Audit of the Identification and Training of DoD’s Operational Contract Support Workforce
Results in Brief

Audit of the Identification and Training of DoD's Operational Contract Support Workforce

April 16, 2019

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether DoD Components incorporated operational contract support (OCS) training into workforce development for military and DoD civilian personnel. We focused on whether the DoD identified the OCS workforce, established OCS training standards, and implemented a strategy to train the OCS workforce.

For the purposes of this audit, identifying the OCS workforce involves establishing the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform OCS activities, and also developing the means to track personnel who meet these standards.

Background

OCS is the process of obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources to support joint military operations (operations conducted by multiple Military Services working together). OCS is a joint activity executed by the geographic combatant commander, subordinate joint force commanders, and their staffs. When properly planned, OCS can increase military effectiveness and provide services that either cannot be performed by military forces and DoD civilian personnel or can be performed more effectively or efficiently through contract solutions.

OCS requires participation and coordination from various components within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and combatant commands. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics (ODASD[Logistics]) serves as the lead for training and educating non-contracting, non-acquisition personnel who support OCS efforts. The ODASD(Logistics) is also responsible for coordinating policy to improve OCS program management and oversight. The Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping units and individuals to perform all aspects of the OCS mission in response to Federal and DoD guidance.

Finding

We determined that DoD Components did not consistently integrate OCS training into workforce development. For example, the Army developed an OCS training course for non-acquisition personnel, but according to Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office planners embedded at the combatant commands, this training does not adequately prepare personnel to perform OCS in theater because it is not sufficient for the execution of combatant command level OCS planning. However, as stated by Army officials, the course is deliberately designed to train Army personnel to perform OCS tasks at the tactical and operational level, not at the combatant command level. In addition, although the Navy has developed training requirements for its OCS personnel, it has not identified which personnel comprise the Navy’s OCS workforce and are required to receive the training. The Air Force and the Marine Corps did not incorporate OCS training into workforce development policy for their military or DoD civilian OCS personnel.

These deficiencies occurred because ODASD(Logistics)—the agency responsible for implementing OCS in the DoD—did not establish OCS training standards or provide guidance establishing the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform OCS activities. Without this guidance, DoD Components did not develop standardized training, identify personnel required to receive OCS training, or identify positions requiring OCS-trained personnel.

In August 2018, ODASD(Logistics) identified actions to mitigate OCS training and workforce capability gaps identified in a 2011 report. However, the actions were not specific enough for the Military Services to develop OCS training or workforce standards and therefore, will not address capability gaps. According to ODASD(Logistics) officials, the process of
implementing the recommendation will be conducted in three phases: developing an OCS competency model, assessing and validating the competency model, and lastly, implementation. The recommendation to establish OCS training standards and identify the OCS workforce depends upon the completion of the first phase, which has an estimated completion of August 2021.

As a result, DoD personnel executing OCS activities in theater are often unable to adequately perform their OCS duties without additional training and support. The lack of trained OCS personnel is a recurring problem because personnel rotate into and out of theater every 9 to 12 months. Without trained OCS personnel to meet combatant commanders’ OCS needs, the DoD risks poor management of contracted capabilities in a contingency environment.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Joint Staff, applicable Defense agencies, combatant commands, and Military Services to conduct an OCS Functional Competency Model assessment for military personnel.

We also recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the combatant commands, develop a policy to establish tiered minimum training requirements and qualifications for OCS positions at each echelon, and establish minimum requirements and milestones for implementation and integration of operational contract support training.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Executive Officer of the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, agreed with our recommendation, stating that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness through the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service Planning and Accountability staff is engaged in an effort with Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment staff in the assessment of personnel occupying identified OCS positions. The effort includes the development of an OCS functional competency model to assess competencies of both civilian and military personnel.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, agreed with our recommendation, stating that in coordination with the Undersecretary for Defense (Personnel & Readiness) Joint Staff, Defense agencies, Joint Staff, defense agencies, combatant commands, and Services, it will publish guidance to clarify minimum training requirements for personnel working within the OCS functional area. The guidance will be used to inform organizational manning and training requirements across the DoD. He also stated that the DoD is working on efforts to identify competencies, knowledge, skills, abilities, and training requirements that would shape the development of OCS training guidance.

Comments from the Executive Officer Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment addressed the specifics of the recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations once we receive the results of the OCS competency model and assessment, and review the OCS training guidance to ensure that it clarifies minimum training requirements and that it informs organizational manning and training requirements for OCS across the DoD.
**Recommendations Table**

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<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
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**Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
AND SUSTAINMENT
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS


We are providing this report for your information. We conducted this audit from May 2018 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We considered management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. The comments received from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment addressed all of the recommendations; therefore, we do not require additional comments.

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905 (DSN 314-664-8905).

Troy M. Meyer
Principal Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Introduction

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether DoD Components incorporated operational contract support (OCS) training into workforce development for military and DoD civilian personnel. We focused on whether the DoD identified the OCS workforce, established OCS training standards, and implemented a strategy to train the OCS workforce. Identifying the OCS workforce involves establishing the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform OCS activities, and developing the means to track personnel who meet these standards.

