



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 668, 28 November 2008

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at <http://cpc.au.af.mil/> for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense,

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National Intelligence Council

November 20, 2008

Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Council's 2025 Project

From the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council

"Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World" is the fourth unclassified report prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in recent years that takes a long-term view of the future. It offers a fresh look at how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence world events. Our report is not meant to be an exercise in prediction or crystal ball-gazing. Mindful that there are many possible "futures," we offer a range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, as a way of opening our minds to developments we might otherwise miss.

Some of our preliminary assessments are highlighted below:

- The whole international system—as constructed following WWII—will be revolutionized. Not only will new players—Brazil, Russia, India and China—have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.
- The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future.
- Unprecedented economic growth, coupled with 1.5 billion more people, will put pressure on resources—particularly energy, food, and water—raising the specter of scarcities emerging as demand outstrips supply.
- The potential for conflict will increase owing partly to political turbulence in parts of the greater Middle East.
- As with the earlier NIC efforts—such as Mapping The Global Future 2020—the project's primary goal is to provide US policymakers with a view of how world developments could evolve, identifying opportunities and potentially negative developments that might warrant policy action. We also hope this paper stimulates a broader discussion of value to educational and policy institutions at home and abroad.

For the full report see: www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html

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Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Managing the Atom

Securing the Bomb 2008

By Matthew Bunn

The world still faces a "very real" risk that terrorists could get a nuclear bomb, and the Obama Administration must make reducing that risk a top priority of U.S. security policy and diplomacy, according to Securing the Bomb 2008, a report released today. The new report was accompanied by a paper offering a specific agenda for the presidential transition and the opening weeks of the new administration.

"President-elect Obama has an historic opportunity to drastically reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism in his first term in office," said Prof. Matthew Bunn of Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom, the report's author. "But it will take sustained White House leadership to close the gaps in existing efforts and get past the obstacles slowing progress. He needs to appoint a senior White House official to take on this responsibility full-time, keeping it on the front burner at the White House every day."

The report details a broad range of progress in efforts to reduce the danger, including programs that have eliminated potential nuclear bomb material entirely from dozens of buildings and have substantially beefed up security for scores of sites. But it warns that major gaps in these efforts remain, and the risk of nuclear terrorism is still unacceptably high. The study provides a frightening survey of incidents around the world, from an armed break-in at a South African site with hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), to a Russian colonel arrested for soliciting bribes to overlook violations of nuclear security rules, to increasing terrorist threats amid Pakistan's ongoing strife, to weak security at many of the roughly 130 research reactors worldwide still using HEU fuel.

"To meet this threat, we must build a real nuclear security partnership with Russia and work with all nations to secure stockpiles around the world," said former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which commissioned the report. "This report offers the road-map we need to win the race between cooperation and catastrophe."

The new study reports that U.S.-sponsored security upgrades have been completed for approximately 75 percent of the buildings in the former Soviet Union that contain weapons-usable nuclear material, and for roughly 65 percent of Russia's nuclear warhead sites. Major issues remain, however, ranging from insider theft and corruption to chronic underinvestment in nuclear security. In much of the rest of the world, the effort is in much earlier stages. The Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative has accelerated efforts to convert research reactors to low-enriched uranium that cannot be used in a nuclear bomb and has accelerated removals of HEU from vulnerable sites. But only about a quarter of these sites have had all of their HEU removed, and only about a quarter of the HEU-fueled research reactors have had security measures put in place that could defeat demonstrated terrorist and criminal threats. Current plans to take back U.S.-supplied HEU would not address more than three-quarters of the U.S.-supplied HEU abroad (most of it in wealthy countries).

Recommendations

The report, and the accompanying transition paper "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: An Agenda for the Next President," co-written by Prof. Bunn and Managing the Atom research associate Dr. Andrew Newman, outline specific steps that President-Elect Obama should take that, together, could drastically reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism:

- Appoint a senior White House official, with direct access to the President, to take full-time charge of all efforts focused on preventing nuclear terrorism.
- Launch a fast-paced global campaign to ensure that every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of plutonium and HEU worldwide is protected against the kinds of threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose.
- Expand and accelerate efforts to remove nuclear material from as many locations around the world as possible, covering a broader range of materials and facilities, with a broader set of approaches and incentives for convincing them to cooperate.
- Seek agreement on effective global standards for nuclear security, including laying out the essential steps countries must take to meet their legal obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to provide "appropriate effective" security and accounting for their nuclear stockpiles.
- Initiate a major effort to convince skeptical policymakers and nuclear managers around the world that nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat worthy of their time and resources - beginning with joint briefings on the threat, nuclear terrorism exercises, realistic nuclear security tests, and evaluations at nuclear sites.
- Put in place new steps to ensure that effective security will be sustained after international assistance phases out, and to build a strong nuclear security culture, not only in Russia, but at facilities around the world.

- Put in place an integrated global approach to stopping nuclear smuggling - using "red teams" to understand the routes smugglers might take to get around defenses - integrating not only radiation detectors, but greatly expanded international police and intelligence cooperation.
- Intensify efforts to identify and stop the other stages of terrorist nuclear plots and work to address the root causes of terrorism.
- Provide the resources necessary to ensure that key efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism will not be slowed by lack of funds. In particular, seek Congressional appropriation of approximately \$500 million in funds that will not expire and can be spent to seize opportunities as they arise.

Securing the Bomb 2008 and its online companion at www.nti.org/securingthebomb is the only available source for "one-stop shopping" on all aspects of these critical U.S. security programs. Since NTI first commissioned this annual report from the Managing the Atom Project in 2002, the report and its recommendations have increased public awareness of the nuclear terrorism threat and helped spur increased government action to reduce nuclear dangers.

The Project on Managing the Atom, based at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, is Harvard's principal research group focusing on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. NTI is a Washington-based non-profit organization, focused on reducing the threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials.

http://www.nti.org/e_research/Securing_the_bomb08.pdf

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Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report #39
September 2008

Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism

Michael A. Levi

The basis of nuclear doctrine during the Cold War was deterrence.

Nuclear powers were deterred from attacking each other by the fear of retaliation. Today, much of the concern over possible nuclear attack comes in the context of rogue states and terrorism. And since only states are known to possess nuclear weapons, an important question is how to deter them from letting terrorists acquire a device, whether through an authorized transfer or a security breach.

