September 13, 2018

Background

Operation Inherent Resolve is the U.S. and Coalition campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As the campaign transitions from the physical defeat of ISIS to the lasting defeat of the terrorist organization, U.S. and Coalition efforts are transitioning from supporting offensive operations to helping build Iraqi security functions. To support this transition, the U.S. and Coalition are helping build the capacity of the Iraqi Police Hold Force. The Iraqi Police Hold Force includes Federal Police, Local Police, Energy Police, and Border Guard units, with the mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency.

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq. Specifically, we determined whether:

1. The Hold Force mission was integrated into the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Campaign Plan.
2. The Programs of Instruction of the Coalition countries conducting training for Iraqi Police Hold Force units were consistent with regard to content and method of instruction, and whether the training content supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.
3. The training received by Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.
4. The equipment provided to the Iraqi Police Hold Force supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.
5. The Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve had a sustainment plan in place for U.S.-provided equipment.
6. The Iraqi Police Hold Force manning requirements (recruitment and retention) were being met.
7. The Advise and Assist efforts of the command supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.

In this evaluation, we focused on the U.S. and Coalition efforts to support the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq. We were unable to determine whether the U.S. and Coalition efforts increased the capability of Iraqi Police Hold Force units because the training and deployment of Iraqi Police Hold Force units was still underway and there were no U.S. or Coalition advisors assigned at the unit level to observe their effectiveness. Additionally, we determined that U.S. and Coalition Forces did not have a direct role or responsibility in the Iraqi personnel recruitment and retention process and thus did not further evaluate this issue.

Findings

We determined that:

The equipment provided to the Iraqi Police Hold Force supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq. The equipment was provided to enable Iraqi Police Hold Force units to conduct clearing operations, checkpoints, and patrols. Additionally, the equipment provided mobile infrastructure to Police and Border Guard units to replace infrastructure destroyed during the ISIS invasion.
Results in Brief

U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force

Findings (cont’d)

The Programs of Instruction from the Coalition countries conducting the training for the Iraqi Police Hold Force were consistent with regard to content and method of instruction. In addition, training courses funded by the Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund were designed to:

- Support Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command–Operation Inherent Resolve and the Ministries of Defense and Interior’s intention to create a Wide Area Security Force composed of police units to support long-term stability and security in Iraq; and
- Provide Iraqi Police Hold Force units the skills needed to use the Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets as command stations that replace infrastructure destroyed during the ISIS invasion and restore the public’s trust in the Iraqi government.

Additionally, Police Task Force–Iraq used funding provided by the European Union and other Coalition Countries to support training programs on traditional police functions ranging from basic policing to advanced courses focusing on specialized skills.¹

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve provided equipment to the Iraqi Police Hold Force in a way that ultimately encouraged the Iraqis to sustain their own equipment by delivering equipment that Iraqis were familiar with and which did not need specialized parts or knowledge to maintain. Additionally, Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve and the Ministry of Interior agreed that the Ministry of Interior could provide the necessary maintenance and sustainment of the equipment given to Iraqi Police Hold Force units.

U.S. and Coalition Forces did not provide advise and assist activities to Iraqi Police Hold Force units conducting Hold Force operations because competing command priorities, resulted in Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command–Operation Inherent Resolve focusing its advise and assist resources on offensive operations. As a result, the command had limited visibility of Iraqi Police Hold Force operations and could not fully determine Iraqi Police Hold Force unit capabilities or adequately assess future training and equipping requirements.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve implement procedures to ensure that feedback concerning Iraqi Police Hold Force unit capabilities, current operations, and future training and equipping requirements flows from the field to the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve.

Management Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, responding for the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, agreed with our recommendation stating that four processes and entities address the flow of feedback from the field back to the Command. Specifically:

- The Force Generation Working Group captures future training and equipping requirements at the brigade level and below.
- The Directorate of Training and Joint Operations Center–Iraq receive Iraqi Police Hold Force requirements from the Iraqis.
- The Ministry Liaison Team receives feedback directly from the Iraqi Police Forces and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

¹ Police Task Force–Iraq is an international organization (subordinate to Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve), which provides trainers and force protection. It is responsible for training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, Police, and Border Guard units.
Results in Brief

*U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force*

**Comments (cont’d)**

- The Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Directorate of Training has an Assessment and Lessons Learned team that assesses Iraqi Security Forces strength, capabilities, and development, validates lessons learned, and includes the information into future Programs of Instruction.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve addressed all specifics of the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We have evidence that the Ministry Liaison Team received feedback directly from the Iraqi Police Hold Forces and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. However, the command did not provide evidence of the other remedial actions. To close the recommendation, we request additional information that documents that:

- The Force Generation Working Group captured future training and equipping requirements at the brigade level and below.

- The Directorate of Training and Joint Operations Center–Iraq received Iraqi Police Hold Force requirements from the Iraqis.

- The Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Directorate of Training assessed Iraqi Police Hold Force unit strength and capabilities (pre- and post-Program of Instruction), and included the lessons learned in future Programs of Instruction.

**Notice of Concern**

On February 16, 2018, we issued a notice of concern to the Commander of United States Central Command identifying security and safety concerns regarding the storage of U.S. owned ammunition and explosives at the Besmaya Range Complex. The 1st Theater Sustainment Command responded on behalf of the Commander of United States Central Command on March 3, 2018, and stated that construction for the refurbishment of the basic load ammunition holding area will begin in March 2018 and that it is developing a plan to move U.S.-owned ammunition from Besmaya to ammunition sites at Taji and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center.

Management’s comment to the notice of concern was responsive; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we determine that Management has moved the ammunition and completed construction on the basic load ammunition holding area at the Besmaya Range Complex.
### Recommendations Table

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<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander of Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>None</td>
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Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE–OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
COMMANDER, 1ST THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND

SUBJECT: U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force (Report No. DODIG-2018-147)

We are providing this report for your information and use. We conducted this evaluation from September 2017 through August 2018 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

We considered management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments from Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve addressed all specifics of the recommendation and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments at this time.

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during this evaluation. If you have any questions, please contact

Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations
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Introduction

This is the fifth report in an ongoing series of Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) evaluations concerning U.S. and Coalition support to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) as part of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The first four evaluations addressed U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces (classified report), the Kurdish Security Forces, and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service. This evaluation addresses the U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.

Specifically, we determined whether:

1. The Hold Force mission was integrated into the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve campaign plan.\(^2\)

2. The Programs of Instruction of the Coalition countries conducting training for Iraqi Police Hold Force units were consistent with regard to content and method of instruction and whether the training content supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.\(^3\)

3. The training received by Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.\(^4\)

4. The equipment provided to the Iraqi Police Hold Force supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.\(^5\)

5. The Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve had a sustainment plan in place for U.S.-provided equipment.\(^6\)

\(^2\) This question is answered in Finding A.

\(^3\) This question is answered in Finding C.

\(^4\) This question is answered in Finding C.

\(^5\) This question is answered in Finding B.

\(^6\) This question is answered in Finding D.
6. The Iraqi Police Hold Force manning requirements (recruitment and retention) were being met.

7. The Advise and Assist efforts of the command supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.7

We scoped this project to focus on the U.S. and Coalition efforts to support the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency. We were unable to determine whether the U.S. and Coalition efforts increased the capability of Iraqi Police Hold Force units because the training and deployment of Iraqi Police Hold Force units was still underway, and there are no U.S. or Coalition advisors assigned at the unit level to observe their effectiveness. Additionally, we determined that U.S. and Coalition Forces did not have a direct role or responsibility in Iraq’s personnel recruitment and retention process for the Iraq Police Hold Force units and, as a result, we did not evaluate this issue.

Background

**Islamic State of Iraq and Syria**

The group known variously as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and the Islamic State or DAESH (the Arabic acronym for ISIS), is a derivative of Al Qaeda in Iraq. While ISIS shares an ideological outlook with its predecessor, it has adopted a different strategy. Al Qaeda primarily focused on carrying out high-profile, large-scale terrorist attacks, while ISIS has been fighting with a more conventional army approach, capturing and occupying territory that once stretched from the outskirts of Aleppo, in Syria, to Tikrit and Mosul, in Iraq.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (renamed the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006) was established in 2004, but did not begin conquering significant territory until its 2012 “Breaking the Walls” campaign, in which the Islamic State in Iraq carried out 24 bombings and eight prison breaks, freeing jihadists who participated in earlier terror attacks. In April 2013, the Islamic State in Iraq merged with the Nusra Front in Syria to form ISIS and launched the “Soldier’s Harvest” campaign against the ISF.8 In December 2013, ISIS militants took control of Fallujah and in the months following captured Mosul (June 2014), Tikrit (June 2014), and the Mosul Dam (August 2014). ISIS continued to take control of Iraqi territory in 2015, occupying Ramadi in May.

