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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at <http://cpc.au.af.mil/> for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy, joann.eddy.ctr@maxwell.af.mil.

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Washington Post
April 30, 2008
Pg. 15

Bush: Revealing Reactor Was Meant To Pressure N. Korea

By Michael Abramowitz, Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush said yesterday that his administration's disclosure of secret information last week about suspected North Korean assistance for a Syrian nuclear reactor was designed to pressure Pyongyang to come clean on its nuclear activities.

At a Rose Garden news conference, Bush also said he wanted to send a message to Iran to cooperate with international efforts to limit proliferation, and to Syria to help stabilize Iraq and Lebanon.

"One of the things that this example shows is that these programs can exist and people don't know about them," Bush told reporters. He added that "the Syrians simply didn't declare the program; they had a hidden program."

Bush and other senior administration officials were silent for nearly eight months about Israel's destruction last September of a building that U.S. intelligence officials said last week was a nuclear reactor, built with North Korea's assistance. Syria has denied it was building a reactor.

The discovery of North Korean ties to the facility has complicated U.S. efforts to get the country to give up nuclear weapons. Under a deal involving Pyongyang, Washington and other parties to the talks, North Korea is supposed to provide an inventory of its nuclear program, but it has yet to do so.

Bush said the disclosures last week should make it "abundantly clear" to North Korea that "we may know more about you than you think, and therefore it's essential that you have a complete disclosure on not only your plutonium activities, but proliferation, as well as enrichment activities."

In recent negotiations, the administration has pulled back on its demand for full disclosure, requesting that North Korea only acknowledge U.S. concerns and evidence on proliferation and uranium enrichment.

Bush avoided criticism of former president Jimmy Carter's recent talks with Hamas, the radical Palestinian group classified by the U.S. government as a terrorist entity. The United States refuses to engage with Hamas, which Bush said is "undermining peace."

"They're the ones whose foreign policy objective is the destruction of Israel," he said. "They're the ones who are trying to create enough violence to stop the advance of the two-party state solution."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/29/AR2008042902560.html>

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Washington Post

April 30, 2008

Pg. 15

Eisenhower Advisers Discussed Using Nuclear Weapons In China

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Senior Air Force officers proposed using 10-to-15-kiloton nuclear bombs against targets in Communist China in 1958, in the event that Beijing blockaded the Taiwan Strait, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower ruled out that option, according to a newly declassified Pentagon document.

At a Cabinet meeting in mid-August 1958, as the threat of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan was developing, Air Force Gen. Nathan F. Twining, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained "that at the outset American planes would drop 10- to 15-kiloton bombs on selected fields in the vicinity of Amoy," a coastal city on the Taiwan Strait now called Xiamen, according to the documents.

But "the President simply did not accept the contention that nuclear weapons were as conventional as high explosives," according to the now-declassified Air Force history of the Taiwan crisis.

In releasing the official history, William Burr of George Washington University's National Security Archive said Eisenhower's decision forced Air Force leaders to think more seriously about conventional warfare instead of relying on nuclear arms.

A similar discussion is underway today as the Pentagon, under direction from Congress, examines U.S. nuclear strategy as part of the debate over whether to develop a new generation of weapons in the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

By mid-August 1958, Air Force commanders had deployed five Strategic Air Command B-47 bombers that "went on alert to conduct nuclear raids against the mainland [China] airfields," the history says. At that time, the commanders assumed "presidential approval [that] any communist assault upon the offshore islands would trigger immediate nuclear retaliation."

When informed that Eisenhower had insisted that first strikes be made with high explosives, Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, the Pacific Air Forces commander, described "this idea of limited response as disastrous . . . and warned that the United States should either be ready to use its most effective weapons -- in his opinion nuclear bombs -- or stay out of the conflict," according to the history.

On Aug. 23, the Chinese began to fire tens of thousands of artillery shells from the mainland to Big and Little Quemoy, offshore islands held by the Taiwanese. Eisenhower approved the deployment of U.S. naval forces to escort ships resupplying Quemoy, the dispatch of an air strike force to the region and a commitment to help provide Taiwan's air defense.

By early October, the Chinese government had announced a cease-fire, and after a few months the crisis dissipated. Kuter, the history says, later "complained that the military had failed to convince civilian authorities that American forces had to be free to use nuclear bombs at the outset of any conflict." Air Force headquarters in Washington, however, accepted that political considerations "might require that initial strikes be made with conventional ordnance."

The Air Force declined to comment on the document yesterday.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/29/AR2008042902563.html>

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Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program FY 08-09 Overview

The mission of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is to provide chemical and biological defense capabilities in support of the national military strategies. To accomplish this mission, the CBDP works with other federal agencies, state and local governments, Congress, and the private sector. This document provides an overview of the current and future programs that enable our troops to protect themselves and our nation from CBRN threat.

The current environment demands a CBDP that is visionary, able to respond quickly to warfighter and national security needs, and streamlined with authority and accountability vested in specific executives. The Department will continuously assess its progress, ever striving to ensure that the U.S. military has the capabilities and information to operate effectively and decisively in the face of CBRN threats, in warfighter and homeland security missions, today and through the challenges of tomorrow.

