### Articles & Other Documents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sec'y Clinton Urges Senate To OK New Nuke Treaty</td>
<td>Russia's New Fourth-Generation Submarine To Become World's Quietest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gates, Mullen Urge Senate To Ratify Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
<td>New Russian Nuclear Submarine Will Not Enter Serial Production – Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START Ratification Is Not On Agenda In Spring Session – Gryzlov</td>
<td>Biolab Opens In Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Raises Stakes By Announcing Four New Nuclear Reactors</td>
<td>Romania, US Start Talks On Missile Shield: Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Vows To Retaliate Over Nuclear Sanctions</td>
<td>U.S. Official Backs Mix-And-Match Approach For Updating Warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Support For Iran Action: Poll</td>
<td>Pentagon To Continue Development Of Conventional Weapons After Ratification Of START</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama Upholds US Sanctions On NKorea</td>
<td>Russia Launches Long-Awaited Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Says Pakistan Nuclear Plants For Peaceful Use</td>
<td>The Way Forward On Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Successfully Test-Fires Ballistic Missile</td>
<td>The Burma-North Korea Axis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention Of N-Capability A Compulsion For Pak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [http://cpc.au.af.mil/](http://cpc.au.af.mil/) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.
Sec'y Clinton Urges Senate To OK New Nuke Treaty
By ROBERT BURNS, AP National Security Writer
Thursday, June 17, 2010

WASHINGTON, (AP) -- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Thursday urged Senate approval of a new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaty, telling lawmakers the pact will not constrain U.S. missile defenses.

She was challenged, however, by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who expressed worry that the Obama administration has left Russia free to abandon the treaty if it objects to U.S. missile defense improvements.

Clinton noted the Russian government's statement that it reserves the right to withdraw from the new START treaty if it feels threatened by an expansion of American defenses against ballistic missiles.

"But that is not an agreed upon view, that is not in the treaty," Clinton told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It's the equivalent of a press release and we are not in any way bound by it."

Testifying alongside Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed her view.

"The Russians can say what they want. If it's not in the treaty, it's not binding on the United States," Gates said.

McCain seemed unconvinced.

"It's at best an ambiguous situation," McCain said.

Returning to the issue, Gates said it should be no surprise that the Russians would state their objections to U.S. missile defenses.

"There is no meeting of the minds on missile defense," Gates said. "The Russians hate it. They've hated it since the late 1960s. They will always hate it, mostly because we'll build it and they won't."

The new START treaty was signed by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April. The pact would put a ceiling of 1,550 on the number of each country's deployed nuclear warheads, down from the current limit of 2,200. The pact replaces the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which expired in December. To be ratified, the treaty needs 67 votes in the Senate. The Russian parliament hasn't yet acted on it.

An important feature of the new deal is that it includes a legal mechanism for verifying that each side complies—an element that was absent from a 2002 deal, known as the Moscow Treaty, that accelerated the weapons reductions laid out in the 1991 treaty.

The treaty includes no limits on short-range nuclear weapons, of which the Russians have a larger stockpile. Gates told the committee that the U.S. favors negotiating limits on short-range weapons but foresees a long path to that goal.

McCain, the top Republican on the committee, pressed the missile defense point in a lengthy exchange with Clinton.

"Russian leadership have all made this statement that this treaty is contingent on the United States not changing, or qualitatively or quantitatively building up, missile defense systems," he said. "That is bound to be worrisome to anyone."

Clinton said the U.S. has issued its own statement about missile defenses, "making clear that the United States intends, and in fact is continuing, to improve and deploy effective missile defense systems."

McCain also questioned Clinton and Gates on why the treaty includes a provision that would prohibit either country from converting silos used to launch offensive ballistic missiles into launch sites for defensive missiles. He indicated that this could be interpreted as a constraint on U.S. missile defense plans.

Clinton said it is not a constraint because the U.S. has no plans for such conversions. Gates went a step further, saying that to permit such conversions would be destabilizing because it would raise questions and perhaps confusion about whether specific silos contained offensive or defensive weapons.

Russia has long opposed U.S. missile defenses, which are far more advanced than Russia's, in part because it fears that the American defenses could eventually undermine the deterrent effect of Russian nuclear forces.

Gates stressed the administration's assertion that its missile defenses—current and future—are designed to protect the U.S. and its allies from small numbers of missiles launched by Iran or North Korea.
Elaborating on why he believes the new START treaty should be ratified and implemented, Gates said it provides a measure of transparency and predictability about U.S. and Russian nuclear forces at a time when the Russians are modernizing theirs, even as they reduce the size of their non-nuclear forces.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2010/06/17/national/w070032D89.DTL
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Department of Defense News
June 17, 2010

Gates, Mullen Urge Senate To Ratify Arms Reduction Treaty
By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 17, 2010 – The United States is better off with the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia than it is without it, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also urged the committee to ratify the agreement, saying the treaty has the full support of uniformed leaders. Gates and Mullen testified alongside Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Energy Secretary Steven Chu.

The agreement reduces U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces in a way that strengthens the stability of the U.S.-Russian relationship, Gates said. The agreement, he added, also protects the security of the American people, and “does not in any way constrain our missile defense programs.”

The secretary stressed that the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor will it impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses.

“I remain confident in the U.S. missile defense program, which has made considerable advancements, including the testing and development of the SM-3 missile which we will deploy in Europe,” he said.

Russia continues to object to U.S. missile defense. Still, Gates said, the American system is designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a rogue state.

“Our missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation’s large, advanced arsenal,” he explained. “Consequently, U.S. missile defenses do not, and will not, affect Russia’s strategic deterrent.”

The United States will continue to try to get the Russians to cooperate on missile defense, Gates said.

The new treaty also does not restrict U.S. ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less, the secretary said.

The treaty limits the United States to 700 deployed delivery vehicles and no more than 1,550 deployed warheads, and Gates emphasized that the treaty’s verification provisions will allow the United States to ensure the Russians hold up their end of the agreement.

“In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its provision for a strong verification regime,” he said. “I would like to emphasize some of the key elements of this regime, which will monitor Russia’s compliance with the treaty, while also providing important insights into the size and composition of Russian strategic forces.”

Each side can conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each year at operating bases for intercontinental missiles, nuclear-capable submarines and nuclear-capable heavy bombers as well as storage facilities, test ranges and conversion and elimination facilities, Gates said. The agreement establishes a database updated every six months, which will help provide the United States with a rolling overall picture of Russia’s strategic offensive forces and vice versa.

“One unique identifiers, for the first time, will be assigned to each ICBM, SLBM and nuclear-capable heavy bomber, allowing us to track accountable systems throughout their life cycle,” Gates said.

The U.S. nuclear deterrent remains a crucial capability, the secretary said, and to ensure its credibility, the nation must maintain an adequate stockpile of safe, secure and reliable nuclear warheads.

“This calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex – our infrastructure and our science, technology and engineering base,” Gates said. “And I might just add, I’ve been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for this, and this is the first time I think I’ve got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal.”

