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Articles & Other Documents:

Iran Confirms Espionage at Nuclear Facilities	Russia's Bulava Missile Hits Target in Test
<u>'US Gave Israel Nuclear Aid'</u>	Next Test Launch of Troubled Bulava Missile due Late October
North Korean Uranium Enrichment Progresses, Analysts Sav	Russia Reveals Detailed Data on Defense Spending Until 2013
	UK and France in Talks over Warheads
S. Korea More Interested in Nuclear Standoff than Power Transition in DPRK: Prez	Nuclear Weapons Likely to Stay in Germany
Russian Envoy Calls for Common View on	Mission to Stop Nuclear Terrorism
Denuclearizing N. Korea	
Senior N. Korean Diplomat Visits Beijing for Talks with Chinese Nuclear Envoy: Source	(HEU) Fuel Return Campaign in Program's History
	Al-Qaeda Magazine Teaches How to Kill Americans
Burma's Nuclear Goals Eerily Familiar Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Push Angers America	Unthinkable? L'entente Militaire
<u></u>	Bulava Missile: the Bitter Taste of Success
Chinese N-reactors for Pakistan Worry India	
India to Build 25 Reactors in Next Five Years	Russia, USA are Doomed to Remain Potential Enemies
Asian Nations Need to Cooperate in Nuclear Field	

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Boston Globe Iran Confirms Espionage at Nuclear Facilities

Says increased security will stop West's spy plot By Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press October 10, 2010

TEHRAN — Iran acknowledged yesterday that some personnel at the country's nuclear facilities were lured by promises of money to pass secrets to the West but insisted increased security and worker privileges have put a stop to the spying.

The stunning admission by Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi provides the clearest government confirmation that Iran has been fighting espionage at its nuclear facilities.

Recently, Iran announced the arrest of several nuclear spies and battled a computer worm that it says is part of a covert Western plot to derail its nuclear program. In July, a nuclear scientist who Iran says was kidnapped by US agents returned home in mysterious circumstances, with the United States saying he was a willing defector who was offered \$5 million by the CIA but then changed his mind.

The United States and its allies have vigorously sought to slow Iran's nuclear advances through UN and other sanctions out of suspicion that Tehran intends to use a civil program as cover for developing weapons. Iran denies any such aim and says it wants only to generate nuclear power.

Tehran said yesterday that it was ready to hold nuclear talks with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China — as well as Germany in late October or early November. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said the precise date was being discussed by the sides.

Iran's semiofficial Fars news agency quoted Salehi as saying that some nuclear personnel had access to information about Iran's plans for "foreign purchases and commercial affairs." The report did not elaborate on the nature of the information or when the spying took place.

"Now, these routes have been blocked. The possibility of information leaking is almost impossible now," Salehi was quoted as saying.

Salehi is also the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. His predecessor, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, had said in April 2008 that some of the nation's nuclear scientists had been approached by the West but did not accept offers to spy.

Yesterday's revelation was the first public word that some personnel have engaged in espionage, although Tehran has arrested suspects in the past. With the announcement, Iran appears to be trying to raise public awareness about what it says are plots by the United States and its allies to derail Iran's nuclear activities.

Salehi said access to information has been restricted within nuclear facilities as part of the increased security measures.

Salehi said Iran's nuclear agency also published booklets for its personnel alerting them to the various techniques the West uses to try to lure them into espionage.

Salehi said measures have been taken to provide welfare to nuclear personnel including housing to enhance their living conditions as a way of protecting them against offers by the West.

When nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri returned home in July from the United States, Iran feted him as a national hero and said he provided valuable information about the CIA.

American authorities claimed Amiri willingly defected to the United States but changed his mind and decided to return home without the \$5 million he had been paid for what a US official described as significant information about his country's disputed nuclear program.

Iran said he was kidnapped by American agents in May 2009.

http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2010/10/10/iran confirms espionage at nuclear facilities/

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Straits Times – Singapore October 11, 2010 **'US Gave Israel Nuclear Aid'** By Agence France-Presse (AFP) TEHRAN - IRAN'S top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said on Monday that Tehran is to reveal proof of how nuclear material enriched by United States was delivered to the Islamic republic's arch-foe Israel.

'We will soon publish documents on how American enriched nuclear material was provided and transported to the Zionist regime,' Mr Jalili said, quoted on state television's website.

Mr Jalili said the key question in the Muslim world was 'how the Zionist regime acquired these (nuclear) weapons?' 'The Zionist regime and those who gave these weapons to the regime should answer for this'.

Israel, widely believed to be the sole but undeclared nuclear weapons power in the Middle East, has not ruled out a military strike against Iran's atomic facilities in a bid to stop Tehran's controversial nuclear programme.

Iran, which denies Israeli and Western suspicions it is making nuclear arms, has repeatedly called for Israel to be questioned over its reported atomic arsenal and to be pressured to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/World/Story/STIStory_589321.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Buenos Aires Herald – Argentina Monday, October 11, 2010

Iran May be Ready for Nuclear Talks by Late October

Iran is ready to hold talks with six major powers over its nuclear programme "in late October or early November," Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said.

"We think late October or early November will be an appropriate date for the talks by the representatives of Iran and 5+1 countries," Mottaki told a news conference.

He gave no details about the venue of the talks. Western officials say they could take place in Vienna or Geneva.

"If Iran is ready to hold talks, all they need to do is pick up the phone and set a date," US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said.

Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council -the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China- as well as Germany -meant to address concerns about Tehran's uranium enrichment, stalled in October last year, leading to a toughening of international sanctions.

A spokesman for European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said there was no official date set for nuclear talks with Iran.

"This is news to us. There has been no official date set for talks, nor has there been any official correspondence received by ... Ashton or her services with regard to a date for talks," the spokesman said.

Ashton "remains ready to talk and is hopeful this can happen very soon," he said.

The United States and its European allies fear Iran's declared civilian nuclear energy program is a cover to develop the capability of producing nuclear weapons.

Iran, the world's fifth-largest oil producer, says it needs nuclear fuel-making technology to generate electricity.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has set conditions for further talks, saying a greater variety of countries must be involved, the parties must say whether they seek friendship or hostility with Iran, and they must express a view on Israel's alleged nuclear arsenal.

The West is wary of what it sees as Iranian efforts to dodge the main issue in talks, buying time for advances in uranium enrichment.

http://buenosairesherald.com/BreakingNews/View/47721

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Global Security Newswire North Korean Uranium Enrichment Progresses, Analysts Say

Friday, October 8, 2010

North Korea seems to be making progress in its military uranium enrichment program, which would give the nation another pathway to building nuclear weapons and a valuable technology to sell on the black market, a U.S. think tank said in a report today (see *GSN*, Oct. 7).

The Institute for Science and International Security report, "Taking Stock: North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Program," asserts that the North "has moved beyond laboratory-scale work" and is equipped to erect a centrifuge "pilot plant" for uranium enrichment. The report relies on information from news reports, the intelligence community and government officials, according to the *Washington Post*.

Drawing on information about North Korean equipment acquisitions abroad, report co-author and ISIS President David Albright said the Stalinist state might have between 500 and 1,000 centrifuges. Most specialists think the North would require 3,000 centrifuges to enrich enough uranium for one weapon (see *GSN*, Jan. 6).

Previously, U.S. nuclear negotiators had primarily concerned themselves with Pyongyang's plutonium production activities while uranium enrichment was considered a secondary concern.

