowed North Korea to consolidate and solidify its nuclear posture and taken the United States down the same road as the failed 1994 Agreed Framework." He called the February deal in Beijing "radically incomplete" since it did not deal properly with the existing nuclear weapons, much less the covert uranium enrichment program. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071109/NATION04/111090099/1008>

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Arizona Daily Star (Tucson)

November 9, 2007

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News Analysis

## **Bush, Military Officials Back Off Iran War Talk**

By Robert Burns, Associated Press

WASHINGTON — U.S. defense officials have signaled that up-to-date attack plans are available if needed in the escalating crisis over Iran's nuclear aims, although no strike appears imminent.

The Army and the Marine Corps are under enormous strain from years of heavy ground fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, the United States has ample air and naval power to strike Iran if President Bush decided to target nuclear sites or to retaliate for alleged Iranian meddling in neighboring Iraq.

Among the possible targets, in addition to nuclear installations like the centrifuge plant at Natanz: Iran's ballistic missile sites, Republican Guard bases, and naval warfare assets that Tehran could use in a retaliatory closure of the Straits of Hormuz, a vital artery for Persian Gulf oil.

The Navy has an aircraft carrier in the gulf area with about 60 fighters and other aircraft that likely would feature prominently in a bombing campaign. And a contingent of about 2,200 Marines is on a standard deployment to the region aboard ships led by the USS Kearsarge, an amphibious-assault ship. Air Force fighters and bombers are available elsewhere in the area, including a variety of warplanes in Iraq and at a regional air operations center in Qatar.

But there has been no new buildup of U.S. firepower in the region. In fact, there has been some shrinkage in recent months. After adding a second aircraft carrier in the gulf early this year — a move Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said was designed to underscore U.S. long-term stakes in the region — the Navy quietly returned to a one-carrier presence.

### **Iran no military weakling**

Talk of a possible U.S. attack on Iran has surfaced frequently this year, prompted in some cases by hard-line statements by White House officials. Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, stated on Oct. 21 that the United States would "not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon," and that Iran would face "serious consequences" if it continued in that direction. Gates, on the other hand, has emphasized diplomacy.

Bush suggested on Oct. 17 that Iran's continued pursuit of nuclear arms could lead to "World War III." Yet on Wednesday, in discussing Iran at a joint press conference with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Bush made no reference to the military option.

"The idea of Iran having a nuclear weapon is dangerous, and, therefore, now is the time for us to work together to diplomatically solve this problem," Bush said, adding that Sarkozy also wants a peaceful solution.

Iran's conventional military forces are generally viewed as limited, not among the strongest in the Middle East. But a leading expert on the subject, Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says it would be a mistake to view the Islamic republic as a military weakling.

"Its strengths in overt conflict are more defensive than offensive, but Iran has already shown it has great capability to resist outside pressure and any form of invasion and done so under far more adverse and divisive conditions than exist in Iran today," Cordesman wrote earlier this year.

Cordesman estimates that Iran's army has an active strength of around 350,000 men.

At the moment, there are few indications of U.S. military leaders either advising offensive action against Iran or taking new steps to prepare for that possibility. Gates has repeatedly emphasized that while military action cannot be ruled out, the focus is on diplomacy and tougher economic sanctions.

Asked in late October whether war planning had been ramped up or was simply undergoing routine updates, Gates replied, "I would characterize it as routine." His description of new U.S. sanctions announced on Oct. 25 suggested they are not a harbinger of war, but an alternative.



## **Commandos an option**

A long-standing responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to maintain and update what are called contingency plans for potential military action that a president might order against any conceivable foe. The secret plans, with a range of timelines and troop numbers, are based on a variety of potential scenarios — from an all-out invasion like the March 2003 march on Baghdad to less demanding missions.

Another military option for Washington would be limited, clandestine action by U.S. special operations commandos, such as Delta Force soldiers, against a small number of key nuclear installations.

The man whose responsibility it would be to design any conventional military action against Iran — and execute it if ordered by Bush — is Adm. William Fallon, the Central Command chief. He is playing down prospects of conflict, saying in a late September interview that there is too much talk of war.

Fallon told Al-Jazeera television that he does not expect a war against Iran. During a recent tour of the region, Fallon made a point of telling U.S. allies that Iran is not as strong as it portrays itself.

"Not militarily, economically or politically," he said.

Fallon's immediate predecessor, retired Army Gen. John Abizaid, raised eyebrows in September when he suggested that initiating a war against Iran would be a mistake. He urged vigorous efforts to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but failing that, he said, "There are ways to live with a nuclear Iran." He also said he believed Iran's leaders could be dissuaded from using nuclear arms, once acquired.

The possibility of U.S. military action raises many tough questions, beginning perhaps with the practical issue of whether the United States knows enough about Iran's network of nuclear sites — declared sites as well as possible clandestine ones — to sufficiently set back or destroy its program.

Among other unknowns: Iran's capacity to retaliate by unleashing terrorist strikes against U.S. targets.

Non-military specialists who have studied Iran's nuclear program are doubtful of U.S. military action.

"There is a non-trivial chance that there will be an attack, but it's not likely," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of a nuclear-strategy project at the New America Foundation, a non-partisan public-policy group.

<http://www.azstarnet.com/news/210776>

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Washington Post

November 10, 2007

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## **N. Korea Offers Evidence To Rebut Uranium Claims**

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

North Korea is providing evidence to the United States aimed at proving that it never intended to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, undermining a key U.S. intelligence finding, South Korean and U.S. officials said this week.

In closely held talks, the North Korean government has granted U.S. experts access to equipment and documents to make its case, in preparation for declaring the extent of its nuclear activities before the end of the year. North Korean officials hope the United States will simultaneously lift sanctions against Pyongyang as the declaration is made.

If North Korea successfully demonstrates that U.S. accusations about the uranium-enrichment program are wrong, it will be a blow to U.S. intelligence and the Bush administration's credibility.

The U.S. charges of a large-scale uranium program led to the collapse of a Clinton-era agreement that had frozen a North Korean reactor that produced a different nuclear substance -- plutonium. That development freed North Korea to use the plutonium route toward gathering the material needed for a nuclear weapon. Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test last year, detonating a plutonium-based device, and has built a plutonium stockpile that experts estimate could yield eight to 10 nuclear weapons.