Mullen assured the senators that the U.S. military leadership’s perspectives and concern’s were heard.
“During the development of the new START treaty, I was personally involved,” the admiral said, “to include two face-to-face negotiating sessions and several other conversations with my counterpart, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General [Nikolai] Makarov, regarding key aspects of the treaty.”

Mullen spoke for the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the committee, and he said the treaty retains a strong and flexible American nuclear deterrent.

“It helps strengthen openness and transparency in our relationship with Russia,” he said. “It also demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide risk of a nuclear incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

Both Gates and Mullen urged ratification. Gates said the agreement is good for today and the future.

“It increases stability and predictability, allows us to sustain a strong nuclear triad, preserves our flexibility to deploy the nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense,” the secretary said. “In light of all these factors, I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the new treaty.”

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

ITAR-TASS - Russia

START Ratification Is Not On Agenda In Spring Session – Gryzlov
17 June 2010

MOSCOW, June 17 (Itar-Tass) -- The speaker of Russia’s State Duma, Boris Gryzlov, confirms that the question of ratifying the new START is not on the agenda of the spring session.

“We continue the procedures, and as far as the ratification is concerned, we shall try to make it synchronically,” he said. “First of all, over the spring session this matter will not be on the agenda of a plenary session.”

“I do not think we shall have to organise an additional plenary session,” he said. “So this will be a question for the autumn session’s consideration.”

The State Duma’s relevant committees, on defence and international affairs, will start a discussion of the treaty on Thursday. The US Congress will follow suit on Thursday, too. The treaty was signed by presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in Prague on April 8. The two leaders agreed to synchronise the process of its ratification.

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

Iran Raises Stakes By Announcing Four New Nuclear Reactors

Iran has raised the stakes in its confrontation with the West by declaring it intends to build four new nuclear reactors.

By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
16 June 2010

Just a week after the United Nations imposed a fourth round of sanctions on the Islamic Republic, officials said that Tehran was determined to supply its own nuclear plants with domestically manufactured uranium fuel.

The announcement appeared to mark the death knell for diplomatic efforts to supply the country’s only functioning nuclear plant with fuel processed in France and Russia.

A compromise proposed in October would have seen Iran swap uranium from its stockpile for foreign made fuel rods under stick conditions that would have reduced the risk of a nuclear bomb being produced.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s hardline president, said that Iran was determined to maintain its nuclear programme despite the ruinous effects of sanctions on the country’s economy.

"You showed bad temper, reneged on your promise and again resorted to devilish manners,” he said of the powers that imposed sanctions. "We set conditions (for talks) so that, God willing, you'll be punished a bit and sit at the negotiating table like a polite child,"
Mr Ahmadinejad, a champion of the nuclear work, told a crowd of loyalists that Tehran would not be defeated by the latest round of sanctions which targeted financial transactions and travel by senior military figures. He said: "If they think they can use sticks to pressure Iran, we say that the Iranian nation will break all of their sticks."

Since the worldwide sanctions regime was strengthened both America and Europe have sought to tighten restrictions on bilateral commercial ties with Iran. Timothy Geithner, the US treasury secretary last night announced the department was prepared to impose a series of measures that implemented and built upon the Iran sanctions resolution passed by the UN.

An EU meeting in Brussels today (Thurs) will agree to impose extra penalties on transport, banking, insurance, technology transfers and the oil industry.

But Tehran has been defiant in the face of such pressure.

Another senior figure threatened to retaliate by disrupting the highly sensitive shipping lanes of the Gulf and other waters around Iran. Ali Larijani, the parliament speaker, said Iranian forces would not allow "bullying powers" to police its sea-borne trade. He said: "We warn the US and some adventurist countries that should they be tempted to inspect consignment of Iranian planes and ships, they should rest assured that we will reciprocate [against] their ships in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea."

Iran announced it had begun enriching uranium up to the 20 per cent threshold that would allow it to produce a weapon earlier this year.

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, said that the four plants would replace the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Built in 1973, the TRR is used to supply Iranian hospitals with equipment for radiography departments.

Turkey and Brazil attempted to revive the October offer to Iran in the days before sanctions were strengthened but that arrangement fell short of international demands.

Mr Salehi went further than past official pronouncements by revealing Tehran had ambitions to export nuclear fuel for medical use to other Islamic nations.

Diplomats said that even if the plants were never built the development was worrying because it gave Iran an excuse for continuing to produce highly refined uranium from its stockpile.

Western officials believe Iran is determined to produce enough material for a nuclear weapon before it agrees to make concessions to ease sanctions. One diplomat said there was concern that Iran had also spurned offers to supply nuclear fuel from commercial firms that manufacture nuclear rods in favour of developing its own capability.

European officials say Tehran's announcement of the enrichment programme and the new plants were part of a strategy to raise the stakes in the nuclear dispute.


(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Reuters U.K.

**Europe Could Face Hundreds Of Iranian Missiles – Gates**

Thursday, June 17, 2010

By Phil Stewart and Adam Entous

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. intelligence showing Iran likely would have the capability to attack Europe with "scores or even hundreds" of missiles factored into the Obama administration's decision to overhaul missile defences, Defence Secretary Robert Gates said on Thursday.

Citing the growing Iranian missile threat, the United States announced plans last September to integrate sea- and land-based missile defences in and around its NATO allies in Europe, referred to as the "phased adaptive approach."

"One of the elements of the intelligence that contributed to the decision on the phased adaptive array (approach) was the realization that if Iran were actually to launch a missile attack on Europe, it wouldn't be just one or two missiles, or a handful," Gates said at a congressional hearing.

"It would more likely be a salvo kind of attack, where you would be dealing potentially with scores or even hundreds of missiles."

Gates voiced confidence that upgraded missile interceptors in development "would give us the ability to protect our troops, our bases, our facilities and our allies in Europe."
Gates said having those interceptor systems in place by around 2020 was critical not only because of the missile threat from Iran and North Korea, but because "I think by 2020 we may well see it from other states, especially if we're unsuccessful in stopping Iran from building nuclear weapons."

Earlier in the hearing, however, Gates sought to allay Russian concerns about the new U.S. approach to missile defences in Europe by playing down the system's ability to counter a large-scale attack from Russia.

RUSSIANS 'HATE IT'

"Our missile defences do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation's large, advanced arsenal. Consequently, U.S. missile defences do not and will not affect Russia's strategic deterrent," Gates said.

"The Russians know that our missile defences are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North Korea," he said.

The Obama administration has held out the possibility that Moscow could take part in the missile Defence system in partnership with the United States.

But Gates said: "There is no meeting of the minds on missile Defence. The Russians hate it. They've hated it since the late 1960s. They will always hate it, mostly because we'll build it and they won't."

U.S. intelligence agencies have long warned about Iran's growing missile threat and officials say anti-ballistic missile systems should cover all of Europe by 2018.

The multibillion-dollar effort is designed to defend against Iranian missiles that could be tipped with chemical, biological or nuclear warheads, officials say.

