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INSIDE THE PENTAGON - www.InsideDefense.com

July 17, 2008

Space challenge also cited

Pentagon Lays Out Three Obstacles To Nuclear Deterrence

An administration official said this week the United States faces three obstacles to its traditional concept of nuclear deterrence in today's more complex security environment, as well as new hurdles with space evolving into a potential conflict zone.

The challenges to the typical idea of nuclear deterrence are founded on separate notions that deterrence is either irrelevant because the country has no enemies, impossible because all the United States' adversaries are crazy or too complicated to understand, according to the administration official who spoke on July 15 in Washington.

The first argument is that Americans have no serious enemies because Russia is no longer an ideological opponent while China is even less so, the official said. North Korea and Iran, moreover, are adversaries but they are even smaller and vastly weaker than the United States, he explained.

This rationale is sometimes reflected on Capitol Hill when lawmakers are reluctant to fund initiatives like replacement warheads for the nuclear arsenal, he asserted. More and more, Congress is asking DOD to articulate the need for such weapons as well as the requirements, he added.

The second theory, which espouses that deterrence is impossible because Americans face opponents that cannot be stopped, is based on the idea Iran is led by a religious fanatic bent on the destruction of Israel and the West, North Korea's president is erratic at best and sometimes has a tenuous grip of reality and that terrorists seek weapons of mass destruction, the official said.

The final idea that deterrence is too complicated means that one cannot reliably calculate deterrence relationships anymore, he said. For instance, he said, the current administration faces a mix of regional balances in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, which are overlaid by intercontinental, bilateral deterrence relationships. In turn, these regional deterrence dynamics may not be particularly sensitive to U.S. deterrence influence, the official explained.

As a result, it is easy to imagine a regional conflict in which local passions simply overwhelm any messages the United States is trying to send, continued the official.

The official said the ability to discourage enemies is further complicated by scant American government experience in dissuading countries like North Korea and Iran. Although the United States lacks a good grip on the countries' decision-making processes, leadership values and the way they communicate their messages, it is evident they do hold high regime survival.

In contrast, the United States has a 45-year history of deterrence with the former Soviet Union, the official explained.

None of these challenges, however, invalidates the basic concept of deterrence, he argued. Rather, the challenges require the administration to think about new ways to apply the practice, as well as new capabilities that are needed, he said.

Today, the United States is moving toward an adaptive planning approach tailored to each adversary and is trying to focus on pre-conflict activities that allow it to reemphasize deterrence, the official noted. He said missile defense also plays a role in convincing an adversary it cannot achieve its goals by military means and helps to reduce

the opportunities for coercion and blackmail.

At the same time, space will also pose a challenge to Americans trying to stem conflict, he added.

It is an increasingly congested domain, according to the official, with a number of nations such as China pursuing a range of worrisome technologies that may be used in space.

In a bid to prevent attacks against American assets in space, the government intends to inform potential adversaries that interference will spur a response, he told the audience.

Moreover, he said, it will consider the use of all elements of national power in protecting its right to transit space.

Carrying out deterrence in that domain may require improving situational awareness, fine-tuning distributed architectures that make it more difficult to take down space assets and developing space coalitions prepared to respond to attacks on individual nations, he explained. -- *Fawzia Sheikh*

<http://insidedefense.com/secure/print/PENTAGON.pdf>

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INSIDE THE PENTAGON - www.INSIDEDefense.com

Effort will examine new triad

Pentagon To Create Strategic Analysis Group On Nuclear Issues

The Defense Department is in the midst of creating a strategic analysis group to examine a range of issues such as the effect of nuclear force levels on stability, as well as to support the work of the government's nuclear-related initiatives, according to an administration official.

The group will consist of action officers, colonels and senior civil servants, the official told *Inside the Pentagon* on June 15. He did not comment on when precisely the group will stand up.

The official noted that DOD had attempted to create such an organization in the past but it was not successful. The new group will eye issues related to the so-called new triad, the official said. The new triad provides a mix of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that include nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities; active and passive defenses; and a robust research, development and industrial infrastructure, according to DOD. The group will assess nuclear matters in the context of the Strategic Posture Review Commission and the Nuclear Posture Review, the official said.

The Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization Act mandated the creation of the Strategic Posture Review Commission.

The bipartisan panel's mission is to assess the role of nonproliferation programs and missile defenses in U.S. strategic policies, according to a March 19 House Armed Services Committee statement. The 12 commissioners,

led by former Defense Secretary William Perry, will seek bipartisan consensus among its members and report its findings to Congress in the spring of 2009.

The Nuclear Posture Review is examining stockpile requirements over the next five to 10 years.

"The new NPR would include a review of the policy objectives with respect to nuclear forces and weapons and include the relationship among [U.S.] nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives," according to a government report (*ITP*, June 14, 2007, p5).

"In addition, the new NPR would look at the role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces play in determining the size and role of nuclear forces," the report states. The review results should be used as the basis for negotiating arms control agreements with other nations, it adds. -- *Fawzia Sheikh*

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INSIDE THE PENTAGON - www.INSIDEDefense.com

July 17, 2008 7

Initial report expected this year

Panel Members For New Nuclear Command And Control Board Named

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has blessed the appointments of a five-member executive panel of the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) Comprehensive Review Committee which will lead a multiagency review tasked with revamping command and control capabilities for U.S. nuclear weapons programs, *Inside the Pentagon* has learned.

Former U.S. Strategic Command chief Adm. Richard Mies will head up the executive panel, according to Capt. Michael Budney, deputy director of NCCS support staff.

Former White House Counsel A.B. Culvahouse, Assistant Defense Secretary for Networks and Information Integration John Grimes, National Nuclear Security Administration chief Thomas D'Agostino, former CIA Deputy Director Adm. William Studeman and former Director of Sandia National Laboratories Paul Robinson round out the executive committee's membership, Budney told *ITP*.

NCCS participants held a series of closed door meetings earlier this month, which were designed to provide the executive committee with information about the Nuclear Command and Control System and for the committee to "provide broad direction for the working and research groups regarding areas to be reviewed during the coming months," Budney said.

Budney declined to comment on the specifics of those briefings, citing security. However he noted that the working and research groups are expecting to present their preliminary findings to the executive panel by the end of this year.

The working and research groups are led by members of the Pentagon, Air Force, Navy, NNSA, Office of the Director of Intelligence, FBI, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, he said. No other formal agreements between the participating agencies were required to enable this interagency study, Budney added.

The first working group will explore "intelligence and other support" elements of the nuclear C2 system, the spokesman said. Members of the intelligence working group will evaluate information assurance systems, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, communications and "threats to the nuclear weapons enterprise."

The second working group will focus on C2 elements of the actual nuclear weapons systems, specifically on weapon delivery systems, warheads and the overall stockpile.

The third working subpanel will drill down into security issues related to the U.S. nuclear stockpile, from physical security of nuclear weapon systems to response strategies in cases of accidents or other "incidents" to the

stockpile.

The fourth and final group will take a hard look at the command and control structure of the stockpile with an eye toward planning and execution of nuclear weapon strikes.

DOD created the temporary panel Jan. 17 following a request from U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. Kevin Chilton (*ITP*, May 15, p1).

Chilton noted in a December 2007 missive that since the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 28 in 2003 -- which supported the implementation of high-level policy guidance for protecting the homeland against nuclear terrorism -- "there has been no inter-departmental, comprehensive review of nuclear command and control responsibilities."

In the interim, "significant policy and guidance changes, emerging threats and vulnerabilities . . . and technological opportunities and challenges have occurred," Chilton wrote in the letter requesting the panel's creation.