"But this would indicate that uranium must be included in the engagement no matter what," Albright said.

With uranium enrichment capabilities, Pyongyang could boost its supply of weapon-ready fissile material, which currently consists of processed plutonium. The North could use both nuclear materials together in a single bomb to make it more deadly or build a thermonuclear weapon.

"A growing concern is that North Korea would provide centrifuge equipment, facilities, and technical know-how or even HEU (highly enriched uranium) to other countries or groups," the report states.

Pyongyang has a history of proliferation. The North is widely thought in the West to have assisted Syria in building a suspected nuclear reactor that was demolished in a 2007 Israeli airstrike. The isolated state also sold nuclear goods to Libya and Washington is worried Pyongyang is helping Myanmar set up a nuclear weapons program.

In February, former National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair told lawmakers that Pyongyang had some ability to enrich uranium "in the past."

The ISIS report, however, argues the North maintained uranium enrichment efforts by operating fraudulent firms, some in China, that purchased needed materials from locations such as Europe (John Pomfret, *Washington Post*, Oct. 7).

"There is no evidence that the Chinese government is secretly approving or willfully ignoring exports to North Korea's centrifuge program in an effort to strengthen North Korea's nuclear weapons program," the report says. "Nonetheless, China is not applying enough resources to detect and stop North Korea's illicit nuclear trade" (Pauline Jelinek, Associated Press I/Yahoo!News, Oct. 8).

The largest mystery is where the North has stashed its centrifuges. One Western intelligence official reportedly told Albright that there were "thousands of sites in North Korea" where the devices could be located (Pomfret, *Washington Post*).

Meanwhile, a senior North Korean political official today appeared to support international opinion that ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong II has selected his youngest son to become the nation's next ruler, the Associated Press reported.

Workers' Party Central Committee member Yang Hyong Sop told the television channel APTN that "our people take pride in the fact that they are blessed with great leaders from generation to generation."

"Our people are honored to serve the great President Kim II Sung and the great leader Kim Jong II," he continued. "Now we also have the honor of serving young Gen. Kim Jong Un."

Kim Jong Un is in his late 20s and not known to have any military experience before his father appointed him a four-star general last week (Associated Press II/Yahoo!News, Oct. 8).

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw 20101008 5520.php

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

China Daily - China

S. Korea More Interested in Nuclear Standoff than Power Transition in DPRK: Prez

By Xinhua News Agency October 11, 2010

SEOUL, October 11 (Xinhua) -- South Korea is more interested in resolving nuclear issues of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) than in the power transition reportedly underway in the state north of the border, South Korean President Lee Myung- bak said Monday.

"It now seems certain that North Korea (DPRK) is moving toward the third-generation hereditary power succession," the president said during a luncheon meeting with Seoul-based foreign correspondents, held at his office Cheong Wa Dae. It was his first direct comment on the issue.

"(But) whatever the process of the hereditary succession is like, North Korean nuclear issues, inter-Korean peace, human rights of North Korean people and their happiness -- these are what we're interested in," Lee added.

His remarks come at a time when relations between the two Koreas, former wartime rivals, are seen to be inching toward a thaw. A recent flurry of diplomatic exchanges between the two sides is putting a brake on the downward spiral in their ties, which dropped to the lowest level in years following the March sinking of a South Korean warship, blamed on Pyongyang's torpedo attack, which was firmly denied by Pyongyang.

There are also apparent signs that moribund nuclear talks aimed at ending Pyongyang's nuclear programs might revive in not too distant future, as the DPRK recently expressed its willingness to return to the negotiation table.

The DPRK, meanwhile, held a massive parade in its capital Sunday with leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and heir apparent Jong-un in attendance.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2010-10-11/content_986009.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News – South Korea October 12, 2010

Russian Envoy Calls for Common View on Denuclearizing N. Korea

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Oct. 12 (Yonhap) -- Members of six-party talks need to form a common view on denuclearizing North Korea and prevent the regime from conducting more nuclear tests, Russia's top nuclear envoy said Tuesday, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin met with South Korea's new Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan during his three-day trip to Seoul that began Monday. Borodavkin is also Russia's chief envoy to the six-party talks on ending North Korea's nuclear programs.

Kim said South Korea will engage with North Korea "if it proves its sincere will (to denuclearize) through action" and if it proposes meeting "on the premise of making progress on denuclearization," an official said.

Pyongyang recently suggested it could return to the six-way talks it walked out on in December 2008 in protest over U.N. sanctions against it for its nuclear and missile tests. Seoul has repeatedly said it is not interested in talks just for talks' sake. The two Koreas, the U.S., host China, Russia and Japan form the multilateral denuclearization forum.

Borodavkin responded that the North's negotiating partners "should work together toward an agreement in opinion," according to the official.

The Russian envoy recalled how his country gave US\$100 million worth of aid to the North following the sixparty agreements in September 2005 that committed Pyongyang to denuclearize, but Pyongyang went ahead with its nuclear test.

"This should not happen again," Borodavkin was quoted as saying, adding Russia has strong interests in peace and security in the entire region of Northeast Asia in the long run.

Borodavkin met with his Seoul counterpart Wi Sung-lac on Monday and was due to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Jae-shin later Tuesday for an annual policy meeting between the two countries, who this year mark the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2010/10/12/32/0401000000AEN20101012006400315F.HTML

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News – South Korea October 12, 2010 Senior N. Korean Diplomat Visits Beijing for Talks with Chinese Nuclear Envoy: Source BEIJING, Oct. 12 (Yonhap) -- A top North Korean diplomat and veteran nuclear negotiator arrived in Beijing Tuesday on a trip expected to include discussions on resuming international talks on Pyongyang's nuclear programs, a source here said.

It was the first time that First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan has traveled to China since his promotion last month from vice foreign minister. For years, Kim served as Pyongyang's lead negotiator in Chinese-hosted, six-nation talks on the North's nuclear programs.

It is unclear whether Kim will remain in that post. There have been speculations that Ri Yong-ho, a seasoned diplomat who was promoted as vice foreign minister last month, will succeed Kim as Pyongyang's main six-party negotiator.

In Beijing, Kim is expected to meet with China's chief nuclear envoy Wu Dawei, the source said on condition of anonymity. Other high-level Chinese officials he could also meet include Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.

The trip came as Pyongyang has been stepping up a campaign to pave the way for the youngest son of leader Kim Jong-il to inherit the communist nation. In late September, the son, Kim Jong-un, was named four-star general and given a powerful Workers' Party post.

On Sunday, the North staged a massive military parade seen as aimed at bolstering the standing of the heirapparent. The junior Kim reviewed the parade from a leadership podium, along with his father, other members of the ruling elite and a senior Chinese Communist Party official, Zhou Yongkang.

In talks with leader Kim, the Chinese envoy conveyed the invitation of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Kim and the "new" North Korean leadership to visit China at a convenient time in the future.

The nuclear talks, involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, have been stalled since the last session in December 2008 due to a North Korean boycott. Prospects for reopening the process have diminished in the wake of March's sinking of a South Korean warship blamed on Pyongyang.

