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Pacific Forum Comparative Connections (CSIS)  
October 2008

## **Japan-Korea: Who's In Charge?**

By David C. Kang and Ji-Young Lee

Coupled with Prime Minister Fukuda's resignation and the choice of Aso Taro as prime minister, Japanese foreign policy was on a brief hiatus. There was little movement in Japan's relations with North Korea as this quarter was dominated by the news that Kim Jong-il was potentially very sick. Although it appeared that there was some progress on the abduction issue and Pyongyang's nuclear development program, by the end of the quarter both issues remained essentially in the same place. In contrast, Japan-South Korean relations plunged to new lows after a promising spring in which both Fukuda and President Lee Myung-bak had pledged to move the relationship forward. The question of who owns the Dokdo/Takeshima islets once again reared its ugly head.

For full text see: [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0803qjapan\\_korea.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0803qjapan_korea.pdf)

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Harvard Belfer Center Event Report  
September 15, 2008

## **North Korea's Future**

Author: John Park, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Recent reports on the ill health of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il have renewed speculation over his succession and the country's future. Chronic food shortages and stalled denuclearization activities have added more variables into the situation. John Park is a Senior Research Associate for Northeast Asia in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention and director of the United States Institute of Peace's Korea Working Group. In this interview, he discusses possible scenarios for North Korea's future.

What is the status of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's health?

Compared to previous rumors about Kim Jong Il's health, recent reports are deemed to be credible. Kim is known to have serious chronic heart and kidney problems. Baseline thinking among North Korea analysts at present is that Kim's health issues -- in this instance a stroke -- have incapacitated him. Debate now revolves around how incapacitated he is. Will he be able to recover or will his initial condition deteriorate?

What are the implications of Kim's weak health on multilateral denuclearization efforts?

As debate continues, questions are growing in Washington, Seoul, and Beijing regarding North Korea's leadership succession and its implications. On this matter, many North Korea analysts assert that a collective military leadership is likely to emerge in Pyongyang should Kim's health problems lead to a succession crisis. While one of Kim's three sons (Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-eun) or his brother-in-law (Jang Sung-taek) may be picked to be the symbolic head of the group, these analysts believe that all major policy decisions would be made by the collective military leadership.

This potentially has serious implications for the Six-Party Talks among a host of other issues. Senior North Korean military leaders are widely believed to be strong proponents for maintaining a nuclear deterrent. With North Korea's massive conventional armed forces deteriorating rapidly in terms of outdated armaments and supply shortages, North Korean military leaders view the nuclear arsenal as much more important than just a bargaining chip -- it is deemed to be a strategic force equalizer in light of superior South Korean and U.S. military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

What are the long-term goals of the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and Russia regarding North Korea? What would each ideally like to see?

All five countries have repeatedly stated the importance of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula by resolving security issues through dialogue and negotiations. These countries have also stated a preference for gradual and peaceful reunification, led by the two Koreas and supported by the regional powers. Given the uncertainty surrounding Kim Jong Il's health and how leadership succession will play out in Pyongyang, these preferences will be tested by how unfolding events in a post-Kim situation will impact these countries' respective national security interests.

During what period was a contingency plan seriously considered for implementation? What major changes have occurred since then?

Following massive floods and crop failures in North Korea in the mid-1990s, a chronic food shortage deteriorated into what now is referred to as the Great Famine. Several hundred thousand North Koreans are estimated to have perished. Fearing a failed state on its only border, the South Korean government braced for a humanitarian disaster. A main focus of Seoul's response plan is administering humanitarian relief in the North.

Much has changed since then. In October 2006, Pyongyang conducted a partially successful nuclear test following a period of renewed production of weapons-grade plutonium in 2003 at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Should there be a post-Kim Jong Il leadership succession crisis in the near term, a major dilemma will be the security of North Korea's significantly expanded nuclear arsenal—a dilemma compounded by the fact that the precise location of all weapons-grade plutonium is largely unknown.

Another important change since the Great Famine is the growth of China's economic interactions with North Korea and rebuilding the bilateral relationship. Benefiting from economic agreements signed by senior Chinese and North Korean officials in the mid-2000s, Chinese companies have been active in developing North Korea's investment-starved mining sector. China has more at stake now as it seeks to promote stability and sustainable economic development in northeastern Asia.

What is the biggest concern among North Korea analysts as Kim Jong Il's health crisis unfolds?

Although we have known about Kim's health problems for years, almost no major coordination has taken place among Washington, Beijing and Seoul in preparation for the potentially rapid development of uncertainty and instability following an event such as Kim Jong Il's death. If this lack of coordination continues among these three countries, there is a reasonable likelihood that once implemented, these contingency plans could lead to a situation resembling a partitioned North Korea. Given that each country's contingency plan has a different primary focus, uncoordinated actions will likely produce ineffective and delayed results.

Beijing, Washington and Seoul may eventually be compelled to commit their respective troops for different tactical objectives and operations in North Korea—these missions range from ensuring law and order in the Sino-DPRK border region to securing North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction to administering humanitarian assistance.

While a smooth transition to a collective military leadership in a post-Kim Jong Il period could provide the best prospects for internal stability in North Korea, this possibility has to be treated as highly uncertain in light of anemic sources of information about the North Korean regime. Almost all reports about the regime are based on rumors or anecdotal evidence. As a result, too often coincidence is mistaken for correlation or causation. This all points to the urgent need for coordination among Beijing, Washington and Seoul in preparing for the aftermath of a potential succession crisis-induced state of instability in North Korea.

Describe USIP's work on Korean Peninsular issues.

USIP regularly convenes the Korea Working Group (KWG), which brings together Korea specialists in Washington who are current or former government officials focused on peninsular security, political, economic, and humanitarian issues. Key findings on pressing topics related to the Korean Peninsula are published as USIP reports. KWG has hosted events with Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, nuclear expert David Albright, and economist Marcus Noland. USIP also runs a research project with the Center for Strategic and International Studies to examine Chinese views of internal developments in North Korea.

For more information about this publication please contact the MTA Project Coordinator at 617-495-4219.

Full text of this publication is available at: [http://www.usip.org/on\\_the\\_issues/northkorea\\_future.html](http://www.usip.org/on_the_issues/northkorea_future.html)

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International Herald Tribune  
Saturday, October 11, 2008

## **North Korea Reports Another Appearance By Leader**

By Choe Sang-Hun

SEOUL: More than a month after his absence from an important anniversary parade fueled theories that he had suffered a stroke, North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, was reported by state media Saturday to have inspected a military unit. Later in the day, North Korea's state television carried still photographs, but no video, depicting Kim chatting with the soldiers, clapping his hands and watching military training. They were the first pictures of him released in nearly two months. The Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim, 66, visited an all-female artillery company. Accompanied by his top military aides, he watched a shooting practice and inspected the barracks, the mess hall and a supply room before posing for pictures with the soldiers, it said. But the agency did not say when or exactly where the visit took place.

In one photograph, Kim, wearing his trademark black sunglasses and zip-up Mao suit, stood on a verdant hill surrounded by North Korean Army officers. It was the second time in a week that North Korea had reported a public appearance by Kim. Last Saturday, it said Kim had watched a soccer match, but did not release any photographs or video images. That was his first reported public appearance since mid-August. The latest report, though it was filed early Saturday, was listed as the last dispatch for Friday, the 63rd anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea. That is an important state holiday, and international observers were watching for some sign that the government would try to use the occasion to try to dispel speculation about Kim's health.

After Kim missed a parade on Sept. 9 marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of North Korea, South Korean and U.S. officials said they believed that he had suffered a stroke. That spawned intense speculation over whether Kim was incapacitated, though North Korean officials have vehemently denied that he was ill. During his latest visit, Kim "was satisfied that the soldiers were on utmost vigilance against the enemy's escalating plot for invasion," the state news agency said.

