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Report No. DoDIG-2014-085



# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

August 13, 2014



## (U) Evaluation of the Dissemination of DoD Intelligence Information to the Library of National Intelligence by the NSA

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

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August 13, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the Dissemination of DoD Intelligence Information to the Library of National Intelligence by the NSA (Report No. DoDIG-2014-085)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the National Security Agency were responsive. The National Security Agency will submit corrective action plans with target completion dates, as requested.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to [DoD OIG: (b)(6)] [DoD OIG: (b)(6)] at (703) 699-[DoD OIG: (b)(6)] DSN 381-[DoD OIG: (b)(6)] or [DoD OIG: (b)(6)] at (410) 854-[DoD OIG: (b)(6)]

  
Anthony E. Thomas  
Deputy Inspector General for  
Intelligence and Special  
Program Assessments

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## (U) Results in Brief

*(U//FOUO) Evaluation of the Dissemination of DoD Intelligence Information to the Library of National Intelligence by the National Security Agency*

**(U) August 13, 2014**

*(U) Executive Summary of DoDIG Report No. DoDIG-2014-085*

### **(U) What We Did**

*(U//FOUO)* The evaluation's objective was to determine how much progress the National Security Agency (NSA) has made in disseminating intelligence information to the Library of National Intelligence (LNI). Specifically, our objective was to: (1) Determine the extent to which the NSA disseminates analytic products to the LNI; and (2) Determine the extent to which the NSA has become more aware of the LNI and LNI-related training.

### **(U) What We Found**

*(U//FOUO)* We found that the NSA is disseminating intelligence information to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as required by the Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, "Analytic Standards" and ICD 206, "Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Products." The NSA's dissemination of intelligence information to the LNI is a routine and autonomous business practice. However, the NSA does not maintain necessary administrative and operational procedures detailing the management and technical implementation of NSA/LNI dissemination practices.

*(U) Visit us on the web at [www.dodig.mil](http://www.dodig.mil)*

*(U//FOUO)* The NSA does not formally document its administrative and operational procedures describing the management and technical processes of NSA/LNI dissemination procedures. The existence of an NSA/LNI Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) would provide a mechanism to communicate current and future expectations for effective sharing of intelligence information.

*(U//FOUO)* The NSA lacks a LNI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NSA and the ODNI for LNI Phase A and B support, as NSA/CSS Policy 1-43 requires. We also found that no Inter-Agency Support Agreement (ISA) exists between the NSA and the ODNI or a completed DD Form 1144 for LNI Phase C reimbursable support, as required by DoD Instruction 4000.19 and NSA/CSS Policy 1-38.

*(U//FOUO)* The NSA did not receive guidance from the National Intelligence University Chancellor regarding general information sharing training, as required by ICD 501, "Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Community (IC)." We also found that the NSA has not developed training specific for using the LNI. However, NSA's <sup>NSA (b)(3)</sup> [REDACTED] conducted several "workforce awareness" events that promoted use of the LNI by NSA analysts.

### **(U) What We Recommend**

*(U//FOUO)* We recommend that a written SOP be established detailing how NSA intelligence information is disseminated to the LNI; create an LNI Memorandum of Understanding, Inter-Agency Support Agreement or DD Form 1144 with the ODNI; make LNI workforce awareness materials more available; and determine if LNI training for NSA analysts should be mandatory.



## (U) Results in Brief

*(U//FOUO) Evaluation of the Dissemination of DoD Intelligence Information to the Library of National Intelligence by the National Security Agency*

### (U) Managements Comments and Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) Comments from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate were responsive to the recommendations. The Signals Intelligence Directorate agreed with the recommendations; however they requested transfer of recommendations B.1, B.2, and C.1 to the Associate Directorate for Policy and Records, the Technology Directorate, and the Associate Directorate for Educations and Training. NSA will submit corrective action plans with target completion dates, as requested **(See Appendix E, "Management Comments.")** We accept management's request to transfer the recommendations and consider it responsive. We request NSA provide the corrective action plan and target completion date within 30 days of this report.