Michael A. Levi analyzes this aspect of deterrence in the post-Cold War world, as well as what to do if deterrence breaks down. He suggests how to discourage states from giving weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists and how to encourage states to bolster security against any accidental transfer. The report also discusses the role of nuclear attribution—the science of identifying the origin of nuclear materials—in deterring transfers, an essential link in assigning responsibility to governments for transfers of nuclear materials.

Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism offers thoughtful analysis and practical guidelines for U.S. policy on a complex and important question and makes an important contribution to the thinking in an underexplored but unavoidable area of the post-Cold War security debate.

For the full report see:

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Nuclear_Deterrence_CSR39.pdf

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The Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
November 14, 2008

Understanding and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

By Travis Sharp and Erica Poff

Since the creation of the atomic bomb, government officials, scientists, and concerned citizens have been aware that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of dangerous terrorist groups or rogue regimes.¹ The rise of Al Qaeda and the events of September 11, however, brought the threat of nuclear terrorism into a whole new light for the United States. Suddenly, the detonation of a crude nuclear device in a major American metropolitan area no longer seemed like something out of a science fiction movie. Indeed, as President-Elect Barack Obama said during the 2008 presidential campaign, nuclear terrorism is “the gravest danger we face.”²

A top priority for nuclear weapons experts is North Korea and Iran. There is no doubt that the development of nuclear programs which may lead to weapons capabilities in these countries is cause for concern. There is little reason to believe, however, that if Pyongyang and Tehran did manage to obtain deliverable nuclear weapons, they would ever be foolhardy enough to use them against the United States. American retaliation against a nuclear first strike from North Korea or Iran would be swift and massive, and the threat of this retaliation deters either country from launching an attack against American targets.

It also is not very likely that North Korea, Iran, or any country would knowingly provide a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons. Not only is it irrational for a nation to hand over its most powerful weapon to terrorists over which it has no definitive control, but the weapons themselves could likely be traced back to their country of origin. Again, retaliation against the supplying state would be devastating and anticipation of this fate deters countries from giving nuclear weapons to terrorists.³

Given the odds against a nation state either launching a nuclear attack against the United States or supplying nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, the greatest threat today is that a non-state actor will steal a nuclear weapon or the fissile materials needed to make one. Al Qaeda already has pledged to carry out an “American Hiroshima.”⁴ Nuclear fissile materials that are either poorly guarded or unaccounted for, known in popular parlance as “loose nukes,” are dangerous and profitable sources for terrorist theft. The number of reported nuclear thefts is “disturbingly high” according to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief Mohamed ElBaradei.⁵ What is perhaps even more disturbing is that stolen materials are rarely noticed to be missing before they are seized from would-be thieves.⁶

In his 2008 annual report to the U.N. General Assembly, ElBaradei said there were nearly 250 reported thefts of nuclear or radioactive material worldwide during the twelve month period ending in June 2008.⁷ In 2006, a Russian citizen was arrested in Georgia with nearly 100 grams of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The theft was never detected and the amount of HEU carried by the thief was never reported missing.⁸ Pakistan’s current stockpile of 60 nuclear weapons and related facilities is considered to be at risk given the presence of Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and the country’s problematic nuclear security system.⁹ Even in the case of “secured” HEU and plutonium, the possibility of theft is not unimaginable. In 2007, a gang of four armed men attacked, entered, and spent 45 minutes inside a nuclear facility in Pelindaba, South Africa without being captured by security forces. The details of the break-in and what was taken (if anything) have yet to be released by the South African government.¹⁰

A multitude of studies have been conducted on the statistical probability that Al Qaeda will obtain and detonate a WMD within the United States. The results range anywhere from one in a million to a 50% chance in the next 10 years.¹¹ Specific estimates aside, a terrorist group obtaining a nuclear capability is certainly not outside the realm of possibilities.

It is not the odds but the consequences of such an attack that propel nuclear terrorism to the top of the U.S. national security agenda. A March 2003 report by Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom found that if a ten-kiloton nuclear weapon, approximately the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, were detonated at Manhattan's Grand Central Station in New York, it would instantly kill over 500,000 people, injure hundreds of thousands, and cause over \$1 trillion in direct damages.¹²

WHAT IS BEING DONE?

As is true in sports, the best offense is a strong defense. U.S. efforts to combat nuclear terrorism have grown steadily over the years. For example, in response to the large nuclear arsenal remaining in Russia following the Cold War, Congress established the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, popularly known as "Nunn-Lugar" after the two senators – Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) – who shepherded it through Washington. CTR is an initiative to secure and dismantle nuclear and other weapons in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. Other federal agencies within the U.S. government have also taken important steps to create programs targeting the sources of nuclear terrorism, such as the Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Department of State's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

Despite these efforts, the United States remains dangerously vulnerable. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission called on the President and Congress to exercise "maximum effort" against WMD proliferation and terrorism. In 2005, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project assessed the progress and efforts of the U.S. government in carrying out the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The Project found the government had made "insufficient progress" and assigned it a 'D' grade overall. Seven years after 9/11, the Partnership for a Secure America issued a similar report card in 2008 giving the U.S. government a 'C' grade.¹³

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

If the United States and countries around the world are serious about preventing a nuclear attack by a terrorist group, efforts to contain the threat at its source need serious attention. According to the Partnership for a Secure America, the biggest problem is the lack of coordination on counter-nuclear terrorism efforts across federal agencies. Congress tried to remedy this shortcoming in 2007 with H.R. 1, the 9/11 Commission Act, which created a White House Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Unfortunately, the Bush administration chose to ignore the law and never filled the position.¹⁴ Failures in coordination are similarly reflected at the international level, where bilateral and multilateral engagement to prevent nuclear terrorism is equally fragmented.

Below are key recommendations the U.S. government ought to incorporate into a comprehensive strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism:

Reorganize the executive branch to better meet the threat of nuclear terrorism.