<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/10/11/asia/korea.php>

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Guardian.Co.Uk  
13 October 2008

## **Kim Jong-Il Photos Taken Months Ago, Reports Claim**

Peter Walker

South Korea says photographs were taken during the summer, fuelling speculation that North Korean leader has had a stroke. Photographs released by North Korea purporting to show Kim Jong-il making a recent public appearance could in fact be months old, reports said today, increasing speculation that the communist state's leader has suffered a stroke. North Korean state television broadcast a series of still images on Saturday showing a seemingly healthy Kim inspecting a women's military unit. They were the first supposedly new images of the leader for two months, a period during which he failed to attend some major state events. Both South Korea and US intelligence officials have said they believe the 66-year-old suffered a stroke.

Today, reports in South Korea suggested that the weekend pictures might date from before Kim's apparent health scare. The JoongAng Ilbo newspaper said that the lush greenery surrounding the military unit appeared to indicate that the photographs were taken in high summer. "There is little chance they were taken in October," Lee Eun-joo, a horticulture specialist at Seoul National University, told the paper, according to Reuters. Separately, South Korea's

Yonhap news agency quoted an intelligence source as saying it was "likely it was July or August" when the pictures were taken.

South Korea's government declined to comment on the speculation. However, an unidentified government source told Yonhap that the release of the photographs was apparently intended to show that Kim remained in control of the country, whatever his state of health. Intelligence officials in South Korea say they believe Kim had a stroke in mid-August and then underwent brain surgery, although he was now thought to be on the road to recovery. North Korea never comments on its leader's health. He is, however, known to have enjoyed an extremely rich diet in the past. Last month, Kim failed to attend a mass military parade in the country's capital, Pyongyang, to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the communist state. Kim, whose official title is Dear Leader, heads the world's only communist dynastic state. He succeeded his father, Kim Il-sung, who died in 1994.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/13/korea>

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Washington Post  
October 12, 2008  
Pg. 1

## **U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List**

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration removed North Korea from its terrorism blacklist yesterday, a move that was aimed at salvaging a sputtering nuclear disarmament deal but that sparked internal controversy, infuriated Japan and drew some Republican opposition. Critics of the accord with a charter member of President Bush's "axis of evil" said the administration had succumbed to the brinkmanship typical of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, who two days ago barred inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, threatened to resume production of weapons-grade plutonium and appeared to prepare for another nuclear test.

But President Bush decided late Friday that North Korea had earned the move by showing enough cooperation on broad principles for verifying its nuclear claims, and yesterday morning, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the document officially deleting North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. U.S. officials said North Korea, in turn, agreed not to restart its partially disabled reactor. In 2002, Bush had famously lumped North Korea with Iraq and Iran, declaring, "States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil." But preserving the nuclear deal with Pyongyang gives the lame-duck administration boasting rights of a diplomatic accomplishment it can pass on to the next president.

The decision reflects a striking evolution in the administration's foreign policy, toward a more pragmatic effort to open contacts and strike understandings with countries such as Iran and Syria, once deemed too belligerent for diplomatic contact. But it also runs the risk of alienating key supporters. Sen. John McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, issued a notably skeptical statement Friday night, warning the administration "to avoid reaching for agreement for its own sake."

In Japan, where North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens many years ago remains an emotional issue, officials were furious about the U.S. concession. Rice and her Japanese counterpart had a tense and lengthy conversation Friday morning, and Bush called Prime Minister Taro Aso yesterday to smooth things over. But Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, in Washington, told reporters that the U.S. decision was "extremely regrettable," adding: "I believe abductions amount to terrorist acts." The State Department, in a rare Saturday news briefing, brought forward one of the chief negotiators and two internal skeptics of the verification deal to show a united front. But U.S. officials acknowledged privately that a key factor was the growing concern that North Korea could test a nuclear weapon in the final 100 days of Bush's presidency.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the main architect of the administration's rapprochement with North Korea, negotiated the plan over three days in Pyongyang this month, after North Korea initially balked at demands for "full access to any site, facility or location" deemed relevant to the nuclear program. Officials declined to release the text of the agreement but said North Korea had bent on two key points: potential access to facilities not included

in Pyongyang's nuclear declaration and permission for inspectors to take environmental samples. North Korea also dropped objections to Japanese and South Korean participation in the inspections, officials said.

The text uses vague terms for some of the purported concessions -- it does not explicitly mention the taking of samples, for example -- but the State Department's assertions rest on a number of oral agreements, sources familiar with the document said. Rice instructed diplomats last week to obtain greater clarity from North Korea on some of the oral understandings before she signed off on the deal. The four other countries involved in what are known as the six-party talks, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea, must endorse the verification plan. China played an important supporting role in the negotiations, but Japan has indicated that it might seek amendments.

Officials acknowledged that they do not have permission to visit the site of North Korea's 2006 nuclear test or any military facilities possibly involved in the nuclear program. Experts will have access to facilities at the Yongbyon reactor site and some academic institutions; visits to additional sites will be subject to negotiations. Officials said it will be months, if not years, before questions about North Korea's nuclear program are answered. "This is going to be a bumpy road," said Assistant Secretary of State Paula A. DeSutter, the chief of the verification bureau. "However, we are building a road." In a sign of internal tensions, DeSutter, whose office was barred from knowing the details of the deal until Friday morning, declined to dismiss complaints about it from John R. Bolton, the former ambassador to the United Nations and her former boss as undersecretary for arms control in Bush's first term. "John is the epitome of a skeptical policymaker, and that's appropriate," she said.

Although Bolton is a well-known hawk on North Korea, other experts also have expressed concerns. "There is a real danger that Pyongyang will pull a bait and switch now that sanctions have been lifted," said Michael J. Green, Bush's former top aide for Asia policy. "The credibility of this agreement really hangs on what happens next, including how we repair the damage done with Tokyo." But David Albright, a former weapons inspector who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, expressed sympathy for the administration's dilemma. "North Korea was more than willing to walk away from this thing," he said. "This is about as good as you could get at this moment."

Sen. Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential nominee, called the plan "a modest step forward" and the decision on the terrorism list "an appropriate response." North Korea, which was placed on the list after the bombing of a South Korean jetliner in 1987, was until yesterday one of five countries deemed to have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Iran, Syria, Sudan and Cuba remain on the list, which subjects them to severe export controls and a ban on receiving U.S. aid. North Korea first sought removal from the list in 2000, but the Clinton administration refused, citing Japan's concerns.

State Department officials said they would first seek answers to questions about North Korea's plutonium program, the source of its nuclear weapons, leaving to later concerns about an alleged uranium enrichment program and North Korea's role in building a suspected nuclear reactor in Syria. Patricia A. McNerney, principal deputy assistant secretary for international security and nonproliferation, said some answers to those issues might emerge from interviews over the plutonium program.

When Bush took office, he was openly skeptical of a Clinton-era agreement that had frozen North Korea's plutonium program and criticized the Clinton administration for making concessions to Pyongyang. After Bush let the accord lapse in 2002 when intelligence analysts discovered signs of an apparent effort to enrich uranium, North Korea promptly produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for more than a half-dozen weapons, allowing it to detonate a nuclear device for the first time. Since the test, Bush has scaled back his demands in an effort to keep negotiations going, including returning North Korean funds tied to illicit activities and minimizing concerns about the uranium program.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/11/AR2008101100261.html>

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The New York Times  
October 13, 2008

## **North Korea Is Off Terror List After Deal With U.S.**

By HELENE COOPER

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration announced Saturday that it had removed North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism in a bid to salvage a fragile nuclear deal that seemed on the verge of collapse. Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said that the United States made the decision after North Korea agreed to resume disabling a plutonium plant and to allow some inspections to verify that it had halted its nuclear program as promised months earlier.