***(U) Recommendations Table***

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations
National Security Agency	A.1, B.1, B.2, C.1

*(U)*



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(b) *Classification*

(d) United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

(e) United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence

(f) Secretary of Defense

(g) Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

(h) Director, Office of Naval Intelligence

(i) Director, National Security Agency

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## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The evaluation's objective was to determine what progress the National Security Agency (NSA) has made in disseminating intelligence-related information to the Library of National Intelligence (LNI); specifically: (1) Determine the extent to which the NSA disseminated analytic products to the LNI consistent with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, Section D.4.1 and ICD 206, Section D.6, and (2) Determine the extent to which the NSA provided training consistent with ICD 501, Section G.1.b, "Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Community."<sup>1</sup>

### (U) Criteria

(U) In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) signed two directives to improve the discovery of and access to intelligence information, as well as the collaboration capabilities of the Intelligence Community (IC). On June 21, 2007, the DNI authorized ICD 203, which established the requirement that all disseminated products be retained as a document of record and maintained within the LNI, when the LNI is operational. On October 17, 2007, the DNI signed ICD 206, which further required that a copy of fully-sourced versions of every disseminated analytic product be submitted to the LNI.

(U) While ICDs 203 and 206 specifically required submitting disseminated analytic intelligence to the LNI, the DNI issued further guidance for IC information sharing and collaboration. On January 21, 2009, the DNI signed the ICD 501, which directs IC elements to "ensure that new information technology (IT) systems or significant changes to existing IT systems provide the capability for discovery, dissemination, and retrieval of information collected or analysis produced through automated means." ICD 501 directs changes in policies, procedures, behavior, culture, and technology to support the new model of information sharing.

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<sup>1</sup>(U) ICD 206 defines Disseminated Analytic Products as intelligence analysis intended to convey authoritative agency, bureau, office, center, department, or IC analytic judgments that are officially distributed to consumers outside the producing IC element.

(U) ICD 501 further requires the IC to develop, in consultation with IC elements and subject to DNI approval, a series of IC integrated implementation plans detailing the roles and responsibilities of the DNI and the IC elements regarding information sharing.

## (U) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) The LNI was developed as part of the ODNI's larger effort to build a more collaborative IC, improve information sharing, and modernize the IC's business practices. The LNI is designed to be a central repository for all of the IC's disseminated intelligence reports, and to store the reports' metadata. The LNI is an IC repository where users can discover and retrieve information or find the sources associated with the intelligence products. LNI development and ingest is a process completed in phases. Two phases are completed, another phase is presently in progress, and four phases have yet to be planned. Phase A involved TS//HCS/SCI/SI-G/TK disseminated analytic products and Phase B involved disseminated intelligence reports. Analytic products identified as "sensitive disseminated reports" and requiring increased security protection are currently being addressed in Phase C. Phases D-G will include non-textual intelligence, information databases, un-disseminated analytic products, and raw data. The LNI is populated through four methods: a (secure script) File Transfer Protocol (FTP) feed, a Rich Site Summary (RSS) code, Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) feed, and manual submissions. (See Appendix C for a detailed outline of the dissemination process).

(U//~~FOUO~~) The ODNI Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive (IC ISE) is responsible for the LNI's financial and program management support, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provides operational support. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the ODNI IC ISE and the CIA stipulates that the ODNI IC ISE will reimburse the CIA for funds it uses to operate and maintain the LNI.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The LNI is accessible through a user interface at ODNI (b)(3) a Federated Search Service application, or the Intelligence Community Data Layer. General-user access to the LNI does not require a specific "user" profile. IC members with JWICS access can search the LNI once they are authenticated by an IC Public Key Infrastructure Certificate. A Mission Need Profile must be approved to access HCS, SI-GAMMA, and ORCON information. According to the IC ISE, as of May 2, 2013, SSA, ODNI (b)(3) users accessed the LNI at least once.