Background

Operational Contract Support

OCS is the process of obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources to support joint military operations (operations conducted by multiple Military Services working together). OCS is a joint activity executed by the geographic combatant commander, subordinate joint force commanders, and their staffs. The three supporting functions of OCS include contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management.

- Contract support integration involves planning, coordinating, synchronizing, and executing contracted support in an operational area to support combatant commander-directed operations. Tasks include collaborating in boards and working groups, and determining contract requirements.
- Contracting support legally obtains supplies or services from commercial sources to support joint force commander-directed operations in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Tasks include planning and organizing contracting support, translating requirements into contract documents, and developing contracts.
- Contractor management provides oversight and integrates contractor personnel and associated equipment to support combatant commander-directed operations in an operational area. Tasks include planning contractor management, deploying and redeploying contractors, managing contractors, and sustaining contractors.
OCS functions are carried out at all levels of the DoD, to enable the joint force commander to achieve mission outcomes.

- At the strategic level, support organizations work with combatant command staff to ensure that contractors are properly used to meet mission objectives. Additionally, combatant command staff plan the use of contractors and define the responsibilities for OCS.

- At the operational level, a joint task force commander establishes a requirements review process and defines the area for OCS to be used.

- At the tactical level, requirements management and performance monitoring processes are conducted by military and DoD civilian personnel after contract award. Requiring activities monitor requirements from concept through delivery of service to ensure contracted capabilities continuously provide value to the mission.

When properly planned, OCS can increase military effectiveness and provide services that either cannot be performed by military forces and DoD civilian personnel or can be performed more effectively or efficiently through contract solutions. According to a 2017 Congressional Research Service report, since fourth quarter FY 2011, contractors outnumbered U.S. troops in Afghanistan. In September 2018, there were more than twice as many contractors as U.S. troops in Afghanistan. These contractors provided supplies and services, including security, logistical support, weapon and equipment maintenance, intelligence, communications, transportation, construction, and base support operations.

Because contractor support plays an integral role in military operations, proper OCS planning is essential. Federal law mandates effective, efficient, and integrated OCS for all joint military operations. The following are current congressional requirements for OCS.

- Section 854 of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), amending chapter 137, title 10, United States Code (10 USC § 2333[e] [2008]), directed the Secretary of Defense to develop joint policies for OCS with implementation authority residing with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics (ODASD[Logistics]).

- Section 849 of the FY 2008 NDAA, amending section 2333, title 10, U.S.C., directed that joint policies provide for OCS training of for non-acquisition DoD personnel involved in contract support and mandated that contract

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operations be incorporated into mission readiness exercises. Section 849 also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to audit the DoD's compliance with these requirements. See Appendix A for additional information on the objective and findings of the GAO audits.

- Section 845 of the FY 2013 NDAA, amending section 117(c), title 10, U.S.C., required the Secretary of Defense to include OCS in defense readiness reporting systems and mandated that OCS be included in the curriculums of the Joint Professional Military Education institutions.

- Section 331 of the FY 2014 NDAA, amending section 482, title 10, U.S.C., required that the Secretary of Defense's quarterly reports on personnel and unit readiness include a risk assessment of dependence on contractor support and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's assessment of “the level of risk incurred by using contract support in contingency operations.”

ODASD(Logistics), in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Defense agencies, combatant commands, and the Services, developed the following documents to establish OCS as an enduring joint capability.

DoD Directive 3020.49, “Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution,” March 24, 2009, states that ODASD(Logistics) is responsible for overseeing and managing the orchestration, integration and coordination of the preparation and execution of acquisition for contingency operations and leading the development of joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting.

Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations, March 31, 2010, provides a unifying strategy for aligning OCS among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to improve the effective and efficient use of contracts and contractors during contingencies.

Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for Operational Contract Support, July 19, 2011, is a capabilities-based assessment conducted by the OCS Community of Interest. The ICD identified 10 critical capability gaps in support of OCS functions.

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6 Organizations represented in the executive-level of the board overseeing OCS functional capabilities.

DoD Operational Contract Support Action Plans function as strategic documents to achieve the desired goals for OCS. These Action Plans outline known capability gaps, and assign tasks to OCS stakeholders in an effort to close these gaps.

Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTmL-PF) Change Recommendation (DCR) for Operational Contract Support, August 20, 2018. A DCR is a document used to recommend changes to existing joint elements when the changes are not associated with a new Defense acquisition program and do not require development or purchase of a new materiel solution. In August 2018, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved a ODASD(Logistics) DCR for OCS, that recommended changes that are or were intended to improve and institutionalize the DoD's OCS capability as outlined in DoD Directive 3020.49, and address the critical OCS capability shortfalls identified in the 2011 ICD. For example, one recommended change is to “review, update (or establish), and implement changes to the programs of instruction (joint and Service-led) to augment and fully integrate OCS into training and education for all personnel, to include military and DoD civilians across all warfighting functions.”

The Directorate for Logistics (J-4), Joint Staff, developed the Joint Publication 4-10 “Operational Contract Support,” July 16, 2014 to build OCS capacity. Joint Publication 4-10 provides doctrine for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations. The doctrine established in Joint Publication 4-10 applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

OCS Roles and Responsibilities

OCS requires participation and coordination from many different stakeholders and various components within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and combatant commands.

