



# **USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**

# **CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

---

---

**Issue No. 860, 16 November 2010**

## **Articles & Other Documents:**

[Obama Seeks Arms Pact Passage before Year End](#)

[North Korea Giving Nuclear Material to Iran, Syria: UN](#)

[Barack Obama Pledges to Push Nuclear New Start Treaty through Congress](#)

[Report: NKorea Begins Building Light-Water Reactor](#)

[White House Pushes for START, but Ratification Remains Uncertain](#)

[Seoul Says N. Korea's Reactor Project Quashes Hope for Denuclearization](#)

[Key Republican Noncommittal on Russia Arms Pact](#)

[Ex-Spy Chief Reads Tea Leaves on N. Korea Denuclearization](#)

[Senate Leader Deals Blow to President on Arms Treaty](#)

[Pakistan under Renewed Pressure for Nuke Freeze](#)

[AP Exclusive: Egypt Worries about IAEA Probe](#)

[Report Questions Safety of Planned Biodefense Lab](#)

[Getting Iran to Agree to Talk about its Nuclear Program Proves Difficult](#)

[Al Qaeda's Nuclear Ambitions](#)

[Govt. Has No Right to Compromise on Iran's Nuclear Rights: MP](#)

[Old Problems with New Start](#)

[Nuclear Rogue at the Border](#)

[ANALYSIS - Are Iran Nuclear Talks Doomed to Fail Again?](#)

[NATO, Nuclear Security and the Terrorist Threat](#)

[Stuxnet Study Suggests Iran Enrichment Aim: Experts](#)

---

*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

*Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at <http://cpc.au.af.mil/> for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.*

Wall Street Journal  
Sunday, November 14, 2010

## Obama Seeks Arms Pact Passage before Year End

By JONATHAN WEISMAN

YOKOHAMA, Japan—U.S. President Barack Obama promised his Russian counterpart a "full-court press" to ratify their nuclear arms accord this year, before a more Republican Senate makes passage considerably more difficult.

In a private meeting here, where both men are attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, Mr. Obama told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by December is his top priority for the lame-duck session of Congress, which begins Monday.

The Democratic majority will be down to 58, after a new Republican senator, Mark Kirk, assumes the seat Monday once held by President Obama. Ratification of a treaty requires 67 Senate votes, a tall order which will be taller still next year when the Democratic majority is down to 53.

"I reiterated my commitment to get the START Treaty done during the lame duck session, and I've communicated to Congress that it is a top priority," Mr. Obama told reporters Sunday morning ahead of his return flight to Washington.

A senior administration official said worries are rising that a failure to ratify the treaty could harm other outreach efforts to Moscow, including cooperation on Afghanistan and efforts to get Russia into the World Trade Organization. Mr. Medvedev will attend next week's summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Lisbon, and his presence could be an irritant as NATO leaders discuss expansion eastward.

"We think the START treaty is important for what it does as an arms control treaty, but we also think that symbolically for this to linger on would begin to bleed into other aspects of U.S.-Russian relations," a senior administration official said, describing the "full-court press under way right now" in the Senate.

The White House is eager to demonstrate to the world that Mr. Obama will still be able to legislate and secure achievements in the new world of Washington where Republicans will control the House and Democrats are on their heels.

The New START treaty would trim the arsenals of the largest two nuclear nations by nearly a third and limit the number of nuclear weapons delivery systems—land-based missiles, submarine launchers and bombers. Each side would have to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal to 1,550 over seven years. Perhaps more urgently, it would restore a system of arms-control verification that lapsed when the last START treaty, negotiated by President George H.W. Bush, expired more than a year ago.

The Obama White House has secured some Republican support, from key senators such as Richard Lugar, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But some Republicans who voted the treaty out of committee, such as Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee, now say they want to delay a vote until the new Congress, when Republicans will have more authority.

That has put passage, already in doubt this year, in more jeopardy. The Obama administration said it will seek billions of dollars more for the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories in a bid to reassure Republicans that the U.S. president will not allow the arsenal to deteriorate through scientific neglect.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703560504575613482223396848.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

London Guardian – U.K.

## Barack Obama Pledges to Push Nuclear New Start Treaty through Congress

*President says legislation on cutting US-Russian nuclear arsenals will be pushed through lame duck session*

Julian Borger and Ewen MacAskill Washington

Sunday, 14 November 2010

Barack Obama today promised to push the New Start treaty on cutting US-Russian nuclear arsenals through the lame duck session of Congress, which begins this week.

Obama, speaking to reporters after a meeting with the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, on the sidelines of an Asian economic summit in Seoul, said: "I reiterated my commitment to get the Start treaty done during the lame duck session, and I've communicated to Congress that it is a top priority."

But it is likely to be a cliffhanger, with the fate of the treaty dependent on only a handful of Republican senators and with less than four weeks of the congressional session left.

The Democrats have 59 votes in the 100-member Senate, but need eight Republicans to secure the necessary two-thirds majority to ratify the treaty.

The critical figure in deciding whether New Start lives or dies will be Senator Jon Kyl, the Republican whip, who has threatened to block the treaty until the administration spends more on modernising the existing arsenal.

The White House is trying to buy him off, offering him \$4bn (£2.4bn) more late last week on top of billions already pledged for modernisation.

But Kyl, like other Republicans, is torn between doing a deal and all-out opposition to Obama.

The New Start treaty, signed by Obama and Medvedev in April, is prized by the Obama administration as one of its most important foreign policy achievements.

It set the seal on Obama's initiative to "reset" US-Russian relations, and has been the principal practical step so far towards "a world without nuclear weapons", which Obama declared to be the ultimate goal of US policy in a 2009 speech in Prague.

Once ratified, the treaty would reduce the number of long-range nuclear warheads each side deployed to 1,550, roughly one-third down from current levels. It would keep delivery systems – missiles and bombers – below a ceiling of 700.

But when administration officials, Pentagon generals and arms control advocates join forces to lobby the senate for ratification over the next few days, they will focus not on the numbers but on the cost of having no treaty at all if ratification is shelved.

The previous Start treaty expired last December, along with its verification procedures. As a consequence, the Pentagon has pointed out, there have been no US inspections of Russian nuclear sites.

The head of US nuclear forces, General Kevin Chilton, told the Senate: "If we don't get the treaty, [the Russians] are not constrained in their development of force structure and ... we have no insight into what they're doing. So it's the worst of both possible worlds."

The Republicans' public position is that they are prepared to back the treaty so long as the remainder of the nuclear arsenal is modernised.

The White House sees the issue as a test of whether the Republicans are serious about a deal or whether their overriding priority is ensuring Obama is not re-elected in 2012.

It is adopting a carrot and stick approach. As well as offering the carrot of \$4bn towards modernisation, it is hinting that, if the Senate fails to ratify the treaty, billions already pledged towards modernisation could also be withdrawn.

Even if Kyl was to come round, there is the problem of a crowded Congressional session, with members facing votes on the budget and tax cuts, and possibly issues such as the repeal of the ban on out gay people serving in the military.

If the treaty is not ratified in the remainder of this session, the White House sees it becoming even harder in the new Congress – scheduled to start in January, when the Republicans will have more senators, elected earlier this month.

Daryl Kimball, the head of the Arms Control Association, said Kyl's position was "irresponsible and unnecessary", arguing that the administration has already earmarked \$80bn on a weapons modernisation programme and another \$100bn on delivery systems over the next 10 years.

"Senate failure to approve the treaty would directly harm US national security by denying the US military information about Russian nuclear forces and plans, and force both nations to rely on worst-case assumptions for planning, increasing the risk of miscalculation and mistakes, Joe Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, which finances research on nuclear weapons policy, said .

"But the treaty's impact goes far behind the modest cuts it makes in US and Russian forces.

"The Senate failure would undermine global confidence in US leadership, weaken the president in any future treaty talks and weaken efforts to stop other states from getting nuclear weapons."

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/14/barack-obama-nuclear-treaty-congress>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Daily Mail – U.K.  
Deutsche Welle – German Federation  
November 16, 2010

## **White House Pushes for START, but Ratification Remains Uncertain**

**With ratification of the new START treaty only likely to be more difficult when the next congress takes office in 2011, the White House is pushing for a vote in the lame-duck Senate. But success is all but sure.**

On Sunday, US President Barack Obama and his cabinet launched a coordinated public relations blitz aimed at rallying support for the ratification of the nuclear disarmament pact Washington had negotiated with Moscow.

Following a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the sidelines of the APEC economic summit in Seoul, Obama promised to get the US-Russian nuclear arms reduction deal passed before the new congress takes office next year.

"I reiterated my commitment to get the START treaty done during the lame duck session, and I've communicated to Congress that it is a top priority."

One day later, on Monday, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates followed up with an op-ed article in the Washington Post, urging congress to quickly ratify the so-called new START treaty - the successor of the original START initiated by President Ronald Reagan, which expired at the end of last year.

Under the headline "We can't delay this treaty," Clinton and Gates made the case for congress to pass the treaty, arguing that "our national security depends on it."

### **High stakes**

The full-court press by the Obama administration highlights both the importance and the stakes for ratification of new START that would limit American and Russian strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 respectively, and improve the verification regime.