"They have shown us some things, and we are working it through," a senior U.S. official said yesterday, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the talks are confidential. "We are having a discussion about things. Some explanations make sense; some are a bit of a stretch."

"This is now in the process of being clarified," a senior South Korean official said in an interview. "The North Koreans are now ready to prove that they did not intend to make a uranium-enrichment program by importing some materials."

He said North Korea is attempting to show that the materials it imported -- including 150 tons of aluminum tubes from Russia in June 2002 -- were intended for conventional weapons programs and other dual-use projects, not for weapons of mass destruction.

The South Korean official said North Korea's efforts mark an important shift. "In the past, North Korea simply said no," he said. "Now they are trying to convince us."

U.S. intelligence first concluded in July 2002 that North Korea had embarked on a large-scale program to produce highly enriched uranium for use in weapons, saying it was constructing a facility that would be fully operational by 2005. "We discovered that, contrary to an agreement they had with the United States, they're enriching uranium, with a desire of developing a weapon," President Bush said in a November 2002 news conference.

U.S. officials have also asserted that a senior North Korean official admitted the existence of the program in an October 2002 meeting in Pyongyang between officials from both nations. North Korea later denied that any such admission took place.

After the administration accused Pyongyang of violating a 1994 agreement struck with President Bill Clinton to freeze its plutonium facilities, North Korea ejected U.N. inspectors from the country and restarted its plutonium reactor, allowing it to stockpile its weapons-grade material.

For years afterward, during the impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, the Bush administration insisted that North Korea first admit having the uranium facility, rejecting arguments from other nations that it was more important to freeze the plutonium facility in order to halt the nation's production. After North Korea tested the nuclear device, the administration agreed to a deal in which Pyongyang froze and then disabled the plutonium facility in exchange for international aid.

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium provide different routes to building nuclear weapons. The North Koreans were able to reprocess 8,000 spent fuel rods -- which had been held in a cooling pond and monitored by U.N. inspectors under the 1994 agreement -- to acquire the weapons-grade plutonium. A uranium program would have required Pyongyang to build a facility with thousands of centrifuges to obtain the highly enriched uranium needed for a weapon. Iran's nuclear program, which the United States alleges is intended for weapons, involves enriched uranium.

The administration this year began to back off its earlier assertions that North Korea has an active program to enrich uranium. In February, the chief U.S. intelligence officer for North Korea, Joseph R. DeTrani, told Congress that while there is "high confidence" that North Korea acquired materials that could be used in a "production-scale" uranium program, there is only "mid-confidence" that such a program exists.

David Albright, a former U.N. inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said in a report this year that there is "ample evidence" that North Korea was trying to put together a small-scale research program involving a few dozen centrifuges but that claims of a large-scale effort were flawed.

Albright said yesterday that the tubes acquired by North Korea needed to be cut in half and shaped in order to be used as the outer casings of centrifuges. If Pyongyang proves that the tubes were untouched, he said, it could "shatter the argument" that they were meant for a uranium program.

But Albright said it is difficult to see how North Korea could explain away a set of centrifuges that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said a Pakistani nuclear-smuggling network provided to Pyongyang. "I think the North Koreans are making a big mistake" if they deny they had any interest in uranium enrichment, he said. "They are going to create a lot of trouble if they stick to this."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/09/AR2007110902364.html>

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Washington Post  
November 11, 2007  
Pg. 1

## **Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned**

### ***Lack of Knowledge About Arsenal May Limit U.S. Options***

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

When the United States learned in 2001 that Pakistani scientists had shared nuclear secrets with members of al-Qaeda, an alarmed Bush administration responded with tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment such as intrusion detectors and ID systems to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

But Pakistan remained suspicious of U.S. aims and declined to give U.S. experts direct access to the half-dozen or so bunkers where the components of its arsenal of about 50 nuclear weapons are stored. For the officials in Washington now monitoring Pakistan's deepening political crisis, the experience offered both reassurance and grounds for concern.

Protection for Pakistan's nuclear weapons is considered equal to that of most Western nuclear powers. But U.S. officials worry that their limited knowledge about the locations and conditions in which the weapons are stored gives them few good options for a direct intervention to prevent the weapons from falling into unauthorized hands.

"We can't say with absolute certainty that we know where they all are," said a former U.S. official who closely tracked the security upgrades. If an attempt were made by the United States to seize the weapons to prevent their loss, "it could be very messy," the official said.

Of the world's nine declared and undeclared nuclear arsenals, none provokes as much worry in Washington as Pakistan's, numerous U.S. officials said. The government in Islamabad is arguably the least stable. Some Pakistani territory is partly controlled by insurgents bent on committing hostile acts of terrorism in the West. And officials close to the seat of power -- such as nuclear engineer A.Q. Khan and his past collaborators in the Pakistani military - - have a worrisome track record of transferring sensitive nuclear designs or technology to others.

That record, and the counterterror prism of U.S. policymaking since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have led the Bush administration to worry less that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal might be used in a horrific war with India than that it could become a security threat to the U.S. homeland in the event of any theft or diversion to terrorist groups. Because the risks are so grave, U.S. intelligence officials have long had contingency plans for intervening to obstruct such a theft in Pakistan, two knowledgeable officials confirmed. The officials would not discuss details of the plans, which are classified, but several former officials said the plans envision efforts to remove a nuclear weapon at imminent risk of falling into terrorists' hands.

The plans imagine, in the best case, that Pakistani military officials will help the Americans eliminate that threat. But in other scenarios there may be no such help, said Matt Bunn, a nuclear weapons expert and former White House science official in the Clinton administration. "We're a long way from any scenario of that kind. But the current turmoil highlights the need for doing whatever we can right now to improve cooperation and think hard about what might happen down the road."

Former and current administration officials say they believe that Pakistan's stockpile is safe. But they worry that its security could be weakened if the current turmoil persists or worsens. They are particularly concerned by early signs of fragmented loyalties among Pakistan's military and intelligence leaders, who share responsibility for protecting the arsenal.

"The military will be stretched thin if the level of protest rises," said John E. McLaughlin, the No. 2 official at the CIA from 2000 to 2004. "If the situation becomes more volatile, the conventional wisdom [about nuclear security] could come into question." He noted that Pakistan's army has become increasingly diverse, reflecting the country's ethnic and religious differences, "and that is different from the way it was years ago."