The deal, which the Bush administration had portrayed as a major foreign policy achievement, began slipping away in recent weeks in a dispute over the verification program. Just days ago, North Korea barred international inspectors from the plant. The decision to remove North Korea from the terror list was a dramatic moment for President Bush, who had called the country part of an “axis of evil” and had only reluctantly ordered administration officials to engage in negotiations, saying that the United States had made deals with the nation’s leaders before without winning enough concessions. That calculus changed in 2006, when North Korea exploded a nuclear device.

But Mr. Bush is already having trouble selling the new agreement to his own party. Republican lawmakers, including the presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, quickly expressed concern, complaining that North Korea had yet to demonstrate that it was serious about adhering to its commitment to denuclearize. Senator Barack Obama, the Democratic nominee for president, called the deal “a modest step forward” in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Other Democrats said they welcomed the agreement but noted that it did not go much beyond an agreement President Clinton reached with North Korea in 1994, which the Bush administration, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, criticized as inadequate.

Bush administration officials, trying to head off potential criticism that they were simply seeking a foreign policy victory in their last months, said the agreement was the best the United States could get at this time. Ms. Rice “very strongly feels that it is our own responsibility, until Jan. 20, 2009, to act as good stewards of the national interest,” Mr. McCormack said during a news conference.

In the most significant part of the accord announced Saturday, North Korea agreed to a verification plan that would allow United States inspectors access to its main declared nuclear compound, at Yongbyon; international inspectors have worked at the site on and off for years. But the deal puts off decisions on the thorniest verification issue: what would happen if international experts suspected the North was hiding other nuclear weapons facilities, particularly those related to uranium enrichment.

The United States wanted the North to agree to inspections at sites that raised suspicions, but North Korea balked. The new agreement calls for United States inspectors to be granted access to such sites “based on mutual consent” with North Korea. Experts on North Korea say that the concession by the United States was probably necessary to achieve a deal, but that it no doubt will lead to future fights, since the North’s leaders will not want to give inspectors free rein to travel the country. Patricia A. McNerney, one of the State Department negotiators, acknowledged that issue would probably lead to a hornets’ nest of problems. “Going into verification with North Korea will not be easy, we know that,” she said. “This is the most secret and opaque regime in the world.”

North Korea on Sunday welcomed its removal from Washington’s terrorism blacklist and said that it would resume disabling its nuclear weapons facilities, allowing American and United Nations monitors back into its main nuclear complex. South Korea and Japan also hailed the agreement on Sunday. But hawkish politicians in Washington’s two main Asian allies, as well as relatives of people allegedly kidnapped by the Communist state, accused the United States of giving in to the North’s bad behavior.

“We are extremely disappointed with the United States, which we had believed would be a pillar of anti-terrorism and human rights,” said Choi Sung Yong, 56, head of the Abductees’ Family Union, which includes relatives of hundreds of South Koreans, mostly fishermen, allegedly abducted to the North. Relatives of the South Korean and Japanese abductees have counted on Bush to use the terrorism blacklist as leverage to pressure the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, to return their missing family members. North Korea, which has long sought international acceptance, had been pushing hard to get off the terror list. But Mr. McCormack made clear on Saturday that North Korea is still subject to numerous economic sanctions.

The agreement follows weeks of intense negotiations and high-stakes brinkmanship, as North Korea, furious that the Bush administration had not removed it from the terrorism list as it agreed last summer, threatened to restart its

plutonium-based weapons program and barred international inspectors from the Yongbyon plant. In Washington, State Department proponents of the deal, including Ms. Rice and her top North Korea envoy, Christopher R. Hill, battled critics inside and outside the administration who castigated them for trying to salvage the accord.

The administration has been at war with itself over whether to go ahead with the North Korea pact despite objections from critics in the office of Vice President Dick Cheney, and even some members of the State Department's verification and compliance office. That rift spilled into the open at the news conference on Saturday, when a reporter asked Paula A. DeSutter, the assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation, how she responded to criticism of the deal from John R. Bolton, her former boss at the State Department. Ms. DeSutter did not defend the accord, saying simply, "John is the epitome of a skeptical policymaker, and that's appropriate."

Despite the internal fights, Ms. Rice convinced President Bush last week that this was the best the administration could get in its remaining time in office. But as late as Friday, things remained up in the air, said one administration official, who, like several other officials and diplomats interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the issue. Another senior administration official described the internal deliberations as a "close call."

Senator McCain said in a statement that he would not support the deal until he got some questions answered. "I expect the administration to explain exactly how this new verification agreement advances American interests and those of our allies," he said. He added that he was "concerned that this latest agreement appears to have been reached between Washington and Pyongyang, and only then discussed with our Asian allies in an effort to garner their support." Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Republican of Florida, issued a statement strongly criticizing the deal. "I am profoundly disappointed," she said. "By rewarding North Korea before the regime has carried out its commitments, we are encouraging this regime to continue its illicit nuclear program and violate its pledge to no longer provide nuclear assistance to extremist regimes."

Two of the Bush administration's main criticisms of the 1994 accord were that it did not mandate the removal of nuclear material from North Korea and that international inspectors were limited to Yongbyon. The 1994 accord collapsed in 2002 after the Bush administration accused North Korea of circumventing the agreement by pursuing a second path to a bomb, based on enriching uranium. The White House said at the time that it would require full verification that any uranium program had been halted, though later the intelligence community expressed some doubts about how far the program had gotten.

Although the new agreement leaves open the possibility of future inspections outside Yongbyon, it leaves vague what mechanism would be used to determine the status of a uranium program. The North has agreed in principle to give up its nuclear material and any weapons, but that seems almost certain to be subject to negotiations with the next president. During the Bush administration, North Korea is believed to have produced enough bomb-grade plutonium for six or more nuclear weapons.

Bush administration officials have been consulting about the latest deal with its partners in the so-called "six-party" talks, the group including Russia, South Korea and Japan that negotiated the agreement in 2007 for the North to halt its nuclear activities. Diplomats said that Japan had expressed reservations about removing North Korea from the terror list because the North still had not addressed all of their concerns about abductions of Japanese citizens decades ago. After the official announcement on Saturday, Japan's finance minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, called the American decision "extremely regrettable." South Korea has been more supportive.

"We welcome the agreement because we believe this will help put the six-party negotiations back on track and eventually lead to the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs," said Kim Sook, South Korea's main nuclear envoy, during a news conference in Seoul on Sunday. The South Korean foreign minister, Yu Myung-hwan, had stressed Friday that if the six-party negotiations fell apart now, the next administration would have difficulty restarting them. Gary Samore, a nonproliferation expert in the Clinton administration, characterized the deal as probably the best that could be gotten at this time, but warned of stormy times to come. "Every agreement you ever have with the North Koreans always contains certain ambiguities, and that ends up being the basis for which you have the next round of talks," he said. "It's always two steps forward and one step back."



For instance, he said, besides the issue of access to suspected nuclear sites, the United States and North Korea appear to have fudged the critical issue of whether American inspectors will be allowed to take all the samples they want out of the country to foreign laboratories for inspection. According to a fact sheet issued by the Bush administration, the two sides agreed "on the use of scientific procedures, including sampling and forensic activities," although the sheet doesn't say where those tests would be done.

Mr. Bolton, the former United States ambassador to the United Nations under Mr. Bush, said that the Bush administration had "punted" the hardest issue, that of inspections beyond declared nuclear sites. "This means that North Korea has a veto over everything beyond Yongbyon," he said, "so that's a clear victory for North Korea."

Choe Sang-hun contributed reporting from Seoul, South Korea.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/asia/13terror.html?hp>

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The Washington Times  
12 October 2008

## **N Korea To Resume Dismantling Nuclear Facilities**

By HYUNG-JIN KIM

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said Sunday it will resume dismantling its main nuclear facilities, hours after the U.S. removed the communist country from a list of states Washington says sponsor terrorism. North Korea's Foreign Ministry said it will again allow inspections by the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency at its Yongbyon nuclear complex to verify the disablement process, pledged under a 2007 disarmament-for-aid deal with the U.S. and four other regional powers.

