



# USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

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**INSIDE THE PENTAGON - [www.InsideDefense.com](http://www.InsideDefense.com)**

**June 26, 2008**

**New SAC 'not going anywhere at this point'**

## **Mullen Says Panel Could Recommend Revived Nuclear Command**

The U.S. military's top officer acknowledged this week that an ongoing Pentagon review might mull re-establishing a command to oversee Air Force nuclear weapons, but he avoided endorsing the concept or speculating on its fate. The Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) was disbanded in 1992. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen was asked about the potential revival of the command during a question-and-answer session with military officials at the Pentagon's auditorium.

"I'm happy to take questions on rumors," Mullen said Monday (June 23). "I love to either validate them or shunt them to ground, as the case might be."

But Mullen offered no clear indication of whether SAC might be re-established.

He noted that earlier this month Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave former defense and energy secretary James Schlesinger 60 days to come up with the first of two batches of recommendations on nuclear weapons management.

"Now, part of what has happened is the Schlesinger commission is going to go look at, OK, here's what we have, and make some recommendations about what to do, which could be re-establishing or establishing some kind of central command," Mullen said.

This “is not going anywhere at this point,” he added. “I don’t know if that would be a recommendation like that.” The need for improved responsibility raises “the whole issue of unity of command or unity of responsibility and accountability,” he said.

“But I’d be the last one in the world to say it ought to be the old SAC,” Mullen added. “I just don’t know that.” At the time of their firings this month, outgoing Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley were contemplating the creation of a SAC-like structure to oversee the service’s entire nuclear arsenal (*Inside the Pentagon*, June 12, p1).

Defense Secretary Gates was asked about the possibility of reviving SAC on June 10, during his trip to Colorado Springs, CO.

Gates noted Schlesinger will seek to fix the division of responsibility that has prevented any one person from being responsible, and making sure that standards are kept.

“I think, ultimately, one of the principal root causes of these problems is that there’s no one person in charge -- or who has responsibility,” he said.

“Now, I think you can fix that without recreating the Strategic Air Command,” Gates added. “I’m not sure how you do that, but I don’t think there’s much interest in doing that, and I don’t have any particular grief for it. But, I think that’s one of the key issues to be addressed.” -- *Christopher J. Castelli*

<http://insidedefense.com/secure/print/PENTAGON.pdf>

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MaximsNews Network

## **The Stanley Foundation: Scary Things That Don't Exist: Separating Myth From Reality In Future WMD**

24 June 2008

**UNITED NATIONS - / MaximsNews Network / 24 June 2008 -- The following is a Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief by reporter Sharon Weinberger examining the proper recognition by the United States of global WMD threats and emphasizing the importance of employing science and technology to assure flexibility in responding to unknown threats.**

**Sharon Weinberger**

*Sharon Weinberger is a senior reporter for Wired's national security blog, DANGER ROOM, and the coauthor of A Nuclear Family Vacation: Travels in the World of Atomic Weaponry (Bloomsbury, 2008). Her writing on military science and technology has appeared in Nature, Discover, Slate, Wired, The Washington Post Magazine, and Aviation Week & Space Technology. She is also the author of Imaginary Weapons: A Journey Through the Pentagon's Scientific Underworld. She received her B.A. from Johns Hopkins University and holds an M.A. from the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University.*

In the future anything is possible, but not all things are equally possible. This may be, in my view, the most important thing to remember when it comes to thinking about future weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I approach this topic neither as a scientist nor as a government official, but as a writer who has spent much of the past decade looking at how the US military makes decisions about science and technology investments and, in part, how those investments reflect its thinking about future threats, including potential future WMD. I have come away from this experience deeply skeptical of those who trumpet the advent of frighteningly new or exotic WMD and of unbounded technological optimism that we can defeat such threats.

As a reporter and at times as a participant, I have sat through many panel discussions about future threats and technology, and I have always been struck by how little dialogue we have about how to evaluate those threats. That is unfortunate, since all too often it leads to a limited discussion and detracts attention from a much-needed debate about how we should plan our investments in future science and technology. Most memorably, I recall sitting in the audience at a seminar on space weapons as a television reporter questioned a missile defense critic. How, the reporter asked, could this critic—a prominent scientist and longtime Pentagon weapons adviser—say that the missile defense system under discussion would never work, given that experts had been wrong so many times in the past? Without rehashing the pros and cons of that particular discussion, I would like to use it as a launching point to discuss future WMD and, more importantly, how the national security agencies gauge risks about such threats—perhaps many years in the future—and how they plan for responding to such threats. Those who want to believe that any development is not just possible, but equally possible, typically quote (or misquote) at least one of the following

three examples: Lord Rutherford's doubts about extracting energy from the atom; *The New York Times*' skepticism of the Wright Brothers' quest for manned flight; and finally, the cringe-worthy "Galileo burning" metaphor often evoked by the "lunatic fringe" to justify some gravity-defying or physics-violating concept. These analogies—now clichés—are often used to demonstrate that experts are often wrong and anything is possible. But under this line of (il)logic, anything is possible because the future is a series of black boxes, from which surprises can pop at any minute.

