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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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Times Online
July 28, 2008

Al-Qaeda chemical and biological weapons expert 'killed'

Jeremy Page, South Asia Correspondent

An al-Qaeda chemical and biological weapons expert may have been among six people killed in a suspected US missile strike on a Pakistani madrassa near the Afghan border today, according to security officials.

Abu Khabab al-Masri, also known as Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, was an Egyptian chemist regarded as one of al-Qaeda's top bomb makers and had a \$5 million bounty on his head.

Pakistani security officials said he was the target of a pre-dawn attack that destroyed a house close to a madrassa used by militants about 12 miles west of Wana, the main town in the tribal region of South Waziristan.

The officials said they had heard that al-Misri, 55, was killed but had been unable to check the reports as it was hard to reach the area, a haven of al-Qaeda and Taleban militants. Similar reports in 2006 turned out to be unfounded. The attack came just before Yousaf Raza Gilani, Pakistan's new Prime Minister, was due to meet President Bush in Washington for talks focusing on co-operation in the War on Terror.

The United States, alarmed by rising casualties among Nato forces in Afghanistan, has been pressing Pakistan to do more to combat the Islamic militants who have been sheltering in its tribal areas since 2001.

But Pakistan's Government is reluctant to inflict further casualties on its armed forces, anger its predominantly Muslim population, and damage relations with the ethnic Pashtun tribes who inhabit the borderlands.

So in recent months, the US military has stepped up its missile attacks, many using unmanned Predator drones, on militant targets in Pakistan, prompting protests from Islamabad.

Al-Masri is described by the website of the US Government Rewards for Justice programme, which offered the bounty, as an "explosives expert and poisons trainer working on behalf of Al-Qaeda".

He served as a trainer at Al-Qaeda's Derunta camp in Afghanistan when it was set up in the late 1990s "where he provided hundreds of mujahedin with hands-on training in the use of poisons and explosives", the site said.

"Since 1999, he has distributed training manuals that contain instructions for making chemical and biological weapons. Some of these training manuals were recovered by US forces in Afghanistan," it said.

The site said his exact whereabouts were unknown but that he might be living in Pakistan.

Residents of the area where he was said to have been killed said they heard the sound of a drone aircraft engine, suggesting that the missile may have been fired by a Predator.

Spokesmen for Nato and US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan denied involvement in any cross-border strike, but said they could not speak for the CIA, which also operates drones.

Pakistan's military spokesman said he had little information, and noted that US coalition forces were no longer informing the Pakistan army about every missile strike.

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4418867.ece>

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Los Angeles Times

July 30, 2008

Strike On Iran Still Possible, U.S. Tells Israel

Ehud Barak, the Israeli defense chief, is visiting as Washington is perceived to be softening its stance toward Tehran.

By Paul Richter and Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON — Bush administration officials reassured Israel's defense minister this week that the United States has not abandoned all possibility of a military attack on Iran, despite widespread Israeli concern that Washington has begun softening its position toward Tehran.

In meetings Monday and Tuesday, administration officials told Defense Minister Ehud Barak that the option of attacking Iran over its nuclear program remains on the table, though U.S. officials are primarily seeking a diplomatic solution.

At the same time, U.S. officials acknowledged that there is a rare divergence in the U.S. and Israeli approaches, with Israelis emphasizing the possibility of a military response out of concern that Tehran may soon have the know-how for building a nuclear bomb.

"Is there a difference of emphasis? It certainly looks as though there is," said a senior American Defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity when discussing the sensitive talks.

U.S. and Israeli officials believe Iran is enriching uranium with the aim of building nuclear weapons.

Tehran says that it is engaged in a peaceful enrichment program for civilian energy purposes.

Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said in an interview that U.S. officials have often made it clear to Israeli officials that Washington prefers to try to mitigate the threat from Tehran by applying economic pressure.

"The military option, although always available, is not our preferred route," Morrell said.

"We have made that point clear to them and the world in our public statements and private meetings."