Additionally, the DOD Annual Report to Congress on the Chemical and Biological Defense Program provides a more detailed overview of the CBDP, as well as a more detailed examination of the program's objectives for the future.

JEAN D. REED

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE AND CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAMS . .

(For complete report, please click link below.)

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/cbdreports/cbd0vw08.pdf>

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Country Reports on Terrorism

Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

U.S. Department of State

April 30, 2008

Chapter 4 -- The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

The nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism poses one of the gravest potential risks to the national security of the United States and its global partners. A successful major WMD terrorist attack could result in mass casualty events and produce far-reaching economic and political consequences that would affect all members of the international community. This chapter outlines:

- The key elements of the United States' National Strategy for Combating WMD Terrorism;
- The various types of materials terrorists may use in a WMD attack;
- The potential that resources of a state could be directed or diverted to facilitate WMD terrorism;
- The emerging WMD terrorism threat presented by non-state facilitators; and
- Transformational U.S. partnerships to combat this growing global risk.

The United States places the highest priority on working with a broad range of national governments, international organizations, local governments, and private sector organizations, to develop effective partnerships to confront the global challenge of WMD terrorism.

DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR COMBATING WMD TERRORISM

U.S. diplomatic priorities for combating WMD terrorism build on the comprehensive approach set forth in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating WMD Terrorism. Specifically, our strategic approach hinges on the six objectives

outlined in the National Strategy. We work across all objectives simultaneously to maximize our ability to eliminate the threat.

- Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD. We need to understand and assess the credibility of threat reporting and provide technical assessments of terrorists' WMD capabilities.
- Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop WMD, with a particular focus on weapons-usable fissile materials, dangerous pathogens, and poisonous chemicals; as well as methods of transport, sources of funds, and other capabilities that facilitate the execution of a WMD attack. In addition to building upon existing initiatives to secure materials, we are developing innovative approaches that blend classic counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism efforts.
- Deter terrorists from employing WMD. A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter terrorists, facilitators, and supporters from contemplating a WMD attack and, failing that, would need to dissuade them from actually conducting an attack. Traditional threats may not work because terrorists generally show a wanton disregard for the lives of innocents and, in some cases, for their own lives. We require a range of deterrence strategies that are tailored to the various WMD threats and the individual actors who facilitate or enable those threats. We will employ diplomatic strategies that seek to address extremism and defuse volatile conditions to discourage consideration of WMD as an appropriate tool to address perceived injustices.
- Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and personnel. We will seek to expand our global capability for detecting illicit materials, weapons, and personnel transiting abroad. We will use our global partnerships, international agreements, and ongoing border security and interdiction efforts. We also will continue to work with countries to enact and enforce strict penalties for WMD trafficking and other suspect WMD-related activities.
- Prevent and respond to a WMD-related terrorist attack. Once the possibility of a WMD attack has been detected, we will seek to contain, interdict, and eliminate the threat. We will continue to develop requisite capabilities to eliminate the possibility of a WMD operation and to prevent a possible follow-on attack. We will prepare ourselves for possible WMD incidents by developing capabilities to manage the range of consequences that may result from such an attack.
- Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device. Should a WMD terrorist attack occur, the rapid identification of the source and perpetrator of an attack would facilitate our response efforts and may be critical in disrupting follow-on attacks. We will maintain and improve our capability to determine responsibility for the intended or actual use of WMD via accurate attribution, using the rapid fusion of technical forensic data with intelligence and law enforcement information.

As we move forward in the implementation of our diplomatic strategic priorities for combating WMD terrorism, we will take special care to work closely with the full range of foreign partners to prioritize and to tailor our capacity-building approaches to the regional and local conditions we face across the world.

THE MATERIAL THREATS

There are four generally accepted categories of weapons of mass destruction that terrorists may seek to acquire and use in a WMD terrorist attack: nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical.

Nuclear

Some terrorist organizations, such as al-Qa'ida (AQ), have openly stated their desire to acquire and use nuclear weapons. The diffusion of scientific and technical information regarding the assembly of nuclear weapons, some of which is now available on the Internet, has increased the risk that a terrorist organization in possession of sufficient fissile material could develop its own crude nuclear weapon. The complete production of a nuclear weapon strongly depends on the terrorist group's access to fissile material and scientific expertise. Terrorists may, however, seek to link up with a variety of facilitators to develop their own nuclear capability. These facilitators include black market proliferators or transnational criminal networks that may seek to profit from the sale of nuclear material, a weaponized device, or technical knowledge gathered from nuclear experts involved in a national nuclear program.