But analysts are skeptical as to whether the joint appeal by Obama, Clinton and Gates will be enough to persuade Republicans to vote for the new START pact.

Some Republican lawmakers believe the treaty weakens the US, while others feel strongly that the newly elected Senate should be given a chance to vote on the pact. Still others are loathe to give Obama a victory in his lame-duck session, and are looking to renegotiate the treaty entirely.

Ratification requires a two-third majority, or 67 votes in the US Senate. Democrats can command 59 votes in the current Senate; in the next Senate they will only control 53 votes.

"I think it is doubtful that this extremely important step will be taken by the United States," said Karl Kaiser, director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations at Harvard University.

"The atmosphere of hostility and partisanship in the United States is such that the vote that the Senate foreign relations committee took - where a majority actually voted in favor of the treaty - I do not think can be repeated. Even in a lame-duck session," Kaiser told Deutsche Welle.

While some senior Republican foreign-policy experts, such as Richard Lugar, support START and want to help get it passed, others want to renegotiate the deal or think a vote should be taken by the new congress.

### **Political football?**

The treaty is a solid, if not overly ambitious agreement, and it should be ratified since it would increase US national security, argues Patricia Lewis, deputy director of the James Martin Center for nonproliferation studies in Monterey, California.

"If it gets turned into political football between two parties in the country and has nothing to do with the larger and wider security issues then who is to know what will happen," Lewis told Deutsche Welle.

She added: "I really hope that it does get ratified and as soon as possible. Because right now there are no inspections on strategic weapons. We want to move ahead with better and more wide-ranging cuts with the Russians, and doing that if this isn't ratified would be very difficult."

In light of its experience with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which Moscow ratified and the US didn't, Russia said this time around that it would only ratify new START after Washington had done so.

Therefore, according to Kaiser, "a setback would also be very bad for the long-term goal of getting rid of all nuclear weapons and non-proliferation."

And Lewis said that if the US doesn't ratify the treaty, "the trust in the United States as a negotiating partner, as a partner with whom you can do business, as a partner who can give their word and keep their word ... becomes further diminished. That would be a real pity."

### **Europe's role**

Lewis and Kaiser have different opinions as to how much influence Europe and the rest of the world can have on the ratification of the treaty.

"I think the entire world will disagree if the treaty doesn't get ratified because this is literally what everybody has wanted," argues Kaiser, who believes Europe hasn't done enough to support the ratification of the deal.

"It is not enough to simply agree with the vision of a non-nuclear world. That's very popular in Europe. Nor is it enough to just argue you have to get rid of tactical nuclear weapons, as a number of European countries have done," Kaiser said.

According to Kaiser, Europe needs to give signals to the Americans "at the highest political levels, notably the Senate," that the world expects American leadership in this matter.

But for her part, Lewis isn't sure how useful it is to put more international pressure on the US.

"The United States is a democracy. And this is very much a debate within the United States democracy," she said. "It's a debate for the Senate to have. I think there is a limit to which other countries can have a huge impact on domestic debates."

Author: Michael Knigge

Editor: Jennifer Abramsohn

<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6234087,00.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Boston Globe

## **Key Republican Noncommittal on Russia Arms Pact**

By Desmond Butler, Associated Press

November 16, 2010

WASHINGTON—A Republican lawmaker who holds pivotal sway on the fate of a nuclear arms control treaty with Russia called a proposal by the Obama administration aimed at winning his support "a step in the right direction."

But Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona remained noncommittal on the New START Treaty and cast doubt on whether it could be considered for ratification this year.

The administration is pushing to get enough Republican support for a vote before the Democrats' majority shrinks by six in January. In a meeting in Japan over the weekend, President Barack Obama reassured his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev of his commitment to winning approval in the so-called lame duck session before most new lawmakers take their post in January.

Last week the administration sought to satisfy Kyl's conditions for supporting the treaty with a proposal to significantly boost funding for the nation's nuclear weapons complex. A congressional aide briefed on White House plans told The Associated Press last week that the White House was proposing to add \$4.1 billion that would go to maintaining and modernizing the arsenal and the laboratories that oversee that effort. U.S. government officials traveled to Kyl's home state to make the proposal.

Asked following an awards ceremony honoring him Monday night whether it was sufficient to win his support, Kyl said: "I don't know, but it certainly is a step in the right direction."

Kyl called the prospects for ratifying the treaty this year "less likely than originally thought," because of other pressing demands on the Senate schedule including tax and government funding issues. But Democrats are likely to bring up the treaty for a vote during the lame duck session if they believe they have enough votes to approve it.

Kyl's support is crucial because a number of his Republican colleagues have said they will follow his lead on the treaty. So his approval could push support beyond the 67 votes the administration needs for ratification.

Kyl has maintained that boosting funding for the stockpile would ease Republican concerns about the treaty by demonstrating that the administration is serious about maintaining a robust U.S. nuclear deterrent. The treaty would

reduce U.S. and Russian limits on strategic warheads to 1,550 for each country from the current ceiling of 2,200. It also would set up new procedures to allow both countries to inspect each other's arsenals to verify compliance.

Some Republicans have argued that the treaty would limit U.S. missile defense options and does not provide adequate procedures to verify that Russia is living up to its terms. Advocates dispute both charges.

The administration is worried that ratification could slip out of reach if a vote were delayed until next year.

Failure to win passage could trip up one of the administration's top foreign policy goals: improving relations with Russia. The treaty, signed in April by Obama and Medvedev, has been the most tangible sign of success, and failure to get it ratified could be viewed as a rebuke in Moscow. It also would leave Obama's push for even greater restrictions on the world's nuclear arsenal in doubt.

[http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/11/16/key\\_republican\\_noncommittal\\_on\\_russia\\_arms\\_pact/](http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/11/16/key_republican_noncommittal_on_russia_arms_pact/)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times  
The CAUCUS  
November 16, 2010

## **Senate Leader Deals Blow to President on Arms Treaty**

By PETER BAKER

President Obama's hopes of ratifying a new arms control treaty with Russia this year appeared to unravel on Tuesday as a Senate Republican leader moved to block a vote in what could be a devastating blow to the president's most tangible foreign policy achievement.

Mr. Obama had declared ratification of the New Start treaty his "top priority" in foreign affairs for the lame-duck session of Congress that opened this week. But the chances of winning the two-thirds vote required for passage of the treaty appeared to collapse with the announcement by Jon Kyl of Arizona, the No. 2 Republican in the Senate and the party's point man on the issue, that the Senate should not vote on it this year.

"When Majority Leader Harry Reid asked me if I thought the treaty could be considered in the lame-duck session, I replied I did not think so given the combination of other work Congress must do and the complex and unresolved issues related to Start and modernization," Mr. Kyl said in a statement. The senator added that he would continue to negotiate with administration officials for a possible vote next year.

The announcement shocked and angered the White House, which learned about it from the news media. Both parties had considered Mr. Kyl the make-or-break voice on the pact, with Republicans essentially deputizing him to work out a deal that would secure tens of billions of dollars to modernize the nation's nuclear weapons complex in exchange for approval of the treaty. After months of negotiations and the addition of even more money in recent days, the White House thought it had given Mr. Kyl what he wanted.

While the White House intends to press for a vote in the next weeks anyway, many Republican senators who had indicated that they would vote for the treaty had made their support contingent on Mr. Kyl's assent. Mr. Reid had likewise resisted bringing the treaty to the floor until Mr. Kyl was satisfied. While Democrats said Tuesday that Mr. Reid was prepared to keep trying, they held out little hope.

"If the Republicans' lead negotiator says we shouldn't consider Start during a lame duck, I think we have to take him at face value," said a Democratic leadership aide who spoke on condition of anonymity to be more candid. "Having said that, we are going to try and get it ratified in the lame duck."

A failure to approve the treaty in the departing Senate could undermine Mr. Obama's broader campaign to curb nuclear weapons and eventually eliminate them. The treaty, which would trim American and Russian strategic arsenals and restore mutual inspections that lapsed last year, was supposed to be the first, and easiest, step in a long-term effort to bring an end to age of nuclear arms.

It could also sour Mr. Obama's two-year effort to "reset" ties with Russia and win greater cooperation from Moscow in areas like counterterrorism, transit routes to Afghanistan and pressuring Iran to give up its nuclear program. Mr. Obama vowed to pass the treaty during a meeting with his Russian counterpart, President Dmitri A. Medvedev, in Japan on Sunday, and is scheduled to see him again later this week at a NATO summit meeting in Lisbon.

If Mr. Obama cannot fulfill that promise, White House officials worry that it will diminish his credibility with world leaders and embolden hard-liners in Moscow who have long expressed skepticism about the rapprochement with

Washington – among them, Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, who allowed Mr. Medvedev to pursue the warmer ties despite his own doubts.

Critics have said that such worries are overstated and that the Obama administration was too willing to curry favor with Moscow at the expense of American national security. But while Republicans have criticized the treaty, the main obstacle has been Mr. Kyl's insistence that it be paired with an expansive investment in modernizing the current nuclear weapons complex.