"These factors affect the ability of the eight federal departments and agencies comprising the NCCS to maintain an appropriate balance between assuring authorized use of nuclear weapons, while assuring against unauthorized or inadvertent use," Chilton wrote.

Since Chilton's December 2007 letter, U.S. officials have recently endured two embarrassing, high-profile incidents in which U.S. military personnel mistakenly transported sensitive nuclear weapons material.

Last August, six live nuclear cruise missiles on board an Air Force B-52 bomber were accidentally flown from across the United States from Minot Air Force Base, ND, to Barksdale AFB, LA. Air Force officials discovered the aircraft's highly dangerous cargo only after the bomber landed at Barksdale AFB that same day.

In March, it was discovered that the Pentagon had mistakenly shipped four ballistic missile detonators to Taiwan three years prior as part of what was thought to be a shipment of helicopter batteries to the Asian nation.

The fallout from both incidents contributed to Gates' decision to fire former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley on June 5. -- *Carlo Muñoz*

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Washington Times

July 17, 2008

Pg. B1

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz

New Iran NIE

The U.S. intelligence community in May completed a major National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran that concluded the Iranian military is building up its missile and conventional forces but that its forces remain relatively outdated, according to U.S. officials.

The classified assessment, circulated to senior policy-makers, comes amid rising tensions in the region over Iran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment and concerns that Israel or the United States will take military action to knock out Iranian nuclear facilities.

Intelligence officials familiar with the estimate declined to disclose its details or even its key judgments, noting that the entire document is classified.

However, the officials said one of the strategic issues discussed in the estimate is whether Iranian military forces have the capability to follow through on threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipping in the event of a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran. An estimated 20 to 40 percent of the world's oil passes through the 21-mile strait.

That question was discussed earlier this month by Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who said the Iranian military could threaten the strait with its forces but could not keep it closed in response to U.S. and allied military action to re-open it.

Asked about Iranian Revolutionary Guards' threats to shut down Hormuz, Adm. Mullen told reporters July 2 that: "The analysis that I have certainly indicates that they have capabilities which could certainly hazard the Straits of Hormuz," Adm. Mullen said July 2. "But ... I believe that the ability to sustain that is not there."

The classified estimate is the first all-agency assessment related to Iran since the questionable estimate of Iran's nuclear program made public in December. That estimate stated that Iran had halted work on its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Senior U.S. intelligence officials later backtracked from the nuclear estimate, stating that Iran continues to seek nuclear arms.

"The Iranian military has an inventory of aging equipment of mixed origins - U.S., Soviet and Chinese - and is heavily reliant on foreign procurement," a defense official told Inside the Ring. "Recent Iranian attempts to acquire

advanced air defense systems from Russia, such as the SA-15 and the SA-20 [surface-to-air missiles], reflect Tehran's attempts to modernize its defense capabilities."

DIA Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples told Congress in February that the Iranian navy buildup includes "asymmetric equipment such as fast missile patrol boats as well as anti-ship cruise missiles and naval mines." Gen. Maples also said Iran is "building an asymmetric capability to counter more advanced, adversary ground forces, including through enhancements to its Basij volunteer forces, which would play a large role in an asymmetric fight." Its missiles can hit targets in Israel and central Europe, he said.

Iran's recent missile tests near the Strait of Hormuz included a test firing of a Shahab-3 medium range missile.

Commanders appeal

The commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. European Command this week wrote to Senate leaders urging full funding of the \$712 million request for missile defenses in Poland and Czech Republic, noting Iran's recent missile tests.

"Iran's actions last week illustrate the imperative of global missile defenses," said Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, the strategic commander, and Army Gen. Bantz Craddock, the European commander. "We cannot wait to counter long-range, WMD-capable Iranian missiles. Deploying missile defenses in Europe would demonstrate our resolve to deter this threat, and protect our nation and allies by providing a critical capability to the war fighter.

"This funding supports the vital implementation of bilateral missile defense agreements reached by the United States to address the growing threats to Europe and North America from Southwest Asia," they stated.

The generals stated they are "in complete agreement that Europe requires a layered defense enabled by a network of sensors and credible interceptor capability," according to the July 14 letter.

The combatant commanders responsible for military operations in Europe and global missile defense operations noted that "our best military advice leads us to strongly endorse the president's funding request for European missile defense sites."

"These capabilities remain critical to defending America and our allies in Europe, and for deterring our adversaries today and in the future."

The letter was sent to Sen. Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia Democrat and chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and four other senators.

21st Century deterrence

Strategic national security specialist Keith B. Payne warns in a new book that U.S. strategic deterrence theory and policy is stuck in the Cold War and needs to be revamped to deter 21st century threats. He also argues that the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons arsenal must be sustained because of the risk that nuclear deterrence will fail.

The book, "The Great American Gamble," presents in detail how U.S. theorists and policy-makers beginning in the 1960s agreed to leave the country vulnerable to a massive Soviet nuclear attack because it was viewed as good for "stability." Mr. Payne is currently president of the National Institute for Public Policy, a private think tank.

However, threats today from radical and rogue states like Iran and North Korea argue for new deterrence theories and policies that include strategic defenses - like missile defenses - as well as air defenses and civil defenses of the population.

The reason: Threats of massive retaliation are not likely to deter states and especially terrorists groups, especially those seeking and threatening to use weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Payne, until 2003 the deputy assistant defense secretary for forces and policy, writes that U.S. nuclear weapons must be sustained because of the risk of "deterrence failure."

The al Qaeda suicide bombings with hijacked airliners in the Sept. 11 attacks highlighted the military's outdated air defense deterrent policies that grew out of "this Cold War definition of 'stable' deterrence," he wrote.

The resulting policy "left a legacy most apparent at the time of the 9/11 attacks," Mr. Payne stated. "The norm of U.S. societal vulnerability had become so well-established that the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) could call on but a few immediately ready interceptors," he said. "Apparently, not all of those few interceptors were armed," he said. "There is little wonder that, according to The 9/11 Commission Report, the absence of U.S. air defense capabilities at the time, '...led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured to protect the United States.' That was an understatement. The lack of significant U.S. air defense capabilities was the cumulative effect of U.S. government policy choices for almost four decades prior to the 9/11 attacks."

Bill Gertz covers national security affairs.

<http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jul/17/inside-the-ring-43010637/>

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Nuclear Weapons: Views on NNSA's Proposal to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex

by Gene Aloise, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Committee on Armed Services.

GAO-08-1032T, July 17.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1032T>

Highlights - <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d081032thigh.pdf>

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Washington Times

July 18, 2008

Pg. 24

Trust Still Needs Verification

By Richard Lugar

Although it escaped most news media attention, the United States received an important bit of good news over the July 4 holiday: Russia's parliament overwhelmingly approved legislation that enables the United States and Russia to continue their 16-year cooperation to safeguard and destroy the vast Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenal, which to this day remains a danger to both countries.

The 336-9 vote to renew the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, which had been pending for more than a year, reaffirms the crucial role of non-proliferation in U.S.-Russian relations.

This agreement underpins all U.S. weapons dismantlement programs in the former Soviet Union. It protects U.S. funding and equipment provided for weapons cleanup from being taxed by Russian authorities, and protects U.S. contractors - who are doing much of the most difficult work - from liability in case of an accident or other mishap.

The previous agreement had expired and was extended on a temporary basis, casting a cloud of uncertainty over major projects. Without these guarantees, work would have halted.

The vote comes as the Nunn-Lugar program is in the process of passing some important milestones. Since 1992, more than 2,000 former Soviet intercontinental missiles have been dismantled and more than 7,200 nuclear warheads have been deactivated. Together, the United States and Russia have eliminated more nuclear weapons than the combined arsenals of Britain, France and China.