Former and current intelligence officials said the focus of U.S. concerns is the stability of Pakistan's army, which was already showing strain from Western pressures to upgrade its counterinsurgency work when President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency last week, unleashing riots and a police crackdown on political opposition groups. The officials said the military might not remain a loyal, cohesive force if violence becomes sustained or widespread.

Anytime a nation with nuclear weapons experiences "a situation such as Pakistan is at present, that is a primary concern," said Lt. Gen. Carter Ham, director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a Pentagon news conference last week. "We'll watch that quite closely, and I think that's probably all I can say about that at this point."

Concerns about possible thefts if the government's authority erodes or disintegrates extend to nuclear components, design plans and special materials such as enriched uranium. Twice in the past six years, Pakistan has acknowledged that its nuclear scientists passed sensitive nuclear information or equipment to outsiders -- including, in one case, members of al-Qaeda.

Two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists traveled to Afghanistan in August 2001 at the request of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. He pressed the scientists for details on how to make nuclear weapons, and the scientists replied with advice and crude diagrams, according to U.S. officials at the time.

Officials at the Pakistani Embassy declined to comment for this story.

Pakistan, which tested its first warhead in 1998, began developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s with help from Khan, the Pakistani engineer who years later became the leader of an international nuclear smuggling ring. Khan covertly acquired sensitive nuclear information and equipment from several European countries, helped build the stockpile and later profited personally by providing materials to Libya, North Korea and Iran.

Pakistan has repeatedly asserted that its government and army were unaware of Khan's proliferation activities until 2003. However, numerous published accounts have described extensive logistical support that military officials provided to Khan, including the use of military aircraft.

In the weeks after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and other senior officials to Islamabad to raise the issue of safeguarding the country's nuclear arsenal. Musharraf agreed to policy changes and security upgrades, starting with the dismissal of some Pakistani intelligence officials suspected of ties to the Taliban, bin Laden's ally.



Musharraf also agreed to move some nuclear weapons to more secure locations and accepted a U.S. offer to help design a system of controls, barriers, locks and sensors to guard against theft.

Unlike U.S. nuclear arms, which are protected by integrated electronic packages known as "permissive action links," or PALs, that require a special access code, Pakistan chose to rely on physical separation of bomb components, such as isolating the fissile "core" or trigger from the weapon and storing it elsewhere. All the components are stored at military bases.

That means would-be thieves would have to "knock over two buildings to get a complete bomb," said Bunn, now a researcher at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "Theft would be more difficult to pull off, though presumably in a crisis that might change."

Instead of allowing U.S. officials access to its weapons facilities, the Musharraf government insisted that Pakistani technicians travel to the United States for training on how to use the new systems, said Mark Fitzpatrick, a weapons expert who recently completed a study of the Pakistani program for the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Washington is confident that Pakistan's nuclear safeguards are designed to be robust enough to withstand a "fair amount of political commotion," said John Brennan, a retired CIA official and former director of the National Counterterrorism Center. The problem, he said, is that no one can reliably predict what will happen if the country slides toward civil war or anarchy.

"There are some scenarios in which the country slides into a situation of anarchy in which some of the more radical elements may be ascendant," said Brennan, now president of Analysis Corp., a private consulting firm based in Fairfax. "If there is a collapse in the command-and-control structure -- or if the armed forces fragment -- that's a nightmare scenario. If there are different power centers within the army, they will each see the strategic arsenal as a real prize."

Other nuclear "prizes" could leak more easily if the military holds together and the bombs remain in their bunkers, according to David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and president of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security. He said individuals working inside nuclear facilities could make a quick fortune by selling bomb components or "fissile" material -- the plutonium or enriched uranium needed for building bombs. "If stability doesn't return, you do have to worry about the thinking of the people with access to these things," said Albright, whose Washington-based institute tracks global nuclear stockpiles. "As loyalties break down, they may look for an opportunity to make a quick buck. You may not be able to get the whole weapon, but maybe you can get the core."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/10/AR2007111001684.html>

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Washington Post  
November 11, 2007  
Pg. B1

## **Those Nuclear Flashpoints Are Made In Pakistan**

By Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins

George W. Bush is hardly the first U.S. president to forgive sins against democracy by a Pakistani leader. Like his predecessors from Jimmy Carter onward, Bush has tolerated bad behavior in hopes that Pakistan might do Washington's bidding on some urgent U.S. priority -- in this case, a crackdown on al-Qaeda. But the scariest legacy of Bush's failed bargain with Gen. Pervez Musharraf isn't the rise of another U.S.-backed dictatorship in a strategic Muslim nation, or even the establishment of a new al-Qaeda haven along Pakistan's lawless border. It's the leniency we've shown toward the most dangerous nuclear-trafficking operation in history -- an operation masterminded by one man, Abdul Qadeer Khan.

For nearly four years, under the banner of the "war on terror," Bush has refused to demand access to Khan, the ultranationalist Pakistani scientist who created a vast network that has spread nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya. Indeed, Bush has never seriously squeezed Musharraf over Khan, who remains a national hero for bringing Pakistan the Promethean fire it can use to compete with its nuclear-armed nemesis, India. Khan has remained under house arrest in Islamabad since 2004, outside the reach of the CIA and investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency, who are desperate to unlock the secrets he carries. Bush should be equally adamant about getting to the bottom of Khan's activities.

Bush's sluggishness over Pakistan-based proliferation, even as he has funneled about \$10 billion in military and financial aid to Musharraf since Sept. 11, 2001, is even harder to explain when one considers the damage Khan has done to the world's fragile nuclear stability. Khan used stolen technology and black-market sales to help Pakistan obtain its nuclear arsenal, setting the stage for a possible atomic showdown with India. He played a pivotal role in

helping Iran start what we increasingly fear is a clandestine nuclear-arms program, allowing Tehran to make significant progress in the shadows before its efforts were uncovered in 2002. He gave key uranium-enrichment technology to North Korea. And if all this weren't enough, he was busily outfitting Libya with a full bomb-making factory when his network was finally shut down in late 2003. Khan has been held incommunicado ever since, leaving the world with new nuclear flashpoints -- and some burning, unanswered questions about his black-market spree.