Radiological

Some terrorists seek to acquire radioactive materials for use in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or "dirty bomb." Most radioactive materials lack sufficient strength to present a significant public health risk once dispersed, and the materials posing the greatest hazard would require terrorists to have the expertise to handle them without getting radiation sickness and possibly dying or being detected. Public panic and economic disruption caused by setting off a radiological dispersal device, however, could be substantial, even if a weak radioactive source is used. Radioactive materials are used widely in industrial, medical, and research applications and include devices used for power supply in remote locations, cancer therapy, food and blood irradiation, and radiography. Their widespread use in nearly every country makes radioactive materials much more accessible than fissile material.

Biological

Bioterrorism, another deadly threat, is the deliberate dispersal of pathogens through food, air, water, or living organisms to cause disease and, potentially more devastating, trigger alarm in a population. If properly produced and released, biological agents can kill on a massive scale and, if terrorists use a pathogen that can be transmitted from person to person, the disease can quickly spread across oceans and continents through air travel before authorities realize their nations have been attacked.

Developing a bioterrorism capability presents some scientific and operational challenges. However, the required scientific capabilities are not beyond the expertise of motivated biologists with basic university-level training. And, unlike other types of WMD, the materials required to produce a weapon are widely available – some are even found in nature. Even a badly-designed weapon resulting in limited health impact can cause significant uncertainty. Even though a small-scale bioterrorism attack, such as the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, can produce a relatively small number of cases of the disease, the costs of decontamination, medical treatment for the "worried well," decreased commercial activity, social distress, and lost productivity can be considerable. The terrorists can often meet their objective of creating disruption and fear without large numbers of casualties.

Among present-day terrorist organizations, AQ is believed to have made the greatest effort to acquire and develop a bioterrorism program. U.S. forces discovered a partially built biological weapons laboratory near Kandahar after expelling the Taliban from Afghanistan. Although it was not conclusive that AQ succeeded in obtaining a biological weapon, the discovery demonstrated a concerted effort to acquire a biological weapons capability.

Chemical

Chemical weapons represent another highly dangerous potential tool in the hands of terrorists. Effectively dispersed and in sufficient dosages, chemical agents could cause mass casualties as demonstrated by the use of chemical weapons during World War I. Today's terrorist threat ranges from the potential acquisition and use of militarized chemical weapons and delivery systems, to the production and use of improvised chemical agents and dissemination systems like the 1995 attack conducted by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway system. Perpetrators of that attack employed an improvised nerve agent (sarin) with plastic bottles taped together, and the pointed end of an umbrella to puncture the containers, which caused mixing and dissemination of the materials. More recently, terrorists have concentrated on acquiring and employing chemical materials with dual uses, such as pesticides, poisons, and industrial chemicals, in their operations (*see below*). The growth and sophistication of the worldwide chemical industry, including the development of complex synthetic and dual-use materials, may make the task of preventing and protecting against this threat more difficult. Preventing chemical terrorism is particularly challenging as terrorists can, with relative ease, use commercial industrial toxins, pesticides, and other commonly available chemical agents and materials as low-cost alternatives to militarized weapons and delivery systems, though likely with more limited effects.

Dual-Use Materials, Equipment, Research, and Technologies of Concern

Reducing the risk of terrorist acquisition of, access to, and use of dual-use materials, equipment, research, and technologies also remains a critical challenge. Terrorists have shown an interest in developing improvised devices leveraging such capabilities, and the diffusion of information on the Internet regarding dual-use research has compounded this challenge. Recent attacks in Iraq involving improvised devices containing chlorine, a dual-use chemical used in water treatment facilities, offer a notable example. Effective partnerships with private sector organizations, industry, academia, and the scientific research community, as well as with local governments, will play an important role in mitigating the risk of dual-use capabilities falling into the wrong hands.

STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM: A KEY CONCERN

A state that directs WMD resources to terrorists, or one from which enabling resources are clandestinely diverted, may pose a potentially grave WMD terrorism threat. Although terrorist organizations will continue to seek a WMD

capability independent of state programs, the sophisticated WMD knowledge and resources of a state could enable a terrorist capability. State sponsors of terrorism and all nations that fail to live up to their international counterterrorism and nonproliferation obligations deserve greater scrutiny as potential facilitators of WMD terrorism.

NON-STATE FACILITATORS: AN EMERGING THREAT

State sponsors of terrorism represent just one facet of the overall risk of WMD terrorism. Non-state facilitators have emerged as a growing WMD proliferation threat in recent years, and could eventually provide terrorists with conduits to materials and expertise that are particularly hard to acquire. In 2003, the United States and its international partners succeeded in interdicting a shipment of WMD-related material destined for Libya's then-active nuclear weapons program. As facts emerged regarding this shipment and its origin, the United States gained insight into an emerging WMD terrorism risk. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had developed a transnational nuclear proliferation network reaching from Southeast Asia to Europe, and was making available sensitive technology and WMD-related materials to nations willing to pay.

The dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network revealed an uncomfortable truth about globalization. The very trends driving globalization, improved communications and transportation links, can enable development of extended proliferation networks that may facilitate terrorist acquisition of WMD. Globalization requires that partner nations work together closely to prevent, detect, and disrupt linkages that may develop between terrorists and facilitators such as A.Q. Khan.

TRANSFORMATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS TO COMBAT WMD TERRORISM

Since September 11, 2001, the international community has made significant strides in responding to the threat of WMD terrorism. States are working together bilaterally and multilaterally to address these threats and protect their populations. The United States has taken concrete measures to build a layered defense against the WMD terrorism threat. In 2003, the United States announced the first National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Through a variety of multinational initiatives such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the United States has taken a leadership role in reducing the threat of WMD in the hands of non-state actors and terrorists.

The Proliferation Security Initiative. Announced by President Bush in 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) deserves special mention as a particularly well received and effective international initiative. The PSI is a global effort that aims to stop the trafficking of WMD, WMD delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern worldwide. States that wish to join the PSI are asked to endorse its Statement of Interdiction Principles, which identifies specific measures participants intend to undertake for the interdiction of WMD and related materials. As of December 31, 2007, 86 states have endorsed the statement. PSI participants also conduct exercises to improve their operational capabilities to conduct interdictions and meet periodically to share information and develop new operational concepts. The PSI has led to a number of important interdictions over the last five years and is an important tool in the overall U.S. strategy to combat WMD terrorism.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism on July 15, 2006, to expand and accelerate the development of partnership capacity against one of the most serious threats to international security. The Global Initiative offers a comprehensive approach to strengthening all defensive layers necessary to prevent, protect against, and respond comprehensively to the nuclear terrorist threat.

By agreeing to the Global Initiative's Statement of Principles, partner nations commit themselves to:

- Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control, and physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;
- Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities;
- Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances in order to prevent illicit trafficking in such materials and substances, to include cooperation in the research and development of national detection capabilities that would be interoperable;
- Improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or devices using them;

- Prevent the provision of safe haven and financial or economic resources to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;
- Ensure respective national legal and regulatory frameworks, which are sufficient to provide for the implementation of appropriate criminal and, if applicable, civil liability for terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism;
- Improve capabilities of participants for response, mitigation, and investigation in cases of terrorist attacks involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances, including the development of technical means to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances that are, or may be, involved in the incident; and
- Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking appropriate measures consistent with their national laws and international obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information which they exchange in confidence.

In the beginning of 2007, the partnership consisted of 13 nations; by December 31, the partnership had grown to 66 partner nations representing all regions of the world. The IAEA and the EU also participated as observers. Partner nations created a Plan of Work, committing themselves to host or co-sponsor events in furtherance of the goals in the Statement of Principles. In 2007, seven countries conducted nine Plan of Work activities implementing all eight of the Principles. The Global Initiative also engaged the private sector and local governments, both of which have an important role to play in preventing, protecting against, and responding to acts of nuclear terrorism.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The goal of GTRI, announced by the United States on May 26, 2004, in Vienna, Austria, is to identify, secure, remove, or facilitate the disposition, as quickly and expeditiously as possible, of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials and equipment around the world that pose a potential threat to the international community. International partners are key participants in this initiative, and GTRI has undertaken cooperative activities in over 90 countries. In particular, GTRI seeks to facilitate globally the reduction or elimination of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear applications and to remove or protect other vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian sites worldwide. Specific activities include the conversion of reactors used for research, testing, and medical-isotope production from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched (LEU); repatriation of fresh and spent HEU fuel to its country of origin (the United States or Russian Federation); enhancing the physical protection at sites utilizing such materials; and removal of unwanted radiological sources and other nuclear materials not otherwise covered by the fuel-return programs.

Additional U.S. Efforts Supporting a Global Layered Defense. The United States has also worked with partner nations through the UN and the IAEA to reduce the threat of WMD in the hands of terrorists. The UN Security Council has passed two important resolutions related to the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. In 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which requires all UN member states to refrain from providing any support, active or passive, to terrorists, and to work together to limit terrorist movement and safe haven. In 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which requires all UN member states to refrain from providing support to non-state actors that attempt to develop or acquire WMD and their means of delivery. The United States remains committed to full implementation of both UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540.

The Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) entered into force on July 7, 2007. The USG submitted the Nuclear Terrorism Convention to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification in 2007, along with three other multilateral counterterrorism instruments: the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. Collectively, these treaties will enhance international cooperation with regard to the prevention of WMD terrorism and proliferation of WMD, as well as the investigation and prosecution of such acts.

Conclusion. The potential threat of terrorists acquiring and using WMD poses one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States and our international partners today. During the past year, the USG has built on a range of activities and launched new efforts to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD. Together with partner nations and international organizations, the United States will continue to take the initiative to reduce the global risk of WMD terrorism.

(For complete report, please click link below.)

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/index.htm>

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Washington Times

May 1, 2008

Pg. 1

N. Korea To Give Nuke Files To U.S.

Steps to verify Pyongyang's declaration

By Nicholas Kravev, The Washington Times

North Korea has tentatively agreed to give the United States thousands of records from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor dating back to 1990 to complement an expected declaration of its nuclear programs, administration and congressional officials said yesterday.