Barak left Israel for Washington amid reports in the Israeli press that he would try to talk the Bush administration out of what many Israelis perceive as a more conciliatory policy toward Iran.

On Tuesday, the Israeli Defense Ministry released a statement saying that Barak had told Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates that "a policy that consists of keeping all options on the table must be maintained."

Speaking to reporters in Washington, Barak said that there remains time for "accelerated sanctions" to try to persuade Iran to abandon the nuclear program.

Israeli officials were concerned in December when a key U.S. intelligence report concluded that Iran had abandoned an effort to build a nuclear bomb. They also have noted with concern comments this month by Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that an Israeli airstrike on Iran would further destabilize the Middle East and compound the strain on overworked U.S. forces.

Also this month, in a rare move toward engagement with Tehran, a senior U.S. diplomat took part in international talks in Geneva about the nuclear program.

And U.S. officials have floated a proposal for opening a low-level diplomatic office in Tehran.

These gestures have taken place at a time of intensifying discussion in Israel about the wisdom of an Israeli military attack on Iran before the Bush administration leaves office.

A senior State Department official said Tuesday that Israel "is a sovereign state and we understand that they view this as an existential threat. And we take the threat that's posed by Iran seriously as well."

But the official, who asked to remain unidentified in keeping with diplomatic rules, said the administration is "pursuing the strategy we believe is the right one."

Gates, in an hourlong meeting with Barak, told the minister that the United States intends to consider providing radar to Israel that can detect ballistic missiles launched from Iran and supplying weapons to counter rocket attacks from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, according to a senior Defense official.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-usisrael30-2008jul30,0,625643.story>

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Washington Times

July 31, 2008

Pg. B1

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz

Counterspy problems

A congressional report made public July 25 reveals continuing problems with the Energy Department's counterintelligence program designed to protect sensitive nuclear weapons secrets from foreign spies.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the department's counterspy problems revealed budget cuts that degraded counterintelligence analysis; a breakdown in communications between counterspy field offices and department headquarters, and a failure to reach strategic counterintelligence goals.

"This CRS study raises some troubling questions about the state of DOE's counterintelligence program and the need for Congress to look more closely at how it is functioning," said Rep. John D. Dingell, Michigan Democrat and chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which released the report.

The report comes a decade after disclosures by the CIA that China obtained thorough espionage secrets on every nuclear weapon deployed in the U.S. arsenal.

The FBI has said it is continuing to investigate the loss of nuclear weapons secrets but has not caught the spies. Los Alamos National Laboratory nuclear weapons designer Wen Ho Lee was charged initially in 1999 with giving nuclear secrets to China but pleaded guilty in 2000 to lesser charges of mishandling classified information for removing tapes containing highly classified nuclear test data.

The Energy Department's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence said in an e-mail in response to the CRS report that it "takes very seriously" its mission to protect the nation's most sensitive national security secrets.

"DOE maintains that our growing investments in counterintelligence over the past three years have resulted in substantial counterintelligence gains, including greater resources for analysis, investigations, the cyber threat, and other counterintelligence programs."

<http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jul/31/inside-the-ring-9598419/>

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New York Times

July 31, 2008

Despite Calls to Halt, Iran Says It Will Continue Its Nuclear Program

By Graham Bowley

Speaking just days before a deadline set by world powers for Iran to reply to proposals to curb its nuclear ambitions, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's supreme leader, said Wednesday that Iran would "continue with its path" of nuclear development, which includes the enrichment of uranium.

Ayatollah Khamenei's comments suggested that Iran might be preparing to take a hard line on the demands by six nations — the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany — that it stop enriching uranium by this weekend. His comments were cited by state radio, according to news agency reports from Tehran.

Representatives of the six nations met with Iranian officials in Geneva on July 19, with a senior American official taking part for the first time. The talks seemed to produce no progress on the chief demand — that Iran stop uranium enrichment.