"We welcome the U.S. which has honored its commitment to delist (North Korea) as 'a state sponsor of terrorism,'" the ministry said in a statement carried by the country's official Korean Central News Agency. North Korea halted its nuclear disablement in mid-August in anger over what it called U.S. delays in removing it from the terror list. The country has since taken steps toward reassembling its plutonium-producing facility and barred international inspectors from the site.

The U.S. had said North Korea first had to allow verification of the declaration of its nuclear programs it submitted in June. On Saturday, the U.S. said it took the North off the terrorism blacklist because Pyongyang had agreed to all Washington's nuclear inspection demands. U.S. officials said North Korea agreed to allow atomic experts to take samples and conduct forensic tests at all of its declared nuclear facilities and undeclared sites on mutual consent, and would permit them to verify that it has told the truth about transfers of nuclear technology and allegations it ran a separate secret uranium enrichment program.

Japan's Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, who was in the U.S. to discuss the global economic crisis, sharply criticized the decision Saturday saying it was "very regrettable" and that his country hadn't been fully consulted beforehand. Japan has been at odds with Pyongyang over abductions of its citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s. "This is very disappointing. I consider kidnapping to be terrorism," Nakagawa said, according to Japan's Kyodo News agency.

Following Nakagawa's comments, Japan's government took pains Sunday to show it was on board with the U.S. delisting. "When the six-party talks continue to move forward, in the process of the various negotiations we will have ample opportunity to discuss the kidnappings. We have not lost any leverage at all," said Prime Minister Taro Aso, who assumed power last month. The Foreign Ministry said President Bush telephoned Aso before the announcement to assure Aso he understood Japan's concerns over the kidnapping issue and was committed to its resolution.

U.S. officials said the North could again be placed on the blacklist if it doesn't comply with the inspections. The North also said Sunday that prospects for its disarmament depend on whether the U.S. delisting actually takes effect and the North receives remaining international oil shipments promised under the 2007 aid deal. Under that agreement with the U.S., South Korea, China, Russia and Japan, the North agreed to abandon its nuclear programs

in return for the equivalent of 1 million tons of oil shipments and other benefits. North Korea said even though it had completed eight of 11 key disablement procedures, only half of the promised oil shipments had been delivered.

Analysts called the latest development important progress in resolving the nuclear tensions, but said it could still take many years to get Pyongyang to completely dismantle its nuclear programs. "The terrorism delisting is just one step in getting the North to abandon its nuclear programs," said Kang Sung-yoon, a North Korea expert at Seoul's Dongguk University. "I think we'll face tiresome discussions" on how to proceed with the nuclear inspections.

The delisting decision has been in the works since chief U.S. nuclear envoy Christopher Hill traveled to Pyongyang and met senior North Korean officials earlier this month. Hill has called the meeting "substantial," while the North's Sunday statement said it was "an in-depth beneficial discussion." Earlier Sunday, South Korea's chief nuclear envoy Kim Sook said his country welcomed the U.S. decision and the North's corresponding moves to resume disablement work. He told reporters those developments would put six-party talks back on track and lead North Korea to give up its nuclear programs.

Kim also said the nuclear talks — which last convened in July — would resume soon to finalize details of the international inspections. South Korea's Yonhap news agency quoted U.S. State Department official Sung Kim as saying the discussions could take place this month. China, which has played a key role as host of the six-party talks since 2003, had no immediate comment Sunday on the delisting, the country's Foreign Ministry said.

*Associated Press writers Matthew Lee in Washington and Jay Alabaster in Tokyo contributed to this report.*

<http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/12/n-korea-resume-dismantling-nuclear-facilities/>

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International Herald Tribune/ The Associated Press  
October 13, 2008

## **IAEA: N Korea Renews UN Access To Nuclear Site**

**VIENNA, Austria:** North Korea on Monday lifted its ban on U.N. inspections of the plutonium-producing plant it used to set up an atomic test blast and announced it will resume deactivation of a linked facility within days, the International Atomic Energy Agency said. The moves were revealed in a restricted IAEA document to its 35-nation board of governors that was obtained by The Associated Press. They were a strong indication that Pyongyang was making good on its pledge to return to honoring a deal with the U.S., Russia, China, South Korea and Japan meant to strip the North of its weapons-enabling nuclear program in exchange for political concessions and energy aid.

"The agency inspectors were ... informed today that as of 14 October 2008, core discharge activities at the (nuclear) reactor would be resumed," said the two-paragraph document. It said all activities envisioned in the "monitoring and verification arrangements" agreed on between the U.N. nuclear agency and the North would also be resumed. Later, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said IAEA inspectors "will also now be permitted to reapply the containment and surveillance measures at the reprocessing facility." That meant agency seals taken off the plant and monitoring cameras recently removed at the North's orders would be restored.

Yongbyon, located about 60 miles (100 kilometers) north of Pyongyang, has three main facilities: a 5-megawatt reactor, a plutonium reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication complex. The reactor is the centerpiece of the complex, with the facility stretching more than a mile along the Churyong River, satellite images show. The reprocessing center to the south of the reactor is capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods.

Up to late last week, the North had threatened to reactivate the plutonium reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon site. It told International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to remove the organization's seals and subsequently banned them from monitoring first the plant and then all the facilities located at the sprawling site. It also stopped deactivating the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. The North rescinded all inspection rights Thursday, but the three-member IAEA team had been allowed to stay on at their guesthouse in Yongbyon. A diplomat who demanded anonymity for divulging confidential information told the AP that Pyongyang approved visas late last week for members of a new team once the tour of those on location is over — even as it appeared to be making moves to restart its atomic activities.

That suggested that the North's threat to stop dismantling its nuclear program and restart it was a negotiating ploy meant to wrest concessions from its five interlocutors engaging the reclusive communist country on the issue. Pyongyang announced Sunday it would resume dismantlement in line with the deal offering political and energy rewards in exchange, after the U.S. removed North Korea from its list of states sponsoring terrorism.

North Korea stopped scrapping its nuclear program in mid-August in anger over Washington's failure to remove the regime from the terror list and began moves toward restarting its plutonium-producing facility. The U.S. had said North Korea first had to allow verification of the declaration of its nuclear programs it submitted in June. In de-listing North Korea on Saturday, Washington said Pyongyang had agreed to all its nuclear inspection demands.

The de-listing is also expected to prompt the U.S., the Koreans, China, Russia and Japan to reconvene the stalled six-party talks aimed at persuading Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs in return for energy aid and other benefits. It was not known Monday whether the North had restarted its disablement work as pledged. The North's state media carried typical propaganda articles praising the Kim Jong Il regime. South Korea's Foreign Ministry said it has not detected any signs of disablement.

North Korea alarmed the world in 2006 by setting off a test nuclear blast. It then agreed to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for the concessions offered by the five nations engaging it. The regime began disabling its nuclear processing plant in Yongbyon in November, and blew up a cooling tower in June in a dramatic display of its determination to carry out the process. Just steps away from completing the second phase of the three-part process, Pyongyang abruptly reversed course and stopped disabling the plant.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/13/europe/EU-Nuclear-NKorea.php>

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Russian News & Information Agency  
NOVOSTI

## **N. Korea Hails U.S. Terror List Removal, Vows To Meet Commitments**

October 13, 2008

MOSCOW (RIA Novosti) - North Korea will fulfill its obligations to denuclearize, Pyongyang's ambassador to Moscow said Monday, reiterating his country's approval of its removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea said Sunday it would readmit UN inspectors and resume the disablement of its plutonium-producing nuclear plants after the United States removed it from the blacklist Saturday after 20 years and nine months. "We welcome the U.S. moves and will honor our obligations," Ambassador Kim Yong-jae said.

He added that Pyongyang expected all other parties to the six-way negotiations - Russia, China, South Korea and Japan - also to live up to their pledges. "It is in our common interests to free the Korean Peninsula of all nuclear weapons," he said.