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7 This question is answered in Finding E.

8 The Nusra Front was a Syrian terrorist cell, formed in January 2012 by jihadists secretly affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq, whose goal was to defeat the Assad regime. The “Soldiers Harvest” campaign was an operation to intimidate and displace Iraqi Security Forces, particularly through the destruction of their homes and targeted assassinations of government officials.
The Fight Against ISIS

Responding to the rise of ISIS and at the request of Iraqi government officials, the United States began air strikes on ISIS positions in August 2014. In September 2014, President Barack Obama pledged to build an international coalition to defeat the ISIS threat. With coalition support, the ISF began retaking territory from ISIS in March 2015 with the liberation of Tikrit. The ISF continued conducting successful counteroffensive operations against ISIS with victories in Ramadi (February 2016), Fallujah (June 2016), Mosul (July 2017), Tal Afar (August 2017), and Hawijah (October 2017).

In February 2018, Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) reported that, as a result of the successful counteroffensive operations by the international coalition to defeat ISIS, ISIS had lost approximately 98 percent of the territory it once held in Iraq and Syria. However, Coalition commanders noted that ISIS still retained the ability to carry out lethal attacks, and it continued to pose a threat to the stability of the region and the civilian population. A CJTF-OIR senior official stated, “Our enduring presence as invited guests in Iraq will shift to focus more on policing, border control, and military capacity building.”

The CJTF-OIR Coalition Narrative (found in Annex F of the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan) states, “The Coalition and its partners have restored hope for a better tomorrow in the Middle East, and will maintain this momentum as Daesh [ISIS] continues to lose its ability to generate conventional threats and looks at other ways to propagate its morally bankrupt ideology. This is a period of ‘consolidating gains’ as Operation Inherent Resolve transitions from the defeat of the physical Daesh [ISIS] ‘caliphate’ to pursuing the lasting defeat of the terrorist organization.”

It further explains that “consolidating gains” has three objectives:

- attacking remnants of ISIS, preventing its ability to develop an effective insurgency;
- providing security for diplomatic, economic, and informational activity to begin; and
- transitioning from offensive military operations to security functions (policing and border control).

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10 ISIS has attempted to create its own state, which it claims as a “caliphate.” A caliphate is an Islamic state led by a caliph who, as the successor to Muhammad, has absolute power and authority.
According to CJTF-OIR and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) officials, the collapse of ISIS occurred much sooner than U.S. and Coalition planners expected. This collapse required the ISF to develop security, policing, and border-control functions more rapidly than initially planned. In order to develop these capabilities, CJTF-OIR is using the Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) to support the training and equipping of Hold Forces in Iraq.

**Hold Force**

CJTF-OIR uses the term “Hold Force” to delineate between those Iraqi Security Forces being generated for offensive operations and those forces used to secure liberated areas and prevent ISIS from reestablishing an effective presence. The Iraqi Police Hold Force is composed of Federal Police, Local Police, Energy Police, and Border Guard units assigned to the Hold Force operations.

- **Federal Police**: The Federal Police are a national level paramilitary force responsible for national security issues. In support of Hold Force operations, the Federal Police provide security of the population and territory liberated from ISIS throughout Iraq and reinforce local police response to ISIS insurgent actions.

- **Local Police**: The Local Police (also referred to as Provincial Police) are a regional policing and local law enforcement organization responsible for upholding the rule of law and providing local security. In support of Hold Force operations, the Local Police provide security to the local population and are the first response to ISIS insurgent actions.

- **Energy Police**: The Energy Police are a national security organization responsible for the security of oil and electrical infrastructure, including related distribution networks. In support of Hold Force operations, the Energy Police secure the energy and electrical infrastructure liberated from ISIS throughout Iraq.

- **Border Guard**: The Border Guard are a law enforcement force subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and responsible for securing Iraq’s borders to prevent smuggling, infiltration, and illegal border crossing. In support of Hold Force operations, the Border Guard is responsible for securing Iraq’s borders and denying ISIS the ability to infiltrate Iraq.
**Coalition Command Structure**

Several U.S. and joint commands support the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

- **United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)** is the warfighting Combatant Command responsible for planning and conducting U.S. military activity in a region consisting of 20 countries from Northeast Africa across the Middle East to Central and South Asia, including Iraq. USCENTCOM’s overall mission is to direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests.

- **Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)** is a subordinate command of USCENTCOM. CJTF-OIR was established in October 2014 to counter the ISIS takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria. CJTF-OIR consists of 75 partners (countries and institutions) that jointly coordinate and participate with the Government of Iraq in multiple operational efforts. These efforts include conducting airstrikes and planning and coordinating ground operations to “defeat ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria and setting conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability.”\(^{11}\) The CJTF-OIR subcomponents associated with the train, advise, assist, and equip mission are described below.

  - **CJTF-OIR CJ7 Partner Force Development** synchronizes train and equip efforts in order to generate a coherent force-generation process that meets operational requirements and tracks the status of CTEF equipment deliveries and divestitures.\(^ {12}\)

  - **CJTF-OIR CJ7 Ministry Liaison Team** liaises between CJTF-OIR and the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense. It delivers subject matter expertise for assessing Iraqi Police Hold Force equipping plans against Iraqi and CJTF-OIR operational requirements.

  - **Police Task Force–Iraq** is an international organization, created on June 19, 2015, and headquartered in Baghdad, Iraq. Previously identified as Task Force Carabinieri because of its Italian majority composition, the unit was renamed to Police Task Force–Iraq in November 2017 to reflect its growing multinational presence.\(^ {13}\) The contributing nations who provide trainers and force protection include Italy, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, and Sweden. It is responsible for training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi MoI, Police, and Border Guard units.

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\(^{11}\) CJTF-OIR Mission Statement.

\(^{12}\) Divestiture is the permanent transfer of U.S. Government equipment to appropriately vetted ISF personnel.

\(^{13}\) The Carabinieri Corps is Italy’s dual Police and Armed Forces responsible for protecting Italian citizens. The Carabinieri is known for its professionalism and role as a military organization with civil policing functions and has been involved in peacekeeping operations and the development of foreign security forces since the mid-19th century.
• **Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR)** was the subordinate command of CJTF-OIR responsible for coalition land force operations in support of the ISF during the campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and liberate more than 4.5 million Iraqis subject to ISIS’ control. In April 2018, CJFLCC-OIR was deactivated and CJTF-OIR assumed all previous CJFLCC-OIR responsibilities. However, because CJFLCC-OIR was active during our fieldwork, this report references CJFLCC-OIR and CJTF-OIR as different commands.

  ○ **CJFLCC-OIR J7** was the training authority for CJFLCC-OIR. This directorate developed operational plans, and executed training through Building Partner Capacity sites and Centralized Training Facilities. It achieved this through regular liaison with the training branches (M7) of the Ministry of Defense and the MoI. When CJTF-OIR assumed CJFLCC-OIR responsibilities, the CJFLCC-OIR J7 was immediately absorbed in its pre-April 2018 state into CJTF-OIR and was renamed the CJTF-OIR Training Directorate.

• **Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I)** operates under the Chief of Mission (Department of State) authority but is administered by DoD personnel. The OSC-I conducts “security cooperation and security assistance to ensure the enduring strategic partnership between the U.S. Military and the Government of Iraq Security Forces.”

• **1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC)** is a subordinate command of United States Army Central. In addition to providing sustainment support for U.S. forces within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, the 1st TSC is also responsible for transporting equipment into and throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, including Iraq, and divesting all equipment to Iraqi Police Hold Force units.

**Counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund**

On November 7, 2014, former President Obama released the strategy to defeat ISIS, which involved nine lines of effort. The DoD was responsible for two of these lines of effort, Denying Safe Haven and Building Partner Capacity. Section 1236 of the

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14 Security cooperation is defined by DoD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA)” October 27, 2010, as activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs. DoD Instruction 5000.68 defines security assistance as a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

15 United States Army Central is responsible for planning, coordinating, and employing land forces within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.
FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act established the underlying authorities for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) to enable the DoD to advance these lines of effort and to grant authority for DoD to train, advise, assist, and equip the ISF.\footnote{Public Law 113-291, “Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,” Section 1236, December 19, 2014.}

The ITEF authorized the Secretary of Defense (in coordination with the Secretary of State) “to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq” for the purposes of:

1. “Defending Iraq, its people, allies, and partner nations from the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and groups supporting ISIL;” and
2. “Securing the territory of Iraq.”

The FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations formally requested the consolidation of ITEF and the Syria Train and Equip Fund into the CTEF. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 established CTEF “to provide assistance, including training; equipment; logistics support, supplies, and services; stipends; infrastructure repair and renovation; and sustainment, to foreign security forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals participating, or preparing to participate in activities to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and their affiliated or associated groups.”\footnote{Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017. CTEF funding was extended by Section 1222 of P.L. 115-91, (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018) making funds available through September 30, 2019.}

**Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Mission**

The CTEF supports training, advising, assisting, and equipping the ISF.