Pyongyang has indicated its willingness to return to the negotiating table in recent months, but Seoul and Washington have urged the North to take responsibility for the ship sinking and prove through action that it is serious about abandoning its nuclear weapons.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2010/10/12/5/0401000000AEN20101012008500315F.HTML

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

San Francisco Chronicle Burma's Nuclear Goals Eerily Familiar

By Joel Brinkley Sunday, October 10, 2010 Page E-4

Standing before the U.N. atomic energy agency in Vienna a few days ago, a Burmese diplomat declared that his nation's nuclear program is "for peaceful development purposes" only. For good measure, he added, reports that Burma is "attempting to develop a nuclear-weapons program" are "unfounded allegations."

Haven't we heard that before? And who's next? Venezuela, Yemen - Belarus? Well, just as Burma was making its declaration in Vienna, Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's pugnacious president, declared that his country, too, was launching a "nuclear-energy project for peaceful purposes - and they aren't going to stop us!"

That's certainly confidence-inspiring. But Chavez is an inveterate loudmouth, and if he were going to build a nuclear weapon, he'd brag about it. He couldn't help himself.

The other two bete-noire nuclear states are equally voluble. North Korea, which already has nuclear weapons, loves to bluster and threaten to use its weaponry against South Korea and the United States. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's president, protests so much and so routinely tells untruths that he has convinced most everyone that Iran is working on a bomb.

But Burma is an entirely different beast. Everyone should be concerned because Burma might be the world's most secretive state. In fact, a few years ago, the ruling military junta abruptly abandoned Yangon, the nation's capital for centuries, and built another one deep in the jungle - isolated and largely empty.

The generals never explained why they took that unusual step. The fact is, they never explain much of anything - for example, why they spend 3 percent of the nation's income on health and 23 percent on defense, even though Burma has no natural external adversaries.

But Burma experts say the generals still fear an invasion from somewhere, perhaps the United States, at any time. So they moved the capital to a near-secret location. That way, no one could see what they were doing. But they forgot about spy satellites. Photos showed them digging fortified tunnels in the hills surrounding Naypyidaw, the new capital.

Then, a year ago, well-placed defectors said the generals were seriously at work on nuclear weapons. And guess who was helping them. North Korea. Who else?

North Korea already is known to be helping Iran with its nuclear program. Why not Burma, another renegade state - this one a neighbor with vast natural-gas reserves to share? At about that time, the U.S. Navy, working on intelligence provided by South Korea, trailed a fully loaded North Korean freighter steaming toward Burma. The South Koreans had said the ship carried missiles and nuclear-weapons equipment. With a warship on its tail, the ship turned around and went back home.

"We worry about the transfer of nuclear technology" from North Korea to Burma, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said then. All of that was a year ago, and the amazing thing is that no one has said much if anything about this threat in the months since, even though evidence continues to mount.

Early this year, a Burmese court sentenced two government employees to death for leaking details of a secret government trip to North Korea. Then in June, an expat Burmese opposition group published a report in which a former U.N. nuclear inspector who had examined photos smuggled out of the state, concluded that Burma "is probably in violation of several international agreements concerning nuclear proliferation."

At a congressional hearing last summer, Scot Marciel, deputy assistant secretary of state for the region, acknowledged: "We've certainly read with interest the recent reports on a possible nuclear initiative by Burma," which "would be tremendously destabilizing for the entire region." But "I can't say too much" about it in the open. Would he be so reticent if there was nothing to it?

In July, Jane's Intelligence Review published its own analysis of photos that showed machine tools and other equipment that it judged to be part of "a nascent program" to build nuclear weapons. Later that month, Burma tried unsuccessfully to keep secret a four-day visit by North Korea's foreign minister, Pak Ui Chun.

So, at the end of September, Tin Win, that Burmese diplomat, told the United Nations that his country was not trying to build a bomb.

All of this is so eerily familiar - and scary. How many dangerous, renegade states can be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons before the unthinkable happens: One of these lunatic leaders actually uses one, killing a million people or more, and opening Pandora's box?

The danger is real, and as the continuing proliferation amply demonstrates, the international deterrent strategy is anemic at best.

Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is a Pulitzer Prize-winning former foreign correspondent for the New York Times.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/10/09/INPT1FPQSC.DTL

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Push Angers America

Pakistan has been secretly accelerating the pace of its nuclear weapons programme, infuriating the US which is trying to cap worldwide stocks of fissile material and improve fraught relations with a fragile ally in the Afghanistan war.

By Praveen Swami, Diplomatic Editor 10 October 2010

The Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based nuclear watchdog, has obtained satellite images showing that a row of cooling towers at Pakistan's secret Khushab-III reactor has been completed. This suggests the plant could begin operation within months, allowing Pakistan substantially to increase its stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium.

Last year, Barack Obama, US president, called for "a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials". In response, the Conference on Disarmament, a 64-nation coalition that negotiated the 1992 Chemical Weapons convention and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, agreed to negotiate a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, intended to cap production of weapons-grade enriched uranium and most forms of plutonium.

But Pakistan, which is deepening its nuclear ties to China, has blocked the Conference on Disarmament from starting discussions, saying a cut-off would hurt its national security interests. Ashley Tellis, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "Pakistan thinks its going to be forced to cap its fissile material stocks and wants to make sure it has as much as it can get before then." The country's position has frustrated many states. Rose Gottmeiler, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, recently warned that her country's "patience is running out".

Khushab-III is the latest in a series of reactors built to feed Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Khushab-II, located next to its new sister plant, became operational in February. The plutonium produced at the complex allows for the construction of small but lethal weapons: a single kilogram can produce an explosion equal to 20,000 tons of conventional explosives.

Work at Khushab III has forged ahead even as Pakistan struggles to cope with floods that have inflicted damage estimated at £27 billion–and amid mounting concerns over the long-term security of the strife-devastated country's nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan argues that its nuclear weapons programme is necessary to counter the superior conventional forces of India, its historic adversary. In a recent report published by the prestigious Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimated it had assembled 70-90 nuclear warheads to India's 60-80, and had produced enough fissile material to manufacture another 90 more.

The Obama administration is also disturbed by Chinese plans to build two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan, bypassing Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules that bar sales of nuclear equipment to states that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India, which along with Israel and Pakistan has refused to sign the NPT, recently obtained a waiver from the NSG allowing sales under international safeguards.

China, however, says it does not need NSG permission to sell reactors to Pakistan, arguing it had committed to the deal before it joined the NSG in 2004–a claim the United States disputes.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8053775/Pakistans-nuclear-arms-push-angers-America.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Hindustan Times – India

Chinese N-reactors for Pakistan Worry India

Kalpakkam, October 10, 2010 By the Indo-Asian News Service

India is concerned over China's supplies of nuclear reactors to Pakistan which has a poor record as a nuclear power, Minister of State for Science and Technology Prithviraj Chavan said.

"We have expressed our concerns at the appropriate place. If China and Pakistan do that within the exiting international regime, they can. We have protested citing the previous exchanges of nuclear technology illegally particularly through Abdul Qadeer Khan (Pakistan's rogue nuclear scientist). Nobody has addressed that," Chavan told reporters here, around 50 km from Chennai,

Speaking on the sidelines of silver jubilee celebrations of the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and Radio Metallurgy Laboratory (RML), he said India had serious concerns about something like that - transfer of nuclear technology illegally - happening.

He said India had established a good track record in the nuclear field whereas Pakistan does not have such a record.

Queried about India allowing private domestic or foreign companies to operate nuclear power stations, amending the Atomic Energy Act, he said: "At the moment the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government does not find any need to change the law.