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8 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council oversees the work in developing overarching joint operational and integrating concepts for joint missions.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]), formerly known as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, serves as adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to acquisition, technology, and logistics, and is the DoD lead for the integration and management of OCS. USD(A&S) develops policies and procedures for the DoD’s acquisition system, including contingency acquisition and OCS integration initiatives.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics
ODASD(Logistics) serves as the lead for training and educating non-contracting, non-acquisition personnel who support OCS efforts. ODASD(Logistics) is responsible for oversight and management of the integration and execution of acquisitions for DoD contingency operations. ODASD(Logistics) is also responsible for coordinating policy to improve OCS program management and oversight, ensuring integration of joint OCS activities, providing oversight experimentation efforts for OCS execution within DoD components, and serving as co-chair of the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board.

Defense Logistics Agency
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Director is responsible for providing personnel to support combatant commanders’ OCS planning and training efforts through the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). The JCASO advises, assists, and supports the Joint Force Commander’s oversight of OCS operations when requested.

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
JCASO provides OCS planning support to combatant commanders through joint OCS planners embedded within the geographic combatant command (GCC) staff and U.S. Special Operations Command to facilitate improvement in OCS planning and execution through the capture and review of joint OCS lessons learned. JCASO also participates in joint exercises, deriving best practices from after-action reports and assisting in the improvement of OCS-related policy, doctrine, rules, tools, and processes.

Military Departments
The Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping units and individuals to perform all aspects of the OCS mission in response to Federal and DoD guidance. Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for incorporating applicable Office of the Secretary of Defense-level OCS policies and instructions into applicable Service-level policy, doctrine, programming, training, and operations.

**Directorate for Logistics (J-4), Joint Staff**
The Directorate for Logistics (J-4), Joint Staff, is responsible for incorporating program management elements of OCS policies into joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, joint training, and joint education. The J-4 is also required to co-chair the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board to lead and coordinate OCS with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, and Defense agencies.

**Geographic Combatant Commands**
GCCs are responsible for planning and executing OCS program management, contract support integration, and contractor management action in all applicable contingency operations in the area of responsibility. GCCs are also responsible for coordinating with the Services and functional components to identify military capability gaps that require contracted solutions and incorporate this information into their operational plans.

**Service Components**
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component commands, along with their associated Service component contracting organizations, are responsible for planning and executing OCS in accordance with the policy and guidance received from their respective Military Departments and supported Joint Forces Command. Service components are also responsible for participating in joint OCS planning actions and developing Service component OCS plans per GCC guidance. These plans include establishing and training a Service component OCS integration cell, and capturing contracting requirements and contract oversight personnel force requirements in annexes and deployment plans.

**Review of Internal Controls**
DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance programs are operating as intended, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.9 We identified significant control deficiencies in OCS policy and training requirements. Specifically, we identified that there are insufficient policies, procedures, and documented training requirements related to OCS training at the USD(A&S), Services, and combatant command levels. In addition, we identified that there is

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not a policy identifying which personnel are considered OCS personnel who should receive OCS training. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the USD(A&S); Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
Finding

The DoD Needs to Consistently Integrate OCS Training Into Workforce Development

DoD Components did not consistently integrate OCS training into workforce development. For example, the Army developed an OCS training course for non-acquisition personnel; however, according to JCASO planners embedded at the combatant commands, this training does not adequately prepare personnel to perform OCS in theater as it focuses on writing contract requirements. In addition, although the Navy has developed training requirements for its OCS personnel, it has not identified which personnel comprise the Navy's OCS workforce and are required to receive the training. Furthermore, the Air Force and Marine Corps did not incorporate OCS training into workforce development policy for their Service military and DoD civilian personnel.

This occurred because ODASD(Logistics)—the agency responsible for the implementation of OCS in the DoD—did not establish OCS training standards or provide guidance establishing the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform OCS activities. Without this guidance, DoD Components could not develop standardized OCS training or identify personnel or positions required to receive the training. In August 2018, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved an ODASD(Logistics) DCR to mitigate OCS training and workforce capability gaps identified in 2011. However, the DCR does not include specific actions for the Military Services to develop OCS training or workforce standards, and therefore will not address capability gaps. According to ODASD(Logistics) officials, the process of implementing the DCR will be conducted in three phases: developing an OCS competency model, assessing and validating the competency model, and lastly, implementation. The recommended actions within the DCR that will establish OCS training standards and workforce identification, depend on the completion of the first phase, which has an estimated completion of August 2021.

As a result, according to JCASO planners, DoD personnel executing OCS activities in theater are often unable to adequately perform their OCS duties without additional training and support. For example, JCASO attempted to mitigate this problem by executing a contract for OCS tutoring for the Military Service components. The lack of trained OCS personnel is a recurring setback because personnel rotate into and out of theater every 9 to 12 months. Without trained OCS personnel to meet combatant commanders’ OCS needs, the DoD risks poor management of contracted capabilities in a contingency environment.
DoD Components Did Not Consistently Integrate OCS Training Into Workforce Development

DoD Components did not consistently integrate OCS training into workforce development. Without established training standards from ODASD (Logistics), the Military Services implemented OCS training in an inconsistent manner or not at all. With the exception of the Army, the Services did not incorporate OCS training into workforce development policy for military and DoD civilian personnel. In the absence of a DoD strategy to implement OCS training and workforce development, combatant commanders had to mitigate known OCS capability gaps, developing localized training and designating personnel to perform OCS requirements as a secondary duty.