In fact, we know this is not the case. Nuclear weapons were a surprise to the public who had been carefully shielded from the Manhattan Project. However, the knowledge base underlying nuclear weapons—neutrons and then nuclear fission—was certainly not unknown to those scientists familiar with the fast-developing field of nuclear physics. (Rutherford's statement, it bears noting, had been made *prior* to the demonstration of fission.) In the case of manned flight, it was a newspaper, not experts, that expressed skepticism. The Wright Brothers' success in manned flight was not wholly a surprise to those who followed the field. Galileo, of course, was condemned primarily by the Church, not by other scientists. In summary, this form of selective quoting is used to bolster the illogical notion that we cannot (or perhaps should not) judge the risk or likelihood of future events, because anything is possible. I would reiterate here, again, that not everything is equally possible.

This is not a startling revelation, but it is one that I think needs to be emphasized. At the heart of many of the Pentagon's science and technology debates is the question of "technological surprise," which—roughly translated—means the fear that an adversary may unexpectedly overtake us, much as the public feared the Soviet Union did with Sputnik fifty years ago. What is the framework we can use to judge the threat of such a surprise occurring again? In fact, such a framework already exists. A few years ago, then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attracted widespread attention for his seemingly convoluted remark about the "unknown unknowns." In fact, his remark made sense to engineers, for whom the unknown unknowns are the problems they do not have enough knowledge about to design around (in contrast to the known unknowns, which are problems they know they do not understand and for which they can overdesign).

Along this same line of thinking, when it comes to WMD, there are things we know and can plan for—such as a WMD attack involving nuclear weapons; there are known unknowns—such as the probability that a terrorist has a nuclear weapon; and then there are the unknown unknowns—which could be some form of future or exotic WMD. So the real question is: How can we best prepare for the known unknowns, and how do we deal with unknown unknowns? More succinctly, should we even worry about the unknown unknowns? This is essentially a question of risk management, and there is no reason why the Pentagon should deal with risk any differently than the airline industry, fund managers, or private companies. Meaning you prepare for the known risks; you overprepare, if possible, for the known unknown risks; and as for the unknown unknown risks, well, you try to understand those risks as much as possible, but you don't bet the farm on them.

Unfortunately, the Pentagon and other national security institutions have not always been that logical about their approach to risk, and there are lessons to be learned from exploring the failures. For the purposes of this essay, I will examine a few areas in which the government's assessment of future WMD threats—and possible countermeasures—has fallen short. . . .

(For entire essay, please click link below.)

<http://www.maximsnews.com/news20080624stanleyfdtnrecognizingwmdthreats0806241602.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

June 26, 2008

Pg. 3

## **Time Is Ending For Talks, Iran Says**

*Key official says nation could take drastic steps amid Western pressure on its nuclear efforts.*

By Borzou Daragahi, Times Staff Writer

BEIRUT -- The powerful speaker of Iran's parliament warned Wednesday that his nation could take drastic steps in response to economic, political and military pressure meant to halt controversial parts of its nuclear program.

Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament and a former nuclear negotiator, said there was "only a little time left" for talks before Iran would make unspecified moves that the West would regret.

Larijani, who is close to supreme leader Ali Khamenei, did not specify what Iran would do. But Tehran's options include kicking out International Atomic Energy Agency monitors now keeping an eye on Iran's nuclear program or stepping up its uranium enrichment program to produce weapons-grade material.

Iran currently produces only reactor-grade uranium suitable for energy production.

"A little time is left for having interaction with Iran," Larijani told lawmakers, the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported. "The final whistle is going to be blown for your defeated game."

Tehran insists its nuclear program is meant only to meet civilian energy needs. The U.S., some European powers and Israel allege the effort is meant to ultimately produce nuclear weapons. They are using diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and hints of future military action along with offers of potential business, political and security cooperation.

The carrot-and-stick approach is meant to cajole Iran into halting its expanding uranium enrichment efforts at its facility near the city of Natanz. European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented a package of incentives on a trip to Tehran this month. Iranians say they are considering the proposals, though they insist they will not halt enrichment.

But Western media reports that Israel was practicing military operations aimed at Iran's nuclear program and the EU's decision this week to slap sanctions against Iran's largest bank have angered officials in Tehran.

"If you are willing to hold talks with Iran over the proposed package, then why have you adopted a confrontational approach before the package was studied?" Larijani asked.

Larijani's remarks Wednesday capped two days of defiant rhetoric against Western pressure. Many Iranians fear the U.S. is preparing for a possible military attack before President Bush leaves office.