**Train**

CTEF-funds are used to provide Iraqi Police Hold Force units training on Wide Area Security, Police Presence in a Box sets, and Border Guard in a Box sets.\footnote{Wide Area Security is the application of combat power to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; deny the enemy positions of advantage; and consolidate gains. Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets are mobile infrastructure provided to Local Police and Border Guard units to replace infrastructure destroyed during ISIS’ invasion. Army Publishing Directorate 3-0 “Unified Land Operations” October 2011.}

Additionally, Police Task Force–Iraq provides training to Federal Police units on traditional police functions (“blue policing”). This training is funded by Coalition countries and the European Union and delivered at the Camp Dublin–BPC site.\footnote{Blue policing refers to traditional police functions including establishing the rule of law and providing local security.} The training of Iraqi Police Hold Force units is discussed in Finding C.
Advise and Assist

The Department of the Army’s Field Manual on Support to Security Cooperation defines advise and assist as, “activities to provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF [foreign security forces] while carrying out the missions assigned to the [FSF] unit or organization.” It further explains that an advisor “mentors and guides the FSF by presenting options and methods that FSF can accept, reject, or modify to meet the needs of the FSF.” Officials from CJTF-OIR and CJFLCC-OIR stated that they do not conduct advise and assist activities with the Iraqi Police Hold Force, and that there are no plans to do so in the future. Advise and assist activities for Iraqi Police Hold Force units is discussed in Finding E.

Equip

CTEF-funds are used to provide equipment to Iraqi Police Hold Force units. Officials from CJTF-OIR stated that the CJTF-OIR CJ7 Partner Force Development developed the Iraqi Police Hold Force equipment requirements based on military judgement. The officials explained that CJTF-OIR first identified the critical terrain the Hold Force would assume upon completion of successful offensive operations. It then identified the composition of the Hold Forces in each area by number and type. CJTF-OIR decided to focus on making a small number of existing police units better, rather than recruiting a new force. CJTF-OIR CJ7 Partner Force Development developed equipment sets based on augmenting basic security force units with shoot, move, and communicate capabilities. The equipping of Iraqi Police Hold Force units is discussed in Finding B.

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21 CJTF-OIR identified Baghdad, the five western provinces (Dahuk, Ninawa, Anbar, Najaf, and Muthanna), critical infrastructure, and the western border with Syria.
22 “Shoot, move, and communicate” are basic infantry skills that, when applied, provide a soldier the ability to fight. As described in the Army Field Manual 3-21-8, “The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad” (March 2007), “when collectively applied by the fire team, squad, and platoon, these skills translate into combat power.” The skills include: accurately engaging the enemy with all available weapons, conducting individual tactical movement techniques, and providing accurate and timely information to those who need it.
Finding A

The Integration of the Hold Force Mission Into the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan

This Finding is discussed in the Classified Appendix.
Finding B

**Equipping of the Iraqi Police Hold Force**

We found that the equipment provided to Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq. Specifically, the equipment was provided to enable Iraqi Police Hold Force units to conduct clearing operations, establish checkpoints, and patrol liberated areas in order to restore the rule of law and prevent a future insurgency. Additionally, the Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets were provided to replace Police and Border Guard units’ infrastructure destroyed during the ISIS invasion.

**Discussion**

*Wide Area Security Force Equipment Sets*

According to Army Publishing Directorate 3-0 “Unified Land Operations” October 2011, Wide Area Security is the application of combat power to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; deny the enemy positions of advantage; and consolidate gains. Iraqi Police Hold Force units will use Wide Area Security techniques in conducting their mission. CJTF-OIR (CJ7 Partner Force Development), CJFLCC-OIR (trainers), and MoI (M7 Training and M4 Logistics) officials explained that Iraqi Police Hold Force units will primarily be used by the Government of Iraq to conduct clearing and checkpoint operations and provide local security. These tasks align with the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.

The provision of the Wide Area Security equipment sets is intended to support the Hold Force mission by providing the Iraqi Police Hold Force with “shoot, move, and communicate capabilities.” Specifically, Iraqi Police Hold Force units will use this equipment to conduct clearing and checking operations in order to secure liberated territories and patrol areas to restore the rule of law and prevent a future insurgency.

Police Hold Force units attending the Wide Area Security training program receive equipment at two points during the course. At the start, the units receive clothing, individual equipment, weapons, and the ammunition needed for the training. Upon completing the course, the units receive the remainder of the ammunition. A CJTF-OIR official stated that the equipment sets contain the “most basic on-the-body equipment needed to conduct checkpoint operations.” The equipment sets include a helmet, body armor (with two plates), individual first aid kit, canteen, and AK-47 (with four magazines).
Police Presence in a Box

The provision of Police Presence in a Box equipment sets was intended to support the Hold Force mission by providing Iraqi Local Police Force units with mobile infrastructure to temporarily replace police facilities destroyed during the ISIS invasion. Specifically, Police Presence in a Box sets, as shown in the Figure, are deployed as mobile police command stations in liberated areas that formerly had government infrastructure which ISIS destroyed. The Police Presence in a Box sets are intended to enable the police to re-establish a presence rapidly in the liberated areas. This should support the transition from offensive military operations to security functions and allow for basic policing functions to resume restoring the rule of law and preventing a future insurgency.

According to CJTF-OIR, once ISIS no longer controls territory, it conducts terror attacks and raises funds through organized crime in newly liberated territories. With 85 percent of police locations in liberated territories destroyed, CJTF-OIR determined that Iraqi police needed an early, visible, and sustained presence in liberated territories to deny freedom of maneuver to ISIS. As a result, the CJTF-OIR CJ7 Ministry Liaison team developed the equipment requirements for

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23 The Police Presence in a Box is also referred to as a Hold Force Response Set.
the Police Presence in a Box sets with Local Police planning officers from the provinces of Ninewah, Diyala, and Salah Ad Din. Major items in these sets include a container, a large tent, a generator, communications equipment, inspection and detainee handling supplies, two Toyota Land Cruisers, and various force-protection, security and safety items.

Officials from the MoI and CJFLCC-OIR explained that when ISIS invaded and the ISF withdrew its forces, causing Iraqi citizens to flee from their homes, Iraqi citizens lost faith and trust in the Government of Iraq and the ISF. A CJTF-OIR CJ7 Partner Force Development official stated that a major function of the Police Presence in a Box is to allow the Iraqi police to be seen in the newly liberated territories in order to begin restoring trust. The official explained that as Iraqi citizens return to their homes, the Police Presence in a Box set and the police officers that occupy the liberated area are the first visible sign of an Iraqi government presence, and stated that this initial contact is an important step in restoring trust in the Government of Iraq.

In January 2017, the Commander of CJTF-OIR approved the purchase of 100 Police Presence in a Box sets. The first two Police Presence in a Box sets are located at MoI training locations. Additionally, according to CJTF-OIR, the 1st TSC has divested the remaining 98 Police Presence in a Box sets to the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

**Border Guard in a Box**

Border Guard in a Box sets were provided to support the Hold Force mission with mobile infrastructure to temporarily replace their facilities which were destroyed during the ISIS invasion. Specifically, the Border Guard in a Box was provided to enable Border Guard units to rapidly establish an immediate presence along the Iraq-Syria border to restore the integrity of Iraq's western border.

The Border Guard is tasked with securing Iraq's western borders, conducting Hold Force operations, and ultimately serving as the western flank of the Hold Force. In this role, the Border Guard is required to protect Iraq from terrorist elements and detect and defeat squad-sized hostile elements along Iraq’s border with Syria. According to CJTF-OIR, during its invasion, ISIS destroyed approximately 80 percent of Border Guard facilities and looted 100 percent of Border Guard equipment and vehicles. Thus, CJTF-OIR developed the Border Guard in a Box to give the Border Guard temporary structures and equipment to enable them to control liberated areas along the border and deliver basic security and law and order capabilities.

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24 An Army Infantry squad contains nine soldiers with various small arms.
The Border Guard Command, in coordination with Coalition border-security experts, developed the equipment list that comprises the Border Guard in a Box sets. The Border Guard in a Box sets provide equipment to:

- establish a physical presence;
- prevent insurgents from crossing the border; and
- maintain minimum rule of law requirements.

Each Border Guard in a Box consists of a 40-foot container with equipment and two vehicles. Major items in the equipment sets include the container, tent, signs, water, tables, chairs, spike strip, razor wire, megaphone, cones, lights, Border Guard vests, evidence stationary, bags, and two vehicles.