The most urgent line of inquiry -- particularly given Bush's bellicose statements about the threat posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions -- centers on what exactly Khan provided to the Iranians over 15 years of doing business with them. He could help answer the questions on which war may depend: Is Iran trying to get the bomb? If so, how close is Tehran to obtaining it? Or are the mullahs simply pursuing a civilian nuclear capacity? We do know that Khan sold Iran advanced equipment to manufacture and operate the centrifuges that can enrich uranium, either to generate electricity or to provide the fuel for a weapon. But Khan's nuclear bazaar trafficked in other goodies as well -- including the blueprints for a Chinese-made nuclear warhead, which were found in Libya after Moammar Gaddafi abandoned his atomic aspirations in December 2003 and fingered Khan as his chief supplier.

Despite all these compelling reasons for interrogating Khan, the Bush administration has treated Musharraf with kid gloves, insisting that the general is simply too critical to the fight against Islamic extremism to jeopardize his tenuous hold on power by forcing him to hand over such a national icon. (The same type of flawed rationale is now being rolled out to defend U.S. timorousness in the face of Musharraf's repugnant crackdown on his political foes, the judiciary, the media and human rights groups.) The nastiest legacy of Musharraf's reign will almost certainly not be his turn toward tyranny. It will be his reluctance to get tough on Khan in the past and to question him now -- a reluctance echoed by U.S. reticence about demanding that Pakistan's leaders control its rogue nuclear network. The dangers those failures created will threaten the world long after Musharraf and Bush are gone.

In fact, Khan could have been stopped before he got started. In the mid-1970s, he was working as a mid-level scientist at a research laboratory in Amsterdam, preparing to steal top-secret Dutch plans for building centrifuges and busily compiling a list of potential suppliers for Pakistan's nascent atomic-weapons program -- the seeds of the procurement network that led Pakistan to the bomb. In the fall of 1975, the Dutch secret service discovered what Khan was up to and grew eager to arrest him on espionage charges. But more pragmatic officials from the Dutch economics ministry urged them to hold off, worried about the embarrassment of exposing a spy in the heart of their nuclear establishment.

The CIA turned out to be a tiebreaker. Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch economics minister at the time and later prime minister, told us that the security service had asked the CIA to support its pleas to bust Khan. But the Americans surprised their Dutch colleagues, asking that the scientist be allowed to continue working so that they could monitor his budding procurement operation. Instead of being thrown in jail, Khan was transferred to a less sensitive job. That demotion tipped him off that time was running out, so he bolted for home, taking with him the nuclear secrets that would help make Pakistan a nuclear power. It was a "monumental error," said Robert Einhorn, a senior State Department official who worked on arms control under Bush and President Bill Clinton.

Four years later, Washington got a second chance to stop Khan. By 1979, U.S. intelligence agencies had a clear picture of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear arms and Khan's crucial role as the chief of its uranium-enrichment efforts. In April, Carter slapped economic sanctions on Pakistan -- a shrewd move that turned out to be woefully short-lived. On Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet troops landed at Kabul International Airport, and by Christmas morning, Red Army soldiers were rolling across pontoon bridges in northern Afghanistan and fanning out across the country. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, saw an opportunity to confront the Soviets by funneling money and arms to the nascent Afghan resistance movement, dominated by the zealous Muslim fighters who would one day become the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But Brzezinski's plan required using Pakistan as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet jihad, which meant abandoning the sanctions on Islamabad. "This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy," Brzezinski wrote Carter in a memo dated Dec. 26, 1979.

Carter reluctantly agreed. But by revoking the sanctions, he granted Pakistan -- and Khan -- carte blanche on the nuclear front. Washington sacrificed the goal of stopping Pakistan's nuclear-arms effort, and the moral authority that the United States had used to advocate the cause of nuclear nonproliferation was severely damaged.

The blame did not end with Carter. During a campaign stop in Florida in January 1980, Ronald Reagan was asked about Pakistan's atomic ambitions. "I just don't think it's any of our business," he replied.

In office, Reagan and his aides made an art of ignoring Pakistan's march toward the bomb, including intelligence in 1987 that warned that Khan had transferred nuclear equipment to Iran. That transaction started Tehran's clandestine atomic program and marked Khan's transformation from a buyer of nuclear technology to a seller of it. Once again, an opportunity to stop him -- and to derail Iran's fledgling efforts -- was missed.

Bush brags that he helped shut down Khan's network. In fact, much of the damage had already been done. And even Bush's supposed great nonproliferation victory -- persuading Libya to abandon its secret nuclear program -- was too little, too late.

Between 1997 and 2003, we found, Libya paid Khan and his associates nearly \$100 million for bomb-making technology and expertise. Among Libya's purchases were detailed plans, which arrived in Tripoli in 2000 or early 2001, for a Chinese warhead. International experts who have seen those designs strongly suspect that the Libyans copied them before turning the plans over to the Americans, along with their nuclear hardware.

In fact, the Americans could have acted against Khan before Libya ever got the nuclear designs. A CIA case officer nicknamed "Mad Dog" had recruited a Swiss technician at the center of Khan's ring who was providing regular reports on what was going to Libya. We don't know whether the mole was aware of the warhead plans, but we do know that he provided the CIA with a list of equipment so frighteningly thorough that British intelligence, after learning how much material Gaddafi was receiving, was clamoring for action against Libya well before the Americans agreed to move.

The mole also revealed another bombshell. In previously secret briefings with senior IAEA officials in Vienna, he disclosed that he had made electronic copies of the warhead plans in the fall of 2003, acting on orders from Khan, according to diplomats with direct knowledge of the briefings. The mole said that he sent the copies to Khan and one of his associates. But the plans have never surfaced.

Other items from Khan's deadly inventory are missing, too, including a shipment of centrifuge components and precision tools that disappeared in mid-2003. International inspectors worry that the material wound up in the hands of a previously unknown Khan customer -- perhaps Saudi Arabia or Syria, both countries where Khan had tried to peddle his wares before he was arrested. Another possible destination: Iran, where some U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials suspect that the military is operating a second, parallel enrichment program buried deep within the mountains that cover much of the country. But solving such dangerous riddles is apparently not as attractive as propping up a dubious ally in the fight against Islamic extremism.