By year's end, Nunn-Lugar will eliminate the last of the Soviets' rail-mobile intercontinental missiles - the SS-24 carried 10 warheads each capable of destroying a city. The program will also continue eliminating road-mobile SS-25 missiles (one warhead each), the giant SS-18 (10 warheads each) and SS-19 (six warheads each) missiles and their silos, and the SS-N-20 (10 warheads each) submarine-launched missiles. It will upgrade the physical security systems at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites in Russia.

Most importantly, after many delays and bureaucratic roadblocks in both Moscow and Washington, the first munitions destruction building will become operational at the vast chemical weapons depot at Shchuch'ye, in Siberia. There, more than 2 million rounds of deadly nerve gas - including small, portable shells capable of killing everyone in a football stadium - have been under security provided by Nunn-Lugar. Such munitions are an ideal target for terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Once the dangerous task to dispose of these weapons is underway, it will take several years to finish. The world will be a far safer place as a result. This is an example of the U.S.-Russian cooperation that can continue and thrive in the face of the ups and downs of a relationship that often finds our countries at odds.

In that spirit, the Bush administration should now focus on enhancing America's own security by extending and strengthening the START Treaty, currently the central arms agreement between our two countries. Under its terms, both sides agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 3,500 warheads. Unfortunately, it is set to expire next year unless it is extended.

More recently, the U.S. and Russia concluded the Moscow Treaty, which calls for further cuts to as low as 1,700 warheads. However, the Moscow Treaty lacks a formal verification regime to give confidence to both sides and reduce the odds of misinterpretation and error. Our relations with Moscow are complicated enough without adding more uncertainty.

This shortcoming was to be remedied by extending START's verification system. Yet increasingly, there are signs the administration intends to let START expire, or accept a much watered-down verification process. Some in the administration argue that START's Cold War verification regime is out of step with the new U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

By contrast, administration officials testified to the importance of START during Senate consideration of the Moscow Treaty in 2003. This is not a mere technical issue - the foundation of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship is about to expire and with it, the key basis for trust between the two sides.

This should be an easy call for President Bush: both President Dmitry Medvedev and former President, now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin favor extending START. Failure to renew START will be seen worldwide as weakening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a further sign to many foreign leaders and experts that U.S. nonproliferation policy is adrift.

I urge President Bush to reject efforts to downgrade the START Treaty or let it expire and extend the treaty's verification rules, thereby strengthening both the nonproliferation regime and America's most critical bilateral relationship.

Richard Lugar is a Republican member of the United States Senate from Indiana.

<http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jul/18/trust-still-needs-verification/>

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Washington Post

July 19, 2008

Pg. 11

Rice To Meet N. Korean Diplomat

Gathering With Asian Foreign Ministers Is Called 'Informal'

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will meet next week with her North Korean counterpart and the foreign ministers of four other countries involved in the effort to end Pyongyang's nuclear programs, the State Department said yesterday.

The session, which will take place on the sidelines of a Southeast Asia security conference in Singapore, will mark Rice's first meeting with the North Korean official, Pak Ui Chun, and follows on an extraordinary thawing in the tensions between the two countries. North Korea last month demolished the cooling tower attached to its Yongbyon nuclear facility after President Bush notified Congress that he intended to remove the country from the list of sponsors of terrorism.

The North Korean talks have entered a delicate stage. While North Korea has declared how much plutonium it possesses, and has broadly agreed to cooperate in the verification of its claims, the technical details of that process remain under discussion. North Korea also has not disclosed how many weapons it has, nor has it provided details on other possible programs or its participation in the building of a Syrian reactor destroyed by Israel last year.

The meeting is billed as an "informal" gathering of the foreign ministers from the countries participating in the six-party talks, which also include China, South Korea, Russia and Japan. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said it is not expected to yield any breakthroughs.

"This is not going to be a meeting that produces specific outcomes," McCormack told reporters. "It's really a meeting to review where the six-party process is at the moment."

Still, the foreign ministers of the countries involved in the effort have never before met as a group, signifying a new level of engagement in an on-and-off process launched five years ago. Rice has frequently spoken of her desire to turn the six-nation negotiating process into a broader security forum for Northeast Asia if North Korea gives up its weapons.

The ministerial meeting also marks the Bush administration's further evolution in its dealings with countries that the president in 2002 said were part of an "axis of evil." The president this week approved sending the State Department's third-ranking official, Undersecretary William J. Burns, to an international meeting being held today in Geneva on Iran's nuclear program -- another first.

In Bush's first term, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in 2002 and 2004 met briefly with Pak's predecessor at the same Southeast Asia conference. Powell arranged the 2002 meeting without notifying the White House. He told his aides that he wanted to "accidentally" bump into his counterpart over coffee, and they passed word to the North Korean delegation.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/18/AR2008071803059.html>

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New York Times

July 20, 2008

Pg. 1

U.S. Is Present, But Iran Nuclear Talks End In Stalemate

By Elaine Sciolino

GENEVA — International talks on Iran's nuclear ambitions ended in deadlock on Saturday, despite the Bush administration's decision to reverse policy and send a senior American official to the table for the first time.

The presence of William J. Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, was one of the most important encounters between Iran and the United States since relations were severed nearly three decades ago. And it was part of a rare show of unity among the six negotiating partners — the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia and China — who pressed Iran to accept compromise.

But Iran responded with a written document that failed to address the main issue: international demands that it stop enriching uranium. And Iranian diplomats reiterated before the talks that they considered the issue nonnegotiable. Specifically, the world powers wanted Iran to accept a formula known as “freeze-for-freeze” to break the deadlock. Under the formula, Iran would not add to its nuclear program, and the United States and other powers would not seek new international sanctions for six weeks to pave the way for formal negotiations. The proposal was originally offered to Iran last year and presented again to it last month as part of a new proposal to ultimately give Iran economic and political incentives if it stops producing enriched uranium.

But officials involved in Saturday's negotiations said that when they repeatedly pressed the Iranians to say whether they could accept the idea, the question was evaded every time.

“We still didn't get the answer we were looking for,” the European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, said at a news conference after several hours of talks, held in Geneva's City Hall.

Mr. Solana said the Iranians were given two weeks to formally respond to the proposal before it would be withdrawn.

At the news conference, Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief negotiator, refused to answer whether Iran would accept a freeze of its uranium enrichment program, however temporary. But he called the negotiating process a “very beautiful endeavor” with a result that he hoped would eventually be “beautiful to behold.”

Mr. Burns did not speak privately with Mr. Jalili. But in a brief statement in the morning meeting, he said that the United States was serious in its support for the six-power process and serious that Iran must suspend its production of enriched uranium, the State Department said.

He told his negotiating partners after the talks that the United States would push for new punitive sanctions at the United Nations Security Council in September, one participant in the meeting said.

Saturday's meeting at Geneva's City Hall was one of the most important public encounters between an Iranian and an American official since relations were halted after the American Embassy was seized in Tehran in 1979.

Other authorized meetings have occurred. Madeleine K. Albright, as secretary of state, for example, once sat at the same table with then Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and other emissaries at the United Nations to discuss Afghanistan. Colin L. Powell, as secretary of state, once shook Mr. Kharrazi's hand. American and Iranian officials have met episodically in Baghdad to discuss Iraq's security.

But Saturday's meeting was the highest-level session between the countries during the Bush administration, which once branded Iran part of an “axis of evil” and has not ruled out military action against Iran because of its nuclear ambitions.

It comes as the Bush administration, in its final months, has told some of its closest allies that the United States was moving forward with a plan to establish an American diplomatic presence in Tehran for the first time since the rupture in bilateral relations.