Iran contends that its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian purposes, but the six powers suspect that the country may be pursuing nuclear weapons.

The six nations "know that the Iranian nation is after using nuclear energy to provide electricity, but they say, 'Because this work gives you capability, we will not allow it,'" Ayatollah Khamenei was quoted as saying by state radio, according to Reuters.

"The Iranian nation, by depending on its useful experience and advantages of 30 years of resistance, does not pay any attention to such talk and will continue with its path," he said.

At the meeting in Geneva, Iranian diplomats reiterated that the issue of uranium enrichment was nonnegotiable. But the six powers gave Iran two weeks to respond to their latest proposal before it would be withdrawn.

The world powers want Iran to accept a formula known as freeze-for-freeze. Under this plan, Iran would not expand its nuclear program, and the United States and other powers would not seek new international sanctions for six weeks to pave the way for formal negotiations.

The proposal, first offered last year, is intended to give Iran economic and political incentives to stop enriching uranium.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said last week that America would seek more sanctions if the latest deadline was ignored.

Ayatollah Khamenei was also quoted by state television as saying in a sermon that taking a step back against what he called arrogant world powers would "lead them to take one step forward."

"The idea that any retreat or backing down from righteous positions would change the policies of arrogant world powers is completely wrong and baseless," he said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/world/middleeast/31iran.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin

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Atlanta Journal-Constitution
July 31, 2008

Nonaligned Nations Weigh In On Nukes

More than 100 nonaligned nations are backing Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear power. Wednesday's endorsement from a conference of the 120-nation Nonaligned Movement is key to Tehran in its standoff with the U.N. Security Council over its refusal to freeze uranium enrichment. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said the backing contradicts claims from some countries that the international community opposes his country's nuclear program.

<http://www.ajc.com/search/content/news/stories/2008/07/31/world.html>

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Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities.

GAO-08-740, July 31.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-740>

Highlights - <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d08740high.pdf>

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INSIDE THE PENTAGON - www.InsideDefense.com

July 31, 2008

Other nuclear issues under review

DSB Study Assessing Nuclear Deterrent Skills Slated For August

The Defense Department expects to complete a study next month examining the status of nuclear deterrent skills since the end of the Cold War, building on previous assessments of the U.S. ability to respond to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, according to Steve Henry, deputy assistant to the defense secretary for nuclear matters. A task force on nuclear deterrent skills being chaired by retired Navy Adm. Henry Chiles is providing an overview of the status of U.S. warheads and platforms, but also the infrastructure and intelligence capability available, Henry said during a July 29 speech at the Capitol Hill Club.

“What we asked for is to take a look, across the skill sets, [at] what’s needed to maintain a nuclear deterrent,” Henry told *Inside the Pentagon* following the presentation. Specifically, the task force was asked to examine how critical skills are being maintained as well as “the entire inventory -- what we haven’t paid attention to,” he said. “So if we want to have a nuclear deterrent, or if you want to be able to look at your responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction, what are the critical skill sets we need that we’ve got to maintain over the long term?” Then-Pentagon acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg asked the Defense Science Board to form a task force looking at this issue two years ago, according to a Oct. 16, 2006, memo. The missive, which is the project’s terms of reference, directed the DSB to assess all aspects of nuclear deterrent skills, including those of the military, federal government and contractors.

The memo also instructed the board to use the 2000 Nuclear Posture Review and the Strategic Capabilities Assessment to frame the “operating environment” of the study. The study is to discuss nuclear project management; nuclear safety and security; weapons effects, simulators, electromagnetic pulse and survivability; design and logistics; command and control, nuclear operations (crew training) and execution; planning (intelligence and targeting); and nuclear policy, according to the document.

Moreover, Krieg directed the DSB to assess the progress the Energy Department has made since the publication of the March 1999 Chiles Commission report, “particularly in light of the laboratory competition on the Reliable Replacement Warhead.”