In the Carter and Reagan years, the justification for going soft on Pakistan's nuclear adventures was always the hope of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan. Under George H.W. Bush and Clinton, the CIA argued convincingly that it needed more information before striking at Khan. When it comes to Pakistan, there's always something -- some perfectly sensible, hard-headed reason for putting the dangers of nuclear proliferation on the back burner. And Washington's priorities may well stay that way until the very moment when the unthinkable occurs.

*Douglas Frantz, a senior writer at Conde Nast Portfolio, and Catherine Collins, a D.C.-based writer, are co-authors of the forthcoming "The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets . . . and How We Could Have Stopped Him."*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/07/AR2007110702280.html>

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SFGate.com

## **Suitcase Nuclear Bomb Unlikely to Exist**

By KATHERINE SHRADER, Associated Press Writer

Monday, November 12, 2007

(11-12) 14:50 PST WASHINGTON, (AP) --

Members of Congress have warned about the dangers of suitcase nuclear weapons. Hollywood has made television shows and movies about them. Even the Federal Emergency Management Agency has alerted Americans to a threat — information the White House includes on its Web site.

But government experts and intelligence officials say such a threat gets vastly more attention than it deserves. These officials said a true suitcase nuke would be highly complex to produce, require significant upkeep and cost a small fortune.

Counterproliferation authorities do not completely rule out the possibility that these portable devices once existed. But they do not think the threat remains.

"The suitcase nuke is an exciting topic that really lends itself to movies," said Vahid Majidi, the assistant director of the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. "No one has been able to truly identify the existence of these devices."

Majidi and other government officials say the real threat is from a terrorist who does not care about the size of his nuclear detonation and is willing to improvise, using a less deadly and sophisticated device assembled from stolen or black-market nuclear material.

Yet Hollywood has seized on the threat. For example, the Fox thriller "24" devoted its entire last season to Jack Bauer's hunt for suitcase nukes in Los Angeles.

Government officials have played up the threat, too.

Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., once said at a hearing that he thought the least likely threat was from an intercontinental ballistic missile. "Perhaps the most likely threat is from a suitcase nuclear weapon in a rusty car on a dock in New York City," he said.

In a FEMA guide on terrorist disasters that is posted in part on the White House's Web site, the agency warns that terrorists' use of a nuclear weapon would "probably be limited to a single smaller 'suitcase' weapon."

"The strength of such a weapon would be in the range of the bombs used during World War II. The nature of the effects would be the same as a weapon delivered by an intercontinental missile, but the area and severity of the effects would be significantly more limited," the paper says.

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#### THE GENIE THAT ESCAPED

During the 1960s, intelligence agencies received reports from defectors that Soviet military intelligence officers were carrying portable nuclear devices in suitcases.

The threat was too scary to stay secret, government officials said, and word leaked out. The genie was never put back in the bottle.

But current and former government officials who have not spoken out publicly on the subject acknowledge that no U.S. officials have seen a Soviet-made suitcase nuke.

The idea of portable nuclear devices was not a new one.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. made the first ones, known as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition. It was a "backpack nuke" that could be used to blow up dams, tunnels or bridges. While one person could lug it on his back, it had to be placed by a two-man team.

These devices never were used and now exist — minus their explosive components — only in a museum.

Following the U.S. lead, the Soviets are believed to have made similar nuclear devices.

Suitcase nukes have been a separate problem. They attracted considerable public attention in 1997, thanks to a "60 Minutes" interview and other public statements from retired Gen. Alexander Lebed, once Russia's national security chief.

Lebed said the separatist government in Chechnya had portable nuclear devices, which led him to create a commission to get to the bottom of the Chechen arsenal, according to a Center for Nonproliferation Studies report. He said that when he ran the security service, the commission could find only 48 of 132 devices.

The numbers varied as he changed his story several times — sometimes he stated that 100 or more were missing. The Russians denied he was ever accurate.

Even more details emerged in the summer of 1998, when former Russian military intelligence officer Stanislav Lunev — a defector in the U.S. witness protection program — wrote in his book that Russian agents were hiding suitcase nukes around the U.S. for use in a possible future conflict.

"I had very clear instructions: These dead-drop positions would need to be for all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons," Lunev testified during a congressional hearing in California in 2000, according to a Los Angeles Times account.

Naysayers noted that he was never able to pinpoint any specific location.

In a 2004 interview with the Kremlin's Federal News Service, Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, former head of the Russian strategic rocket troops, said he believes that Lebed's commission may have been misled by mock-ups of special mines used during training.

Yesin believed that a true suitcase nuke would be too expensive for most countries to produce and would not last more than several months because the nuclear core would decompose so quickly. "Nobody at the present stage seeks to develop such devices," he asserted.

Some members of Congress remained convinced that the suitcase nuke problem persists. Perhaps chief among these lawmakers was Curt Weldon, a GOP representative from Pennsylvania who lost his seat in 2006.

Weldon was known for carrying around a mock-up of a suitcase nuke made with a briefcase, foil and a pipe. But it was nowhere near the weight of an actual atomic device.

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#### THE SCIENCE

Majidi joined the FBI after leading Los Alamos National Laboratory's prestigious chemistry division. He uses science to make the case that suitcase nukes are not a top concern.

First, he defines what a Hollywood-esque suitcase nuke would look like: a case about 24 inches by 10 inches by 12 inches, weighing less than 50 pounds, that one person could carry. It would contain a device that could cause a devastating blast.

Nuclear devices are either plutonium, which comes from reprocessing the nuclear material from reactors, or uranium, which comes from gradually enriching that naturally found element.

Majidi says it would take about 22 pounds of plutonium or 130 pounds of uranium to create a nuclear detonation. Both would require explosives to set off the blast, but significantly more for the uranium. Although uranium is considered easier for terrorists to obtain, it would be too heavy for one person to lug around in a suitcase.

Plutonium, he notes, would require the cooperation of a state with a plutonium reprocessing program. It seems highly unlikely that a country would knowingly cooperate with terrorists because the device would bear the chemical fingerprints of that government. "I don't think any nation is willing to participate in this type of activity," Majidi said.

That means the fissile material probably would have to be stolen. "It is very difficult for that much material to walk away," he added.

There is one more wrinkle: Nuclear devices require a lot of maintenance because the material that makes them so deadly also can wreak havoc on their electrical systems.

"The more compact the devices are — guess what? — the more frequently they need to be maintained. Everything is compactly designed around that radiation source, which damages everything over a period of time," Majidi said.