President-Elect Obama should move immediately to correct President Bush's mistake by filling the position of Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Creating a separate agency for arms control and nonproliferation, either inside or outside the State Department, modeled on the previous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would further enhance the government's institutional ability to prevent nuclear terrorism. If creating this separate agency is deemed too radical, separate bureaus could be created within the State Department to focus solely on arms control and nonproliferation. Moreover, steps should be taken to recruit and retain the scientific, technical, and policy professionals needed to run a robust governmental effort to prevent a nuclear attack by terrorists. This may require some additional hiring incentives and bonuses.¹⁵

Create international standards for securing HEU, plutonium, and fissile materials.

Protecting nuclear weapons and fissile material at their source is the first line of defense against terrorists seeking “loose nukes.” One place to start would be to strengthen U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, a resolution adopted in 2004 that addresses the risk of non-state groups obtaining WMDs. By strengthening the language, setting specific guidelines for states’ obligations (including strict measures for securing fissile material), and creating an enforcement mechanism, some of Resolution 1540’s vagaries could be eliminated.¹⁶

Strengthen bilateral and multilateral agreements on the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

The nature and threat of nuclear terrorism is international; thus, initiatives which seek to prevent nuclear-capable terrorist groups must be international and draw from the combined resources of the global community. There are two methods for marshaling the international community’s commitment to prevent nuclear terrorism: multilateral treaties (such as Resolution 1540) and bilateral agreements. On the latter, there are a few key places where the United States should focus:

Re-connect with Russia on nuclear arms agreements. The United States and Russia together account for nearly 80% of the world’s nuclear weapons-usable materials.¹⁷ It is imperative that the two countries realign on nonproliferation and counter-nuclear terrorism measures. The first action ought to be the renewal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before its expiration in December 2009.¹⁸ Engage emerging nuclear states such as Pakistan and India on securing fissile material and other nonproliferation initiatives. The most pressing threat of a regional arms race lies in South Asia between Pakistan and India. Not only is it necessary for the United States to engage both countries on nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, but the United States will inevitably need to tread carefully during implementation of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which presents a tremendous challenge to global nonproliferation efforts.

Invest in technical and analytic tools to detect proliferation activities, networks, and materials.

This includes creating more stringent standards for security on the borders where a nuclear weapon could be smuggled into the United States; improving intelligence networks that can identify terrorist work on nuclear weapons; and developing technological tools that can detect fissile material.

Lead by example by actively working to reduce the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

No matter how safeguarded a nuclear weapons program is, and no matter how secure weapons-grade fissile material may be, the fact remains that so long as nuclear weapons and materials exist, the threat of nuclear terrorism will remain. As Harvard University nuclear weapons expert Matthew Bunn stated, “...convincing foreign countries to reduce and consolidate nuclear stockpiles [and] put stringent nuclear security measures in place...will be far more difficult if we are not doing the same at home.”¹⁹ With President-Elect Obama having already dedicated himself to “work for a world in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be reduced and ultimately eliminated,” the United States could demonstrate its seriousness about reducing nuclear dangers early on in an Obama administration by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It will take much effort for President-Elect Obama to achieve his oft-stated goal of securing “all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years – the most effective way to prevent terrorists from acquiring a bomb,” but the CTBT would be a good place to start.²⁰

NOTES

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2. Alexander Mooney, "Obama Says Time to Rid the World of Nuclear Weapons," CNN (July 16, 2008).
3. Ashton Carter, Michael May, and William Perry, "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," *The Washington Quarterly* 30:4 (Autumn 2007), 19-32.
4. Ibid.
5. Neil Macfarquhar, "Rate of Nuclear Thefts 'Disturbingly High,' Monitoring Chief Says," *New York Times* (October 27, 2008).
6. See Matthew Bunn, "The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism – And Next Steps to Reduce the Danger," testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (April 2, 2008).
7. Macfarquhar, "Rate of Nuclear Thefts 'Disturbingly High,' Monitoring Chief Says."
8. Bunn, "The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism – And Next Steps to Reduce the Danger."
9. For information on Pakistan's nuclear weapons stockpile, see Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (May/June 2007), 71-73. For information on Pakistan's nuclear weapons security system, see Max Postman, "History, Design, and Prospects for Improving Pakistan's Nuclear Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)," *Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation* (March 5, 2008).
10. Bunn, "The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism – And Next Steps to Reduce the Danger."
11. See *ibid.*, as well as John Mueller, "The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood," *Ohio State University Department of Political Science* (January 1, 2008).
12. Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, "Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan," *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University* (March 2003).
13. Partnership for a Secure America, *WMD Report Card: Evaluating U.S. Policies to Prevent Nuclear, Chemical, & Biological Terrorism Since 2005* (August 2008).
14. See Kingston Reif, "Time to Name a Coordinator for WMD Proliferation," *Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation* (June 26, 2008).
15. For more information on reorganizing the U.S. government to deal with arms control, see *ibid.*, "Fact Sheet on Strengthening Arms Control and Nonproliferation," *Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation* (July 3, 2008).
16. For a thoughtful critique of Resolution 1540, see Wade Boese, "Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1540," presentation to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management panel discussion (March 15, 2005).
17. Bunn, "The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism – And Next Steps to Reduce the Danger."
18. For more information on START renewal, see Daryl Kimball, "START Anew: The Future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty," presentation at the Carnegie Moscow Center (May 12, 2008).
19. Bunn, "The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism – And Next Steps to Reduce the Danger."

20. Barack Obama quotes taken from Council for a Livable World, 2008 Presidential Candidates' Responses to Seven Key National Security Questions (August 2007).

http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/111408_understanding_preventing_nuclear_terrorism/#

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Joint Forces Quarterly
Issue 51, 4th quarter 2008

DOD and the Nuclear Mission

By Clark A. Murdock

This article presents an advocacy narrative for the still important contributions that nuclear weapons make to U.S. security and outlines a set of recommendations for how the Department of Defense (DOD) should organize for the nuclear mission. After first addressing the role of nuclear weapons in 21st century international affairs and national security, this article reviews how the nuclear mission has been neglected in the post-Cold War era and suggests what actions are needed to resuscitate the nuclear deterrent.

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/9.pdf

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National Journal
November 18, 2008

Obama Will Have Opening on Arms Initiatives, Expert Says

By James Kitfield

WASHINGTON -- Few experts in Washington are more steeped in their disciplines than arms control advocate Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, the author of *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*, and an expert adviser to the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Secretary of Energy and Defense James Schlesinger. Though he also served as an informal adviser to the Obama campaign, Cirincione stressed that the opinions shared in this interview are strictly his own (see GSN, Nov. 10).