The administration has committed to spending \$80 billion program to do that over the next 10 years, but Mr. Kyl has sought more money and greater assurance that the money would come through in future years. In recent days, the administration dangled an additional \$4 billion in hopes of winning his support, but Mr. Kyl held out. The administration has also promised to spend more than \$100 billion over 10 years upgrading the triad of nuclear weapons: submarines, bombers and missiles.

The senator's statement Tuesday blindsided White House. On Monday, an administration official working on the issue expressed hope that a deal could be reached with Mr. Kyl this week. The official, in an interview Monday, said that the administration had had "very positive conversations" with Mr. Kyl and believed the prospects for approval were "trending more positive."

Asked if the senator's statement was meant to close the door to a vote in the lame-duck session, his spokesman, Ryan Patmintra said: "Correct. Given the pending legislative business and outstanding issues on the treaty and modernization, there simply isn't enough time."

In his statement, Mr. Kyl said that he appreciated "the recent effort by the administration to address some of the issues that we have raised, and I look forward to continuing to work" on them in the new year.

If the issue carries over to the new Senate, it could be months before it is taken up again and its chances would be even more uncertain given that Republicans picked up six more seats in this month's elections. Instead of needing eight Republicans and a unified Democratic caucus, Mr. Obama would need 14 Republicans without losing anyone from his own party.

The treaty would restore mutual inspections and ban both countries from deploying more than 1,550 strategic warheads and 700 launchers each. Because the original Start treaty expired last December, the two countries have now gone without inspections for the first time since the cold war.

The administration hoped to follow up this treaty with another more ambitious one that would pare back on tactical nuclear weapons and stored strategic weapons. It also hoped to follow a victory on New Start by reviving the never-ratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And it envisioned negotiating another new treaty that would cut off production of fissile material.

<http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/senate-leader-deals-blow-to-president-on-arms-treaty/?partner=rss&emc=rss>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Denver Post

## **AP Exclusive: Egypt Worries about IAEA Probe**

November 12, 2010

By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press

VIENNA—Egypt fears being grouped with the likes of Iran and Syria if a U.N. investigation into traces of highly enriched uranium found in the country isn't brought to a swift end, according to what officials describe as a confidential report from the country's nuclear agency.

The particles—enriched close to the levels required to arm nuclear missiles—have been under investigation since being detected by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2007 and 2008. Egypt, a U.S. ally in the Middle East, has said the particles originated from abroad and were inadvertently imported, but the agency is unsatisfied with that answer.

The IAEA first disclosed that it was probing Egypt in May 2009, in a restricted report obtained by the AP. The reports said traces of low-enriched uranium also were found at the site—Inshas, northeast of Cairo, where Egypt's two small research reactors are located.

Both high- and low-enriched uranium can be used to make radio isotopes, which have applications in medicine and scientific research.

The latest report, shared in part with The Associated Press, seemed to reflect a growing sense that Yukiya Amano, who replaced Mohamed ElBaradei in December as IAEA chief, has less tolerance than his predecessor for nations under nuclear scrutiny that use delaying tactics to undermine investigations.

A senior diplomat familiar with IAEA probes of all three countries said that the implications of the find in Egypt remain worrying, because they could indicate past undeclared experiments with technology that could be used in a weapons program.

Still it is unclear how old the material is. If the traces were unknowingly imported on containers with radio isotopes, as Cairo says, and they originate from decades ago, then the IAEA is likely to deem the case closed.

Iran and Syria, in contrast will remain high priorities. The agency is trying to persuade both to stop stonewalling its efforts follow up on concrete intelligence that they are trying to hide attempts to develop nuclear weapons programs—suspicions Iran and Syria deny.

Amano has been more directly critical of both Iran and Syria than ElBaradei, a stance that apparently stoked Egyptian worry.

The report aims to "calculate the potential damage to Egypt of continued IAEA investigation into the Egyptian nuclear program," says an excerpt. Amano may not take the "fairly lenient" approach of ElBaradei, says another passage, adding: "Was it a mistake not to report the activity to the IAEA in the first place and to offer unsatisfactory answers?"

"It is vital to prevent any comparison to Iran and Syria in the international area and every effort should be done to convince the IAEA to finally close the Egyptian dossier."

An official from an IAEA member nation said the report dates from September and was drawn up under the supervision of Mohammed Taha al Qalali, head of Egypt's Atomic Energy Authority.

He and the senior diplomat asked for anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information.

Ehab Fawzy, Egypt's ambassador to Austria and its chief representative to the IAEA, said he doubts the report is genuine, adding the premise that Amano was tougher on Egypt than ElBaradei was wrong.

"Cooperation with the agency has been going on in a very good way," he told the AP.

The excerpts shared with the AP did not reveal new details on the source of the enriched uranium traces.

The senior diplomat said the Egyptians had given agency experts samples of the material but suggested that Cairo could be more pro-active with the IAEA probe if it were not hiding anything. He said the Egyptian excerpts appeared genuine.

Egypt was already the subject of an earlier probe launched after disclosures in 2004 that it failed to report nuclear experiments and related activities that could potentially be used for either nuclear civilian or weapons programs.

In a report published the following year, the agency described the work as small-scale, saying the programs took place decades ago and did not appear to be part of an attempt to make nuclear weapons. Still, it faulted Egypt for keeping them secret, despite obligations to report them to the IAEA.

[http://www.denverpost.com/rawnews/ci\\_16594761](http://www.denverpost.com/rawnews/ci_16594761)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

## **Getting Iran to Agree to Talk about its Nuclear Program Proves Difficult**

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer  
Saturday, November 13, 2010

For four months now, European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili have traded a series of letters trying to pin down a time and place for Iran to meet with a group of powerful countries concerned about its nuclear program. Finally, late last week, the two sides appeared to have settled on a start date: Dec. 5.

But they have yet to agree on venue, a length for the talks or even the subject. Iran says it is willing to talk about everything but its uranium enrichment program; the other countries - the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany - want to talk mostly about the entire nuclear program.



The difficult path to restarting the talks, which have been on hold for more than a year, doesn't bode well, analysts and diplomats say.

The latest round of U.N. Security Council sanctions, which by all accounts have been more crippling than anticipated, was intended to force Tehran to begin negotiating seriously about its nuclear program. But Iranian officials, insisting that the program is for peaceful energy purposes, have given little indication they are interested in such a negotiation.

U.S. officials say that Iran's well-documented problems with its uranium enrichment program this year have greatly reduced concerns that Iran is on the brink of producing a nuclear weapon, giving additional time to strike a deal.

Iran is enriching uranium with a Pakistani version of a half-century-old Dutch design, and "the Iranians now have discovered that it's a very poor machine," said a senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "It's prone to breaking down. They've had hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of these things break down."

The enrichment program appears to have plateaued at just under 4,000 active centrifuges, he added. "They could install a lot more if they wanted to but they've decided that this machine is a loser so that's why they stopped," he said, adding that the Iranians appear to have had little success with a more advanced design.

Yet, paradoxically, the rise of a Republican majority in the House of Representatives could bring new political pressure to bear on the administration, forcing it to harden its stance on Iran and making it more difficult to strike a deal.

In the past week, senior GOP figures have pushed the administration to take tougher steps. Ilena Ros-Lehtinen, the incoming chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told Reuters that "if the country with whom we are negotiating with and playing diplomatic niceties with gets the feeling that they can string us along and have no actions take place, I think that's to the detriment of the United States." She warned against conveying a "sense of weakness and a lack of resolve."

Although the Obama administration has publicly stressed its interest in negotiations, some administration officials and advisers privately think the president would use military force to set back Iran's nuclear program if it appeared the country was on the verge of having weapons capability.

At the same time, some analysts think the tough talk increasingly reduces the chances of a successful negotiation. "The stick side has been emphasized so much that it is hard for Iran to hear anything positive," said Paul R. Pillar, national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005 who teaches at Georgetown University. He warned that military action would be "an enormous blunder with huge consequences for the United States."

The upcoming talks will also be complicated by a failed agreement concerning a medical research reactor in Tehran, the centerpiece of the talks in 2009.

At the time, the deal looked like creative diplomacy. Iranian negotiators had agreed in principle to transfer more than 2,600 pounds of low-enriched uranium out of the country so that Russia and France could convert it into the specialized fuel cells for the reactor. The United States would help improve safety at the reactor, which makes medical isotopes for cancer patients.

But the deal quickly fell apart as Iranian officials backed away, suggesting that U.S. crowing about its achievement had hurt Iranian pride. Iran later renegotiated the deal with Turkey and Brazil, but that pact was rejected by the other powers.

Now, Iran has indicated that the only part of its nuclear program it is willing to discuss is the research reactor, which is not controversial, instead of the centrifuge facility at Natanz that is the source of international concern. Moreover, Iran has begun enriching some uranium to 19.75 percent, bringing it a step closer to weapons-grade, because that is the level needed for the medical isotope facility.

Because Iran has built up its stockpile since the deal fell apart, the United States and the other countries at the table have agreed to demand substantially more enriched uranium from Iran this time. But analysts point out that 2,600 pounds would fulfill Iran's requirements at the research reactor for the next 20 years, making it unclear why Iran would have any incentive to give up more.