But for some, it is hard to understand why the Americans have made a diplomatic gesture with Mr. Burns's participation at this time. America's negotiating partners, particularly Britain, had wanted an American presence when they traveled to Tehran last month to present an enhanced package of incentives. That moment, officials said, would have been meaningful and more logical.

Instead, Mr. Burns came to the table when the Iranians were giving their reply, and there had never been a strong signal that it was going to be different from the past.

Despite the shift in American willingness to talk, one point of policy clearly has not changed: the Bush administration wants to avoid the impression that it is negotiating with Iran before it suspends its production of enriched uranium, which can be used to make electricity or fuel bombs.

Even the subject of a joint photograph was one of dispute. The only photo accepted by the American side was one with all parties at the table. The Americans objected to the idea of a photo of Mr. Solana and Mr. Jalili at a joint news conference with Mr. Burns and the other participants standing behind them.

Complicating the diplomacy was the fact that before Saturday's talks, the six powers were not united on a joint strategy on how to proceed. The American delegation had told its partners that Mr. Burns's appearance was a one-time event and that Iran had two weeks to decide whether to accept the “freeze-for-freeze” formula.

Germany, Russia and China, by contrast, argued that there should be time to explore the negotiating track with Iran.

There were other disagreements among the six powers as well. France and Britain have argued that there should be a precise definition of what the Iranians would have to freeze to open the way to formal talks.

But those disagreements evaporated during the talks with Iran. The six powers presented a united front in pushing the Iranians to give a clear answer on whether they were willing to make the good-faith gesture of halting new nuclear activity to pave the way for formal talks.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=U.S.%20Is%20Present,%20But%20Iran%20Nuclear%20Talks%20End%20In%20Stalemate&st=cse&oref=slogin

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Washington Times

July 21, 2008

Pg. 27

Keep U.S. Nukes

Deterrence is job number one

By Peter Huessy

At a June 27 Washington seminar, Gen. Larry Welch, USAF (ret.), former chief of staff and commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, warned about the all-too-complacent attitude we have toward nuclear weapons and maintaining deterrence. Gen. Welch criticized the erroneous view that going to zero nuclear weapons on our part will somehow ease the strains of nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea: "Too many believe that U.S. security can be strengthened by letting our nuclear weapons capabilities wither away."

Gen. Welch noted that believing that "the danger of proliferation and counterproliferation trumps all other considerations" results in a view that "we don't need a nuclear deterrent at this moment." But whatever surface appeal this has is washed away by hard reality. The capability to destroy the United States exists in the inventory of nuclear weapons in Russia, as during the Cold War. And the motivation existed to destroy the United States if the attacker could get away with it. "Now today the intent does not exist. But the capability does and the intent can change overnight," he said.

All things must stem from this inescapable logic - of the relationship between capability and intent. Gen. Welch said that before risking the elimination of nuclear deterrence, a discussion of this relationship must be held. But "I have heard none," he added. In fact, among those states or actors who aspire to attain nuclear weapons, which will give that desire up if we do? Answer: zero. What nation, not now seeking nuclear weapons, will do so if we sustain a reliable, safe and secure nuclear deterrent? Answer: zero. And what nation will seek to gain nuclear capabilities if it loses confidence in our nuclear-umbrella deterrent? Answer: many.

Gen. Welch emphasized: "The purpose of a reliable, safe, and secure deterrent capability is to serve as a deterrent. A retaliatory capability is essential to a credible deterrent, but it is an enabler, not the objective. If deterrence fails, we have failed in our purpose. We need to maintain a nuclear deterrent so as not to need to use it." Thus the imperatives are reliable, safe and secure weapons and a sustainable policy that pays total attention to the nuclear enterprise. If our weapons are reliable, safe and secure, their credibility cannot be questioned and therefore we would not have to use them. These weapons are designed to be responsive and are not on "hair-trigger alert," although some have been saying our ICBMs need to be de-alerted. In fact, "ICBMs have the most positive control under all conditions - and this never changes," said Gen. Welch.

The general never had to worry about ICBMs. They have the most constant positive command and control and still do to this day since their status remains constant in peace or crisis. "Why change an approach that has proven totally safe and reliable in times of calm and times of crisis for more than half a century? Whoever is recommending this is not adequately considering the full consequences of their recommendation," he said.

The strategy during the Cold War was the product of years of intense intellectual focus and debate. But "this has not been the case for the situation in the 21st century. The role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century is more complex than during the Cold War and intense policy attention is urgently needed," said Gen. Welch.

We need to pay more attention to the nuclear enterprise. Success over time has bred the perception of indifference to this enterprise. Said Gen. Welch: "My review ... showed committed individuals at the lower ranks who understood the nuclear mission's importance despite their senior leadership's lack of attention or understanding; however, no matter how dedicated those people are, that is at the wrong level of leadership to be focused on the nuclear enterprise."

What about moving to significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons, such as eliminating land-based missiles? Gen. Welch - the former military commander of all U.S. nuclear forces - noted that while we know the submarine missile fleet is the most survivable, it can be attrited over time. But there is no motivation to do so while there are significant numbers of ICBMs on alert. Further, there is no motivation to attack the ICBM force. With the

configuration of single-warhead ICBMs and arms-control agreements that have drastically reduced strategic warheads, ICBMs have become a stabilizing force. Without them, a pre-emptive attack may be more likely, the nuclear threshold may be diminished and the possibility for conflict increases.

Nuclear weapons are critical to U.S. security. Nuclear deterrence is job number one. Any aspirant to the presidency must explain how the U.S. nuclear enterprise will be maintained and avoid making proposals that are bumper-sticker slogans that will give the appearance of an America less than committed to its job as the leader of the free world.

Peter Huessy is president of GeoStrategic Analysis.

<http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jul/21/keep-us-nukes/>

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New York Times

July 22, 2008

Pg. 8

Iran Offers 2 Pages And No Ground In Nuclear Talks

By Elaine Sciolino

PARIS — The Iranians called their proposal a “None paper.”

Indeed, for officials of the six countries sitting on the other side of the table, the paper addressed none of their ideas for resolving the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.

Instead, the informal two-page document that Iran distributed at nuclear talks in Geneva on Saturday ignored the main six-power demand on curbing Iran’s enrichment of uranium and called for concessions from the other side.

The title of the English-language text had two mistakes. “The Modality for Comprehensive Negotiations (None paper),” it read, according to a copy obtained by The New York Times. (Diplomatic jargon for an unofficial negotiating document is “nonpaper.”)

For the six powers — the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany — the paper’s substance was just as disappointing as its style. Sergei Kisliak, the Russian deputy foreign minister, could not suppress a laugh when he read it, according to one participant.

The talks on Saturday included the participation of a senior American official for the first time. The six powers were hoping that Iran would accept a compromise formula to pave the way to formal negotiations. For six weeks, Iran would not add “any new nuclear activity,” refraining from the new installation of centrifuges that enrich uranium, and the United States and other powers would not seek new United Nations sanctions.

But both in their paper, and throughout the talks, the Iranians did not discuss the formula, called a “freeze for freeze.” As a result, they left the impression that they wanted to lure the parties into an open-ended, cost-free, high-level negotiating process.

“The paper calls for a huge exercise in talking,” said one senior European official. “If you were to try to implement it, it would take a minimum of several years.”

Officials spoke on condition of anonymity under normal diplomatic rules.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Iran on Monday that it could not continue to “stall” and she warned of more sanctions if it defied a two-week deadline to accept the proposal.