**Army**

The Army integrated OCS training into its workforce development policy but has not fully identified an OCS workforce. Specifically, the Army Logistics University at Fort Lee, Virginia, provides the Operational Contract Support Course, a 2-week course focused on preparing military and civilian non-acquisition personnel to serve as members of an operational contract support cell as part of a tactical or operational headquarters staff. At the conclusion of the OCS Course, Army personnel receive a “3C” additional skill identifier for OCS, which indicates the ability to provide instruction on how to prepare acquisition requirements packages and manage a unit’s overall contracting officer’s representative responsibilities for basic service and supply contracts. Additionally, personnel with the 3C identifier can prepare performance work statements, independent Government cost estimates, purchase requests, and conduct contractor performance oversight techniques. However, according to JCASO planners embedded at the combatant commands, this training does not adequately prepare personnel to perform higher-level, GCC-relevant OCS planning in theater.

According to USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM JCASO officials, the Army’s OCS training strategy is not sufficient for the execution of combatant command-level OCS planning. USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM JCASO officials stated that the 3C course focuses mostly on writing contract requirements and conducting OCS duties at the tactical level, which is not relevant to higher-level, GCC-relevant

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10 Additional skill identifiers identify specialized skills, qualifications, and requirements that are closely related the military occupational specialties. Military occupational specialties are alpha-numeric codes used to identify occupation, skill level, and special qualifications.
OCS planning. However, Army officials stated that the 3C course is deliberately
designed to train Army personnel to perform OCS tasks at the tactical and
operational level, not at the joint task force or combatant command-level.

In addition, according to, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command officials,
although the Army has guidance for who can and should attend the course, the
Army does not have an official policy or documentation to show how personnel
are selected to attend this course. Instead, the Army identified a list of enlisted
personnel, warrant officers, and officers MOSs that are eligible to attend the
training, as well as civilian grade requirements that must be met to attend the
training. According to Army Combined Arms Support Command officials, although
the course is open to all Services, approximately 99 percent of the 3,950 personnel
who graduated from the OCS Course from FY 2013 through FY 2018 were
Army personnel.\textsuperscript{11}

In December 2017, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command issued
the Army’s first comprehensive non-acquisition OCS training strategy, which
identified OCS capabilities and gaps in the Army’s training and education systems
and provided solutions designed to improve individual and collective OCS skills
within the Army. The Strategy also stated that many of the Army’s OCS training
initiatives—including the 3C additional skill identifier—were “hastily developed ad
hoc (training) solutions.”

\textbf{Navy}

The Navy integrated OCS training into its workforce development policy, but
has not identified an OCS workforce. On November 14, 2018, the Navy issued
Operational Navy Instruction 3020.12, which addresses OCS integration and
includes OCS training requirements for Navy Component Commands, Commanders
of the U.S. and Pacific Fleet Forces, and the commanders of the Naval Supply
Systems and Naval Facilities Engineering Commands. Additionally, according
to Navy officials, the Defense Acquisition University online course and Joint
OCS Essentials for Commanders and Staff online course are sufficient for
most Navy workforce needs. However, the Navy had not identified an OCS
workforce, by establishing the knowledge, skills, or abilities for a Navy OCS
professional. In addition, the Navy had not identified a methodology to track
Navy OCS personnel. The Maritime Operations Center Standardization Manual,

\textsuperscript{11} Army Combined Arms Support Command officials provided the number of OCS Course graduates and recipients of the
3C identifier over the last 6 years.
January 2018, identifies one position with OCS duties to be filled by an “OCS Officer” and outlines the responsibilities of the position; however, the manual does not outline how the Navy OCS workforce is to be identified.\(^1\)

**Air Force**

The Air Force has not fully integrated OCS training into its workforce development policy or identified an OCS workforce. Air Force officials stated that less than 60 Air Force personnel have attended the Joint Staff, J-4-supplied Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) each year since FY2013. According to the course description, the 8½-day JOPEC provides a detailed understanding of the scope and implications of contracted support used today and the OCS planning and execution requirements to manage this essential part of the “Total Force.” Additionally, according to Air Force officials, the Air Force planned to identify OCS training requirements at various levels of its workforce before the end of FY 2018. However, as of December 2018 the Air Force had not developed an OCS implementation instruction nor approved a plan to identify training requirements.

According to Air Force officials, the Air Force strategy for OCS training is to continue sending its personnel to the JOPEC, but the course is not required for Air Force personnel filling an OCS position. Air Force officials stated that, over the last 6 years, 223 Air Force personnel have completed the JOPEC, including 130 Air Force personnel assigned to Air Force organizations and 93 Air Force personnel assigned to non-Air Force organizations, such as GCC headquarters.