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#### PROVING A NEGATIVE

A former CIA director, George Tenet, is convinced that al-Qaida wants to change history with the mushroom cloud of a nuclear attack. In 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a statement called "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam."

"It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God," he said.

Among numerous avenues of investigation after the Sept. 11 attacks, Tenet said in his memoir that President Bush asked Russian President Vladimir Putin whether he could account for all of Russia's nuclear material.

Choosing his words carefully, Tenet said, Putin replied that he could only account for everything under his watch, leaving a void before 2000.

Intelligence officials continued digging deeper, hearing more reports about al-Qaida's efforts to get a weapon; that effort, it is believed, has been to no avail, so far.

But intelligence officials are loath to dismiss a threat until they are absolutely sure they have gotten to the bottom of it.

In the case of suitcase nukes, one official said, U.S. experts do not have 100 percent certainty that they have a handle on the Russian arsenal.

Laura Holgate, a vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, says the U.S. has not appropriately prioritized its responses to the nuclear threat and, as a result, is poorly using its scarce resources.

Much to many people's surprise, she noted, highly enriched uranium — outside of a weapon — is so benign that a person can hold it in his hands and not face any ill effects until years later, if at all. It can also slip through U.S. safeguards, she says.

The Homeland Security Department is planning to spend more than \$1 billion on radiation detectors at ports of entry. But government auditors found that the devices cannot distinguish between benign radiation sources, such as kitty litter, and potentially dangerous ones, including highly enriched uranium.

Holgate considers the substance the greatest threat because it exists not only at nuclear weapons sites worldwide, but also in more than 100 civilian research facilities in dozens of countries, often with inadequate security.

Her Washington-based nonproliferation organization wants to see the U.S. get a better handle on the material that can be used for bombs — much of it is in Russia — and secure it.

The big problem, she said, is not a fancy suitcase nuke, but rather a terrorist cell with nuclear material that has enough knowledge to make an improvised device.

How big would that be? "Like SUV-sized. Way bigger than a suitcase," she said.

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On the Net:

White House's "Are You Ready?" information: <http://tinyurl.com/5x6y>

FEMA's kids' page: [www.fema.gov/kids/nse/radiological.htm](http://www.fema.gov/kids/nse/radiological.htm)

FBI's weapons of mass destruction page: [www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/wmd/wmd\\_home.htm](http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/wmd/wmd_home.htm)

National Atomic Museum: [www.atomicmuseum.com/](http://www.atomicmuseum.com/)

Nuclear Threat Initiative: [www.nti.org/](http://www.nti.org/)

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/11/10/national/w082358S94.DTL&type=politics>

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Boston Globe  
November 13, 2007

# Merkel, Sarkozy Agree On Iran Plan

## *Urge sanctions and diplomacy*

By Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune

BERLIN - While urging Russia and China to increase the pressure on Iran, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed yesterday to pursue sanctions and diplomacy to deal with Tehran's nuclear program and stop it from producing nuclear weapons.

Speaking in Berlin during the twice-yearly French-German consultations, Sarkozy said Berlin and Paris were working in tandem over Iran.

"I think our positions are very close," he said at a news conference with Merkel. "We may have, here or there maybe, a problem of tempo, but on the main points of this policy, we are on the same wavelength - no nuclear arms for Iran, sanctions, and dialogue. The door remains open but the sanctions are toughening."

Merkel said that the United Nations Security Council should prepare for new sanctions even though Russia and China oppose such a move.

Speaking after two days of talks with President Bush in Crawford, Texas, Merkel insisted that diplomacy must be pursued. The Bush administration has repeatedly said that all options, including military action, are on the table. But Sarkozy warned that there was little time left for the international community.

"Germany and France think that, for sanctions to be efficient, there must be unity in the international community, including China and Russia, and that we must maintain the line of dialogue at the same time as firm sanctions," he said. "Time is working against us."

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear monitor, is to present a report in Vienna this week on Iran's compliance with its obligations to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Under the terms of the treaty, Iran is obligated to allow the agency to inspect sites and verify that nuclear technology is being used for peaceful purposes only. Until recently, Tehran refused to cooperate fully with the agency.

Diplomats involved in trying to persuade Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and cease all processing have said ElBaradei's report will be both positive and negative.

A European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Iran is now beginning to cooperate with the agency and allowing inspectors to visit sites.

"Iran is slowly clarifying the past," the diplomat said. "It had covered up. It had hidden some aspects of their nuclear program. It had not been transparent. Here we see some movement. That is the good news. That, after all, is its treaty obligations. The downside is that Iran will not suspend its uranium enrichment program. And that is the outstanding issue."

Without taking this step, German officials said, it would be impossible for the Europeans to offer Iran a framework agreement that would include close trade, political, and technological ties with European nations. In practice, it would mean that if Iran suspended its enrichment program, the international community would establish normal relations with Iran.

Another European diplomat said: "The issue is that Iran will not agree to suspension of any kind. It believes it has done enough by cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency and therefore that does not merit any more sanctions."

Iran is also refusing to set a date to meet Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief, who represents the Europeans in its negotiations with Iran.

Solana, who is preparing his own report on Iran, had requested a meeting this week, but the Iranian response was to wait until the end of November, when the UN Security Council is set to meet to discuss another round of sanctions. In September, the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany agreed that they would table another resolution to impose sanctions against Iran unless the November reports by ElBaradei and Solana showed a positive outcome of their efforts.

Britain, France, and Germany agree that much tougher sanctions should be imposed through the Security Council.

But without support from China and Russia, diplomats said, it is hard to see how the threat could have any impact on Iran.

[http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/11/13/merkel\\_sarkozy\\_agree\\_on\\_iran\\_plan/](http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/11/13/merkel_sarkozy_agree_on_iran_plan/)

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New York Times

November 13, 2007

Pg. 5



## **Britain Takes Tougher Stance On Sanctions Against Iran**

By John F. Burns

LONDON, Nov. 12 — Britain will push for a worldwide ban on foreign investment in Iran's oil and gas industry and other financial sanctions unless two reports due this month show that the Tehran government is ready to abandon efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Gordon Brown said Monday.

In a speech setting out his government's foreign policy agenda, Mr. Brown said Iran posed "the greatest immediate challenge" to the effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. He warned Iran that "it has a choice: confrontation with the international community leading to a tightening of sanctions, or, if it changes its approach and ends its support for terrorism, a transformed relationship with the world."