U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Saturday that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had rescinded North Korea's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, saying "North Korea agreed on a series of verification methods for denuclearization." "North Korea has stated it will resume disablement of its nuclear facilities. This demonstrates that the six-party principle of action-for-action is working," McCormack added.

The United States earlier insisted North Korea had to allow international inspectors to verify all details of its nuclear program before it could be removed from the terrorism list. Accusing Washington of renegeing on its pledge, Pyongyang last month expelled international monitors and said it would start to restore its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. The reactor has been largely dismantled in return for economic aid and diplomatic incentives under a 2007 six-nation denuclearization deal. The North also agreed to deconstruct its plutonium-producing facility.

<http://en.rian.ru/world/20081013/117711364.html>

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Washington Post

# U.S. Move on N. Korea Assailed in Japan

Nuclear Plant's Dismantling To Resume, Pyongyang Says

By Blaine Harden

Washington Post Foreign Service

Monday, October 13, 2008; A18

TOKYO, Oct. 12 -- A day after the Bush administration removed North Korea from its terrorism blacklist, the country announced that it would resume tearing down its main nuclear plant, and South Korea welcomed the move as a step toward ending its next-door neighbor's nuclear program. But in nearby Japan -- where North Korea's kidnapping of Japanese citizens is a festering national sore that politicians dare not neglect -- the decision to take the country off the list of state sponsors of terrorism was condemned by family members of the abductees. These relatives are well-known and much-honored in Japan, and their opinions have been a powerful force in crafting Japan's hard-nosed policy toward North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

"I think it is an act of betrayal," said Teruaki Masumoto, a brother of one of the eight Japanese who were stolen away by North Korean agents in the 1970s and '80s and who the Japanese government says are still alive in North Korea. Masumoto is secretary general of the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea. "Why did the United States remove North Korea from the list when it is clear to anyone's eyes that the North is a terrorism-assisting country?" asked Sakie Yokota, 72, whose daughter, Megumi Yokota, was 13 when she was kidnapped nearly 31 years ago and is by far the most famous of the abductees.

Struggling to explain the emotional resonance of the abductee issue for the Japanese people, a Foreign Ministry official in Tokyo earlier this year compared Megumi Yokota to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the late Nobel Prize-winning novelist who made the world aware of the network of Soviet prisons known as the gulag. In Washington on Saturday, Japanese Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa told reporters that the U.S. decision was "extremely regrettable." He said that "abductions amount to terrorist acts."

For more than 18 months, as the Bush administration has made a seismic shift from prickly denunciation of North Korea toward flexible diplomacy, the Japanese government has been worried that its interests in getting information about the abductees would be shunted aside, as the United States single-mindedly pursued denuclearization. North Korea has infuriated Japan in recent years by saying that all the abductees are dead. It supplied death documents that the Japanese government said are forgeries. Japanese officials say DNA tests have shown that cremated bones sent to Japan from North Korea were not the remains of the abductees. "How can you trust a government that sends you phony bones?" a government official in Tokyo said last year.

President Bush, who met with Megumi Yokota's mother two years ago, called Prime Minister Taro Aso on Saturday evening to explain the decision. Japanese media reported that the call came only about 30 minutes before the State Department announced the removal. According to the Japanese government, Bush said: "I understand the Japanese people have strong concerns and anxiety over the [abduction] issue. I would like to convey my deep sympathy to the families of the abductees."

The prime minister on Sunday played down any negative consequences of the U.S. move, telling reporters that "it does not mean a loss of leverage" for Tokyo in discussions with North Korea about the abductions. But Japanese officials have privately disagreed with that assessment. Japan recently renewed trade sanctions against North Korea. Although the United States and many other countries supply large amounts of food aid to the North, where crop failure and hunger are chronic problems, Japan does not. Japan cut off all aid to North Korea in 2004, when it discovered the "phony bones." In August, North Korea backed out of negotiations with Japan aimed at resolving the abduction issue.

In Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Sunday that work to disable the Yongbyon nuclear plant would resume, according to the official Korean Central News Agency. North Korea, which stunned the world by testing a small nuclear device in 2006, agreed last year to disable the plant as part of a disarmament-for-aid deal. This summer, the country turned over documents detailing some of its nuclear programs, and Bush, in response, said he would take it off the U.S. terrorism list -- if the full extent of North Korean nuclear activities could be verified by outside inspectors.

But for months North Korea balked at verification, and the Bush administration refused to budge on the list. North Korea then took steps to begin rebuilding the Yongbyon plant. It also barred inspectors from the plant and appeared

to prepare for another nuclear test. Three days of negotiations between the North and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill in Pyongyang this month led to a compromise. U.S. officials said Saturday that the North had bent on potential access to its facilities and on permission for inspectors to take environmental samples, as well as to allow Japan and South Korea to be part of the inspection process.

In the statement Sunday, North Korea's Foreign Ministry said: "We welcome the U.S. which has honored its commitment to delist [North Korea] as 'a state sponsor of terrorism.' " The Foreign Ministry said it will again allow inspections by the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency at Yongbyon.

*Special correspondent Akiko Yamamoto contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/12/AR2008101200889.html?hpid=moreheadlineslocal>

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Sydney Morning Herald/ Agence France-Presse/Associated Press  
October 13, 2008

## **N Korea's Reprieve Angers Japan**

WASHINGTON: Japan says it is "extremely regrettable" that the US has removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and North Korea welcomed the move, saying it would resume disabling its nuclear plants. The US boasted it got "every single thing" it wanted from North Korea on steps to verify its nuclear disarmament in return for striking Pyongyang from the terrorism blacklist. A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman said: "We have decided to resume the disabling of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and to allow US and [International Atomic Energy Agency] monitors to carry out their work again," the official Korean Central News Agency reported. The deal enabled experts to visit declared and undeclared sites in North Korea, remove samples and equipment for analysis, view documents and interview nuclear program staff, US officials said.

"Every element of verification that we sought is included in this package," said Sean McCormack of the State Department. However, the Japanese Finance Minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, said the US decision was "extremely regrettable", Japanese media reported. Japan has been urging the US not to delist North Korea, pressing first for more information on the fate of Japanese civilians kidnapped by the North in the 1970s and 1980s to train the regime's spies.

Japan has taken the hardest line in the six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear programs. Kim Sook, South Korea's chief envoy to international nuclear talks with North Korea, said he expects the North immediately to resume work to disable its nuclear reactor. He said Seoul believed the developments would put multilateral talks back on a normal track and lead to the North giving up its nuclear weapons programs.

<http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/n-koreas-reprieve-angers-japan/2008/10/12/1223749846327.html>

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Federation of American Scientist  
Accessed on October 13, 2008

## **North Korea: Nuclear Weapons Program**

North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosive test on October 16, 2006. The estimated yield of the test was less than one kiloton. In a roundtable discussion with the United States and China in Beijing on April 24, 2003, North Korean officials admitted for the first time that they possessed nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korean officials claim to have reprocessed spent fuel rods and have threatened to begin exporting nuclear materials unless the United States agrees to one-on-one talks with North Korea.

Tensions between the United States and North Korea have been running especially high since, in early October of 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly informed North Korean officials that the United States was aware that North Korea had a program underway to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Initially North Korea

denied this, but later confirmed the veracity of the US claim. In confirming that they had an active nuclear weapons program, they also declared the Agreed Framework nullified.

The Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994 in Geneva agreed that:

- North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear program and agree to enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
- Both sides would cooperate to replace the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors for related facilities with light-water (LWR) power plants.
- Both countries would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
- Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
- And that both sides would work to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Prior to the establishment of the Agreed Framework, intelligence sources believed that North Korea could have extracted plutonium from their reactors for use in nuclear weapons; perhaps enough for one or two nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, it has remained unclear whether North Korea had actually produced nuclear weapons due to difficulties in developing detonation devices.