Additionally, the Air Force leverages an OCS tutoring contract with DLA to assist with training Air Force personnel in OCS duties. According to Air Force officials, the DLA tutors are identifying “staff equities” to determine what level of OCS training is necessary for OCS positions within the Air Force. However, this strategy is still at the discussion level and Air Force officials do not expect to approve and integrate the plan until FY 2019.

**Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps has not fully integrated OCS training into its workforce development policy or identified an OCS workforce. In September 2016, the Commandant of the Marine Corps issued Marine Corps Order (MCO) 4200.34 providing policy and guidance for the Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Force (CCF) Program. The CCF is designed to execute OCS at all levels of support. MCO 4200.34 outlines training requirements for Marines serving in a CCF role; defines training-related duties for the Headquarters Marine Corps

Operational Contract Support Section; identifies two OCS-related military occupational specialties; and defines the requirements to fill each military occupational specialties.\textsuperscript{13}

MCO 4200.34 requires Marines serving in a CCF role to attend the JOPEC. Marine Corps officials also stated that DLA OCS tutors provide introductory OCS training at the various Marine Service Component Commands. In addition to the training provided by DLA OCS tutors, the Marine Corps began offering an introductory OCS class at the Marine Corps War College in January 2018.

Although the Marine Corps has taken steps to address OCS training, it has not developed a defined OCS training strategy to implement going forward or implemented the requirements in the OCS-related policy it issued in 2016. For example, MCO 4200.34 also requires the Headquarters Marine Corps Operational Contract Support Section to conduct an annual assessment of the CCF to ensure that personnel receive OCS training. Marine officials stated that they have yet to implement these requirements and did not provide a timeline for when assessments would begin.

MCO 4200.34 outlines positions for two OCS-related military occupational specialties across the Marine commands, 3044 OCS Specialist and 3006 OCS Officer. However, Marine Corps officials stated that III Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, and Marine Corps Forces Pacific were not staffed in accordance with MCO 4200.24 due to a lack of personnel with the required skillset.

**ODASD(Logistics) Did Not Establish Training Standards or Ensure the OCS Workforce Was Identified**

In DoD Directive 3020.49, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated ODASD(Logistics) as the DoD Component responsible for the implementation of OCS. However, ODASD(Logistics) did not establish training standards or provide guidance establishing the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform OCS activities. Without this guidance, DoD Components could not develop standardized OCS training or identify personnel or positions required to receive the training. According to DoD Directive 3020.49, ODASD(Logistics) oversees and manages the orchestration, integration, and coordination of acquisition for contingency operations. The Directive also states that ODASD(Logistics) leads the development of joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contracting. In 2010, ODASD(Logistics) established the OCS Concept of Operations, which states that the Services will provide OCS training to military personnel.

\textsuperscript{13} Military occupational specialties are alpha-numeric codes used to identify job, skill level, and special qualifications.
Additionally, DoD Instruction 3020.41 provides policy for OCS and states that the Secretaries of the Military Departments must incorporate DoD Instruction 3020.41 guidance into applicable policy, doctrine, programming, training, and operations. However, these are the only policies that govern OCS training, and they do not establish training standards or identify which personnel require OCS training.

Although the DoD did not establish training standards, there are two existing DoD courses that provide OCS training—the JOPEC sponsored by the Joint Staff, J-4, and the Army OCS course in Fort Lee, Virginia. Additionally, the Joint Knowledge Online website offers online training courses. However, ODASD(Logistics) did not establish policy to require OCS professionals to attend any of these courses. Therefore, the ODASD(Logistics), in coordination with the combatant commands, should develop a policy establishing qualifications for OCS positions at each echelon (tactical, operational, and strategic), and establish minimum training requirements for each echelon. In accordance with 10 USC § 2333(e) (2008), OCS training for non-acquisition personnel shall be sufficient to ensure they understand the scope and scale of contractor support they will experience in contingency operations and are prepared for their roles and responsibilities with regard to requirements definition, contractor oversight, and contingency contracting. For example, tiered training would include instruction on how to ensure that commercial support in operational areas is integrated into the joint planning process; how to plan and create requirements packages and how to plan, allocate and execute contract officer’s representative and quality assurance representative oversight duties. Lastly, USD(A&S), in coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant commands and Services, should establish minimum requirements and milestones for implementation and integration of operational contract support training.

### The DCR Will Not Address Capability Gaps in a Timely Manner

In August 2018, ODASD(Logistics) developed a DCR to mitigate some of the 10 OCS capability gaps that were identified in the initial capabilities document in 2011. According to the ODASD(Logistics) DCR, the OCS Functional Competency Model assessment is a multi-step analysis and assessment that will improve identifying,
tracking, and training for U.S. military and DoD civilian OCS personnel. The process of implementing the DCR and the DoD OCS Functional Competency Model assessment will be conducted in three phases.

- Phase I will focus on developing a competency model that consists of developing a list of OCS knowledge, skills, and abilities.
- Phase II will involve assessing the competency model drafted in Phase I for gaps and validating or refining the model.
- Phase III will be the implementation of the competency model. Based on the competency model, the DoD will be able to identify an OCS workforce, identify new training requirements or modify existing ones, develop OCS position descriptions, and ensure adequate numbers of civilians are competent in OCS knowledge, skills, and abilities.