"Right now money is not an issue for allowing foreign companies as nuclear power plant operators. We are inviting domestic government owned companies as minority partners for the Nuclear Power Corporation of India."

He said the government does not want anybody to walk out of the plant by simply shutting it down one day as there are issues like proper handling of nuclear waste.

He said the government was also looking at providing more autonomy to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).

"There is an internal debate going on as to the shape of additional autonomy that the AERB should be given," he said.

He said India was certainly interested in buying uranium mines overseas so as to overcome the shortage.

"We are looking at African countries to buy uranium mines adopting the ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corp) model," he said. ONGC has set up subsidiary ONGC Videsh to acquire oil fields abroad.

According to Chavan, the government was in the process of drafting the rules for the recently passed Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act.

On the reservations expressed by the US on the act, he said: "Americans expressed concern about right to recourse. But it has been adequately explained. We explained what our position is. After the rules get framed, it should get settled down."

Queried about the import of nuclear reactors and India's three phased nuclear power programme, Chavan said: "The government is committed to the three phased nuclear power programme. The import of light water reactors are proposed to meet the power and fuel demand."

The utilisation of large reserves of thorium available in India requires fast breeder reactors, Chavan added.

Queried about importing nuclear reactors from one or two vendors at a cheaper rate by assuring volumes instead of buying from multiple vendors, he said: "In the first phase of imports four companies will be supplying to India.

"During the second round of imports we will look at other commercial considerations (localisation of components) and reactor systems which are more fuel economical and safer like the ones having multiple redundancies.

"All imported reactors should get the approval of the national regulatory authority," he added.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/Chinese-N-reactors-for-Pak-worry-India/Article1-610909.aspx

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Sify.com – India India to Build 25 Reactors in Next Five Years

By the Indo-Asian News Service October 10, 2010

Mahabalipuram (Tamil Nadu), Oct 10 (IANS) India is planning to build 25 reactors in the next five years, a senior official said Sunday.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the inaugural function of Asian Nuclear Prospects 2010, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) chairman and managing director S.K. Jain said: 'India has 19 operational reactors now. The fourth reactor in Kaiga will go critical by November second week this year.'

One unit of 2x1000MW Kudankulam nuclear power project will go critical by March 2011 and the second unit by December, he said.

Asked the reasons for the delay, he said: 'NPCIL had issues with regard to design and supplies from Russia. Since it was not built in Russia, we had some issues with additional design features.'

Jain said that the fuel will be loaded in the reactor by this December.

He said the third and fourth reactors in Kudankulam are expected to be cleared soon.

The 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) will go on stream by early or mid 2012, he said.

On the plans for new reactors, he said two more reactors will be built at Kakrapar (Gujarat) and in Rajasthan.

In addition, there is also principle approval of building 700MW pressurized heavy water reactors - two each in Haryana and Madhya Pradesh where land acquisition is on. The reactor project will be launched by March 2012 there, Jain said.

http://sify.com/news/india-to-build-25-reactors-in-next-five-years-news-national-kkkxOcdbagf.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Sify.com – India

Asian Nations Need to Cooperate in Nuclear Field

By the Indo-Asian News Service October 11, 2010

Mahabalipuram (Tamil Nadu), Oct 11 (IANS) As a whopping 271 nuclear power reactors are being planned in Asia, there is an urgent need for cooperation among countries of the region to the meet the various technological and infrastructural challenges and proliferation concerns, a top industry official said here Monday.

'The Asian nations have to face the challenges like choice of technology and reactor size, setting up acceptable infrastructure, developing human resource, developing safety and quality culture, gaining pubic confidence, setting up regulatory framework, management of spent fuel and instituting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security framework,' said S.K.Jain, chairman and managing director of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL).

He told the Asian Nuclear Prospects 2010 (ANUP 2010) conference that global, regional and bilateral cooperation is the need of the hour among the Asian nations in sharing technology, experience, resources and address the nuclear proliferation concerns.

Jain said India can offer cooperation in technologies, quality assurance, site evaluation, construction, regulatory support, commissioning, procurement, manufacturing, operation and maintenance and others.

He said India's strength lies in building small and modular reactors (SMR) an idea that is being discussed in the nuclear world.

The country can export 220 MW pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) to friendly countries.

'The strength of Asia in the nuclear domain includes human resources, lowest cost, well developed industry and allied infrastructure and development of end-to-end technologies in the nuclear power field,' Jain added.

According to him, 493 reactors are being planned and proposed in the world, of which 271 are in Asia.

Leading the Asian pack is China that has planned 153 reactors followed by India with 60 reactors, Vietnam (14), Japan(13), South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand (six each), Kazakhstan and Pakistan (four each), Bangladesh (two), Armenia, Malaysia and North Korea (one each).

About India's nuclear power plans, Jain said the plan is to increase the capacity to 63,000 MW by 2032.

The route for that will be 40,000 MW through imported light water reactors (LWR), 16 units of 700 MW PHWR, including 10 based on reprocessed uranium, setting up of indigenous LWRs and Fast Breeder Reactors.

'Beyond 2032, the focus will be on large capacity fast reactors powered by metallic fuel and introduction of thorium based reactors,' Jain said.

http://sify.com/finance/asian-nations-need-to-cooperate-in-nuclear-field-news-default-kklsadhabjb.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti - Russian Information Agency

Russia's Bulava Missile Hits Target in Test

7 October 2010

A test warhead from a Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile successfully hit its target on the Kura test range in Russia's Far East Kamchatka region, the Defense Ministry said on Thursday.

The missile was fired from the Dmitry Donskoy submarine in the White Sea.

Bulava test launches were put on hold after a failed launch on December 9, 2009, which was caused by a defective engine nozzle.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30), a three-stage liquid and solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), has officially suffered seven failures in 13 tests.

MOSCOW, October 7 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101007/160865732.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti - Russian Information Agency

Next Test Launch of Troubled Bulava Missile due Late October

8 October 2010

The next test launch of Russia's troubled Bulava ballistic missile is preliminarily set for late October, a source in the test commission said Friday.

"The commission will review the success of the previous test launches in order to work out the date of the next Bulava launch," the source said.

The missile was successfully fired from the Dmitry Donskoy submarine in the White Sea on Thursday, hitting its target in the Kura test range in Russia's Far Eastern Kamchatka region.

Bulava test launches were put on hold after a failed launch on December 9, 2009, which was caused by a defective engine nozzle.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30), a three-stage liquid and solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), has officially suffered seven failures in 13 tests.

Two test launches of the Bulava are planned before the end of 2010: one from the Dmitry Donskoy sub, and the other from Russia's newest strategic nuclear-powered submarine, the Borey class Yury Dolgoruky.

MOSCOW, October 8 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101008/160883811.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti - Russian Information Agency

Russia Reveals Detailed Data on Defense Spending Until 2013

12 October 2010

Russia has made public for the first time in many years a detailed account of its defense spending until 2013, the Vedomosti daily said on Tuesday.

State Duma Defense Committee head Viktor Zavarzin said last week that the country's defense spending, including R&D, would total 487 billion rubles (\$16.3 bln) in 2010, 574 bln (\$19.2 bln) in 2011, 726 bln (\$24.3 bln) in 2012, and 1.16 trillion (\$38.8 bln) in 2013.

The share of spending on R&D will drop from 22 percent in 2010 to 16 percent in 2013, the lawmaker said.