"We advise U.S. officials to be careful not to face another tragedy," Mohammed Hejazi, an official in the military's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Wednesday, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. "If you want to move toward Iran, make sure you bring walking sticks and artificial legs because if you come, you will not have any legs to return on."

A day earlier Khamenei, Iran's top political and military authority, called the White House "the most resented rulers and policymakers" of the world.

"The 'Death to America' slogan, which was once coined and chanted by the Iranian nation, has now spread to other nations too," he said.

Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, a relative moderate who tried unsuccessfully to liberalize Iran's foreign and domestic policies, told an audience in Norway on Tuesday that U.S. policies had made the world more insecure, unstable and violent.

"The United States has to realize that they cannot resolve all their problems through aggression and force," Khatami said at a conference in Oslo promoting dialogue between the Islamic world and the West.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran26-2008jun26,0,6124849.story?track=rss>

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Seattle Times

June 26, 2008

## **Iran's Nuclear Stand Could Affect Its War On Drugs**

By Sebastian Abbot and Nasser Karimi, Associated Press

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran's battle against drug traffickers in well-armed convoys crossing its border from Afghanistan could be threatened by the standoff over the country's nuclear policies.

Western nations have told Iran that they could cut off any new help to Iran's anti-drug units unless the Islamic regime halts uranium enrichment, which the U.S. and its allies worry could be used to develop nuclear arms.

The United States has applauded Iran's anti-drug campaign, and European nations help fund the fight.

The warning was a small but potentially significant item tucked amid an array of trade and economic incentives presented June 14 by the five permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany. But Iran has repeatedly said it will not back off uranium enrichment — pushing the European Union this week to freeze assets of Iran's largest bank and updating the blacklist of Iranian nuclear experts and companies.

The EU has not yet decided on whether to trim its aid to Iran's anti-drug fight, and tying the drug battle to the offer could be counterproductive, some U.N. officials say.

The arid badlands of eastern Iran have become one of the world's busiest pipelines for opium and heroin

A "heroin tsunami" could hit Europe if the drug interdiction by Iran is weakened, warned Antonio Maria Costa, the director of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

"We should definitely assist Iran in this respect," he said.

Roberto Arbitrio, head of the U.N. drugs and crime office in Iran, said the war on drugs should be viewed as "a nonpolitical area of mutual interest."

The new stance is a sharp departure from the strong — but mostly behind-the-scenes — cooperation the United States and other Western countries forged with Iran on Afghanistan after the Taliban's fall in late 2001.

The West and Iran shared a common enemy in the Taliban, the Sunni extremist group that gave shelter to al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and now continues to fight the U.S. military and NATO. Taliban fighters help finance their battles by taxing Afghanistan's opium farmers, whose poppies provide the raw material for heroin. The West has had little success reducing the huge opium crop in southern Afghanistan where the Taliban are strongest.

The U.S. has recently accused Iran of providing support to the Taliban in order to bog down Western militaries in Afghanistan, although it has offered little public evidence. Iran denies the charge.

Overall opium production in Afghanistan has more than doubled in the last four years — and smuggling the drug into Iran is the first step toward reaching Western markets. Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the world's opium last year, and about 50 percent of the drugs leaving the country flowed through Iran, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime says.

"Cooperating with Iran in Afghanistan on this and other issues is not a favor we do for Iran, but something we need to do in our own interest," said Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan at New York University.

The incentive package promised Iran "intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking" from Afghanistan — but only if it suspends uranium enrichment first. Iran claims its nuclear program is only for energy-producing reactors and insists it has the right to have uranium-enrichment technology.

Iran has built a series of dikes and trenches along large portions of its roughly 560-mile border with Afghanistan to stop drug smugglers and has seized hundreds of tons of opium and heroin. Moughaddam said 900 tons of narcotics were seized last year, including what the U.N. estimated was 80 percent of total world opium seized.

The efforts have taken their toll: More than 3,500 Iranian law-enforcement officers have died in clashes with heavily armed drug traffickers over the last two decades, the Iranian government says.

"There is overwhelming evidence of Iran's strong commitment to keep drugs leaving Afghanistan from reaching its citizens," said the U.S. State Department in its 2007 narcotics report on Iran.

Despite that praise, the United States does not donate money to the U.N. to support Iran's anti-drug efforts because of unilateral sanctions. The United Nations, however, has received contributions from several European nations, including Britain, France and Italy, to aid Iran's drug-fighting efforts.

But political disputes have made fundraising to help Iran difficult, Arbitrio said. His office has raised only \$8.5 million since 2005 for a three-year program originally budgeted at \$20 million to help Iran intercept narcotics smuggled from Afghanistan and other measures.

The United States has spent \$878 million since 2001 trying to wean Afghan farmers off growing opium — even as production has skyrocketed.