### History

North Korea maintains uranium mines with an estimated four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium ore. Information on the state and quality of their mines is lacking, but it is estimated that the ore contains approximately 0.8% extractable uranium. In the mid-1960s, it established a large-scale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon and trained specialists from students who had studied in the Soviet Union. Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor.

In the 1970s it focused study on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974 Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research reactor, what is called the "second reactor." In 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR.

The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. In the 1980s, focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. It began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests. In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. The installation at Yongbyon had been known for eight years from official IAEA reports. In 1985, under international pressure, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In July 1990 [The Washington Post](#) reported that new satellite photographs showed the presence in Yongbyon of a structure which could possibly be used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel.

In a major initiative in July 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo called for new efforts to promote North-South exchanges, family reunification, inter-Korean trade, and contact in international forums. Roh followed up this initiative in a UN General Assembly speech in which South Korea offered for the first time to discuss security matters with the North. Initial meetings that grew out of Roh's proposals started in September 1989. In September 1990, the first of eight prime minister-level meetings between North Korean and South Korean officials took place

in Seoul, beginning an especially fruitful period of dialogue. The prime ministerial talks resulted in two major agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (the "basic agreement") and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (the "joint declaration").

In late 1991 North and South Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Joint Declaration called for a bilateral nuclear inspection regime to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula. The Declaration, which came into force on 19 February 1992, states that the two sides "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and that they "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." A procedure for inter-Korean inspection was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was mandated with verification of the denuclearization of the peninsula.

On 30 January 1992 the DPRK also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992. In March 1992, the JNCC was established in accordance with the joint declaration, but subsequent meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of establishing a bilateral inspection regime.

When North Korean Deputy Prime Minister Kim Tal-Hyon visited South Korea for economic talks in July 1992, President Roh Tae Woo announced that full North-South Economic Cooperation would not be possible without resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. There was little progress toward the establishment of an inspection regime, and dialogue between the South and North stalled in the fall of 1992.

The North's agreement to accept IAEA safeguards initiated a series of IAEA inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. This promising development was halted by the North's refusal in January 1993 to allow special inspections of two unreported facilities suspected of holding nuclear waste. Ignoring the South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea refused IAEA inspections and operated nuclear reprocessing facilities, making the world suspicious of its nuclear intentions.

Lack of progress on implementation of the denuclearization accord triggered actions on both sides that led to North Korea's March 12, 1993, announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The North's threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) brought North-South progress to an abrupt halt. Tensions ran high on the Korean Peninsula as the confrontation between North Korea and the United States deepened.

The UN Security Council on 11 May 1993 passed a resolution urging the DPRK to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to implement the 1991 North-South denuclearization accord. It also urged all member states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this resolution and to facilitate a solution.

The US responded by holding political-level talks with the DPRK in early June 1993 that led to a joint statement outlining the basic principles for continued US-DPRK dialogue and North Korea's "suspending" its withdrawal from the NPT. A second round of talks was held July 14-19, 1993, in Geneva. The talks set the guidelines for resolving the nuclear issue, improving U.S.-North Korean relations, and restarting inter-Korean talks, but further negotiations deadlocked.

Following the DPRK's spring 1994 unloading of fuel from its five-megawatt nuclear reactor and the resultant US push for UN sanctions, former President Carter's visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 helped to defuse tensions and resulted in renewed South-North talks. A third round of talks between the US and the DPRK opened in Geneva on July 8, 1994. However, the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung on July 8, 1994 halted plans for a first ever South-North presidential summit and led to another period of inter-Korean animosity. The talks were recessed upon news of the death of North Korean President Kim Il Sung, then resumed in August. These talks concluded with the Agreed Framework.

Under the framework agreement, the North would freeze and eventually dismantle its existing suspect nuclear program, including the 50 MW and 200 MW graphite-moderated reactors under construction, as well as its existing 5 MW reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. In return, Pyongyang would be provided with alternative energy, initially in the form of heavy oil, and eventually two proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWR). The two 1,000 MW light-water nuclear reactors would be safer and would produce much less plutonium, in order to help boost the supply of electricity in the North, which is now in a critical shortage. The agreement also included gradual

improvement of relations between the US and the DPRK, and committed North Korea to engage in South-North dialogue.

A few weeks after the signing of the Agreed Framework, President Kim loosened restrictions on South Korean firms desiring to pursue business opportunities with the North. Although North Korea continued to refuse official overtures by the South, economic contacts appeared to be expanding gradually.

A close examination by the IAEA of the radioactive isotope content in the nuclear waste revealed that North Korea had extracted about 24 kilograms of Plutonium. North Korea was supposed to have produced 0.9 gram of Plutonium per megawatt every day over a 4-year period from 1987 to 1991. The 0.9 gram per day multiplied by 365 days by 4 years and by 30 megawatts equals to 39 kilograms. When the yearly operation ratio is presumed to be 60 percent, the actual amount was estimated at 60% of 39 kilograms, or some 23.4 kilograms. Since 20-kiloton standard nuclear warhead has 8 kilograms of critical mass, this amounts to mass of material of nuclear fission out of which about 3 nuclear warheads could be extracted.

Estimates vary of both the amount of plutonium in North Korea's possession and number of nuclear weapons that could be manufactured from the material. South Korean, Japanese, and Russian intelligence estimates of the amount of plutonium separated, for example, are reported to be higher -- 7 to 22 kilograms, 16 to 24 kilograms, and 20 kilograms, respectively -- than the reported US estimate of about 12 kilograms. At least two of the estimates are said to be based on the assumption that North Korea removed fuel rods from the 5-MW(e) reactor and subsequently reprocessed the fuel during slowdowns in the reactor's operations in 1990 and 1991. The variations in the estimates about the number of weapons that could be produced from the material depend on a variety of factors, including assumptions about North Korea's reprocessing capabilities -- advanced technology yields more material -- and the amount of plutonium it takes to make a nuclear weapon. Until January 1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8 kilograms would be needed to make a small nuclear weapon. Thus, the United States' estimate of 12 kilograms could result in one to two bombs. In January 1994, however, DOE reduced the estimate of the amount of plutonium needed to 4 kilograms--enough to make up to three bombs if the US estimate is used and up to six bombs if the other estimates are used.

On 22 April 1997, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon officially stated, "When the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement was signed in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. intelligence authorities already believed North Korea had produced plutonium enough for at least one nuclear weapon." This was the first time the United States confirmed North Korea's possession of plutonium.

In accordance with the terms of the 1994 framework, the US Government in January 1995 responded to North Korea's decision to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with US and IAEA verification efforts by easing economic sanctions against North Korea in four areas through:

- Authorizing transactions related to telecommunications connections, credit card use for personal or travel-related transactions, and the opening of journalists' offices;
- Authorizing D.P.R.K. use of the U.S. banking system to clear transactions not originating or terminating in the United States and unblocking frozen assets where there is no D.P.R.K. Government interest;
- Authorizing imports of magnesite, a refractory material used in the U.S. steel industry--North Korea and China are the world's primary sources of this raw material; and
- Authorizing transactions related to future establishment of liaison offices, case-by-case participation of U.S. companies in the light water reactor project, supply of alternative energy, and disposition of spent nuclear fuel as provided for by the agreed framework, in a manner consistent with applicable laws.

Smooth implementation of the 1994 agreed framework was obstructed for a time by North Korea's refusal to accept South Korean-designed LWR model reactors. US and DPRK negotiators met for three weeks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and on June 12, 1995, reached an accord resolving this issue. North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) with respect to the model for the LWRs and agreed that KEDO would select a prime contractor to carry out the LWR project. The KEDO executive board announced that it had selected the South Korean-designed Ulchin 3-4 LWR as the reference model for the project and that a South Korean firm would be the prime contractor. The South Korean prime contractor would be responsible for all aspects of the LWR project including design, manufacture, construction, and management. In this Kuala Lumpur accord to the 1994 Geneva agreed framework, the DPRK also agreed to negotiate directly with



KEDO on all outstanding issues related to the LWR project. On December 15, 1995, KEDO and the DPRK signed the Light Water Reactor Supply Agreement. KEDO teams have also made a number of trips to North Korea to survey the proposed reactor site; in the spring of 1996, KEDO and the DPRK began negotiations on implementing protocols to the supply agreement.