The spending will focus on procurement of RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles and Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers, Su-35 Flanker-E long-range fighter jets, submarines, corvettes and frigates for the Black Sea Fleet, and battlefield command-and-control systems for the Ground Forces.

The share of spending on modernization of existing weaponry will be spread almost evenly throughout the four-year period - 13 percent in 2010, 15 percent in 2011-2012, and 14 percent in 2013.

MOSCOW, October 12 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101012/160919044.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Financial Times – U.K.

UK and France in Talks over Warheads

By James Blitz in London and Ben Hall in Paris October 7, 2010

An agreement being negotiated by the UK and France would see British nuclear warheads serviced by French scientists and break with half a century in which neither country has collaborated on its independent deterrent.

Ahead of a summit in three weeks, the governments are close to agreeing that Britain would use a French laboratory to help maintain and service its 160 nuclear warheads, officials in both countries say.

A deal to share the secrets of their nuclear programmes would boost powerfully defence collaboration between the countries and save money at a time when their defence budgets are under stress.

Britain and France run completely different deterrent systems with all details kept secret. The scheme would give Britain access for the first time to France's Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, which maintains about 300 warheads in the French *force de frappe*.

In effect, the CEA would service UK nuclear warheads, raising concerns among politicians in both countries about whether their governments were maintaining an independent deterrent.

According to a person familiar with the negotiations, Britain has consulted the US over the proposed move. A US-UK treaty forbids Britain from sharing its nuclear secrets with another country because the UK deterrent, built on the Trident D5 missile, is in large part based on US technology.

François Heisbourg, a French defence analyst, said sharing warhead research would assume "that the British break their very special relationship with America in that field". This would require considerable "confidence on the US part".

Defence chiefs have ruled out schemes such as joint submarine patrols by France and Britain in the Atlantic. London and Paris believe that collaborating on warheads would make sense.

France and Britain are signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and therefore forbidden to conduct destructive tests.

As warheads decay or are modified, scientists need to establish through computer simulation how their potential functioning has changed.

France would charge the UK for access to CEA facilities. But the UK would avoid having to build its own expensive simulation laboratories to maintain the effectiveness of the warheads it possesses.

"If we don't share some of these capabilities, we will lose them," said a British defence insider.

"But making progress is easier now than it was. France is in Nato and many of the issues that divided us in the past – such as the Iraq war – have now disappeared."

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/86783318-d252-11df-8fbe-00144feabdc0.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Der Spiegel – German Republic Nuclear Weapons Likely to Stay in Germany

October 11, 2010

Nuclear weapons, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has long insisted, have no place in Germany. But a new NATO paper seems to indicate that his efforts to get all such weapons removed from German soil will not succeed.

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has long shown an interest in having the remaining atomic weapons based in Germany removed. At the beginning of his term in office one year ago, he called the weapons a "relic of the Cold War" and said they "no longer have a military purpose." Indeed, Westerwelle's desire to get rid of the weapons even found its way into the governing coalition agreement his Free Democrats signed with Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives.

Now, with NATO foreign ministers meeting this week to prepare for November's summit in Lisbon, it looks as though Westerwelle isn't going to get his way. In a secret draft of the new NATO Strategic Concept currently under development -- and which has been seen by SPIEGEL -- the nuclear missiles stationed in Germany are not mentioned. Furthermore, the document urges that NATO's nuclear posture must take into account the disparity with the larger Russian arsenal of nuclear short-range missiles.

Indeed, the document appears to leave no room for the kind of unilateral desires Berlin had been espousing. In a speech at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels last Friday, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, while avoiding specifics, said that "our job remains to deter attack against our citizens, which means that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO must retain nuclear weapons as well." He didn't specifically mention the weapons stationed in Germany.

'Huge Imbalance'

NATO has some 200 short-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe with an estimated 20 of those in Germany. Russia is thought to have many times that amount. In an interview with SPIEGEL earlier this year, former NATO Secretary General George Robertson said Russia had 5,400 such weapons. In that interview, Robertson was very critical of Westerwelle's desire to remove all atomic weapons from German soil, calling it "simply dangerous."

The demand from Berlin, he said, "does not deny the idea of extended nuclear protection. It just says that Germany does not want to share the risks of providing it." He also said that "instead of making unilateral demands for weapons to leave Germany, the priority should be to do something about this huge imbalance."

The issue of Russian nuclear weapons is sure to come up during the NATO foreign ministers meeting. Germany has also pushed for a closer strategic alliance between NATO and Russia, but many NATO members in Eastern Europe have proven skeptical of such a path. The draft Strategic Concept includes a reference to cooperation with Russian in the creation of a missile defense system.

In an interview with the daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* published on Monday, Westerwelle reiterated his support for nuclear disarmament but did not specifically mention the warheads stationed in Germany.

"We are interested in ensuring that the connection between international security on the one hand, and disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the other, is clearly established," he said. "Disarmament is no less a task for humanity than climate protection. The more countries that have nuclear arsenals, the larger is the danger that terrorists can gain access to them."

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,722435,00.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Daily Telegraph Mission to Stop Nuclear Terrorism

A multi-million dollar US programme is attempting to make safe the world's bomb-grade uranium before terrorists can get to it. By Nick Meo in Warsaw

11 October 2010

To the Warsaw motorists returning from their Saturday afternoon shopping trips, it looked like a nuclear emergency.

Frantic policemen, some wearing ski masks and all armed with submachineguns, flashed their headlights and leant out of their patrol car windows, shouting and waving to make the traffic pull over and stop at the side of the road as helicopters clattered overhead.

Then a convoy of seven lorries rumbled past, armed police in the cabs and radioactive warning signs stuck on the shipping containers they carried.

The frightened-looking motorists and their families didn't know it but this convoy two weeks ago wasn't an emergency; it was no exercise though, and the cargo being moved through the Warsaw suburbs in a top secret operation was the stuff of nightmares.

The lorries carried enough bomb-grade uranium for terrorists to build eight nuclear devices, sealed inside thick metal flasks weighing five tons each to stop radiation leaking.

The shipment, at the beginning of a 3,500 mile journey to a Russian reprocessing plant where it will be made safe, was part of an effort to secure hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium worldwide before terrorists can acquire it.

"The world is a safer place because of this shipment," said Andrew Bieniawski, a senior official with the US government's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, as the convoy and its sinister-looking escort of Polish special forces police started off.

American intelligence officials believe that if al Qaeda could get its hands on a piece of highly enriched uranium (HEU) the size of a grapefruit, let alone a consignment as big as the Polish one, the destruction of a city like London, New York or Washington would follow.

So far, such a nightmare has been confined to Hollywood thrillers. But the US government is so concerned at the threat of nuclear terrorism that next year the budget for making bomb-grade material secure worldwide will be increased by 67 per cent to \$558 million dollars (£352 million).

The American effort, constantly expanded since the attacks of September 11th 2001, is intended to deal with weapons-grade uranium in 28 nations around the world, most of it the Cold War legacy of the Atoms for Peace programmes when America and Russia shared nuclear secrets with their allies.

In the 1950s they helped spread civilian nuclear power plants and research reactors around the world, to win friends and help mankind benefit from cheap electricity and medical isotopes; but the unforeseen result has been a stockpile of deadly spent fuel - HEU - which can be used as the raw material for the type of atom bomb used at Hiroshima.