The United States is seeking access to those records, as well as samples from toxic waste and the destruction of the "cooling tower" at the North's main nuclear complex in response to criticism that it is lowering the bar in negotiations with Pyongyang, the officials said.

"The administration is trying to work out the arrangements necessary to verify the accuracy of the North Korean declaration," one official said in reference to an account of the North's nuclear programs required in six-nation talks to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

"We need to secure access not only to records, but also to waste product," said the official, who, like all other sources interviewed for this article, asked that his name not be used because of the sensitivity of the matter.

The tentative agreement was reached last week in Pyongyang between Kim Kye-gwan, the chief North Korean negotiator, and Sung Kim, director of the Korea office at the State Department, officials said.

North Korea missed a Dec. 31 deadline to disclose details of its nuclear past, a key step in negotiations in which the North would receive aid and other economic assistance for giving up atomic weapons and the ability to produce them.

The Bush administration has been holding off on announcing the latest deal to give the North Korean diplomat time to clear it with his superiors. Officials said they were waiting for official confirmation from Pyongyang, which could come as early as today.

The United States estimates that North Korea has between 65 and 110 pounds of plutonium. It triggered a small nuclear explosion in an October 2006 test.

"The North Koreans were more forthcoming than they have been in the past about their plutonium effort," a senior administration official said about last week's meetings.

"I'm talking about their willingness to disclose what their program looks like — the elements, how the whole thing was put together, the facilities and processes by which they came up with the plutonium for weapons," he said.

The North froze plutonium production after a 1994 deal with the Clinton administration known as the Agreed Framework, under which it received economic aid such as fuel oil to generate electricity.

But it declared the agreement dead and reopened the plant in early 2003.

That move followed the Bush administration's assertion in October 2002 that Pyongyang had developed a secret uranium-enrichment program in the 1990s.

Both plutonium and enriched uranium can fuel a nuclear explosion.

The administration has insisted for months that the uranium effort, as well as the North's proliferation activities, be included in the declaration, which is required under a six-nation agreement reached last year.

Earlier last month, however, the administration said that those two issues will be dealt with in a separate document.

Officials said privately that the United States will write the document instead of the North Koreans, who will simply "acknowledge" the U.S. concerns.

Criticism of the proposed disclosure procedure on Capitol Hill and in the administration itself prompted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to emphasize the importance of verification, which led to last week's demands put by the State Department's Mr. Kim during his visit to Pyongyang.

Also last week, the administration told Congress that a Syrian plutonium facility that was bombed by Israel in September was built with North Korean help.

President Bush said the disclosure was meant to show Pyongyang that Washington knows more than the North thinks it does.

A former administration official familiar with the current strategy said that Washington was also asking Pyongyang to expedite the collapse of Yongbyon's cooling tower, a step that would make it difficult for plutonium production to resume.

The collapse would have been part of the complex's dismantling in the next stage of the process — at least months away — but the administration is seeking to satisfy Congress that the North's program cannot be easily reversed, officials said.

"We have to make sure this is something we can take to Congress and the American people and stand behind," the senior administration official said. "We are moving closer to a declaration that has credibility on plutonium."

A congressional official suggested that Washington would also seek access to the site where North Korea conducted its 2006 test. But the former administration official said that such access will be difficult to gain, and that demand may be a bargaining chip.

"The tactic so far has been that we ask for 10 things, get three and move on," he said.

Jon Ward contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080501/FOREIGN/813540289/1003/foreign>

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Washington Times

May 2, 2008

Pg. 6

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz

Missile defense

House Democrats held a hearing this week focusing on problems with U.S. missile defense. It included testimony from two Democratic critics, former Clinton administration defense testing official Philip Coyle and former Democrat congressional staff member Joseph Cirincione.

Rep. John F. Tierney, Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform national security and foreign affairs subcommittee, said at the hearing Wednesday that earlier panels had "raised very serious concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and even the need for our country's current missile defense efforts."

Countering the critics was Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering, director of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, who said the missile defense opponents are misguided.

"The fact is that many of our critics disagree with the policy choice that we ought to deploy strategic or tactical systems to counter the ballistic missile threat," Gen. Obering said. "They have other approaches, to include, denying that the threat exists, or using more destabilizing or destructive solutions."

The Pentagon has a limited missile defense against long-range missiles with interceptors at bases in Alaska and California and is gradually developing better strategic defenses.

Gen. Obering quoted from a draft presidential memorandum that stated: "A number of arguments for deployment of a less-than-perfect ballistic missile defense are most persuasive. A ballistic missile defense, even though of limited capability, could be very effective against a simple attack by a minor power, a small accidental attack, or a small attack constrained by arms control measures.

"Such a defense would contribute to the deterrence of blackmail threats and to the stability of arms control agreements. A ballistic missile defense of limited capability would contribute to the deterrence of large attacks by raising doubts about the attacker's ability to penetrate. Such a defense, even though limited, greatly complicates the design and tactics for offensive systems."

The memorandum was dated Oct. 6, 1962, during the administration of President John F. Kennedy.