Ivanka Barzashka, a research associate at the Federation of American Scientists, said Iran will perceive the West as once again moving the goal posts. She said it was more important to quickly strike a deal that results in Iran giving up the 66 pounds of 19.75 percent uranium it had produced and enough low-enriched uranium, about 2,200 pounds, to produce the rest of the fuel needed by the reactor.

The "political selling point" of Iran giving up enough uranium so it did not have enough for a bomb has been rendered meaningless by Iran's continued production of enriched uranium in the past year, she said.

"The more important thing is to get this settled," said Ivan Oelrich, senior fellow at the federation. "We should just clear the decks to get the talks going."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/13/AR2010111304158.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Tehran Times – Iran

Saturday, November 13, 2010

## **Govt. Has No Right to Compromise on Iran's Nuclear Rights: MP**

Tehran Times Political Desk

TEHRAN - MP Mohammad Karami-Rad says the government has no right to compromise on Iran's inalienable rights to peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Talking to reporters, Karami-Rad said Iran's representative will take part in the planned talks with the 5+1 group to clarify about its peaceful nuclear activities.

The 5+1 group includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany.

Elsewhere in his remarks, Karami-Rad noted that it seems the West is pursuing a "policy of procrastination" in negotiations with Iran.

"Seemingly, the West is seeking negotiations for negotiations' sake," said Karami-Rad, a member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy committee.

He also suggested that the 5+1 countries develop a new agenda for the talks so that the negotiations would be fruitful.

EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton has agreed with Iran's proposal that the talks be held on December 5.

Earlier Iran's Supreme National Security Council secretary Saeed Jalili has proposed meeting in Istanbul on either November 23 or December 5.

[http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index\\_view.asp?code=230354](http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=230354)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Star – Malaysia

Monday November 15, 2010

## **ANALYSIS - Are Iran Nuclear Talks Doomed to Fail Again?**

By Fredrik Dahl

VIENNA (Reuters) - Iran is likely to stick to a stalling strategy towards world powers, seeking to blunt their pressure to curb its uranium enrichment drive without making any major concessions over work the West fears has military aims.

The Islamic state has agreed to meet with a representative of the six big powers for the first time in more than a year, but diplomats and analysts see little chance of a breakthrough in the long-running dispute over Tehran's nuclear programme.

At most, they say, the talks that could take place early next month between Iran's nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton may be followed by more meetings to halt a downward spiral in ties.

Both sides have expressed readiness to resume discussions on Dec. 5 but they have yet to agree on a venue.

A senior Western diplomat in Tehran voiced pessimism about the latest bid to find a diplomatic solution to the row, which has the potential to kindle a regional arms race and spark a military conflict in the Middle East.

"I don't believe it will lead anywhere," the diplomat told Reuters. "The fundamental differences are so large and the room for compromise is so small."

Iranian officials have a track record of using similar sessions in the past to insist on the country's "inalienable right" to develop nuclear energy while refusing to address Western suspicions that the main aim is to build bombs.

"Time is on our side ... every passing hour we advance further," a former Iranian nuclear official said.

The six powers leading efforts to resolve the dispute diplomatically -- the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany -- hope tougher sanctions implemented against the Islamic Republic since June will make it more flexible.

## **IRANIAN PRESTIGE**

They want Iran ultimately to agree to suspend uranium enrichment, which can have both civilian and military uses, in return for a package of economic and political incentives.

But while Iran's international isolation is hurting the oil-dependent economy, Tehran is signalling no willingness to compromise over a nuclear programme it says is solely designed for peaceful purposes such as producing electricity.

For President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has championed a steady expansion of Iran's nuclear work since he came to power in 2005, defiance towards the West is a way to rally nationalist support and distract attention from the country's economic woes.

"They are economically under pressure, but they definitely don't see that as a reason to change their policy on the nuclear issue," the Tehran-based diplomat said. "The anti-Western rhetoric has been stepped up in recent months."

Since Jalili last met with representatives of the big powers, in October 2009 in Geneva, Iran has continued to increase its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and now has enough for at least two bombs, if it was refined much further.

Underlining Western suspicions that Iran will try once again to avoid any talks on its sensitive atomic work, Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials have in recent weeks suggested that Tehran's rights to nuclear capabilities were non-negotiable.

"We believe the issue has been resolved. We will continue our peaceful nuclear activities," Ahmadinejad said last week.

Such comments may be directed mainly at a domestic audience and EU diplomats in Brussels say they do not believe Iran is closing the door to talking about the nuclear issue.

But a Western envoy in Vienna, home to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, said he believed power rivalries within Iran's ruling establishment would block any attempt to reach a deal.

"I'm optimistic there will be a meeting and I'm realistic that there won't be any significant forward progress at all."

An Iranian analyst who declined to be named said the leadership could not accept an enrichment suspension as it "would harm its prestige among its core supporters".

## **NUCLEAR FUEL SWAP**

The West may in the end have to accept Iran continuing some enrichment activity, said proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"Iran has made very clear that that is an absolute bottom line," he said. "A negotiation would explore ways that Iran can satisfy concerns whilst still maintaining some enrichment."

But he added: "I'm very pessimistic on the chances that Iran would negotiate a satisfactory outcome."

Even the possibility of reviving a plan to swap nuclear fuel, seen by the West as a possible way to build confidence for broader negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme, seems remote.

While both Iran and the United States say they are ready to resume talks on a proposal to exchange Iranian LEU for higher-grade material for a Tehran research reactor, they are far apart on how it would take place.

A tentative agreement last year under which Iran would send out 1,200 kg of LEU in return for the reactor fuel fell apart after Tehran backed away from its terms and later started producing higher-enriched material itself.

Western diplomats say Iran must now send out much more LEU under any revised deal to reflect the growing size of its stockpile, a demand Iran rejects.

Baqer Moin, an Iran expert in London, suggested the most likely scenario for the meeting between Jalili and Ashton was "more talks about talks" rather than substantive discussions.

U.S.-based Iran experts Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi said a few meetings could not resolve three decades of enmity between Tehran and Washington since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution.

"Success will only come if diplomats are willing to play the long game, placing a premium on patience and long-term progress rather than quick fixes aimed at appeasing sceptical and impatient domestic political constituencies," they wrote.

*Editing by Alistair Lyon and Samia Nakhoul*

[http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/11/15/worldupdates/2010-11-15T191121Z\\_01\\_NOOTR\\_RTRMDNC\\_0\\_-529220-1&sec=Worldupdates](http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/11/15/worldupdates/2010-11-15T191121Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-529220-1&sec=Worldupdates)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Reuters.com

## **Stuxnet Study Suggests Iran Enrichment Aim: Experts**

By William Maclean, Security Correspondent

LONDON, Tuesday, November 16, 2010

(Reuters) - New research on the Stuxnet worm shows definitively it was made to target the kind of equipment used in uranium enrichment, deepening suspicions its aim is to sabotage Tehran's suspected nuclear arms program, experts say.

Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm of unknown origin that attacks command modules for industrial equipment, is described by some experts as a first-of-its-kind guided cyber missile.

Thanks to the worm's sophistication, uncertainty has lingered about its origins and exact aim since German company Siemens first learned in July that the malware was attacking its widely-used industrial control systems.

Some analysts point to unexplained technical problems that have cut the number of working centrifuges in Iran's uranium enrichment program as evidence that its nuclear ambitions may have suffered sabotage.

Diplomats and security sources say Western governments and Israel view sabotage as one way of slowing Iran's nuclear program, which the West suspects is aimed at making nuclear weapons but Tehran insists is for peaceful energy purposes.

New research by cyber security company Symantec contains evidence that apparently supports the enrichment sabotage theory, pointing to tell-tale signs in the way Stuxnet's changes the behavior of equipment known as frequency converter drives.

A frequency converter drive is a power supply that can alter the frequency of the output, which controls the speed of a motor. The higher the frequency, the higher the motor's speed.

Stuxnet "sabotages" the systems the drives control, a paper posted online by Symantec researcher Eric Chien said.

"We've connected a critical piece of the puzzle."

**VERY SIGNIFICANT**

Stuxnet's approach is to monitor the frequency of these drives and only attack ones that run between 807 Hertz (Hz) and 1210 Hz -- very high speeds used only in a limited set of applications, including gas centrifuges.

Once operation at those frequencies occurs for a period of time, Stuxnet begins modifying the behavior of the frequency converter drives and in effect sabotages it, Symantec said.

Ivanka Barzashka, a research associate at the Federation of American Scientists, said in an email that if Symantec's findings were true they were very significant.

"If Symantec's analysis is true, then Stuxnet likely aimed to destroy Iran's gas centrifuges, which could produce enriched uranium for both nuclear fuel and nuclear bombs."

Leading German cyber expert Ralph Langner, who says he reached the same conclusion independently of Symantec, agreed that a gas centrifuge was the likely target.

"This finding strongly points to a controller for a module in a gas centrifuge cascade," he blogged. "One reasonable goal for the attack could be to destroy the centrifuge rotor by vibration, which causes the centrifuge to explode.

Enrichment is a method of boosting the proportion of fissile isotope found in uranium ore to make it usable as nuclear fuel or the explosive core of nuclear weapons. A gas centrifuge is a machine that separates the fissionable U-235 isotope from the much more prevalent U-238 by spinning at supersonic speeds.