~~(U//FOUO)~~ Finding A:

ODNI: (b)(3)

[Redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~

ODNI: (b)(3)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Overview of NSA Dissemination

~~(U//FOUO)~~ ICD 501, section G.2.c, required the NSA to develop and provide an implementation strategy to the IC ISE. This strategy included a specific, appropriately-resourced plan to meet the ICD 501 objectives. The NSA created a phased plan to disseminate and make its intelligence information discoverable and retrievable by the IC. The focus areas and the phased approach included the following stages:

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 1: Library of National Intelligence Implementation Phases

Phasing
Phase A: Disseminated analytic products (up to TS//SI-G/TK/HCS)
Phase B: Disseminated Intelligence Reports
Phase C: Sensitive disseminated analytic products and Intelligence reports
Phase D: Non-textual disseminated products
Phase E: Databases that may inform analysis
Phase F: Undisseminated analytic products
Phase G: Information Collected

(U) Source: NSA's ICD 501 Implementation Plan V1.4.1

~~(U//FOUO)~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ We reviewed the ICD 501 Implementation Strategy Template that the NSA submitted and was approved by the ODNI. The NSA implementation strategy, of October 15, 2009, is a "planning iteration" document guiding how the agency would address Phases A through C, as previously discussed. We found that the plan met the strategic planning requirements of the ICD 501.

## (U//~~FOUO~~) Mechanics of NSA/LNI Dissemination

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(S//~~REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Table 2: Description of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Reports Provided to LNI

Product Line	Purpose
(U) EGRAMs	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
(U) EGRAMs GAMMA and ORCON	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted] [Redacted]
(U) TACREPs	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
(U) CRITICS	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
(U) Executive Reports (E-Series)	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
(U) [Redacted]	(S// <del>REL TO USA, FVEY</del> ) NSA; ODNI; (b)(1) Sec 4(c); (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA; ODNI; (b)(3) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(U) NSA: ODNI: (b)(3)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ NSA: ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)  
[Redacted]

(U) Source: NSA

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) ODNI's IC ISE personnel confirmed how the NSA populates the LNI and that the NSA proactively contributes to LNI development. They explained that NSA's information-sharing personnel contribute to metadata standard development, which increases future report discoverability and retrieval. We reviewed the NSA's LNI ingest record and found that since August 2008, NSA submitted NSA: ODNI: (b)(3) products to the LNI.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Table 3: Historical SIGINT Reports Disseminated by the NSA to the LNI

Product Line	Number of Submissions
EGRAMs	NSA: (b)(3), ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)
EGRAMs - GAMMA and ORCON	
TACREPs	
CRITICs	
Unspecified	
<b>Total</b>	

(U) Source: LNI, as of July 12, 2013

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) To verify that the NSA disseminated intelligence reports to the LNI, we selected and reviewed a judgmental sample of reports disseminated to the LNI between calendar years 2010 and 2012. Table 4 shows that the majority of SIGINT reports we reviewed were in the LNI.

~~(C//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Table 4: LNI Submission by Calendar Year

Fiscal Year	Number of Submitted Reports by Topic	Number of Reports Reviewed	Number of Reports NOT Submitted to LNI
FY 2010	NSA: (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)		
FY 2011	NSA: (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)		
FY 2012	NSA: (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)		
<b>Total</b>	NSA: (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)		

(U) Source: NSA and LNI, as of July 12, 2013

~~(C//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

~~(C//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ According to ODNI representatives, NSA (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3) of NSA's reports are successfully posted to the LNI. Between November 2007 and May 2013, NSA (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3) NSA reports failed to populate the LNI. NSA personnel manually correct and resubmit the rejected reports. Currently, NSA's LNI ingest rate is NSA: (b)(3); ODNI: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3) LNI representatives verified that NSA personnel regularly review LNI receipt logs for failed submissions, and correct and resubmit them. LNI representatives told us that failures can be attributed to duplicate document submission, format errors (for example, metadata irregularities), invalid dates, and not providing required information.

### (U) NSA/LNI Standard Operating Procedures

(U//FOUO) As outlined in Appendix D, we reviewed directives that govern dissemination of intelligence information. Apart from the referenced ODNI ICDs, we did not find any policies relating to LNI dissemination. NSA's NSA: (b)(3) confirmed that NSA's information-sharing directives do not address the LNI population. For example, the NSA has not established, at either the information technology enterprise or operational level, standard NSA/LNI dissemination policy. Consequently, few personnel who are not part of NSA: (b)(3) know how the NSA disseminates intelligence reports to the LNI.