(Nov. 18) - An arms control expert has called on U.S. President-elect Barack Obama to undertake several major nuclear-weapon initiatives (Saul Loeb/Getty Images).

National Journal: Do you agree with those who argue that the Obama administration should move quickly to open negotiations with Russia on further reductions in nuclear arms, as he suggested during the campaign?

Joseph Cirincione: Absolutely. Transforming U.S. nuclear weapons policy would accomplish numerous goals for the new president. First, it would represent an early political victory, because there is now a broad, bipartisan consensus for fundamentally changing our nuclear posture. That includes drastically reducing the size of our nuclear arsenal, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reining in nuclear proliferation. Secondly, such an initiative would make our country more secure, not less. Finally, it would save tens of billions of dollars that could pay for some of the other military bills coming due.

NJ: You say there is a broad consensus, but aren't there still strong opponents in Congress for ratifying the CTBT and reducing our nuclear arsenal dramatically?

Cirincione: There is a core of between 20 to 25 percent of congressional Republicans on the very right who will go nuts over anything [Barack] Obama does to address our nuclear posture. The good news is there is somewhere between 75 to 80 percent of those in Congress who will support each of the steps I just outlined, including a significant number of more moderate Republicans. Remember, as a presidential candidate Senator John McCain also supported many of these same steps.

NJ: What accounts for that increase in support?

Cirincione: The "Four Horsemen of the Anti-Apocalypse." Last year, [former Senator] Sam Nunn, William Perry and [former Secretaries of State] George Schultz and Henry Kissinger all co-authored an article calling for the United States to reclaim its leadership position on nuclear nonproliferation by further steep reductions in our arsenal and by recommitting to the pledge in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to move towards eliminating nuclear weapons.

That opened huge political space on the issue that will give a President Obama much more maneuvering room than President Clinton had on these issues. Clinton was always playing defense on arms control in order to protect his domestic agenda from the right wing of the Republican Party. I believe a President Obama will be just as interested on international issues as domestic, and he will not be looking for tactical positioning. I think transformation is part of his world view.

NJ: The Russians have made clear that as part of any arms control deal, they will insist on the U.S. scrapping its planned missile defense system in Poland and Europe. Won't that prove a very contentious issue?

Cirincione: I don't think a President Obama will cancel that system, but he has already said that we shouldn't proceed with it until the system is known to work. We're at least two years away from that point. So I think we should put missile defense more on a scientific basis and less of an ideological one, and take it off this artificial fast track the Bush administration put it on. That would give the next administration time to reduce U.S.-Russian tensions.

NJ: With those tensions running very high in the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, do you really think we can strike an arms control deal with the Russians?

Cirincione: I've been in Moscow twice in the past year, and the message I heard from a wide variety of actors there is that nuclear arsenals, missile defense, global strike and NATO expansion are all linked and that any deal must address each of those complex issues. I think we should send a message back that we will proceed slowly in erecting the missile system in Europe, and that in the meantime we're willing to discuss their legitimate concerns. Now that oil prices have plummeted, I also think we may have more leverage with Russia than we did before.

NJ: Do you agree with experts who argue that Obama could build positive momentum by taking U.S. nuclear weapons off of "hair trigger" alert, making an accidental launch less likely?

Cirincione: Yes. I think there is a high probability that early on an Obama administration will move to reduce the number of our nuclear weapons deployed overseas, and to take them off of hair-trigger alert status. The question is whether the United States should do that as part of broader arms control talks with the Russians, or whether it should do it unilaterally with the understanding that the Russians would follow suit. That's the way that George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev reduced deployed nuclear arsenals in 1991.

Either way, Barack Obama has been very clear almost from the beginning of his campaign that taking nuclear weapons off of hair-trigger alert was near the top of his list of things to do in this area. The others are deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and signing a treaty limiting fissile material.

NJ: And you don't think such an ambitious arms control agenda risks significant political blowback?

Cirincione: Barack Obama can make real transformational changes that will represent a net plus for the United States both internationally and domestically, changes that actually save money and make the country more secure. So I think you would see the opposite of blowback.

http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php?ID=nw_20081118_9029

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Los Angeles Times
November 20, 2008
Pg. 23

Rethinking Nation's Anti-Terror Policies

Civil liberties groups want Obama to close Guantanamo, stop the tribunals and curtail domestic surveillance.

By James Oliphant

WASHINGTON -- It's called the president's daily brief, or, more informally, the "threat matrix." And it could change the way President-elect Barack Obama views the world and the dangers that exist. Obama began receiving daily intelligence reports -- the ones given to President Bush -- after the election. They provide a far more detailed look at terrorist threats than he received as a senator or presidential candidate. "If ever there were proof of the existence of evil in the world, it is in the pages of these reports," former Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft once said about the briefings.

Obama and his national security advisors will probably keep those reports in mind as they consider changes to the Bush administration's counter-terrorism policies. Civil liberties groups and others have compiled a wish list of sorts, seeking the repudiation of controversial tactics such as domestic surveillance, extended detention, "enhanced" interrogation and "extraordinary rendition." "This administration got a chance to make all its own rules," said Annemarie Brennan of Amnesty International USA.

Now it's Obama's turn. But tempering his desire to close the book on an administration that has been accused of violating domestic and international law will be the need to ensure the nation remains protected. Obama must decide whether to dismantle the legal framework that the Bush administration created after the Sept. 11 attacks, when the White House, Pentagon and Justice Department determined that existing legal processes, both civilian and military, were inadequate to meet the threat posed by terrorism. Specifically, human rights and civil liberties groups are pushing for the Obama administration to do the following:

- * Close the prison at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Obama has repeatedly expressed his desire to do so. But before that can happen, his administration must review the basis for holding each of the remaining 250 detainees, and decide who should be released, who should be transferred to the U.S. for trial, or whether to continue to hold some indefinitely.

- * Dismantle the military commission process for trying accused terrorists and try them in U.S. federal courts. That would present formidable legal issues involving the use of classified information, as well as evidence obtained through possibly illegal interrogation techniques.

* Issue an executive order that ends so-called extraordinary rendition -- the practice of sending an alleged terrorist to another country to be held and questioned -- and revokes a 2007 order that reauthorized the CIA's detention and interrogation program.