*For story on cyber warfare threat: Additional reporting by Fredrik Dahl in Vienna and Mark Heinrich in London  
Editing by Noah Barkin*

<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AF2F320101116>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Nation – Pakistan  
November 13, 2010

## **North Korea Giving Nuclear Material to Iran, Syria: UN**

UNITED NATIONS (AFP) - North Korea is supplying banned nuclear and ballistic equipment to Iran, Syria and Myanmar using “surreptitious” means to avoid international sanctions, according to a UN report released Friday.

China had blocked publication of the report which has been ready for six months, diplomats said.

North Korea is involved with “the surreptitious transfer of nuclear-related and ballistic missile-related equipment, know-how and technology” to countries including Iran, Syria and Myanmar, said the report.

A UN sanctions committee panel of experts called for heightened vigilance to stop the nuclear trade and for more detailed investigation into the sophisticated means used by North Korea to circumvent sanctions. North Korea, known officially as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “employs a broad range of techniques to mask its transactions, including the use of overseas entities, shell companies, informal transfer mechanisms, cash couriers and barter arrangements,” said the investigators. Since the last sanctions were imposed in June 2009, four “non-compliance cases involving arms exports” had come to light, the report said.

It did not give details but said North Korea used “masking techniques” including mislabelling containers, falsifying ships’ manifests and destination details “and use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions.”

The North is increasingly using foreign-owned ships and modern air freight jets which can now easily get from North Korea’s main airports to the Middle East without refuelling and so avoid checks.

The experts said the Security Council should consider ordering North Korea to declare all air cargos before countries give overflight clearance.

The experts “expressed concern that certain countries, such as the Syrian Arab Republic, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Myanmar, continue to be associated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in regard to proscribed activities and believes that special attention should be taken by all member states to inhibit such activities.

North Korea staged one nuclear test in 2006 and claims it set off another nuclear device in 2009, when the last sanctions were imposed. The UN Security Council has banned trade in nuclear and ballistic material.

The UN has named eight entities and five individuals for asset freezes and travel bans. The report said the number involved was much higher and called on countries to name other banks and other entities that should be added to the list.

North Korea had been involved in nuclear talks with China, the United States, Russia, Japan and South Korea. But the last talks were in late 2008 and the isolated North pulled out of the negotiations the following year.

International Atomic Energy Agency director Yukiya Amano said this week that the standoff with North Korea was now “very bad”.

The UN report said there were no signs that North Korea “is ready to move forward on denuclearisation or to step back from its other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile development programmes.”

The North “has continued to engage in activities proscribed by the relevant Security Council resolutions and has continued to boycott the six-party talks. It continues to market and export its nuclear and ballistic technology to certain other states.

China has been the North’s main ally on the international stage and it had blocked the report since it was prepared in May, diplomats said.

<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/13-Nov-2010/North-Korea-giving-nuclear-material-to-Iran-Syria-UN>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Seattle Pilot  
November 13, 2010

# **Report: NKorea Begins Building Light-Water Reactor**

By KWANG-TAE KIM, ASSOCIATED PRESS

SEOUL, South Korea -- North Korea has begun building an experimental light-water reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, a news report said Saturday, in what could be an attempt to draw attention and press Washington to resume talks on Pyongyang's atomic programs.

The reactor will be able to generate about 25 to 30 megawatts of electricity, Siegfried Hecker, former director of the U.S. Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, told reporters in Beijing after a trip to North Korea, according to Japan's Kyodo News agency.

Hecker said construction of the reactor has just begun and is likely to take several years to complete, according to Kyodo.

In March, North Korea said it would build a light-water power plant using its own nuclear fuel in the near future.

Building a light-water reactor would give the country a reason to enrich uranium, which at low levels can be used in power reactors - and at higher levels in nuclear bombs.

Recent satellite images of the Yongbyon complex have shown new activity there, the Institute for Science and International Security said in September.

South Korea is aware of some movements at the nuclear complex and needs to further analyze North Korea's intentions, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said on condition of anonymity.

Lee Byung-ryung, a South Korean nuclear expert who was involved in a now-canceled U.S.-led project to build two light-water reactors in North Korea, said a reactor of that size "doesn't appear to be a meaningful source of electricity because it is small."

Under a 1994 deal to freeze North Korea's atomic program, the U.S. and other nations promised the energy-starved North two light-water reactors that would have been less likely to lead to nuclear proliferation. The deal collapsed in 2002 when the U.S. accused North Korea of running a secret uranium enrichment program.

After nearly seven years of adamant denials, North Korea announced last year that it was in the final stages of uranium enrichment - a process that would give it a second way to build atomic bombs in addition to its earlier plutonium program.

The reported construction "is a message to the United States that North Korea will keep working on its nuclear programs unless the U.S. comes forward to the six-nation talks," said Kim Yong-hyun, an expert on North Korean affairs at Seoul's Dongguk University.

He also doubted any actual achievement of construction of the reactor.

There has been no recent sign of progress in restarting stalled talks on ending North Korea's nuclear programs.

All of North Korea's nuclear projects are of intense concern because of worries the country is building its arsenal of atomic weapons. Pyongyang carried out nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, drawing international condemnation and U.N. sanctions.

Just before the second test, North Korea quit the nuclear talks, but it has recently expressed a willingness to rejoin the negotiations, which involve the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia and Japan.

However, South Korea and the U.S. have said North Korea must first take specific moves to demonstrate its sincerity.

[http://www.seattlepi.com/national/1104ap\\_as\\_koreas\\_nuclear.html](http://www.seattlepi.com/national/1104ap_as_koreas_nuclear.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News – South Korea  
November 15, 2010

## **Seoul Says N. Korea's Reactor Project Quashes Hope for Denuclearization**

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's reported construction of a light-water nuclear reactor, if confirmed, would be a blow to the international community's hope that Pyongyang forgoes its nuclear ambitions, South Korea said Monday.

An American nuclear expert, Siegfried Hecker, said Saturday after a trip to North Korea that he was told that the communist nation was building an experimental light-water nuclear reactor at the country's main Yongbyon nuclear complex, according to news reports.

Hecker, former chief of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, also told reporters during a stopover in Beijing that he heard the output of the reactor is on a scale of 25 to 30 megawatts.

The reported construction raised concerns about North Korea's attempt to enrich uranium for weapons because a light-water reactor uses lowly enriched uranium as fuel. If highly enriched, uranium can be used to build atomic bombs. North Korea claimed last year that it succeeded in experimental uranium enrichment.

The North's move to let the world know about the construction could be an attempt to pressure the United States and South Korea to resume the stalled six-nation nuclear negotiations, where the country could get economic and political concessions.

Seoul and Washington have demanded that the North first take concrete steps demonstrating its denuclearization commitments if the regime wants to reopen the talks involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S.

On Monday, Foreign Ministry spokesman Kim Young-sun said that South Korea is unable to confirm the report and does not have information about North Korea's capabilities in light-water reactor construction.

However, Kim said the reported construction of a light-water reactor, if confirmed, "would be going contrary to expectations from members of the six-party talks and the international community."

"North Korea promised to give up all nuclear weapons and nuclear-related programs" in a 2005 agreement, Kim said. "It is important for the North to sincerely carry out the promise and international obligations for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula."

The nuclear talks have been stalled since the last session in December 2008 due to North Korea's boycott. But the communist regime has signaled in recent months that it is willing to return to the negotiating table amid international sanctions on its nuclear test last year and the sinking of a South Korean warship in March.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2010/11/15/93/0401000000AEN20101115006100315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Korea Times – South Korea  
November 15, 2010

## **Ex-Spy Chief Reads Tea Leaves on N. Korea Denuclearization**

By Sunny Lee

BEIJING — Is North Korea willing to give up its nuclear weapons? This is an old debate among pundits. But on the eve of the G20 Seoul Summit, President Lee Myung-bak brought it up again.

Lee told reporters that the North's genuine expression of a willingness to give up its nuclear weapons program was a key prerequisite to resume the six-party talks, which China has been promoting vigorously on behalf of North Korea.

"We will only resume the talks when North Korea shows its true willingness to give up nuclear weapons," he said, adding he would have an "in-depth" discussion on North Korea's nukes with leaders of five of the participants in the six-party talks, including Hu Jintao and Barak Obama.

To stress Lee's remarks, a senior Cheong Wa Dae official followed it saying that if the North reacts positively to Lee's call, South Korea would even drop its earlier demand for an apology from North Korea for sinking the Cheonan in order to resume the stalled six-nation talks.

The six-party talks were born in 2003 for the purpose of mapping out how to reward North Korea for renouncing its nukes and taking steps for denuclearization. Naturally, if Pyongyang doesn't have any intention of scrapping its nuclear arsenal, the talks lose intrinsic rationale for existence.

In the ensuing years of discussion, however, the talks have often stumbled upon hurdles and the question raised over and over again was to ask the now almost Hamlet-like question: Is North Korea willing to give up its nukes or not?

"Yes, I think so," said Kim Man-bok, former chief of the National Intelligence Service. "Should the conditions they request be met, North Koreans will ultimately give up its nukes," he said.

That's a bold prediction today when there is a growing pessimism on the matter among decision makers in Washington and Seoul.