## (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) A.1 We recommend that NSA (b)(3) representatives coordinate on creating Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the LNI. The ODNI implementation directives do not require that IC elements develop separate LNI policies. The SOP must address the NSA resources required for the LNI dissemination, describe the roles and responsibilities for NSA personnel and how NSA report repositories interface with the LNI, and provide continuity of operations procedures. The SOP should also include a breakdown of coordination protocols for the NSA and the ODNI IC ISE office, detail NSA/ODNI working group participation and procedures, data evaluation verification and validation, risk management, and information flow modeling. The SOP will ensure that the technical, operational, and manpower responsibilities for the LNI population remain constant, yet flexible.

### (U) NSA Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA's NSA (b)(3) concurred with the finding and recommendation as written. A corrective action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date.

### (U) Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA was responsive to all specifics of the recommendation and no additional comments are needed. We request NSA provide the corrective action plan and target completion date within 30 days of this report.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Finding B:

ODNI (b)(3)

[Redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~

NSA, ODNI (b)(3)

[Redacted]

**(U) NSA/LNI Memorandum of Understanding**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ We found that the ~~NSA (b)(3)~~ has no MOU with ODNI for LNI Phase A and B support. According to NSA/CSS Policy 1-43, "Memoranda of Understanding / Memoranda of Agreement," NSA/CSS elements shall enter into MOU's for documenting terms and conditions of unique business arrangements whereby the agency supports or is supported by an external organization and said support does not require financial reimbursement. The NSA/CSS Policy 1-43 identifies the coordination, review, and approval processes that serve as the internal vetting process for supporting external agencies. An NSA/LNI Phase A and B support MOU should have been provided documenting how the NSA supports the LNI and the ODNI Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive (IC ISE). As a result, vested NSA elements may be unaware of or approved the service provided to the outside agency. For example, an MOU concerning NSA support to the LNI should, at a minimum, be staffed through the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the Technology Directorate, and the Information Assurance Directorate. The NSA Office of the General Counsel should review NSA MOUs for legal sufficiency. The NSA Office of Policy and Records coordinates all NSA MOUs and assists with developing and staffing an MOU to ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the service and support the NSA is providing.

## (U) Inter-Service Agreement or DD Form 1144

~~(S//NF)~~ We also found that the NSA lacks an Inter-Service Agreement (ISA) with the ODNI, as required by DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," and NSA/CSS Policy, 1-38, "Inter-Service and Intra-Governmental Support." These policies require the NSA to use an ISA whenever inter-agency support includes fund reimbursement.

NSA: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)

Similar to the review and coordination process of an MOU, vested NSA elements also approve ISAs and DD Form 1144s. For example, the Office of Policy and Records ensures that the ISA and DD Form 1144 are staffed through the appropriate offices to include the General Counsel, Senior Procurement/Acquisition Executives, and the Comptroller Office. Resources might be unavailable to pay for the NSA's Phase C future support if an ISA and/or DD Form 1144 are not completed in accordance with DoD Instruction 4000.19 and NSA/CSS Policy 1-38. Phase C IT support derives from a long-term agency-wide IT enterprise support contract. Additionally, because Senior Procurement/Acquisition Executives may not have reviewed the ISAs and DD Form 1144s, compliance with Defense and Non-Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation related to contractor personnel may have been improperly verified. The NSA Comptroller is required to ensure that resources for all active ISAs are allocated in the NSA/CSS budget.

NSA: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(e); (b)(3)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ NSA: (b)(3)

## (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) B.1 We recommend that the Deputy/Chief, NSA: (b)(3) [REDACTED] coordinate with the Chief, Office of Policy and Records, to address LNI MOU requirements in NSA/CSS Policy 1-43.

### (U) NSA Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA's NSA: (b)(3) [REDACTED] non-concurred as action lead, however concurred as contributor, and will transfer to the Chief, Office of Policy and Records for resolution. A corrective action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date.

### (U) Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA was responsive to all specifics of the recommendation and no additional comments are needed. We agree with the request to transfer the recommendation to the Chief, Office of Policy and Records for resolution. We request NSA provide the corrective action plan and target completion date within 30 days of this report.

(U//~~FOUO~~) B.2 We further recommend that the Deputy/Chief, NSA: (b)(3) [REDACTED] coordinate with the Chief, Office of Policy and Records, to address Inter-Agency Service Agreement and DD Form 1144 requirements in DoD Instruction 4000.19 and NSA/CSS Policy 1-38 for the LNI support.