According to U.S. estimates, Iran could produce enough bomb-grade fuel for a nuclear weapon in as little as one year but would probably need three to five years to deploy a "usable" one.

(Reporting by Adam Entous and Phil Stewart; Editing by Bill Trott)

http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE65G4Z220100617

Dallas Morning News

**Iran Vows To Retaliate Over Nuclear Sanctions**

Thursday, June 17, 2010


TEHRAN, Iran – Defying week-old U.N. sanctions over its nuclear program, Iran said Wednesday it would expand its atomic research and force the West to "sit at the negotiating table like a polite child" before agreeing to further talks.

Tehran, which insists its nuclear work is peaceful, said it will build four new reactors for atomic medical research.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran will not make "one iota of concessions." He said he will soon announce new conditions for talks with the West, but first he wants to punish world powers for imposing sanctions.

"You showed bad temper, reneged on your promise and again resorted to devilish manners," he said of those countries. "We set conditions so that, God willing, you'll be punished a bit and sit at the negotiating table like a polite child," he said in a televised speech in the central Iranian town of Shahr-e-Kord.

The U.S. and some of its allies believe Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, and the Islamic republic's plans to expand research could encourage calls in the West for more economic pressure against Iran.

The Obama administration took its first step in implementing new sanctions Wednesday, leveling penalties against individuals and institutions it says are helping Iran develop its nuclear and missile programs and evade international sanctions.

The list includes a bank; 22 petroleum, energy and insurance companies; two individuals and four organizations that are part of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; and five front companies.

The list also includes more than 90 ships that Iran's national maritime carrier has been using to try to evade sanctions. Some of the ships are based in Iran, while others are based in countries including Britain, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Germany.

Majorities in many Western and some Muslim countries are willing to consider military action against Iran to prevent the Islamic republic from obtaining nuclear weapons, a global poll showed on Thursday.

The Pew Research Center's poll conducted in 22 countries found majorities or pluralities in 16 countries endorsing the possibility of military intervention.

Americans are among the most supportive of a military option to deal with Iran with 66 per cent of those who oppose a nuclear-armed Iran saying they would consider the use of force, a figure second only to Nigeria's 71 per cent.

Among Europeans, the views are more mixed.

In France, 59 per cent said they would consider the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but a sizeable minority of 41 per cent rejected this option.

Support for the military option is softer in Germany (51 per cent), Spain (50 per cent) and Britain (48 per cent), while significant numbers (39, 34 and 37 per cent, respectively) said it is more important to avoid a military conflict with Iran, even if it results in a nuclear-armed Tehran.

In the Muslim world, there is support for the use of military action to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in Egypt (55 per cent), Jordan (53 per cent) and Lebanon, with 44 per cent supporting such a notion and 37 per cent opposed.

In Turkey, 37 per cent of those surveyed said avoiding a military conflict with Iran should be the priority while 29 per cent would consider the use of military force.

Pakistanis, meanwhile, largely support Iran's purported efforts to acquire nuclear arms: 58 per cent favour and just 10 per cent oppose Iran acquiring such weapons, the poll showed.

Of the Pakistanis who oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, 34 per cent said avoiding a conflict with Iran should be the priority and just 21 per cent would endorse taking military action.

Russians were divided on the use of force, with 32 per cent in each camp, while the Chinese poll respondents favoured avoiding a clash by a margin of 43 to 35 per cent; in Japan the priority of avoiding conflict was endorsed by 55 per cent to 34 per cent.

The poll also showed widespread negative views of Tehran's Islamic regime and broad support for efforts to prevent the country from arming itself with atomic weapons.

"There is widespread opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and considerable support for tougher economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic," Pew said in its Global Attitudes Project poll.

The poll found strong opposition to the Iranian nuclear effort and support for stronger sanctions in Spain (79 per cent), Britain (78 per cent), Germany (77 per cent) and France (76 per cent), as well as 67 per cent in Russia and 58 per cent in China.

Some 86 per cent in Germany expressed an unfavourable view of Iran, with the figure 81 per cent in France and 75 per cent in Japan.

Iran had a positive image only in Pakistan and Indonesia in the poll, which surveyed 24,000 people in 22 countries between April 7 and May 8.

European leaders on Thursday backed new sanctions on Iran, going further than new UN and US punitive measures, in the wake of a fourth set of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council slapped over Iran's refusal to halt suspect nuclear activities.

Obama Upholds US Sanctions On NKorea
16 June 2010
By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

President Barack Obama renewed unilateral US sanctions on North Korea left by his predecessor George W. Bush, as he cited the continuing threat from Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program.

"The national emergency declared on June 26, 2008, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond June 26, 2010," Obama said in a notice distributed by the White House.

The president, who renewed the order a year ago, said the national emergency was effective for another year.

He said "the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

On June 26, 2008, then-president Bush warily eased some trade sanctions on North Korea and moved to take the reclusive Stalinist state off a terrorism blacklist as a reward for nuclear disclosures it made.

But many sanctions remained in place when he also issued an executive order under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Under the order, property and interests in property that were blocked as of June 16, 2000, and that remained blocked immediately prior to June 26, 2008, remain blocked, according to the Treasury Department.

In addition, US persons are "prohibited from registering vessels in North Korea, obtaining authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, and owning, leasing, operating, or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea."

Benjamin Chang, a deputy spokesman at the National Security Council, said the order issued in June 2008, and renewed a year ago, "imposed certain sanctions against North Korea and North Korean nationals."

They were imposed, he said, "based on the continued existence and the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material in North Korea, which constitute a continuing threat to the national security of the United States."

"The President determined on June 14, the United States would maintain these sanctions for another year through the continuation of the national emergency," he said in an email exchange with AFP.

"In taking this action, our purpose remains to employ every available appropriate tool to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and programs," he added.

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Star – Malaysia
Thursday, June 17, 2010

China Says Pakistan Nuclear Plants For Peaceful Use

BEIJING (Reuters) - China said on Thursday its civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan was for peaceful purposes, after the United States said it was seeking clarification from China on a deal to build two new reactors.

"I want to stress that the civilian nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is in line with each side's international obligations," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a news briefing in Beijing.

"It is for peaceful purposes, and is under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency," he added without elaborating.

U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley told reporters on Tuesday that Washington had asked China for more details on the deal.

"We have asked China to clarify the details of its sale of additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This appears to extend beyond cooperation that was grandfathered when China was approved for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group," he said.

"We believe that such cooperation would require a specific exemption approved by consensus of the Nuclear Suppliers Group," Crowley said.

The United States was expected to oppose the China-Pakistan deal next week at a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The 46-nation group controls trade in "dual-use" nuclear fuel, materials and technology to ensure they are applied only to civilian nuclear energy programmes and not diverted into clandestine nuclear weapons work.