Most of the HEU in Eastern Europe has been stored since Soviet times, often in badly maintained and poorly guarded facilities where for years underpaid staff were potentially vulnerable to bribery by well-funded terrorists

Last year a massive new effort to dramatically reduce the amount of civilian HEU worldwide was announced by President Barack Obama in a high-profile speech in Prague, his first major foreign policy speech delivered abroad.

The President has made countering nuclear terrorism a top priority and described it as "the greatest danger we face". He has committed the United States to secure the world's vulnerable civilian bomb-grade material by the end of 2013.

He has taken the threat so seriously that over the next three years the President wants to spend \$7.9 billion on nuclear nonproliferation programmes, including homeland security to detect nuclear bombs or material being smuggled into America, as well as programmes like the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

The shipment in Poland was the biggest the Americans have organised anywhere.

It started its journey at a nuclear research reactor in a forest outside Warsaw, where HEU had been stored in cooling ponds for years. The convoy, escorted by more than 100 policemen, moved rapidly to a railway yard on the outskirts of the capital where it was loaded onto a goods train for the overnight journey 200 miles north to the port of Gdansk. The route took it past villages and towns whose sleeping inhabitants had no idea of the deadly cargo passing so close to them. At every stage technicians checked that radioactivity was not leaking.

On arrival in Gdansk it was loaded onto a specially converted ship, with thick metal radiation-proof plates installed, for a sea voyage to the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk. The consequences of spreading radiation in a crash ruled out air transport.

In Murmansk it was loaded on to another train for the last stage of the journey, hundreds of miles across Russia to a reprocessing plant beyond the Ural mountains, deep in Siberia.

In the past year this journey, lasting three weeks, has been repeated five times, moving 1,000 lbs of Polish HEU in total - enough to make 18 atom bombs - at a cost to the US taxpayer of \$60 million.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative decided to forgo its usual secrecy rules and invite The Sunday Telegraph to observe the final shipment, in order to make its work in Poland public; details can now be revealed after it arrived safely at its destination.

Intelligence agencies will not reveal their reasons for being so frightened now about what for years seemed a remote and unlikely risk.

But it may be because of the deeply troubling cases of smuggling that surface from time to time in Eastern Europe, hinting at the existence of a nuclear black market.

Such attempts at illicit nuclear sales have been made at least twice this year, once in Moldova, when a gang attempted to sell a small amount of nuclear material, and once in Georgia where several smugglers were arrested with an undisclosed amount of uranium. That was a far more disturbing case, according to investigators who said it showed a worrying level of organisation.

Since the end of the Cold War the International Atomic Energy Authority, the UN's nuclear watchdog, has logged 800 incidents of radioactive material going missing or being seized by smugglers. A handful of cases have involved weapons-grade material.

Nobody knows whether gangsters or corrupt officials really could deliver enough material for a home-made bomb to terrorists or rogue states. US officials fear that anyone trying to acquire HEU on a nuclear black market will want it to destroy an American city.

"We know that terrorists are actively seeking to acquire this material to target the United States," Mr Bieniawski said. "If they acquire it, they have basically overcome the main hurdle to getting a bomb. The risk is low but we can't just trust to luck when we are talking about the catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon." Since work started in 2004 HEU has been removed from 18 nations, including five in the past year - Romania, Libya, Taiwan, Turkey, and Chile, where the shipment was briefly delayed by February's earthquake.

Until the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was little concern about the estimated 2000 tons of HEU stockpiled around the world, much lying around half-forgotten in badly-guarded facilities in poor countries with corruption problems.

Facilities often lacked armed guards, secure fences, even locks that worked properly.

American efforts which had begun in the chaos of Russia in the 1990s to secure vulnerable nuclear material were stepped up worldwide after 2001; as long ago as 1998 Osama bin Laden spoke of his determination to acquire the bomb "to terrorise the enemies of God".

Frank Barnaby, an author and former Aldermaston nuclear physicist, said: "The really frightening thing about HEU is that it is so easy to make an atom bomb out of it. You only need a couple of PhD students and a small amount of material.

"I think we should be very frightened about the possibility of nuclear terrorism; I'm surprised it hasn't happened yet." The American experts hope their work with 130 nations will make that nightmare less likely.

In some cases they have strengthened defences at plants judged vulnerable to theft.

But their preferred method is to remove HEU for reprocessing. "That way it is made safe, permanently," Mr Bieniawski said.

Poland, like many nations with HEU stockpiles, has to send the material abroad because it has no reprocessing plant of its own.

The American officials were at pains to stress that they have complete trust in Russia to keep to its end of the deal and reprocess the uranium sent inside its borders in US-funded shipments.

Under an agreement between Mr Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last year, the USA and Russia each take back uranium they supplied to friendly countries. So Romania and Poland sent theirs to Russia, while that of Chile and Turkey has been reprocessed in the United States.

There are, however, glaring omissions in President Obama's plan; the Global Threat Reduction Initiative cannot make HEU safe in a few nuclear nations, most notably Pakistan and North Korea, which are judged to pose the greatest risk of terrorists obtaining the raw material for a bomb.

As a Polish member of the team working on the operation said: "This shipment makes nuclear nightmares less likely."

But not impossible.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/8053159/Mission-to-stop-nuclear-terrorism.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Press Release

NNSA Completes Largest Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Fuel Return Campaign in Program's History

Shipment completes removal of more than 450 kilograms of HEU from Poland October 12, 2010

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced the removal of more than 450 kilograms (more than 1,000 pounds) of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuel from Poland.

The nuclear material, enough to make more than 18 nuclear weapons, was sent back to Russia in a series of five shipments over 12 months and marks the completion of the largest spent fuel shipment campaign in NNSA's history. The campaign also included the largest single shipment of HEU spent fuel (187 kilograms) and involved the entire fleet of spent fuel transportation casks used for transportation of Russian-origin HEU.

"This major milestone brings us one step closer to achieving President Obama's goal of securing all nuclear material around the world within four years," said NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino. "These shipments also support the goals of the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit where 47 nations committed to strengthening nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Our close partnership with Poland to eliminate this excess nuclear material reduces the risk that it could be stolen by terrorists and sets an important example for other countries to follow."

The shipments were conducted by NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in close coordination with Poland's Radioactive Waste Management Plant and Institute of Atomic Energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Russian Federation. They included HEU reactor fuel from both the Ewa and Maria research reactors that are located at the Nuclear Center in Swierk, Poland. With the removal of this material, GTRI has now removed all HEU from the Ewa research reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Building at the Institute.

NNSA and Poland's Institute of Atomic Energy share a long history of cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation issues. This cooperation has included the return of HEU fresh fuel to Russia in two shipments in August 2006 and August 2007, technical cooperation to prepare for conversion of the Maria research reactor from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and improvement of security for nuclear materials.

"Our partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration has enabled us to continue Poland's leadership on global nuclear security issues while also maintaining the excellent scientific work being done by the Institute of Atomic Energy," said Miroslaw Lewiński, Director of the Nuclear Energy Department in the Polish Ministry of Economy. "We look forward to continuing to work with the United States as we advance our common nuclear nonproliferation agendas."

During each of the five shipments, the material was packaged into internationally licensed transportation casks, secured in shipping containers, and transported in an armed convoy from the site to a nearby rail station. The material was then transported by rail to a Polish seaport where it was loaded onto a vessel and transported to the Russian Federation.

In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama called for an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. These shipments result in permanent threat reduction because they eliminate weapons-usable nuclear material at civilian sites.