However, the recommended actions within the DCR that will establish OCS training standards and workforce identification, depend upon the completion of the first phase, which has an estimated completion of August 2021. Furthermore, the recommended actions in the DCR do not fully address key OCS capability gaps, such as the inability to fully integrate OCS and the lack of a human capital strategy. Table 1 shows the 10 capability gaps identified in 2011 and whether those gaps were included as unresolved issues in DoD OCS Action Plans issued from FYs 2013 to 2018.

**Table 1. Status of Capability Gaps From 2011 to 2018**

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<td>1. Insufficient awareness of the significance and complexity of OCS.</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Limited integration of OCS into task planning, assessments, training, and reporting.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lack of a strategy for total force manpower requirements for OCS-enabling functions.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lack of personnel, manpower, rules, tools, or processes to integrate OCS into theater plans.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Status of Capability Gaps From 2011 to 2018 (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Insufficient ability to visualize, track, and monitor OCS capabilities in theater.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lack of sufficient leadership oversight of OCS.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lack of ability to identify contract vehicles and capabilities by region.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Inadequate capability to oversee contractor performance.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. No common capability to generate acquisition-ready contract support requirements packages.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lack of a capability to identify contractors and control base access.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The “x” in the DoD OCS action plan 2013 to 2018 columns represent gaps that remained opened during those years according to the plans. The blank squares represent if the gap was closed out for that year.

2 The “x” in the “DCR 2018” column represents if the gap was addressed in the 2018 DCR. The blank squares represent if the gap was not addressed.


The ODASD(Logistics) DCR provided the Services with recommended actions to address capability gaps identified in 2011; however, the DCR does not provide the Services with workforce standards or clear instructions for how to develop OCS training. Instead, it provides the Services with actions to address OCS competency development. The following are two capability shortfalls identified in 2011 concerning training or workforce development.

- The DoD and Joint Force lack the ability to fully integrate OCS into capability and task planning, operational assessments, force development, training, readiness reporting, lessons learned, and continuous process improvement.
- The DoD lacks a human capital strategy—recruit, train, track, and retain—for all OCS functions, which encumbers deployment and staffing for the Joint Force and complicates execution of OCS and compliance with legislation and regulation.

To address the inability to fully integrate OCS, the DCR outlined recommendations that the Services review, update (or establish), and implement changes to Joint and Service-led programs of instruction to augment and fully integrate OCS into training and education for all personnel, including military and DoD civilians across all warfighting functions. However, this action is dependent upon the results of the OCS competency model developed in phase one.

To address the absence of a human capital strategy, the DCR recommends that the Office of the Undersecretary for Defense (Personnel & Readiness) (OUSD[P&R]) identify positions for which OCS training is a requirement and develop the initial minimum training requirements. This action is scheduled to take place after OUSD(P&R) completes the OCS Functional Competency Model workforce assessment. As of January 2019, according to ODASD(Logistics) officials, OUSD(P&R) only had the authority to conduct this assessment for the civilian workforce; as such, the ongoing assessment does not include the military workforce. Personnel from OUSD(P&R) and ODASD(Logistics) indicated that OUSD(P&R) was in the process of obtaining the authority to include the military workforce in the assessment. In addition, OUSD(P&R) officials do not have the strategic workforce policy that outlines the functional competency model or the established milestones for completion. Therefore, the OUSD[P&R] should collaborate with USD(A&S), Joint Staff, applicable Defense agencies, combatant commands, and Military Services to conduct an OCS Functional Competency Model assessment for DoD military personnel, which would lead to the identification of the OCS workforce.

**DoD Personnel Have Been Unable to Fulfill Their OCS Responsibilities**

DoD personnel executing OCS activities in theater have often been unable to fulfill their OCS responsibilities. Without trained OCS personnel to meet combatant commanders’ OCS needs, the DoD risks poor management of contracted capabilities in a contingency environment, decreasing OCS effectiveness and increasing costs.

**U.S. Central Command**

At the request of USCENTCOM, the Directorate for Logistics (J-4), Joint Staff (J-7), conducted an assessment from October 2016 to May 2017 to evaluate the adequacy of OCS activities carried out in theater by USCENTCOM personnel.
In the assessment, J-4 personnel identified capability gaps in OCS training prior to deployment. For example, J-4 personnel found that the training available (JOPEC, Army OCS Course, and Joint Knowledge Online courses) did not adequately focus on some of the practical OCS tasks that staff officers must be able to perform at the strategic theater and operational staff levels. Additionally, according to USCENTCOM officials, pre-deployment OCS training needs to include more tactics, techniques, and procedures for OCS officials. USCENTCOM established pre-deployment training requirements and provided a USCENTCOM-developed OCS course in theater. However, this course was provided only once and J-4 officials stated that the Services’ are responsible for training OCS professionals, not the combatant commanders. USCENTCOM officials stated that having to supplement OCS training in theater reduces the amount of time that deployed personnel can effectively carry out their OCS responsibilities during 9- to 12-month deployments.