In February 2017, the Commander of CJTF-OIR approved the purchase of 100 Border Guard in a Box sets. 1st TSC divested 99 of the Border Guard in a Box sets to the Border Guard Force. As of April 2018, a senior Iraqi Border Guard Official reported that 44 of the 99 divested boxes are already deployed to Border Guard outposts on the Syrian border, with the remaining 55 sets staged at an unknown location for deployment.

**Lack of Feedback Regarding Equipment**

While the equipment provided to Iraqi Police Hold Force units was intended to support the Hold Force mission, we were unable to determine whether the equipment increases the Iraqi Police Hold Force’s capability to meet current requirements. Specifically, the lack of U.S. and Coalition advisors supporting Iraqi Police Hold Force units resulted in a limited ability to assess unit capabilities and operations. CJTF-OIR and CJFLCC-OIR officials explained that the commands received very little feedback on the implementation and deployment of the Police Presence in a Box and the Border Guard in a Box sets. For example, as of April 2018, CJTF-OIR only knew the locations of 31 of the 99 Border Guard Boxes that it had provided to the Border Guard Forces. Additionally, a CJFLCC-OIR trainer stated that, by not receiving feedback on the how the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Police Hold Force units use the equipment, it is difficult to adjust the equipment CJTF-OIR provides to Iraqi Police Hold Force units based on the current situation on the ground. This issue is further discussed in Finding E.

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25 The one remaining box is located at the Besmaya-BPC site for training purposes.
Conclusion

The Equipment provided to the Iraqi Police Hold Force supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq. Specifically, the Wide Area Security equipment sets were provided to enable Iraqi Police Hold Force units to conduct clearing operations, checkpoints, and patrols. Additionally, the Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets were provided to supply Police and Border Guard units with mobile infrastructure to replace their facilities destroyed during the ISIS invasion.
Finding C

Training the Iraqi Police Hold Force

We found that the Programs of Instruction (POIs) conducted by the Coalition countries training Iraqi Police Hold Force units were consistent with regard to content and method of instruction. Further, the training was designed to support the Hold Force mission.

Specifically, training courses funded by the Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund were designed to:

- Support Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command–Operation Inherent Resolve and the Ministries of Defense and Interior’s intention to create a Wide Area Security Force composed of police units to support long-term stability and security in Iraq; and

- Provide Iraqi Police Hold Force units the skills needed to use the Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets as command stations that replace infrastructure destroyed during the ISIS invasion and restore the public’s trust in the Iraqi government.

Additionally, Police Task Force–Iraq used funding from the European Union and other Coalition countries to support training programs on traditional police functions ranging from basic policing to advanced courses focusing on specialized skills.

Discussion

CTEF-Funded Training Programs

The Hold Force mission is to secure liberated areas and prevent a future insurgency in Iraq. CJFLCC-OIR determined that to accomplish this mission the ISF needed a Wide Area Security Force and mobile infrastructure to temporarily replace infrastructure destroyed during the ISIS invasion. As a result, CJFLCC-OIR and Police Task Force-Iraq developed the following three training POIs to support these needs.

- **Wide Area Security Training Program**: This 4-week POI is designed to deliver security and counterinsurgency oriented training to train police units in security operations within a counterinsurgency environment in order to support stability and security once the conventional threat posed by ISIS is defeated.

- **Police Presence in a Box Training Program**: This 12-day POI is designed to provide Police Station Commanders (Heads of the Iraqi Local Police) with “the capability to manage the small unit that will execute the basic police duties in the assigned area of responsibilities.”

- **Border Guard Presence in a Box Project Training Program**: This 12-day POI is designed to train Border Guard units on using the box (and the equipment provided in the box) to take effective control of the border by rapidly establishing Border Guard command locations along the Iraq-Syria border.

Traditional Police Functional Training Programs

Officials from USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, and CJFLCC-OIR explained that CTEF could not be used to fund the training of traditional “blue policing” functions because the purpose of CTEF funded training programs must be linked to countering ISIS. In order to fill this capability gap, Police Task Force–Iraq used funding from other Coalition countries and the European Union to support training programs on traditional police functions ranging from basic policing to advanced courses focusing on specialized skills. The training activities listed below are the most frequent “blue policing” courses taught at Camp Dublin:

- **Law and Order Training Program**: This 8-week POI is designed to provide local police training on the skills needed to restore the rule of law and establish basic policing in areas liberated from ISIS. The course focuses on police duties in an urban context with training on topics such as riot control, patrolling, and crime-scene procedures.
• **Community Policing Training Program:** This 5-day POI is designed to provide local police with a firm understanding of the concepts of community policing, develop the skills necessary to work within the community, and show local police how to develop relationships with key community partners across religious, ethnic, and gender lines.\(^{26}\)

• **Police Advanced Training Program:** This 8-week POI is an intensive training program for units within the Iraqi Police that are similar to Special Weapons and Tactics teams.\(^{27}\) It focuses on developing advanced shooting skills and the capability to clear buildings. The curriculum also includes specialized skill training on topics such as urban climbing, basic first aid, close protection, and conducting negotiations.

• **Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Training Program:** This 4-week POI is designed to teach trainees how to defeat any kind of IED or booby trap. A significant portion of this course involves practical exercises on the range, giving Iraqi Police experience clearing IEDs before conducting C-IED operations.

### Program of Instruction Development and Coordination

Police Task Force–Iraq developed, coordinated, and oversaw the training of the Iraqi Police (including the Iraqi Police Hold Force). It develops the POIs for each course of training with specific input from the Coalition country responsible for conducting the training and in coordination with the Iraqi MoI. For example, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were the lead trainers for the Police Presence in a Box training and, thus, helped develop its POI.\(^{28}\) Once Police Task Force–Iraq developed the training POIs, it forwarded the POIs to CJFLCC-OIR J7 for final approval.

Police Task Force–Iraq also coordinated training for the Iraqi Police Hold Force among the Coalition countries conducting the training. Officials from CJTF-OIR and CJFLCC-OIR stated that each training course presented to Iraqi Police Hold Force units has a standardized POI no matter which Coalition country conducts the training or which BPC site hosts the training. As an example, the Wide Area Security Training program was conducted at four BPC sites run by trainers from different coalition countries. According to CJFLCC-OIR officials, all BPC sites used the same Wide Area Security training POI and trained to the same standards.

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\(^{26}\) According to the POI, Community policing is the concept that building trust with the public will result in greater cooperation and aid in detecting and preventing crime.

\(^{27}\) A Special Weapons and Tactics team provides increased law enforcement capabilities using specially trained and equipped tactical officers to prevent or respond to high-risk emergency incidents.

\(^{28}\) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is the Canadian national police service and has a multi-faceted mission that includes enforcing laws, investigating crime, protecting government officials, and supporting other law enforcement agencies. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s International Training Services has trained police from 140 countries in areas such as forensics, counter-terrorism, and drug enforcement.
CJFLCC-OIR J7 was responsible for ensuring all BPC sites use the same POI and train to the same standards. A CJFLCC-OIR official explained that during a review, it was discovered that each Coalition country trained with its own marksmanship targets. This resulted in training to differing marksmanship qualification standards. CJFLCC-OIR J7 identified this problem and now all BPC sites use the same marksmanship targets.

**Training Programs Support the Hold Force Mission and Coalition Plans**

The Iraqi Police Hold Force mission and U.S. and Coalition plans both focus on the need to secure the liberated territories in Iraq and prevent a future insurgency. Iraqi Police Hold Force training programs were designed to support these requirements.

The Police Presence in a Box and the Border Guard Presence in a Box Training Programs were designed to provide Iraqi Police Hold Force units the skills needed to use the Police Presence in a Box sets and the Border Guard Presence in a Box sets as command stations. An official from Police Task Force–Iraq explained that the boxes and the officers that occupy them are the first government presence seen by Iraqi citizens returning to areas reclaimed from ISIS, and that this visibility was important in restoring the Iraqi citizens’ trust in the Government of Iraq. Similarly, senior MoI officials emphasized the key role of the Police and Border Guard Presence in a Box sets in rebuilding confidence and trust. As of April 2018, 181 Iraqi Police Hold Force personnel completed the Police Presence in a Box Training Program and another 667 Border Guard personnel received Border Guard in a Box training. (As of April 2018, eight units were scheduled to enter into training.)