Yet, in a rare interview, the former head of South Korea's chief intelligence agency, who had worked there since 1974 and has had access to more information on North Korea than anyone else, including secret trips to Pyongyang, explained why he believes the reclusive regime is open to the idea of disowning its nuclear weapons.

According to Kim, "North Korea's foremost condition for denuclearization" will result from its conclusion that it won't need nuclear weapons and will need "assurance" that the regime won't be subject to outside attempts that undermine its security.

"North Koreans argue that their regime security should be guaranteed by the United States, and that the guarantee should be proven by a series of actions on the part of the United States," said Kim who retired in 2008.

In other words, as Seoul and Washington want to see the North's "intention" of giving up its nuclear weapons, the North, according to Kim, also wants to see first a clear "intention" from the U.S. of dropping what it views as the latter's "hostile policy" toward North Korea.

North Korea wants the removal of the hostile policy as demonstrated by the lifting of sanctions by the United States, followed by formally ending the Korean War by signing a peace treaty, which then will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two, Kim said.

Skeptics argue that North Korea is unlikely, whatsoever, to give up its nuclear weapons as Kim Jong-il regards them as his major legacy. According to this opinion, Kim Jong-il has accomplished the task of establishing a "powerful" country from the stated national goal of creating a "powerful and prosperous" country by the year 2012. Now, what remains is to accomplish the other half of the goal of creating a "prosperous" country by focusing on the economic front. Here, a gesture to return to the six-party talks with the condition of having the sanctions lifted, as it is doing now, is a deceptive strategy by North Korea.

However, the former spy chief points out that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was among the dying injunctions by the late Kim Il-sung, "which have been set as the significant guidelines for the North Korean government," arguing that if conditions are met North Korea will ultimately give up its nukes to honor the late leader's wishes.

#### N. Korea fragile but unlikely to collapse

Since Kim Jong-un's official debut as the heir-apparent last month, pundits have been eagerly reading tea leaves on the future of North Korea. It's a vulnerable time for the regime. The North's economy is in tatters. The aging dictator is said to be barreling down a steep waning slope of physical vitality. Sanctions have isolated the country like a cadaver seeping blood. With that, there have been increasing expectations that the regime may undergo contingency that is likely to lead to its collapse.

This prediction has gained widening popularity lately. In a telling indication, at the annual security meeting between South Korea's Defense Minister Kim Tae-young and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Washington, D.C. last month, the two countries for the first time used the term "contingencies" in the joint communiqué.

President Lee Myung-bak also weighed in on this prospect by suddenly announcing the idea of a "unification tax," a South Korean attempt to prepare for a sudden collapse of the North Korean government.

Some analysts believe Seoul's reluctance to engage North Korea, including through the six-party talks, has been partly driven by this expectation. In other words, as Seoul doesn't have much faith in the North giving up their nuclear weapons ambitions, it is leaning closer to the opportunity for regime change as the North is undergoing a volatile leadership change, compounded by economic hardship, some scholars said.

The veteran former intelligence officer disagreed with this prediction. "Although North Korea suffers from various problems including economic hardship, international alienation, as well as Kim Jong-il's worsening health, I do not think North Korea will collapse that easily.

"The economic hardship is most serious. But if you review similar situations such as the French Revolution, we can conclude that even though starvation may foretell some protests in North Korea but it won't be sufficiently strong enough to lead to a revolution," he said.

Kim cites a lack of an alternative political force or a civil society that can replace the current leadership in North Korea as an important factor that disowns such wishful thinking.

All in all, Kim sees North Korea as fragile but it is not likely to fall apart any time soon, challenging the wisdom of the Lee administration's "strategic patience" of waiting for contingencies in North Korea to transpire.

Critically, the collapse scenario also didn't factor in China's actions. Since mid-last year, China has de-linked the North Korean nuclear issue from any bilateral relationship. It has maintained its political and economic support for



the North, while deciding to deal with the nuclear issue as an independent diplomatic agenda, which shouldn't harm China's friendly ties with North Korea.

"China's overall policy attitude toward its socialist brother is to maintain stabilization of North Korea's political situation and a sustainable bilateral relationship," Kim said.

Although Washington and Seoul often cite Beijing as wielding the most influence on Pyongyang and often prod it to do more for the North's denuclearization, Kim believes that ultimately the ball is in Washington's court, not Beijing's.

"I think the United States is the country that holds the key. Currently, North Korea faces a dual dilemma: it should catch two hares contradictorily. The two hares are regime stability and economic recovery. And it is the United States that holds the key to the double jeopardy."

[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/11/116\\_76400.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/11/116_76400.html)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Express Tribune - Pakistan

## **Pakistan under Renewed Pressure for Nuke Freeze**

By Kamran Yousaf

November 13, 2010

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan is under immense pressure from powerful countries led by the US to freeze its nuclear programme by agreeing to a controversial treaty that bans production of fissile materials to make atomic bomb.

Western powers, which are pushing for a deal on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), have threatened to take Pakistan's case to the UN Security Council if it did not sign the longstanding agreement, disclosed a senior official of the country's nuclear establishment.

"You can't even imagine what kind of pressures is being exerted on Pakistan," said the official, who is associated with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Headed by Gen Khalid Kidwai, the SPD controls the country's nuclear arsenal.

In a rare background conversation, the SPD official told The Express Tribune that Western powers particularly the US have been using 'coercive measures' for the last several months against Pakistan.

"They have threatened to take our case to the UNSC ... they are even threatening us with isolation," he added.

However, the country's political and military leadership have so far resisted the pressure as they believe bowing to such demands will seriously undermine the country's national security, said a top foreign office official. "It's a Pakistan-specific treaty," the official added. "The FMCT will not harm big powers because they have surplus nuclear fuel," he said.

He said Pakistan will have to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections if it signs the FMCT. "This is certainly unacceptable," he maintained.

The idea of placing a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been discussed for a long time, and the talks broke down in 1995. Since then, there has been very little formal progress.

However, US President Barack Obama is trying to revive the process. At the nuclear summit held in January this year in Washington, President Obama expressed disappointment over Pakistan's refusal to sign the FMCT. Islamabad has been accused of being a major roadblock in the way of finalising an accord on FMCT, which envisages a ban on the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

One of the key objectives of the FMCT is to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on the fissile material. Western countries fear Pakistan is the most likely country, where this could happen. "This is ridiculous," said another official.

Pakistan believes FMCT must include existing stocks otherwise the imbalance of power in the world will simply be further enhanced. Its reluctance to sign the treaty is also attributed to the discriminatory policies of the West on civilian nuclear cooperation.

"Some states have been denied the right to peaceful nuclear cooperation while others are supported in promoting unsafe nuclear programmes," asserted the official in a clear reference to Indo-US nuclear deal.

"With its current form and conditions, Pakistan will never sign the FMCT," remarked Foreign Office Spokesman Abdul Basit.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/76731/pakistan-under-renewed-pressure-for-nuke-freeze/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Wall Street Journal  
Monday, November 15, 2010

## **Report Questions Safety of Planned Biodefense Lab**

*Associated Press*

TOPEKA, Kan. — The federal government has underestimated the risks of building a lab for researching dangerous animal diseases in a densely populated area in the heart of cattle country, a report released Monday contends.

The National Research Council's report notes that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security itself has estimated that there is a 70 percent chance a pathogen could be released from the lab within 50 years, and that it could cause up to \$50 billion in damages.

Homeland Security officials have concluded that the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility would be safe. The \$451 million lab would be built on the north side of the Kansas State University campus in Manhattan.

The research council calls the assessment "not entirely adequate or valid."

The council, which is affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences, specifically avoids saying whether the new lab should be built in Kansas. But its report also says that the site — in the heart of cattle country and near Kansas State's football stadium — adds to the risks.

The council's 146-page report says Homeland Security's assessment of the risks, completed in June, "had several major shortcomings."

"It neglected to consider the risks associated with NBAF's proximity to a metropolitan area and other animal facilities," the council says. "Ultimately, policymakers will need to decide whether the risks are acceptable relating to constructing and operating NBAF in Manhattan."

The new lab would replace an aging one on Plum Island, N.Y., and Congress ordered the research council's report in agreeing to provide \$32 million last year for planning. Construction is supposed to start in 2012, with operations transferred from Plum Island by as early as 2017.

The lab would research foot-and-mouth and other dangerous animal diseases that can be passed to humans. Kansas State already conducts similar research at the Biosecurity Research Center, which is located near where the new lab will be constructed.

The National Research Council's report notes that the site is near Kansas State's College of Veterinary Medicine and that almost 10 percent of the nation's nearly 95 million cattle are within 200 miles of the site, as are substantial swine operations and meatpacking plants.

The report notes that the existing lab is on an uninhabited island, while the new one would be in an area "that has a large human population and is very close to susceptible animals."

"The large population that gathers for football games and other events is potentially susceptible to infections," the report says. "Additionally, the presence of large numbers of vehicles during public events increases the odds that some will transport a released pathogen outside of the area."

The council also says it is concerned that Homeland Security officials have not adequately described how they'd detect the release of a pathogen early.