The Chiles Commission Report described the central role played by key personnel in the weapons program, and discussed the challenges associated with recruiting, hiring, training and retaining them.

Finally, the DSB assessment will recommend methods and strategies to maintain “a right-sized, properly trained and experienced work force” to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent through 2020.

Beyond critical skills sets, DOD is also taking a closer look at other concerns, Henry told the audience during his address.

Retired Navy Adm. Richard Mies is heading a panel that will conduct a nuclear command and control system comprehensive review. The review was announced in January, and the panel members were approved only this month. Working and research groups are slated to present their preliminary findings to the executive panel by the end of this year (*ITP*, July 17, p1).

The first working group will explore “intelligence and other support” elements of the nuclear C2 system.

Members of the intelligence working group will evaluate information assurance systems, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, communications and “threats to the nuclear weapons enterprise.”

The second working group will focus on command and control elements of the actual nuclear weapons systems, specifically on weapon delivery systems, warheads and the overall stockpile.

The third working subpanel will drill down into security issues related to the U.S. nuclear stockpile, from physical security of nuclear weapon systems to response strategies in cases of accidents or other “incidents” to the stockpile.

The final group will take a hard look at the command and control structure of the stockpile with an eye toward planning and execution of nuclear weapon strikes.

In addition, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is undertaking an intelligence community common threat assessment, added Henry.

DOD has also asked for task forces on nuclear weapons inspections (chaired by retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Larry Welch); nuclear weapons management (headed by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger); and the nuclear weapons enterprise logistics team.

Finally, a congressional commission on the strategic posture (led by former Defense Secretary William Perry), has been directed to review the country’s strategic posture, including capabilities and military programs such as conventional strategic systems, nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs, missile defense systems and the future of nuclear weapons. -- *Fawzia Sheikh*

<http://insidedefense.com/secure/print/PENTAGON.pdf>

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Apparent Suicide In Anthrax Case

Bruce E. Ivins, a scientist who helped the FBI investigate the 2001 mail attacks, was about to face charges.

By David Willman, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer

A top government scientist who helped the FBI analyze samples from the 2001 anthrax attacks has died in Maryland from an apparent suicide, just as the Justice Department was about to file criminal charges against him for the attacks, the Los Angeles Times has learned.

Bruce E. Ivins, 62, who for the last 18 years worked at the government's elite biodefense research laboratories at Ft. Detrick, Md., had been informed of his impending prosecution, said people familiar with Ivins, his suspicious death and the FBI investigation.

Ivins, whose name had not been disclosed publicly as a suspect in the case, played a central role in research to improve anthrax vaccines by preparing anthrax formulations used in experiments on animals.

Regarded as a skilled microbiologist, Ivins also helped the FBI analyze the powdery material recovered from one of the anthrax-tainted envelopes sent to a U.S. senator's office in Washington.

Ivins died Tuesday at Frederick Memorial Hospital after ingesting a massive dose of prescription Tylenol mixed with codeine, said a friend and colleague, who declined to be identified out of concern that he would be harassed by the FBI.

The death -- without any mention of suicide -- was announced to Ivins' colleagues at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, or USAMRIID, through a staffwide e-mail.

"People here are pretty shook up about it," said Caree Vander Linden, a spokeswoman for USAMRIID, who said she was not at liberty to discuss details surrounding the death.

The anthrax mailings killed five people, crippled national mail service, shut down a Senate office building and spread fear of further terrorism after the Sept. 11 attacks.

The extraordinary turn of events followed the government's payment in June of a settlement valued at \$5.82 million to a former government scientist, Steven J. Hatfill, who was long targeted as the FBI's chief suspect despite a lack of any evidence that he had ever possessed anthrax.

The payout to Hatfill, a highly unusual development that all but exonerated him in the mailings, was an essential step to clear the way for prosecuting Ivins, according to lawyers familiar with the matter.

Federal investigators moved away from Hatfill -- for years the only publicly identified "person of interest" -- and ultimately concluded that Ivins was the culprit after FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III changed leadership of the investigation in late 2006.