"This operation is an excellent example of how two allies, the United States and Poland, can work with Russia to enhance nuclear security," said U.S. Ambassador to Poland Lee A. Feinstein.

With the successful completion of this shipment, NNSA has now removed or assisted with the disposition of more than 2,850 kilograms of HEU and plutonium – enough material to make more than 110 nuclear weapons.

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/polandheu101210

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

Al-Qaeda Magazine Teaches How to Kill Americans

Al-Qaeda has published a series of articles in its magazine giving would-be militants tips on how to kill Americans, including a section on how to mow people down with a pickup truck. By Richard Spencer, Middle East correspondent 12 October 2010

The 74-page online, English-language magazine, titled Inspire, which has a foreword by Osama bin Laden, encourages "individual jihad" to kill Americans and westerners.

It is an indication that the terrorist network is signalling a move away from terror "spectaculars", which are easier for intelligence agencies to foil, towards one-man operations.

In a graphic feature called The Ultimate Mowing Machine, it gives ideas for one-man operations, such as attaching blades to the front of a pickup truck which can then be used to "mow down" passers-by.

"To achieve maximum carnage, you need to pick up as much speed as you can while still retaining good control of your vehicle," it advises. "The ideal location is a place where there are a maximum number of pedestrians and the least number of vehicles."

Another option is the use of personal firearms. "A random hit at a crowded restaurant in Washington DC at lunch hour for example might end up knocking out a few government supporters," it says.

The magazine is the second high-quality edition of "Inspire", which is produced by Arab-Americans who have defected to the Yemeni base of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Their ideological figurehead is Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born Yemeni cleric, who is said to be the mastermind behind the attempted bombing of an airliner on Christmas day, and who was in email contact with Major Nidal Hassan, the Fort Hood "shooter".

Some have alleged the magazine is a piece of western "black propaganda".

It seems to confirm that al-Qaeda operations are being hampered by better intelligence and drone attacks on its bases in Pakistan and Yemen. Last month, a "Mumbai-style" attack on European cities was uncovered by a combined operation involving US, UK, French and German intelligence agencies.

"It is no longer possible to operate by the methods of the old model, through the 'secret regional-hierarchical' organisations, especially after the September 11 events and the onset of the American campaigns, where the great majority of the existing secret organisations were destroyed," one article admits.

"We need to concentrate the research on the methods of the open fronts, and the methods of individual jihadi operational activity."

The internet and mobile phones had been useful tools, another article says, but it goes on: "The rules concerning surveillance in the West have been relaxed when it comes to monitoring Muslims and you could be arrested for the least suspicion."

In a reaction to closer monitoring of airlines, it urges followers to become jihadis at home - to strike at the head of the serpent, as it puts it.

However, one of the articles, "I am proud to be a traitor to America", is a first-hand account by a recruit about his journey from a North Carolina suburb to the mountains of Yemen.

In other features, the magazine continues the jaunty tone favoured by the first edition. Those who do leave the comforts of their homes in the West are warned to expect to sleep on rough ground - and in one case, urged to make sure to wash their feet regularly to avoid foot infections.

It also takes up a cry of many western governments by highlighting the usefulness of degrees in chemistry and microbiology – if only to develop unconventional terror weapons. Science graduates, it suggests, are as highly sought after by jihadi employers as capitalist ones.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8059725/Al-Qaeda-magazine-teaches-how-to-kill-Americans.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Guardian – U.K. OPINION/Editorial

Unthinkable? L'entente Militaire

It makes sense for two European military powers to co-operate on warheads and joint submarine patrols but why stop there?

Saturday, 9 October 2010

A report, dismissed on both sides of the channel as speculation and therefore probably true, that the UK and France are negotiating an agreement which would see British nuclear warheads serviced by French scientists does not go far enough.

French defence analysts rightly say that for this to happen Britain would have to break its very special relationship with America in this field. Would that be such a bad thing?

It makes eminent sense for two European military powers, both of whom have nuclear deterrents which are independent in name only, to co-operate with each other on warheads and joint submarine patrols.

But why stop there? Why not consider transport aircraft, helicopter capacity and carriers? Why should French warplanes not operate from British aircraft carriers and vice versa?

The Royal Navy is still considering ordering cheaper catapult-launched aircraft for its future carriers, a move which would enable French Dassault Rafale M planes to land on them, because the cost of the alternative – the American F-35 Joint Striker Fighter – has ballooned.

The price of ordering two carriers and the 140 F-35s planned to go with them would be to scupper the rest of the fleet. France and Britain have much in common at the moment. Both are proud, postcolonial and broke.

Between them, they have 460 nuclear warheads. Each has conventional forces that neither can afford.

Signals intelligence (eavesdropping) should also be combined. Turn the entente cordiale into an entente militaire.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/09/unthinkable-uk-france-nuclear-warheads

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency OPINION & ANALYSIS Bulava Missile: the Bitter Taste of Success

11 October 2010

An RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-32) solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was successfully test-fired on Thursday, October 7. Although an important stage of the Bulava test program, the launch does not signal the solution of all problems plaguing the latest Russian missile.

This became the thirteenth Bulava launch to date, the first launch in 2010 and the first success after three abortive launches from late 2008 until late 2009. This time the number 13 was not unlucky: The missile reportedly operated without a hitch, with its multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) hitting their respective targets.

The successful launch took place at a time when another fiasco would have jeopardized the entire Bulava program, also probably leading to its revision and delaying the adoption of Project 955 Borei class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

The situation is also aggravated by the lack of a realistic and easy to produce alternative to the Bulava missile. The production R-29RMU Sineva liquid-propellant SLBM has outstanding specifications but different dimensions.

Most importantly, the Sineva has to match far more stringent storage, servicing and launch requirements. Consequently, it will be expensive to refit Borei class submarines, so that they could serve as Sineva launch platforms.

The successful Bulava launch once again confirms the program's feasibility. Despite previous successful launches, a number of analysts claimed that the missile's inherent defects made it impossible to implement this program.

It turns out that problems plaguing the Bulava missile are primarily caused by production defects and ineffective quality control.

This situation can be explained by the fact that Russia's crisis-ridden defense industry had long lacked orders and budgetary allocations, that's why this entirely new project proved to be too demanding for the industry. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which lacked prior experience of making sea-launched missiles, had to develop the Bulava missile from scratch. When the institute received a request for proposal (RFP), it was believed that various engineering solutions embodied in the Topol (SS-25 Sickle) and Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles would also be used to make the Bulava.

However, the highly specific SLBM program precluded the use of such know-how.

Test program difficulties were exacerbated by the chaotic nature of technical system failures. The Bulava malfunctioned because of an overall decline in production, engineering and management ethics, rather than due to some defective unit or system. The elimination of various defects did not prevent new ones from appearing seemingly out of nowhere. The decline simply aggravated typically Soviet problems linked with quality control.

It is therefore unclear when the Bulava will be adopted. One successful launch is obviously not enough after a number of setbacks. Additional tests are needed in order to confirm the existence of an effective missile production system.

Improvements in the Bulava design warrant co-production arrangements making it possible to manufacture entirely new hi-tech products.

It appears that Russia has not tackled such objectives since the 1970s and 1980s, when military equipment now forming the mainstay of the Armed Forces' combat potential began to be mass produced.

This objective has to be accomplished at a time when engineering and technical training system is in decline. Training standards have fallen appreciably and now Russia has few skilled specialists. In addition, most employees of defense companies are underpaid.