[http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2008017996\\_irandrug26.html?syndication=rss](http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2008017996_irandrug26.html?syndication=rss)

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Washington Times

## **IAEA probe inconclusive on suspected nuke site**

George Jahn

Thursday, June 26, 2008

VIENNA, Austria (AP) | An initial probe of U.S. allegations that a Syrian site hit by Israeli warplanes was a secretly built nuclear reactor is inconclusive and further checks are necessary, a senior U.N. atomic inspector said Wednesday.

Olli Heinonen, a deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said he was satisfied with what was achieved on his four-day trip but "there is still work that needs to be done" in following up on the claims that Syria was hiding elements of a potential nuclear arms program.

Mr. Heinonen spoke to reporters after arriving on a flight from Damascus back to Vienna, headquarters of the IAEA. He met in the Syrian capital with officials in charge of the nation's nuclear program and senior generals. Damascus claims the building flattened by Israel was a non-nuclear military structure.

With Syrian authorities imposing a virtual news blackout on his trip, few details had surfaced beyond the fact that Syrian authorities allowed the three-man inspection team to visit the Al-Kibar site targeted in September.

Washington hopes the U.N. agency team is carrying persuasive evidence backing U.S. intelligence that the structure hit by Israel in September was a nearly completed plutonium-producing reactor.

If so, the trip could mark the start of an investigation similar to the probe Iran has been subjected to over the past five years. The process could draw in countries like North Korea, which Washington says helped Damascus, and Iran, also linked by media reports to Syria's nuclear strivings.

But Mr. Heinonen declined to tip his cards on what he and his team had been able to see and do beyond acknowledging they were able to take environmental samples in the large area where material from the site may have been spread by the exploding Israeli ordnance.

"We achieved what we wanted on this first trip," he said. "We continue our discussions, we took the samples we need to take and now it's time to analyze them and also look at the information we got from Syria."

Syria agreed to allow the nuclear inspectors to visit the bombed Al-Kibar site in early June only after months of delay. And even before the IAEA team left for Damascus on Saturday, Syrian authorities had already said three other locations suspected of possibly harboring secret nuclear activities were off limits.

IAEA officials had sought to play down heightened expectations ahead of the trip. The agency has little formal inspection rights in Syria, whose only declared nuclear program is rudimentary and revolves around research and the production of isotopes for medical and agricultural uses, using a small, 27-kilowatt reactor.

<http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/iaea-probe-inconclusive-on-suspected-nuke-site/>

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USA Today

## **US military shoots down separating missile in test**

**June 26, 2008**

KAPAA, Hawaii (AP) — The military's ground-based missile defense system destroyed a missile launched from an airplane in the first successful test of the system's ability to destroy a warhead that separates from its booster, the Missile Defense Agency said.

The interceptor missile launched off Kauai on Wednesday had to differentiate between the warhead and the body of the missile before destroying the warhead above the Pacific Ocean, the agency said. It was the fifth successful intercept in five attempts since 2005 for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, according to the agency. The system used a mobile launcher at Kauai's Pacific Missile Range Facility to shoot down a target representing a ballistic missile, said Lt. Gen. Henry "Trey" Obering.

The threat missile was launched from a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft flying over the Pacific Ocean. The interceptor missile was fired six minutes later.

Like the Patriot anti-missile defenses, THADD is designed to knock out ballistic missiles in their final minute of flight. However, it is designed to intercept targets at higher altitudes, enabling it to defend a larger area.

THADD is one of two missile defense systems being tested at the Navy's Hawaii missile range. The sea-based Aegis system completed its own successful test on June 5.

[http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-06-26-missile-hawaii\\_N.htm?csp=34](http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-06-26-missile-hawaii_N.htm?csp=34)

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New York Times on the Web

June 27, 2008

## **North Korea Destroys Tower At Nuclear Plant**

By Choe Sang-Hun

SEOUL, South Korea -- With international TV networks filming the scene, North Korea blew up the most visible symbol of its nuclear program on Friday in a gesture demonstrating its commitment to stop making plutonium for weapons.

The 60-foot-tall cooling tower at the North's main nuclear power plant was blasted away shortly after 4 p.m. Friday before an audience of international TV cameras, reported South Korea's MBC-TV. MBC has a crew at the demolition site in Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

When internationally televised later Saturday, the collapse of the concrete structure, the most conspicuous part of the North's main nuclear complex, bore witness to the incremental progress that has been made in American-led multilateral efforts to end North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.

On Thursday, North Korea submitted its first significant — although partial — account of its arms programs.

Almost simultaneously, President Bush announced that Washington was removing North Korea from a U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and issued a proclamation lifting some sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Yongbyon complex, built around a Soviet-era nuclear reactor, is the North's only known source of plutonium. North Korea had started disabling the reactor and other parts of the complex last year under an agreement with the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China.