The Wide Area Security Training Program was designed to support CJFLCC-OIR and the Ministries of Defense and Interior’s intention to create a Wide Area Security Force composed of Police units to support long-term stability and security in Iraq. We observed CJFLCC-OIR trainers from the Spanish Guardia Civil train an Iraqi Energy Police unit on Wide Area Security tasks at Besmaya-BPC site in November 2017. The CJFLCC-OIR trainers actively participated in training and coached individual trainees on specific scenarios. For example, during checkpoint training, the trainer directed the units on stationary checkpoint skills such as

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29 The Guardia Civil, established in 1844, is a public security corps of a military nature that is part of the Spanish Security Forces and Corps. The Guardia Civil mission is to guarantee the protection of citizens, ensure legal compliance, bring criminals to justice, defend freedom of citizens, and preserve citizen security. In addition to national policing functions, the Guardia Civil also conducts special missions to help citizens, such as mountain rescue and the protection of natural resources.
screening individuals and dealing with approaching threats. The trainer also taught the police about establishing mobile checkpoints to prevent threats from avoiding checkpoint areas. In a raid scenario, the trainer coached trainees on specific roles, such as providing cover from a concealed position.

The Iraqi Energy Police unit commander and police officer trainees were enthusiastic about their training, stating that it provided them the skills they needed to conduct police work and defend against ISIS attacks. Similarly, the CJFLCC-OIR trainers and CJTF-OIR CJ7 Partner Force Development officials stated that the Wide Area Security Training Program taught Iraqi Police Hold Force units the skills they needed to perform Wide Area Security in newly liberated Iraqi territories. As of April 2018, 20,765 members of the Iraqi Police Hold Force completed this training and an additional 20 units were scheduled to attend the training in the future.

While the Iraqi Police Hold Force's use of Wide Area Security provides an initial security presence, according to CJTF-OIR officials, Iraq will ultimately require a police force capable of establishing effective governance and the stability required to prevent reemergence of ISIS or other insurgent groups. Additionally, Iraqi Police Hold Force units must conduct high-risk operations in urban areas such as arresting criminals, preventing terror attacks, and protecting sensitive targets. Coalition partners provide training programs on Law and Order, Police Advanced Training, and Counter-IED to develop these skills in the Iraqi Police Hold Force units. A CJFLCC-OIR trainer explained that, after establishing an initial presence and security, the Police Hold Force should begin working with tribal elders to gain community support. The Coalition's Community Policing training teaches the Police Hold Force the skills needed to interact with the local community and develop relationships with community leaders.

**Lack of Feedback Regarding Training**

While the training provided to Iraqi Police Hold Force units supports the Hold Force mission, we were unable to determine whether the training increased the Iraqi Police Hold Force's capability to meet current requirements. Specifically, the lack of U.S. and Coalition advisors directly supporting Iraqi Police Hold Force units limited the Coalition's ability to assess unit capability and operations. For example, a CJFLCC-OIR trainer stated that, by not receiving feedback on the implementation and deployment of the Police Presence in a Box sets, they cannot adapt training POIs based on field operations experience. This issue is further discussed in Finding E.
Conclusion

Iraqi Police Hold Force units received CTEF-funded training on Wide Area Security, Police Presence in a Box, and Border Guard in a Box capabilities. Iraqi Police Hold Force units also receive training from other Coalition countries and the European Union on traditional police functions. These training courses support the Hold Force Mission of securing liberated areas by teaching Iraqi Police Hold Force units the skills needed to conduct wide area security. Additionally, the training courses support the Hold Force Mission of preventing a future insurgency by training Iraqi Police Hold Force units on traditional “blue policing” functions.
Finding D

Sustainment and Maintenance of Iraqi Police Hold Force Equipment

We found that:

- CJTF-OIR and Iraqi MoI officials agreed that the MoI could provide the necessary maintenance and sustainment of CTEF purchased equipment provided to the Iraqi Police Hold Force.
- CJTF-OIR provided equipment to the Iraqi Police Hold Force in a way that ultimately encouraged the Iraqis to sustain their own equipment. CJTF-OIR did this by providing equipment which the Iraqis were familiar and which did not require specialized parts or knowledge to maintain.
- Training courses attended by Iraqi Police Hold Force units included periods of instruction on maintenance and sustainment of equipment.

Discussion

The Ministry of Interior’s Maintenance and Sustainment Capability

CJTF-OIR can use CTEF to purchase spare parts for the maintenance and sustainment of Iraqi Police Hold Force equipment. However, according to CJTF-OIR officials, the Government of Iraq and the MoI have ultimate responsibility to maintain and sustain their own equipment. CJTF-OIR officials from CJ7 Ministry Liaison Team and CJ7 Partner Force Development believe the Government of Iraq has the necessary maintenance and sustainment capability for CTEF purchased equipment. Additionally, a senior MoI M4 official stated that the MoI has the capability and spare parts that are needed to maintain equipment in its warehouses and in front-line mobile maintenance shops.

According to CJTF-OIR reports from key leader engagements with MoI officials, CJTF-OIR’s CJ7 Ministry Liaison Team concluded that the MoI has the capability to maintain CTEF-purchased equipment. The reports explained that, according to MoI officials, the Hold Force organizations have the capability to support minor repairs at the Battalion and Brigade levels. CJTF-OIR corroborated this by stating that the Federal Police are able to buy spare parts from the local economy.

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30 Key leader engagements refer to U.S. forces direct coordination with foreign leaders. Army Field Manual 3-22, “Army Support to Security Cooperation,” June 21, 2013, explains that key leader engagements should be carefully planned and coordinated to achieve desired effect.
Additionally, an MoI M4 official reported to the CJTF-OIR CJ7 Ministry Liaison team that the Border Guard currently relies on the Federal Police to help sustain armored security vehicles while it develops its own capability. Moreover, the Border Guard is in the process of establishing a maintenance facility to repair night-vision goggles, with the goal that all night-vision goggle repairs become centralized at that location.

**Planning for Iraqi Provided Maintenance and Sustainment**

A CJTF-OIR CJ7 Partner Force Development official stated that the goal of the U.S. is to provide equipment and support in a way that ultimately encourages the Iraqis to sustain their own equipment by providing equipment that did not need specialized parts or knowledge to maintain and with which the Iraqis were familiar. For example, the Wide Area Security force equipment sets and Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets include equipment Iraqis are familiar with and that do not need specialized parts or knowledge to maintain. Specifically, the Wide Area Security force equipment set includes AK-47s with cleaning kits and the Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets include Toyota Land Cruisers.

AK-47s are widely available in Iraq and Iraqis have experience using and sustaining these weapons. A CJTF-OIR official explained that the reason Toyota Land Cruisers are part of the Police Presence in a Box and Border Guard in a Box sets is the widespread availability of spare parts for these vehicle on the Iraqi economy. This means that when a Toyota Land Cruiser needs maintenance an Iraqi mechanic can easily purchase the needed part and fix the problem. This is different from when a specialized vehicle needs maintenance. For example, if a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle needs maintenance the mechanic might not have the specialized knowledge required to fix it and would not have easy access to the spare parts.31

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31 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles are highly survivable multi-mission platforms capable of mitigating improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, explosively formed penetrators, underbody mines and small arms fire threats. MRAP provides light forces with protected mobility and mounted firepower.
**Maintenance and Sustainment Training**

Iraqi Police Hold Force units attended training courses that included periods of instruction on maintenance and sustainment of equipment. The Wide Area Security Force Training includes weapons maintenance. The training enables all trainees to keep their weapons in working order through daily and field maintenance. To successfully complete the course, trainees must:

- demonstrate the correct strip and assemble drill for their assigned weapon;\(^{32}\)
- perform the daily maintenance process on their weapon; and
- execute the function safety test on command without requiring direction.\(^{33}\)

Additionally, the Police Presence in a Box and the Border Guard Presence in a Box POIs include training on the use, maintenance, and basic logistic capabilities of equipment provided to enable its long-term sustainability. To successfully complete the course, trainees must:

- sustain and manage all the materials contained in the box including tent, generator, communications equipment, inspection and detainee handling supplies, and Toyota Land Cruisers; and
- understand all the aspects of the logistics accountability responsibilities of the Commander or Head of the box.

**Conclusion**

CJTF-OIR provided equipment and support in a way that encouraged the Iraqis to sustain their own equipment by providing equipment that the Iraqis were familiar with and that did not need specialized parts or knowledge to maintain. Additionally, CJTF-OIR included instruction on maintenance and sustainment in all CTEF-provided training POIs. Based on key leader engagements with the MoI, CJTF-OIR officials believe the MoI and its police forces, including the Police Hold Force, have the ability to provide necessary maintenance and sustainment of CTEF-provided equipment.

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\(^{32}\) The strip and assemble drill refers to taking apart a weapon for cleaning and reassembling the weapon. The drill standard is to clean, inspect and lubricate the rifle and magazine so that they function correctly.

\(^{33}\) A Function Safety test confirms that a rifle operates correctly with the selector switch in each position. The selector switch is used to place an AK-47 on safe (cannot fire), semiautomatic (pull the trigger for each shot), or automatic (hold down the trigger - fires at 700 rounds a minute).
Finding E

Advise and Assist of Police Units Conducting Hold Force Operations

We found that U.S. and Coalition Forces did not provide advise and assist activities to the Iraqi Police Hold Force units conducting Hold Force operations because competing command priorities results in CJFLCC-OIR focusing its advise and assist resources on Iraqi units conducting offensive operations. As a result, the Command had limited visibility of current Iraqi Police Hold Force operations and could not fully determine Iraqi Police Hold Force unit capabilities or adequately assess future training and equipping requirements.