Bill Gertz covers national security affairs.

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080502/NATION04/235824757>

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Arizona Daily Star (Tucson)

May 2, 2008

Senate Panel Boosts U.S. Missile Defense Plans In Europe

By Associated Press

WASHINGTON — A Senate panel gave a boost to U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic by authorizing a doubling of funds for the project.

The move, one of many steps necessary for approval of the funding, would increase the budget for the European system from \$320 million to \$712 million. Lawmakers also included money for construction of the two sites, which was withheld in last year's funding bill.

The authorization, included in a 2009 defense policy bill approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee this week, matched a request by the Bush administration.

The U.S. missile defense plans include building a radar in the Czech Republic and installing 10 interceptors in Poland as part of a system that the United States says is intended to protect parts of Europe and the United States. The Defense Department says it could begin construction late next year.

The missile defense plans in Europe have become one of the thorniest issues in U.S.-Russian relations. Russia opposes having missile defense sites so close to its borders, contending that would undermine its nuclear deterrent. The United States says the system is aimed at countering long range missiles from the Middle East or Asia and has cited Iran as the most likely threat. The Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency said Thursday that the Democratic-controlled Senate panel's authorization endorsed that view.

"It just goes to show that there is certainly a bipartisan consensus in the Senate that there is a threat to Europe and the U.S. from Iran," said spokesman Rick Lehner.

The draft bill that the panel authorized included restrictions on funding for construction of the system. It requires that the Polish and Czech parliaments approve the projects and that the Defense Department certify testing of the system before the funds can be used.

The Czech government has reached a deal with the United States and expects to sign it in coming months.

Negotiations in Poland have lagged over Polish insistence that any deal include broader U.S. defense aid. Both deals still need parliamentary approval.

The overall U.S. authorization bill must now be approved by the entire Senate and reconciled with a version in the House of Representatives before going to the president for approval. A separate appropriations bill would have to clear the same steps to approve the funding.

<http://www.azstarnet.com/news/237110>

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Washington Post

May 2, 2008

Pg. 13

N. Korea Agrees To Blow Up Tower At Its Nuclear Facility

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

North Korea has agreed to blow up the cooling tower attached to its Yongbyon nuclear facility within 24 hours of being removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, diplomats said this week.

The destruction of the cooling tower is intended by U.S. officials to be a striking visual, broadcast around the globe, that would offer tangible evidence that North Korea was retreating from its nuclear ambitions. Wisps of vapor from the cooling tower appear in most satellite photographs of Yongbyon, making it the facility's most recognizable feature, though experts say its destruction would be mostly symbolic.

North Korean officials had privately indicated previously they would destroy the tower as part of the disablement of Yongbyon. During talks last week with a top U.S. State Department official, Sung Kim, North Korea reaffirmed it would act quickly after Pyongyang is removed from the terrorism list.

During the talks, North Korean officials also tentatively agreed to release to U.S. officials thousands of pages of documents, dating back to 1990, concerning the daily production records of the facility. The records are intended to help U.S. experts determine how much plutonium was produced at the facility and thus verify North Korean claims. North Korea has indicated it produced more than 30 kilograms of plutonium, but Pyongyang does not count waste or material that collects in the facility's pipes, making it difficult to compare it with U.S. intelligence estimates of about 50 kilograms.

The diplomats spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the discussions. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack declined to comment "on ongoing negotiations," he said.

Several months ago, North Korean technicians broke through the concrete bottom of the tower, making it unusable, but hot water could still be dumped directly in a nearby river if North Korea were unconcerned about possible ecological damage. Other aspects of the disabling of the facility are more significant; U.S. officials say they think that North Korea would need to order months of repairs if it wanted to restart it.

Under a tentative deal struck between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea will be removed from the terrorism list and from a second sanction -- the Trading With the Enemy Act -- once it produces a declaration of its nuclear activities. U.S. officials have especially been focused on the plutonium segment of the declaration, telling

Pyongyang that it need only "acknowledge" U.S. evidence and concerns about two other issues: its nuclear dealings with Syria and a suspected uranium-enrichment program.

U.S. officials have argued that those two issues are considered of secondary, historical interest, in contrast to the more urgent matter of the plutonium stash. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006 and is known to possess enough plutonium to make several more nuclear bombs.

North Korea is one of five countries on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, which makes it subject to severe U.S. export controls, particularly of dual-use technology and military equipment. Those controls prohibit much foreign aid and obligate the United States to oppose financial assistance to the country from institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/01/AR2008050103719.html>

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YaHoo! News

China has secret nuclear submarine base: Jane's

by Robin Millard

Fri May 2, 10:42 AM ET

LONDON (AFP) - China is building a major underground nuclear submarine base on the southern tip of Hainan Island, defence group Jane's said Friday.

Jane's Intelligence Review, a respected defence periodical, said satellite images of the base from imagery provider DigitalGlobe were the first confirmation of its existence.

Although Beijing is displaying no overt aggression, the base could mean an increase in its strategic capability in the South China Sea and considerably further afield, Jane's analysis said.