The Iranian document, which has not been made public, offered a snapshot of Iran’s negotiating style. It put the burden on the other parties. Its imprecise language and misspellings were in sharp contrast to the rigorous approach by Iranian negotiators, many of them career diplomats, who were in charge in 2003 when France, Britain and Germany began the initiative of incentives in exchange for suspension of major nuclear activities. Those diplomats have since been replaced.

The paper called for at least three more meetings with Javier Solana, the European Union foreign policy chief, who represents the six powers. Those would be followed by at least four meetings at the foreign ministers’ level, which would start with the halting of any sanctions against Iran, “both inside and outside” the United Nations Security Council.

The Iranian document also seemed to suggest that there could be no discussion of the main issue of contention: some sort of limit on Iran’s production of enriched uranium, which can be used to make electricity or to fuel bombs. “The parties will abstain from referring to or discussing divergent issues that can potentially hinder the progress of negotiations,” the paper said.

The six powers want to use their proposed freeze-for-freeze period as a prelude to formal negotiations on a package of economic, political, technological and security rewards. But Iran has to stop enriching uranium for the formal talks to begin.

In its paper, Iran focused only on negotiating a “comprehensive agreement” for the rewards. The paper also said current international sanctions against Iran would be discontinued. The Iranian nuclear issue will no longer be dealt

with by the Security Council or the 35-country governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Only the atomic energy agency itself can deal with the subject, the paper said.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/22/world/22iran.html?scp=1&sq=Iran%20Offers%20%20Pages%20And%20No%20Ground%20In%20Nuclear%20Talks&st=cse>

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Department of Homeland Security

Testimony of Jeffrey W. Runge, MD before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology

Release Date: July 22, 2008

Providence, RI

Good morning Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on this important and timely issue. My colleagues and I have testified before your Subcommittee on several occasions on this topic, and I appreciate your continued interest in ensuring that an outbreak of a disease, intentional or natural in origin, does not threaten our homeland security, economic stability, and our Nation's critical infrastructures and key resources. I am thus pleased to have the opportunity to share our views with you and your constituents through this hearing in Providence, RI.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, this is one of the last events where I will appear as the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as I will be leaving Federal service at the beginning of August. I delayed the timing of my departure in order to testify once again to the urgency and importance of giving sufficient attention to biological threats to our Nation. At this, my last hearing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you personally for all that you have done to ensure the success of the Office of Health Affairs and our mission to make the Nation safer and more secure.

Today I will discuss a number of important issues surrounding emerging biological threats and our Nation's preparedness, including: the current biological threat environment as illustrated by the effect a biological attack might have in a city like Providence, our approach to bio-surveillance and environmental detection, and the roles and responsibilities of Federal, State, local and the private sector in response to and recovery from a biological attack. Providing this information to the public creates a more resilient public. By reducing the elements of surprise, fear and panic, we can reduce the terror associated with such an event, making the public reaction a key part of the solution rather than the problem.

Current Biological Threat

The risk of a large-scale biological attack on the Nation is significant. We know that our terrorist enemies have sought to use biological agents as instruments of their warfare, and we believe that capability is within their reach. I know many here today recall the anthrax attacks of 2001. As you know, Mr. Chairman, certain buildings occupied by Members of the Legislative Branch were temporarily closed while they were decontaminated. The magnitude of that terrorist attack is miniscule compared to the larger, anthrax release envisioned by our enemies. It is nonetheless exemplary of the potential health and economic damage to which we are vulnerable. Unfortunately, the threat has not diminished since then - in fact, it has been building since well before the attacks of 9/11.

We know that, in the late 1990s, al-Qaeda began developing a biological weapons program and constructed a low-tech facility in Qandahar, Afghanistan for anthrax production. Fortunately, U.S. military forces disrupted this activity and additional American and coalition operations in the region have damaged al-Qaeda leadership and operational capabilities - but not their intent to use biological weapons. You will recall that in 2002, al-Qaeda stated that they had the right to kill 4 million Americans - 2 million of them children - and cripple thousands. An advisor to bin Laden later issued a fatwa on the permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction and increased the 4 million casualty figure to 10 million.

We have determined that al-Qaeda seeks to develop and use a biological weapon to cause mass casualties in an attack on the homeland. Our analysis indicates that anthrax is a likely choice; and a successful single-city attack on an unprepared population could kill hundreds of thousands of citizens. A coordinated attack on multiple targets would come much closer in magnitude to our enemy's goal. Because of this, we see the threat of an aerosolized anthrax attack as our number one bioterrorism concern, and it is that threat which we vigorously plan, invest and intend to defeat. Our efforts are not optional or discretionary. The ramifications of such an attack include tremendous loss of life, economic costs, damage to critical infrastructure, and unprecedented environmental contamination.

A biological attack would impact every sector of our society - not just the medical and public health communities. A biological attack respects no geographic or geopolitical boundary and will have an impact well beyond our nation's emergency departments and public health infrastructure. Absenteeism across multiple sectors due to illness, fear of contagion, or public health measures could threaten the function of critical infrastructure, the movement of goods and services, and the operation of our institutions. No Federal department or agency will be exempt from the consequences of such an attack. Further, critical life-saving activities will depend on actions taken in the first few moments of the event. State and local governments will be called on to take several critical actions - alerting the public of the crisis without inciting panic; maintaining public confidence while making critical decisions; and bolstering local communities to rebound quickly.

As we work together to counter this threat, we must keep in mind that acts of biological terrorism don't go "bang." It could be hours or even days before we realize the full extent of an incident. Because of the lack of an explosion or immediate visual damage, many do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that of a nuclear or conventional strike, even though such an attack could kill as many people as a nuclear detonation and have its own long-term environmental effects. This has caused a lack of public urgency in devoting significant resources to countering this threat - a luxury we simply cannot afford.

Mr. Chairman, many people ask me "what keeps you up at night?" It is the possibility of a large-scale biological attack on our homeland.

Threat Awareness

Given the challenges we face in assessing current terrorist capabilities and identifying plots, it is unlikely that we will receive actionable or specific warning of an imminent biological attack. Furthermore, many of these deadly biological agents, including anthrax, are readily available in nature, relatively easy to procure, culture, and weaponize. There are numerous domestic and international biological research programs using these agents for legitimate purposes, making it more difficult to separate the ill-intentioned research initiatives. As a result, it is unlikely that we will have credible knowledge of an imminent biological threat before it occurs.

This is why it is imperative that we continue to enhance our Nation's efforts to disrupt biological plots, provide the earliest possible detection and warning of an attack, strengthen our preparedness and response efforts, and increase our capacity to quickly recover.

Secretary Chertoff and I have been promoting the inclusion of health and medical expertise in our State and local fusion centers as they develop and expand. OHA is working with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to provide information on biological threats to communities in harm's way and to encourage fusion centers to tap into local expertise in public health and health care to be a part of their information fusion. We have begun discussions with the HHS Assistant Secretary for Health regarding the incorporation of officers from the corps of the U.S. Public Health Service to help communities achieve this capability. DHS will be holding meetings in the late summer and early fall with States and local representatives with the goal of providing information on the biological threat and discussing the value of public health in fusion centers.

Providence, RI

While it is easy for us to assume that terrorists are only interested in striking major cities such as Washington, D.C. or New York City, we cannot ignore the attractiveness of softer targets to our enemies. On April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City experienced the horrors of terrorism when a truck bomb was detonated in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, killing 168 people, including 19 children, and injuring hundreds more. Who would have thought that Oklahoma City would have been a target for terrorism? It is therefore imperative that all States and local jurisdictions are adequately prepared to handle events across the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear spectrum, as well as more conventional attacks or naturally occurring outbreaks.