**U.S. Southern Command**

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) officials stated that USSOUTHCOM has established training objectives in exercises, but has not established training requirements for OCS positions, because there are no OCS-specific positions at USSOUTHCOM. According to USSOUTHCOM officials, all OCS activities are carried out by USSOUTHCOM personnel as a secondary responsibility. The Joint Staff and DLA JCASO have supported USSOUTHCOM by providing OCS observer trainers, small group scenario training, and classroom academics. Furthermore, USSOUTHCOM and its components receive training support from DLA and USD(A&S) for OCS requirements planning. USSOUTHCOM officials stated that, while the Army OCS course teaches the basics of requirements development, it is not relevant to GCC-level (strategic) OCS planning.

USSOUTHCOM officials stated that, they do not believe the Military Services have not fully embraced OCS or integrated structured training into workforce development. For example, JCASO planners at USSOUTHCOM organized a routine OCS working group; however, three of the five Service components were not able to participate. USSOUTHCOM has experienced OCS manpower shortages and staff cuts due to not having existing OCS billets. In addition, USSOUTHCOM has training deficiencies because there are no set OCS training requirements or OCS billets. USSOUTHCOM officials reported their manpower and training deficiencies in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. The training deficiencies at the Service level have resulted in a lack of personnel trained to perform OCS tasks in USSOUTHCOM. Some of the OCS tasks include, but are not limited to, collaborating in boards and working groups, determining contract requirements, planning and organizing contracting support, and planning contractor management.
DLA Planners and Tutors Supplement the Services

The DoD uses DLA planners to augment combatant command OCS capabilities, and the DLA has executed a contract for eight DLA tutors to provide OCS training for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as U.S. Special Operations Command OCS personnel.

JCASO is a DLA subsidiary office that employs OCS planners, who are DoD civilians experienced in logistical planning and general OCS matters who are embedded in each GCC to enable OCS planning and integration. These planners work in support of the GCC and U.S. Special Operations Command, but report to and are funded by the DLA. JCASO planners are also expected to serve as part of the GCC’s OCS integration cell to coordinate OCS activity across the combatant command staff and with Service component OCS personnel.

However, JCASO officials stated that, due to the lack of trained Service component personnel, the scope of work for the JCASO OCS planner position has increased beyond originally established responsibilities. In addition to performing their own duties, JCASO planners routinely provide support to Service personnel who are not adequately trained to fulfill OCS capabilities in the GCC without assistance. For example, JCASO planners are meant to assist each command with OCS duties such as developing contracting support plans and contractor integration plans; however, according to DLA officials, JCASO planners are becoming the primary executors of OCS duties.

In September 2017, JCASO attempted to mitigate this problem by executing a contract for OCS tutoring for the Military Service components. The $1.8 million contract includes an option year for an additional $1.8 million, which began in September 2018. The contract specifies that eight OCS tutors will provide training for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. According to the performance work statement, the tutors are to “train, tutor, mentor, and advise Service component staff of key OCS tasks.” According to the OCS tutors and service personnel, their work varies from creating draft proposals for OCS training to implementing a “train the trainer” program for Service component staff. Tutors continue to support Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps that exercised the option year except for the Navy.

The role of the embedded combatant command planners is to supplement OCS-trained combatant command personnel; however, according to DLA officials, the embedded planners are often the primary executors of OCS duties because the combatant command personnel are not trained to perform OCS. Meanwhile, through its tutoring contract, the DLA has committed resources to train or facilitate training for Service personnel at the Service headquarters and component
levels because the Military Services have not integrated OCS training into their workforce development. Without trained OCS personnel to meet combatant commanders’ OCS needs, the DoD risks poor management of contracted capabilities in a contingency environment.

**Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

**Recommendation 1**

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness collaborate with Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Joint Staff, applicable Defense agencies, combatant commands, and Military Services to conduct an Operational Contract Support Functional Competency Model assessment for DoD military personnel.

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness**

The Executive Officer of the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, agreed with our recommendation, stating that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, through the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service Planning and Accountability staff, is engaged in an effort with USD(A&S) staff in the assessment of personnel occupying identified OCS positions. The effort includes the development of an OCS functional competency model to assess competencies of both civilian and military personnel. The Executive Officer stated that the completion of the model and subsequent assessment is pending the authorization to use the competency tool to assess both segments of the workforce.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Executive Officer addressed our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we receive the results of the OCS functional competency model and assessment for civilian and military personnel.

**Recommendation 2**

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services, develop and implement policy to:

- Establish tiered minimum training (tactical, operational, and strategic) requirements and qualifications for OCS positions at each echelon.
- Identify which positions require an OCS-trained professional.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, agreed with our recommendation, stating that in coordination with the OUSD(P&R), Joint Staff, Defense agencies, combatant commands, and Services, will publish guidance to clarify minimum training requirements for personnel working within the OCS functional area. The guidance will be used to inform organizational manning and training requirements across the DoD. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment stated the DoD is working on efforts to identify competencies, knowledge, skills, abilities, and training requirements that would shape the development of OCS training guidance.