At a meeting in London last week, the six-nation group monitoring Iran's response to demands for an end to its uranium enrichment program — made up of Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany — agreed to consider a new round of United Nations sanctions on Iran if there was no early breakthrough on the issue. Two new reports on Iran's compliance, one by the European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, and another by Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, are due before the end of the month.

"Unless positive outcomes" flow from the reports, Mr. Brown said, "we will lead in seeking tougher sanctions both at the U.N. and in the European Union, including on oil and gas investment and the financial sector. Iran should be in no doubt about our seriousness of purpose."

The warning, the bluntest yet given by Britain, came in Mr. Brown's speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, an annual event that British prime ministers traditionally use for major foreign policy addresses. In office for six months, Mr. Brown appeared eager to depict himself as a match in international affairs for his predecessor, Tony Blair, and in particular to answer critics who have predicted that Britain, under the Brown government, will be a less congenial partner for the United States than it was during Mr. Blair's 10 years in office.

President Nicolas Sarkozy of France visited Washington last week, a visit in which the French leader expressed his admiration for America and his intention to abandon years of estrangement between Paris and Washington. Under Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany's relationship with the United States has also warmed.

Mr. Brown seemed eager to regain lost ground. "It is no secret that I have been a lifelong admirer of the United States," he said.

*Steven R. Weisman contributed reporting from Washington.*

[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/world/europe/13britain.html?\\_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/world/europe/13britain.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin)

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New York Times

November 14, 2007

## **Chinese Minister Visits Iran For Talks**

By New York Times

TEHRAN, Nov. 13 — The Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, arrived here on Tuesday to urge Iran to comply with the international demands to halt its uranium-enrichment program, in advance of two reports on the country's nuclear program.

Mr. Yang met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and was expected to meet with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, the state-run IRNA news agency reported.

Mr. Ahmadinejad said during his visit with Mr. Yang that Iran wanted to continue its talks with European countries and the United Nations nuclear agency over its nuclear program, which it maintains is for energy production. But Western countries fear that Iran is trying to obtain a nuclear arsenal.

Iran has been counting on China and Russia, each of which has veto power in the Security Council, not to back tougher sanctions. But at a meeting last week in London, both China and Russia, along with the United States, France, Germany and Britain, agreed to seek even stronger sanctions against Iran if it refused to comply.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled to meet next week to take up the issue.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14tehran.html?\\_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14tehran.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin)

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New York Times

November 14, 2007

## **In Gesture, Iran Provides Nuclear Document**

By Elaine Sciolino

VIENNA, Nov. 13 — After two years of stonewalling, Iran has given the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency a document showing how to cast uranium metal into hemispheres to form the core of an atom bomb, European officials said Tuesday.

Iran is likely to portray the gesture as an important sign that it is cooperating fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency in resolving questions about suspicious and secretive nuclear activities that date back two decades. Iran argues that because of this cooperation on its past activities, it should not be punished with new sanctions for its current programs, even though it is violating Security Council resolutions by continuing to produce enriched uranium, which can be used to make energy or weapons.

Possession of the document is not expected to add much to the agency's understanding of Iran's nuclear history. The agency had been able to read the document inside Iran, but has sought an actual copy to study it in full.

The Iranians did not disclose why they had possession of the document and what they intended to do with the information, according to the European officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under normal diplomatic rules.

The Iranian gesture will be included in a scheduled report that Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director, is to present to its 35-country governing board as early as Wednesday.

Iran was given the engineering drawings that could have helped it cast uranium into the precise shapes needed to build the core of a nuclear bomb as part of a larger black market offer in 1987, according to previous agency reports. The information, which was offered by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb program and the head of what was the world's largest nuclear black market, came into Iran's hands as the country was covertly buying nuclear equipment for its program to enrich uranium.

Iran has told agency officials that it had never asked for the information.

The agency disclosed its discovery of the document in 2005, indicating that the Khan network offered to help Iran shape uranium metal into "hemispherical forms," which both the nuclear agency and outside nuclear analysts said are often a prerequisite for making a nuclear weapon.

The United States, France, Britain and other countries are convinced that Iran's nuclear program is aimed at developing a weapon, but Iran has denied it has a nuclear weapons program, insisting that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes.

Last summer, Iran reached an agreement with the United Nations agency on a timetable to answer questions about various past nuclear activities that have led many nations to suspect it harbors a secret weapons program.

Despite the latest gesture, Iran has failed to comply with a number of other demands by the agency under the timetable, said the officials.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14nuke.html?ref=world>

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Washington Post

November 14, 2007

Pg. 2

## **Delayed Intelligence Report On Iran To Be Finished Soon**

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said yesterday that a long-awaited intelligence estimate covering Iran's nuclear program will be finished by the end of this month, attributing the delay to new information collected in late spring that caused a reconsideration of some elements of the assessment.

"We had more information that inserted some new questions, so the effort has been to sort that out," McConnell said at a luncheon at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Following a recently announced policy, McConnell said he does not intend to release an unclassified version of the estimate's key judgments.

McConnell also said that he does not want "a situation where the young analysts are writing something because they know it's going to be a public debate or political debate."

A senior intelligence official said that declassification of past key judgments on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and terrorism had led to misunderstandings of the underlying evidence.

McConnell said his objective in preparing the Iran estimate was "to present the clinical evidence and let it stand on its own merits with its own qualification," meaning that it would contain dissent. "There are always disagreements on every national intelligence estimate," he said.

He said he expects leaks of the Iran estimate, some of them politically motivated. Asked how he would respond if Bush administration officials misused it, McConnell said, "If it were cherry-picked in an inappropriate way, then for me there's a professional obligation to object, and I would submit my resignation."

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Washington Post

## Boys and Girls, Can You Say Anthrax?

Agencies Use Cartoons, Games and Even Rap in Twist on Disaster Lessons

By Mary Beth Sheridan

Washington Post Staff Writer

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In the 1950s, children practiced ducking under desks in case of a nuclear blast. Now, schools are introducing a post-9/11 equivalent: emergency-preparedness lessons.

"Boys and girls, what time is it?" bellowed Art Lawson, an Amtrak police officer in a starched white shirt, as he stood before fifth-graders in a Northwest Washington school one recent afternoon.

"It's Commander Ready time!" they yelled.