* Issue an order that a single standard be used in interrogating terrorism suspects. The military is bound by restrictions that forbid coercive and extreme methods, but the intelligence services are not.

* Scale back amendments passed this year to the federal law that governs the surveillance of foreign agents, and which provided retroactive immunity from lawsuits to the nation's largest telecommunications companies. Obama supported the amendments but also opposed granting immunity. Until now, he probably did not know the extent to which the surveillance program has provided valuable information.

* Conduct a formal review of Bush administration legal policy and decisions made on interrogation and detention. The White House has been reluctant to make public memos and other papers documenting its conclusions that all of its anti-terrorism programs were within the law.

<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/20/nation/na-obama-terror20>

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RAND

October 22, 2008

Breaking the Failed-State Cycle

By: Marla C. Haims, David C. Gompert, Gregory F. Treverton, Brooke Stearns Lawson

Insecurity in the 21st century appears to come less from the collisions of powerful states than from the debris of imploding ones. Failed states present a variety of dangers: religious and ethnic violence; trafficking of drugs, weapons, blood diamonds, and humans; transnational crime and piracy; uncontrolled territory, borders, and waters; terrorist breeding grounds and sanctuaries; refugee overflows; communicable diseases; environmental degradation; and warlords and stateless armies. Regions with failed states are at risk of becoming failed regions, like the vast triangle from Sudan to the Congo to Sierra Leone. For security, material, and moral reasons, leading states cannot ignore failed ones. While no two failed states are alike, all typically suffer from cycles of violence, economic breakdown, and unfit government, rendering them unable to relieve the suffering of their people, much less empower them. This paper aims to improve the understanding and treatment of failed states by offering an integrated approach based on two ideas: that certain critical challenges at the intersections between security, economics, and politics must be met if the cycle is to be broken and that, in meeting those critical challenges, the guiding goal should be to lift local populations from the status of victims of failure to agents of recovery.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP204.pdf

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RAND

October 22, 2008

Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options

By: Gregory F. Treverton

One lesson of 9/11 is that the signs of the attack were not assembled into a warning that might have made it possible to prevent the disaster. In the wake of that failure, one question on the U.S. agenda is whether

the country needs a dedicated domestic intelligence agency – separate from law enforcement – to address the U.S. terrorist threat.

The Department of Homeland Security asked the RAND Corporation to conduct an independent study on the feasibility of creating a counter-terrorism intelligence agency. While it asked RAND not to offer specific recommendations, DHS wanted to know the relevant considerations for creating such an agency, as well as the benefits and pitfalls of doing so.

Among the key findings of the report:

- The motivating question is one of organization, and depending on how the problem with the nation's domestic intelligence approach is defined, changing organizations is one solution. However, other approaches – such as reallocation resources, changing regulations or laws, or enhancing agency collaboration – are options as well.
- Fundamentally, what the United States seeks by way of domestic intelligence remains unclear, and existing arrangements have not been assessed in detail, all of which raises questions about the objectives of any reorganization effort.
- "Break-even" analysis provides a systematic means of exploring the question of how much a new domestic intelligence agency would have to reduce terrorism risk – given a presumed level of threat and estimates of agency cost – to justify creating it.

The report, "Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options," can be found at www.rand.org.

The author of the report is Gregory Treverton.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG767.pdf

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Combating Terrorism Center, (West Point)
November 2008

CTC Sentinel

The contents of this month's edition are:

- "The Dilemma of the Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay" by Gregory Johnson & Chris Boucek
 - o An interview featuring the authors on NPR this morning can be found at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97230217>
 - o An article in the Washington Post featuring the article can be found at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/18/AR2008111803423.html?hpid%3Dsec-nation&sub=new>
 - "Al-Qa`ida's Presence and Influence in Lebanon" by Bilal Y. Saab
 - "U.S. Cross-Border Raid Highlights Syria's Role in Islamic Militancy" by Anonymous
 - "Afghanistan's Hear of Darkness: Fighting the Taliban in Kunar Province" by Brian Glyn Williams
 - "Al-Qa`ida's Changing Outlook on Pakistan" by Jarret Brachman

- o An article from Reuters featuring the article can be found at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE4AH94T20081118>
- “Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11” by Hanna Rogan
- “Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas’ Deradicalization Work in Indonesia” by Nick O’Brien
- “Shi`a Leaders Disagree on Integration of Sons of Iraq into Army” by Reidar Visser

<http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss12.pdf>

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The Long War Journal

Senior Al Qaeda Leader Targeted in Airstrike in Bannu, Pakistan

Written by Bill Roggio

November 19, 2008

This morning's airstrike in Pakistan's Bannu region targeted a senior al Qaeda leader with close ties to Osama bin Laden, sources told *The Long War Journal*. The early morning Predator strike is thought to have killed Abdullah Azzam al Saudi, a senior al Qaeda leader operating in Pakistan's tribal areas and the Northwest Frontier Province. Azzam, a Saudi national, serves as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest, intelligence officials said. Azzam facilitates al Qaeda's external operations network that is tasked with striking against the West. He has also served as a recruiter and trainer for al Qaeda.

Pakistani intelligence officials reported Azzam was killed along with four other al Qaeda and Taliban operatives after Hellfire missiles launched from Predator or Reaper unmanned aircraft slammed into the home of Sakhi Mohammad in the Bannu Frontier Region. US intelligence officials contacted by *The Long War Journal* would not confirm or deny Azzam's death. "It is far too soon to know, and northwestern Pakistan isn't the easiest place in the world to find out if these strikes succeed or fail," one senior official said. "We've had far too many false positives this year to be certain this hit was successful."