The Washington Post reported that China had suggested that the sale was grandfathered from before it joined the NSG in 2004, because it was completing work on two earlier reactors for Pakistan at the time.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Ken Wills)

Peoples Daily – China

**India Successfully Test-Fires Ballistic Missile**

June 18, 2010

India on Friday successfully test-fired its indigenously developed, nuclear-capable, ballisitic missile Prithvi-II from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur, about 15 km from Balasore off the Orissa coast, reported The Times of India electronic edition.

The missile mounted on a mobile launcher was blasted off from the launch complex-3 in the ITR at around 6:50 a.m., the report quoted defense sources as saying.

The trial of Prithvi-II was conducted by the Indian Army. It has a maximum striking range of 350 km and is capable of carrying a pay-load of 500 kg, said the report.

Prithvi is the first ballistic missile developed under the country's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program and is propelled by liquid propulsion twin engine, according to the report.

The last trial of the Prithvi-II missile was successfully conducted from the same site on March 27 this year.

*Source: Xinhua*


(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Press Trust of India – India

**Retention Of N-Capability A Compulsion For Pak**

By Rezaul H Laskar

Islamabad, Jun 18 (PTI) - The retention of an essential nuclear capability is a "compulsion" for Pakistan because of the growing imbalance created by India's massive military build-up and “assertive posturing”, a top Pakistani military commander has said.

General Tariq Majid, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, made the remarks while addressing a convocation ceremony at the National Defence University last night.

Though Majid did not name India in his speech, it was obvious he was referring to the neighbouring country as he referred to Indian military doctrines and the India-US nuclear deal.

Pakistan has to be mindful of the "blatant pursuit of military preponderance in our neighbourhood" and the build-up of conventional and nuclear forces, Majid said.

http://www.ptinews.com/news/724948_Retention-of-N-capability-a-compulsion-for-Pak-

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Pravda – Russia

**Russia's New Fourth-Generation Submarine To Become World's Quietest**

16 June 2010

On Tuesday, June 15, Dmitry Medvedev arrived in the city of Severodvinsk and visited the nation’s largest ship-building enterprise Sevmash. The enterprise has finally finished building Russia’s unique fourth-generation
submarine, which was named after the city – Severodvinsk. The president took part in the official ceremony to launch the new submarine.

The works on the submarine began in 1993. The project was suspended in 1996 and then resumed in 2000. It usually takes Russia five years to build a submarine. With Severodvinsk, though, the time was much longer – 17 years. Officials of the enterprise assured reporters that the submarine had been outfitted with state-of-the-art equipment despite the long construction process. Severodvinsk will become one of the quietest submarines in the world. The sub will accompany strategic missile carriers and defend Russia’s Arctic deposits. Severodvinsk will have up to 90 crewmembers.

“World’s largest superpowers invest a lot in the development of offensive and defensive systems. Russia must do the same. We must conduct an effective modernization of our armed forces,” Dmitry Medvedev said.

If the tests of Severodvinsk are successful, Russia will build six other submarines like that. The tests will begin already this summer.

Yasen class submarine (Project 885), also known as the Severodvinsk class, is a new Russian nuclear multipurpose attack submarine class. The submarine is based on the Akula-class submarine and the Alfa-class submarines and are projected to replace Russia's older Soviet-era class attack submarines both Akula class and Oscar class.

The submarine's technology and design is claimed to be state-of-the-art. Though smaller than the older Akula class submarines, the Yasen class will have more firepower per its complement. The submarine's armament includes 24 cruise missiles, with several types suggested, including the 3M51 Alfa SLCM, the P-800 Oniks SLCM or the RK-55 Granat SLCM. It will also have 8 torpedo tubes as well as mines and anti-ship missiles like the RPK-7.

This class is the first Russian submarines to be equipped with a spherical sonar, designated as Irytysh-Amfora. Due to the large size of this spherical array, the torpedo tubes are slanted. The submarine will have a crew of 50, suggesting a high degree of automation in the submarine's different systems. The newest U.S. attack sub, the Virginia-class submarine, has a crew of 134 in comparison. If true, this might imply that much of the automated equipment could have been developed from the highly automated project 705 Lira, which is considered as the most automated nuclear attack submarine of all times (the entire half of the boat with reactor and propulsion was unmanned and controlled from the control room).

Length: 120 meters.
Width: 12 meters
Speed (underwater): 28-33 knots
Depth of submersion: 380-500 meters
Crew: 85
Arms: 30 torpedoes, 24 Onyx missiles (5,000 km range).

http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/16-06-2010/113862-submarine-0
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

**New Russian Nuclear Submarine Will Not Enter Serial Production – Paper**
16 June 2010

A fourth-generation Russian nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine that was floated out on Tuesday is too expensive for serial production, a business daily said on Wednesday.

On Tuesday, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrived in the northern port of Severodvinsk to attend the official float-out ceremony.

The construction of the Severodvinsk, the first Project 885 Yasen (Graney) class submarine, began in 1993 at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, but has since been dogged by financial setbacks. Russia planned to float out the submarine on May 7 to mark the 65th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in May 1945.

Russia's Vedomosti daily said the price of the strategic project was kept secret, but the estimated cost reached $1 billion.
Mikhail Barabanov, the editor-in-chief of Moscow Defense Brief magazine, said the submarine's cost was too high to make it viable for serial production.

Barabanov told Vedomosti that the U.S. Navy did not produce a large number of advanced Sea Wolf submarines, similar to the Severodvinsk vessel, since they were too expensive. Instead of these, they use cheaper and unsophisticated Virginia-class submarines.

The expert said the Russian Navy would probably replace the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine with a more affordable analogue. Barabanov said the second Yasen (Graney) class submarine Kazan was the most probable alternative to the Severodvinsk submarine.

Russian experts expect Graney-class submarines to boost the Navy's operational effectiveness and combat capabilities.

Graney-class nuclear submarines are designed to launch a variety of long-range cruise missiles (up to 3,100 miles or 5,000 km), with conventional or nuclear warheads, and effectively engage submarines, surface warships and land-based targets.

The submarine's armament includes 24 cruise missiles and eight torpedo launchers, as well as the mines and anti-ship missiles.

MOSCOW, June 16 (RIA Novosti)
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

BioPrepWatch.com

Biolab Opens In Ukraine
by Tina Redlup
June 17, 2010

U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar applauded the opening of the Interim Central Reference Laboratory in Odessa, Ukraine, this week, announcing that it will be instrumental in researching dangerous pathogens used by bioterrorists.

The level-3 bio-safety lab, which is the first built under the expanded authority of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, will be used to study anthrax, tularemia and Q fever as well as other dangerous pathogens.

“The continuing cooperation of Nunn-Lugar partners has improved safety for all people against weapons of mass destruction and potential terrorist use, in addition to advancements in the prevention of pandemics and public health consequences,” Lugar said.

Lugar said plans for the facility began in 2005 when he and then Senator Barack Obama entered a partnership with Ukrainian officials. Lugar and Obama also helped coordinate efforts between the U.S and Ukrainian researchers that year in an effort to study and help prevent avian flu.

The Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, was established in 1991. Since that time it has provided funding and assistance to help the former Soviet Union dismantle and safeguard large stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The program has also been responsible for destroying chemical weapons in Albania, Lugar said.

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Breitbart.com

Romania, US Start Talks On Missile Shield: Official
June 17, 2010
By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Bucharest and Washington have launched negotiations on US plans to deploy elements of a new missile shield in Romania, officials said Thursday.

"I am happy to announce the formal start of negotiations on Romania's participation in the US anti-missile defence system in Europe," Romanian junior foreign affairs minister Bogdan Aurescu told a press conference.

Romania was officially invited in February by US President Barack Obama to be part of the missile shield.
The Balkan country will host SM3-type medium-range ballistic missile interceptors, which should be operational by 2015.

"I am here today with the US delegation to conduct consultations with our Romanian government counterpart on security issues of mutual interest including work on an agreement to station US missile defense assets in Romania," Ellen Tauscher, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, said.

"We look forward to working together to enhance European security and strengthen our partnership," she added.

Aurescu said a new meeting should take place in about two months' time.

Washington originally planned to install an anti-missile shield in Poland and the neighbouring Czech Republic, aimed at countering feared attacks from Iran.

In September 2009 US President Barack Obama scrapped that project, which had been pushed by his predecessor George W. Bush and enraged Russia.

Washington has since reworked the scheme and signed a new treaty with Moscow on reducing strategic nuclear weapons, which has yet to be ratified.

Russia has said it reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if Washington presses ahead with missile defence systems in eastern Europe in a way that Moscow opposes.

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.9617d58605e531a144c822366d5be1a7.2c1&show_article=1
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Global Security Newswire

“New START” Won’t Limit Missile Defense Plans, U.S. Generals Say

Thursday, June 17, 2010

By Martin Matishak

WASHINGTON -- A new nuclear arms control treaty signed by the United States and Russia in April would not limit future U.S. plans for missile defense, key military brass said yesterday (see GSN, June 16).

Nothing in the "New START" pact, currently before the U.S. Senate for ratification, would constrain the administration's missile defense plans, including the "phased adaptive approach" for regional missile defense in Europe, Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "There are no limitations in the treaty on our plans for missile defense," he said.

His agency is responsible for testing and developing a multilayered defense against potential ballistic missile attacks on the United States and its allies.

Under White House plans, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system would employ interceptors based in Alaska and California to attempt to shoot down incoming strategic-range ballistic missiles during any limited strikes against the U.S. homeland.

In addition, according to its blueprint for phased defenses, the United States would deploy missile defense systems to Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean over the next two years. The military would then field increasingly advanced weapons that would protect Europe and the United States from Iranian missiles of any range by 2020.

The nation's top warfighting commander for missile defense also vouched for the agreement, which would replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

"As the combatant command ... responsible for synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations and advocacy, this treaty does not constrain any current missile defense plans," said U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. Kevin Chilton.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed New START two months ago in Prague. Once ratified, the agreement would require the former Cold War adversaries to cut their respective strategic arsenals to 1,550 deployed warheads, down from a previously agreed level of 2,200, which was to be reached by 2012 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

Both countries would also keep their deployed nuclear delivery vehicles -- missiles, submarines and bombers -- at 700, with up to another 100 held in reserve.
Some Republican lawmakers have expressed concerns about a nonbinding unilateral statement that Russia issued April 7, just prior to the New START signing ceremony. In it, Moscow said it reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if the United States augments its missile defenses beyond a certain level.

The GOP critics have raised questions about whether the Obama administration has struck a secret deal to allay Russian concerns, and have alleged that the Kremlin's unilateral statement about New START could ultimately hamstring U.S. missile-defense efforts (see GSN, May 3).

The Washington Times reported yesterday, citing unnamed U.S. officials, that Foggy Bottom is secretly working with Moscow on a draft agreement to allay Russian fears on missile defenses (see related GSN story, today).

On Tuesday, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told the foreign relations panel that Washington had struck no secret bargains with Russia on missile defense or any other matters. Yesterday both commanders said they had no knowledge of any unspoken agreements, either.

The Russians understand that the United States will continue developing and fielding missile defenses into the future, O'Reilly said.

The assurances were not enough for some the committee's Republican members.

"If they understand, why are they making unilateral statements saying they've won and bested us in our ability to defend ourselves from missile attack?" asked Senator James Risch (R-Idaho).

Lawmakers in both nations must approve the treaty before it can enter into force. In the U.S. Senate, that would require yea votes from at least 67 lawmakers. The foreign relations panel has held eight hearings on the new agreement since the White House submitted it last month, including one classified session with the accord's negotiators.

Yesterday O'Reilly said the new treaty would actually eliminate some constraints the previous agreement put on developing a missile defense system.

For example, the missile agency's intermediate-range target booster system -- used in tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the phased adaptive approach -- was accountable under the previous treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Those test assets would not be accountable under the newly minted arms control deal, which would provide the agency greater flexibility for utilizing retired components as missile-defense test targets, according to O'Reilly.

Risch grilled the MDA chief on what he said are limitations within the new treaty, such as a prohibition on the conversion of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Both O'Reilly and Chilton agreed that those limitations exist, but would apply to measures that were never included in U.S. plans anyway.

The options that are prohibited "would be ones that we would not choose, I wouldn't choose, [nor] any other director of missile defense because it ... gives us less capability than what we are currently pursuing now," O'Reilly told the Idaho lawmaker.

Chilton said launching a missile defense asset from an ICBM field also could create confusion in Moscow about U.S. intent.

Senator Richard Lugar (Ind.), the panel's ranking Republican, asked if Russian officials felt threatened that the fourth stage of the Obama administration's phased adaptive approach -- which would see a high-performance Standard Missile 3 deployed at land bases -- would come on line around the same time the successor agreement is slated to expire in 2020.

"The reality is we don't have the technical ability to deploy the sophisticated defense that would be necessary to really make a dent, or try to negate, the extensive Russian nuclear strategic arsenal," said Principal Deputy Defense Undersecretary for Policy James Miller, testifying alongside the two generals. The SM-3 would be in a "tail chase" if it were to go after a Russian ICBM, he added.

"The objective was effective missile defense against the threats that we see today and that we believe may emerge from Iran and others in the region," Miller said.

O'Reilly said it was not a very controversial topic in Moscow because the SM-3 is not large enough to reach Russia's "strategic fields."

Nuclear Weapons
Chilton, who also commands the country's nuclear forces, endorsed the arsenal cuts detailed in the new treaty, as well. Strategic Command provided military analysis to the administration's negotiators, he noted.

Other benefits of the new agreement include limiting the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads and strategic delivery vehicles, while at the same time allowing the United States to retain enough nuclear deterrent forces to hedge against "technical and geopolitical surprise," he said.

New START would also reestablish an arms control verification regime that disappeared when the original treaty expired in December, according to Chilton.

"If we don't get this treaty, A, they're not constrained in their development of force structure and, B, we have no insight into what they're doing. So it's the worst of both possible worlds," the combatant commander told the panel.