The FBI's new top investigators -- Vincent B. Lisi and Edward W. Montooth -- instructed agents to reexamine leads or potential suspects that may have received insufficient attention. Moreover, significant progress was made in analyzing genetic properties of the anthrax powder recovered from letters addressed to two senators.

The renewed efforts led the FBI back to USAMRIID, where agents first questioned scientists in December 2001, a few weeks after the fatal mailings.

By spring of this year, FBI agents were still contacting Ivins' present and former colleagues. At USAMRIID and elsewhere, scientists acquainted with Ivins were asked to sign confidentiality agreements in order to prevent leaks of new investigative details.

Ivins, employed as a civilian at Ft. Detrick, earlier had attracted the attention of Army officials because of anthrax contaminations that Ivins failed to report for five months. In sworn oral and written statements to an Army investigator, Ivins said that he had erred by keeping the episodes secret -- from December 2001 to late April 2002. He said he had swabbed and bleached more than 20 areas that he suspected were contaminated by a sloppy lab technician.

"In retrospect, although my concern for biosafety was honest and my desire to refrain from crying 'Wolf!' . . . was sincere, I should have notified my supervisor ahead of time of my worries about a possible breach in biocontainment," Ivins told the Army. "I thought that quietly and diligently cleaning the dirty desk area would both eliminate any possible [anthrax] contamination as well as prevent unintended anxiety at the institute."

The Army chose not to discipline Ivins regarding his failure to report the contamination. Officials said that penalizing Ivins might discourage other employees from voluntarily reporting accidental spills of "hot" agents. But Ivins' recollections should have raised serious questions about his veracity and his intentions, according to some of those familiar with the investigation. For instance, although Ivins said that he swabbed areas near and within his personal office, and bleached surfaces to kill any spores, and that some of the swabs tested positive, he was vague about what should have been an essential next step:

Reswabbing to check whether any spores remained.

"I honestly do not recall if follow-up swabs were taken of the area," Ivins said. "I may have done so, but I do not now remember reswabbing."

"That's bull---," said one former senior USAMRIID official. "If there's contamination, you always reswab. And you would remember doing it."

The former official told The Times that Ivins might have hedged regarding reswabbing out of fear that investigators would find more of the spores inside or near his office.

Ivins' statements were contained within a May 2002 Army report on the contamination at USAMRIID and was obtained by The Times under the Freedom of Information Act.

Soon after the government's settlement with Hatfill was announced June 27, Ivins began showing signs of serious strain.

One of his longtime colleagues told The Times that Ivins, who was being treated for depression, indicated to a therapist that he was considering suicide.

Soon thereafter, family members and local police officers escorted Ivins from USAMRIID, where his access to sensitive areas was curtailed, the colleague said.

Ivins was committed to a facility in Frederick for treatment of his depression. On July 24, he was released from the facility, operated by Sheppard Pratt Health System. A telephone call that same day by The Times verified that Ivins' government voice mail was still functioning at the bacteriology division of USAMRIID.

The scientist faced forced retirement, planned for September, said his longtime colleague, who described Ivins as emotionally fractured by the federal scrutiny.

"He didn't have any more money to spend on legal fees. He was much more emotionally labile, in terms of sensitivity to things, than most scientists. . . . He was very thin-skinned."

FBI spokeswoman Debra J. Weierman said Thursday that the bureau would not comment on the death of Ivins.

Last week, FBI Director Mueller told CNN that "in some sense, there have been breakthroughs" in the case.

"I'll tell you we made great progress in the investigation," Mueller added.

"And it's in no way dormant."

Ivins, the son of a Princeton-educated pharmacist, was born and raised in Lebanon, Ohio, and received undergraduate and graduate degrees, including a doctorate in microbiology, from the University of Cincinnati.

The eldest of his two brothers, Thomas Ivins, said he was not surprised by the events that have unfolded.