Under the deal, North Korea has been receiving fuel aid from the five nations. But it was not obliged to destroy any of its nuclear facilities until further talks are held to sort out what rewards it will get in return.

South Korean and U.S. officials welcomed the early demolition of the cooling tower as an encouraging sign of North Korea's commitment to a broader deal under which Washington hopes to eradicate all the North's nuclear assets.

"By demolishing the tower, North Korea appears to demonstrate that it would not produce any more plutonium," said Kim Yeon-chul, a North Korea expert at the Asiatic Research Center at Korea University in Seoul.

The cooling tower carries waste heat from the reactor. With the Communist government keeping its nuclear activities shrouded in secrecy, plumes of steam curling out from the tower into the atmosphere in spy satellite photographs provided outside observers with the most visible sign of operations at Yongbyon.

It also reminded the rest of the world of the operations' dangerous implications. North Korea shocked the world in October 2006 by detonating a nuclear bomb in an underground test. It is also suspected by U.S. officials of providing nuclear technology to countries like Syria.

The tower is a technically insignificant structure, relatively easy to rebuild. North Korea also has been disabling — though not destroying — more sensitive parts of the nuclear complex, such as the 5-megawatt reactor, a plant that makes its fuel and a laboratory that extracts plutonium from its spent fuel.

"It's symbolic. But in real terms, whether demolishing or not a cooling tower that has already been disabled doesn't make much difference," said Lee Ji-sue, a North Korea expert at Seoul's Myongji University.

The demolition also shows that North Korea has concluded that the Yongbyon complex, in service for several decades, has served its purpose after producing an unknown number of nuclear weapons, Mr. Lee said.

U.S. officials have accused North Korea of hiding an uranium-enrichment program, a charge that the North's declaration on Thursday failed to address.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/world/asia/28korea.html?hp>

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New York Times

June 27, 2008

Pg. 1

## **Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners To Ease North Korean Curbs**

By Helene Cooper

WASHINGTON — Two days ago, during an off-the-record session with a group of foreign policy experts, Vice President Dick Cheney got a question he did not want to answer. "Mr. Vice President," asked one of them, "I understand that on Wednesday or Thursday, we are going to de-list North Korea from the terrorism blacklist. Could you please set the context for this decision?"

Mr. Cheney froze, according to four participants at the Old Executive Office Building meeting. For more than 30 minutes he had been taking and answering questions, without missing a beat. But now, for several long seconds, he stared, unsmilingly, at his questioner, Steven Clemons of the New America Foundation, a public policy institution. Finally, he spoke:

"I'm not going to be the one to announce this decision," the other participants recalled Mr. Cheney saying, pointing at himself. "You need to address your interest in this to the State Department." He then declared that he was done taking questions, and left the room.

In the internal Bush administration war between the State Department and Mr. Cheney's office over North Korea, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her top North Korea envoy, Christopher R. Hill, won a major battle against the Cheney camp when President Bush announced Thursday that he was taking the country he once described as part of the "axis of evil" off the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The administration sought to portray the move as a largely symbolic, reciprocal move, made in return for North Korea's long-delayed declaration of its nuclear program to the outside world. It is the first step in what will be a long, drawn-out diplomatic process that is meant to lead eventually to establishing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. North Korea also said that it would blow up the cooling tower of its nuclear plant at Yongbyon on Friday, and it has invited news organizations to watch the event. North Korea probably has the fuel for several nuclear devices, according to United States intelligence estimates, but after the ambiguous result of its one test detonation, its nuclear status remains murky.

North Korea declared that it had slightly more plutonium than it had previously admitted. But the declaration falls short of the full accounting that the administration had sought, since it omits any information about North Korea's suspected efforts to enrich uranium, or the extent of any of the North's sharing of technology around the world.

Thursday's announcement intensified a pitched battle in Washington, where Democrats and many foreign policy experts said the administration had dithered too long before reaching this deal, allowing North Korea to acquire enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons. From the other side of the fence, conservative hard-liners complained that the United States gave away too much for too little, and should have adopted a more absolutist approach with the secretive North Korean government.

Speaking to reporters, National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley conceded that the administration had decided to accept incremental progress with North Korea instead of its previous all-or-nothing strategy. He said the notion that North Korea would quickly acquiesce to all of Washington's demands "was probably unrealistic."

Even so, many critics of Mr. Bush noted that the administration's turnaround on North Korea did not come about until after North Korea exploded its first nuclear device in October 2006. Mr. Hill and Ms. Rice subsequently persuaded Mr. Bush that North Korea's nuclear test had changed the rules of the game enough that the president should complete an agreement with North Korea and four other countries that led to Thursday's declaration.