Our Response

Comments from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment addressed our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we obtain and review the published OCS training guidance to ensure that it clarifies minimum training requirements for personnel working within the OCS functional area and that it informs organizational manning and training requirements for OCS across the DoD.
Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from May 2018 through March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

At the beginning of the audit, the team met with Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment personnel who explained that, if our objective was evaluating the integration of OCS training by the DoD, our focus should be OCS “workforce” development and not “force” development. They stated that “force” integration was specific terminology for efforts that did not include training.

We reviewed the following Federal and DoD criteria.

- Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C), “Armed Forces,” July 2011
- Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations, March 31, 2010
- Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and DCR for Operational Contract Support, August 20, 2018
We interviewed personnel from the USD(A&S), ODASD(Logistics), JCASO, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the J-4 to identify their roles and responsibilities for developing, reviewing, and incorporating operational contract support training into force development for military and DoD civilian personnel. We reviewed and discussed the DCR and the annual OCS action plans with ODASD(Logistics). With each of the Services, we discussed and reviewed their plans to incorporate OCS training into workforce development. DLA representatives explained the ongoing OCS efforts carried out by JCASO personnel forward deployed and at the combatant command headquarters. Lastly, we discussed the OCS workforce competency model assessment with OUSD(P&R) to identify the goals of the assessment and the timeline for completion.

We conducted site visits to USCENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, and USSOUTHCOM in Doral, Florida, from July 17 to July 23, 2018, to determine the effects of OCS training on the geographic combatant commands. We spoke with JCASO personnel at USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM headquarters to identify their daily responsibilities. Additionally, USCENTCOM provided us with the USCENTCOM OCS study, released in October 2017, that assessed and captured lessons learned and best practices of the efforts to institutionalize and operationalize OCS throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Because of the findings in the Commission on Wartime Contracting Report and the number of joint contracts in USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility, we initially focused on USCENTOM. However, because of the proximity of USSOUTHCOM headquarters to USCENTCOM headquarters, we decided to include USSOUTHCOM in the audit.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

**Prior Coverage**

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued three reports discussing OCS. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at https://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

**GAO**


The objective of this report was to examine the extent to which geographic combatant commands, the Services, and DoD organizations collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned; integrate OCS issues from the Joint Lessons Learned
Program (JLLP); and use the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) to share OCS issues and lessons learned. The GAO recommended that the DoD and the Services issue Service-wide OCS lessons learned guidance; establish OCS training for senior leaders; ensure the OCS joint proponent’s responsibility for integrating OCS issues from the JLLP; and improve JLLIS’s functionality. The DoD concurred with three of the recommendations and partially concurred with one.


The objective of this report was to examine the extent to which Pacific Command: (1) accounted for contractor personnel and implemented a process to vet foreign vendors; (2) established an organizational structure to manage and oversee OCS; and (3) integrated OCS into key planning documents. The GAO issued six recommendations regarding developing and clarifying accountability guidance for contractor personnel; vetting guidance for foreign vendors; guidance for OCS roles and responsibilities for requirements development; and ensuring full integration of OCS of all joint staff functions. The DoD concurred with two of these recommendations and partially concurred with four.

DoD OIG


(UNCLASSIFIED) The objective of this report was to determine whether U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command adequately integrated OCS into ongoing operations and operational planning.
MEMORANDUM FOR PROGRAM DIRECTOR, READINESS AND GLOBAL OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL


As requested, I am providing a response to recommendation 2 contained in the subject report.

Recommendation 2:
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services, develop and implement policy to:

- Establish tiered minimum training (tactical, operational, and strategic) requirements and qualifications for Operational Contract Support (OCS) positions at each echelon.
- Identify which positions require an OCS-trained professional.

Response:
Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Joint Staff, defense agencies, combatant commands, and Services, will publish guidance to clarify minimum training requirements for personnel working within the OCS functional area. This guidance will be used to inform organizational manning and training requirements across the Department.

The Department is currently working to identify competencies, knowledge, skills, abilities, and training requirements under the OCS functional competency assessment process and other related actions. This effort will inform and shape development of OCS training guidance required by this recommendation.

Please contact [redacted] if additional information is required.

Robert H. McMahon
MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, READINESS AND GLOBAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Identification and Training of the Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Workforce – Project Number D2018-D000RH-146.000

This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of the Identification and Training of DoD’s Operational Contract Support Workforce draft report, with specific focus on Recommendation #1. We concur with this recommendation without additional comment. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, through the DCPAS Planning and Accountability staff, is currently engaged in an effort with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment staff in the assessment of personnel occupying identified OCS positions. This effort includes the development of an OCS functional competency model to assess competencies of both civilian and military personnel. The completion of the model and subsequent assessment is pending the authorization to use the competency tool to assess both segments of the workforce.

The point of contact from the DCPAS Planning and Accountability line of business is [redacted].

Todd Charette
Executive Officer
### Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ODASD(Logistics)</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPEC</td>
<td>Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>OCS</td>
<td>Operational Contract Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(P&amp;R)</td>
<td>Office of the Undersecretary for Defense (Personnel &amp; Readiness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(A&amp;S)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment</td>
</tr>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>Marine Corps Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting Force</td>
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U.S. Department of Defense

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For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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