The city of Providence, like many mid-size cities, has a number of characteristics that make it potentially attractive as a target, such as its proximity to military assets, major metropolitan areas, and an important transportation routes. An aerosolized sprayer releasing air-borne anthrax particles into the air throughout a city like Providence would not necessarily be detected in the immediate aftermath of the release. Clinical symptoms of inhalational anthrax would not be discovered for at least two or three days after the attack occurred, yet the health effects and environmental consequences could be catastrophic.

Surveillance and Detection

It is critical to receive warning of a biological attack as soon as it occurs and to identify the causative agent immediately. Such a warning would enable the prevention of most cases of inhalational anthrax, through the combined response of the CDC and its State and local partners in distributing sufficient prophylactic antibiotics to the public before the onset of disease. A delay of just one day in detection of an anthrax release - and therefore treatment of affected populations - would result in thousands of unnecessary deaths.

Sufficient early warning through environmental detection is one of the Department's top priorities, one for which the Office of Health Affairs, working with the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), is responsible. We are

investing significant amounts of taxpayer resources to our BioWatch program, which provides detection and warning of a biological attack in our Nation's highest-risk urban areas through a series of pathogen detectors. With S&T, we are developing the next generation of detectors, known as Generation 3, which will be automated and significantly reduce detection time to allow our health providers to get countermeasures into the hands of affected populations within the critical window of time to save lives.

Complementing our BioWatch capabilities is our establishment of a robust biosurveillance integration center, where other departments and agencies come together to monitor their biological data and analyze potential biological threats. The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), authorized in the 9/11 Act (P.L. 110-53), will bring together data from other Federal departments, the public domain and eventually the private sector and States and local government to understand and characterize biological events and incidents across the areas of human health, animal health, food, water and the environment. Through robust data analysis and integration across these sectors, we aim to provide the earliest possible warning of outbreaks and threats to human and veterinary health and the food and water supply. Over the past several months, we have made great progress in our governance structure. We now have all the relevant departments coming to an "ownership meeting," which recognizes that DHS is the host for NBIC, but the system belongs to every department across the Federal government that needs access to a bio-surveillance common operation picture (BCOP). We are working very closely with the CDC as they develop improved human health surveillance systems, which will be a vital element of the Government's BCOP. It is in all of our interest to ensure the success of our partner agencies' improvements in their data systems.

Federal, State and Local Response and Recovery

If a large-scale biological attack occurred here in downtown Providence using aerosolized anthrax, it would likely go undetected for days, until large numbers of people begin showing up in emergency departments and doctors' offices two to five days after the attack. Unfortunately, most cases would progress quickly to a form of pneumonia that is very resistant to treatment once it has started. The sentinel cases would be those receiving the highest doses of anthrax spores, and would be the harbinger of tens of thousands more, nearly all requiring intensive medical care, including ventilatory support and the anthrax countermeasures we have in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Federal, State and local law enforcement would seek to identify the perpetrators to prevent subsequent attacks. Since we do not know the extent of the exposure, Federal and local health officials would likely mobilize the SNS for antibiotics to be given to the population as environmental sensors and samples identify the affected areas. In such a scenario, State and local resources, including medical assets, would be taxed if not overwhelmed. Rather than a smoking building defining the extent of the victims, every man, woman, and child in the area - and every building and every farm in the plume - could be affected. This is not a pretty picture, so preparedness is required to minimize the impact.

In such a case, the Secretary of Homeland Security would stand up all of the power and assets of Federal government to manage the incident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would stand up its National Resource Coordination Center to bring Federal assets to bear. The responsibility for the public health and medical response lies within the Department of Health and Human Services under the Public Health Services Act and as the lead for Emergency Response Function (ESF) - 8: Public Health and Medical Response, with the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) as the HHS Secretary's principal advisor and as the official responsible for certain functions. In order to have the tools to execute its mission successfully, HHS has invested thousands of hours and billions of dollars to make sure we have the appropriate medical countermeasures to deal with the threats to human health. This includes research and development of new medicines, vaccines and anti-toxins, as well as their stockpiling and distribution. DHS has been their advocate and partner every step of the way. Additionally, law enforcement and security measures are directed by the Department of Justice as the lead for ESF - 13: Public Safety and Security; decontamination activities and environmental cleanup are directed by the Environmental Protection Agency as the lead for ESF - 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response; and the terrorism crime scene investigation, as well as attribution and characterization to prevent second attacks are led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our success is dependent on their success, Mr. Chairman. I encourage you to lend them your support in this effort, and encourage the support of your Congressional colleagues. While homeland security may not be the primary mission of these agencies, their homeland security responsibilities are crucial to our mission.

The Department of Homeland Security is charged with leading the overall domestic incident management, including coordinating the Federal response and integrating it with the State and local response efforts. OHA leads the DHS biodefense activities, which includes oversight and management responsibility for implementation for Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, although many other components and offices have major related responsibilities. The DHS National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, a component of S&T, is responsible for the bioforensics analysis, and working with I&A and law enforcement, to determine the likely source of the germ. Our National Operations Center (NOC) coordinates all of the Federal

operations and monitors the responses and requirements of local entities. DHS would quickly stand up a Joint Information Center (JIC) with all the relevant Departments and agencies to ensure accuracy and timeliness of information to the public. Under a Stafford Act declaration, FEMA coordinates Federal assistance to requesting States. In accordance to the National Response Framework and because a biological incident would likely be an unusually complex incident requiring extraordinary coordination Secretary Chertoff has named a pre-designated a Principal Federal Official (PFO) to lead the response to a biological event. The PFO would assist States, local and tribal governments by overseeing a coordinated Federal response. A PFO is a senior Federal official with proven management experience and strong leadership capabilities. Vice Admiral Vivien Crea of the U.S. Coast Guard is our pre-designated PFO for biological events and provides excellent leadership and knowledge.

Recommendations

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of recommendations for the Subcommittee to consider to enhance the state of preparedness in the event of a biological attack or natural outbreak.

1. Continue to support our development of next generation automated detection technologies to reduce the time-to-detect to allow the necessary time to deliver life-saving medical countermeasures to the population. Because a biological attack is so challenging to accurately predict, we must continue to refine our early detection and warning capabilities. If our partners at HHS are to deliver life-saving prophylactic antibiotics, we must be able to detect a biological release sooner. Our current detection equipment has a built-in delay of up to 36 hours, which is not consistent with the requirements of disease prophylaxis. Over time, we must seek to cover more of our Nation's population with earlier environmental warning. Such an expansion must be risk-based which takes into account population density and critical infrastructures.
2. Continue to support the development of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC). It is the one place where agencies can come together to share data across the sectors of human health, animal health, food, water and the environment. The Center illustrates the very nature of DHS - to integrate the assets and resources of sister government agencies in a protected, open environment for the purposes of subject matter expertise and information sharing. The service we must provide is a common operating picture for decision makers before and during events to afford them the best possible information upon which to make good decisions. The oversight of NBIC belongs to the Committee on Homeland Security in full view and participation of other Congressional committees and sister agencies.
3. Support the full integration of health expertise into information fusion centers. While intended initially for law enforcement, with the threats including biological and chemical events, the expertise of the health community is needed in the information fusion process. The assistance of HHS may be available to assist local agencies where needed. DHS will work with local health directors to ensure necessary security clearances and information analysis training to ensure the success of such participation.
4. Consolidate the Committee's jurisdiction over issues of homeland security. While DHS is by its authorization (P.L. 109-295) a collaborative agency, so must Congress work collaboratively to ensure a more secure homeland, empowering an effective yet supportive oversight environment. As Secretary Chertoff has mentioned on numerous occasions, the current threat environment does not lend itself to jurisdictional disputes in Congress over the Department's authorities and responsibilities. Homeland Security is a team sport and we all should have the common goal of a more secure Nation as our first priority.