Accusing the North Koreans of violating a previous diplomatic accord on ending its nuclear program, called the Agreed Framework, which was negotiated during the Clinton administration, Mr. Bush pulled out of talks with North Korea in 2002 and pressed to isolate the North Korean government. The abandonment of talks gave North Korea greater leeway to produce plutonium and become a nuclear power, critics say.

Had Mr. Bush instead stuck with a diplomatic course, the critics say, North Korea might not have acquired enough plutonium to make a nuclear weapon.

"What is absolutely clear is the decision they took in 2002 to terminate the Agreed Framework gave North Korea the opening" to kick international inspectors out of its Yongbyon nuclear plant and press ahead with its work on the bomb, said Carlos Pascual, director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "That was the tragedy of the Bush administration's policy," Mr. Pascual said. "That by opting for terminating our engagement, we opened the door to North Korea's becoming a nuclear power."

The decision to re-engage with North Korea continues to divide the administration, with officials in Mr. Cheney's office remaining skeptical of the deal. Right until the end of furious behind-the-scenes talks between State Department officials and their North Korean counterparts over the details of the declaration this week, American negotiators found themselves buffeted by North Korea on one side and conservatives at home on the other. One of the last details to be settled was how much the United States would pay North Korea to blow up the cooling tower at Yongbyon.

North Korean officials said the demolition would cost \$5 million, and the United States offered \$2.5 million — an amount that conservative hard-liners in Washington said was too much, according to several administration officials involved in the talks.

"The forthcoming demolition of a nuclear cooling tower this weekend is little more than the destruction of an empty shell," Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican of Florida, complained in a statement.

"This is a sad, sad day," said John R. Bolton, the former United States ambassador to the United Nations and a leading critic of the new American negotiating stance. "I think Bush believes what Condi is telling him, that they're going to persuade the North to give up nuclear weapons, and I don't think that's going to happen. I think we've been taken to the cleaners."

The 60-page declaration from North Korea, one of the world's most isolated and impoverished nations, described in previously undisclosed detail its abilities in nuclear power and nuclear weapons, meeting a major demand of the United States and other countries that consider the North a dangerous source of instability.

"This can be a moment of opportunity for North Korea," Mr. Bush said, announcing the declaration at the White House early on Thursday morning. "If it continues to make the right choices it can repair its relationship with the international community."

Removing North Korea from the sanctions of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which dates to World War I, would leave only Cuba subject to it. North Korea will become eligible for some additional types of American aid and for loans from international institutions like the World Bank. The accord clears the way for more international shipments of food and fuel to North Korea, which has severe shortages of both commodities.

But other sanctions on North Korea will remain, at least for now, prohibiting or restricting American companies from doing business there. North Korean assets in the United States that have been frozen under previous orders are not expected to be released immediately.

The North, for its part, declared that it possessed around 80 pounds of plutonium, a crucial part of its nuclear weapons program, and an amount at the low end of the 65-to-110 pound range estimated by American intelligence analysts, according to American and Asian diplomats familiar with the declaration.

The total is more than the 65 pounds that North Korea had acknowledged previously. Estimates on how many nuclear bombs North Korea could wring from its plutonium program have ranged from 6 to 10.



The administration is hoping to make up for the declaration's shortfalls through a strong verification program. Administration officials said that North Korea had agreed to allow American inspectors to collect independent samples of nuclear waste at Yongbyon, as well as samples of the reactor core, which, along with the 18,000 pages of operation records provided by North Korea, could go a long way toward helping determine the scale of North Korea's nuclear program. Part of the delay in reaching the agreement with North Korea was over the issue of verification, administration officials said, including negotiating with the North the precise steps that the United States and international inspectors could take on sampling at Yongbyon.

"It sounds to me like the administration has gotten the North Koreans to agree to some intrusive and significant verification steps," said Gary Samore, a vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations who helped negotiate the Clinton administration's 1994 agreement with North Korea. Mr. Samore described the promised destruction of the cooling tower at Yongbyon as a photo stunt that is easily reversible, but said that the other steps that North Korea had taken, including rendering the fuel at Yongbyon unusable, were significant.

*Norimitsu Onishi reported from Tokyo and Graham Bowley from New York. Reporting was contributed by Edward Wong in Beijing, Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers in Washington, and Choe Sang-Hun in Seoul, South Korea.*  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/world/asia/27nuke.html?scp=1&sq=Bush+Rebuffs+Hard-Liners+To+Ease+North+Korean+Curbs&st=nyt>

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London Times  
June 27, 2008

## **Last US Nuclear Weapons 'Withdrawn From UK'**

By Michael Evans, Defence Editor

Lakenheath--The last remaining American nuclear weapons based on British territory have been withdrawn, according to a study by scientists in the United States.