### (U) NSA Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA's NSA: (b)(3) [REDACTED] non-concurred as action lead, however will transfer the recommendation to the Technology Directorate for resolution. A corrective action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date.

### (U) Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA was responsive to all specifics of the recommendation and no additional comments are needed. We agree with the request to transfer the recommendation to the Technology Directorate for resolution. We request NSA provide the corrective action plan and target completion date within 30 days of this report.



## (U//~~FOUO~~) Finding C: Review Information Sharing/LNI Training Program

(U//~~FOUO~~) We found that the NSA has received no guidance from the National Intelligence University Chancellor (NIU) regarding general information-sharing training, as ICD 501 required. We also found that the NSA has not developed training specific to LNI. However, NSA's <sup>NSA: (b)(3)</sup> [REDACTED] has conducted several "workforce awareness" events related to the LNI for increasing the number of NSA analysts who use the LNI.

### (U) Training Program

(U//~~FOUO~~) ICD 501, paragraph G.1.b, directed that the NIU Chancellor coordinate with the IC elements to develop broad IC information-sharing training. ICD 501 does not address LNI training or other workforce awareness efforts. Training representatives from the NSA National Cryptologic School, responsible for training NSA analysts, told us that they had not received direction or coordinated with the NIU for either ICD 501 information-sharing training or LNI-specific training. As a result, the NSA has no formal training for the LNI. Despite the lack of direction from the NIU and no specific LNI training, NSA's <sup>NSA: (b)(3)</sup> [REDACTED] conducted several LNI workforce awareness activities. These activities include educating and informing NSA users about LNI's mission and capability, distributing LNI Fact Sheets at briefings, having an article published in the NSA's internal newsletter SID Today, briefings for NSA analytic components, and an informational brief at an agency dissemination conference.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We asked during our interviews with NSA analysts, who since August 2010 have regularly used the LNI, whether they had received any LNI-specific training. We found that some users were unaware of the LNI's mission and services, and that many users were only somewhat familiar or totally unfamiliar with LNI's capabilities. But other NSA users said the LNI was an important intelligence resource and repository. A small number of analysts reported that they received training on using the LNI and its mission and services. The NSA/LNI users explained that the lack of either a formal or informal training program left users unaware of the LNI capabilities. (See Appendix B for our interview results.)

## (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) C.1 We recommend that the Deputy/Chief, <sup>NSA: (b)(3)</sup> [REDACTED] coordinate with the Chief of Staff from NSA's Associate Director of Education and Training to make LNI workforce awareness information more available to NSA analysts and trainees at the National Cryptologic School and determine whether mandatory LNI training for analysts is needed.

### **(U) NSA Comments**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA's <sup>NSA: (b)(3)</sup> [REDACTED] non-concurred as action lead, however will transfer the recommendation Associate Director of Education and Training for resolution. A correction action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date.

### **(U) Our Response**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA was responsive to all specifics of the recommendation and no additional comments are needed. We agree with the request to transfer the recommendation to the Associate Director of Education and Training for resolution. We request NSA provide the corrective action plan and target completion date within 30 days of this report.

## (U) Appendix A

### (U) Objective

(U//~~FOUO~~) The evaluation's objective was to determine what progress the NSA has made to disseminate intelligence-related information to the LNI; specifically: (1) The extent to which the NSA has disseminated analytic products to the LNI, consistent with ICD 203, Section D.4.1 and ICD 206, Section D.6, and (2) The extent that the NSA has provided training, consistent with ICD 501 Section G.1.b.

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U//~~FOUO~~) This project was initially announced as an audit; however, due to scope limitations, we conducted this project as an evaluation in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation that the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency issued. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives. This evaluation generally covers, but is not limited to, the NSA's dissemination of intelligence information to the LNI from 2010 through 2013. We reviewed SIGINT intelligence reports disseminated to the LNI since November 19, 2010, relevant DoD, ODNI, and NSA policies or procedures regarding dissemination, information sharing, and dissemination-related training and curricula. (See Appendix D for a listing of authorities.)