Pyongyang is cooperating with Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, whose leading members are South Korea, the United States and Japan. KEDO has reached an agreement on the provision of the light-water nuclear reactors by 2003, and, in return, North Korea has frozen its nuclear program. South Korea, which has promised to bear the lion's share of the reactor project cost estimated at US\$4.5 billion, is asking the United States to put up at least a symbolic amount. The US administration, however, has said it can make no contribution to the construction cost as Congress has not appropriated the necessary budget. An official in Seoul, however, said that South Korea cannot drop its demand simply because of domestic problems in the United States. The US Congress has been delaying approval of the cost for the reactor project. South Korean officials said the U.S. refusal to share the reactor cost would make it difficult for them to obtain approval from the National Assembly for the South Korean share.

Since the conclusion of the Supply Agreement in December 1995, six related protocols have come into effect and three rounds of expert-level negotiations have produced solid results. The ROK power company, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), is the prime contractor for this project and has as its responsibility the design, manufacture, procurement, construction and management of the reactors. On 19 August 1997 KEDO and North Korea held a groundbreaking ceremony to begin construction of two light-water reactors. In October 2002, North Korean officials acknowledged the existence of a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons that is in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it had conducted a nuclear test. The USGS reported a magnitude of 4.2 on the Richter Scale with a location at 41.29N 129.09E +/- 8.1 km. Initial speculations about the yield ranged from less than 1 kt up to 15 kt. On October 16, 2006, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence announced that analysis of air-samples conducted on October 11 had confirmed that the event had been an underground nuclear explosion near P'unggye on October 9, 2006. DNI concluded that the "explosion yield was less than a kiloton."

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Foreign Affairs  
November/December 2008

## **The Latter-Day Sultan**

Power and Politics in Iran  
By Akbar Ganji

Summary: The real decision-maker in Iran is Supreme Leader Khamenei not President Ahmedinejad. Blaming Iran's problems on President Ahmadinejad inaccurately suggests that Iran's problems will go away when Ahmadinejad does. As the Iranian parliamentary elections of March 2008 approached, many Iranians wondered nostalgically: If a reformist had won the 2005 presidential election instead of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would Iran be in its current dismal state? For Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, a former government spokesperson, Iran's situation is "worse today than it has ever been over the past 50 years." And for many Iranian opposition leaders, as well as much of the Western media and political class, Ahmadinejad is the main culprit of Iran's ills today: censorship, corruption, a failing economy, the prospect of a U.S. attack.

But this analysis is incorrect, if only because it exaggerates Ahmadinejad's importance and leaves out of the picture the country's single most powerful figure: Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader. The Iranian constitution endows the supreme leader with tremendous authority over all major state institutions, and Khamenei, who has held the post since 1989, has found many other ways to further increase his influence. Formally or not, the executive, legislative,

and judicial branches of government all operate under the absolute sovereignty of the supreme leader; Khamenei is the head of state, the commander in chief, and the top ideologue. He also reaches into economic, religious, and cultural affairs through various government councils and organs of repression, such as the Revolutionary Guards, whose commander he himself appoints.

Of all of Iran's leaders since the country became the Islamic Republic in 1979, only Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's leader; Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's president for much of the 1990s; and Khamenei have had defining influences. Despite all the attention he receives, Ahmadinejad does not even rank among Iran's top 100 leaders over the past 30 years. Khamenei supports Ahmadinejad immeasurably more than he did any of Ahmadinejad's predecessors, but Ahmadinejad is only as powerful as he is devoted to Khamenei and successful at advancing his aims. Khamenei's power is so great, in fact, that in 2004 the reformist Muhammad Khatami declared that the post of president, which he held at the time, had been reduced to a factotum. Blaming the country's main problems on Ahmadinejad not only overstates his influence; it inaccurately suggests that Iran's problems will go away when he does. More likely, especially regarding matters such as Iran's foreign policy, the situation will remain much the same as long as the structure of power that supports the supreme leader remains unchanged.

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For full text see: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001essay87604/akbar-ganji/the-latter-day-sultan.html?mode=print>

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Federation of American Scientists  
Accessed on Oct 13, 2008

## **Iran: Nuclear Weapons Program**

There are ongoing investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At the end of August 2003, the IAEA stated in a confidential report leaked to the media that trace elements of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) were found in an Iranian nuclear facility. In June of 2003, a IAEA Director General report stated that Iran had not met the obligations required of it by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. A November 2003 report identified further violations. In February 2004 it was discovered that Iran had blueprints for an advanced centrifuge design usable for uranium enrichment that it had withheld from nuclear inspectors. In December 2003, Iran signed an additional protocol authorizing IAEA inspectors to make intrusive, snap inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities. The protocol was signed as an addition to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Remaining uncertainties surrounding Iran's uranium enrichment activities were addressed in the IAEA's November 2004 report. IAEA deputy director for safeguards Pierre Goldschmidt reported in June 2005 that Iran had admitted to separating out small amounts of plutonium as recently as 1998.

Background:

Iran's nuclear program began in the Shah's era, including a plan to build 20 nuclear power reactors. Two power reactors in Bushehr, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, were started but remained unfinished when they were bombed and damaged by the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war. Following the revolution in 1979, all nuclear activity was suspended, though subsequently work was resumed on a somewhat more modest scale. Current plans extend to the construction of 15 power reactors and two research reactors. Research and development efforts also were conducted by the Shah's regime on fissile material production, although these efforts were halted during the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Iran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, and since February 1992 has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities.

It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack.

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Washington Post  
October 14, 2008; A13

## **U.S. Proposal Yet to Reach Iran**

Tehran Hints It Would Respond Favorably to Interests Section

By Thomas Erdbrink

TEHRAN, Oct. 13 -- Iran has yet to receive a request from the United States to open an interests section here, officials said Monday, but analysts added that such a proposal would probably get a positive response. "We have had no request from the United States on this issue," said Hassan Qashqavi, a spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "First we need a request, and then we can consider it." David Ignatius of *The Washington Post* wrote in a column Sunday that the Bush administration plans to announce the opening of a U.S. interests section in Tehran in mid-November.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told state television in an interview last week: "Our stance remains the same: We would react favorably to any positive signals indicating the will for communication on the basis of respect and justice." But some Iranian officials expressed frustration at ambiguous statements from unnamed U.S. officials quoted by the media.

"They are talking to us through the media but not making any official requests for negotiations," Kazem Jalali, a spokesman for the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said recently. "Iran will seriously consider any official request from the United States government for talks," Jalali said. "But if that is not made, nothing can happen."

Iran's position marks a change from when any talk of relations with the United States was taboo in Iranian politics. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who oversees all foreign policy issues, would have to agree to the opening of any U.S. representative office in the country. Since the idea was floated in Washington in August, Iranian politicians who are in regular contact with him have been positive and have made clear that such a request from the United States would be considered.

"It is clear from the positive responses from Iranian officials that if such a request would be made, the Iranian system would accept it," said Davoud Hermidas Bavand, professor of international relations at the Allameh Tabataba'i University in Tehran. Seyyed Mohammad Marandi, head of the North American studies department at the University of Tehran, went even further. "Everything depends on the Americans. If the United States compromises, the Islamic Republic of Iran will do the same," he said.

Marandi said the United States must make the first move because of the longtime hostility toward Iran. "Iran's top leadership is confident and ready to talk, but only when the Americans change their attitude," he said. The United States severed all official relations with Iran when 52 Americans in the U.S. Embassy were held hostage for 444

days in 1979-1980. The Swiss Embassy represents U.S. interests in Iran. Iran has an interests section in Washington, under the umbrella of the Pakistani Embassy.