Neither the Pentagon nor the Ministry of Defence would confirm or deny the report, but the pullout of the 110 air-launched B61 gravity bombs from RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk would bring to an end an historic military link between Britain and the US. The reported withdrawal is believed to be part of a readjustment of American nuclear forces in Europe, with the focus switching to the southern flank.

The report by the Federation of American Scientists says that US nuclear weapons are located mostly at American Air Force bases at Aviano in Italy and at Incirlik in Turkey. Four other bases, in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, are also said to have some nuclear weapons stocks.

RAF Lakenheath is the home of the US Air Force 48th Fighter Wing. During the Cold War, dozens of F111 nuclear bombers were on continuous alert there.

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4221834.ece>

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New York Post  
June 27, 2008

## **Korean Nukes: Don't Get Giddy**

*We're Still Far From Ending The Threat*

By Peter Brookes

NORTH Korea gave the world some good news this week - finally handing over a declaration about its nuclear program *and* promising to blow up the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. But don't break out the best bubbly just yet.

These moves are only a first step in what is likely to be a drawn-out, slippery, pot-hole-filled road in a (possibly futile) attempt to roll back Kim Jong Il's membership in the nuclear-weapons club.

Yes, the White House got a bit light-headed over the Korean news: It's already started the process of lifting economic sanctions on the reclusive nation as a reward for good behavior. (That process could get controversial, especially in Congress: Do Kim & Co. *really* deserve to come off the Terrorism List, or to escape punishment under the Trading With the Enemy Act?)

And it *was* good news, if measured: Tumbling the cooling tower puts the Yongbyon plant out of commission - and it would take a year to rebuild. Making the nuclear declaration this week is a welcome step, too.

But a welcome *initial* step. Pyongyang is six months late in handing over what's supposed to be a complete and correct accounting of its nuclear programs - and you can bet we're not going to get anything *close* to the Full Monty.

\* It won't have anything about the regime's *clandestine*, uranium-based nuclear-weapons program.

Washington insists Pyongyang has such a program, which parallels the *plutonium* program at Yongbyon. But the North Koreans have been evasive - at best - about its existence.

\* The declaration also won't have any info on the regime's nuclear-proliferation activities, such as its work with Damascus on a nuclear reactor at al Kibar in northern Syria (the one targeted in last September's Israeli air raid). Proliferation-watchers also have a sinking sense that North Korea may be involved with Iran. After all, the two have robust ties on ballistic missiles - Iran's Shahab missile is based on North Korea's No Dong.

\* Finally, it won't have the scoop on the size of the North Korean nuclear-weapons arsenal.

Pyongyang sees its nukes as a critical ace-in-the-hole against American pressure or aggression. But getting a handle on the arsenal's size is key, if (and that's a *big* if) we're ever going to make progress on pulling Pyongyang's nuclear fangs.

Other challenges are ahead, too. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation just a week ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted the United States would demand tough verification of Kim's declaration, including access to nuclear facilities and other data.

That's the right approach - verification is a critical element of any current or future agreement. But good luck getting anywhere on *that* one.

The idea of a gaggle of US inspectors freely running around the ultra-secretive North Korean police state poking their noses into labs and the like boggles the mind.

In fact, recent North Korean whispers suggest Pyongyang will reject out of hand any verification regime that would pass the laugh test.

Rejecting verification outright would call into question Kim's willingness to disarm in the long run - after all, the regime has a solid record of breaking its word on nukes, most notably the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. Overall, a solid verification regime is probably the proverbial "long pole in the tent" - the toughest test in getting from this week's first steps to the final goal of disarmament.

In the end, all US moves must support a verifiable process that ultimately uncovers *all* of Pyongyang's programs, neuters its nukes and puts an end to its problematic proliferation.

*Heritage Foundation senior fellow Peter Brookes is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.*

[http://www.nypost.com/seven/06272008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/korean\\_nukes\\_dont\\_get\\_giddy\\_117426.htm](http://www.nypost.com/seven/06272008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/korean_nukes_dont_get_giddy_117426.htm)

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Christian Science Monitor

## U.S. Eases North Korea's Isolation

Bush lifts some sanctions in exchange for pariah nation's step toward nuclear cooperation.

**By Howard LaFranchi** | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

June 27, 2008

WASHINGTON - Even as he declared that "the United States has no illusions about the regime in Pyongyang," President Bush on Thursday announced his intention to remove North Korea from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

That action, along with US plans to remove sanctions that date to the Korean War, follow North Korea's submission of a partial declaration of its past nuclear activities Thursday. And on Friday, the North is scheduled to destroy part of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor that produced plutonium for the country's nuclear weapons.

The administration's moves on North Korea signal a remarkable turnaround for a pariah nation that always figured at the top of Mr. Bush's list of threats. But they also hint at efforts by a presidency in its twilight to fashion a positive historical record - especially on Bush's hallmark theme of national and global security.