"He buckled under the pressure from the federal government," Thomas Ivins said, adding that FBI agents came to Ohio last year to question him about his brother.

"I was questioned by the feds, and I sung like a canary" about Bruce Ivins' personality and tendencies, Thomas Ivins said.

"He had in his mind that he was omnipotent."

Ivins' widow declined to be interviewed when reached Thursday at her home in Frederick. The couple raised twins, now 24.

The family's home is 198 miles -- about a 3 1/2 -hour drive -- from a mailbox in Princeton, N.J., where anthrax spores were found by investigators.

All of the recovered anthrax letters were postmarked in that vicinity.

Willman reported from Los Angeles and Washington. Times researcher Janet Lundblad contributed to this report.
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-anthrax1-2008aug01.0.2864223.story>

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Los Angeles Times

August 1, 2008

North Korea Rights Issue To Get More Focus In Nuclear Talks

The U.S. envoy to the talks tells senators that Pyongyang's treatment of its citizens will now be a formal part of discussions.

By Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Under pressure from political conservatives, the top U.S. envoy on North Korea agreed Thursday to step up the Bush administration's emphasis on human rights issues during nuclear weapons talks, but stopped short of saying an improved record would be a precondition for normalized relations.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill told a Senate committee that North Korea's rights record was "abysmal." He promised that from now on, the country's treatment of its citizens would be a formal part of discussions between the United States and the government in Pyongyang. Up until now, the Americans have raised the issue only as a secondary concern in the nuclear talks.

"We will definitely raise these issues as an element of our normalization process," Hill said under questioning by Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), who had held up the nomination of a U.S. ambassador to South Korea as a sign of his unhappiness with the administration's approach on North Korea.

But Hill added: "I'm not in a position, at my level, to state to you today what the specific conditions of normalization will be."

Conservatives in Washington are upset over prospects that the United States might normalize relations with North Korea after the isolated communist country abandons its nuclear program, in spite of widespread human rights abuses. But the issue is sensitive diplomatically, because the North Korean regime views any criticism of its rights record as part of an American plot to overthrow it.

Brownback, a frequent critic of North Korea's rights record, had blocked the nomination of Kathleen Stephens, President Bush's choice to be ambassador to Seoul. Stephens, a career diplomat, would succeed Alexander Vershbow, who is completing a customary three-year rotation.

Brownback said Thursday that he was lifting his hold on Stephens' nomination because of Hill's assurances.

Hill said that Pyongyang's prison camps were "truly a scar on the Korean peninsula" and that U.S. officials intended to raise the issue, along with concerns about North Korea's judicial system.

The U.S., Russia, China, Japan and South Korea have been in talks with North Korea since 2003, reaching a deal under which Pyongyang would halt its nuclear weapons program and gradually give up its nuclear weapons and plutonium stockpile.

Under questioning by Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Hill said the agreement commits North Korea to give up all its plutonium, including the fissile material in the small number of bombs it currently possesses.

But Hill said he could not estimate how long it would take to reach that goal.

"That is very difficult to assess," Hill said. He said the wary North Koreans "prefer small steps," and pointed out that they had shut down their rickety Yongbyon nuclear facility only "because we moved them along."

Hill's answer underscored the uncertainty still surrounding the multinational deal. U.S. and North Korean diplomats are trying to work out a process for verifying disclosures in June by North Korea about its nuclear activities and assets. But many experts on North Korea remain skeptical that Pyongyang will ever be willing to entirely close down a program it believes has guaranteed the security of the regime.

The hearing signaled the widely varying reactions to the deal. Although many conservatives are deeply unhappy with the agreement, Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), a staunch conservative, told Hill that "it looks like you're beginning to make some progress."

At the same time, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) said he was worried an administration decision to drop North Korea from the U.S. list of governments that sponsor terrorism might have been "premature."