The strike in Bannu is the first recorded US attack outside of Pakistan's seven Taliban-controlled tribal agencies, and appears to be the deepest US strike inside Pakistani territory to date. In the past three years, the US has concentrated its attacks in Bajaur and on North and South Waziristan, which border Bannu to the west. There have been 30 recorded cross-border attacks and attempts in Pakistan this year, according to numbers compiled by *The Long War Journal*. Twenty-three of these attacks have occurred since Aug. 31. There were only ten strikes during 2006 and 2007 combined. The US strikes inside Pakistan's tribal areas have killed five senior al Qaeda leaders this year.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_3.php

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Joint Forces Quarterly

Issue 51, 4th quarter 2008

Al Qaeda: Refining a Failing Strategy

By Martin J. Hart

Al Qaeda's inability to translate its post-9/11 approval in the Muslim world into a mass movement jihad against the

West is prompting a search for new ways to regenerate lost momentum, but the group's inherent weaknesses are likely to prevent progress and gradually discredit its vision for the future of Islam. Al Qaeda's long-term plan—according to the writings of its core leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri—is to move from a small vanguard movement to the leadership, at least at a nominal level, of a

global Islamic insurgency in order to destroy Western influence in the Muslim world and reestablish the historic caliphate.

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/25.pdf

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Joint Forces Quarterly
Issue 51, 4th quarter 2008

Defeating Global Networks: The Need for a Strategic Targeting Organization

By Robert M. Brassaw

The National Military Strategy clearly articulates the diverse global threats that face the United States, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not implemented a process to deal with these adversaries effectively. Current threats involving transnational and nonstate actors operate across the areas of responsibility (AOR) of multiple combatant commands. In order to deal with these threats, there must be a single DOD entity empowered to globally integrate and prioritize targeting.

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/26.pdf

Other Articles of Interest in the JFQ:

Terrorist Violence in the Next Millennium: New Legal Solutions for an Old Nemesis

By James P. Terry

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/28.pdf

Information-driven Interagency Operations in Afghanistan

By Shannon O'Harren, Trude V.V. King, Tushar Suthar, and Kenneth D. Cockrell

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/29.pdf

Confronting Biological Threats to the Homeland

By Michael Chertoff

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/10.pdf

The New Threat of Unconventional Warfare

By Albert J. Mauroni

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/10.pdf

Combating WMD Collaboratively

By Paul I. Bernstein

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/12.pdf

Missile Defense and NATO Security

Peppino A. DeBiaso

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/8.pdf

Command and Control of Military Forces in the Homeland

By Jeffrey W. Burkett

For the full text see: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/27.pdf

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New York Times
November 20, 2008

Iran said to have Nuclear Fuel for One Weapon

By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER

Iran has now produced roughly enough nuclear material to make, with added purification, a single atom bomb, according to nuclear experts analyzing the latest report from global atomic inspectors. The figures detailing Iran's progress were contained in a routine update on Wednesday from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been conducting inspections of the country's main nuclear plant at Natanz. The report concluded that as of early this month, Iran had made 630 kilograms, or about 1,390 pounds, of low-enriched uranium.

Several experts said that was enough for a bomb, but they cautioned that the milestone was mostly symbolic, because Iran would have to take additional steps. Not only would it have to breach its international agreements and kick out the inspectors, but it would also have to further purify the fuel and put it into a warhead design — a technical advance that Western experts are unsure Iran has yet achieved. "They clearly have enough material for a bomb," said Richard L. Garwin, a top nuclear physicist who helped invent the hydrogen bomb and has advised Washington for decades. "They know how to do the enrichment. Whether they know how to design a bomb, well, that's another matter."

Iran insists that it wants only to fuel reactors for nuclear power. But many Western nations, led by the United States, suspect that its real goal is to gain the ability to make nuclear weapons. While some Iranian officials have threatened to bar inspectors in the past, the country has made no such moves, and many experts inside the Bush administration and the I.A.E.A. believe it will avoid the risk of attempting "nuclear breakout" until it possessed a larger uranium supply.

Even so, for President-elect Barack Obama, the report underscores the magnitude of the problem that he will inherit Jan. 20: an Iranian nuclear program that has not only solved many technical problems of uranium enrichment, but that can also now credibly claim to possess enough material to make a weapon if negotiations with Europe and the United States break down.

American intelligence agencies have said Iran could make a bomb between 2009 and 2015. A national intelligence estimate made public late last year concluded that around the end of 2003, after long effort, Iran had halted work on an actual weapon. But enriching uranium, and obtaining enough material to build a weapon, is considered the most difficult part of the process. Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University and a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory said the growing size of the Iranian stockpile "underscored that they are marching down the path to developing the nuclear weapons option."

In the report to its board, the atomic agency said Iran's main enrichment plant was now feeding uranium into about 3,800 centrifuges — machines that spin incredibly fast to enrich the element into nuclear fuel. That count is the same as in the agency's last quarterly report, in September. Iran began installing the centrifuges in early 2007. But the new report's total of 630 kilograms — an increase of about 150 — shows that Iran has been making progress in accumulating material to make nuclear fuel.

That uranium has been enriched to the low levels needed to fuel a nuclear reactor. To further purify it to the highly enriched state needed to fuel a nuclear warhead, Iran would have to reconfigure its centrifuges and do a couple months of additional processing, nuclear experts said. "They have a weapon's worth," Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist in the nuclear program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a private group in Washington that tracks atomic arsenals, said in an interview.

He said the amount was suitable for a relatively advanced implosion-type weapon like the one dropped on Nagasaki. Its core, he added, would be about the size of a grapefruit. He said a cruder design would require about twice as much weapon-grade fuel.

“It’s a virtual milestone,” Dr. Cochran said of Iran’s stockpile. It is not an imminent threat, he added, because the further technical work to make fuel for a bomb would tip off inspectors, the United States and other powers about “where they’re going.” The agency’s report made no mention of the possible military implications of the size of Iran’s stockpile. And some experts said the milestone was still months away. In an analysis of the I.A.E.A. report, the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington, estimated that Iran had not yet reached the mark but would “within a few months.” It added that other analysts estimated it might take as much as a year. Whatever the exact date, it added, “Iran is progressing” toward the ability to quickly make enough weapon-grade uranium for a warhead.

Peter D. Zimmerman, a physicist and former United States government arms scientist, cautioned that the Iranian stockpile fell slightly short of what international officials conservatively estimate as the minimum threatening amount of nuclear fuel. “They’re very close,” he said of the Iranians in an interview. “If it isn’t tomorrow, it’s soon,” probably a matter of months. In its report, the I.A.E.A., which is based in Vienna, said Iran was working hard to roughly double its number of operating centrifuges.