(U//~~FOUO~~) We interviewed officials from the Government Accountability Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive, and the LNI librarian. We interviewed NSA employees from its <sup>NSA: (b)(3)</sup> [REDACTED] Office of Policy and Records. As part of our methodology, we interviewed a judgmental selection of NSA/LNI users. We identified these users based on a listing that the IC ISE provided, which gave us their names, email addresses, and the number of times each user accessed the LNI.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We tested, as appropriate, given our evaluation scope and objectives, selected reports, records, procedures, and practices to obtain reasonable assurance that

(U//~~FOUO~~) the NSA management complied with Intelligence Community Directives and NSA regulations that, in our judgment, could have a material effect on our evaluation's results.

### (U) Scope Limitation

(U//~~FOUO~~) The evaluation's scope was limited, in part, to the analysis of documents related to the NSA's submission of intelligence information to the LNI. The LNI operates through an MOA between the ODNI and the CIA. The MOA addresses the roles, responsibilities, procedures, and relationship between the ODNI and CIA regarding the mission support and infrastructure services that the CIA and ODNI provide. The DoD IC functions as a user and contributor of intelligence information, which limits the oversight capabilities of the DoD IG specific to the LNI operation. As such, the evaluation team coordinated with the IC Inspector General to interview ODNI subject-matter experts and obtain information specific to the DoD IC enterprise. From these measures, we believe the evaluation objectives were accomplished, and that in total, sufficient, appropriate, and relevant evidence exists to support our observations and recommendations.

### (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this evaluation.

### (U) Prior Coverage

(U//~~FOUO~~) No prior evaluations have been conducted on the NSA's dissemination of intelligence information to the LNI.



## (U) Appendix B

### (U) Interview Results

(U//~~FOUO~~) As part of our methodology, we interviewed a judgmental selection of NSA/LNI users. We identified these users from an NSA/LNI user list that the ODNI IC ISE provided, which supplied their email addresses and the number of LNI sessions each NSA/LNI user had as of May 2, 2013.

#### (U) 1. How often do you access the Library of National Intelligence?

Occasionally	41%
Monthly	14%
Weekly	5%
Daily	18%
Never	23%

#### (U) 2. How important is the Library of National Intelligence to fulfilling your intelligence gathering requirements?

Somewhat Important	14%
No Opinion / Not Sure	32%
Mostly Important	27%
Very Important	14%
Not Important	14%

#### (U) 3. How familiar are you with the mission and services provided by the Library of National Intelligence?

Somewhat Familiar	32%
No Opinion / Not Sure	9%
Mostly Familiar	32%
Very Familiar	0%
Not Familiar	27%

#### (U) 4. Overall, how would you rate your experiences using the Library of National Intelligence?

Somewhat Negative	5%
No Opinion / Not Sure	23%
Mostly Positive	45%
Very Positive	27%
Negative	0%

#### (U) 5. Have you ever received training related to the mission, services, or how to use the Library of National Intelligence?

Yes	5%
No	95%

## (U) Appendix C

### (U) NSA/LNI Dissemination Processes

(U//FOUO) EGRAM Report Flow	
(U//FOUO) NSA: (b)(3)	<p><b>(U//FOUO) Product Line: EGRAM</b></p> <p><del>(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)</del> The EGRAM Product Line contains NSA SIGINT Products that meet LNI Phase A criteria. These products are classified up to TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NF. Processing of these documents occurs <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></p> <p><del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li><li>2. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li><li>3. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li><li>b. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li></ol></li><li>4. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li><li>5. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li><li>6. (U//FOUO) <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></li></ol> <p><b>(U//FOUO) Product Line: EGRAM - GAMMA and ORCON</b></p> <p><del>(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)</del> The EGRAM - GAMMA and ORCON Product Line contains NSA SIGINT Product (for example EGRAMs) that meets LNI Phase B criteria. These products are classified up to TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//TK//OC/NF. Processing of these documents occurs <del>NSA: (b)(3)</del></p> <p><del>NSA: (b)(3)</del> (for example GAMMA and ORCON) documents.</p>

(U) Source: NSA

(U//FOUO) EGRAM Report Flow


(U//FOUO)

NSA: (b)(3)



(U//FOUO) Product Line: TACREP

(U//REL TO USA, FVEY) The TACREP product line contains Tactical Reports, NSA: (b)(3)