It also says the department's strategies for dealing with such a release don't "realistically demonstrate" how well federal, state and local authorities would handle it.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/AP984fc4e256c444619f544fd21f5e4ebe.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Foreign Policy.com

## **Al Qaeda's Nuclear Ambitions**

*Ayman al-Zawahiri promises to make his next smoking gun a mushroom cloud.*

BY ROLF MOWATT-LARSEN

NOVEMBER 16, 2010

American authorities managed to foil al Qaeda's latest plot to attack -- via hidden explosives in mail parcels -- but the long-term question remains unanswered: How can they ensure that they stay one step ahead of the terrorist group?

The good news is that there's no need to wonder what the terrorists' strategic and tactical goals are -- one need only listen to what their leaders have already told us. The bad news is that we no doubt won't like what we hear. Al Qaeda's leaders yearn to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction against the United States; if they acquired a nuclear bomb, they would not hesitate to use it. Indeed, such an attack would be meant to serve as a sort of sequel to the 9/11 plot.

The evidence for those intentions aren't hidden in encoded communications or classified intelligence. Quite the opposite: They're hidden in plain sight. Just as Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa to declare war on the United States in 1998, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a fatwa a decade later to herald a prospective next stage in the conflict. If we take him at his word, some day jihadists will use weapons of mass destruction to change history once and for all.

Of course, al Qaeda leaders have spoken of acquiring weapons of mass destruction for well over a decade. They have had little observable success in achieving their goals of producing a nuclear bomb or biological weapon capable of producing mass casualties. Fortunately, it is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for a terrorist group to acquire a strategic weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Nonetheless, the al Qaeda core has kept at it over the years, in the hopes that time and opportunity will enable it to overcome the daunting challenges in this regard.

What has changed recently is that the goal is no longer theoretical, but operational -- a change spurred by Zawahiri's intervention. Rather than follow bin Laden in issuing a religious edict, Zawahiri chose to release a book in 2008 titled *Exoneration*. In it, he resurrects a fatwa issued by senior Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd in May 2003 -- notoriously, the only such treatise that ever endorsed the use of WMD. Zawahiri adopts Fahd's ideas wholesale. He uses the same ideas, thoughts, examples, and scholarly citations to reach the same conclusion: The use of nuclear weapons would be justified as an act of equal retaliation, "repaying like for like."

Zawahiri raises key Quranic themes to sweep away all potential objections to the use of WMD. He offers answers to questions about the legality of killing women, children, and the elderly; the justice of environmental destruction; the morality of harming noncombatants; the tactical prudence of attacking at night; and analyses of deterrence. Zawahiri adopts Fahd's examples verbatim: The Prophet Mohammed's attack on the village of al-Taif using a catapult, for instance, permits the use of weapons of "general destruction" incapable of distinguishing between innocent civilians and combatants.

The take-away from Zawahiri's book is that the use of weapons of mass destruction should be judged on intent rather than on results; if the intent to use WMD is judged to be consistent with the Quran, then the results are justifiable, even if they clearly violate specific prohibitions under Islam. The same reasoning is applied in a detailed explanation of such matters as loyalty to the state, contracts, obligations, and treaties; the permissibility of espionage; and deception and trickery. For example, on the topic of Muslims killed in combat unintentionally in the fight against infidels: "When Muslims fight nonbelievers, any Muslim who is killed is a martyr."

Aside from its general endorsement of WMDs, we should pay special attention to two operational messages embedded in Zawahiri's book.

First, America is a special object of Zawahiri's attention when discussing a nuclear attack. Zawahiri explicitly ties U.S. crimes to the alleged need to use WMD, quoting Fahd: "There is no doubt that the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims at this time is the Americans."

Zawahiri further explains that he considers the United States to be a "single juridical entity" under Islam. It's a verdict with chilling implications: Zawahiri means to say that all Americans are valid targets, regardless of whether they are men, women, or children. This is not a mere aside; it is a careful choice of words that reflects a seriousness of purpose.

Indeed, he is at pains to prove his judiciousness. He cites a variety of viewpoints from the Quran and *hadiths* (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), some of which support his judgments, others which do not. At times, he dramatically prefaces his conclusion with the words "I say ..." to draw attention to the fact that his judgments digress from the views held by some Islamic scholars; it is also a way for Zawahiri -- a medical doctor, not a religious scholar by training -- to assume authority for himself as an arbiter of Islamic law.

Second, al Qaeda has reckoned with the horrific scale of a nuclear attack; indeed, Zawahiri sees mass casualties as a point in WMDs' favor. Zawahiri's book explicitly justifies a potential attack that could kill 10 million Americans. Again, that enormous figure is not merely tossed off casually by Zawahiri. He believes that such a plan requires justification, and he is satisfied, at the conclusion of his book, that he has done so.

It is notable that Zawahiri repeatedly uses the phrase "artillery bombardment" in the context of discussing the wide-scale destruction of a WMD attack. For al Qaeda, it seems, modern weapons of mass destruction are simply a form of weapon that cannot distinguish between civilians and combatants. Nuclear weapons, Zawahiri wants to argue, are no more morally significant than the catapult often cited in the Quran and hadiths. Here Zawahiri quotes Fahd once again: "If a bomb were dropped on them, destroying 10 million of them and burning as much of their land as they have burned of Muslim land, that would be permissible without any need to mention any other proof."

Needless to say, Zawahiri's approach goes against all Western theories of just war. Zawahiri's dismissal of moral qualms in jihad echoes the words of his mentor, Islamist philosopher Sayyid Qutb: "The Islamic jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way it is conducted."

Zawahiri is a man of action, not contemplation, and his tone leaves little question that he believes the West has not yet been exonerated for its crimes. And like bin Laden in 1998, Zawahiri is not only a cleric but an operational planner -- we can be assured that he is planning al Qaeda's redemption by means of the terrible weapons he champions. *Exoneration* is a warning that the rules of engagement may be about to change. We would be foolish not to heed it.

*Rolf Mowatt-Larssen is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He served over three decades in the U.S. Army, CIA, and Energy Department.*

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/16/al\\_qaedas\\_nuclear\\_ambitions](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/16/al_qaedas_nuclear_ambitions)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Wall Street Journal

OPINION

Monday, November 15, 2010

## Old Problems with New Start

*The Senate shouldn't ratify the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty without guarantees that the administration will modernize weapons and improve missile defense.*

By R. JAMES WOOLSEY

A number of years negotiating arms-control agreements with the Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian counterparts, don't appear eager—friendly yes, eager never. Regrettably, the Obama administration seems to have become eager for a deal in its negotiations on the follow-on treaty to the recently expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start). Hopes for a boost in efforts to "reset" relations with Russia, and for progress toward the president's dream of a world without nuclear weapons, apparently combined to trump prudent negotiating strategy.

As a result, concessions to Russian demands make it difficult to support Senate approval of the new treaty, known as New Start, as it currently stands. Why has the administration agreed to a treaty that limits our nonnuclear long-range weapons and runs the risk of constraining our missile defenses? And why did the treaty end up with verification provisions substantially more lax than those negotiated in the 1991 Start treaty?

The Russians are engaging in a comprehensive modernization of their nuclear forces, which senior Russian military officials say is their top priority. We cannot deal effectively with them or with the growing number of nuclear-weapon states around the world if we are strategically weaker, undefended and clueless about our adversaries' capabilities.

Before the Senate approves New Start it should ask the administration to demonstrate its commitment to three things.

First, the administration needs to commit to replacing and modernizing our aging nuclear weapons laboratory and industrial infrastructure as well as the bombers, submarines and ballistic missiles—and the warheads on them—that provide our ultimate guarantee of national security.

The Senate's resolution of ratification should, for example, require the president to commit to specific modernization plans so we can be sure these programs will have his full support. The administration has particularly resisted warhead modernization, beginning with its Nuclear Posture Review last year. This led 10 former directors of the nation's nuclear weapons labs to write to the secretaries of Defense and Energy urging them to revisit that misguided policy. The secretaries should commit to doing so.

Second, it is crucial for the Senate to require that, in the ratification instruments that would be exchanged with Russia, it be made clear that New Start in no way constrains our development and deployment of the most effective missile-defense capabilities.

The administration should also be asked to show that it plans not only to maintain the current program to deploy effective missile defenses in Europe, but also to improve the missile-defense system now deployed to defend the U.S. against long-range threats. The administration's own intelligence estimates indicate that Iranian missile developments could constitute a serious threat to the U.S. several years before the administration's current program can add what is necessary to our defense against it. The administration should reverse the significant cuts it has made to our missile defenses and provide increased resources to develop our ground- and sea-based defenses, including new technologies that will take advantage of the first minutes of a hostile ballistic missile's flight.

Likewise, the Senate resolution should make clear that the treaty will not limit our key new nonnuclear systems, such as very accurate long-range missiles that can hit terrorist havens. And the administration should commit publicly to deploying these systems.

Is New Start verifiable? In this treaty, unlike in the original Start, Russia is free to encrypt telemetry from missile tests, making it harder for us to know what new capabilities it's developing. There is no longer the requirement for permanent, on-site monitoring of Russia's primary missile production facility, which under old Start helped us keep track of new mobile missiles entering the Soviet force. Satellites alone can't tell what's in a railcar exiting a factory. The administration touts treaty provisions that permit the U.S. to inspect Russian missiles themselves, but the new treaty requires fewer inspections.