The weekly class, launched this year in D.C. schools, brings homeland security to the lunchbox set. It is part of a national effort to get families to prepare emergency kits and otherwise plan for disasters -- a message spread through cartoons, Disney shows and even first-responder camp.

The lessons aren't just aimed at kids, though. Consider Ready Eddie, a grinning, spiky-haired flashlight character created by Howard County. He tells children to pester Mom and Dad to store batteries, a radio and water.

Whiny kids as a homeland security tool? Exactly. After all, officials point out, children were the ones who bugged their parents to recycle, wear seat belts and stop smoking in past campaigns.

"We're hoping the kids will go home and talk about what's happening in their classrooms," said Dyonicia Brown of Serve DC, the agency that runs the city's program. "That will give us one more advantage to make sure the District of Columbia is prepared."

Disaster lessons for kids go back a long way. In the 1950s, Bert the Turtle prepared students for a nuclear strike in the infamous "Duck and Cover" film. Later, the Federal Emergency Management Agency distributed Sesame Street earthquake kits, with Muppets rocking to the tune "Beatin' the Quake."

But the current level of activity would impress even Oscar the Grouch. The Department of Homeland Security has sent its "Ready Kids" program to nearly 400,000 teachers. It handed out coloring sheets at Disney shows at 42 shopping malls this summer.

New York City is distributing more than a million children's emergency-preparedness guides this fall, offering nursery rhymes on evacuation and such puzzles as "Readydoku." Alabama offered sleepover "Be Ready Camp" for sixth-graders in September. Forget archery; they learned "terrorism awareness," according to a news release. The highlight was a mock disaster exercise.

"Taking the patients to triage was fun," one girl told the Mobile Press-Register.

Laugh if you will. ([YouTube](#) already has a send-up of Big Bird getting avian flu.) But the campaigns address a serious problem, officials said. Even in the Washington area, a target of the al-Qaeda attacks, only 43 percent of residents are prepared for disaster, according to a study carried out by the region in 2005.

"We're talking about a major behavioral shift we're trying to bring about here," said Jo'Ellen Countee, spokeswoman for the city's emergency management agency.

Homeland Security first considered creating a children's program after parents requested kid-friendly material. At the same time, the agency was consulting with advertising experts on how to get more people to stockpile emergency supplies and make family plans for disaster. It gradually saw the potential in the underage crowd.

"There was kind of unanimous agreement that . . . if you hook the children, you hook the parents," said George Foresman, a former Homeland Security official who oversaw the launch of Ready Kids last year.

"At the end of the day, McDonald's sells more hamburgers because they come up with a successful way to target it to children. You sell more cereal because you target it to children."

Tony the Tiger isn't assembling a disaster kit -- yet. But a variety of other cartoon characters are teaching kids how to prepare for emergencies.

The District uses the Commander Ready team: Reggie, Rachel and their dog, Rodney. Homeland Security's kits feature Rex and his mountain lion family. Discount chain Target distributed 45,000 leaflets in September with disaster advice from mice, turtles and bunnies.

Then there's FEMA for Kids, a Web site starring the Disaster Twins, Robbie and Julia, a sort of Dick and Jane of the emergency age.

"Let's shelter in place!" their teacher says brightly, grabbing her duct tape and plastic sheeting.

The programs have not met with universal admiration. Skeptics note there has been little formal evaluation of the results. James Carafano, a homeland security specialist at the Heritage Foundation, said some are downright "stupid."

"Mathematically, the odds of any child being killed by a terrorist in the United States are infinitesimally small," he said. "You might as well give them classes on how to avoid being hit by asteroids."

But, he said, many folks are woefully unprepared to protect themselves even in the most common emergencies.

"Changing that culture does begin with children, teaching them the right lessons," he said.

The District's program, developed with \$200,000 in Homeland Security grant funds, consists of a six-week series of lessons being taught in eight schools, supplemented by such supplies as "go-kits," with flashlights and Commander Ready water bottles. The program will expand to twice as many schools next year, officials said.

Although some other local jurisdictions offer occasional lessons on fires or floods, the D.C. course appears to be the most extensive.

It ranges from the mundane (flu) to the apocalyptic (dirty bombs). Among the "fun things" promised by the Commander Ready workbook is a word game on biological attack. Children are invited to design a flag for their evacuation shelter.

But this isn't just terrorism for tots, D.C. officials insist.

"Terrorism is very minor in regards to the curriculum," said Brown, of Serve DC. "We definitely mention it, because it's something that needs to be mentioned. But it's a holistic approach."

Indeed, Lawson, the Amtrak officer, was struggling on a recent Friday to get students at Tubman Elementary in Columbia Heights to understand the need to plan in case of a fire at home. What if they couldn't escape through the front door?

"I would break my neighbor's wall," announced one boy.

"What if your neighbor's wall is made of brick, like this?" the officer responded, punching the cinderblock.

"Use a chainsaw," reasoned the student.

"Couldn't you use a parachute and go out the window?" another wondered.

Gradually, the children seemed to catch on.

Angelica Cruz, 10, said she enjoyed the class. "It's a nice thing for people to know what to do when they're on fire," she said, smiling.

Lawson repeatedly urged the students to discuss fire safety with their parents. Like most of the children's programs, Commander Ready tries to get parents to stockpile emergency supplies including food, flashlights and a radio, and to make plans on where to go in case of disaster.

But Cruz's mother, Leida, a Salvadoran-born housecleaner, said a few days later that the family had no emergency plan.

"She talked to me about it, but I didn't understand a lot," the mother admitted.

Kathleen J. Tierney, director of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, said the best programs for kids integrate catastrophes into subjects such as science or social studies, giving children a broader understanding of the world. The Red Cross tries to do that with a program called Masters of Disaster, which is used in some area schools.

And the worst programs? Let's just say bureaucrats and youth culture can be a fearsome mix.

Consider the FEMA for Kids rap:

Disaster . . . it can happen anywhere,

But we've got a few tips, so you can be prepared

For floods, tornadoes, or even a 'quake,

You've got to be ready -- so your heart don't break.

Disaster prep is your responsibility

And mitigation is important to our agency . . .

Class dismissed, kids. Go forth and mitigate.

To listen to the FEMA rap, go to <http://washingtonpost.com/metro>.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/13/AR2007111302423.html>

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