1. (U//FOUO) NSA: (b)(3) [Redacted]
2. (U//FOUO) NSA: (b)(3) [Redacted]
3. (U//FOUO) NSA: (b)(3) [Redacted]
4. (U//FOUO) NSA: (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

(U) Source: NSA

(U//FOUO) CRITIC Report Flow

(U//FOUO) Product Line: CRITIC

(U//FOUO) The CRITIC Product Line contains high-precedence reports NSA: (b)(3)



CRITICs are prepared and released in accordance with United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) guidance. NSA: (b)(3)

(U) Source: NSA

<sup>1</sup>(U//FOUO) NSA: (b)(3)

<sup>2</sup>(U//NSA: (b)(3)

## (U) Appendix D

### (U) Table of Authorities

(U//~~FOUO~~) OMB Memorandum, Improving the Management and Use of Interagency Acquisitions, June 6, 2008.

(U) DoD Instruction 4000.19, Support Agreements, April 25, 2013.

(U) ICD 203, Analytic Standards, June 21, 2007.

(U) ICD 206, Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products, October 17, 2007.

(U) ICD 501, Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Community, January 21, 2009.

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 1-38, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support, July 2, 2010

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 1-43, Memoranda of Understanding / Memoranda of Agreement, March 16, 2009

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 11-1, Information Sharing, March 28, 2012

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA: (b)(3)

(U) NSA: (b)(3)



## (U) Appendix E

### (U) Management Comments

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## SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE memorandum

12 June 2014

FROM: Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID)

TO: Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG)

SUBJ: (U//~~FOUO~~) SID Response to the Draft DoD IG Report on Dissemination of NSA Information to the Library of National Intelligence

(U) The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) comments on findings and recommendations identified in the subject draft report.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DoD IG conducted an evaluation to determine progress NSA has made in disseminating intelligence information to the Library of National Intelligence. On 27 March 2014, DoD issued a draft IG report titled Evaluation of the Dissemination of DoD Intelligence Information to the Library of National Intelligence by the NSA. The report identified four recommendations for remediation by the SIGINT Directorate's NSA: (b)(3) [redacted] Recommendations A.1, B.1, B.2, and C.1. NSA: (b)(3) [redacted] concurred as action lead for recommendation A.1; however, non-concurred as action lead for B.1, B.2, and C.1. SID concurs with the recommendations and findings as written; however, SID requests transfer of B.1, B.2, and C.1 to the Associate Directorate for Policy and Records (DAR), the Technology Directorate (TD), and the Associate Directorate for Education & Training (ADET), respectively. SID will seek confirmation of the appropriate NSA/CSS action leads prior to final report publication. NSA will submit corrective action plans with target completion dates, as requested.

(U) The SID consolidated interim response is attached to this memorandum.

NSA: (b)(3)  
[redacted]

Deputy Chief of Staff for  
SIGINT Policy and Corporate Issues

Page: 1/1

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**NSA/CSS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**(U) Interim Response to the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) Draft Report on Dissemination of NSA Information to the Library of National Intelligence (D2013-DINT02-0130)**

**SUBJECT:** (U//~~FOUO~~) SID Interim Response to the Draft Report: DoD IG Report on Dissemination of NSA Information to the Library of National Intelligence (D2013-DINT02-0130)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SID is required to provide management corrective actions for the subject draft DoD IG report in accordance with DoD Directive 7850.3, "Follow-up General Accounting Office (DoD) Inspector General, and Internal Audit Reports," IG-11357-12, "Coordinating Office of Inspector General Reports." The DoD IG will evaluate the management response and determine whether changes to a finding, conclusion, or recommendation can be supported.

Rec#	Action Lead	Comments and Feedback	Target Completion Date
A.1	NSA: (b)(3)	<p><b>(U) RECOMMENDATION A.1:</b> (U//<del>FOUO</del>) We recommend that NSA: (b)(3) representatives coordinate on creating Standard Operating Procedures for the LNI. The SOP must address the NSA resources required for the LNI dissemination, describe the roles and responsibilities for NSA personnel and how NSA report repositories interface with the LNI, and provide continuity of operations procedures. The SOP should also include a breakdown of coordination protocols for the NSA and the ODNI IC ISE office, detail NSA/ODNI working group participation and procedures, data evaluation, verification and validation, risk management, and information flow modeling. The SOP will ensure that the technical, operational, and manpower responsibilities for the LNI population remain constant, yet flexible.</p> <p><b>(U) SID Response:</b> (U//<del>FOUO</del>) [redacted] concurs with the finding and recommendation as written.</p> <p><b>(U) Corrective Action Plan:</b> (U//<del>FOUO</del>) A correction action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date. (U//<del>FOUO</del>) POC: NSA: (b)(3) [redacted] 066-2780</p>	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) TBD.