The White House's National Intelligence Estimate on the newly minted pact's monitoring capabilities would likely provide more transparency and insight on the verification issue, he added.

That document has yet to be submitted to lawmakers. It is expected to arrive on Capitol Hill before the August congressional recess, according to committee's press secretary, Jennifer Berlin.

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100617_8701.php

Global Security Newswire

U.S. Official Backs Mix-And-Match Approach For Updating Warheads

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

By Elaine M. Grossman, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- A senior U.S. defense official last week voiced confidence in a newly defined "reuse" approach to modernizing nuclear warheads that some scientists have called into doubt (see GSN, April 7).

As the U.S. arsenal ages, atomic arms in some cases could made more reliable by swapping out selected major components for new ones, according to John Harvey, principal deputy to the assistant defense secretary for nuclear and chemical and biological defense programs.

Under such a reuse approach, previously tested warhead parts might for the first time be combined in new configurations that have never been subjected to full experimentation together. The mix-and-match method might involve, for example, joining the first stage of one warhead, called the "primary," with the second stage or "secondary" of another warhead, if doing so is thought to address aging problems.

"Twelve years ago, I would have said that would have been too high a risk to take, in connection with our ability to assure safety and reliability without testing," Harvey said at a June 11 breakfast event on Capitol Hill. Until last July, he headed the policy planning staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous arm of the Energy Department.

"After 12 years of Stockpile Stewardship, I think we've learned quite a bit and I am much more comfortable with the idea that we might take a pit from one warhead that we have in the stockpile or that has been previously tested, and combine it with the secondary on another warhead," Harvey said. "And even though that agglomerated system hasn't been tested, [I think] that we would still have confidence that such a system would be reliable and safe."

A "pit" is the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon's primary stage. Harvey did not offer examples of specific weapons that might undergo modernization employing a reuse approach, but the next aging warhead being evaluated for overhaul is the Air Force's B-61 gravity bomb (see GSN, May 18).

Under the Stockpile Stewardship effort, the U.S. nuclear weapons complex has inspected weapons in the arsenal to monitor any effects of aging, and performed non-nuclear tests and computer simulation to anticipate problems and devise fixes. Physicists and engineers could then repair or remanufacture aging components without changing their precise design details.

The reuse approach is one of two preferred options for updating the stockpile laid out by the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, a yearlong appraisal of strategy, force posture and readiness completed in April. Under the plan, aging warheads would be modernized as they come up for periodic overhaul, and the methods employed could vary on a case-by-case basis, officials said.

The posture review's other favored approach would be the more traditional process of service life extension, in keeping with the Stockpile Stewardship effort.
Only if those two methods appeared infeasible would a third option -- warhead replacement -- potentially be exercised, but only with presidential authorization and congressional approval, according to the Nuclear Posture Review. The policy is to adhere to a Stockpile Management Program laid out by Congress last year, which aims to improve arsenal safety, security and reliability against malfunctions without explosive testing.

President Barack Obama opposed the former Bush administration’s advocacy of a Reliable Replacement Warhead that, in pursuit of similar goals, would have eventually supplanted all the weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Critics of the RRW effort asserted that the stockpile could be kept viable for years to come without introducing new weapons, and that a more modest approach could help Washington take the high road in discouraging nuclear proliferation around the globe.

Congress twice refused to fund the RRW program and, once Obama took office, he canceled the effort. Even so, some aspects of Obama's own plan for warhead modernization have taken a bit of heat. Swapping out newly remanufactured versions of old designs, in itself, might not prove controversial. However, critics have said the Obama administration has defined component reuse in such a broad way -- allowing for the combination of central warhead features that have never been tested together -- that confidence in the reliability of the stockpile could be imperiled in the absence of new underground testing.

The United States has honored an informal moratorium on nuclear explosive tests since 1992, and the Obama administration said in the posture review that no new tests would be conducted. The president has also said he would seek Senate ratification for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a pact signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996 but not approved on Capitol Hill. Without the ability to test nuclear warheads to ensure their viability, it makes sense to hew closely to design configurations that underwent tests before the moratorium was put in place, according to Roger Logan, the former head of Directed Stockpile Work at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.

"Mixing primaries -- pits and related parts that make the primary work -- and secondaries that were not tested together is a crap shoot," he told Global Security Newswire last week. "We don't have to do it, so why do it?"

A carefully bounded approach of mixing and matching warhead components that can be tested without new nuclear explosive experiments should be fine, Logan noted.

"Those [parts] that were tested together as a system or those that do not affect the process of the nuclear event" could be traded out for different designs without necessarily jeopardizing warhead reliability, he said. "You want to make those changes as far as you can away from the nuclear package itself."

Under debate, though, is the advisability of changes to a weapon's crucial "physics package" -- the components directly involved in setting off a nuclear chain reaction.

At last week's breakfast event, Harvey said that knowledge gained from limited tests conducted at the national laboratory facilities over the past decade or so would minimize any risk associated with swapping out physics-package apparatus.

"Subcritical experiments we've done at the Nevada Test Site, non-nuclear experiments but involving plutonium and high-explosive, help us understand the equation of state of plutonium," Harvey said, referring to plutonium's pressure, temperature and volume during the explosive event. "Some of the work that computers have done would allow us to understand better the boost process, of what happens when plutonium sort of mixes up in that process."

In fact, he said, "we have a much better understanding [of] how nuclear weapons work now than we ever did when we were testing. We didn't need to know how they worked; we could prove that they worked by testing them. Today we have to understand the basic physics in such a way that our folks, who are very conservative, are comfortable with these variations and are comfortable enough to certify them without testing."

"I think John Harvey has it exactly right," Linton Brooks, who headed the Energy Department's nuclear security agency from 2003 to 2007, told GSN yesterday.

"The increase in understanding of nuclear weapons from first principles over the past two decades has been remarkable," he said. "I think the science today makes it perfectly plausible to employ a reuse strategy."

Logan agreed that Stockpile Stewardship has helped the scientific community further develop its comprehension of how U.S. nuclear weapons function. However, as soon as new physics-package features or combinations are introduced into weapons, they would become wild cards in the quest to certify reliability, which should be based on scientifically known performance rather than best guesses, he said.
He took issue with a number of Harvey's statements, opining that the defense official was overly sanguine and simplistic in asserting last Friday, for instance, that if a "secondary gets enough energy, it'll go." Logan also differed with Harvey's contention that, prior to the testing moratorium, lab officials had little need to grasp exactly how atomic weapons operate.

The nuclear complex management "tends to use ego as a substitute for the diligence of quantifying confidence," said Logan, who holds a Ph.D. in engineering. "There are professional standards for doing this."

If nuclear-weapon program officials "make a step change, like adding a feature or widget, confidence cannot be quantified anymore," he insisted. "You can then only declare confidence based on a deep, confident-sounding voice."

Kathleen Bailey, a senior associate at the National Institute for Public Policy, said Harvey may be right that certain changes to existing warheads would do little harm, but she worries that it could set a bad precedent.