Discussion

Lack of Resources and Competing Command Priorities

CJFLCC-OIR was responsible for providing advise and assist activities to the ISF. However, due to competing command priorities, CJFLCC-OIR determined that it did not have the resources to advise and assist the Iraqi Police Hold Force at the unit level. A CJTF-OIR official stated that CJFLCC-OIR focuses its advise and assist resources on ISF units conducting offensive operations. Specifically, CJFLCC-OIR and CJTF-OIR have advise and assist teams at the brigade level and higher, and Coalition special operations forces have an advise and assist mission with Iraqi tribal forces, Counterterrorism Services, and Federal Police units conducting offensive operations. A CJTF-OIR senior official stated that it was a deliberate decision not to provide advise and assist support to Iraqi Police Hold Force units conducting Hold Force operations.

Inability to Assess Capabilities, Current Operations, and Future Training and Equipping Requirements

DoD Instruction 5000.68 explains that Security Force Assistance encompasses “DoD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces . . . .” These efforts are conducted by, with, and through the foreign security forces. By not conducting

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35 According to DoD Instruction 500.68, the expression “by, with, and through” “describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces that initially involves training and assisting (interacting “with” the forces). The next step in the process is advising, which may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the forces). The final phase is achieved when foreign security forces operate independently (act “by” themselves).”
advise and assist activities with the Iraqi Police Hold Force, CJFLCC-OIR and CJTF-OIR cannot fully assess unit capabilities, current operations, or future training and equipping requirements of the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

Representatives from CJTF-OIR, CJFLCC-OIR, and OSC-I expressed concerns over their inability to evaluate the operational capability of the Iraqi Police Hold Force units and determine future training and equipping requirements. CJTF-OIR and CJFLCC-OIR officials explained that the commands received very little feedback on the implementation and deployment of the Police Presence in a Box and the Border Guard in a Box sets. For example, as of April 2018, CJTF-OIR only knew the locations of 31 of the 99 Border Guard Boxes it divested to the Border Guard Forces. Additionally, a CJFLCC-OIR trainer stated that, by not receiving feedback on the implementation and deployment of the Police Presence in a Box sets, CJFLCC-OIR could not adapt training POIs to the current situation. He explained that the same is true for the equipment requirements; by not receiving feedback on implementation, CJTF-OIR may not be able to adjust the equipment it provides to the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

While CJTF-OIR's CJ7 Ministry Liaison team's key leader engagements with senior MoI officials influence the equipping and training requirements of the Iraqi Police Hold Force, it solely relied on the MoI's projected requirements based on the MoI's perceived current situation in the field. A CJTF-OIR CJ7 Ministry Liaison team official commented that the MoI lacked transparency and, by not conducting advise and assist activities with the Iraqi Police Hold Force, CJTF-OIR could not develop an independent assessment of current capabilities and requirements.

A CJFLCC-OIR senior official stated that CJFLCC-OIR could indirectly assess the training and current capability of the Iraqi Police Hold Force units by reviewing crime and casualty reports for locations before and after units attended training to show their current capability. However, a CJTF-OIR official stated that the commands were not currently doing anything to determine the capability of the Iraqi Police Hold Force, and suggested that they ask units to provide feedback reporting on the use of the equipment and the usefulness of training once the units are deployed into the field.
Conclusion

U.S. and Coalition Forces did not provide advise and assist activities to Iraqi Police Hold Force units conducting Hold Force operations because the limited advise and assist resources were focused on offensive operations. As a result, CJTF-OIR may not be able to assess unit capabilities, current operations, and the future training and equipping requirements of the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation E

We recommend that the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve implement procedures to ensure that feedback concerning unit capabilities, current operations, and the future training and equipping requirements of Iraqi Police Hold Force units flows from the field to Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve.

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff of CJTF-OIR, responding for the Commander of CJTF-OIR, agreed with our recommendation, stating that four processes and entities address the flow of feedback from the field back to CJTF-OIR. Specifically:

- The Force Generation Working Group was directed to capture future training and equipping requirements at the brigade level and below.
- The Iraqis provide the Iraqi Police Hold Force requirements through the Directorate of Training and Joint Operations Center–Iraq.
- The Ministry Liaison Team receives feedback directly from the Iraqi Police Forces and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.
- The CJTF-OIR Directorate of Training has an Assessment and Lessons Learned team that assesses Iraqi Security Forces strength, capabilities, and development (pre-and post-POI) as well as collects data from BPC sites. The lessons learned are then validated and fed back into the POIs.
Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve addressed all specifics of the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We have evidence that the Ministry Liaison Team received feedback directly from the Iraqi Police Hold Forces and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. However, the command did not provide evidence of the other remedial actions. To close the recommendation, we request additional information that documents that:

- The Force Generation Working Group captured future training and equipping requirements at the brigade level and below.
- The Directorate of Training and Joint Operations Center–Iraq received Iraqi Police Hold Force requirements from the Iraqis.
- The Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Directorate of Training assessed Iraqi Police Hold Force unit strength and capabilities (pre- and post-Program of Instruction), and included the lessons learned in future Programs of Instruction.
Notice of Concern

During our evaluation, we found that the storage of U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives at the Iraqi-owned and -managed Besmaya Range Complex basic load ammunition holding area potentially put the safety and lives of U.S. and Coalition personnel stationed at BPC-Besmaya and Iraqi personnel at the Besmaya Range Complex at risk. Specifically:

- U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the basic load ammunition holding area were at risk of sabotage, damage, and theft because of the Iraqi-provided security practices; and
- U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the basic load ammunition holding area were vulnerable to a simultaneous detonation that could pose a threat to the lives and safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel stationed at BPC-Besmaya and Iraqi personnel at the Besmaya Range Complex because of the Iraqi-provided safety practices.

On February 16, 2018, the DoD OIG issued a notice of concern to the Commander of USCENTCOM regarding these issues. The 1st TSC responded on behalf of USCENTCOM to the notice of concern and our associated recommendation on March 3, 2018. Both the notice of concern and the 1st TSC’s response are included in Appendix C.

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation

We recommended that the Commander of United States Central Command assess conditions at the basic load ammunition holding area and implement necessary corrective actions to ensure the safety of U.S. and Coalition military personnel stationed at building partner capacity site-Besmaya and ensure the security and safety of U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives.

1st Theater Sustainment Command Comments

The 1st TSC, answering on behalf of the Commander of USCENTCOM, agreed with the recommendation, specifically stating that CJFLCC-OIR, through CJTF-OIR, approved a Memorandum of Request to fund the refurbishment of the basic load ammunition holding area, with construction to begin in

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36 A basic load ammunition holding area is a storage area for ammunition located within the boundaries of a barracks or in the immediate vicinity thereof to ensure mission readiness.
March 2018. Additionally, the response states that the 1st TSC is developing a plan to remove the CTEF-ammunition from Besmaya and redistribute it to ammunitions sites at Taji and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center.

**Our Response**

Comments from management addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that construction for the refurbishment at the basic load ammunition holding area is complete and that the 1st TSC redistributed ammunition from Besmaya to ammunitions sites at Taji and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center.
Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this evaluation from September 2017 through July 2018 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation” published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency in January 2012. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on our objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on our objective.

The DoD OIG originally announced this evaluation on March 17, 2017, with the objective to evaluate the U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Federal Police in support of operations against ISIS. The heavy-losses suffered by the Iraqi Federal Police during the Mosul counter offensive caused us to terminate the evaluation and on September 8, 2017 announce a new evaluation focused on the Iraqi Police Hold Force. The objective of this evaluation was to evaluate the U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip an Iraqi Police Hold Force in support of stability operations. We modified our objective to “determine whether U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.”

Specifically, we determined whether:

1. The Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq was integrated into the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve campaign plan.

2. The Programs of Instruction of the Coalition countries conducting training for Iraqi Police Hold Force units were consistent with regard to content and method of instruction and whether the training content supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.

3. The training received by Iraqi Police Hold Force units supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.

4. The equipping of the Iraqi Police Hold Force supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.
5. The Commander of CJTF-OIR had a sustainment plan in place for U.S.-provided equipment.

6. The manning requirements (recruitment and retention) were being met.37

7. The Advise and Assist efforts of the command supported the Hold Force mission of securing liberated areas and preventing a future insurgency in Iraq.