"Jane's can confirm that the satellite pictures show that China is constructing a major underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya, on Hainan Island off its southern coast," the group said.

The Daily Telegraph, which reported the satellite images, called the base a "vast, James Bond-style edifice capable of concealing up to 20 nuclear-powered submarines, which will enable China to project its power across the region."

The British broadsheet said in an editorial that it was a sign of China's secretive side and Beijing "too often seeks to conceal its activities and becomes defensive when questioned."

Jane's said that Asian military sources had told it about the base in 2002, but the photographs provided independent verification.

The satellite images showed the harbour layout and a Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine at the base, said Jane's.

Others show three Luyang guided missile destroyers and a Jiangwei 2 guided missile frigate moored on a jetty, it said.

There are believed to be 11 tunnel openings at the base, it was reported, with each entrance, carved into the hill-side, stretching to a height of about 60 feet (18 metres). Pictures showed two of the tunnel entrances.

Another showed construction operations involving engineering and excavation barges.

The extent of construction indicates that the Sanya base could become a key future hub for the Chinese navy's aircraft carriers and other power-projection ships, Jane's said.

The Chinese navy moved its first Type 094 submarine to Sanya in December 2007, it added.

The identification of an underground submarine base and the positioning of China's most advanced sub-surface combatants at Sanya could have implications for China's control of the South China Sea and the strategically vital straits in the area, said Jane's.

"For both regional and extra-regional powers, it will be difficult to ignore that China is now building a major naval base at Sanya and may be preparing to house and protect a large proportion of its nuclear forces here and even operate them from this base," the group said.

"This development so close to the south-east Asian sea lanes so vital to the economies of Asia can only cause concern far beyond these straits."

Jane's Intelligence Review editor Christian Le Miere said: "China's nuclear and naval build-up at Sanya underlines Beijing's desire to assert tighter control over this region.

"China's increasing dependence on imported petroleum and mineral resources has contributed to an intensified Chinese concern about defending its access to vital sea lanes, particularly to its south.

"It is this concern that in large part is driving China's development of power-projection naval forces such as aircraft carriers and long-range nuclear submarines."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080502/wl_asia_afp/chinamilitarynuclearbase_080502144226

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London Daily Telegraph
May 3, 2008

Chinese Nuclear Submarines Prompt 'New Cold War' Warning

By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent

Tensions in the Far East could reach "Cold War levels" defence analysts warned, following evidence that China had secretly developed a major nuclear submarine base.

Satellite photographs passed to The Daily Telegraph this week showed that the secret base at Sanya on Hainan island will house up to 20 of the latest 094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic submarines that could be capable of firing anti-satellite missiles and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

The construction showed that China was "ramping up its operational capability" and developing a "blue water navy" that would challenge the dominance of the US in the Pacific, said Alex Neill, head of the Asia Security Programme at the Royal United Services Institute.

In the last 20 years China had gone from a coastal force to a navy capable of "exerting its influence far afield," a senior Royal Navy officer said.

"It is clearly looking at a wider area of operations in the Far East but it also does not like the US placing their carrier battle groups in the area. In due course this could lead to Cold War levels of stand off," the officer said.

There are also concerns that Beijing has secretly developed a broad military strategy - including internet assaults and satellite strikes - that could allow it to take Taiwan with the US unable to respond.

While talks continue for a peaceful settlement the island has long been in Beijing's sights since it broke from the mainland in 1949.

Kerry Brown, the China expert at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, warned of "hawkish" elements in the two million strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) who were "very focused" on Taiwan.

"The main source of friction is Taiwan and you cannot rule out a nationalistic military faction coming to power to taking a punt to have a quick go."

Chinese defence expenditure is estimated by the Pentagon to be \$50 billion (£25 billion) but analysts believe large chunks of the budget are "squirreled away" and it could be as high as \$200 billion making it the second largest in the world after America.

The PLA is developing a strategy called the "sea denial campaign" which would prevent America intervening in any conflict with Taiwan, Mr Brown said.

It entails asymmetric conflict in which China would use cyber warfare and laser energy to wipe out communications. Anti-satellite missiles, potentially launched from submarines, would ensure that America was "blind" over the Far East. The Chinese have already proven that they have these capabilities as well as using espionage to remove military technology from the US.

"This is what they call pressure point warfare in which they remove any US response in one fell swoop," Mr Brown said. "China wishes to power project well into the Pacific and challenge the dominance of the US Pacific Command."

He also said that the Sanya base gave China reach into the Indian Ocean.

Much to America's disgust, China's missile accuracy has been improved from 5km down to 1km. China's own space programme - that some experts believe equals Cape Canaveral in size - is also expanding close to the navy base on Hainan island.

There was no one available at the Chinese Embassy in London to comment.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/uselection2008/1920917/Chinese-nuclear-submarines-prompt-%27new-Cold-War%27-warning.html>

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Washington Times
May 4, 2008
Pg. 1

Bush's N. Korea Policy Draws Right Jab

Ex-aides remain unpersuaded after Pyongyang's pledge to release records.