"What he says is accurate, as far as it goes," she told GSN in an e-mail response to questions this week. "The problem is that we can make some limited changes without testing and have acceptably high confidence -- or, better-said, limited doubt -- about its success. But that makes it easier the next time to make a political decision that change without testing is acceptable."

Bailey called the approach a "slippery slope."

"When do you know that the changes do not warrant confidence?" she asked.

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100616_1846.php

Washington Post

Pentagon To Continue Development Of Conventional Weapons
After Ratification Of START

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, June 17, 2010

Senior Pentagon officials said Wednesday that the recently signed U.S.-Russian arms treaty will not impede their plans for new intercontinental missiles with conventional warheads that could hit targets anywhere in the world within an hour.

U.S. officials have hailed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, as a milestone in attempts to draw down on the number of nuclear weapons in the world. But Russia has criticized the U.S. development of a non-nuclear weapons system, the Prompt Global Strike program, saying its missiles could be as destabilizing as nuclear warheads.

Although final decisions on the Prompt Global Strike program have not been made, James N. Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that officials expected it to only require, at most, 28 ground- or sub-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. That number could easily be handled within the 700 strategic delivery systems allowed by the treaty, he said.

Miller said the Pentagon is also considering development of a "boost-glide vehicle," a conventionally armed shuttle-like device that would be launched on a missile but be capable of steering in various directions -- unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles -- before striking a target. He said the Pentagon believes such a system would not be counted under the treaty as a new kind of strategic offensive vehicle.

Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), the ranking Republican on the panel, raised the modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and delivery systems as well as missile defenses as issues of concern. Since Lugar's support would be needed to get enough Republican votes for the 67 required to ratify the U.S.-Russian treaty, the Pentagon officials focused on the issues he raised.

Miller said the Defense Department will transfer $4.6 billion over the next five years to assist the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration reach its 10-year goal of spending $80 billion on the nation's nuclear weapons complex. Some $100 billion is to be spent over the decade on modernization of strategic delivery systems, including new bombers to replace the B-52s, submarines to replace the Tridents and land-based ICBMs to replace the Minuteman III.

The only hint of controversy at the hearing came in exchanges generated by Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), who argued that there were "deep differences with the Russians on what this treaty actually means when it comes to defending
ourselves." Risch was referring to a Russian unilateral statement, which is not part of the treaty, in which Moscow reserved the right to withdrawal from the treaty if there were a quantitative and qualitative buildup of U.S. missile defenses.

While agreeing that Moscow officials have wanted to use the treaty to constrain U.S. missile defenses, the Pentagon officials insisted nothing in the treaty prevents any missile defense approach that Washington plans to pursue. When Risch noted the treaty prohibits putting missile defense interceptors in silos that currently hold land- or sub-based ICBMs, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O'Reilly, head of the Missile Defense Agency, said he would never recommend such steps, adding he did not believe them "prudent or operationally effective."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/17/AR2010061701879.html
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency
OPINION & ANALYSIS

Russia Launches Long-Awaited Submarine
16 June 2010

The fourth-generation ballistic missile submarine, the Severodvinsk, finally departed the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia on June 15. The boat has been under construction since 1993. This project, with its epic delays, reflects the problems Russia's entire defense sector has been facing for twenty-odd years.

Soviet designers began work on its fourth-generation submarines in 1977, and they were added to the rearmament program in 1985. According to Soviet tradition, plans were made to build several classes of nuclear submarine at the same time -- strategic, anti-air, multipurpose, anti-submarine and special-use. When it became clear by the end of the 1980s that this would dramatically increase the navy's spending, a decision was made to limit the naval rearmament project to two classes of submarines -- strategic nuclear deterrence submarines and multipurpose submarines.

Project 955 was chosen for strategic deterrence and the first boat, the Yury Dolgoruky, was launched in 2007. Project 885 was selected for multipurpose boats.

The first Project 885 submarine, which was slated to launch in the early 1990s, was postponed until 1993 due to lack of funding and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. When the project got back on track, the launch date for the first boat was initially set for 1998. It was rumored that perhaps two or three other boats of that class would follow. But the launch date was pushed back twice more, first until the early 2000s and then until 2007.

But it wasn't until 2010 that the first Project 885 Yasen (Graney) class submarine was finally launched, and it will be put on combat duty in 2011 at the earliest.

Unlike the Yury Dolgoruky, which has not been armed with Bulava missiles yet, the Severodvinsk will soon be equipped with existing missiles and torpedoes.

It turns out the claim that several more boats of this class were laid down in the 1990s was just a rumor. Work on the second upgraded boat of this class, the Kazan, began only in 2009.

There are several reasons for the delay in construction, including lack of funding and the need to modernize the boat's equipment, which was designed in the late 1980s. There has also been talk that the next-generation power unit was in need of adjustment.

Some even argued in the mid-2000s that there was no need for this class of boats. The Severodvinsk is a large submarine with a displacement of 9,700 tons when surfaced and 13,500 tons when submerged. It measures 120 meters in length, with a beam of 13 meters and a maximum speed of 31-35 knots when submerged.

Graney class nuclear submarines have eight 533 mm and 650 mm torpedo launchers and 24 silos for launching a variety of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles with a range of up to 5,000 km (3,100 miles), which are effective against submarines, surface warships and land-based targets.

The $2 billion boat has powerful electronic and sonar equipment. Its closest rival is the SSN21 Seawolf, a large, high-speed and heavily armed boat designed during the Cold War to maintain the United States' acoustic advantage over Soviet Project 971 submarines in the late 1980s. The United States planned to build 30 expensive Seawolf boats.

With the end of the Cold War, the cost of these submarines was deemed prohibitive (the three completed boats cost $4 billion each) and the program was scrapped in favor of new Virginia class attack submarines, which are smaller and cheaper. The United States plans to build 30 Virginia class boats to replace its Los Angeles class fleet.
One has to wonder if Russia needs to build boats comparable to the Seawolf; the Yasen boats were designed for a potential war against the world's most powerful navy. Perhaps Russia should limit itself to two or three Project 885 submarines and then shift its focus to a cheaper boat that would have comparable power thanks to modern equipment and weapons.

Even if Russia builds the six Severodvinsk class boats it has planned, they will not replace the existing fleet of multipurpose submarines. The Russian navy currently has 27 nuclear submarines from projects 949, 945, 671RTM and 971, which were launched between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s. At least half of them will be decommissioned within 15 years.

Therefore, it would be advisable to build 12-15 cheaper boats whose specifications will roughly correspond to the latest Project 971 or even Project 671RTM submarines, but which will have better equipment and a lower noise level.