It is impossible to guarantee the successful implementation of the Bulava program, unless these negative trends are eliminated. However, they cannot be overcome by overhauling the defense sector. Any success will require tremendous spending, with unpredictable results.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20101011/160910799.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti - Russian Information Agency

Russia, USA are Doomed to Remain Potential Enemies

RIA Novosti interview with Alexei Fenenko

Dr. Alexei Fenenko, a leading researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for International Security, in an interview with Samir Shakhbaz.

The cold war is long gone but its legacy however is having enormous influence on the present system of international relations. Although today's global security is based on such restrictive factors as various international treaties and organizations, many experts believe that a decisive role still belongs to nuclear deterrence. The growing tensions between Russia and the United States in late 2008 that could have led to unpredictable consequences made both countries reconsider their relations by declaring a "reset" policy. Alexei Fenenko, leading research fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of International Security, assesses its preliminary results and also speaks on the future of U.S.-Russian relations.

Samir Shakhbaz: Enough time has passed since the start of the U.S.-Russian reset policy to assess its preliminary results. Are they positive or not? Do you agree that the only visible result is cooperation on Iran?

Alexei Fenenko: Let's agree on one point: It is more difficult for Russia to develop relations with the United States than with any other country. The material and technical aspects of their bilateral relationship depend on mutual nuclear deterrence. Like it or not, we have always looked at each other through the nuclear missile sights.

However, Russia is the only country that is technically capable of annihilating the United States; China does not yet have this capability. Russia is also the only country that can theoretically wage war against the United States using comparable types of weapons.

From this point of view, Russia and the United States are doomed to remain potential adversaries. It is with this in mind that both countries develop their respective military doctrines, and the U.S. National Security Council confirmed this once again in 2010.

The U.S. national security strategy outlined the following priorities in relations with Russia: reducing strategic nuclear weapons, overcoming disagreements on missile defense, and lastly, developing economic relations with Russia.

However, it will be difficult to achieve the final objective as long as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment stands.

So, the goal of the reset policy as formulated by Joe Biden in 2009 is primarily to lower the risk of military confrontation. There was a very high probability of a confrontation in late 2008, following the war with Georgia over South Ossetia and the conflict over U.S. plans for a missile defense shield in Europe. Russia resumed flights of its strategic aviation, further increasing tensions in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

The second goal is to preserve the system of arms control, and the third goal is to develop a code of conduct for a potential conflict between Russia or the United States and other countries, so that these countries, for example Georgia, do not embroil either of the world's two biggest military powers in their conflicts.

In terms of these goals, the reset policy has so far been successful. We have reduced the risk of military confrontation, preserved the system of arms control by signing the News START treaty in Prague, and started talks on conflicts with other countries. If we do not set impossible goals for ourselves, but rather limit ourselves to these results, we can say that the reset policy is proceeding quite well.

S.S: Is Russia's stance on Iran a result of the reset policy?

A.F: The situation with Iran is much more complicated. Why has Russia traditionally provided Iran "protection", as we say? What is the essence of the Iranian problem?

In the last 15 years, the Americans have been talking about reforming the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If Iran is prohibited from enriching uranium, this will amount to a revision of Article 4 of the NPT, which states that every non-nuclear state has the right to create a closed nuclear fuel cycle.

From here one can trace the chain of precedents, from the disarmament of Iraq, which turned out not to have weapons of mass destruction, to the prohibition of uranium enrichment in Iran.

Next on the agenda could be North Korea: the United States has proposed deactivating its nuclear facilities and destroying them under the supervision of the five-country commission.

Another target could be Pakistan, where the United States is working on plans to ensure external control of that country's nuclear weapons and to give U.S. specialists access to them.

The vague U.S.-Indian maneuvers regarding a nuclear agreement are also quite alarming.

In short, we have a set of precedents that add up to a system of forced disarmament of countries that are hostile to the United States. This does not suit Russia as a nuclear power with independent military capabilities, and could even be dangerous for it. We are aware of this threat, which is why we reject any radical revisions to the NPT.

That being said, we have no illusions about Iran. During the past seven years of the standoff, we tried to act as an intermediary in talks between Iran and the IAEA twice, in 2005 and 2007, but each time Iran rejected our mediation offer after initially accepting it. This is why we are gradually stepping aside and essentially telling Iran that it can try to settle its problems with the United States on its own, while we gradually distance ourselves from this problem.

S.S: My point is that, based on what you've said, it seems that nuclear disarmament is not an attractive option for Russia.

A.F: No, that's not the case. Nuclear disarmament is an attractive option for Russia for two reasons. First, nuclear weapons become obsolete every 15 or 20 years and need to be modernized. The Americans are in a better position to do this – they have access to uranium fields in Canada and Australia and also uranium reserves in their own country.

Russia's situation is more complicated: its nuclear arsenal is based on plutonium and so we need to regenerate fissile materials more frequently, which is also more expensive. Therefore, any cuts in strategic nuclear weapons benefit Russia.

To put it bluntly, we agree to cut weapons created in the 1980s, and we are trying to ensure that we do this jointly with the United States.

Secondly, the strategic arms reduction treaties are intended to reduce the chance of a disarming nuclear strike. Modern nuclear war doctrines differ dramatically from the doctrines of the 1950s, which implied that a first nuclear strike must annihilate the adversary's cities and infrastructure. The modern doctrines hold that the first nuclear strike must be disarming and aimed at the adversary's launch systems, forcing the country to surrender.

S.S: Another achievement of the reset policy is a compromise on missile defense systems. But is this compromise practical, or is it a temporary move that benefits the United States?

A.F: I would say that it signifies the beginning of a crisis in the reset policy. Last spring, the Obama administration drafted a "minimum deterrence" concept, which calls for a 75% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and the extensive development of missile defense systems.

There would be a high probability of a conflict under these circumstances, because a country that is stronger militarily will be tempted to exert military pressure. This is why we need to reach a compromise on missile defense.

President Dmitry Medvedev said in Helsinki last spring that all negotiations after the signing of a New START treaty will be based on a missile defense compromise. This was added to the Prague treaty, which in itself was a major achievement because we managed to link talks on defensive and offensive weapons.

That achievement was especially important in light of the fact that since 1989 the START talks had been based on the Wyoming compromise, according to which talks on defensive and strategic offensive weapons must be held separately.

The agreement to hold such talks simultaneously implies a partial revision of the Wyoming compromise, which benefits Russia. From the signing of the New START treaty in Prague and until the Obama-Medvedev summit in Washington in late June, we actively discussed a compromise solution to the missile defense problem.

I do not think the Washington summit was successful; it caused a crisis in the reset policy. Following the talks, the United States proposed signing a declaration on cooperation in the sphere of missile defense.

We responded that we have signed seven such declarations in the last 20 years. One of them was the Moscow Declaration of 2002, according to which the United States was to consult Russia on all questions related to the deployment of missile defense systems. Others include the RAMOS program (Russian-American Observation Satellite) and the 1997 Helsinki agreement.

In other words, we have done this before. What we need now is a fundamental agreement limiting the number of interceptor missiles and their deployment areas. The Americans made it clear at the Washington summit that they would not agree to it in the next few years, which is why the reset policy is running into problems.

We simply don't know what the next step is. Even ratification of the Prague treaty could be put in question.

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(Return to Articles and Documents List)