Conclusion

The threat of bioterrorism against the U.S. remains a significant concern. We continue to face an enemy determined to acquire and develop biological agents into weapons of mass destruction against the Homeland. The Office of Health Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security takes this threat very seriously and are doing significant work to prevent, enhance early detection and surveillance and integrate Federal, State and local preparedness and response capabilities to reduce the catastrophic consequences of a biological attack on the Homeland.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely appreciate your dedication and efforts to enhance the security of the Nation. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. It has been a real pleasure working with you during my time at the Department of Homeland Security. I have created an office that is completely ready for the transition. I leave the Office in the experienced and capable hands of Dr. Jon R. Krohmer, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Chief Medical Officer. I ask for your support of Dr. Krohmer over the coming months, as he is eager to work with you to better secure the Homeland.

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1216677175660.shtm

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Minot airmen fell asleep with classified nuke hardware

By Michael Hoffman and Kent Miller - Staff writers Posted : Thursday Jul 24, 2008 22:11:55 EDT

Three missile officers with the 91st Space Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., fell asleep July 12 while holding a classified "code component" - a hardware device containing the codes needed to activate the control system for Minot's intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The device, kept in a locked case, installs the codes that allow the missile launch control center to command the ICBMs in the missile silos. One piece of hardware is installed and the old one is removed, somewhat akin to changing hard drives in a computer.

Four officers had completed the process of changing the codes for the system underground in the launch control center and had returned topside to the large living center, which looks much like a ranch house inside and includes six bedrooms, a large kitchen and dining area, gym and a security control center for security forces airmen, according to Air Force officials.

While waiting for permission to bring the device back to base, the three officers with the code component in their possession fell asleep. The fourth officer was not present.

When they woke up, the officers reported the incident to their command, said Col. Dewey Ford, a Space Command spokesman. Representatives from U.S.

Strategic Command, Space Command, the 91st Missile Wing at Minot, the 20th Air Force - headquartered at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and the National Security Agency investigated the incident. They found that the missile launch codes were not compromised.

Ford called the incident a "procedural violation," and emphasized that the code devices were no longer usable since the new codes had already been installed in the missiles. Ford said public safety was never at risk.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates was not notified.

"Because [the codes] were never compromised, [the Air Force] did not contact top levels of leadership," Ford said. "The procedural error involved the fact that they fell asleep. If they had stayed awake, this would not have been an issue."

Asked for comment about the incident, a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer said senators had not been informed.

During their confirmation hearing before the committee July 22, Michael Donley, who's been nominated to become Air Force secretary, and Gen. Norton Schwartz, the nominee for chief of staff, said their top priority would be shoring up nuclear surety and restoring the country's trust in the service's ability to manage its nuclear weapons and mission. They did not mention the incident.

Minot has been ground zero in the ongoing crisis surrounding the Air Force's inability to properly manage and secure its nuclear weapons.

Last August, airmen of Minot's 5th Bomb Wing mistakenly loaded six nuclear warheads onto a B-52, which then flew to Barksdale Air Force Base, La. The Stratofortress then sat on the runway at Barksdale for more than 12 hours before anyone noticed that the bombs under its wing, which were supposed to be dummies, were in fact live nuclear weapons.

The 5th Bomb Wing subsequently failed its NSI in May because of failures to properly secure its nuclear stockpile. The 91st Space Wing at Minot failed its limited nuclear surety inspection in January, also because of "critical safety and security" failures.

When inspection teams returned to Minot in May, they determined the wing had fixed its security flaws and passed the 91st.

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/07/airforce_nuclear_072408w/

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Washington Times

July 24, 2008

Pg. B1

Nuclear Fuel To Be Moved

300 tons of spent fuel in Kazakhstan

By Kelly Hearn, The Washington Times

Kazakhstan's military forces this summer held a training exercise to thwart a fake terrorist assault on a Soviet-built nuclear facility near Almaty, the country's former capital located on its southeastern border.

In the exercise, a reactor was the simulated target of terrorists trying to steal some of the deadliest nuclear material ever made. It came, by no coincidence, as U.S. and Kazakh officials put the finishing touches on a plan to move 300

tons of used nuclear fuel from a decommissioned Soviet nuclear reactor near the port city of Aktau on the Caspian Sea not far from Iran.

Starting early next year, the spent fuel will be transported from the Aktau-based facility via railway cars in five shipments of 60 tons each. The fuel will be stored in a permanent inland storage site at the Baikal-1 facility at Semipalatinsk, a former Soviet nuclear testing site near Kazakhstan's remote northeastern border with Russia. If reprocessed, the fuel would yield about 3 tons of pure plutonium.

"This material is like fruit from the forbidden tree," Erlan A. Idrissov, Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States, told The Washington Times. "So it only makes sense to keep it as secure as possible."

Plans to move the fuel by rail across the steppes of central Asia go back more than a decade, when officials were scrambling to contain the black-market dispersal of the former Soviet Union's atomic arsenal.

In 1999, the Kazakh government signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy to shut down and secure the Aktau-based BN-350 reactor, a commercial-scale "breeder reactor" originally loaded with highly enriched uranium, a potential fuel for nuclear weapons.

Ex-officials and experts interviewed for this story said that security planners saw Iran's proximity to the reactor as a possible security threat.

"It is especially pure and very attractive for making nuclear bombs," said Laura Holgate, a nuclear expert at the Nuclear Threat Initiative think tank in Washington.

Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University's Belfer Center, which analyzes proliferation issues, estimates that the plutonium inside was more than 97 percent pure. By comparison, the fuel used by the U.S. in its arsenal is about 90 percent pure.

"It is better [quality] than the plutonium used in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile," Mr. Bunn said.

Since it takes 10 to 15 pounds of plutonium to make a bomb, the Aktau reactor fuel contained enough for about 400 atomic bombs similar to one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in the final days of World War II.

At the time, officials in the Clinton administration cited Iran's proximity to the reactor as a reason for moving the fuel - concerns that deepened after Tehran asked to open a consulate in Aktau, a city with scant economic or political clout.

Mr. Idrissov, the Kazakh ambassador, said the security concerns over Tehran's intentions were probably overblown.

"The plan [to open an Iranian consulate] never materialized," Mr. Idrissov said, dismissing the idea that Tehran had interest in getting close to the Aktau-based reactor.

"Iran could simply have had the foresight to see that Aktau was going to become commercially important," he said. Indeed, Aktau has become a major hub for Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry.

Although many of the details remain classified, the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration has worked with the Kazakh government and helped fund major upgrades at both ends to make the shipment possible.

Some nuclear experts regard the effort as an anachronism. They dismiss the idea that terrorists would hijack a heavily guarded train, steal a 60-ton cask and get it to a reprocessing factory with the giant vats of acid needed to extract the plutonium.

Leonard Spector, a former Energy Department official who was responsible for advancing the program in the 1990s, dismissed the idea of an attack orchestrated by the Iranian government. But he said threats still exist.

"You have elements in Iran that aren't necessarily well supervised, and you can't dismiss that they could act on their own," he said.

Even so, Mr. Spector said security at the Aktau-based facility is substantial.

"It's not like situations elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, where we had to worry about one person sneaking out discs of weapons grade uranium in his pocket," he said.

Ms. Holgate, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said that some terrorists might be willing to die to get the material.

"One question is how self-protecting the material is," she said. "Does it have so much radiation that a terrorist trying to process it would die from a massive radiation dose? Even if that were the case, a terrorist may not care that he or she dies."

In the 1990s, nuclear proliferation experts were divided on what to do with the fuel. Some favored leaving the material in the protected facilities at Aktau, Mr. Spector said.