Scope
We included the following areas in this project’s scope:

- Policies, plans, and activities conducted by U.S. and Coalition Forces related to efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force, including interagency coordination.
- U.S. and Coalition funding for train, advise, assist, and equip tasks involving the Iraqi Police Hold Force.
- Activities conducted by DoD entities in CONUS pertaining to efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force.
- Issues pertaining to the growth, performance, and operational readiness of the Iraqi Police Hold Force.
- Opinions of defense officials in the Iraqi government and U.S. and Coalition officials in all commands involved with the Iraqi Police Hold Force.
- U.S. and Coalition contributions to Iraqi plans, orders, decrees, and other guidance associated with the efforts to develop the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

Methodology
We visited or contacted organizations and individuals in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq that were directly responsible for training, advising, assisting, or equipping the Iraqi Police Hold Force. We also reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, DoD directives and instructions, and appropriate USCENTCOM (and subordinate command) orders and guidance.

We met and interviewed individuals from the following CONUS organizations:

- United States Central Command
- Joint Staff J-5 Directorate (Strategic Plans and Policy)
- Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency

37 We determined that U.S. and Coalition Forces do not have a direct role or responsibility in the Iraq’s personnel recruitment and retention process and thus did not further evaluate this issue.
We conducted site visits in Iraq and Kuwait and interviewed individuals from the following Commands:

- Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve
- 1st Theater Sustainment Command
- Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command—Operation Inherent Resolve
- Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq
- Combined Joint Operations Command—Baghdad
- Iraqi Ministry of Interior
  - M7 – Training
  - M4 – Logistics

**Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to support our findings.
Appendix B

Prior Coverage

During the last 8 years, the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and the DoD Office of Inspector General issued several reports that are significant within the context of the objective of our assessment.


Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html.

Unrestricted, archived Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reports can be accessed at www.sigir.mil.

**Government Accountability Office**


This report evaluated and provided recommendations to the DoD to enhance the DoD’s documentation and management of the Global Train and Equip Program and to ensure timely completion of required Congressional assessment reporting.


This report assessed needs and key requirements within the advising mission, assessed the validation of the personnel mix in support of the advising mission, and assessed the training requirements related to augmented personnel.

**Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**


This report found the Iraqi Special Operations Forces to be capable of executing independent operations, that it had a mutually supportive relationship with U.S. Special Operations Forces, and that its training doctrine and organization were sound. The report also identified two areas of concern: the extra-constitutional movement of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces from the Ministry of Defense to the Office of the Prime Minister and the uncertainty of the Government of Iraq’s support for the force due to personnel and sustainment issues.

This report found that U.S. forces met the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act and Title 10 United States Code requirements for equipping the Counter Terrorist Services for combat operations. Additionally, the report identified warehouse equipment drawing constraints, training courses lacked well-defined standards, and live-fire training as inadequate to prepare students for combat.


This report evaluated whether the DoD had effective procedures for securing ITEF weapons in Kuwait and Iraq. The evaluation team identified that combat sustainment support battalions, specifically incoming and outgoing Kuwait combat sustainment support battalions, did not consistently follow established procedures.


This report identified issues in the logistic and supply chains that support the equipping of the Kurdish Security Forces. It recommended that the Commanding General of USCENTCOM determine requirements and issue a written plan, execute the written plan, and conduct follow-on periodic reviews to monitor readiness and address issues.


This report evaluated the extent to which Tribal Resistance Forces have enabled their combat effectiveness and successful integration into the Iraqi National Security Forces.


This report evaluated the effectiveness of DoD, USCENTCOM, and Coalition plans, operations, and resources to train, advise, and assist the Iraqi Army to initiate and sustain combat operations to defeat ISIS.

This report identified systemic challenges and problem areas, with related lessons learned, in the U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop partner-nation security forces to include training and equipping of partner-nation security forces and advisory assistance in support of partner-nation security forces and ministries.


This report evaluated whether the DoD met requirements to effectively execute the plan for transitioning authority, personnel, and equipment from the DoD to the Chief of Mission Baghdad, and whether the DoD provided the required support to meet initial operating capability to ensure that the OSC-I, at full operating capability, would be sufficient to accomplish the mission of supporting Iraq Security Forces capability development.


This report was the ninth in a series of reports that focused on the train and equip mission in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The report found that U.S. forces had made significant progress in developing the logistics-sustainment capability of the ISF when compared with their assessments of similar focus in 2007 and 2008.
Appendix C

Notice of Concern

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

February 16, 2018

SUBJECT: Security and Safety Concerns at the Besmaya Range Complex Pose a Threat to U.S. Personnel Stationed at Building Partner Capacity Site – Besmaya (Project No. D2018-D005PO-0018.000)

This memorandum results from recent fieldwork conducted in Iraq, supporting a Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) evaluation, entitled “U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip an Iraqi Police Hold Force in Support of Stability Operations.” We will include this memorandum and any management comments received on the suggested actions in the final report. Please respond with actions proposed or taken in response to this memorandum within 14 calendar days of its receipt.

Issues of Concern

The storage of U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives at the Iraqi-owned and -managed Besmaya Range Complex basic load ammunition holding area (BLAHA) potentially puts at risk the safety and lives of U.S. and Coalition personnel stationed at Building Partner Capacity (BPC) site – Besmaya and Iraqi personnel at the Besmaya Range Complex. Specifically:

- U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the BLAHA are at risk of sabotage, damage, and theft because of the Iraqi-provided security practices.
- U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the BLAHA are vulnerable to a simultaneous detonation that could pose a threat to the lives and safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel stationed at BPC – Besmaya and Iraqi personnel at the Besmaya Range Complex because of the Iraqi provided-safety practices.

Criteria

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 6055.09E, “Explosives Safety Management (ESM),” November 18, 2016, incorporating Change 1, July 28, 2017, applies to explosives safety management associated with:

- DoD military munitions on DoD land or in DoD facilities, on non-DoD land, or in non-DoD facilities; and
- The potential impact on DoD activities or operations on base or nearby.

1 Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) purchased equipment that has not yet been given (divested) to the Iraqi Security Forces is still U.S.-owned material.
Notice of Concern (cont’d)

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.16, “Explosives Safety Management Program,” July 29, 2008, incorporating Change 2, November 14, 2017, states that it is “DoD policy to provide the maximum possible protection to people and property from the damaging effects of DoD military munitions” in accordance with DoDD 6055.09E.

Background

Besmaya Range Complex is a large Iraqi military training base that contains a Spanish-led BPC site and an Iraqi-managed BLAHA. The U.S. has 33 military members stationed at BPC – Besmaya, 13 of which are assigned to the 275th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (275th CSSB).

Representatives from the DoD OIG, along with the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Iraq (CJFLCC-I) and the 275th CSSB, visited the BLAHA on November 11, 2017. Officials from the 275th CSSB explained to the DoD OIG evaluation team that CTEF-purchased ammunition and explosives (U.S. owned ammunition and explosives) cannot be stored on BPC – Besmaya because of net explosive weight capacity limits and the close proximity to U.S. and Coalition living quarters. As a result, the 275th CSSB uses shipping containers on the Iraqi-managed BLAHA to store the ammunition and explosives.

Representatives from the 275th CSSB and CJFLCC-I informed the DoD OIG team that the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) and Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) were aware of the BLAHA conditions and that the 1st TSC Inspector General had sent a team to conduct an inspection. We have requested a copy of the resulting inspection report by the 1st TSC Inspector General through the Army Inspector General but have not yet received it.

During its visit to the BLAHA, the DoD OIG team observed security procedures and unsafe ammunition and explosive storage practices that could pose a threat to the lives and safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel stationed at BPC – Besmaya and Iraqi personnel at the Besmaya Range Complex. We outline these issues below.

Security

U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the Iraqi-owned and -managed BLAHA are at risk of sabotage, damage, and theft because of Iraqi-provided security practices at the BLAHA. For example, the DoD OIG team observed severely deteriorated perimeter barriers surrounding the BLAHA and multiple gaps in the barbed wire atop the barriers, which could allow unauthorized entry into the BLAHA. Additionally, according to an official from the 275th CSSB, the entry control points at the BLAHA are run-down and do not provide proper security. The DoD OIG team observed three Iraqi-security personnel guarding the BLAHA who appeared lax and did not actively patrol. One Iraqi security guard was wearing sandals and was not carrying a weapon. These security practices leave the BLAHA and the U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored there vulnerable to sabotage, damage, and theft.
Notice of Concern (cont’d)

Safety

U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored in shipping containers at the Iraqi-owned and -managed BLAHA are vulnerable to a simultaneous detonation that could pose a threat to the lives and safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel stationed at BPC – Besmaya and Iraqi personnel at the Besmaya Range Complex. This is because of the Iraqi-provided safety practices at the BLAHA. The DoD OIG team observed that the shipping containers were aligned next to each other without any HESCO barriers separating them and the HESCO barriers surrounding the perimeter of the BLAHA were severely deteriorated.²

During the DoD OIG team’s visit to the BLAHA, officials from the 275th CSSB expressed concern about their uncertainty of the net explosive weight of the ammunition and explosives stored at the BLAHA. They explained that there is a considerable amount of U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the BLAHA that is not projected to be divested to the Iraqi Security Forces. Officials from the 1st TSC also stated that there are plans to retrograde the U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives; however, the plan is still being developed. Additionally, an official from the 275th CSSB explained that due to the lack of net explosive weight capacity limits for the BLAHA (because it is on an Iraqi base), some coalition countries consolidate and store ammunition and explosives at the BLAHA. The 275th CSSB official stated that there was no way to determine the amount or type of ammunition and explosives that the other coalition countries store at the BLAHA. This coalition ammunition is in addition to any U.S.- and Iraqi-owned ammunition and explosives stored at the BLAHA.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Commander, United States Central Command, assess conditions at the BLAHA and implement necessary corrective actions to ensure the safety of U.S. and Coalition military personnel stationed at BPC – Besmaya, and ensure the security and safety of U.S.-owned ammunition and explosives.

Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

² HESCO barriers are used as temporary to semi-permanent blast walls against explosions. They are made of a collapsible wire mesh container, heavy-duty fabric liner, and filled with rocks and dirt.
Management Responses to Notice of Concern

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General, “Security and Safety Concerns at the Besmaya Range Complex Pose a Threat to U.S. Personnel Stationed at Building Partner Capacity Site – Besmaya (Project No. D2016-D06SFO-0019.000)

1. In response to the recommendation of the assessment of the conditions at the Besmaya BLAHA and implementation of corrective actions, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1 TSC), with concurrent efforts from CJTF, has conducted safety surveys of the BLAHA (ref: MFR, CJTF-OIR Safety, Explosives Safety Site Visit, 16-19 December 2017, Besmaya, Iraq, dated 5 January 2018). All parties concur with the DoD OIG assessment that the HESCO barriers are deteriorated and of insufficient height. Moreover, the teams observed the same casual security noted by the aforementioned DoD report.

2. In January of 2018, CJFLCC, thru CJTF, approved a Memorandum of Request (MOR) for the funding of refurbishment at the BLAHA. Construction is to begin in March of 2018 to include the following:

   - Site preparation, soil compaction, leveling, and grading prior to filling HESCOs and installing Guard Towers
   - Install MIL 7 and MIL 10 HESCOs
   - Install pickets and concertina wire
   - Install camo netting
   - Install 4 Pre-fabricated Concrete Guard Towers
   - Minimize disturbing the ground outside the proposed project site

3. While these improvements will correct the degraded ammunition and explosives protective construction, it will not change the fact that the BLAHA is owned and operated by Iraqis over whom CJTF and 1 TSC have limited influence. Also, while the new concrete security towers will provide adequate guard facilities, it will not change the fact that the towers are manned by Iraqis whom may or may not apply any additional effort despite the improved site. This is not to state with any certainty that the Iraqis cannot or will not comply with safety and security measures; but CJTF and 1 TSC cannot positively control those actions.
Management Responses to Notice of Concern (cont’d)

ACT-SCK-CTEF
SUBJECT: Follow up to Department of Defense Inspector General, “Security and Safety Concerns at the Besmaya Range Complex Pose a Threat to U.S. Personnel Stationed at Building Partner Capacity Site – Besmaya (Project No. D2018-D00SPO-0018.000)

4. What is within our scope of our influence is our Soldiers and the ammunition for which we are responsible. Based on a visit to Besmaya by the 1TSC leadership, 1 TSC is developing a plan to remove the CTEF ammunition from Besmaya and redistribute it to the ammunition sites at Taji and Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC).

5. We are in conference with personnel from the CJTF-CJ7 Partner Force Development Cell to coordinate future ammunition divestitures to the Iraqi Forces from the alternate locations. With the shift from defeat ISIL operations to training Iraqi Security Forces with a more predictable schedule, we can effectively support training at Besmaya from other locations with no mission degradation.

6. Meanwhile, the construction efforts at the Besmaya BLAHA will improve the site and make it safer and more secure for the Iraqis themselves whom will continue to store their ammunition at the Besmaya BLAHA provided they follow safety guidelines.

7. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [REDACTED]

IREDRELL K. AGEE
COL, USA
1 TSC Director, CTEF
Management Responses to Notice of Concern (cont’d)

ACT-SCK-CTEF
SUBJECT: Follow up to Department of Defense Inspector General, “Security and Safety Concerns at the Besmaya Range Complex Pose a Threat to U.S. Personnel Stationed at Building Partner Capacity Site – Besmaya (Project No. D2018-D00SPO-0018.000)

Email pasted from COL Brian W. Ellis, Deputy CJTF, CJTF-OIR

Kit, with the options available I concur with the memo and actions to move CTIF ammo from Besmaya to Taji and BDSC due to the security issues.

r/Brian

BRIAN W. ELLIS
COL, USA
Deputy CJTF/Director, Partner Force Development
CJTF-OIR Forward / UNION III Baghdad, Iraq
Management Comments

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, United States Central Command (CENTCOM), 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101


2. (U) The draft report states on page 25: “We recommend that the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve implement procedures to ensure that feedback concerning unit capabilities, current operations, and the future training and equipping requirements of Iraqi Police Hold Force units flows from the field to Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.”

(U) CJTF-OIR Response: CONCUR. The following processes and entities address the flow of feedback from the field back to CJTF-OIR:

- (U) **Force Generation Working Group (FGWG)**: The FGWG has been directed to capture future training and equipping requirements at the brigade level and below.
- (U) **CounterISIS Train and Equip Funds (CTEF) process**: Feedback from the field is inherently captured in the CJTF-OIR CTEF process. Local police hold force requirements are provided by the Iraqis through the Directorate of Training (DIR-T) and Joint Operations Center-Iraq (JOC-I). The definitions of these requirements begins the CTEF process.
- (U) **Ministry Liaison Team**: Feedback is received by the Ministry Liaison Team directly from the Iraqi police forces and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) and provided to requirement owners.
- (U) **Assessments and Lessons Learned**: The CJTF-OIR Directorate of Training has an Assessment and Lessons Learned team for the purpose of assessing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) strength, capabilities, and development pre- and post-program of instruction (PoI), as well as collecting data from the
Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (cont’d)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR-OFFICIAL-USE-ONLY

IRIR

SUBJECT: Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)

Building Partner Capacity (BPC) sites for measures of performance and lessons learned. The lessons learned are validated and fed back into the Poles and Iraqi Ministry of Defense and MoI.

3. (U) Attached with the draft report was a "ProActive Release Document" which requested the CJTF-OIR review of six numbered paragraphs marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) to determine if the paragraphs are exempt from release under the Freedom of information Act (FOIA).

4. (U) The CJTF-OIR has determined that paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the ProActive Release Document are Unclassified, and not protected under the FOIA.

5. (U) Although paragraph 2 is not covered under FOIA statutes, CJTF-OIR recommends the by-province list of police equipment not be released due to Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns. The correct portion marking is as follows:

(U) In January 2017, the Commander of CJTF-OIR approved the purchase of 100 Police Presence in a Box sets. The first two Police Presence in a Box sets are located at MoI training locations. Additionally, according to CJTF-OIR, the Istr TSC has divested the remaining 98 Police Presence in a Box sets to the Iraqi Police Hold Force.

6. (U) The content of the paragraph, the divestment locations of Police Presence in a Box sets, does not further the purposes of the report. Additionally, the content is foreign government information (FGI) and is to be protected from public release pending the approval of the Government of Iraq (GoI).

a. (U) FGI may be defined under Executive Order 13526 dated 29 December 2009, Part 5, Section 6.1.s.1, "...information produced by the United States Government pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence...

2
Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve (cont'd)

IRIR
SUBJECT: Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)
Response to CENTCOM Tasker USCC1821653141, DODIG D2018-D00SP00018.000 Draft Report on Police Hold Force: ProActive Release Document

b. (U) FGI must be approved for release per CENTCOM Regulation 380-14, Section 2.5(c), "Unclassified FGI is withheld from public release until approved by the source country or organization."

7. (U) The point of contact for this memo is

1 Encl
1. ProActive Release Document (FOUO)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Digitally signed by
GAYDON.PATRICK
LEWIS

PATRICK L. GAYDON
COL, U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff

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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st TSC</td>
<td>1st Theater Sustainment Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJFLCC-OIR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command—Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF-OIR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTEF</td>
<td>Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITEF</td>
<td>Iraq Train and Equip fund</td>
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<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman’s role is to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and employees’ rights and remedies available for reprisal. The DoD Hotline Director is the designated ombudsman. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/DoD-Hotline/.

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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