By David R. Sands, Washington Times

Conservative critics of the Bush administration's North Korea policy — including former top security officials from the president's first term — say they are not assuaged by the administration's latest move to toughen the terms of a deal to end Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons programs.

These opponents say the administration repeatedly has offered concessions to keep the deal alive, even as North Korea has tested a nuclear device, ignored international sanctions, repressed dissent at home and now stands accused of helping Syria develop a secret nuclear program.

"Allowing North Korea to win its Cold War with the world will go down in history as one of the most remarkable and disturbing elements in the Bush administration legacy," said David Asher, who coordinated the State Department's North Korea Working Group from 2001 to 2005 before leaving the administration.

The Washington Times reported last week that U.S. negotiators had won a tentative agreement from Pyongyang to release thousands of additional records dating back nearly 20 years on its Yongbyon nuclear site, considered a critical facility in the North's nuclear drive.

Administration officials said they sought access to the new files in part to counter criticisms that they were lowering the bar in the talks with Pyongyang.

The North missed a Dec. 31 deadline to reveal all of its nuclear assets, part of a February 2007 deal under which the North promised to eventually end all its nuclear programs in exchange for economic aid and diplomatic concessions from the United States and its allies.

Conservative critics also have slammed the administration for easing the reporting requirements for the North's nuclear declaration, and for hinting the North could be dropped from the official U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states while a number of proliferation and espionage issues remain unresolved.

The skepticism is shared on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers of both parties last week complained of being kept largely in the dark about intelligence regarding North Korea's Syria connection.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday approved a bill that would force President Bush to certify that North Korea had completely dismantled its nuclear-weapons assets before the North could be removed from the terror list.

A day later, White House spokesman Tony Fratto declined to suggest a new deadline for North Korea's nuclear declaration, noting a State Department team was in Pyongyang just the previous week.

"We just counsel some patience and wait to see what we get back from the North Koreans in terms of their declaration," Mr. Fratto said.

U.S. officials acknowledge that deadlines have been missed, but say the deal already has succeeded in shutting down the Yongbyon reactor. North Korea has agreed to demolish the cooling tower at the site when it is formally dropped from the terror list.

John R. Bolton, the lead nonproliferation official in the State Department in Mr. Bush's first term, has been the most outspoken ex-official to attack the North Korea talks. But he is not the only one.

Carolyn Leddy, who served with Mr. Bolton in the State Department and then was the director of counterproliferation strategy at the National Security Council from July 2006 to November 2007, denounced the administration's "feckless and dangerous" North Korea policy last week at a forum sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute.

"I'm not talking about some conservative conspiracy to derail the talks," she said. "This administration has always lacked the will to apply and sustain pressure on the North Korean regime to actually make any kind of difference."

Mr. Asher recalled that Bush administration officials came to office in 2001 critical of the Clinton administration's attempts to deal with the North and of the "Sunshine Policy" of engagement favored by the government in South Korea.

"We thought the sunshine was more moonshine," he said.

But now, Mr. Asher said, North Korea has "crossed all the red lines we set in the talks, blown past all the international treaty commitments, and has paid no attention to U.N. resolutions," while the Bush administration has refused to get tough.

"The administration appears to have gotten inebriated on the Clinton-era moonshine, and lost sight of its original goals," he said.

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080504/FOREIGN/582180556/1003/foreign>

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New York Times

May 5, 2008

Pg. 10

Iran Seems To Reject West's Offer

By Nazila Fathi

TEHRAN — Iran's supreme religious leader said Sunday that his nation would not bow to pressure after Western powers announced Friday that they would offer a new package of incentives to coax Iran to give up its nuclear program.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme religious leader, who has the final word on state matters, did not refer directly to the country's nuclear program, but his comments seemed to suggest that Iran was not willing to compromise.

"Have you not tested the Iranian nation?" the ISNA news agency quoted him as asking during a speech in Fars Province on Sunday. "We will forcefully continue on our path and will not allow the oppressors to step on our rights."

Ayatollah Khamenei said economic sanctions could not affect the nation's will. He was referring to action from the United Nations Security Council, which ordered a third set of sanctions against Iran in March.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and senior officials from Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany met Friday in London and said that they would offer a new package of incentives to Iran in an effort to persuade it to abandon its uranium-enrichment program. Details of the new package have not been made public.

Iran has rejected previous proposals in the past, stressing that it would not give up its heavy water enrichment program.

Iran's foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, was quoted in Sunday newspapers as saying that the new package should not cross Iran's "red line." Officials have said in the past that Iran's red line was its uranium-enrichment program.

Enrichment can make fuel for civilian nuclear reactors or, if taken to higher levels, for nuclear warheads. The United States and other Western countries have accused Iran of having a clandestine nuclear arms program, but Iran says its program is peaceful and is devoted solely to producing fuel for nuclear reactors that generate electricity.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/world/middleeast/05tehran.html?ref=world>

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