Most importantly, New Start's verification provisions will provide little or no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the Russians fail to declare, are off-limits to U.S. inspectors, or are underground or otherwise hidden from our satellites. Incredibly, inspectors will only inspect declared sites. The treaty's preamble emphasizes that its verification mechanisms are less costly than those in the original Start treaty. Is there some reason to make our means of understanding the most lethal threat to our existence a high priority for cost-cutting?

Lastly, the Senate should demand that the administration negotiate a binding limitation on Russian sub-launched cruise missiles, as was the case with the first Start treaty. At the same time that the Russians are preparing to deploy a new 5,000 kilometer sub-launched cruise missile, it is inexplicable that the administration would seek no limitations over systems such as these.

With adequate attention to the country's strategic needs and written guarantees thereof, the administration may be able to secure Senate approval of New Start. But it will be unlikely to succeed if it denigrates or ignores legitimate Senate concerns and continues on the path it has taken so far.

*Mr. Woolsey served as an adviser to the Salt I negotiation (1969-70), a delegate-at-large to the Start and Defense and Space negotiations (1983-86), and ambassador and chief negotiator for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty (1989-91). He was director of Central Intelligence from 1993-95.*

<http://topics.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703514904575602992172574172.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Bangkok Post – Thailand  
OPINION/Editorial

## **Nuclear Rogue at the Border**

November 15, 2010

The United Nations' confirmation of nuclear smuggling by Burma and North Korea presents a major challenge to the government and the region. The report by a panel of experts confirms what has long been suspected. It states that Pyongyang has been smuggling and side-stepping UN sanctions. The Burmese military junta, and the regimes in Syria and Iran, have been aiding North Korea. A formal pattern of illegal movement of nuclear and missile technology and equipment has been developed. The UN report makes it mandatory that the government and the international community press Burma strongly for details.

The 75-page United Nations report was written by specialists from China, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Britain and the United States. They were charged by the UN Security Council with assessing how Pyongyang was responding to sanctions imposed after the Kim Jong-il regime tested nuclear devices in 2006 and again last year. Lamentably and inexcusably, China held up release of the document for six months. Just as inexcusably, the other Security Council members acquiesced to this Chinese censorship. Finally, Beijing has dropped its protection of the North Korean regime and agreed to release the document to the public.

The bottom line of the report is that North Korea is taking part in "nuclear and ballistic missile related activities in certain other countries including Iran, Syria and Burma". It is backed with solid evidence of known shipments, new details on smuggling activities previously unknown to the public, and particulars of the criminal trafficking. The

experts believe that what is known about the North Korean law-breaking still seriously understates the extent of illegal activities by the Pyongyang regime.

For Southeast Asia, there is disturbing information in the report. Burma has allegedly entered into a conspiracy with the North Korean company Namchonggang Trading Corporation. This firm is blacklisted by United Nations sanctions, and all UN members are forbidden by international law from doing business with it. The report details the sale to the Burmese military junta by North Korea of a magnetometer. This device has two uses: to build ring magnets for use on centrifuges used in refining nuclear material, and as part of a missile guidance system.

The neighbours and Asean partners of Burma never have been informed of this sort of advanced nuclear or weapons purchase. Burma has been rumoured to be discussing the building of nuclear reactors, but never has told other nations or the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of such plans. Acquiring such equipment secretly is against international law, as is doing business with the North Korean company which reportedly sold and smuggled it to Burma. The report said that Burma has "use(d) air cargo to handle high valued and sensitive arms exports" from North Korea — similar to the rogue arms trafficking flight detained last December at Don Mueang airport. North Korea, reported the experts, has increasingly resorted to the use of foreign-flagged ships and aircraft to do its dirty work of spreading weapons of mass destruction, contrary to United Nations instructions.

US President Barack Obama last week put more pressure on North Korea, giving them a choice between joining the international community, or suffering still more sanctions. He made a pointed visit to US troops in South Korea.

But the real pressure must be put on Burma. The junta's release of Aung San Suu Kyi is simply to curry favour. Instead, it must be held accountable for tough questions such as stealing last week's election, and for getting into the nuclear arms business with North Korea.

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/206399/nuclear-rogue-at-the-border>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

OPINION

International Herald Tribune Op-Ed Contributor

## **NATO, Nuclear Security and the Terrorist Threat**

By SAM NUNN

November 16, 2010

Over the past two decades, no geopolitical space has undergone as dramatic a transformation as that between the Atlantic and the Urals. During the Cold War, a devastating conventional and nuclear war on the European continent was a very real possibility; today, no state faces this type of deliberate existential threat.

Despite these positive developments, the two largest powers in the region — the United States and Russia — still possess thousands of nuclear weapons each, and over 90 percent of the world's nuclear inventory. Many of these nuclear arms remain deployed or designed for use within the Euro-Atlantic region, including small tactical nuclear weapons — a terrorist's dream — deployed in numerous states throughout the Euro-Atlantic zone.

The reduction and elimination of this Cold War nuclear infrastructure is the largest piece of unfinished business from a bygone era, and should be moved to the policy front burner.

Today, urgent security steps relating to nuclear weapons security are essential for both NATO and Russia.

If we don't address this issue with urgency, we may wake up one day to a 1972 Munich-Olympics scenario, with a masked terrorist waving a gun outside of a nuclear warhead bunker somewhere in Europe. This time the hostages could be millions of people living close by.

Beginning on Friday, NATO leaders will meet in Lisbon for three days to adopt a new Strategic Concept — the document that sets out the fundamental purpose, tasks and strategy of NATO.

The role of nuclear weapons in NATO security policy — including whether to endorse the continued deployment of an estimated few hundred air-delivered U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at six bases in five European countries — is reportedly one of the last issues still under discussion.

In two articles I co-wrote with George Shultz, William Perry and Henry Kissinger, the four of us said that these smaller and more portable tactical nuclear weapons — currently uncovered by arms control — are inviting acquisition targets for terrorists.

For this reason, we proposed starting a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating their own weapons to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting and eventual elimination of these weapons.

Given the complexity of this issue for many NATO members, the differing views regarding the continuing political utility of these weapons and a curious absence of leadership from key countries, it appears unlikely that NATO will achieve such clarity in Lisbon.

Instead, NATO is likely to adopt least common denominator language in the Strategic Concept, all under the mantra, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

More time will probably be needed for NATO to sort out key political questions, including alternatives to U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, to assure and involve NATO allies, as well as a strategy for engaging Russia regarding its estimated stockpile of a few thousand tactical nuclear weapons. At Lisbon, NATO leaders should make this a priority as part of a thorough and expeditious review of NATO’s nuclear posture.

The burden of proof during this review should not only be on those who are advocating change, but also on defenders of the nuclear status quo.

They should be pressed to answer this question: What is the rationale for continuing the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe for the next two decades, in particular when it will cost many millions of dollars in new NATO spending for improvements in nuclear storage facilities, tactical nuclear weapons and the replacement of aircraft currently used to deliver NATO’s nuclear bombs?

All this comes at a time when European defense spending is under extreme pressure — witness the recent dramatic cuts in defense spending announced by Britain — and NATO looks to adapt its security policies to meet new threats.

Leaders should also keep in mind this central point, which would always be central in the mind of any adversary: NATO will remain a nuclear alliance in the absence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, given that NATO includes three states — the United States, Britain and France — each with significant strategic nuclear forces and each committed to NATO’s collective defense.

In the meantime, NATO could take additional essential steps regarding the security of these remaining weapons — an issue highlighted in a 2008 U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Security Review, which concluded that most sites in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons were lacking in security.

At Lisbon, NATO should state that: As long as U.S. tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in Europe, all of NATO has a stake in their security; all of NATO also has a stake in the security of Russian tactical nuclear arms; and Russia has an equal stake in the security of NATO weapons as well as their own. The United States, NATO and Russia got in to this dilemma together; they need to get out together.

This security imperative should drive NATO and Russia to move without delay to adopt a series of steps that will improve the security of tactical nuclear weapons now, and pave the way for further consolidation, reduction and elimination of these weapons throughout the Euro-Atlantic zone.

These steps would be focused on security, transparency and confidence-building, and they should not require a new treaty or even a formal agreement.

These joint measures could include:

- A threat assessment, focused on how terrorists might seek to penetrate sites where tactical nuclear weapons are located and gain access to a nuclear bomb;
- A security assessment, focused on identifying necessary improvements in site security in light of the terrorist threat;
- A recovery exercise, where NATO and Russian forces would work together to recover nuclear material stolen by a terrorist group;
- A site visit to a NATO and Russian base where tactical nuclear weapons are located to encourage improved security and build confidence;
- A commitment not to locate tactical nuclear weapons with operational units in the field; and
- A declaration of the total number of tactical nuclear weapons located in the Euro-Atlantic region.

There is every reason for NATO and Russia to work together on these issues now — before a nuclear Munich.

*Sam Nunn is co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and a former U.S. Senator from Georgia.*

[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/opinion/17iht-ednunn.html?\\_r=1&ref=global&pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/opinion/17iht-ednunn.html?_r=1&ref=global&pagewanted=all)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)