Transferring the material is an expensive, dangerous venture requiring infrastructure upgrades and possibly garnering only incremental security gains, he said.

"We didn't take the decision regarding moving the fuel lightly," Mr. Spector said.

He said the decision to move the fuel may also have been political for Kazakhstan, a country he described as a faithful U.S. partner in nonproliferation efforts.

Harvard's Mr. Bunn agreed.

"The main reason this is being done is because years ago the U.S. government signed an agreement with the Kazakhs that committed the U.S. government to do this," Mr. Bunn said. Moving the fuel, he said, has "some good housekeeping merit. But then the question is whether that virtue is worth the current cost estimate for the program."

U.S. officials said the Kazakh government is paying for the transportation costs, roughly calculated to be up to \$30 million. However, the Kazakh Embassy did not confirm those numbers.

The U.S. government has funded extensive upgrades to facilities in both Aktau and Semipalatinsk.

In an e-mail response to questions submitted by The Times, officials at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provided details of the operation, saying the plan was motivated by security needs - namely a desire to move the material out of a population center and to protect a primary oil port from potential nuclear sabotage.

But the officials could not immediately say how much the U.S. government has spent.

Mr. Bunn of Harvard, who reviewed federal budget documents, said the total cost of canning, curing and shipping the spent fuel runs close to \$175 million.

A Government Accountability Office official said the agency has yet to produce a report on the program.

"We cover many nuclear nonproliferation programs but haven't focused on this project," said Gene Aloise, director of GAO's nuclear nonproliferation work. "Perhaps this article will spark some interest."

<http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jul/24/nuclear-fuel-to-be-moved/>

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New York Times

July 25, 2008

Pg. 15

Missile Crew Asleep On The Job

By Associated Press

Three members of a ballistic missile crew at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota fell asleep while holding classified launch code devices this month, resulting in an investigation by military and National Security Agency experts, the Air Force said. The inquiry found that the missile launch codes were not compromised in the July 12 episode. A continuing review by Minot commanders will determine what, if any, actions will be taken against the crew members.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/us/25brfs->

[MISSILECREWA_BRF.html?scp=1&sq=Missile%20Crew%20Asleep%20On%20The%20Job&st=cse](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/us/25brfs-MISSILECREWA_BRF.html?scp=1&sq=Missile%20Crew%20Asleep%20On%20The%20Job&st=cse)

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Time

August 4, 2008

Still Training For The End Of The World

With Russian and U.S. warheads on a hair-trigger alert, the cold war's last sentries remain ever vigilant. Still training for the end of the world

By Eben Harrell

Prophecies aside, the first news of the apocalypse will appear on a giant monitor screen in a small control room deep inside Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station. Here, in a fortress dug into a mountain high above Colorado Springs, the trip-wire that would once have turned the Cold War very, very hot remains taut, ready to alert America's commander in chief of any incoming missiles. The outlook at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has changed considerably since the collapse of communism dramatically reduced prospects for thermonuclear war — although security remains tight, Cheyenne Mountain is now open to tourists and school groups, and a shop on the base sells T-shirts, hats, commemorative coins and other tchotchkes at its visitor center. On May 13, in apparent confirmation of the facility's obsolescence, NORAD — the joint American-Canadian command for which this structure was built in 1966 — marked its 50th anniversary by moving almost all of its operations to nearby Peterson Air Force base. There it has established what it calls an "integrated command center for the 21st century" — one attuned to more plausible, if less apocalyptic, perils such as drug smugglers, suspicious ships and airline hijacks.

Cheyenne Mountain has not been mothballed, however. One of NORAD's original missions — missile watch — remains in force, and has once again entered the national conversation as America's nuclear readiness has become part of the presidential campaign debate.

Behind its 25-ton blast doors, the 900-odd residents of Cheyenne Mountain live in a self-contained, 4.5-acre world. It has four man-made lakes holding millions of gallons of water. It has two fitness centers, a basketball court, a canteen, a chapel, a barber shop, a dental clinic, and enough food to survive for a minimum of 30 days.

The entire complex is designed to support the 30 NORAD personnel on the grim nuclear-watch detail. They work in crews of five behind a door that reads in gold letters "North America's Command Center of Excellence," and their sole mission is to distinguish benign rocket launches from missiles traveling toward North America at 4 miles a second, bearing multiple, independently targeted nuclear warheads, each capable of destroying an entire city. They have a matter of minutes to make the call that could unleash nuclear Armageddon.

"It's a typical military watch," explains Captain Steve Thompson, Cheyenne Mountain Division Chief, who oversees the crews. "A lot of routine punctuated by moments of sheer terror."

Even now, Russia and the United States maintain thousands of nuclear warheads on hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles ready to launch at a moment's notice. With so many weapons on hair-trigger alert, and with both sides retaining the option to "launch on warning" of an incoming attack, critics warn that an accidental nuclear war remains a plausible danger. Senator Barack Obama has pledged to remove America's weapons from launch-ready status if elected President; Senator John McCain has been more cautious, saying only that he will review U.S. nuclear policy. For now, however, the missile-warning detail in Cheyenne Mountain carries a heavy burden.

The typical burnout rate for personnel in the high-stress missile-watch postings is two years. Captain Thompson says the strain comes not from waiting for the end of the world, but from the troglodytic lifestyle it requires. After three months of training, the missile watch — usually mid-level officers in their 30s — works 12-hour shifts on a four-day rotation. They go home when not on shift; no one sleeps in Cheyenne Mountain. During their shift, the missile watch must eat in the control room and its members are allowed only short breaks in a sterile warren of small, tidy offices and gleaming corridors decorated only with the occasional photo of an anonymous soldier in combat gear. Maintaining a sense of connection with the outside world can be difficult inside Cheyenne Mountain. All the missile-watch rooms are suspended on four-foot springs, each weighing a ton, designed to absorb the shock of any nearby detonation. Even the weather arrives two weeks late: When it rains or snows outside, it takes around 14 days for the precipitation to percolate through 2,300 feet of rock into tarpaulins on the ceilings.

Despite the extreme setting, there's no shortage of new recruits to Cheyenne Mountain postings. The clammy security offered by U.S.-Russian nuclear parity provides a welcome break from the asymmetrical combat of America's current conflicts. "Most [personnel serving] here have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for many months," says Captain Thompson. "Here, they get time with their families, working a steady shift. It's a great opportunity." To serve at Cheyenne Mountain, of course, is to be placed squarely in the cross hairs of Russia's nuclear fleet — in the event of a thermonuclear showdown, one of the first orders of business for Moscow's missiles would be to turn Cheyenne Mountain into Cheyenne Valley. "We don't tend to talk about [an actual attack] much. But of course we train for it," Thompson says. "That's why we're here."

<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1818559,00.html>

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New York Times

July 27, 2008

Pg. 12

Iran Chief Signals Atomic Expansion

TEHRAN (Reuters) — Iran is running more than 5,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Saturday, suggesting a continued expansion of the country's nuclear program even while international negotiators have issued a deadline for Iran to stand down or face more sanctions.

"Today, we have more than 5,000 active centrifuges," state television quoted the president as saying.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said in May that 3,500 centrifuges were working at the Natanz complex in central Iran.

The United Nations Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions on Iran for not halting uranium enrichment work that carries the potential for civilian and military uses.

Iran and six world powers, represented by the European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, met in Geneva on July 19 to discuss the country's disputed nuclear ambitions. Afterward, Western officials said Iran had two weeks to reply to an offer to end talk of further sanctions if Iran froze uranium enrichment and other nuclear expansion.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/world/middleeast/27nuke.html?scp=1&sq=Iran%20Chief%20Signals%20Atomic%20Expansion&st=cse>

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