*The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.*

MOSCOW (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik)

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100616/159452336.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Wall Street Journal

OPINION

June 17, 2010

**The Way Forward On Missile Defense**

*We've committed to developing proven technologies, and the new START Treaty won't stand in our way.*

By MICHELE FLOURNOY AND ASHTON B. CARTER

Ballistic missile defenses have matured from a Cold War idea to a real-world necessity. Threats today from ballistic missiles are real, present and growing. Iran and North Korea have extensive inventories of these weapons that threaten their neighbors. Both are working on longer-range missiles capable of posing a direct danger to the United States in the coming years. Iran's continued pursuit of an illicit nuclear program and North Korea's rash intimidation after sinking a South Korean navy ship are but the most recent reminders of the real need for effective U.S. missile defenses.

To counter Iran's ballistic missile program, President Obama announced a phased adaptive approach for European missile defense last September—a move unanimously welcomed by our NATO allies. The first phase begins next year with the deployment of radars and ship-based systems in southern Europe. Romania and Poland have agreed to host land-based defenses for the second and third phases.

A similar phased adaptive approach is being applied to missile defenses in the Middle East and East Asia. While the details of the deployments and host-country arrangements will differ by region, the common thread is significant improvement in ballistic missile defense capabilities, meant to protect our deployed forces overseas and our allies and partners.

In a departure from past approaches, we are no longer building systems anchored in one place and wedded to current threat assessments. We know that the capabilities of potential adversaries do not always progress according to intelligence assessments. Our program must adapt accordingly in the face of evolving and unpredictable threats.

We are also making continued progress in improving our ability to defend the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile attack. By the fall, the U.S. will have 30 deployed ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, with eight more missile defense silos near completion.

The U.S. is committed to a "fly before you buy" approach supported by a rigorous and independently-monitored testing program. An essential element of that program, and a key capability for the phased adaptive approach, is the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor. The SM-3 version deployed on Navy ships today has hit—within inches—its exact target in nine out of 10 tests. The accuracy of these tests has been confirmed in a variety of ways: by fiber-optic grids that can precisely indicate the point of impact on the target; by images taken from the interceptor in the very last moment before impact (images not available to the public for security reasons); by data from highly accurate radars and airborne sensors; and by extensive rocket sled tests and computer simulations on the ground. All these verification sources confirm that when a missile warhead was hit, it was destroyed. These results have been validated by an independent panel of experts with access to all of the classified and unclassified test data.

Missile defenses have become a topic of some discussion in the context of the Senate's consideration of the New START Treaty with Russia. The fact is that the treaty does not constrain the U.S. from testing, developing and
deploying missile defenses. Nor does it prevent us from improving or expanding them. Nor does it raise the costs of doing so. We have made clear to our Russian counterparts that missile defense cooperation between us is in our mutual interest, and is not inconsistent with the need to deploy and improve our missile defense capabilities as threats arise.

U.S. ballistic missile defenses are effective, affordable and increasingly adaptable. These capabilities are critical to protecting U.S. citizens, our forces abroad, and our allies from real and growing threats.

Ms. Flournoy is the under secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Carter is the under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics.

TopOpinion
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

New York Times
OPINION
June 18, 2010

The Burma-North Korea Axis
By AUNG LYNN HTUT

WASHINGTON — This is a sensitive moment in relations between the United States and the world’s most corrupt regime: the military junta that has plundered Burma for decades as if it were a private fiefdom.

The Obama administration has attempted to apply a strategy dubbed “pragmatic engagement.” As it works to rethink its position amid the present cacophony of foreign and domestic crises, there is a danger that Washington might give Burma short shrift and unwittingly soften its stance toward the country’s military leaders. It should be careful not to do so. And it should take the junta’s nuclear-weapons ambitions seriously.

The regime in Burma has a history of deceiving American officials. I know; before defecting to the United States in 2005, I was a senior intelligence officer for the war office in Burma. I was also the deputy chief of mission at Burma’s embassy in Washington.

In the autumn of 2003, a senior staff member for a U.S. senator came twice to our embassy in Washington to call on Ambassador U Lin Myaing and me. At about the same time, officials from the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council also met in New York with U Tin Win, from the office of Burma’s prime minister, and Colonel Hla Min, the government’s spokesman.

The American officials were checking reports that Burma had secretly renewed ties with North Korea — one of the three pillars of George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.”

Burma had severed ties with North Korea in 1983, after North Korean operatives attempted to assassinate South Korea’s president, Chun Doo Hwan, during a state visit to Rangoon. Chun was unhurt, but 17 senior South Korean officials — including the deputy prime minister and the foreign and commerce ministers — were killed.

The head of Burma’s junta, Senior General Than Shwe, instructed us to lie to the Americans. We did. We blamed Burma’s political opposition for the “rumors” that Rangoon had renewed ties with Pyongyang. The Americans wanted proof. Than Shwe then ordered Foreign Minister U Win Aung to send a letter denying the reports to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The British government knew the truth. London’s ambassador to Rangoon rightfully called U Win Aung a liar.

Why did Burma renew ties with North Korea? Regime preservation.

In the aftermath of the 1988 nationwide uprising in Burma, many foreign joint ventures for the production of conventional weapons were cancelled. Than Shwe began the secret re-engagement with North Korea in 1992, soon after he took control of Burma’s ruling clique.

He argued that Burma faced potential attack from the United States and India, which at the time was a champion of Burma’s democracy movement. He wanted a bigger army. He wanted more modern weapons. He even wanted nuclear arms. He cared not at all for the poverty of Burma’s people.

Than Shwe secretly made contact with Pyongyang. Posing as South Korean businessmen, North Korean weapons experts began arriving in Burma. I remember these visitors. They were given special treatment at the Rangoon airport. With a huge revenue bonanza from sales of natural gas to Thailand, Burma was soon able to pay the North Koreans cash for missile technology.
The generals thought that they could also obtain nuclear warheads and that, once these warheads were mounted on the missiles, the United States and other powerful countries would not dare to attack Burma and have much less leverage on the junta.

Than Shwe hid these links with North Korea as long as he could from Japan and South Korea, because he was working to lure Japanese and South Korean companies to invest more in efforts to plunder Burma’s natural resources. By 2006, the junta’s generals felt either desperate or confident enough to publicly resume diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Burma has worked for almost a decade to expand its production of missiles and chemical warheads. General Tin Aye — chairman of the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, the military’s business arm — is the top manager of ordinance production and main liaison with North Korea.

According to a secret report leaked last year, the regime’s No. 3 man, General Shwe Mann, also made a secret visit to Pyongyang in November 2008. He signed an agreement for military cooperation that would bring help from North Korea for constructing tunnels and caves for hiding missiles, aircraft, even ships.

That this information was leaked by Burmese military officials working on such sensitive activities shows both the degree of Than Shwe’s military megalomania and the existence of opposition within the regime itself.

The words “pragmatic engagement” should not become synonymous with any weakening of Washington’s firm opposition to Burma’s rulers.

The United States and other nations must continue to question the legitimacy of Than Shwe and the regime. They should not believe his promises to hold free and fair elections this year.

Only coordinated pressure from around the globe will be effective in dealing with this master of deceit.

Aung Lynn Htut is a former senior intelligence officer in Burma’s Ministry of Defense. He is working on his memoirs.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/19/opinion/19iht-edauga.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)