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B 1	NSA: (b)(3)	<p><b>(U) RECOMMENDATION B.1:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> We recommend that the Deputy Chief, NSA: (b)(3) coordinate with the Chief, Office of Policy and Records to address LNI MOU requirements in NSA/CSS Policy 1-43.</p> <p><b>(U) SID Response:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> non-concurs as action lead; however, concurs its contributor. Recommend transfer of recommendation to Chief, Office of Policy and Records for resolution.</p> <p><b>(U) Rationale:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> DJ, the Office of Policy and Records owns the NSA/CSS MOU/MOA process, as described in Policy 1-43. Recommend the NSA: (b)(3) and the Technology Directorate (TD), along with any other equitable stakeholders, serve as key contributing partners, as applicable, in this effort.</p> <p><b>(U) Corrective Action Plan:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> A correction action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date, pending lead agreement.</p> <p><del>(U//FOUO)</del> POC: NSA: (b)(3) 968-2760</p>	<del>(U//FOUO)</del> TBD
B 2	NSA: (b)(3)	<p><b>(U) RECOMMENDATION B.2:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> We further recommend that the Deputy Chief, NSA: (b)(3) coordinate with the Chief, Office of Policy and Records to address Inter-Agency Service Agreement and DD Form 1144 requirements in DoD instruction 4000.19.19 and NSA/CSS Policy 1-3B for the LNI support.</p> <p><b>(U) SID Response:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> non-concurs as action lead. Recommend transfer of recommendation to TD for resolution.</p> <p><b>(U) Rationale:</b> <del>(U//FOUO)</del> The Technology Directorate NSA: (b)(3) received money from ODNI/CCIO to develop the LNI Phase C solution for NSA.</p>	<del>(U//FOUO)</del> TBD

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		<p><b>(U) Corrective Action Plan:</b> (U//<del>FOUO</del>) A corrective action plan and target completion date will be provided at a later date pending NSA lead agreement.</p> <p>(U//<del>FOUO</del>) POC NSA: (b)(3) 966-2760</p>	
C 1	NSA: (b)(3)	<p><b>(U) RECOMMENDATION C.1:</b> (U//<del>FOUO</del>) We recommend that the Deputy/Chief, NSA: (b)(3) coordinate with the Chief of Staff from NSA's Associate Directorate of Education and Training to make LNI workforce awareness information available to NSA analysts and trainees at the National Cryptologic School and determine whether mandatory LNI training for analysts is needed.</p> <p>(U//<del>FOUO</del>) NSA: (b)(3) non-concurs as action lead. Recommend transfer of recommendation to ADET for resolution.</p> <p><b>(U) Rationale:</b> (U//<del>FOUO</del>) The National Intelligence University (NIU) is responsible for establishing training for all IC elements, as stated in ICD 501. Once this training is established, it should be implemented through ADET. In the interim, NSA: (b)(3) continues to provide Brown Bag sessions upon request and to publish SiDToday articles to raise NSA user awareness.</p> <p>(U//<del>FOUO</del>) POC NSA: (b)(3) 966-2760</p>	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) TBD

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## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

(U)	CRITIC	Critical IC Report
	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
	DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
	DNI	Director for National Intelligence
	EGRAM	Electrigram
	E-Series	Executive Series
	ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
	IC	Intelligence Community
	ICD	Intelligence Community Directive
	ICIG	Intelligence Community Inspector General
	<small>NSA: (b)(3)</small>	
	IC ISE	Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive
	LNI	Library of National Intelligence
	NSA	National Security Agency
	NGA	National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
	ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
	ORCON	Originator Controlled
	SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
	TACREP	Tactical Report

(U)

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