A senior European diplomat close to the agency said Iran might have 6,000 centrifuges enriching uranium by the end of the year. The report also said Iran had said it intended to start installing another group of 3,000 centrifuges early next year. The atomic energy agency said Iran was continuing to evade questions about its suspected work on nuclear warheads. In a separate report released Wednesday, the agency said, as expected, that it had found ambiguous traces of uranium at a suspected Syrian reactor site bombed by Israel last year.

“While it cannot be excluded that the building in question was intended for non-nuclear use,” the report said, the building’s features “along with the connectivity of the site to adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to what may be found in connection with a reactor site.” Syria has said the uranium came from Israeli bombs.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

For the IAEA report: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/gov2008-59.pdf>

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Times of London
November 20, 2008

Military Analysts: Iran 'Has Enough Material for Atomic Bomb'

Hannah Strange

Iran has now accumulated enough nuclear material to make an atomic bomb, weapons experts said today. An analysis of the latest monitoring report on the country’s nuclear programme concluded Iran had amassed 630kg of low enriched uranium, enough for a single weapon. Iran denies allegations it is seeking to build a bomb and claims it is only developing a peaceful energy programme in its plant at Natanz. Non-proliferation rules allow for a domestic nuclear industry. But UN officials said they were unable to verify Iran's claims.

“We had gridlock before but until September at least we were talking to each other. Now it’s worse. There is no communication whatsoever, no progress regarding possible military dimensions in their

programme,” said a senior official from the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA has struggled to get to the bottom of US intelligence suggesting that Iran has in the past melded projects to process uranium for atomic fuel, test high explosives at unusually high altitudes and revamp the cone of a long-range Shahab-3 missile in a way that would fit a nuclear warhead. Iran says such intelligence is forged, but monitors have said that unless Iran produces credible evidence for its denials or permitted inspections beyond declared atomic sites, the IAEA could not verify Iran’s enrichment was wholly peaceful.

The last IAEA report, on September 15, detailed the Islamic Republic’s non-cooperation with requests for documents and access to sites and officials and physicists for interviews. UN officials said that the situation has not since improved. The only aspect of the inquiry that has continued are the routine inspections of the Natanz plant, the monitors said. These contacts had revealed Iranian plans to start installing another 3,000 centrifuges early next year, adding to 3,800 already enriching uranium and another 2,200 being gradually introduced. But monitors also found that Iran has not boosted the number of centrifuges regularly refining uranium since reaching the 3,800 level in September. The reason for Iran’s relatively slow progress was unclear, UN officials said.

“Our questions are there and they need to be addressed. There is no point in writing them again every week. We are just awaiting their response,” one senior official said. “But we have a long vacuum of communication now.”

Experts cautioned that although Tehran had enough material for a weapon, it was a largely symbolic milestone as Iran would have to convert the fuel into high enriched uranium and put it into a warhead design. Western analysts doubt Iran is technically capable building a functioning warhead.

“They clearly have enough material for a bomb,” said Richard Garwin, a top nuclear physicist who helped invent the hydrogen bomb and has been a Washington adviser for many years. “They know how to do the enrichment. Whether they know how to design a bomb, well, that’s another matter.” Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, insisted that the report showed Iran had “provided necessary access” for UN inspectors within the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards.

“Naturally in the future also the agency’s access and inspections within the same framework will continue,” he told reporters in Tehran. Iran says that IAEA inspectors do not have the right to inspect the sites it is requesting access to, as they are conventional military facilities which any nation would keep off limits on security grounds.

It turned over more than 200 pages of documents to the IAEA in June and at the time insisted they answered all relevant questions, declaring: “The matter is over.” Diplomats say that despite Western refusal to accept such a stance, the Islamic Republic will face little pressure to change course before US President George Bush hands over to Barack Obama in January.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5200151.ece

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RIA Novosti
20 November 2008

Iran Pledges to Continue Work with IAEA Despite Critical Report

VIENNA, November 20 (RIA Novosti) - Iran's top nuclear official said the country will continue to cooperate with the UN nuclear watchdog, after the agency issued a report criticizing Tehran for failure suspend uranium enrichment. Official news agency IRNA quoted Mohammad Saeedi as saying on Wednesday that the country has granted inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full access to its nuclear facilities, and will continue to do so.

Earlier on Wednesday, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei circulated a report to the agency's Board of Governors on Iran's controversial nuclear program. The report says: "Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities," and that Iran "has not offered any cooperation with the agency." Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad insisted on Wednesday that his country would not cave in to Western pressure, and would continue uranium enrichment.

"Now the great powers are disappointed, as they have not the least bit of hope of breaking the Iranian people down," he said in a speech broadcast on state TV. The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the report when it next convenes in Vienna on 27 November. The report says that 6,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges have already been set up at Iran's Natanz nuclear center, 3,800 of which are in operation. Iran has obtained an estimated two tons of enriched uranium since its uranium enrichment activities restarted at Natanz two years ago.

ElBaradei said that IAEA inspectors have been unable to verify whether Iran has a secret plan for nuclear weapon development, since Iran has refused to provide any support for IAEA's investigation on the nature of its nuclear plans. Iran is under three sets of relatively mild sanctions over its nuclear program, which it insists has purely civilian goals. Western powers led by the United States, along with Israel, accuse Tehran of developing nuclear weapons.

<http://en.rian.ru/world/20081120/118433867.html>

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International Herald Tribune/ The Associated Press
November 17, 2008

IAEA Chief: Traces of Uranium Found at Syria Site

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates: The head of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog said Monday the agency needs more transparency from Syria and others to determine whether traces of uranium found at a site bombed by Israeli planes indicate Damascus was building a nuclear reactor there. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei confirmed that the radioactive material was found at the site but said the source was inconclusive. "It's not highly enriched uranium. It could have come from so many different ways," he told reporters in Dubai. "That's why we're looking at so many different scenarios."

Uranium can be found naturally in low concentrations and must be "enriched" before it can be used in either power plants or nuclear weapons. Highly enriched uranium is the type used in atomic bombs. ElBaradei made the comments during and after a speech to business leaders here, just days before the IAEA is expected to circulate a confidential report to board members outlining the status of his agency's investigation. "We still have a lot of work to do. We haven't yet reached a conclusion whether that was a reactor or not a reactor," ElBaradei said.

In Washington, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack said ElBaradei's announcement about the traces indicated that more needed to be found out about the site. "Certainly, that would indicate that there was some basis for this investigation and that it should continue until a full picture is able to be drawn by the IAEA as to what exactly happened at that site," he said.