After having declared in 2002 an "axis of evil" made up of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, Bush is said to be keen to demonstrate that his presidency is leaving behind a safer world. Adding North Korea to the list of global security threats defanged by Bush policies - a list that administration officials top with Iraq - would enhance the president's legacy, some experts say.

Yet before being able to finally remove North Korea from its dark pantheon, the administration faces a number of high hurdles. These include unresolved questions about evidence of a uranium enrichment program and suspicions that Pyongyang at some point secretly provided Syria with a nuclear installation.

"This is a significant step toward fulfilling part of North Korea's requirements for declaring all of its nuclear activities," says Bruce Klingner, a North Korea expert at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "But we still need to see considerably more transparency on its uranium-based program and its proliferation activities."

Bush acknowledged as much in a Rose Garden statement Thursday, citing these two outstanding issues before concluding, "This isn't the end of the process. This is the beginning of the process."

What is likely to be the final quid pro quo – the dismantling of Pyongyang's plutonium bombs in exchange for full normalization of relations and integration into the global economy – will have to wait for the next US president. But administration officials speak in terms of having created the "glide path" for that goal to be reached.

Administration officials "are talking about this in legacy terms," says Jim Walsh, a North Korea expert in the security studies program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge. "Their view is that leaving with the North Korea nuclear program capped and then shut down will be a lasting achievement of the Bush presidency."

The administration must first face skepticism among foreign-policy hard-liners at home. And some allies, in particular Japan, are concerned that the US may be going too far too fast with a regime that still possesses nuclear weapons and has not answered questions about its proliferation activities.

Japan sounded a cautious note Thursday when its foreign minister, Masahiko Komura, said the declaration North Korea delivered to the Chinese government would have been more meaningful if it had included information on the North's existing nuclear arsenal.

"It would have been better if the declaration had included nuclear weapons," Mr. Komura said, adding that the question remained "whether the declaration will contribute to the complete abandonment of North Korea's nuclear weapons."

That statement followed earlier acknowledgement by US officials Tuesday that the plutonium weapons Pyongyang possesses would not be part of the current declaration. Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of State for East Asian affairs, said in Beijing that the plutonium bombs would be part of a "subsequent phase" in the denuclearization process.

US hawks on North Korea see that "concession" as part of a pattern of the Bush administration going soft on the North as it pushes to cement a deal before year's end. Last year John Bolton, a former undersecretary of State for arms control, said many Republicans were "brokenhearted" over the administration's approach to North Korea. Mr. Bolton and some congressional foreign-policy hawks have questioned the administration for continuing the six-party process even after intelligence surfaced last year suggesting that North Korea was helping Syria acquire a nuclear reactor. The suspected reactor site was taken out by Israeli airstrikes last September.

This week, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency were in Syria to try to determine exactly what Syria was doing at the now-destroyed site.

But that is not the only issue ruffling the feathers of hard-liners like Bolton. They also object that the US is allowing Pyongyang to leave out disclosure of its suspected uranium enrichment activity from this week's declaration.

Omission of uranium enrichment also figured in the cautious reception that North Korea's declaration received in South Korea, where officials and experts emphasized the hard road ahead before a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is achieved.

South Korea's chief nuclear envoy, Kim Sook, said Thursday that the North's declaration "provides an important momentum to the process." But he also emphasized how long it had taken to get this far, and time would remain "the common enemy" of the six-party process since the next steps could be so difficult and take so long.

"It is still many, many miles to go, and the path is getting steeper," says former South Korean foreign minister Song Min Soon, noting that what lies ahead is the dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons, estimated at six to a dozen. North Korea is known to have imported centrifuges for uranium enrichment, though it is not suspected of ever having gotten far enough with the technology to use it for weapons development. Still, experts like Mr. Klingner of the Heritage Foundation say full disclosure of details of even a partial program is important for determining the extent of international proliferation networks, as well as for verifying all Pyongyang's activities.

Allaying allies' concerns is one reason Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will be in Asia through the beginning of next week.

In Japan Thursday and Friday for a G-8 foreign ministers meeting, Secretary Rice will meet with her Japanese counterpart and will be reminded of Japanese concerns that the issue of its citizens abducted by the North in the 1970s and '80s could be lost in Washington's press to conclude a deal with Pyongyang. Beyond that issue are Japan's broader concerns about security in northeast Asia and what a North Korea deal – especially one hammered out in a process led by a rising China – will mean for the region.

Rice is set to be in Seoul Saturday before traveling to China, where the participants in the six-party talks are expected to meet Monday.

The Bush administration, Klingner says, will have to settle for at best a full declaration of North Korea's activities and a dismantlement of Yongbyon by the time it leaves office. But, he says, the US has "lowered the bar" in its quest to get that much.

• Donald Kirk in Seoul, South Korea, contributed to this report.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0627/p01s12-usfp.html>

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