Analysts here said the U.S. gesture would have to be made carefully. Rahman Ghahremanpour, an analyst at Iran's Center for Strategic Studies, said, "The U.S. can't say, 'We are opening an interest section in Iran, and that's final.' That will not be regarded as positive. The announcement should be a start of negotiations on the subject." Ghahremanpour supports the idea of an opening.

"The language should not be confrontational but diplomatic and geared toward open negotiations," he said. "Such an announcement cannot be made unilaterally by the United States without consulting Iran first. That should be clear." If proposed in a nonconfrontational way, the announcement would be regarded as a confidence-building measure, he added. "The Iranian system knows that sooner or later it will have to talk to America, even though domestically there might be resistance by some political groups. They are ready."

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/13/AR2008101302531\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/13/AR2008101302531_pf.html)

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New York Times  
October 10, 2008  
Pg. 6

## **Nuclear Aid By Russian To Iranians Suspected**

By Elaine Sciolino

PARIS — International nuclear inspectors are investigating whether a Russian scientist helped Iran conduct complex experiments on how to detonate a nuclear weapon, according to European and American officials. As part of the investigation, inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency are seeking information from the scientist, who they believe acted on his own as an adviser on experiments described in a lengthy document obtained by the agency, the officials said.

The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the investigation is under way, said that the document appeared authentic, without explaining why, but they made it clear that they did not think the scientist was working on behalf of the Russian government. Still, it is the first time that the nuclear agency has suggested that Iran may have received help from a foreign weapons scientist in developing nuclear arms.

The American and European officials said the new document, written in Farsi, was part of an accumulation of evidence that Iran had worked toward developing a nuclear weapon, despite Iran's claims that its atomic work over the past two decades has been aimed solely at producing electrical power. In February, in a closed-door briefing at the agency's headquarters in Vienna, its chief nuclear inspector presented diplomats from dozens of countries with newly declassified evidence — documents, sketches and even a video — that he said raised questions about whether Iran had tried to design a weapon.

Among the data presented by Olli Heinonen, the chief inspector, were indications that the Iranians had worked on exploding detonators that are critical for the firing of most nuclear weapons. When the Iranian envoy at the briefing called the charges "groundless" and protested that the tests were for conventional arms, Mr. Heinonen replied that the experiments were "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon," two participants said. He called the shape and timing involved in the firing systems and detonators "key components of nuclear weapons."

At the same time, Mr. Heinonen acknowledged that the agency "did not have sufficient information at this stage to conclude whether the allegations are groundless or the data fabricated." The new document under investigation offers further evidence of such experiments, the Western officials said. Iranian officials have said repeatedly that the documents the agency is using in its investigation of Iran's past nuclear activities are fabrications or forgeries, and that any experiments were not related to nuclear weapons.

Iran has said the same about the new evidence, although the agency has not shown the full document to government officials in Tehran. Instead, Iran has been given only five pages of excerpts that have been translated from Farsi into



English. The Western officials said that the conditions under which the inspectors obtained the document prohibited them from revealing it in full to the Iranians, out of fear that doing so could expose the source of the document. These restrictions present a problem for Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director general, who is pressing Iran to reveal its past nuclear activity. "I cannot accuse a person without providing him or her with the evidence," he said last year.

Although officials would not say how they had obtained the new document, it was first publicly mentioned in an agency report in May as one of 18 documents presented to Iran in connection with suspected nuclear weapons studies. At the time it was described as a "five-page document in English" about experiments with a complex initiation system to detonate a large amount of high explosives and to monitor the detonation with probes. There was no indication that the document was a translation of a much longer, more comprehensive document in Farsi.

The original, Farsi document is described by officials familiar with it as a detailed narrative of experiments aimed at creating a perfectly timed implosion of nuclear material. According to experts, the most difficult challenges in developing nuclear weapons are creating the bomb fuel and figuring out how to compress and detonate it. That was followed by an agency report last month that revealed that Iran might have received "foreign expertise" in its detonator experiments.

A senior official with links to the agency said then that a foreign government was not involved. He ruled out the involvement of Libya and the remnants of the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist who built the world's largest black-market sales operation for nuclear technology. But he would not comment further.

European and American officials now say that the "foreign expertise" was a reference to the Russian scientist, but they offered only scant details. They said that the scientist was believed to have helped guide Iranians in the experiments, but that he did not write the document. Nor is he thought to have been affiliated with the civilian electric power plant that is being rebuilt by Russia at the Iranian port of Bushehr, and which Russia has agreed to fuel with nuclear material, the officials said.

Russia says it opposes any effort by Iran to obtain a weapon, but cooperation by Russian companies and individuals with some aspects of Iran's nuclear program dates back years. In the late 1990s, Russia's scientific and technical elite, reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union, forged ties to Iran, which paid hard currency for aid in weapons and technical programs. Western experts say the help extended to Tehran's atomic efforts, but there was never any proof in those years of a Russian link to nuclear weapons development.

"The Iranians were very active in recruiting and paying Russian scientists to provide them with assistance in their nuclear program," said Gary S. Samore, a National Security Council official during the Clinton administration who now directs studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He said he had no recollection of Russian aid in the design of Iranian nuclear arms but added that it could have happened. "It's plausible to me that they at some point paid a Russian nuclear expert to provide assistance," he said in an interview. Asked about the potential contribution of the Russian scientist in detonator experimentation, a senior Russian official who has long followed Iran's nuclear program said, "It is difficult for me to add anything."

*William J. Broad contributed reporting from New York, and David E. Sanger from Washington.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/world/10nuke.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>

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Financial Times  
October 12 2008

## **Go-It-Alone Plan On Iran Sanctions**

By Daniel Dombey in Washington and James Blitz in London

The US and its allies are discussing a "coalition of the willing" that would impose sanctions on Iran's energy and financial sectors without UN backing as concerns increase about Tehran's accelerating nuclear programme and a possible Israeli military response. A foreign policy adviser to Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential nominee, recently helped to write a report that warned: "The Europeans make war more likely if they do not strengthen sanctions against Iran."

The September report was produced by the Bipartisan Policy Center, a Washington-based think-tank, with the co-operation of Dennis Ross, perhaps Mr Obama's most influential adviser on the Middle East. While backing an intensive diplomatic effort, it calls for immediate military steps to deal with Iran, such as "pre-positioning additional US and allied forces, deploying additional aircraft carrier battle groups and minesweepers [and] emplacing other war matériel in the [Gulf] region".

Referring to discussions about a possible Israeli strike on Iranian facilities, a European diplomat told the Financial Times: "As we go along 2009, you're going to hear more and more about it [military action]." He added there was a growing consensus that Tehran could have sufficient fissile material for a bomb by the end of next year. Iran insists its nuclear programme is purely peaceful.

The diplomat said that, in light of concerns, European countries and the US were planning to impose sanctions on Iran's energy sector as "like minded countries" – rather than through the UN – and were discussing targeting exports of engineering products for Iranian refineries as well as refined oil itself. He said that after a largely empty UN resolution this month, western countries had concluded: "If there is another [resolution] it will take a lot of time and there will be very little substance in it."

Another western diplomat said: "The idea would be to get together a coalition of the willing ... given the difficulties we would have getting this past Russia and China [in the UN]." "Iran has a limited refining capacity, so they rely on petrol imports ... We are therefore working on targeting investment in the Iranian refinery industry," he said, adding that measures, which might also target the financial sector, could be agreed in early November. "You would try and stop investment in new projects inside Iran, preventing extraction and transportation," he said. Iran meets about one-third of its petrol needs through imports, estimated to cost more than \$10bn (€7bn, £6bn) this year.

While Israel may ultimately be ready to launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, it is for the time being looking for other solutions. It supports UN-led efforts to impose sanctions, al-though it has repeatedly called for a tougher line.

Additional reporting by Tobias Buck in Jerusalem and Najmeh Bozorgmehr in Tehran

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