Diplomats told The Associated Press earlier this month that soil samples collected at the bombed site revealed minute traces of processed uranium. Syria's foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, said last week that the leaks to the media about the uranium were meant to put pressure on Damascus, which has denied any wrongdoing. ElBaradei called specifically for more cooperation from Damascus, saying it needs "a lot of transparency on the part of Syria." He said he was hopeful that Syria would allow inspectors back into the country to carry out further tests. But he also said Israel needs to provide more information to address Syrian allegations that the uranium may have come from Israeli bombs dropped on the site during the September 2007 raid.

Al-Moallem last week said it was unclear what type of bombs targeted the site, adding that the United States has used bombs containing depleted uranium in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Israeli Foreign Ministry had no comment on the matter when asked last week. ElBaradei also called on countries that have satellite images of the site to cooperate with the investigation. "We need cooperation from everybody," he said. "We are not going to be able to reach a quick conclusion or jump the gun unless we have absolutely credible information."

<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/17/news/ML-Nuclear-Syria.php>

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International Herald Tribune/The Associated Press
November 18, 2008

Syrian Official Dismisses Uranium Traces Report

DAMASCUS, Syria: A Syrian official disputed on Tuesday that the U.N. nuclear agency's discovery of uranium traces at a bombed site was an indication that Syria was building a nuclear reactor. Buthaina Shaaban, an adviser to President Bashar Assad, also said in a CNN interview that Damascus had nothing to hide, and was waiting for the International Atomic Energy Agency to release a report on its investigation into Syria's purported nuclear activities. "They (Americans) said it is a building under construction," said Shaaban. "I don't know how a building under construction could have uranium."

"I would rather say that we wait to see the (IAEA) report, and we would like the world to stand against aggression to which our country was subjected to." IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei had told reporters in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on Monday that the radioactive material's source was inconclusive. ElBaradei said greater cooperation from Syria and other nations was needed to determine whether the uranium traces at the site, bombed by Israeli jets last year, was from a nuclear reactor.

U.S. officials have said the facility was a nearly completed reactor that — when on line — could have produced plutonium, a pathway to nuclear arms. Uranium can be found naturally in low concentrations and must be "enriched" before it can be used in either power plants or nuclear weapons. Highly enriched uranium is the type used in atomic bombs. Syria's foreign minister suggested last week that the traces may have been from Israeli bombs dropped on the site. Shaaban argued the international community should be more concerned about Israel's alleged nuclear capabilities. Although Israel has never confirmed it has nuclear weapons, it is widely considered to possess such arms. "The world should speak with one voice, one measure," Shaaban said.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/18/news/ML-Syria-Nuclear.php>

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The Guardian (UK)
November 19, 2008
Pg. 26

Russia to Build Nuclear Reactor for Chavez

New foreign policy challenge for Obama

By Rory Carroll and Luke Harding

Russia's deepening strategic partnership with Venezuela took a dramatic step forward yesterday when it emerged that Moscow has agreed to build Venezuela's first ever nuclear reactor. President Dmitry Medvedev is expected to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with his Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chavez, during a visit to Latin America next week, part of a determined Russian push into the region.

The reactor is to be named after Humberto Fernandez Moran, a late Venezuelan research scientist and former science minister, Chavez has announced. It is one of many accords he hopes to sign while hosting Medvedev in Caracas next week. The prospect of a nuclear deal between Moscow and Caracas, following a surge in Russian economic, military, political and intelligence activity in Latin America, is likely to alarm the US and present an early challenge to the Obama administration. "Hugo Chavez joins the nuclear club," Russian's Vedomosti newspaper trumpeted yesterday.

Venezuela's socialist leader said the reactor may be based in the eastern state of Zulia. He stressed that the project would be for peaceful purposes. As if to underline that point, four Japanese survivors from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs visited Venezuela this week at the government's invitation. The energy ministry, which is scouting

locations, said the project was at a very early stage. A report which mooted a nuclear reactor long before Chavez came to power has been dusted off.

Despite abundant oil reserves, Venezuela's energy infrastructure is creaking and prone to blackouts. A nuclear reactor would enable the country to utilise its rich uranium deposits and allay criticism that the government has neglected energy investment. More importantly for Moscow and Caracas, a nuclear deal will showcase a partnership which advocates creating new "poles" of power to check American hegemony.

Nick Day, a Latin American specialist, said the nuclear deal was deliberately timed to pile pressure on the US administration during a moment of transition and weakness. "Russia is manoeuvring hard in the time between Obama's election and his inauguration. What the Russians are trying to do is to set up a chessboard that gives them greater mobility in negotiations when he (Obama) comes to power," Day said. He added: "Russia's message is: 'We can exert influence in your backyard if you continue to exert influence in our backyard. If you don't take your missiles out of Poland and end Nato expansion we're going to increase our influence in Latin America and do things to provoke you.'"

According to Sergei Novikov, spokesman for Russia's federal nuclear agency, no reactor can be built until both countries have signed a preliminary agreement on nuclear cooperation. This will be signed next week, Novikov told Vedomosti. Both presidents are also expected to firm up details of a Russian-Venezuelan energy consortium to jointly produce and sell oil and gas. Russian companies which are already exploring oilfields in Venezuela could then extend their reach to fields in Ecuador and Bolivia.

Venezuela has bought \$4bn of Russian arms, including Sukhoi fighter jets, making it one of Moscow's best clients. Chavez has spoken of also buying Project 636 diesel submarines, Mi-28 combat helicopters, T72 tanks and air-defence systems. Despite the spending spree, Venezuela's military has not tipped the regional balance of power. Chavez's armed forces lag behind that of Brazil, Chile and Colombia and analysts question Venezuelan effectiveness.

For Russia's president, however, Caracas is a valuable springboard into Latin America. In addition to Venezuela Medvedev will visit Peru, Brazil and Cuba - the first trip by a Russian leader to Havana in eight years. Moscow has spoken of reviving Soviet-era intelligence cooperation with the communist island and in a sign of dramatically improved ties, President Raul Castro last month attended the opening of a Russian Orthodox cathedral in Havana.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/19/venezuela-russia-nuclear-reactor>

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