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-uskorea1-2008aug01_0,3520723.story

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2008 National Defense Strategy

Introduction

A core responsibility of the U.S. Government is to protect the American people – in the words of the framers of our Constitution, to “provide for the common defense.” For more than 230 years, the U.S. Armed Forces have served as a bulwark of liberty, opportunity, and prosperity at home. Beyond our shores, America shoulders additional responsibilities on behalf of the world. For those struggling for a better life, there is and must be no stronger advocate than the United States. We remain a beacon of light for those in dark places, and for this reason we should remember that our actions and words signal the depth of our strength and resolve. For our friends and allies, as well as for our enemies and potential adversaries, our commitment to democratic values must be matched by our deeds. The spread of liberty both manifests our ideals and protects our interests.

The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources.

The Department of Defense must respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. We must balance strategic risk across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone. The President's 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) describes an approach founded on two pillars: promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity by working to end tyranny, promote effective democracies, and extend prosperity; and confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. It seeks to foster a world of well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly

in the international system. This approach represents the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) serves as the Department's capstone document in this long-term effort. It flows from the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy. It also provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. It reflects the results of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and lessons learned from on-going operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces will fight and win America's wars and how we seek to work with and through partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert conflict.

The NDS describes our overarching goals and strategy. It outlines how DoD will support the objectives outlined in the NSS, including the need to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against us, our allies, and our friends; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); work with others to defuse regional conflicts, including conflict intervention; and transform national security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. The NDS acts on these objectives, evaluates the strategic environment, challenges, and risks we must consider in achieving them, and maps the way forward. . . .

Prevent Adversaries from Acquiring or Using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

There are few greater challenges than those posed by chemical, biological, and particularly nuclear weapons. Preventing the spread of these weapons, and their use, requires vigilance and obligates us to anticipate and counter threats. Whenever possible, we prefer non-military options to achieve this purpose. We combine non-proliferation efforts to deny these weapons and their components to our adversaries, active efforts to defend against and defeat WMD and missile threats before they are unleashed, and improved protection to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. We also seek to convince our adversaries that they cannot attain their goals with WMD, and thus should not acquire such weapons in the first place. However, as the NSS states, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising its right of self-defense to forestall or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries.

Reducing the proliferation of WMD and bolstering norms against their use contribute to defending the homeland by limiting the number of states that can directly threaten us and dissuading the potential transfer of these weapons to nonstate actors. As we and our partners limit WMD proliferation, we will deny terrorists a potent weapon and contribute to bringing the fight against violent extremists to a successful conclusion on U.S. terms.

A number of hostile or potentially hostile states are actively seeking or have acquired WMD. Some may seek them for prestige or deterrence; others may plan to use them. Preventing such regimes from acquiring or proliferating WMD, and the means to deliver them, contributes to promoting security.

Fortunately, the ranks of the nuclear powers are still small, but they could grow in the next decade in the absence of concerted action. Many more countries possess chemical and biological weapons programs – programs that are more difficult to detect, impede, or eliminate. These countries will continue to pursue WMD programs as a means to deter, coerce, and potentially use against adversaries. Shaping the behavior of additional states seeking or acquiring weapons of mass destruction will require an integrated, international effort.

Technological and information advances of the last fifty years have led to the wide dissemination of WMD knowledge and lowered barriers to entry. Relatively sophisticated chemical agents, and even crude biological agents, are within the reach of many non-state actors with a modicum of scientific knowledge. Non-state actors may acquire WMD, either through clandestine production, statesponsorship, or theft. Also of concern is the potential for severe instability in WMD states and resulting loss of control of these weapons. In these cases, the United States, through a concerted interagency and partner nation effort, must be prepared to detect, tag and track, intercept, and destroy WMD and related materials. We must also be prepared to act quickly to secure those weapons and materials in cases where a state loses control of its weapons, especially nuclear devices. Should the worst happen, and we are attacked, we must be able to sustain operations during that attack and help mitigate the consequences of WMD attacks at home or overseas. . . .

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